uS ollcy and racLlce 8egardlng MulLllaLeral eace CperaLlons"

uS ollcy and racLlce 8egardlng MulLllaLeral eace CperaLlons

Abstract
1hls asslgnmenL descrlbes and seeks Lo explaln Lhe cycle Lhrough whlch unlLed SLaLes pollcy
Loward mulLllaLeral peace operaLlons has Lraveled over Lhe pasL decade AfLer resldenL 8ush
and resldenL CllnLon ln 19921993 arLlculaLed pollcles of sLrong supporL for unlLed naLlons
(un) peacekeeplng Congress forced Lhe LxecuLlve Lo back away from provldlng such supporL
and Lhe AdmlnlsLraLlon lncreaslngly relled on reglonal organlzaLlons Lo conducL peace
operaLlons CllnLon's pollcles whlle leavlng Lhe naLlon beLLer prepared Lo conducL and supporL
nA1C peace operaLlons helped weaken Lhe un pollLlcally and economlcally and dld noL
slgnlflcanLly sLrengLhen un mlllLary peacekeeplng capablllLles Cbama has Laken some sLeps Lo
sLrengLhen Lhe un peace keeplng operaLlon 1hls asslgnmenL ldenLlfles some of Lhe key facLors
LhaL shaped uS pollcy and argues LhaL Lhe uS fallure Lo sLrengLhen un peace operaLlons has
undermlned oLher sLaLed Amerlcan forelgn pollcy ob[ecLlves














troduct|o
'It is not enough to talk about peace. One must believe in it .and it is not enough to believe in it.
One must work at it. (Eleanor Roosevelt, 1884-1962)

1he harsh reallLles of Lhe dlfflculLy of conducLlng peace operaLlons congresslonalexecuLlve
Lenslons parLlsan pollLlcs AdmlnlsLraLlon mlscalculaLlons and compeLlng prlorlLles and an
underlylng amblvalence wlLhln Lhe broader body pollLlc abouL Amerlca's global role all
conLrlbuLed Lo a reshaplng of uS peace operaLlons pollcy as lL had orlglnally been concelved by
Lhe CllnLon Whlle Lhe beneflLs of un peacekeeplng have been uneven operaLlons ln places
such as Macedonla Mozamblque Ll Salvador and LasLern Slavonla demonsLraLe Lhe
conLrlbuLlons LhaL un mlsslons can make Lo lnLernaLlonal peace and securlLy 1he
AdmlnlsLraLlon began expandlng Lhe use of Amerlcan Lroops for peace operaLlons largely
Lhrough Lhe norLh ALlanLlc 1reaLy CrganlzaLlon (nA1C) lL ls noL surprlslng nor necessarlly
problemaLlc LhaL Lhe globe's leadlng power prefers Lo run Lhe humanlLarlan lnLervenLlons Lo
whlch lL conLrlbuLes heavlly AfLer all nA1C remalns Lhe only lnsLlLuLlon Lruly capable of
underLaklng complex and mlllLarlly challenglng operaLlons 1he problemaLlc aspecL of Lhls Lrend
was Lhe neglecL of un peacekeeplng Slnce !une 1999 Lhe uS has supporLed flve new un
operaLlons and a doubllng of un forces ln Lhe fleld Lo almosL 40000 Lroops
1
even as Congress
kepL Lhe counLry deeply ln arrears Lo Lhe world body
Research question:
%his paper will critically analyze the role oI U.S Policy on UN peace keeping operations in
diIIerent region in the world. %o maintain international peace and security in the world, diIIerent
peace keeping operations have taken by the UN. But the question is how much eIIective was the
peace keeping operation due to diIIerent obstacles?
Peacekeeping:
Peacekeeping is deIined by the United Nations as "a unique and dynamic instrument developed
by the Organization as a way to help countries torn by conIlict creates the conditions Ior lasting
peace". It is distinguished Irom both peace building and peacemaking.

1
See un peacekeeplng webslLe hLLp//wwwunorg/uepLs/dpko/dpko/opshLm





%he United Nations is not the only organization to have authorized peacekeeping missions. Non-
UN peacekeeping Iorces include the NA%O mission in Kosovo and the Multinational Force and
Observers on the Sinai Peninsula.
Objectives oI peacekeeping operation:
W Preventing and settling wars.
W Protesting against militarism and armed conscription.
W Eliminating mass violence.
W Promoting the evenhanded advantage oI internationalism and globalization.
W Upholding the non-violent and cooperative relations among peoples.
W %o create the consciousness oI world peace.
W %o Iaster Iriendship and harmony among the peoples.
W %o achieve disarmament and total elimination oI all biological, chemical and nuclear
weapons in the entire world.
W %o puriIy and maintain a clean and ecological balanced environment.
W %o alleviate poverty and hunger .
W %o improve the healthy, educated and living conditions oI peace on earth.
W %o promote and protect human rights.
W %o assure international justice .

Background:
Since UN`s Iounding in the summer oI 1945, there have been more than 200 wars up to
2002.
eadly 2
nd
world war.
%he optimistic assumption to reduce war due to the creation oI un went in vain, rather the
member has been increased.
ars as a conIlict settling process remain active even in the last part oI 20
th
and 21
st
century.
On the edges oI the 'Zone oI peace there is certain gray area to be Iound characterized
primarily by instability.
%he classic version oI peacekeeping is a Iorm oI military operation that is not based on Iorce.
%he signiIicance oI inIormal chapter 6 oI UN.
%he weakening oI Security Council due to the exercise oI veto power.
%he attempt oI general assembly.
%he Nobel peace prize by UN peace mission.
%he increasing oI peacekeeping mission.





On the basis oI above background ennis jet (2000, page; 21-34) has identiIied seven phases oI
peacekeeping mission.
1. In the nascent period: (1946-56)
%here were only two missions both oI which continue to the present day, and Ior neither oI
which was the term peacekeeping used explicitly the original purpose oI this mission was indeed
the saIeguarding oI a ceaseIire Iollowing the Iirst Arab-Israel was in 1948.
. In the assertive period:(1956-67)
An innovative concept oI peace maintenance was developed and used in several instance, with
varying levels oI success. %here were a total oI eight new missions, ranging Irom observer troops
to comprehensive missions that have been given complex and Nobel sets oI task.
. In the dormant period:(1967-7)
A certain amount oI disillusionment appeared, maniIesting itselI in the blocked oI Iurther
missions through the systemic antagonism oI the two superpowers.

4. In the resurgent period: (197-78)
A Iew new classic missions were begun.
5. In the maintenance period: (1978-88)
No new missions were introduced and the system suIIered once again Irom the heightening east-
west conIlict.
6. In the expansion period: (1988-9)
In the course oI the massive changes going on in world politics, there was an increased member
oI missions (there was more mission initiated in these Iive years than in the previous Iorty). %his
exhibited, however, signiIicant conceptual diIIerences Irom and much more complex mandates
than the earlier mission.
7. In the contraction period: (since 199-)





Because oI the Iailure oI several missions, disillusionment has crept in once again and while it
shows itselI on the one hand in somewhat undiIIerentiated un bashing, it has also given rise to a
number oI ideas Ior reIorm.

Tobias Debiel ():
%he scope oI the tasks undertaken by a mission should be the extent to which a peace operation
is capable oI using compulsion when consensus is not Iorthcoming the identiIies Iive types oI
military peacekeeping:-
1) %raditional peacekeeping as a consensus oriented instrument oI military peacekeeping.
2) Multidimensional peacekeeping in which new tasks in the realm oI post conIlict peace
building are added.
3) Robust peace mission as a cross between mission based on consensus and those capable oI
using Iorce.
4) Military peace implementation in medium intensity wars in which there are actual
conIrontations between the UN troops and the warring parties.
5) Military peace implementation in high intensity wars in which extensive use oI Iorce and
compulsion is made.

UN APPROACHES TO PREVENTING AND
MANAGING CONFLICTS

W Collective security- theory and practice where by all states thwart an aggressor state
by joining together against aggressor. Attempts to prevent the outbreak oI conIlict, but iI
an occurs, aggressor is met with Iorce. attack
W Preventive diplomacy- practice oI engaging in diplomatic intervention beIore the
outbreak oI conIlict and monitoring hot spots through the use oI peace keeping Iorces or
surveillance technology.





