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Hearsay PEOPLE v. CUSI G.R. No. L-20986 DIZON; August 14, 1965 (ricky) NATURE Petition for certiorari praying that the ruling of Judge Cusi be declared erroneous and to order him to allow witness Sgt. Lucio Bao to answer the question in full FACTS - Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged with robbery in band with homicide in the CFI of Davao, to which they pleaded not guilty. - During the trial, and while Sgt. Lucio Bao, of the Police Force of Digos, Davao, was testifying as a prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by Arcadio Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation in the commission of the offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and everyone of them. - The prosecutor asked the witness to mention in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were concerned. Judge Vucente Cusi resolved the objection by directing the witness to answer the question but without mentioning the names of the accused who had interposed the objection. In other words, the witness was allowed to answer the question and name his coconspirators except those who had raised the objection. The prosecutor's MFR of this ruling was denied. ISSUE WON Judge Cusi erred in resolving the objection. HELD YES. Ratio There is no question that hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Reasoning The purpose of the prosecutor is nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bao the names of those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bao would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, the question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca and took part in the commission of the offense. Disposition The writ is granted. ESTRADA V DESIERTO 356 SCRA 108 PUNO; March 2, 2001 (joey) NATURE Consolidated cases: GR No. 146710-15- Petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, GR No. 146738 - Quo Warranto FACTS - This case concerns Eraps fall from power. You know the story - January 18, 2001 start of EDSA II - January 20, 2001 [midnight] first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power between Estradas and Arroyos camps; [noon] Davide administered the oath to Arroyo as President of the Philippines; [2:30 p.m] Estrada and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace and issued a press statement saying that he has strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President but he was nevertheless leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. - Still on January 20, Estrada signed a letter with the following tenor: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
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transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the VicePresident shall be the Acting President. Copies of this were received by former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. and by Senate President Pimentel at 9 p.m. - January 22 - Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency; SC issued Resolution in A.M No. 01-1-05-SC, wherein the court resolved unanimously to confirm the authority given by the 12 members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Arroyo as President - Arroyo was recognized by more than a hundred foreign diplomats and by the House of Representatives (through Resolution No. 175) as the new President. She appointed cabinet members, ambassadors and special envoys, signed bills into laws, and nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. as VP. Surveys to the public also showed high rate of acceptance. - February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated. - Several cases were filed against Estrada in the Office of the Ombudsman. A special panel of investigators was created to investigate the charges against the petitioner. - Petitioner filed these petitions, the first one seeking to enjoin the Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted, and the second praying for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. ISSUES 1. WON the cases at bar involve a political question 2. WON Estrada resigned as President 3. WON petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President. 4. WON petitioner enjoys immunity from suit 5. WON the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
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- During this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. - The resignation of the petitioner was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. - It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave of absence due to his inability to govern and cites the letter transmitted to the Senate President and House Speaker as support. However, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. Petitioners resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. - Petitioner also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which states that no public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the RPC on bribery.
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prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. - The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco tiaco it was held: the [Governor-General] is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercise discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, he acts, not as GovernorGeneral but as a private individual, and, as such, must answer for the consequences of his act. - Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him. - The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. 5. NO Ratio To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by
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- Mr. Joseph Estrada invokes "temporary incapacity" under Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution. This assertion is difficult to sustain since the temporary incapacity contemplated clearly envisions those that are personal, either by physical or mental in nature, 7 and innate to the individual. - Neither can it be implied that the takeover has installed a revolutionary government. A revolutionary government is one which has taken the seat of power by force or in defiance of the legal processes. Within the political context, a revolution is a complete overthrow of the established government. In its delimited concept, it is characterized often, albeit not always, by violence as a means and specificable range of goals as ends. In contrast, EDSA 2 did not envision radical changes. The government structure has remained intact. Succession to the presidency has been by the duly-elected Vice-president of the Republic. The military and the police, down the line, have felt to be so acting in obedience to their mandate as the protector of the people. Mendoza [concur] - The legitimacy of a revolutionary government cannot be the subject of judicial review. In contrast, these cases do not involve the legitimacy of a government. They only involve the legitimacy of the presidency of Arroyo. - The events that led to the departure of petitioner Joseph E. Estrada from office are well known and need not be recounted in great detail. Justice Mendoza quoted excerpts from the Far Eastern Economic Review and Time Magazine as quoted in the submitted Memorandum. - The permanent disability referred to in the Constitution can be physical, mental or moral, rendering the President unable to exercise the powers and functions of his office. As his close adviser wrote in his diary of the final hours of petitioner's presidency: The President says: "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko namasyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. Angara himself shared this view of petitioner's inability. He wrote in his diary: "Let us be realistic," I counter. "The President does not have the capability to organize a counter-attack. He does not have the AFP or the Philippine National Police on his side. He is not only in a corner; he is also down. - This is the clearest proof that petitioner was totally and permanently disabled at least as of 11 P.M. of
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- We cannot replace this test of actual prejudice with the rule of res ipsa loquitur. The latter rule assumes that an injury (i.e., prejudicial publicity) has been suffered and then shifts the burden to the panel of investigators to prove that the impartiality of its members has been affected by said publicity. Such a rule will overturn our case law that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. - Petitioner suggests that the Court should order a 2month cooling off period to allow passions to subside and hopefully the alleged prejudicial publicity against him would die down. There is no assurance that the so called 2-month cooling off period will achieve its purpose. Petitioner cannot avoid the kleiglight of publicity. What is important for the petitioner is that his constitutional rights are not violated in the process of investigation. 2. YES Ratio In determining whether a given resignation is voluntarily tendered, the element of voluntariness is vitiated only when the resignation is submitted under duress brought on by government action. The threepart test for such duress has been stated as involving the following elements: (1) whether one side involuntarily accepted the others terms; (2) whether circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite side. - A resignation may be found involuntary if on the totality of the circumstances it appears that the employers conduct in requesting resignation effectively deprived the employer of free choice in the matter. Factors to be considered, under this test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some alternative to resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of the choice he or she was given; (3) whether the employee was given a reasonable time in which to choose; and (4) whether he or she was permitted to select the effective date of resignation. In applying this totality of the circumstances test, the assessment whether real alternatives were offered must be gauged by an objective standard rather than by the employees purely subjective evaluation; that the employee may perceive his or her only option to be resignation - for example, because of concerns about his or her reputation - is irrelevant. Similarly, the mere fact that the choice is between comparably unpleasant alternatives - for example, resignation or facing
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- Morgan: The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself rests not upon any notion that the circumstances in which it was made furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory of litigation. A party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath. A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. - The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party. - Even if the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, it is binding on him under the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. - Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta (see Section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court) However, the rule has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent. - Executive Secretary Angara was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacaang Palace. The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara. - Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent are binding on the principal. The reason behind this is "What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument. - Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements. These are statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true or not. They belong to two classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which are
