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Descartes and Elisabeth

In the replies to the sixth objections (CSM II: 297-8), Descartes writes that he wants the relationship between the mind and the body to be understood on the model of how he thought gravity or heaviness is present in a body. Earlier in his career, Descartes understood gravity to be a real quality that inhered in bodies and, in so being a real quality, he made the easy passage to thinking of it as a substance. There then arose the question of how to understand the relationship between a stone (e.g.) and the gravity in it. On the one hand, the gravity seems to be spread out in all the parts of the stone and yet it can act at just one point; consider, for example, how a stone attached to a rope will, as it were, focus all its gravity at the point of attachment so that it can be said that the whole stone is pulling on the rope. Furthermore, when thinking about how gravity has the aim of pulling bodies to the centre of the earth, he was aware of him attributing some kind of knowledge of the centre of the earth to the stone for how else does the stone know where to go? And yet, despite thinking of gravity in a quasi-mental way, he was happy to admit that the stone had non-mind-like properties: that it could divided and measured, for example. In the exchange with Elisabeth, Descartes discusses the gravity theme further. Elisabeth wants to know how something non-substantial, and hence lacking in extension, can move a body that does have extension. Elisabeth is thinking that for one thing to move another, there must be contact between the surfaces and if something lacks a surface, it cant move something else. Descartes replies that this is the wrong way to think about how one thing moves another. Or, rather, it is not the only way. We have, he says, a clear grasp of ourselves being a unity of mind and body. The ordinary man knows such a thing on the basis of ordinary experience: his thoughts move his body and the external world impresses on his mind. We are dimly aware of the differences between minds and bodies. This is because we have two types of basic concept for understanding minds and bodies and it is through doing a little bit of metaphysics that we clarify them by revealing the essences of minds and bodies to be thought and extension. We now see that they are distinct so that mind and body are separable. Now, this seems to present a contradiction to the hasty mind: mind and body are one and yet separable! But this shows that we are mistaken to try to reduce mind-body talk to the two categories of substance and to root around for the tools to understand the connection in these two categories. We must embrace the third type of primitive concept, the concept of their union, the possession of which in each of us explains the ease with which the ordinary man feels himself to be a unity whilst, as metaphysicians, recognising that it can only be known obscurely, in contrast to the other two. That we understand them all dimly before doing some (Cartesian) metaphysics is shown by our confusion over gravity. The Scholastics saw gravity as Descartes had seen it: a real quality, thus a kind of substance and one which is quasi-mental. Descartes says that this commits the mistake of employing the concepts we have for understanding the mind and the mind-body union to the physical world. In thinking of gravity as something which knows how to pilot an object, we mistakenly think of it as mental. In thinking that gravity has a special, intimate union with the material body it inheres in, at once spread out and able to act at a point, we are employing our concept of mind-body union: our mind is spread out and yet able to act at points such as our limbs.

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Elisabeth Descartes - La Haye, 16 mai 1643

Mais aujourd'hui, M. Pallotti m'a donn tant d'assurance de votre bont pour chacun, et particulirement pour moi, que j'ai chass toute autre considration de l'esprit, hors celles de m'en prvaloir, en vous priant de me dire comment l'me de l'homme peut dterminer les esprits du corps, pour faire les actions volontaires (n'tant qu'une substance pensante). Car il semble que toute dtermination de mouvement se fait par la pulsion de la chose mue, manire dont elle est pousse par celle qui la meut, ou bien de la qualification et figure de la superficie de cette dernire. L'attouchement est requis aux deux premires conditions, et l'extension la troisime. Vous excluez entirement celle-ci de la notion que vous avez de l'me, et celui-l me parat incompatible avec une chose immatrielle. Pourquoi je vous demande une dfinition de l'me plus particulire qu'en votre Mtaphysique, c'est--dire de sa substance, spare de son action, de la pense. Car encore que nous les supposions insparables (qui toutefois est difficile prouver dans le ventre de la mre et les grands vanouissements), comme les attributs de Dieu, nous pouvons, en les considrant part, en acqurir une ide plus parfaite.