W Peaceful settlement- various techniques by which disputes are settled, such as
adjudication, arbitration, mediation, conciliation and good oIIicers.
W Peacemaking- eIIorts oI bring parties to agreement.
W Peacekeeping- the use oI multilateral Iorces to achieve several, diIIerent objectives:
observation oI truce and ceaseIire lines; separation oI Iorces, promotion oI law and order;
provision oI humanitarian aid and intervention.
W Peace building- post conIlict activities to strengthen and preserve peace, such as
development aid, civilian administration and human rights and election monitoring.
W Enforcement measures direct actions taken to ensure compliance with UN
measures, such as imposition oI economic sanctions, banning oI air Ilights or
communications, and use oI Iorce.
W Arms control and Disarmament- eIIorts to persuade states to limit reduce or
eliminate speciIic types oI weapons.






Types of peace keeping operation:
Marrock goulding in his article, the evolution oI UN peacekeeping, published in international
aIIairs. 69(3); 1993 enumerated six types oI peacekeeping operations as:
1. Preventive development oI un troops beIore a conIlict has actually begun, at the presence
oI one oI the parties and on its territory only which applied is Macedonia.
2. %raditional peacekeeping which involves monitoring ceaseIires, controlling buIIer zones
and so on.
3. %ype three consist oI operations set up to support implementation oI a comprehensive
settlement which has already been agreed by the parties :
Such operation can include-
Monitoring cease-Iire.
%he containment and demobilization oI troops.
%he destruction oI weapons and Iormation and training oI new armed Iorces.
Monitoring existing police Iorces and Iorming new one.
Supervising existing admin.
'eriIying respect Ior human rights.
%he paradigm is the very successIul operation in Namibia in 1989-90.

4. %ype Iour consist oI operation to protect the delivery oI humanitarian relieI is condition
oI containing warIare .this has been tried in Somalia and Bosnia Herzegovina.
5. %ype Iive is the deployment oI a United Nations Iorce in a country where the institution oI
states has largely collapsed.
6. %ype six can be called cease Iire enIorcement where a U N Iorce would be developed aIter an
agreement had been reached between the parties with the authority is armament to use Iorce
against any party which violated the cease Iire or other agreed military agreement.

PEACE MAIN%ENANCE OF UN: COMMON
FRAMEORK OF AC%IONS







HIERARCHY OF UN PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS






o|ut|o of UN operat|os

uurlng Lhe Cold War Lhe unlLed naLlons underLook a relaLlvely small number of peacekeeplng
operaLlons mosL of whlch lnvolved classlcal" peacekeeplng Lhe sLaLlonlng of unarmed
monlLorlng forces wlLh Lhe consenL of Lhe local parLles
2

ush Adm||strat|o o||cy
As Lhe Cold War and Culf War drew Lo a close resldenL Ceorge 8ush began focuslng on ways
Lo help Lhe un assume a greaLer role an approach deslgned Lo advance uS forelgn pollcy
ob[ecLlves ln a new era Some characLerlsLlcs are glven below
1) Pe made a pragmaLlc case Lo expand and lmprove peacekeeplng capablllLles Lo help shape a
world conslsLenL wlLh Amerlcan values and uS lnLeresLs

2
Wllllam ! uurch ed 1he LvoluLlon of un eacekeeplng Case SLudles and ComparaLlve Analysls new ?ork SL
MarLlns ress 1993 pp 79





2) As confllcLs are resolved and vlolence subsldes" he declared Lhen Lhe lnsLlLuLlons of free
socleLles can Lake hold And as Lhey do Lhey become our sLrongesL safeguards agalnsL
aggresslon and Lyranny"
3

3) 8ush's concepL of a new world order" governed by Lhe rule of law requlred an effecLlve un
peacekeeplng capablllLy
4

4) 1he flrsL uS pollcy sLaLemenL slnce Lhe 1ruman AdmlnlsLraLlon Lo advocaLe acLlve uS
supporL for un peacekeeplng recommended a varleLy of uS and un lnlLlaLlves
3) 1he flnal 8ush AdmlnlsLraLlon naLlonal SecurlLy SLraLegy commlLLed Lhe uS only Lo helplng
plan and supporL un operaLlons
3

6) resldenL 8ush summarlzed hls new pollcy ln a SepLember 1992 address Lo Lhe un Ceneral
Assembly ln whlch he urged delegaLes Lo Lhlnk dlfferenLly abouL how we ensure and pay for
our securlLy ln Lhls new era"
6

7) Pe called on naLlons Lo develop and Lraln mlllLary unlLs for posslble peacekeeplng duLy and
Lo make Lhem avallable on shorL noLlce and he advocaLed mulLlnaLlonal plannlng Lralnlng and
fleld exerclses Lo beLLer prepare un peacekeeplng forces
8) Pe pledged LhaL Lhe unlLed SLaLes would work wlLh Lhe unlLed naLlons Lo besL employ our
conslderable llfL loglsLlcs and communlcaLlons and lnLelllgence capablllLles" and would offer
our capablllLles for [olnL slmulaLlons and peacekeeplng exerclses Lo sLrengLhen our ablllLy Lo
underLake [olnL peacekeeplng operaLlons"
7

9) resldenL 8ush also called for Lhe developmenL of un plannlng crlsls managemenL and
lnLelllgence capablllLles for peacekeeplng

3
Ceorge 8ush 8emarks Lo Lhe unlLed naLlons SecurlLy Councll ln new ?ork ClLy 31 !anuary 1992 ubllc apers
Ceorge 8ush resldenLlal Llbrary hLLp//bushllbraryLamuedu/papers/1992/92013100hLml
4
Ceorge 8ush 1he resldenLs news Conference on Lhe erslan Culf ConfllcL 18 !anuary 1991 ubllc apers
Ceorge 8ush resldenLlal Llbrary hLLp//bushllbraryLamuedu/papers/1991/91011800hLml
3
uaalder knowlng When Lo Say no" p 62
6
Ceorge 8ush Address Lo Lhe unlLed naLlons Ceneral Assembly ln new ?ork ClLy 21 SepLember 1992 ubllc
apers Ceorge 8ush resldenLlalLlbraryhLLp//bushllbraryLamuedu/papers/1992/92092100hLml
7
8ush Address Lo Lhe unlLed naLlons Ceneral Assembly ln new ?ork ClLy 21 SepLember 1992





10) Pe offered Lo provlde uS mlllLary experLlse Lo Lhe unlLed naLlons
8
and Lo broaden
Amerlcan supporL for monlLorlng verlflcaLlon reconnalssance and oLher un peacekeeplng

8ush of course never lmplemenLed hls pollcy lL would appear glven hls declslon Lo enhance
un peacekeeplng generally and hls commlLmenL of uS forces Lo a unauLhorlzed rellef
operaLlon ln Somalla LhaL he was headed for many of Lhe same challenges LhaL Lhe CllnLon
Leam would face

ee|opmet of C||to Adm||strat|o eacekeep| o||cy
uurlng Lhe campalgn candldaLe CllnLon had expressed supporL for un peacekeeplng prlmarlly
as a way Lo reduce uS securlLy cosLs
9
Whlle sLaLlng LhaL he would never Lurn uS naLlonal
securlLy over Lo Lhe unlLed naLlons or any oLher lnLernaLlonal organlzaLlon
10
he slmulLaneously
called for a un rapld deploymenL force Lo be used for purposes beyond LradlLlonal
peacekeeplng
11

1) 1he expanslve lnLernaLlonallsL rheLorlc of Lhe lncomlng resldenL and hls offlclals
seemed Lo adumbraLe a deeper commlLmenL Lo peace operaLlons and Lhe unlLed
naLlons
2) ln Lhe sprlng of 1993 naLlonal SecurlLy Councll sLaff drafLed ollcy 8evlew uocumenL
(8u) 13 whlch had Lhe sLaLed alm of lmprovlng un peacekeeplng
3) 1he enLagon creaLed a new poslLlon of AsslsLanL SecreLary for uemocracy and
eacekeeplng and requesLed defense dollars from Congress Lo pay for uS parLlclpaLlon
ln peace operaLlons Lo lmprove Lhe un's peacekeeplng headquarLers and Lo Lraln
forelgn peacekeeplng Lroops

