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Terrorism DA

Because nuclear weapons are the only thing preventing a nuclear terrorist attack on the US we must negate. My Value is Morality stemming from the word ought in the resolution, my standard is decreasing suffering. Affirming means that all STATES lose their weapons and wont procure more, terrorists on the other hand will be able to obtain nukes. The NEG is defending the status quo, a world where countries do have nukes, and there are avenues for nukes to develop in new countries.
The most difficult aspect of building a nuke for terrorists is acquiring nuclear materials, Bunn
Bunn, Matthew. "Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult?." Annals of the American Academy (2006): n. pag. Web. 14 Nov 2010.

Those who discount the threat of nuclear terrorism often fail to grasp a crucial fact: the most difficult part of making a nuclear bomb is getting the nuclear material. As one leading critic argued, "Actually building [a crude nuclear weapon] is extremely difficult . A number of countries with vast resources and expertise, such as Iraq, have struggled unsuccessfully to produce one. It is difficult to
imagine that a small terrorist group would find bomb-building any easier" (Kamp 1998). Similarly, the security chief of Russia's Federal Agency for Atomic Energy has publicly stated that "even having any nuclear material does not mean that an explosive device can be made [by terrorists]. This is absolutely impossible" (Khinshteyn 2002). Unfortunately , these

arguments are simply incorrect. They conflate the difficulty of producing the nuclear material with the difficulty of making a bomb once the material is in hand. These critiques also fail to make the crucial distinction between the technical and scientific challenge of building safe, reliable, and efficient nuclear weapons suitable for delivery by a missile or a fighter aircraft and the far simpler task of making a single crude, unsafe, and unreliable terrorist nuclear explosive that might be delivered by truck or boat. The basic problem in making a fission bomb is getting a supercritical mass of material
together fast enough so that the reaction does not blow the material apart before it can generate an appreciable explosive yield. Two basic types of bomb design accomplish this.

Terrorism DA
In fact common men have produced workable crude nuclear weapons as a test before, Bunn
Bunn, Matthew. "Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult?." Annals of the American Academy (2006): n. pag. Web. 14 Nov 2010. Nor has the question of terrorist nuclear capability [has not] been left to analysis alone; it has been subjected to "experiment" as well. For instance, in 1977, a Princeton undergraduate designed an implosiontype bomb for a senior paper. Freeman Dyson, the student's professor and a Manhattan Project veteran, gave him an A on the paper, after which the government promptly classified it (Phillips and Michaelis 1978). In one effort in the 1960s, the government asked two physicists fresh out of graduate school with

no knowledge of weapon-usable nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, or explosives to design a nuclear bomb from scratch with only unclassified information. (There were ultimately a total of three participants, as one of the original two dropped out and was replaced.) They quickly decided that designing a workable gun-type bomb would be too easy to show off their technical skills in a way that would improve their subsequent job prospects; instead, they successfully designed a workable implosion bomb (Stober 2003). In yet another example, Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), when serving as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, asked the three U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories whether terrorists, if they had the nuclear material, could make a crude but workable nuclear bomb. The answer given was yes. Senator Biden (2004) reported that a few months later, the laboratories had actually built a gun
type device, using only components that, except for the nuclear material itself, were commercially available without breaking any laws. The device was actually brought into a secure Senate hearing room to demonstrate the gravity of the threat. These analyses and experiments offer a powerful rebuttal to the claim that it is "impossible" for terrorists to detonate a nuclear explosive successfully.

Terrorists will eventually get the bomb, as materials becomes more common in the market, Hand
Hand, Kevin. "Nuclear Smuggling Chains." American Behavioral Scientist (2003): n. pag. Web. 14 Nov 2010.

Thefts of nuclear material are becoming more common. Most known thefts of weapons-usable and other nuclear and radioactive material have been committed by impoverished insiders in the hope of improving their desperate financial situation. As Rensselaer Lee points out, because they diverted the material on their own initiative rather than in response to someones order, the nuclear black market we have seen to date is supply-driven (Lee, 1999). However, given the strong interest on behalf of proliferating states and some terrorist organizations in acquiring weapons-usable nuclear and other radioactive material, the demand-driven market may exist as well. However, if this market exists, it remains largely
invisible due to the sophisticated smuggling schemes employed by the powerful players, such as organized crime groups and well-placed insiders at source facilities. Unless the accounting and physical protection systems are sufficiently upgraded to guard against insiders at all nuclear facilities in the world that house weapons-usable fissile material, interdiction of nuclear smuggling will remain a challenge and nuclear material falling into the wrong hands will remain a possibility. Poor

accounting and security practices for radiation sources worldwide also exacerbate the risk of radiological terrorism and other malevolent acts.

Terrorist DA
The nuclear material doesnt need to be from weapons, research reactor fuel works, Bunn
Bunn, Matthew. "Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult?." Annals of the American Academy (2006): n. pag. Web. 14 Nov 2010. Another quite plausible form in which terrorists might acquire nuclear material is in the form of research reactor fuel containing HEU. The U.S. Department of Energy has compiled data indicating that 128 research reactors or associated facilities worldwide hold twenty kilograms or more of HEU (U.S. Congress 2004, 28). Unlike the massive

fuel assemblies used in most power reactors (which usually contain only LEU), research reactor fuels are typically found in fuel elements that are small and easy to handle often less than a meter long, several centimeters across, and weighing a few kilograms. While many types of research reactor fuel exist (including, in some cases, weapon-grade HEU metal), a common fuel is a mixture of uranium and aluminum, with aluminum cladding. To separate the uranium from the aluminum, such fuel could be cut into pieces, dissolved in acid,
and the uranium separated from the resulting solution by well-known processes. Converting the chemical forms of uranium that would be recovered by these means to metal would also involve straightforward processes, all of which are published in the open literature and require only modest commercially available equipment. Hence, while the need for such processing would require an additional set of expertise and equipment, it would probably not pose an

It is worth noting that the chemistry involved in converting opium poppies to heroin an industry with which al Qaeda reportedly has substantial connections is probably roughly as complex as the chemistry required to separate uranium from research reactor fuel, and because of the
insurmountable challenge to terrorist groups.

toxicity of airborne heroin, primitive glove boxes of the kind that might be used to handle nuclear material are sometimes used in the illegal narcotics industry as well.

Terrorists are actually effected by deterrence Garamone furthers

Garamone Jim American Forces Press Service http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=61684 While not all extremist groups share the same goals or ideology, they do retain sufficient

autonomy to make their own strategic choices, which in my mind makes them vulnerable to some form of coercion, and perhaps even deterrence, he said.Hamas, Hezbollah, the Taliban and alQaida can be deterred by the threat of retaliation in one form or another under this idea, Mullen said. But another form of deterrence may be far more effective in countering threats, he added. Small extremist groups or individuals can be deterred, he explained, but it will require be a longterm effort And a new form of deterrence.

Having nuclear weapons is the only way to prevent armed terrorists from attacking, Payne
Payne, John http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-toi/all-that-matters/Obama-uses-Rajivs-words-on-Ndisarmament/articleshow/6882092.cms The problem, however, in elevating this disarmament narrative to be the lodestar for U.S. policy is that most of its main points are half-truths or complete fallacies. To begin with, even if death-loving terrorists are not themselves

directly susceptible to nuclear deterrence, the state that harbors them may be. The Soviet Union, for example, appears to have been successful in applying high-level military threats against Iran in 1985 to bring pressure on the PLO and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Thus even though we dont deter terrorist organizations directly, we deter states that harbor terrorists from allowing them to use the bomb.