[I would like you to tell me] how the human soul can determine the movement of the animal spirits in the body so as to perform voluntary acts being as it is merely a thinking substance. For the determination of movement seems always to come about from the moving body's being propelled to depend on the kind of impulse it gets from what sets it in motion, or again, on the nature and shape of this latter thing's surface. Now the first two conditions involve contact, and the third involves that the impelling thing has extension; but you utterly exclude extension from your notion of soul, and contact seems to me incompatible with a thing's being immaterial. Descartes Elisabeth - Egmond du Hoef, 21 mai 1643
Premirement, je considre qu'il y a en nous certaines notions primitives, qui sont comme des originaux, sur le patron desquels nous formons toutes nos autres connaissances. Et il n'y a que fort peu de telles notions ; car, aprs les plus gnrales, de l'tre, du nombre, de la dure, etc., qui conviennent tout ce que nous pouvons concevoir, nous n'avons, pour le corps en particulier, que la notion de l'extension, de laquelle suivent celles de la figure et du mouvement ; et pour l'me seule, nous n'avons que celle de la pense, en laquelle sont comprises les perceptions de l'entendement et les inclinations de la volont ; enfin, pour l'me et le corps ensemble, nous n'avons que celle de leur union, de laquelle dpend celle de la force qu'a l'me de mouvoir le corps, et le corps d'agir sur l'me, en causant ses sentiments et ses passions.

First of all, I believe that there are some basic concepts in us, that act as templates on the basis of which we form other conceptsfor body, we have the concept of extension, for mind, we have just the concept of thought, by which we are to understand all the perceptions of the understanding and actions of the will ; and finally, for the body and mind together, we have nothing more than the concept of their union, on the basis of which we have the concepts of the force that the mind has to move the body and the body to move the mind, in causing its emotions and passions.
Je considre aussi que toute la science des hommes ne consiste qu' bien distinguer ces notions, et n'attribuer chacune d'elles qu'aux choses auxquelles elles appartiennent. Car, lorsque nous voulons expliquer quelque difficult par le moyen d'une notion qui ne lui appartient pas, nous ne pouvons manquer de nous mprendre ; comme aussi lorsque nous voulons expliquer une de ces notions par une autre ; car, tant primitives, chacune d'elles ne peut tre entendue que par elle-mme. Et d'autant que l'usage des sens nous a rendu les notions de l'extension, des figures et des mouvements, beaucoup plus familires que les autres, la principale cause de nos erreurs est en ce que nous voulons ordinairement nous servir de ces notions, pour expliquer les choses qui elles n'appartiennent pas, comme

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lorsqu'on se veut servir de l'imagination pour concevoir la nature de l'me, ou bien lorsqu'on veut concevoir la faon dont l'me meut le corps, par celle dont un corps est m par un autre corps.

Secondly, I believe that a scientific understanding of man requires us to do nothing more than to distinguish these three concepts and to use each of them only of what belongs to themAnd it is because the use of our senses makes the concepts of extension, shape and motion much more familiar to us than the other concepts that the main cause of [philosophical] error is to use these concepts to explain things to which they do not apply, as when one uses the imagination to try to understand the nature of the mind or indeed when one wants to conceive of the way in which the mind moves the body by thinking in terms of how one body is moved by another.
Ainsi je crois que nous avons ci-devant confondu la notion de la force dont l'me agit dans le corps, avec celle dont un corps agit dans un autre ; et que nous avons attribu l'une et l'autre, non pas l'me, car nous ne la connaissions pas encore, mais aux diverses qualits des corps, comme la pesanteur, la chaleur et aux autres, que nous avons imagin tre relles, c'est--dire avoir une existence distincte de celle du corps, et par consquent tre des substances, bien que nous les ayons nommes des qualits. Et nous nous sommes servis, pour les concevoir, tantt des notions qui sont en nous pour connatre le corps, et tantt de celles qui y sont pour connatre l'me, selon que ce que nous leur avons attribu a t matriel ou immatriel. Par exemple, en supposant que la pesanteur est une qualit relle, dont nous n'avons point d'autre connaissance, sinon qu'elle a la force de mouvoir le corps, dans lequel elle est, vers le centre de la terre, nous n'avons pas de peine concevoir comment elle meut ce corps, ni comment elle lui est jointe ; et nous ne pensons point que cela se fasse par un attouchement rel d'une superficie contre une autre, car nous exprimentons, en nous-mmes, que nous avons une notion particulire pour concevoir cela ; et je crois que nous usons mal de cette notion, en l'appliquant la pesanteur, qui n'est rien de rellement distingu du corps, comme j'espre montrer en la Physique, mais qu'elle nous a t donne pour concevoir la faon dont l'me meut le corps.