8
1hls pledge was reallzed ln Lhe form of uS mlllLary offlcers seconded Lo Lhe un ueparLmenL of eacekeeplng
CperaLlons
9
8osner 1he new 1ugofWar p 68
10
8osner 1he new 1ugofWar 10 n p 68
11
uaalder knowlng When Lo Say no" p 40





4) 1he AdmlnlsLraLlon pressed Lhe unlLed naLlons Lo launch an operaLlon Lo relleve Lhe
bulk of uS forces ln Somalla and began dlscusslng poLenLlal un operaLlons ln PalLl and
8osnla
3) 1he resldenL sald Lhe unlLed SLaLes would express lLs leadershlp Lhrough mulLllaLeral
means such as Lhe unlLed naLlons whlch spread Lhe cosLs and express Lhe unlfled wlll
of Lhe lnLernaLlonal communlLy"
12


res|det Cbama's po||cy o Strethe| UN eacekeep|

un peacekeeplng can dellver lmporLanL resulLs by proLecLlng clvlllans helplng Lo rebulld
securlLy and advanclng peace around Lhe world lrom Sudan Lo Llberla Lo PalLl peacekeeplng
operaLlons are a cosLeffecLlve means for Lhe unlLed SLaLes and all naLlons Lo share Lhe burden
of promoLlng peace and securlLy Cver Lhe lasL Len years Lhe demands on peacekeeplng have
grown and operaLlons have become more complex lL ls ln all of our lnLeresLs Lo lmprove Lhe
efflclency and effecLlveness of Lhese efforLs" resldenL 8arack Cbama
ln a meeLlng wlLh leaders from counLrles LhaL conLrlbuLe Lhe largesL numbers of Lroops and
pollce Lo un peacekeeplng operaLlons resldenL Cbama Loday dlscussed efforLs Lo sLrengLhen
un peacekeeplng Lo more effecLlvely meeL currenL challenges
WlLh approxlmaLely 113000 mlllLary pollce and clvlllan personnel ln 13 operaLlons around Lhe
world un peacekeeplng mlsslons help proLecL clvlllans ln confllcL zones shore up peace or
sLave off a wlder war creaLe securlLy provlde ald groups wlLh access Lo clvlllans and enable
emerglng democracles Lo hold elecLlons and sLrengLhen Lhe rule of law 1oday Lhere are more
Lhan Lhree Llmes Lhe number of un peacekeepers Lhan Lhere were a decade ago

1o address Lhese challenges Lhe Cbama AdmlnlsLraLlon ls worklng Lo
1) Lnsure LhaL mandaLes for peacekeeplng operaLlons are credlble and achlevable so LhaL Lhey
are equlpped Lo succeed ln clearly measurable ways

12
vlLa uS MlllLary 1ralnlng for new Mlsslon" ALlanLa !ournal and ConsLlLuLlon p A16





2) lnLenslfy efforLs Lo medlaLe confllcLs and revlve flagglng peace processes ln order Lo geL Lhe
parLles ln fraglle peace Lalks Lo ablde Lhelr commlLmenLs Lo cooperaLe wlLh peacekeepers and
bulld muLual LrusL
3) Lxpand Lhe pool capaclLy and effecLlveness of Lroop and pollce conLrlbuLors
4) Pelp Lhe un moblllze crlLlcal enabllng asseLs such as fleld hosplLals englneers LransporL and
avlaLlon unlLs and ls wllllng Lo conslder conLrlbuLlng more uS mlllLary offlcers clvlllan pollce
and clvlllan personnel Lo un mlsslons
3) lncrease aLLenLlon Lo peacebulldlng acLlvlLles LhaL can bulld up Lhe naLlonal governmenLs
capaclLy Lo Lake over from un peacekeepers parLlcularly ln Lhe realms of governance securlLy
and Lhe rule of law

1he unlLed SLaLes supporLs un peacekeeplng by
1) 1ralnlng and equlpplng Lroops slnce 2003 more Lhan 83000 Lroops from 76 counLrles have
been Lralned and equlpped for un and reglonal peacekeeplng operaLlons
2 )rovldlng alrllfL loglsLlcal asslsLance medlcal servlces and oLher enabllng asseLs Lo un and
reglonal operaLlons lncludlng LransporLlng Lhousands of personnel Lo mlsslons and provldlng
more Lhan $400 mllllon ln equlpmenL Lralnlng and loglsLlcal supporL for peacekeepers ln un
and Afrlcan unlon mlsslons ln uarfur and Somalla
3) ConLrlbuLlng unlformed personnel approxlmaLely 62 uS pollce offlcers and 17 mlllLary
offlcers are worklng ln un peacekeeplng operaLlons ln PalLl Llberla Sudan Chad and Lhe
Mlddle LasL
4) Worklng Lo reach and relnforce Lhe ceaseflres and peace agreemenLs LhaL un operaLlons
can Lhen help lmplemenL and
3) ConLrlbuLlng more Lhan 23 percenL of Lhe annual cosLs for un peacekeeplng 1he resldenL's
2010 budgeL requesLs $226 bllllon Lo meeL Lhe uS share of peacekeeplng assessmenLs







CnntrIbutInns nf Trnnps In Fnrmcd MI!Itary UnIts tn UN and nnn-UN
Pcacc OpcratInns, Inc!udIngCnntrIbutInns nf Pcrmancnt Mcmbcrs nf thc
5ccurIty CnuncI! (I!!ustratIvc cxamp!c durIng May-Junc,2000.

Tnp Tcn
UN
Trnnp
CnntrIbutnr
s
Trnnps
PrnvIdcd
tn UN-!cd
OpcratInn
s
As
Pcrccnt
nf
27,466
UN
Trnnps
Dcp!nyc
d
FIvc
Pcrmancnt
5ccurIty
CnuncI!
Mcmbcrs
and
Othcr Tnp
CnntrIbutnr
s
tn nnn-
UN
OpcratInns
Trnnps
PrnvIdcd
In
FnrmatInn
s tn
UN-!cd
OpcratInn
s
Trnnps
PrnvIdcd
In
FnrmatInn
s tn
5FOR and
KFOR
As
Pcrccn
t nf
67,100
Trnnps
In
5FOR
and
KFOR
India 3,957 14 Unilod
Slalos
0 10400 16
Nigoiia 3,231 12 Iianco 233 8100 12
}oidan 2,217 8 Unilod
Kingdon
310 6100 9
AusliaIia 1,842 7 Russian
Iodoialion
0 4300 6
angIadosh 1,5O9 6 China 0 0 0
Chana 1,438 5 IlaIy 46 8000 12
Konya 1,124 4 Coinany 14 7600 11
IoIand 992 4 Spain 0 2600 4
ThaiIand 9O8 3 Canada 187 2330 4
IhiIippinos 825 3 IoIand 992 2220 3
Tnta! 18,043 66% Tnta! 1802 31670 77

SOURCLS: Unilod Nalions Dopailnonl of Ioacokooping Opoialions, US Dopailnonl of
Dofonso, Offico of lho Dopuly
Assl. Sociolaiy foi Ioacokooping and Hunanilaiian Affaiis.
* Nol individuaI olsoivois oi poIico.
@o address these cha||ees the Cbama Adm||strat|o |s work| to
1) Lnsure LhaL mandaLes for peacekeeplng operaLlons are credlble and achlevable so LhaL
Lhey are equlpped Lo succeed ln clearly measurable ways