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the generalization that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial question. - Petitioner asserts that these acts of Congress of passing Resolutions should not be accorded any legal significance because: (1) they are post facto and (2) a declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be implied. There is nothing in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution which states that the declaration by Congress of the Presidents inability must always be a priori or before the Vice-President assumes the presidency. Special consideration should be given to the fact that the events which led to the resignation of the petitioner happened at express speed and culminated on a Saturday. Congress was then not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori on petitioners letter claiming inability to govern. - Petitioner cannot strictly maintain that the President of the Senate, the Honorable Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Honorable Arnulfo P. Fuentebella, recognized respondent Arroyo as the "constitutional successor to the presidency" post facto. Before the oath-taking, Senate President Pimentel, Jr. and Speaker Fuentebella had prepared a Joint Statement which states their recognition of Arroyo as the constitutional successor to the Presidency. This a priori recognition by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives was followed post facto by various resolutions of the Senate and the House, in effect, confirming this recognition. These acts of Congress, a priori and post facto, cannot be dismissed as merely implied recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the President of the Republic. - The Constitution clearly sets out the structure on how vacancies and election contest in the office of the President shall be decided. Thus, section 7 of Article VII covers the instance when (a) the President-elect fails to qualify, (b) if a President shall not have been chosen and (c) if at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled. Section 8 of Article VII covers the situation of the death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President. Section 11 of Article VII covers the case where the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. In each case, the Constitution specifies the body that will resolve the issues that may
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- It is clear from A.M. No. 01-1-05 SC, that the Court did not treat the letter of respondent Arroyo to be administered the oath by Chief Justice Davide, Jr., as a case but as an administrative matter. If it were considered as a case, then petitioner has reason to fear that the Court has predetermined the legitimacy of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency. To dispel the erroneous notion, the Court precisely treated the letter as an administrative matter and emphasized that it was "without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party." - In further clarification, the Court on February 20, 2001 issued another resolution to inform the parties and the public that it "did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution." - To disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices. Dispositive MR denied for lack of merit CORNEJO, SR. V SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. L-58831 FERNAN; July 31, 1987 (mini) NATURE Petition for certiorari to review Sandiganbayan decision FACTS - Cornejo seeks a review on certiorari of a decision in a Criminal case wherein the Sandiganbayan found him guilty for the crime of Estafa - facts of the criminal case: Accused represented himself to be connected
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long before respondents went to Hawaii; Dominga erected a house on the land long before the outbreak of World War II; Dominga financed out of her own money the construction of the house and subsequent improvements thereof, she being a merchant when she could still travel to Cagayan Valley; granting that respondents had been sending money to Dominga, said money already belonged to her; if Dominga used said money for improving the house, respondents have no right over the house. - During the pendency of the case and before she could take the witness stand, Dominga died. Following pretrial, trial on the merits ensued. Witnesses for the plaintiffs were respondents and their aunt, Margarita Burcena (Margarita); while petitioner testified on his own behalf. - RTC held that the donation is void because Dominga could not have validly disposed of the subject property since it was bought with the money sent by respondents while working abroad, although declared for taxation purposes in Dominga's name. (petitioner found in good faith -only has to turnover property) - Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. The CA found no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC, as well as the latter's assessment of the credibility of witnesses. The CA held that the case involves an implied trust known as purchase price resulting trust under Article 1448, CC where property sold is granted to one party but the price is paid for by another; that the evidence presented by the respondents convincingly show that the subject property was bought with money belonging to respondents but declared in Dominga's name as administrator thereof; and that Dominga's act of donating the property to petitioner was beyond her authority and capacity, done without the consent of the real owners, herein respondents. Thus, the CA sustained the conclusion of the RTC that the donation is void. - Petitioner's MFR was denied. ISSUE/S 1. WON CA erred in discussing an issue not brought before it (implied trust) 2. WON Margarita's statement on the witness stand (that Dominga told her that the respondents sent her money to buy the subject property) should not have been given weight or credence by the RTC and the CA because it is hearsay and has no probative value.
COMILANG V BURCENA GR 146853 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; Feb13, 2006 (bauza) FACTS - Francisco and Mariano Burcena (respondents), together w/ their mother, Dominga Reclusado Vda. de Burcena (Dominga), filed a complaint for annulment of document w/ damages against Salvador Comilang (petitioner). - The complaint alleges that: respondents are the owners of a 918-sqm parcel of land located in Manueva, Santa, Ilocos Sur and the house with a floor area of 32 sqm built thereon; respondents acquired the subject property through their earnings while working abroad; the subject property was declared for taxation purposes in Dominga's name as administrator thereof; petitioner caused the execution of a Deed of Donation over said property by taking advantage of Dominga's blindness, old age and physical infirmity; the said Deed of Donation is null and void because: (a) Dominga had no right to donate the same since she is not its owner, (b) Dominga did not give her consent and was misled to the execution of such document, (c) granting Dominga had authority to donate, the donation is void because the property donated is the only property declared in her name and therefore she could not have reserved for herself in full ownership sufficient property to support herself; petitioner is in possession of the subject property, depriving respondents of its ownership and enjoyment of its fruits. - In his Answer, petitioner contends that: the Deed of Donation was freely and voluntarily executed by Dominga in consideration of her love and affection for him; the subject property was acquired by Dominga together w/ her 2 sisters, Aniceta and Juana Reclusado,
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FACTS -Josue Molas (accused-appellant) and Dulcesima Resonable (Dulcesima, victim) were sweethearts and were engaged to be married. Dulcesima was the daughter of Bernardo and Soledad Resonable, and the sister of Nicolas and Abelardo Resonable -on Feb 2, 1983, at about 6:00 pm after farm work, Bernardo arrived at their house and found 8-y.o. Abelardo at the doorway of their house bathed in his own blood. Bernardo carried Abelardo into their house. Abelardo informed his father that Josue Molas was the person who not only inflicted his injuries but also stabbed Dulcesima and Soledad. Bernardo then looked for Dulcesima, who he found dead in a dried carabao mud pool 3-arms length from the house, and Soledad, who he found near the bench by the door of the house. Bernardo ran to the barangay captain and sought help from authorities. Abelardo was brought to the Provincial hospital but died the next day. -dawn of Feb 3, Josue Molas, with blood-stained clothes, surrendered to Patrolman Geronimo Vallega, together with the hunting knife I used in killing the mother, the daughter and the boy. Patrolman Vallega then lodged Molas in jail. Molas was transferred to Valencia Police Station later. -next morning, after being informed of his Constitutional rights, refused to give any statement to the police. Eventually, Molas freely and voluntarily related the whole story, as taken down by Patrolman Fetalvero. The following are contained in Molas sworn statement: In our arrival to their house at sitio Inas, Barangay Dobdob, from Kabangogan, * this Soledad Resonable lighted a gas lamp in their store and said, "maayo kay naabot na ta walay makaboot nako ug patyon nako ang akong anak." [It's good that you have arrived, no one can stop me if I kill my own daughter] at the same time went near Dulcesima, her daughter and grabbed her hair and boxed her to the different parts of her body. Because of faith and sympathy, I stopped Solidad by holding her hands to prevent her boxing Dulcesima, but on my intervention, Soledad boxed me hitting my head and arms. Due to blocks I made she was tired and again went back to Dulcesima and again boxed her to the different parts of her body. Because I was hurt on the part of Dulcisima, my wife-tobe and no other means to prevent Solidad, I was able to
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blood-stained clothing at the time of the surrender only hours after the killings, Abelardo's dying declaration, and the testimonies of the policemen in the police stations in Pamplona and Valencia to whom he admitted his guilt constitute an unbroken chain proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was he who murdered Abelardo, Dulcesima and Soledad Resonable. Disposition. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment convicting Josue Molas for the murders of Dulcesima Resonable, Soledad Resonable and Abelardo Resonable and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of said murders is AFFIRMED, with modification of the death indemnity which is hereby increased to P50,000.00 for each case. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE VS GUMIMBA 517 SCRA 25 TINGA; February 27, 2007 (athe) NATURE APPEAL from the decision of the CA FACTS - Gumimba and co-accused Abapo were charged with the crime of rape with homicide of an eight-year old child. - Both entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment. The prosecution presented two witnesses: Magallano and Arenas. They testified that Gumimba went to Magallanos home and confessed to him that he alone and by himself raped and killed his niece in Ozamis City. He even repeated his narration and confessed to the baranggay captain that he had raped and killed the victim. - Gumimba later on changed his plea of not guilty to GUILTY. - Both were found guilty of the crime. However, on appeal the appellant raises the issue that the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant on the basis of his improvident plea of guilty and his alleged confessions to Magallano and Aranas, the latter being hearsay. ISSUE WON the testimonies of Magallano and Aranas are inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay HELD