I believe that we have confused the concept of the force with which the mind moves the body with the force with which one body moves another and we have attributed the one and the other not to the mind, for we do not yet understand the mind, but to various physical qualities, such as weight and heat, that we think to be real qualities of bodies that are distinct from them, and consequently to be real substances, even though we have named them qualities. We have then made sense of these features sometimes in terms of physical concepts (those relating to bodies), sometimes in terms of mental concepts (those relating to the mind), according to whether what we are attributing them to is material (physical) or immaterial (non-physical). For example, supposing that weight is a real quality of which we have no understanding other than that it has the force to move the body in which it is towards the centre of the earth, we have no trouble in understanding how it moves the body nor how it is joined to it. We do not think that there is a real contact of one surface with another (that of the body with that of its weight)Our way of understanding it is on the model of how the mind moves the body, but here is an example of where we misuse the notion of the mind-body connection, for the weight of a body is nothing really distinct from the body itself. Elisabeth Descartes - La Haye, 20 juin 1643
Et j'avoue qu'il me serait plus facile de concder la matire et l'extension l'me, que la capacit de mouvoir un corps et d'en tre mu, un tre immatriel. Car, si le premier se faisait par information, il faudrait que les esprits, qui font le mouvement, fussent intelligents, ce que vous n'accordez rien de corporel. Et encore qu'en vos Mditations Mtaphysiques, vous montrez la possibilit du second, il est pourtant trs difficile comprendre qu'une me, comme vous l'avez dcrite, aprs avoir eu la facult et l'habitude de bien raisonner, peut

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perdre tout cela par quelques vapeurs, et que, pouvant subsister sans le corps et n'ayant n'en de commun avec lui, elle en soit tellement rgie. I confess that it would be simpler for me to admit that the soul has matter and extension than that to admit that an immaterial entity has the capacity to move a body and to be moved [=affected]. For if the former [=moving a body] occurs by the process of information, the [animal] spirits that cause the movement would have to be intelligent and yet you say nothing bodily is so.1 And although you show the possibility of the second [=being affected by the body] but can move and be moved] in the Meditations, it is still difficult to understand how a soulhaving had the faculty and habit of reasoning, can lose it by various vapours2, and, being able to subsist with body and having nothing in common with it, can be ruled by it.

Descartes Elisabeth - Egmond du Hoef, 28 juin 1643

Premirement, donc, je remarque une grande diffrence entre ces trois sortes de notions, en ce que l'me ne se conoit que par l'entendement pur ; le corps, c'est--dire l'extension, les figures et les mouvements, se peuvent aussi connatre par l'entendement seul, mais beaucoup mieux par l'entendement aid de l'imagination ; et enfin, les choses qui appartiennent l'union de l'me et du corps, ne se connaissent qu'obscurment par l'entendement seul, ni mme par l'entendement aid de l'imagination ; mais elles se connaissent trs clairement par les sens. D'o vient que ceux qui ne philosophent jamais, et qui ne se servent que de leurs sens, ne doutent point que l'me ne meuve le corps, et que le corps n'agisse sur l'me ; mais ils considrent l'un et l'autre comme une seule chose, c'est-dire, ils conoivent leur union ; car concevoir l'union qui est entre deux choses, c'est les concevoir comme une seule. Et les penses mtaphysiques, qui exercent l'entendement pur, servent nous rendre la notion de l'me familire ; et l'tude des mathmatiques, qui exerce principalement l'imagination en la considration des figures et des mouvements, nous accoutume former des notions du corps bien distinctes ; et enfin, c'est en usant seulement de la vie et des conversations ordinaires, et en s'abstenant de mditer et d'tudier aux choses qui exercent l'imagination, qu'on apprend concevoir l'union de l'me et du corps.