2) lnLenslfy efforLs Lo medlaLe confllcLs and revlve flagglng peace processes ln order Lo geL
Lhe parLles ln fraglle peace Lalks Lo ablde Lhelr commlLmenLs Lo cooperaLe wlLh
peacekeepers and bulld muLual LrusL
3) Lxpand Lhe pool capaclLy and effecLlveness of Lroop and pollce conLrlbuLors
4) Pelp Lhe un moblllze crlLlcal enabllng asseLs such as fleld hosplLals englneers
LransporL and avlaLlon unlLs and ls wllllng Lo conslder conLrlbuLlng more uS mlllLary
offlcers clvlllan pollce and clvlllan personnel Lo un mlsslons
3) lncrease aLLenLlon Lo peacebulldlng acLlvlLles LhaL can bulld up Lhe naLlonal
governmenLs capaclLy Lo Lake over from un peacekeepers parLlcularly ln Lhe realms of
governance securlLy and Lhe rule of law

@he U|ted States supports UN peacekeep| by
1) 1ralnlng and equlpplng Lroops slnce 2003 more Lhan 83000 Lroops from 76 counLrles
have been Lralned and equlpped for un and reglonal peacekeeplng operaLlons
2) rovldlng alrllfL loglsLlcal asslsLance medlcal servlces and oLher enabllng asseLs Lo un
and reglonal operaLlons lncludlng LransporLlng Lhousands of personnel Lo mlsslons and
provldlng more Lhan $400 mllllon ln equlpmenL Lralnlng and loglsLlcal supporL for
peacekeepers ln un and Afrlcan unlon mlsslons ln uarfur and Somalla
3) ConLrlbuLlng unlformed personnel approxlmaLely 62 uS pollce offlcers and 17
mlllLary offlcers are worklng ln un peacekeeplng operaLlons ln PalLl Llberla Sudan
Chad and Lhe Mlddle LasL
4) Worklng Lo reach and relnforce Lhe ceaseflres and peace agreemenLs LhaL un
operaLlons can Lhen help lmplemenL and
3) ConLrlbuLlng more Lhan 23 percenL of Lhe annual cosLs for un peacekeeplng 1he
resldenL's 2010 budgeL requesLs $226 bllllon Lo meeL Lhe uS share of peacekeeplng
assessmenLs



Coress a|ks





Congresslonal anLlpaLhy Loward peace operaLlons congealed durlng Lhe flrsL year of Lhe CllnLon
AdmlnlsLraLlon
1) 1he enLagon's proposed AsslsLanL SecreLary oslLlon was abollshed followlng congresslonal
ob[ecLlons Lo Lhe nomlnee Congress re[ecLed uefense ueparLmenL's peace operaLlons budgeL
requesLs
2) 1he unlLed SLaLes fell furLher behlnd ln lLs peacekeeplng paymenLs Lo Lhe unlLed naLlons
and Congress developed leglslaLlon deslgned Lo hamper uS lnvolvemenL ln un operaLlons
3) 1he AdmlnlsLraLlon expended slgnlflcanL Llme parrylng leglslaLlve resLrlcLlons and succeeded
ln blocklng Lhe mosL pernlclous lnlLlaLlves 8uL Lhe sLraLegy became one of seeklng Lo mlnlmlze
pollLlcal cosLs accommodaLlng Congress wherever posslble
4) unwllllng Lo elevaLe Lhe sLakes Lhe LxecuLlve lncreaslngly losL conLrol of Lhe lssue
uemocraLlc SenaLor 8oberL 8yrd was an early leadlng opponenL of CllnLon pollcles quesLlonlng
boLh Lhe wlsdom of and Lhe presldenLlal prerogaLlve Lo commlL uS Lroops Lo naLlon
bulldlng" ln Somalla
13

3) When resldenL CllnLon announced a plan Lo pull ouL uS Lroops afLer Lhe CcLober 3 1993
8yrd noneLheless pushed Lhrough leglslaLlon mandaLlng Lhe wlLhdrawal of uS forces
6) 1he vlcLorlous 8epubllcans qulckly pushed measures Lo prohlblL uS forces from servlng
under un command Lo requlre a furLher reducLlon ln Lhe uS share of un peace
operaLlons assessmenLs and Lo requlre relmbursemenL for uS mlllLary acLlons Laken
ln supporL of" un SecurlLy Councll auLhorlzaLlons

7) 1he neL effecL of such provlslons would have been Lo end uS supporL for un peace
operaLlons
14


8) ln order Lo asserL conLrol over uS peace operaLlons pollcy Congress lncreaslngly
Lurned volunLary offers from Lhe execuLlve branch (eg Lo provlde regular brleflngs
advance noLlflcaLlons addlLlonal documenLaLlon) lnLo leglslaLlve requlremenLs and

13
Amerlcans by Lhe dozens are paylng wlLh Lhelr llves and llmbs for a mlsplaced pollcy on Lhe alLar of some fuzzy
mulLllaLerallsm" SenaLor 8oberL 8yrd (uWv) Carnage ln Somalla" 4 CcLober 1993 Carr CenLer for Puman
8lghLs ollcy Worklng aper 013

14
lor a dlscusslon of congresslonal resLrlcLlons and reasonlng see !ohansen uS ollcy 1oward un" pp 1319





Lransformed even mlnor lssues (such as provldlng llmlLed equlpmenL Lo un forces) lnLo
maLLers of prlnclple
13


9) Congresslonal requlremenLs compllcaLed and ofLen delayed acLlons ranglng ln
lmporLance from Lhe provlslon of uS loglsLlcal supporL Lo formal un SecurlLy Councll
declslons abouL peace operaLlons

10)Whlle some aLLempLs Lo leglslaLe resLrlcLlons elLher dlsslpaLed or were defeaLed
16
Lwo
lssues conLlnued Lo domlnaLe Lhe debaLe durlng Lhe 1990's Lhe paymenL of un
assessmenLs and speclflc uS Lroop deploymenLs

11)As un peace operaLlons surged so dld uS assessmenLs for Lhese acLlvlLles PlsLorlcally
peacekeeplng cosLs had been relaLlvely predlcLable around $30 mllllon annually
Lhrough Lhe mld1980's 8uL beLween flscal year (l?) 1988 and l? 1989 Lhe counLry's
peacekeeplng assessmenL more Lhan quadrupled from $43 mllllon Lo $193 mllllon 8y
l? 1992 Lhe cosLs had nearly Lrlpled agaln Lo abouL $363 mllllon
17


12)8y Lhe summer of 1993 Lhe AdmlnlsLraLlon faced Lhe prospecL of becomlng nearly $1
bllllon ln arrears on peacekeeplng by Lhe end of l? 1994 Some members of Congress
sympaLheLlc wlLh un peacekeeplng urged Lhe resldenL Lo LreaL lL as a hlgher prlorlLy
maklng a personal appeal for more fundlng
18


13)ln 1994 Congress dld agree Lo pay pasL un dues 1hls was due ln parL !eremy 8osner
argues Lo leglslaLors' percepLlon of Lhe lssue as one of pasL debLs raLher Lhan fuLure
obllgaLlons


13
lor example Lhe AdmlnlsLraLlon ln 1994 began regular consulLaLlons on peace operaLlons on CaplLol Plll
16
1hese lncluded leglslaLlve proposals regardlng command and conLrol and relmbursemenL for cosLs ln supporL
of" un resoluLlons
17
See llgure 1 noLe LhaL l? 1994 saw Lhe hlsLorlc hlgh for uS assessmenLs for un peacekeeplng of abouL $126
bllllon
18
8osner quoLes leLLer Lo CllnLon from 8ep Lee PamllLon on AugusL 3 1993 8osner 1he new 1ug of War p 83






14)ln CcLober 1993 Congress capped uS paymenLs aL 23 percenL lnsLead of Lhe un
assessmenL raLe of 304 percenL guaranLeelng LhaL fuLure bllls would be underpald
13)laclng mounLlng lnLernaLlonal crlLlclsm as Lhe world's blggesL un deadbeaL Lhe
AdmlnlsLraLlon ulLlmaLely declded Lo back SenaLor !oseph 8lden of uelaware Lhe
ranklng uemocraL on Lhe SenaLe lorelgn 8elaLlons CommlLLee as he negoLlaLed a
fundlng deal wlLh Lhe CommlLLee's Chalrman 8epubllcan !esse Pelms
16)Cver Lhe nexL years Lhe AdmlnlsLraLlon soughL Lo make Lhe subsLance of Lhe deal less
ob[ecLlonable and more pollLlcally achlevable whlle sLruggllng Lo dellnk Lhe lssue of un
dues from famlly plannlng CllnLon AdmlnlsLraLlon offlclals also aLLempLed Lo lmprove
undersLandlng" beLween Lhe unlLed naLlons and Congress brlnglng un SecreLary
Ceneral kofl Annan Lo CaplLol Plll and shepardlng uS leglslaLors Lo Lhe unlLed naLlons
headquarLers ln new ?ork
19