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they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 2 YES - For a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence, these requisites must concur: (1) that death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) that the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) that the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify to; (4) that the declarant thereafter dies; and (5) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the subject of inquiry. - The degree and seriousness of the wounds suffered by the victim Miguelito and the fact that his death supervened shortly thereafter may be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by him with the full realization that he was in a dying condition. The victim Miguelitos dying declaration having satisfied all these requisites, it must be considered as an evidence of the highest order because, at the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabrication are stilled. A victims utterance after sustaining a mortal wound may be considered pure emanations of the incident. Note: The Court found that the appreciation of treachery by RTC to qualify the offense to murder is reversed. Disposition: RTC Decision MODIFIED. Accused guilty of HOMICIDE and NOT MURDER. PEOPLE V. MOLO G.R. No. L-44680 Per Curiam; 11 January 1979 (ice) Nature Automatic Review Facts Molo was accused of Murder. He allegedly attacked and assaulter Gapisa in Romblon with a bolo. -Venancio Gapisa and Simeona Rapa-Gapisa, husband and wife, retired to sleep. The couple lived in a typical hut made of bamboo flooring and dilapidated buri walling surrounded by fruit bearing banana plants. Simeona, who had not yet fallen asleep, heard an
PEOPLE V MARAMARA G.R. No. 110994 PARDO; October 22, 1999 (rean) NATURE Appeal from RTC Decision FACTS - Cresencio Maramara was convicted of murder for killing Miguelito Donato. He now appeals to SC. - Prosec Version: At a benefit dance held in the yard of accused Maramaras house in the evening of Nov. 18, 1991 and at about 12 mn, while Ricardo Donato was dancing with a certain Rowena, Dante Arce, a friend of accused, approached Ricardo and boxed him on the chest. Rowena ran away while Ricardo scampered toward the fence for safety. Miguelito Donato was about 2 meters away from where Ricardo Donato stayed at the fence. Accused took his handgun tucked in his waist and fired at victim Miguelito, hitting the latter on the left breast. Ricardo tried to help his fallen brother but somebody struck Ricardos head with an iron bar which knocked him out for about 3 minutes. When Ricardo regained consciousness, he hurried home and informed his parents of what happened to their son Miguelito. - Miguelitos father, Regarder, immediately went to the crime scene and rushed Miguelito to the Hospital where the latter died. Before Miguelito expired, Regarder asked who shot him and Miguelito replied that it was accused. - Defense Version: At about 11p,pm., brothers Ricardo and Miguelito arrived at the benefit dance and
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that her husband was already boloed before the light was snuffed out. With regard to alleged incredible assertions, i.e. that it was very unusual that she remained silent while witnessing the attack on her husband. The transcripts showan answer to the misgivings by showing that she was scared of being boloed as well which the court finds reasonable. With regard to the assertion that Simeona only pointed to the accused as the killer because he was a hated criminal in the locality No. There was certainty in the identification of Molo. WON Simeona's account is contrary to physical facts (i.e how Molo stabbed her husband) No it is not. To simply thrust a bolo at a lying person is not as forceful as to hack him with it. The first is an awkward if not difficult movement, but the second is natural and can be done with facility. WON Simeona could have been able to recognize Molo (given that he was at the foot of the stairs and there is a banana plant obstructing the moonlight) Yes. Simeona testified that the banana plants did not obstruct the light cast by the moon and the defense did not disprove this fact. Indeed, Simeona had no difficulty in recognizing the accused, considering that their house was only elevated by two steps and at the time she saw him through the dilapidated burl wall he was already at the foot of the stairs. WON the dying declarations should not be accorded credence because the victim could not have recognized his assailant, since as testified by Simeona he was asleep when attacked No, it was only at the initial stage of the attack when the victim was asleep, because he was awakened by the first blows and stood up to defend himself. The statements of Venancio Identifying Dominador Molo as his assailant to Alejandro, his son, and Roman, his neighbor are dying declarations. Considering the nature and extent of the wounds, eight in all, Venancio must have realized the seriousness of his condition and it can therefore be inferred that he made the incrimination under the conciousness of impending death, which, in fact, supervened barely 41/2 hours after he was boloed. Disposition
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PEOPLE V BASAY G.R. No. 86941 DAVIDE, JR.; March 3, 1993 (anton) NATURE Automatic appeal to the SC for penalty of life imprisonment (case: life imprisonment not provided in the RPC. It is not the same as reclusion perpetua) FACTS - Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez were charged with Multiple Murder with Arson in a criminal complaint filed on March 24, 1986 with the MCTC of Pamplona in Negros Oriental for allegedly killing the spouses Zosimo and Beatrice Toting and their six-year old daughter, Bombie, and for burning the said spouses' house to conceal the crime, resulting in the death of another daughter, Manolita. - April 15, 1986: the accused filed a Waiver of Preliminary Investigation, prompting the MCTC to forward the records to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. - August 14, 1986: the Integrated National Police (INP) Station Commander of Pamplona amended the complaint by including the name of another victim, Manolo Toting, who suffered second and third degree burns because of the burning of the house. - December 11, 1986: the Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental an Information for Multiple Murder and Frustrated Murder with Arson against the accused. - After both accused entered a not guilty plea during their arraignment on 23 February 1987, trial on the merits ensued. - December 15, 1988: the RTC promulgated its Decision acquitting accused Basay but convicting Ramirez. - The evidence for the prosecution upon which the decision is based is summarized in the RTCs decision, and contains the following: Zosimo Toting, Sr. Beatrice Toting, Manolita Toting and Manolo Toting were found near the vicinity of the burned house. About 40 meters away, the investigating officers found six year old Bombie
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services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. - The purported extra-judicial confession belonging to appellant Jaime Ramirez and obtained during custodial interrogation was taken in blatant disregard of his right to counsel, to remain silent and to be informed of such rights, guaranteed by Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 (and 1987) Constitution. - No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it is in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. - Elpedio Catacutan was not yet a lawyer, only a barrister. Even if he were called on as counsel, he was not present during the custodial investigation. Securing counsel to help the accused when the latter subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late and had no palliative effect; it did not cure the absence of counsel at the time of the custodial investigation when the extra-judicial statement was being taken. 2. NO Ratio The trial court itself ruled that Bombie was not a competent witness. Her condition at the time she supposedly gave her statement made it impossible for her to have communicated effectively. Reasoning - Bombie suffered the following injuries: Infected hack wound from the right anterior lumbar area transecting mid abdomen, inguinal area left to the medial thigh left through and through, with necrotic transected muscle. - She was taken from the crime scene only on 6 March 1986, or 2 days after the commission of the crime, and died in the hospital on March 7, 1986. Dr. Edgar Cantalao (doctor who attended to Bombie before she died) testified that when he last saw Bombie alive, she could not talk. It was this inability to talk which led the trial court to express its doubts on the veracity of the latter's supposed statement. RTC:
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was positioned at that time. Although there was a gemilina tree growing in the space in between his house and the store of Artemio, the same did not block his view of Artemio. Likewise, the coconut trees and young banana plants growing at the scene of the crime did not affect his view. -At the same instance, Ernita was also in their kitchen preparing milk for her baby who was then lying on the floor of their kitchen. When she was about to put the bottle into the babys mouth, she suddenly heard the sound of a gunburst followed by a shout, Help me Pre, I was shot by the captain. She immediately pushed open the window of their kitchen and saw the accused wearing a black jacket and camouflage pants running towards the direction of the back portion of Litos house. From there, the accused crossed the street and disappeared. Ernita saw the accused carrying a long firearm which looked like an M-14 rifle and also sensed that accused had some companions with him because she heard the crackling sound of the dried leaves around the place. She had a clear view of accused at that time because their place was well-illumined by the full moon that night and by the two (2) fluorescent lamps in their store. She immediately went out of their house and ran towards Artemio who tried to speak to her but could not do so because his mouth was full of blood. She repeatedly called her neighbors for help; a few responded to her calls and approached them; no brgy tanod or any member of the CFO and CAFGU came to help. -While waiting for the police, Ernita did not allow Artemios body to be touched by anybody. After more than 2hours, [around 10pm] the police arrived, together with a photographer named Fe Mendez who took pictures of the crime scene. Ernita and Lito then approached PO2 Operario and informed him that accused was the one responsible for the shooting. PO2 Operario stayed at the crime scene for about 1hour and waited for the funeral vehicle to pick up the body of Artemio. When the funeral hearse arrived, PO2 Operario told the crew to load Artemios body into the vehicle. Thereafter, he then boarded again their mobile car together with Lito Santos. -Armed with the information that accused was the one responsible for the shooting of Artemio, PO2 Operario proceeded to the house of accused and informed him that he was a suspect in the killing of Artemio. He then invited accused to go with him to the police station and also to bring along with him his M-14 rifle. Accused did