First, then, there is a great difference which I observe between these three sorts of notions. The soul conceives itself only through pure understanding. Body (that is, extension, shapes, and motions) can also been known through the understanding alone, but much better through the understanding helped by the imagination. Finally, things which belong to the union of the soul and the body are known only obscurely through the understanding alone, and even through the understanding helped by the imagination; but they are known very clearly through the senses. This is why people who never philosophise, and use only their senses, have no doubt that the soul moves the body, and that the body acts on the soul. They consider both of them as a single thing that is to say, they conceive their union, since to conceive the union of two things is to conceive them as a single thing. It is metaphysical thinking (which exercises the pure understanding) that has the function of making us familiar with the notion of the soul. It is the study of mathematics (which mainly exercises the imagination in the consideration of shapes and motions) that gets us into the habit of forming thoroughly distinct notions of body. Finally, it is through immersing ourselves in real life and everyday social contacts, and abstaining from meditation or studying
1

The scholastic process of information is one in which we come to perceive and understand by being sensitive to the forms of things. The forms literally enter our minds and in-form them. Descartes rejected the scholastic picture as far as possible. Elisabeths question is to be understood as follows. If the mind can have effects on the body, then surely the mind must transmit its intelligence into the animal spirits. So, suppose I want the sandwich on the table. I conceptually represent the object of my want (in italics). Now, to direct me to that sandwich on that table, that conceptual complexity must somehow be present in the brain rather than the mind so that I move in the right way. Descartes could say no: there is translation from the conceptual language of the mind to the physical language of the brain. But this would raise the question: where? The mind cant translate it doesnt speak the physical language. The brain cant translate it doesnt speak the mental language. It must be magic. 2 That is, by becoming ill, which is surely a bodily condition, our mind can be severely affected too.

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things which exercise the imagination, that we learn to conceive the union of the soul and the body.
Mais, puisque Votre Altesse remarque qu'il est plus facile d'attribuer de la matire et de l'extension l'me, que de lui attribuer la capacit de mouvoir un corps et d'en tre mue, sans avoir de matire, je la supplie de vouloir librement attribuer cette matire et cette extension l'me ; car cela n'est autre chose que la concevoir unie au corps. Et aprs avoir bien conu cela, et l'avoir prouv en soi-mme, il lui sera ais de considrer que la matire qu'elle aura attribue cette pense, n'est pas la pense mme, et que l'extension de cette matire est d'autre nature que l'extension de cette pense, en ce que la premire est dtermine certain lieu, duquel elle exclut toute autre extension de corps, ce que ne fait pas la deuxime. Et ainsi Votre Altesse ne laissera pas de revenir aisment la connaissance de la distinction de l'me et du corps, nonobstant qu'elle ait conu leur union.

Your Highness remarks that it is easier to attribute matter and extension to the soul, than it is to attribute to it the capacity to move a body and to be moved by it without having any matter. But please feel free to attribute such matter and extension to the soul, since this is nothing other than to conceive it as united to the body. Once you have formed a good conception of this, and tested it in your own inner experience, it will be easy for you to consider that the matter which you will have attributed to this thinking is not the thinking itself, and that the extension of this matter is of a different nature from the extension of this thinking, in that the first is determined to a particular place from which it excludes all other bodily extension, whereas this is not true of the second. Thus your Highness will have no difficulty in returning to the knowledge of the distinction between the soul and the body, despite the fact that you have had a conception of their union.
Enfin, comme je crois qu'il est trs ncessaire d'avoir bien compris, une fois en sa vie, les principes de la mtaphysique, cause que ce sont eux qui nous donnent la connaissance de Dieu et de notre me, je crois aussi qu'il serait trs nuisible d'occuper souvent son entendement les mditer, cause qu'il ne pourrait si bien vaquer aux fonctions de l'imagination et des sens ; mais que le meilleur est de se contenter de retenir en sa mmoire et en sa crance les conclusions qu'on en a une fois tires, puis employer le reste du temps qu'on a pour l'tude, aux penses o l'entendement agit avec l'imagination et les sens.

Finally, I believe that it is absolutely necessary, just once in a lifetime, to acquire a thorough comprehension of the fundamentals of metaphysics, since it is these which give us knowledge of God and of our soul. However, I also believe that it would be very harmful to overload the understanding with meditation on such things, since it would crowd out the functions of the imagination and the senses. So the best policy is to rest content with your memory of, and belief in, the conclusions which you have drawn on one single occasion, and to spend the rest of the time you have available for study on thoughts where the understanding acts in co-operation with the imagination and the senses.

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