NA@C Assumes Ceter Stae
As Lhe 1990s progressed WashlngLon gradually moved away from parLlclpaLlng ln un
operaLlons and even from pollLlcally supporLlng un operaLlons ln cases LhaL were noL deemed
Lo be of sufflclenLly dlrecL lnLeresL Lo Lhe unlLed SLaLes8ecause
1) lnsLead of relylng so heavlly on Lhe un Lhe uS began promoLlng reglonal organlzaLlons
and coallLlons of Lhe wllllng as Lhe soluLlon Lo lnLernaLlonal crlses even when such
enLlLles were clearly lneffecLlve or blased
20

2) 1he AdmlnlsLraLlon dld manage Lo preserve lLs freedom Lo deploy uS forces for peace
operaLlons when Lhe resldenL deemed lL lmporLanL

3) ln Lransformlng Lhe operaLlon lnLo a un peace operaLlon Lhe uS obLalned pollLlcal
leglLlmacy flnanclal supporL and a graceful way ouL of whaL was essenLlally an
Amerlcan occupaLlon

4) WlLh Lhe pollLlcal heaL Lurned up lL was more feaslble Lo defend acLlon ln Lhe conLexL of
nA1C Lhan Lhe baggageladen un


19
klLfleld and Plrsch ln Polbrooke's vlew 'We Pave a SLake'" naLlonal !ournal p 2730
20
lor example nelLher LCCMCC Lroops ln Llberla nor ClS forces deployed LhroughouL Lhe former SovleL unlon
were successful or acLed ln a manner conslsLenL wlLh mlnlmum sLandards of mlllLary responslblllLy






3) 1herefore lf Lhe uS were Lo commlL slgnlflcanL forces nA1C would need Lo be ln
charge of mlllLary operaLlons even lf Lhe unlLed naLlons ulLlmaLely ran oLher aspecLs of
Lhe overall efforL

6) Lach large uSled peace operaLlon meL wlLh popular skepLlclsm and sLrong
congresslonal opposlLlon PlsLorlcally leglslaLors had demanded consulLaLlon prlor Lo
uS mlllLary deploymenLs and had crlLlclzed parLlcular operaLlons

7) uurlng Lhe Cold War Congress had usually avolded sLralghL up or down voLes on Lhe
commlLmenL of forces conslderlng Lhese Loo rlsky and unpaLrloLlc

8) 1hese were usually nonblndlng and ofLen lnconslsLenL seemlngly demonsLraLlng
dlsarray ln uS forelgn pollcy Congress Lyplcally was relucLanL Lo dlcLaLe wlLhdrawal or
Lo lmpose a compleLely rlgld deadllne for an operaLlon and leglslaLors generally
provlded much of Lhe requesLed supplemenLal fundlng

US f|ac|a| Cotr|but|o o UN eacekeep|
Cperat|o

lL was noL unLll laLe ln 1999 LhaL resldenL CllnLon compromlsed on Lhe aborLlon lssue LhaL had
Lled up Lhe grand bargaln Lo pay un debLs Whlle Lhe leglslaLlon provlded some rellef ln Lhe
near Lerm and many of lLs Lerms have been meL Lhe uS could noL meeL 100 percenL of Lhe
condlLlons speclflcally Lhe reducLlon of Lhe uS peacekeeplng assessmenL share Lo 23
percenL Cn uecember 22 2000 he asLonlshed observers by negoLlaLlng an agreemenL ln
prlnclple Lo reduce Lhe uS share of Lhe un regular budgeL from 23 percenL Lo 22 percenL and
Lhe share of Lhe un peacekeeplng budgeL from 30 percenL Lo 27 percenL
21


21
CrosseLLe AfLer Long llghL" new ?ork 1lmes p A6








Powever an addlLlonal $244 mllllon ls Lo be pald conLlngenL upon oLher condlLlons and
Congress sLlll musL resolve Lhe ouLsLandlng lssue of dlspuLed arrears" whlch has resulLed ln
un clalms of a uS debL of approachlng $300 mllllon
22
1he scale of planned un operaLlons ls
noL llkely Lo reLurn Lo Lhe 1993 hlgh of almosL 80000 flelded forces buL Lhe cosLs of un
peacekeeplng are predlcLed Lo cllmb near Lhe record levels LhaL orlglnally fueled congresslonal
revolL
23
1he requlremenLs of several mlsslons lncludlng admlnlsLerlng LerrlLorles and
recreaLlng devasLaLed sLaLe sLrucLures are remlnlscenL of Lhe very naLlon bulldlng" ob[ecLlves
LhaL damaged Lhe un's repuLaLlon only a few years ago 1he un remalns llLLle beLLer prepared
operaLlonally for Lhese challenges Lhan lL was a decade ago when resldenL Ceorge 8ush
sLressed Lhe need Lo lmprove lLs capaclLles

22
37 Congress' 23 percenL cap on peacekeeplng assessmenLs was lncorporaLed lnLo Lhe Pelms8lden grand
bargaln" and Lhe resulLlng gap beLween un assessmenLs and uS paymenLs wlll llkely remaln a conLenLlous lssue
23
39 CAC CosLs of eacekeeplng ls Llkely Lo Lxceed CurrenL LsLlmaLes p 4






actors Shap| US o||cy
A hosL of facLors comblned Lo move Lhe unlLed SLaLes away from lLs espoused goal of
enhanclng un peacekeeplng 1hese lnclude AdmlnlsLraLlon pollLlcal prlorlLles and calculaLlons
congresslonal opposlLlon pollLlcs Lhe sLrucLural Lenslons beLween Congress and Lhe LxecuLlve
and Lhe lack of naLlonal consensus abouL Lhe uS role ln Lhe world

1)CllnLon AdmlnlsLraLlon AcLlons





Whlle Lhe CllnLon AdmlnlsLraLlon lnlLlally wanLed Lhe unlLed naLlons Lo play a more asserLlve
securlLy role WashlngLon fundamenLally underesLlmaLed Lhe dlfflculLy of Lhe new peace
enforcemenL" operaLlons
24

1) 1he un SecurlLy Councll's subsequenL declslon Lo call for Lhe capLure of Ceneral Aldeed
a local Somall warlord flowed from a leglLlmaLe deslre Lo respond Lo hls kllllng of
aklsLanl Lroops and Lo proLecL Lhe un's repuLaLlon 8uL Lhe end resulL of LhaL declslon
lefL Lhe un more vulnerable Lhan before ln no small parL because of Lhe uS reacLlon Lo
lLs mlllLary role ln Lhe efforL

2) 1he CllnLon AdmlnlsLraLlon had sLrongly backed Lhe call Lo arresL Aldeed and provlded
speclallzed uS forces (under separaLe Amerlcan command) for Lhls purpose

3) Cn CcLober 3 1993 elghLeen uS soldlers were kllled ln a flreflghL wlLh Aldeed's forces
As Lelevlslon broadcasL Somalls dragglng a uS soldler's body Lhrough Lhe sLreeL
domesLlc pollLlcal crlLlclsm ralned down upon CllnLon pollcles permanenLly Larrlng Lhe
un and peacekeeplng

4) rlor Lo CcLober 3 Lhe CllnLon AdmlnlsLraLlon already had begun Lo adapL lLs pollcy ln
response Lo ongolng operaLlonal experlence and challenges from Congress