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-Defense witness Ronito Bedero testified that on the night Artemio Pantinople was shot, he was at his house and he saw an unidentified armed man flee from the crime scene who later joined two other armed men near a nangka tree not far from where deceased was shot. All three later fled on foot towards the direction of the Purok Center in Brgy Gatungan. He noticed that one of the three men was armed with a rifle but could not make out their identities since the area where the three men converged was a very dark place. After the three men disappeared, he saw from the opposite direction Marturillas and his team of kagawads and 3 SCAA members going to the scene of the crime but they did not reach the crime scene. A little later, he saw the Marturillas group return to where they came from. -Dominador Lapiz testified that he was one of the first persons who went to the crime scene where he personally saw the body of deceased lying at a very dark portion some distance from the victims house and that those with him at that time even had to light the place with a lamp so that they could clearly see the deceased. He also testified that there were many coconut and other trees and bananas in the crime scene. He also testified that the house of Lito Santos was only about 4meters from the crime scene, while the house of victim-Artemio Pantinople was about FIFTY (50) meters away. He testified that there was no lighted fluorescent at the store of deceased at the time of the shooting. His testimony also revealed that when the responding policemen arrived, Lito Santos immediately approached the policemen, volunteered himself as a witness and even declared that he would testify that it was Marturillas who shot Artemio Pantinople. He further testified that immediately after he went to the crime scene, the widow of the victim and the children were merely shouting and crying and it was only after the policemen arrived that the widow uttered in a loud voice, Kapitan nganong gipatay mo ang akong bana? Ruling of RTC and CA: -The guilt of petitioner had been established beyond reasonable doubt. He was positively identified as the one running away from the crime scene immediately after the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of the victim himself that he had been shot by the captain, clearly established the latters complicity in the crime. -No ill motive could be ascribed to the prosecution witnesses. Thus, their positive, credible and unequivocal testimonies were accepted as sufficient to
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Re: Statements Uttered Contemporaneous with the Crime -It was to be expected that, after seeing the victim stagger and hearing the cry for help, Santos would shift his attention to the person who had uttered the plea Help me pre, I was shot by the captain. A shift in his focus of attention would sufficiently explain why Santos was not able to see the assailant. Santos never pointed to petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime. His statements corroborated those of Ernita and therefore simply added credence to the prosecutions version of the facts. If it were true that he had an ulterior motive, it would have been very easy for him to say that he had seen petitioner shoot the victim. Re: Dying Declaration -Rule 130.37: The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. -Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of death, are entitled to the highest degree of credence and respect. Persons aware of an impending death have been known to be genuinely truthful in their words and extremely scrupulous in their accusations. The dying declaration is given credence, on the premise that no one who knows of ones impending death will make a careless and false accusation. Hence, not infrequently, pronouncements of guilt have been allowed to rest solely on the dying declaration of the deceased victim. -To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarants death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death; 3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a declarant competent to testify as a witness, had that person been called upon to testify. -The law does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death. The perception may be established from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the declarants injury and conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness of impending death. Even if
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block. This showed petitioners antagonism towards the victim. -These pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it was petitioner who shot and killed the victim. Where an eyewitness saw the accused with a gun seconds after the gunshot and the victims fall, the reasonable conclusion is that the accused had killed the victim. -To be sure, conviction in a criminal case does not require a degree of proof that, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. That some pieces of the above-mentioned evidence are circumstantial does not diminish the fact that they are of a nature that would lead the mind intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, toward the conviction of petitioner. Circumstantial, vis--vis direct, evidence is not necessarily weaker. Re: Paraffin Test & Corpus Delicti - The negative paraffin test result and the prosecutions failure to present the gun used in the shooting is not enough to exculpate the accused from the crime. The choice of what evidence to present, or who should testify as a witness is within the discretionary power of the prosecutor and definitely not of the courts to dictate. -A negative paraffin test result is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. It is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when culprits wear gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or are bathed in perspiration. -The prosecution was able to give sufficient proof of the corpus delicti -- the fact that a crime had actually been committed. [Corpus delicti] is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved by the testimony of eyewitnesses. In its legal sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered, to the firearms in the crime of homicide with the use of unlicensed firearms, to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom, or x x x to the seized contraband cigarettes. Re: Alibi -As held by the CA: [Petitioners] alibi is utterly untenable. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Here, the locus criminis was only several meters away from [petitioners] home. In any event, this defense
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tendency is toward the extension of the rule admitting spontaneous declarations to meet the needs of justice when other evidence of the same fact cannot be procured. - Justices Street, Malcolm, and Ostrand: the court erred in not admitting Exhibit 1 as the statement of a fact against penal interest. Had Exhibit 1 been received, it is believed that its influence would have been felt by the trial court. Without Exhibit 1, the appellate court is bound by the appreciation of the evidence made in the trial court, and could, with little propriety, set aside the findings made by a learned trial judge. The case calls for an examination of the right of the courts to receive in evidence documents of the character of Exhibit 1. - Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said on high authority, is excluded by courts in the United States that adhere to the principles of the common law. One universally recognized exception concerns the admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits the reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to their own pecuniary or proprietary interest. But the general rule is stated to be that the declarations of a person other than accused confessing or tending to show that he committed the crime are not competent for accused on account of the hearsay doctrine. - Professor Wigmore attempted to demonstrate the false premises on which the arbitrary limitation to the hearsay rule rests. He shows that the limitation is inconsistent with the language originally employed in stating the principle and is unjustified on grounds of policy. - Donnelly vs. United States: The rues of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and common sense, less hampered by history than some parts of the substantive law. There is no decision by this court against the admissibility of such a confession; the English cases since the separation of the two countries do not bind us; the exception to the hearsay rule in the case of declarations against interest is well known; no other statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder; it is far more calculated to convince than dying declarations, which would be let in to hang a man; and when we surround the accused with so many safeguards, some of which seem to me excessive; I think we ought to give him the benefit of a fact that, if proved, commonly would have such weight. The history of the law and the arguments against the
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- PAR. 1477. Same: Policy of this Limitation. It is plain enough that this limitation, besides being a fairly modern novelty, is inconsistent with the broad language originally employed in stating the reason and principle of the present exception (ante, pars. 1457, 1476) as well as with the settled principle upon which confessions are received (ante, par. 1475). - But, furthermore, it cannot be justified on grounds of policy. The only plausible reason of policy that has ever been advanced for such a limitation is the possibility of procuring fabricated testimony to such a admission if oral. This is the ancient rusty weapon that has always been drawn to oppose any reform in the rules of evidence, viz., the argument of danger of abuse. This would be a good argument against admitting any witnesses at all, for it is notorious that some witnesses will lie and that it is difficult to avoid being deceived by their lies. The truth is that any rule which hampers an honest man in exonerating himself is a bad rule, even if it also hampers a villain in falsely passing for an innocent. - The only practical consequences of this unreasoning limitation are shocking to the sense of justice; for, in its commonest application, it requires, in a criminal trial, the rejection of a confession, however well authenticated, of a person deceased or insane or fled from the jurisdiction (and therefore quite unavailable) who has avowed himself to be true culprit. The absurdity and wrong of rejecting indiscriminately all such evidence is patent. - The rulings already in our books cannot be thought to involve a settled and universal acceptance of this limitation. In the first place, in almost all of the rulings the declarant was not shown to be deceased or otherwise unavailable as a witness, and therefore the declaration would have been inadmissible in any view of the present exception (ante, par. 1456). Secondly, in some of the rulings (for example, in North Carolina) the independent doctrine (ante, pars. 139-141) was applicable that, in order to prove the accused's noncommission of the offense by showing commission by another person, not merely one casual piece of evidence suffices but a "prima facie" case resting on several concurring pieces of evidence must be made out. Finally, most of the early rulings had in view, not the present exception to the hearsay rule, but the doctrine of admissions (ante, pars. 1076, 1079) that the admissions of one who is not a co-conspirator cannot affect others jointly charged.