3) 1here were many evenLs LhaL conLrlbuLed Lo or mlghL have crysLalllzed concerns abouL
un peacekeeplngresldenL CllnLon's response Lo Lhese early evenLs ln Somalla was
crlLlcal Lhen Pe ended Lhe uS commlLmenL Lo Lhe operaLlon soughL compromlse ln
Congress and wrongly lmplled LhaL Lhe un was Lo blame
23



24
l say Lhls as a former CllnLon AdmlnlsLraLlon offlclal who lnlLlally argued LhaL Lhe un should be able Lo assume a
peace enforcemenL role 1oday lL ls obvlous LhaL operaLlons ln whlch slgnlflcanL combaL can be anLlclpaLed are
beyond Lhe un's reach and llkely Lo remaln so
23
See 8owden 8lack Pawk uown for an accounL of Lhe un force's rescue of Lhe 8angers Carr CenLer for Puman
8lghLs ollcy Worklng aper 013






6) Moreover he seemed Lo blame Lhe unlLed naLlons for Lhe deaLhs of Lhe uS
servlcemen
26
when Lhe laLLer had acLually operaLed under an lndependenL uS chaln of
command

%Cerreach| at nome ad Abroad
eacekeeplng pollcy offers anoLher cauLlonary Lale of Lhe early days of Lhe CllnLon presldency
Llke Lhe lssue of gays ln Lhe mlllLary or healLh care pollcy Lhe AdmlnlsLraLlon plunged ahead on
peacekeeplng wlLhouL havlng a flrm sense of Lhe pollLlcal Lerraln ln Lerms of boLh crafLlng uS
pollcy and pushlng Lhe un lnLo peace operaLlons Lhe AdmlnlsLraLlon's lnlLlal approach Lo
promoLlng change acLually harmed Lhe underlylng pollcy ob[ecLlves 1he AdmlnlsLraLlon began
by looklng aL peacekeeplng pollcy ln a curlously Lechnlcal way llrsL lL appeared Lo assume LhaL
8ush AdmlnlsLraLlon pollcy provlded a solld foundaLlon on whlch Lo bulld Second lL barely
consldered Lhe pollcy's pollLlcal ramlflcaLlons
27
or Lhe lmpacL upon Congress where Lhe lssues
were consldered cenLral Lo Congresslonal prerogaLlves
28


3)AdmlnlsLraLlon rlorlLles
Advanclng uS supporL for un peacekeeplng necessarlly requlred sLrong supporL from Lhe Lop
buL Lhere were few bureaucraLlc lmpulses Lo change Lhe resldenL's calculaLlons 1he blggesL
push Lo promoLe Lhe AdmlnlsLraLlon's overall forelgn pollcy occurred ln SepLember 1993
29

LvenLually Lhe AdmlnlsLraLlon compromlsed on Lhe prlnclple LhaL Lhe uS owed lLs un dues
uncondlLlonally CllnLon drew Lhe llne only around Lhe resldenL's commanderlnchlef
prerogaLlve Lo deploy uS forces Many offlclals raLlonallzed Lhls accommodaLlon as
unavoldable afLer all Congress conLrolled Lhe purse sLrlngs 1he resldenL could have declded
LhaL enhanclng un peace operaLlons capablllLles was as lmporLanL Lo naLlonal securlLy as

26
CllnLon WhlLe Pouse 1he resldenL's news Conference" p 2068
27
8osner 1he new 1ug of War p 70
28
1he AdmlnlsLraLlon belleved LhaL war powers lssues could be separaLely addressed Lhrough an alLernaLlve pollcy
revlew
29
See uaalder knowlng When Lo Say no" pp 3336






nAl1A or nA1C expanslon launchlng a publlc offenslve deploylng agency prlnclpals" and
courLlng key members of Congress Whlle even Lhe mosL forceful campalgn mlghL noL have
changed congresslonal calculaLlons abouL cerLaln lssues (parLlcularly placlng uS forces under
un command)
30
AL Lhe same Llme Lhe neL effecL was Lo undermlne ln pracLlce lf noL by
AdmlnlsLraLlon deslgn Lhe unlLed naLlon's role ln promoLlng lnLernaLlonal peace and
securlLy

%Coress
lnsLlLuLlonal lnLeresLs played an lmporLanL role ln galvanlzlng congresslonal opposlLlon Lo peace
operaLlons parLlcularly among uemocraLs who mlghL oLherwlse have supporLed Lhelr
resldenL 1here had been llLLle conLroversy when un peace operaLlons had been falrly few
unevenLful and lnexpenslve and when Lhey had rarely lnvolved uS forces
31
8uL changes ln
Lhe pace characLer and cosL of peace operaLlons vasLly lncreased Lhe sLakes for Congress

3)arLlsans
1he lnsLlLuLlon of Lhe unlLed naLlons remalns code" for many fears LhaL whlle Lhey cross parLy
llnes resonaLe mosL sLrongly among 8epubllcan Members of Congress 1he unlLed naLlons ln
some clrcles ls vlrLually synonymous wlLh poLenLlal world governmenL global LaxaLlon and
unelecLed bureaucraLs and llleglLlmaLe rules lmplnglng upon Amerlcans and uS soverelgnLy
6)ubllc Cplnlon
ubllc Cplnlon Congress and Lhe vocal MlnorlLy 8oberL !ohansen concludes LhaL durlng Lhe
1990's LwoLhlrds of Lhe uS publlc qulLe conslsLenLly" endorsed un peacekeeplng and uS
parLlclpaLlon ln such mlsslons en[oyed on average Lhe falrly conslsLenL" supporL of 38 percenL
of Amerlcans
32
noL surprlslngly publlc supporL for uS parLlclpaLlon ln speclflc operaLlons

30
Lven Loday Lhls remalns a hoL buLLon lssue Lhe focus of proposed leglslaLlve resLrlcLlons and Lhe campalgn
pledge of resldenL Ceorge W 8ush
31
uS parLlclpaLlon ln small numbers ls also governed by Lhe un arLlclpaLlon AcL (22 uSCS 287d1)

32
!ohansen uS ollcy 1oward un" pp 20 22





ofLen decreased dependlng on Lhe naLure of Lhe mlsslon Lhe role of uS forces Lhe llkellhood
of success and oLher facLors Lven before Lhe deaLh of uS 8angers for example supporL for
uS forces ln Somalla had decllned from 84 percenL Lo 43 percenL
33
presumably due Lo
percepLlons LhaL Lhe orlglnal mlsslon (humanlLarlan rellef) had been achleved and Lo mlsglvlngs
abouL seeklng Lo end Lhe clvll war ?eL ln Lhe days followlng Lhe lncldenL 38 percenL sLlll
favored uS parLlclpaLlon ln un operaLlons
34


7%Amb|a|ece about Amer|ca's G|oba| ko|e

eace operaLlons pollcy engages a cenLral dllemma of uS forelgn pollcy afLer Lhe Cold War
how Lo arLlculaLe lnLeresLs and malnLaln a moral foundaLlon for pollcy ln Lhe absence of dlrecL
LhreaLs Lo uS sLraLeglc lnLeresLs"
33
uurlng Lhe Cold War lnLeresLs and values ofLen colnclded
nlcely 1oday Lhelr congruence ls less apparenL parLlcularly when Lhe uS pollcy communlLy
conLlnues Lo deflne lnLeresLs narrowly Many remalned unconvlnced by Lhese argumenLsunLll
Lhe counLry achleves a broader consensus abouL Lhe naLure of Amerlcan global leadershlp and
lLs responslblllLles peace operaLlons wlll conLlnue Lo be a llghLenlng rod for Lhe naLlon's
underlylng amblvalence 1he debaLe abouL ends was mlrrored by amblvalence abouL means


Intcrcsts and Cnnscqucnccs

% US terests | UN eacekeep|
ln Lhe new mlllennlum Lwo underlylng reallLles perslsL 1he flrsL ls LhaL Lhe unlLed SLaLes
remalns more heavlly engaged ln mulLlnaLlonal lf noL un peace operaLlons Lhan anyone

33
uaalder knowlng When Lo Say no" p 63
34
!ohansen uS ollcy 1oward un" p 21
33
8erdal laLeful LncounLer" p 33






would have predlcLed ln 1994 eace operaLlons offlces remaln ensconced LhroughouL Lhe
bureaucracy lncludlng Lhe enLagon Congress evenLually saw Lhe wlsdom of helplng forelgn
counLrles lmprove Lhelr peacekeeplng capablllLles so LhaL Lhe unlLed SLaLes would noL have Lo
respond Lo all crlses alone
36
1he second reallLy ls LhaL afLer a slgnlflcanL hlaLus lnLernaLlonal
securlLy and pollLlcal demands have pushed Lhe unlLed naLlons back lnLo Lhe peace operaLlons
llmellghL and Lhe unlLed SLaLes has found lL ln lLs lnLeresLs Lo supporL Lhls expanslon of Lhe
un's role lor all of Lhese reasons a pollcy LhaL undermlnes Lhe lnsLlLuLlon's mosL vlslble publlc
role peace operaLlons ls cosLly

% M|ss| the ost Co|d War Momet
lnsLlLuLlonal change ln world pollLlcs ofLen requlres an unusual confluence of evenLs 1he early
1990's provlded a slgnlflcanL openlng for enhanclng un peacekeeplng ln 1992 SecreLary of
SLaLe !ames 8aker had descrlbed un peacekeeplng as a naLlonal securlLy prlorlLy" and preLLy
good buy"
37
uS relucLance Lo sLrongly supporL Lhe un has cascaded lnLo heslLaLlon on Lhe
parL of oLher wesLern powers and has even engendered a blLLer reacLlon Lo Lhe 8rahlml 8eporL
from nonallgned and developlng naLlons 1here are serlous quesLlons regardlng wheLher Lhe
squandered opporLunlLy Lo enhance un peacekeeplng can be recapLured

%Weake| UN eacekeep| Capab|||t|es
uurlng Lhe 1990's Lhe unlLed naLlons lmproved Lhe ueparLmenL of eacekeeplng CperaLlons
(ukC) has creaLed a slLuaLlon room and lnformaLlon gaLherlng capablllLles and has lmproved
lLs recrulLmenL Lralnlng and equlpplng of forces 1he un has soughL Lo learn from lLs mlsLakes
lssulng cleareyed reporLs deLalllng lLs fallures ln 8wanda and Sreblnlca 1he un's
lneffecLlveness ls noL prlnclpally WashlngLon's faulL or responslblllLy and Lhe unlLed SLaLes has
helped ln some modesL ways Lo overcome speclflc weaknesses (for example by secondlng

36
See 8uperL uS 1roops 1each eacekeeplng Lo Afrlcans" WashlngLon osL p A16 and ueparLmenL of SLaLe
Congresslonal 8udgeL !usLlflcaLlon for lorelgn CperaLlons p 37 of verslon found aL
hLLp//wwwsLaLegov/www/budgeL/fy2001/fn130/forops_full/130fy0_fo_globalproghLml
37
Commerce !usLlce SLaLe and !udlclary SubcommlLLee of Lhe Pouse ApproprlaLlons CommlLLe SLaLe ueparLmenL
llscal ?ear 1993 lundlng roposal Sec 8aker's commenLs may be found on p 6 of Lhe Lexusnexus verslon






mlllLary personnel and provldlng an archlLecLure for compuLer upgrades) 8uL by Lhe mosL
lmporLanL measures dlscussed below Lhe world's leadlng naLlon has fallen shorL

%US ud|
As MargareL karns and karen MlngsL deLall ln congresslonal acLlons such as lnslsLence upon
zero un budgeL growLh and refusal Lo pay assessmenLs posed greaL challenges for Lhe un [usL
as lL assumed a larger role ln lnLernaLlonal securlLy As early as 1993 8lchard 1hornburgh Lhen
un underSecreLary Ceneral for AdmlnlsLraLlon and ManagemenL reporLed LhaL Lhe un's
ongolng flnances were ln crlsls and LhaL peacekeeplng fundlng ls sLlll much llke a flnanclal
'bungee [ump' ofLen underLaken sLrlcLly ln bllnd falLh LhaL Llmely approprlaLlons wlll be
forLhcomlng"
38
AL Lhe end of 1998 Lhe un owed over $1 bllllon Lo member sLaLes for Lhelr
parLlclpaLlon ln peacekeeplng
39
whlle Lhe unlLed SLaLes accounLed for over 60 percenL of Lhe
almosL $16 bllllon LhaL naLlons owed for peacekeeplng assessmenLs
40
uS arrears conLrlbuLed
Lo delays ln un relmbursemenLs Lo naLlons LhaL conLrlbuLed peacekeeplng Lroops
41

% US M|||tary Support
lf uS pollLlcal supporL ls a prerequlslLe for un approval of a peace operaLlon almosL any Lype
of uS mlllLary supporL can help encourage or enable oLher naLlons Lo parLlclpaLe
42
1hls ls
parLlcularly sallenL because even many of Lhe more mlllLarlly powerful un members can no
longer perform brlgadelevel mlsslons cannoL deploy Lhemselves over slgnlflcanL dlsLances and
ofLen lack necessary equlpmenL As we have seen however congresslonal opposlLlon meanL
LhaL Lhe unlLed SLaLes largely sLopped sendlng combaL forces Lo parLlclpaLe ln bluehelmeLed
operaLlons 1he uS even falled Lo provlde sufflclenL loglsLlcal supporL or equlpmenL Lo cerLaln
un mlsslons lL would cosL relaLlvely llLLle Lo ease Lhe resLrlcLlons on such provlslon of goods
and servlces sLrengLhenlng Lhe un and earnlng Lhe unlLed SLaLes conslderable goodwlll


38
PolL 8rleflng 8ook on eacekeeplng p 10
39
CAC SLaLus of uS ConLrlbuLlons and Arrears p 12
40
CAC SLaLus of uS ConLrlbuLlons and Arrears p 13
41
CrosseLLe uarkesL Pour aL un" new ?ork 1lmes p A6
42
LaurenLl 1he unlLed naLlons and lnLernaLlonal SecurlLy" p 3






%|ock| fforts to rotect terat|oa| eace ad Secur|ty
1he AdmlnlsLraLlon occaslonally blocked Lhe un from underLaklng peace operaLlons Some
ob[ecLlons reflecLed valld concerns such as Lhe lack of a clear mlsslon or an overly amblLlous un
roleWashlngLon dld noL appear Lo undersLand LhaL Lhe un was lnLended Lo proLecL
lnLernaLlonal peace and securlLy 1he mosL forceful example ls Lhe case of 8wanda ln 1994
WashlngLon became a vocal advocaLe for pulllng Lhe small un peacekeeplng conLlngenL ouL as
Lhe genoclde began sweeplng Lhe counLry lf Lhe un offered a more capable mlllLary force
SecurlLy Councll member sLaLes mlghL be beLLer able Lo shape dlplomacy ln meanlngful ways
1ake Lhe example of Slerra Leone 1he un's lnablllLy Lo proLecL Lhe governmenL conLrlbuLed Lo
pressures Lo slgn a reprehenslble peace agreemenL LhaL broughL a war crlmlnal lnLo
governmenL asslgnlng hlm de facLo conLrol over Lhe naLlon's resources 1he unlLed naLlons
was Lhen powerless even Lo enforce Lhls bad deal resulLlng ln yeL anoLher humlllaLlon lnvolvlng
Lhe murder and Laklng hosLage of un peacekeepers 1here ls conslderable scope for Lhe un Lo
expand lLs capablllLles whlle sLlll eschewlng Lhe more dlfflculL peace operaLlons LhaL should be
conducLed by nA1C or a coallLlon of Lhe wllllng
7% Amer|ca's mae
lew naLlons expecL (or perhaps aL boLLom wanL) Lhe unlLed SLaLes Lo conducL peace
operaLlons only under un command ln facL oLher leadlng naLlons lncreaslngly are uneasy
abouL commlLLlng Lroops Lo un operaLlons 8uL lL would be mlsLake Lo equaLe Lhe lssue of
Amerlcan soldlers donnlng blue helmeLs wlLh LhaL of uS supporL for un peacekeeplng1he
fundamenLal problem from Lhe perspecLlve of oLher naLlons ls noL LhaL Lhe uS wanLs Lo do lLs
own Lhlng buL LhaL lL has falled Lo Lake slgnlflcanL flnanclal pollLlcal loglsLlcal or oLher sLeps Lo
sLrengLhen Lhe collecLlve opLlon of un peace operaLlons
43
1hls uS lnacLlon ls doubly
frusLraLlng for forelgn observers LhaL undersLand boLh LhaL un peacekeeplng ofLen serves
dlrecL Amerlcan lnLeresLs (eg ln Lhe Mlddle LasL PalLl 8osnla kosovo) and LhaL Lhe un has a
mandaLe Lo promoLe lnLernaLlonal noL [usL Amerlcan peace and securlLy