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at eight o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay. The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. *In this case, Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against penal interest and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr. Felicisimo testified that on 24 June 1989 while he was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed Malaspina in "retaliation;" that he even showed him the knife he used and asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail and, if possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives of the deceased. The following day however he learned that the selfconfessed killer was gone and that petitioner had been arrested for a crime he did not commit. For his part, Station Commander P/Sgt. Conde, Jr., testified that after the criminal information for murder was filed on 26 July 1989, petitioner met Felicisimo who informed him of the disclosure by Zoilo. Conde then advised Felicisimo that if it was true that it was Zoilo who fatally stabbed Malaspina Felicisimo must persuade Zoilo to surrender. Conde then personally went to Barangay San Isidro to investigate. There he was told by the townsfolk that Zoilo had already fled. ISSUE WON the admission against penal interest allegedly made by Zoilo Fuentes can be accepted in this case HELD NO RATIO One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true,
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The defense asserts that Openda, Jr. was a drug-pusher who was arrested by the police, and thus not kidnapped. TC: Bernal guilty beyond kidnapping Openda, Jr. reasonable doubt weight of to
Bernal: TC committed error in giving prosecutions witnesses testimony. SC: No error. TC affirmed.
Bernal conspired with the two Does. Proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only. The circumstances here sufficiently indicate Bernals participation. Circumstance A Testimony of Sagario, Bernals childhood friend and neighbor: He saw Bernal at the billiard hall at 11am with two companions. He overheard Bernal dispatch one of his companions to Tarsings Store to check if a certain person is still there, which person turned out to be Openda, Jr. Upon confirmation of Openda, Jr.s presence, the three men left the billiard hall. Minutes later, a handcuffed Openda, Jr. passed by the billiard hall with Bernals companions. Circumstance B Testimony of Racasa, Bernals neighbor and compadre, who narrated the facts as found by the TC. Circumstance C Testimony of Enriquez, a tailor and Openda, Jr.s friend: That sometime in January 1991 Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernals wife Naty were having an affair. SC: Natys infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge. Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction. Openda. Jr.s revelation to Enriquez is admissible in evidence as a declaration against interest which has the following requisites:
PEOPLE V THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN & PETER DOE (June 19, 97) Romero [maem] Facts accdg to TC: Around 11:30am of August 1991 Rasaca and Openda, Jr. are drinking. The two invited Bernal who was passing by. After a few minutes Bernal leaves, saying he has to fetch his son. After Bernal left, two men (the Does) arrived, approached Openda, Jr. asking him if he was Payat. When Openda, Jr. said yes, one of the two men suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other handcuffed Openda, Jr. who was told not to run because theyre policemen and he had a score to settle with them. With that they hastily took him away. The prosecution established through Enriquez testimony (which includes Openda, Jr.s declaration against his own interest) that Bernal kidnapped Openda, Jr. because the latter had an illicit affair with Bernals wife Naty.
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property all in Prudencios name since tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership. - Upon appeal to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC decision. The CA found as meritorious Prudencios contention that since petitioner failed to formally offer in evidence any documentary evidence, there is nothing to refute the evidence offered by respondent. - It ruled that the trial courts statement that Parels occupancy of the house is due to a special power of attorney executed by his parents most specially the deceased Florentino Parel who is in fact a co-owner of said building" is wanting of any concrete evidence on record. - The said power of attorney was never offered, hence, could not be referred to as evidence to support Parels claim. - Except for the bare testimonies of Candelario Regua, the carpenter-foreman, that it was Florentino who constructed the house and Corazon Garcia, the former barangay captain, who testified that the lot was allocated to Florentino, there was no supporting document which would sufficiently establish factual bases for the TCs conclusion; and that the rule on offer of evidence is mandatory. - An affidavit dated September 24, 1973 was issued by Florentino. The said affidavit stated that Prudencio, not Florentino, was the owner of the house. The CA found the affidavit to be conclusive proof of Prudencios sole ownership of the house since it was a declaration made by Florentino against his interest. - The CA also found the tax declarations and official receipts representing payments of real estate taxes of the questioned property covering the period 1974 to 1992 sufficient to establish Prudencios case which constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. ISSUES WON Parel was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that his father was a co-owner of the subject two-storey residential house HELD YES
That it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; [With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present provision, it is safe to assume that interest has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal here, the affair with Naty was a crime.] That at the time he made said declaration, the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his interest; [Openda, Jr. advised Naty not to do it {giving him money for motel} again because she was a married woman.] That the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true. [No sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.] Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself.
PAREL V PRUDENCIO G.R. 146556 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; April 19, 2006 (aida) NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - February 27, 1992 Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Parel. Prudencio alleged that he owned a two-storey residential house in Baguio City, the construction of which was funded by his own money and declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 47048. The construction began in 1972 and was completed after three years. - In 1973, when the second storey of the house was undergoing construction, Prudencio allowed Parels
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Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 ROC FACTS: - PFPI is a domestic corporation engaged in the publication of Philippine Free Press Magazine, a widely circulated political magazine. It enjoyed considerable prestige and a high profit margin prior to the declaration of Martial Law. Its main office was in Pasong Tamo, Makati. - During the 1965 elections, PFPI supported Diosdado Macapagal against Ferdinand Marcos. Upon the election of Marcos and prior to Martial law, PFPI printed numerous articles highly critical of the Marcos administration, exposing the corruption and abuses of the regime. PFPI likewise ran a series of articles exposing the plan of the Marcoses to impose a dictatorship in the guise of Martial Law. - In the evening of Sept 20, 1972, soldiers surrounded the Free Press Building, forced out its employees at gunpoint and padlocked the said establishment. The soldier in charge informed Teodoro Locsin, Jr., son of Teodoro Locsin, Sr., President of PFPI, that Martial Law had been declared and that they were to take over the building and to close the printing press. - On Sept 21, 1972, Locsin, Sr. was arrested, brought to Camp Crame, and subsequently transferred to Fort Bonifacio. - In Dec, 1972, Locsin, Sr. was informed that no charges were to be filed against him and that he was to be provisionally released subject to the following conditions: (1) he remained (sic) under city arrest; xxx (5) he was not to publish the Philippine Free Press nor was he to do, say or write anything critical of the Marcos administration. - Consequently, publication of the Philippine Free Press ceased. The building remained padlocked and under heavy military guard. This led to the financial ruin of PFPI. Its situation was further aggravated when its employees demanded the payment of separation pay. Its minority stockholders also made demands that Locsin, Sr. buy out their shares. - On separate occasions in 1973, Locsin, Sr. was approached by Atty. Crispin Baizas with offers from Pres Marcos for the acquisition of PFPI. Locsin, Sr. refused. A few months later, Sec Guillermo De Vega, reiterated Marcoss offer to purchase the name and the assets of PFPI. - mid-1973, Brig. Gen. Hans Menzi, former aide-decamp of Pres Marcos, contacted Locsin, Sr. concerning
PHILIPPINE FREE PRESS, INC v CA (LIWAYWAY PUBLISHING, INC) G.R. No. 132864 GARCIA; Oct 24, 2005 (kooky) NATURE:
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- CA, in rejecting PFPIs posture of vitiation of consent, observed: xxx the testimonies of Locsin, Sr. and Locsin, Jr. regarding Menzis alleged implied threat that Marcos cannot be denied and that Liwayway was to be the corporate vehicle for Marcoss takeover of the Free Press is hearsay as Menzi already passed away and is no longer in a position to defend himself It is clear from the provisions of Sec 36, Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence that any evidence, . . . is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand. Consequently, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule - SC: Evidence of statement made or a testimony is hearsay if offered against a party who has no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Hearsay evidence is excluded precisely because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of or is bereft of opportunity to cross-examine the persons to whom the statements or writings are attributed. - Sec 38, Rule 130 ROC, an exception to the hearsay rule, reads: Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successorsin-interest and against third persons. - In assessing the probative value of Menzis supposed declaration against interest, i.e., that he was acting for Pres Marcos when he purportedly coerced Locsin, Sr. to sell the Free Press property, it cannot be given evidentiary weight as PFPI wants. The Locsins can hardly be considered as disinterested witnesses. They are likely to gain the most from the annulment of the subject contracts. Moreover, allegations of duress or coercion should, like fraud, be viewed with utmost caution. They should not be laid lightly at the door of men whose lips had been sealed by death. Francisco explains why: It has been said that of all evidence, the narration of a witness of his conversation with a dead person is esteemed in justice the weakest. One reason for its unreliability is that the alleged declarant can not recall
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Pedigree
MENDOZA VS CA
201 SCRA 675 CRUZ; September 24, 1991
FACTS - The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day. The trial court believed him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court. - The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child. - Casimiro, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiffs allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees. - Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that her father was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. When she married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. - Lolito corroborated his mother and said he considered Casimiro his grandfather because Teopista said so. - Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro. Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro. Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which eventually resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant and giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be given to Brigida at Teopista's baptism. Casimiro also gave him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida.
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Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light of Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows: Sec. 39 Act or declarations about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. - To set the record straight, it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's illegitimate daughter. - Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because "it is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. Nevertheless, precisely because of its nature as hearsay evidence, there are certain safeguards against its abuse. - Commenting on this provision, Francisco enumerates the following requisites that have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence: 1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify. 2. The pedigree must be in issue. 3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue. 4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose. 5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration. - All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the
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paid for MONINA's tuition fees. However, expenses for books, school supplies, uniforms and the like were shouldered by FRANCISCO. At the start of each semester, MONINA would show FRANCISCO that she was enrolled, then he would ask her to canvass prices, then give her the money she needed. After finishing two semesters at University of San Agustin, as evidenced by her transcript of records she transferred to De Paul College, just in front of Mrs. Francos house, and studied there for a year. Thereafter, MONINA enrolled at Western Institute of Technology (WIT), where she obtained a bachelors degree in Commerce in April 1967. During her senior year, she stayed with Eusebio and Danthea Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said couple. She passed the CPA board exams in 1974, and took up an M.B.A. at De La Salle University as evidenced by her transcript (Exh. AA), wherein FRANCISCO was likewise listed as Guardian In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge Romeo Callejo of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48. As additional witnesses, FRANCISCO presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iigo Supertisioso, Lourdes Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores Argenal. FRANCISCO declared that Pansays employment ceased as of October, 1944, and that while employed by him, Pansay would sleep with the other female helpers on the first floor of his residence, while he, his wife and daughter slept in a room on the second floor. At that time, his household staff was composed of three (3) female workers and two (2) male workers. After Pansay left in October 1944, she never communicated with him again, neither did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly denied having had sexual relations with Pansay and disavowed any knowledge about MONINAs birth. In the same vein, he denied having paid for MONINAs tuition fees, in person or otherwise, and asserted that he never knew that Mr. Lagarto paid for these fees. Moreover, FRANCISCO could not believe that Lagarto would pay for these fees despite absence of instructions or approval from FRANCISCO. He likewise categorically denied that he told anyone, be it Danthea Lopez, Zafiro Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong or Remedios Franco, that MONINA was his daughter.
FRANCISCO L. JISON, vs. CA and MONINA JISON G.R. No. 124853 1998 J. DAVIDE, JR. (SJ) NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS In her complaint filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her
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evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth. REASONING (FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE RATIO) With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant controversy. FRANCISCOs arguments that he could not have had sex with MONINAs mother deserve scant consideration. While it has been observed that unlawful intercourse will not be presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for such indulgence, this does not favor FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances, the only witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual act themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victims or mothers word, as against the accuseds or putative fathers protestations. In the instant case, MONINAs mother could no longer testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she had, unfortunately, passed away long before the institution of the complaint for recognition. But this did not mean that MONINA could no longer prove her filiation. The fact of her birth and her parentage may be established by evidence other than the testimony of her mother. The paramount question then is whether MONINAs evidence is coherent, logical and natural. The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge of Pansay by about the end of 1945. We agree with MONINA that this was broad enough to cover the fourth quarter of said year, hence her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be attributed to sexual relations between FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother. In any event, since it was established that her mother was still in the employ of FRANCISCO at the time MONINA was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact between FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother was not at all impossible, especially in light of the overwhelming evidence, as hereafter shown, that FRANCISCO fathered MONINA, has recognized her as his daughter and that MONINA has been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter.
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the Civil Code.
1
NOTE THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE FAMILY CODE HERE. THE COURT SAID THAT IT MAY BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED SINCE IT WILL NOT PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES AS THEY ARE BOTH ALIVE AND HENCE, IN THE POSITION TO DEFEND THEMSELVES ADEQUATELY.
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Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the persons preferred who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus: Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; XXX Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person, thus: Sec. 2 Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x" An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters of administration, respondent alleged that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased, implying that he is an interested person in the estate and is considered as next of kin. But has respondent established that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased? On this point, this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, held: "The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a
SOLINAP V LOCSIN G.R. No. 146737 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ: December 10, 2001 (da) FACTS: -Eleven (11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed a "Petition for Letters of Administration" praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He allegedthat he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin and that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent. -January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondent's petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name. -January 5, 1993 , another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the statute of limitations. -The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and opposition dated January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein respondent and the deceased. -To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D") of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D" contains the information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was machine
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Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not appear. -In Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar: "Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child." (Emphasis ours) -The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeal where this Court said that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity." -A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.18 Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth. At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General. -Respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not
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- Certification by the OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there was no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez - Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F. Poe - Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds of Pangasinan in the name of Lorenzo Pou, - Copies of tax declarations under the name of Lorenzo Pou - Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou - Copy of marriage contract of Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley -Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos, Pangasinan stating that the records of the birth of the said office from 1900 to May 1946 were destroyed during World War II - January 23, 2004 COMELEC dismissed the Fornier petition for lack of merit. Fornier filed MFR (denied) ISSUE/S 1. WON FPJ can be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he materially misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino HELD 1. NO Ratio While the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Phils., the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. Reasoning Quick version: In ascertaining whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Phils. was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have
TECSON V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GR 161434 VITUG; March 3, 2004 (maia) NATURE This is a consolidation of 3 petitions, all assailing the citizenship of Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). The two petitions (Tecson v COMELEC and Velez v Poe, Jr.) were dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction (the petitions were filed in the SC, without going through the COMELEC). Thus, only one petition was considered by SC (Fornier v COMELEC). Such petition was filed under Rule 64 of ROC (Review of Decision of COMELEC) FACTS - Quick Facts: FPJ was allegedly disqualified from being a candidate for President because he was not a naturalborn citizen. Allegedly, he was born to an American mother and a Spanish father. Alternatively, even granting that the father was Filipino, FPJ could not have inherited the Philippine citizenship because he was illegitimate (father had a prior subsisting marriage, thus marriage to mother was bigamous; or even granting there was no prior marriage, FPJ was born one year prior to the marriage of his parents, thus still illegit). Long Facts: On Dec.31, 2003, FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for President under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP). In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born citizen. His real name was stated to be Fernando, Jr. or Ronald Allan Poe, born in Manila on August 20, 1939. - Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen.