43
See 1he LconomlsL's coverage of uS peacekeeplng pollcy 1he magazlne was parLlcularly crlLlcal of Congress'
braLLlsh condlLlons" for paymenL of lnLernaLlonal dues obllgaLlons See ay up and lay Lhe Came" 1he
LconomlsL p 20





US aemet | terat|oa| eacekeep| rom
Asp|rat|o to mp|emetat|o
ClLlzens for Clobal SoluLlons as parL of Lhe arLnershlp for LffecLlve eacekeeplng has released
a new reporL enLlLled uS LngagemenL ln lnLernaLlonal eacekeeplng lrom AsplraLlon Lo
lmplemenLaLlon 1he reporL calls on Congress and Lhe Cbama AdmlnlsLraLlon Lo lmprove uS
parLlclpaLlon ln lnLernaLlonal peacekeeplng operaLlons and offers recommendaLlons ln four
areas
1) uS fundlng of un peacekeeplng
2) Women ln peacekeeplng
3) 1ralnlng and Lqulpplng eacekeepers
4) SLandlng Clvlllan and ollce CapaclLy
1oday 13 un peacekeeplng operaLlons are deployed worldwlde lnvolvlng nearly 100000
Lroops and pollce from abouL 120 counLrles ln addlLlon reglonal organlzaLlons such as Lhe
Afrlcan unlon Lhe Luropean unlon and nA1C have conducLed mlsslons all over Lhe world
1oday's peacekeepers are deployed ln unsLable and hosLlle envlronmenLs Lo supporL Lhe
lmplemenLaLlon of fraglle peace agreemenLs 1hey underLake complex mlsslons from ensurlng
securlLy and proLecLlng clvlllans Lo promoLlng Lhe rule of law and organlzlng democraLlc
elecLlons Pere glven unkC LxecuLlve 8oard






lncreaslng lnLernaLlonal demand for peacekeepers and broadenlng of mlsslon mandaLes are
sLreLchlng Lhe un capaclLy Lo deploy requlred resources and unlformed personnel ClLlzens for
Clobal SoluLlons belleves LhaL lnLernaLlonal peace operaLlons are a cruclal lnsLrumenL Lo
supporL peace and securlLy worldwlde proLecL clvlllans ln armed confllcLs and provlde Lhe
secure envlronmenL necessary Lo lmplemenL peace processes and rebulld warLorn socleLles
CCS acLlvely supporLs Lhe uS AdmlnlsLraLlon sLrengLhenlng un peacekeeplng capaclLy by
provldlng sufflclenL and Llmely fundlng provldlng equlpmenL and Lralnlng sLrengLhenlng Lhe





uns ablllLy Lo proLecL clvlllans and enhanclng Lhe ablllLy of reglonal organlzaLlons Lo carry ouL
peacekeeplng mlsslons
@ake Act|o Coress

1he unlLed SLaLes relaLlonshlp wlLh Lhe unls vlLal Lo proLecL Amerlcan forelgn pollcy goals
naLlonal securlLy economlc lnLeresLs as well as promoLe peace and securlLy around Lhe world
8uL Lhls parLnershlp ls ln [eopardy due Lo Lwo laws passed by Congress ln Lhe 1990s LhaL
requlre Lhe uS Lo wlLhdraw fundlng from any un enLlLy LhaL recognlzes a alesLlnlan sLaLe
resldenL Cbama musL demand LhaL Congress provldes a walver Lo laws forclng Lhe uS Lo
wlLhdraw fundlng for un agencles lf Lhey recognlze alesLlne
Susan 8lces llve Coals of eacekeeplng
AL Lhe SecurlLy Councll uebaLe on un eacekeeplng CperaLlons held lasL year Lhe uS
Ambassador Lo Lhe unlLed naLlons Susan 8lce lssued a sLaLemenL on global peacekeeplng
operaLlons ln whlch she lald ouL flve peacekeeplng goals
1) rovlde peacekeeplng mlsslons wlLh clear credlble and achlevable mandaLes
2) lncrease cooperaLlon and collaboraLlon wlLh Lroop and pollce conLrlbuLlng counLrles
3) romoLe a new arLnershlp Agenda
4) lmplemenLaLlon peacekeeplng mandaLes ln a successful and Llmely manner
Pave Lhe uS meeL lLs flnanclal obllgaLlons We remaln ready Lo lnvesL ln un peacekeeplng
even ln a Llme of economlc crlsls because Lhls Lruly global enLerprlse serves a shared lnLeresL
and offers mllllons of people Lhe prospecL of a more secure prosperous and dlgnlfled fuLure











Cnnc!usInn
uS pollcy Loward mulLlnaLlonal peace operaLlons has come full clrcle durlng Lhe pasL decade
for reasons LhaL are unllkely Lo change 1he demand for lnLervenLlon wlll conLlnue Lo ouLpace
Lhe deslre or capaclLy of reglonal organlzaLlons or key sLaLes Lo respond ln many lnsLances Lhe
un wlll remaln Lhe vehlcle Lo whlch oLher naLlons even Lhe unlLed SLaLes look Lo address
crlses 8y falllng Lo sLrengLhen un peacekeeplng WashlngLon flnds lLself ln a curlous place
lncreaslngly rellanL on a Lool lL has weakened 1he uS wlll conLlnue Lo approve or Lo encourage
un lnLervenLlon ln a varleLy of clrcumsLances WashlngLon may be unable Lo lgnore a crlsls buL
noL wlsh Lo send uS forces and see no oLher opLlon lf Lhe unlLed SLaLes chooses noL Lo
sLrengLhen un peace operaLlons capablllLles lL should assume Lhe responslblllLy for and cosLs
of llmlLlng Lhe demands member sLaLes place on Lhe organlzaLlon CLherwlse Lhe cycle of
dlsllluslonmenL wlll conLlnue sLaLes wlll seL Lhe un up Lo fall undermlne lLs lnLernaLlonal
sLandlng and conflrm lLs crlLlcs' predlcLlons LvenLually Lhe unlLed SLaLes mlghL flnd lLself wlLh
a cholce beLween assumlng Lhe un's responslblllLles or allowlng enLlre reglons of Lhe world Lo
become consumed by confllcL 1hls dllemma a cholce beLween lgnorlng spreadlng vlolence
or becomlng Lhe world's pollceman ls preclsely whaL resldenL 8ush and resldenL CllnLon
had hoped Lo avold by sLrengLhenlng unlLed naLlons peacekeeplng capablllLles

















keferece
1) un peacekeeplng webslLe hLLp//wwwunorg/uepLs/dpko/dpko/opshLm
2) %he United Nations an Introduction. Sven Berrhard Gareis and Johannes 'arwicle.
3) International politics, proIessor yesmin ahmed and Raki Barmen.
4) International organization and aIIairs,abdul latiI khan
5) %oday`s United Nations, published by United Nations inIormation centre.
6) Everyone`s United Nation.
7) Basic essay, published by proIessor`s publication .page 426.
8) www.wikipedia.com
9) Wllllam ! uurch ed 1he LvoluLlon of un eacekeeplng Case SLudles and
ComparaLlve Analysls
10)
1
uaalder knowlng When Lo Say no"
11)8osner 1he new 1ugofWar
12)vlLa uS MlllLary 1ralnlng for new Mlsslon" ALlanLa !ournal and ConsLlLuLlon
13)