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- 1935 Constitution provided jus sanguinis (blood relationship) as basis for citizenship, as indicated in Sec. 1, Art. 3 (defining citizens): (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Phils (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Phils and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law - 1973 Constitution Corrected Sec. 1, Art. 3 (4) of the 1935 Constitution, which, when taken together with the existing civil law provisions would provide that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands. This was deemed discriminatory in that it incapacitated the Filipino woman from transmitting her citizenship to her legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. 3, 1973 Constitution state that the ff are citizens of the Phils: - Those who are citizens of the Phils at the time of the adoption of this Constitution - Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Phils - Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the 1935 Constitution - Those who are naturalized in accordance with law - Add Sec. 2 of the same article which provided that a female citizen of the Phils who marries an alien retainers her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission she is deemed to have renounced her citizenship under the law. - 1987 Constitution aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution and outlines in Article 4, Sec. 1 that the following are Filipino citizens: - Those who are citizens of the Phils at the time of the adoption of this Constitution - Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Phils - Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority - Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Concept of Citizenship in the Phils from the Spanish times to the present - Spanish period: no such term as Philippine citizens, only Spanish subjects. In church records, natives were identified as indios. Although there were a lot of Spanish laws on citizenship, not all these were extended to the Phils. It was only in the Civil Code of Spain (which became effective in the Phils 1889) where a categorical enumeration of Spanish citizens were made, viz: a. Persons born in Spanish territory b. Children of a Spanish father or mother even if they were born outside Spain c. Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers d. Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy - Article 10 of the Treaty of Paris stated that the civil and political status of the native inhabitants would be determined by the US Congress. Spanish subjects and natives who choose to remain in the territory may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making a declaration of their decision within a year from the date of the ratification of the treaty. If no such declaration is made, their allegiance shall be held renounced and they would have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside. Upon ratification of the treaty, the native inhabitants of the Phils ceased to be Spanish subjects. They did not become American citizens either but were issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Phils entitled to protection of the US. - in the Philippine Bill of 1902, it was provided that all inhabitants of the Phil. Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects in the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in said islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Phil Islands (this is what they call the Filipinization en masse) -under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of Phils was deemed to be a citizen as of 11 April 1899 if he was (1) a subject of Spain on said date, (2) residing in the Phils on said date, and (3) since that date, not a ctizen of some other country.
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precluded from being applicable by the CC or FC provisions. Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court: Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. - For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. - Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, do hereby declare that: 3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the Phils. as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ. 9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944. 18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
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municipal civil register contains no record of the Gravadors birth. - Gravador filed a suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages in CFI Negros Oriental as he asked the court to adjudge him entitled to the office of principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School and to order payment of not only his back salaries but also damages in the total amount of P52,400. - TC: (1) concluded that the post-war records were intended to replace the pre-war records and therefore the correct date of birth is December 11, 1901; (2) took into account the verified answer in a cadastral proceeding in CFI Negros Oriental, dated March 15, 1924, filed by the Gravadors brother where it was stated that he was one of the co-owners of a piece of land and at the time he was 23 years old. TC granted his petition - Respondents Claim: (1) TC erred in placing full reliance on the post-war records because these records were made only because it was thought that the prewar records had been lost or destroyed, but as some pre-war records had since been located, the date contained in the pre-war records should be regarded as controlling; and (2) the finding of the Superintendent of Schools that Gravador was born on November 26, 1897 is an administrative finding that should not be disturbed by the court. ISSUE WON TC erred in giving full reliance on post war records and verified answer by Gravadors brother in a cadastral proceeding (PEDIGREE) HELD NO - The findings of fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts if supported by substantial evidence is a settled rule of administrative law. But where there is substantial evidence supporting the finding of the Superintendent of Schools is precisely the issue in this case. - Cogent Reasons why TC did not err in its findings (1) although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition. Even in his application for back pay which he filed with the Department of Finance, through the
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aforementioned void in the proof of respondent's citizenship has been duly filled. - The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person, birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare. - Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive. Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from persons who are not members of the family - the reason for the distinction is the public interest that is taken in the question of the existence of marital relations. - The public reputation in Macalelon that Esteban was Ana's natural child, testified to by the witness, would constitute proof of the illegitimacy of the former. Besides, if Estaban were really born out of legal union, it is highly improbable that he would be keeping the surname "Mallare" after his mother, instead of adopting that of his father. And it would be straining the imagination to perceive that this situation was purposedly sought by Esteban's parents to suit some ulterior motives. In 1903, we can not concede that alien inhabitants of his country were that sophisticated or legally-oriented. - The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog (and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as being mere conclusions devoid of evidentiary value. The declarations were not only based on the reputation in the community regarding her race or race-ancestry, which is admissible in evidence, but they must have certain factual basis. - And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. Dispositive Upon the foregoing considerations, and on the basis of the original and additional evidence herein adduced the decision of this Court dated April 29, 1968, is hereby definitely set aside, and the complaint in this case is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
Common Reputation
IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE A.M. No. 533 FERNANDEZ; September 12, 1974 (glaisa)
FACTS - A decision was rendered by this Court on April 29, 1968, holding that by preponderance of evidence, it appeared that respondent Mallare's father, Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his mother admittedly being a Chinese, respondent is likewise a Chinese national. Consequently respondent Florencio Mallare was declared excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the bar was revoked, and he was ordered to return to this Court, the lawyer's diploma previously issued to him. - Respondent petitioned the Court for the reopening of the case and for new trial on the ground, inter alia, of newly discovered evidence, the introduction of which
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HELD In this case, the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses. These two witnesses were with the victim at the time that he was shot and they positively identified petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime. Their testimonies were corroborated by the testimony of another prosecution witness, SPO3 Jesus Patriarca, the police officer who investigated the incident. -Contrary to petitioners contention, the fact that Mascardo and Tad-y Benito worked for the victim does not in any way render their testimonies incredulous. Petitioner has not ascribed any ill motive on their part to wrongfully accuse him of the crime. In the absence thereof, their respective testimonies are not affected by their relationship to the victim. -Considering the positive identification of petitioner as the assailant of the victim by eyewitnesses to the crime, both the TC and CA gave scant consideration to petitioner's defense of denial and alibi. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. -Moreover, for alibi to prosper, petitioner must prove not only (1) that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but (2) it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. -To the mind of the Court, the distance between Sangandaan, Quezon City and Tondo, Manila does not preclude the possibility that petitioner could have been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at or about the time of its commission. -Alibi is a defense invariably viewed by the Court as weak. It is treated with disfavor simply because it is easily fabricated on the part of the accused, his friends, relatives and supporters. Petitioner's defense of alibi is thus unavailing especially in light of the clear and positive identification of him as the assailant by two credible eyewitnesses who had no motive to lie. The testimony of prosecution were alleged to be fraught with inconsistent and incredulous statements. The prosecution allegedly tried to portray the victim as a "pacifist" and that he was "meek as a lamb" when in fact he was a Lieutenant Colonel assigned to the headquarters of the Armed Forces. The victim was not
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decisionof the CA. FACTS -RTC of QC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. -Initially, the Information filed against petitioner charged him with homicide. Subsequently, the Information was amended charging petitioner with murder. At his arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. -Fr. Garabato, the deceased, hired Abundo Tad-y and Mario Mascardo in the construction of his house. On June 16, 1993, the two workers were unloading construction materials from a Ford Fiera owned and driven by Fr. Garabato. -The vehicle was parked in front of the house of the petitioner, SPO4 Pablo De La Cruz where another vehicle was also parked behind it. -The petitioner got upset with the deceased because he could not get his jeep out. Fr. Garabato moved the vehicle. At that moment, the two workers were standing behind the Ford Fiera, and they heard successive shots of gunfire. They instinctively turned their sights towards the origin of the gunshots; such that they saw smoke coming from the side of petitioner's jeep and saw petitioner seated in the driver's seat still holding his gun pointing towards the Ford Fiera. -Petitioner alighted from his jeep, walked towards Fr. Garabato's position, re-loaded his gun with another magazine and shot Fr. Garabato anew. Petitioner immediately left the scene on board his jeep. -Out of fear of their lives, the two workers ran to the house being constructed. About half an hour later, Mario Mascardo went back to the locus criminis and there he saw the helpless body of Fr. Garabato surrounded by several curious spectators and police officers. -Fr. Garabato's body was rushed to Quezon City General Hospital where he was pronounced DOA. The
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DAVIDE, JR.; Sep 27, 1999 (athe) NATURE: Appeal FACTS AVA (mother of Ethel) and LEEZEL (live-in partner of Ava; not the father of Ethel) were initially charged with serious physical injuries under Section 10, Article VI of R.A. NO. 7610.3 (Otherwise known as "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.") but later on the information was amended to charge them with the crime of parricide when the victim, ETHEL died. Ethel was beaten and mauled in the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly caused her death. Among the witnesses presented by the prosecution were Lilia Gojul (Avas sister), Michelle Torente (neighbor), Theresa Castillo (neighbor). Lilia Gojul used to live with her sister but was forced to leave as Avas household was not at all peaceful. One day Lilia visited Ava and her niece but she was shocked to see Ethel's appearance; her hair was shaven, her face was full of contusions, her neck had faded cigarette burns while her arms and legs had traces of pinching and maltreatment. She also had marks of "black-eye" on both eyes. Lilia also noticed Ethel's knees with contusions due to prolonged kneeling. When Lilia asked the little girl to identify who inflicted the injuries on her body, Ethel tearfully pointed to Ava and Leezel. Lilia confronted Ava about her and Leezel's treatment of Ethel The second witness, Michelle Torrente, testified that she was aghast to see Ethel shaven, with bruises all over her body and wounds in her arms and legs. Ethel also had cigarette burns, and when Michelle asked what happened, Ethel replied: "pinaso po ako." When Michelle further asked who burned her and caused her bruises, Ethel said, "Papa ko po," referring to Leezel Franco. The little girl's shaven head and bruises were also noticed by Theresa Castillo, an occupant of unit 115, adjacent to Ava's residence. When she asked Ethel's "yaya" why this was done to the little girl, the "yaya" answered, "parusa". AVA and LEEZEL were the witnesses presented by the defense.
-Even if the declaration was not to be considered as res gestae, the testimonies of Mascardo and Tad-y Benito positively identifying petitioner is sufficient to establish the latter's guilt. -CA correctly held that petitioner cannot avail himself of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. When petitioner went to the Sangandaan Police Station, he did so purportedly to clear his name. It was not his intention to submit himself to the authorities and assume responsibility for the death of the victim. To be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the voluntary surrender must be spontaneous. DISPOSITION WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. PEOPLE vs. CARIQUEZ GR 129304
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the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. Reasoning In this case the startling occurrences were the tortures inflicted on ETHEL, who when asked who caused them spontaneously pointed to AVA and LEEZEL. That some time may have lapsed between the infliction of the injuries and the disclosure, it must however, be pointed out that there has been no uniformity as to the interval of time that should separate the occurrence of the startling event from the making of the declarations. What is necessary is that the injuries sustained by ETHEL prior to the incident on 27 May 1996 were inflicted by AVA and LEEZEL. 2. NO. Ratio Circumstancial evidence is sufficient to convict provided the following requisites are present, namely: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived from are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.17 [Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court.] The circumstantial evidence must constitute an unbroken chain of events so as to lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the guilt of the accused. Reasoning In the Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General enumerates seven (7) circumstantial evidence which the trial court took in to account and relied upon as bases for its finding that AVA and LEEZEL, were criminally responsible for the death of ETHEL (testimony of Lilia, Michelle, Theresa, Dr Bienvenida, etc.) DISPOSITION : Decision of RTC finding Ava and Leezel guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Parricide and Homicide respectively is AFFIRMED. PEOPLE v VELASQUEZ G.R. Nos. 132635 & 14387275 MENDOZA; February 21, 2001 (jojo) NATURE An appeal from the decision of the RTC of Angeles City, convicting Lamberto Velasquez of (1) acts of lasciviousness committed against his granddaughter Aira Velasquez; and (2) rape of his stepdaughter Mary Joy Ocampo FACTS Velasquez was charged with acts of lasciviousness upon the person of AIRA VELASQUEZ, MARY JOY OCAMPO and KIMBERLY VELASQUEZ; and rape of MARY JOY OCAMPO. Velasquez pleaded not guilty to the charges against him, whereupon the cases were consolidated and jointly tried. The evidence for the prosecution: In October 1994, Mary Joy (stepdaughter of accused), then 13 years of age, slept in a room she shared with Velasquez, her mother Angelina, and her two half-brothers. When she woke up in the morning, she found the accused beside her on the floor, her mother having left for the market. He kissed her on the mouth and the breasts. Then he raised her shirt, pulled down her shorts and underwear, and kissed her private parts. Afterward, he inserted his middle finger into Mary Joys vagina. Mary Joy felt a sharp pain and tried to resist by kicking him, which made the latter remove his finger although he continued kissing her. He then left, but not before warning her to keep quiet and not to tell anyone what he had done to her. - 2 weeks later, still in October, while Mary Joy was watching television alone in the living room, Velasquez approached her and, though she tried to evade him, he succeeded in forcing her to their room. He lowered her shorts and underwear, raised her shirt and bra, and started kissing her. Then he inserted his middle finger into her vagina and later had sexual intercourse with her. Up to April 1997, Velasquez continuously molested Mary Joy, sometimes forcing her to masturbate him and at other times licking her vagina. - Regail (daughter of accused) has a daughter named Aira, 2 years old. On April 16, 1997, at 3PM, while Regail was folding clothes, Aira walked into the room crying. Aira complained that her grandfather did something to her, which she demonstrated by opening her right leg and moving one of her right fingers toward her vagina. Regail did not want to believe her daughter and thought that her father was just joking with the latter. However, Aira started to cry. In the days that followed, she noticed that Aira complained of pain in her vagina while taking a bath. When Regail asked her why her vagina hurt, Aira said it was because of the things her grandfather had been doing to her vagina, showing her mother what had been done to her.On
SEC. 42. Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequently thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
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the proceedings in the trial court were in accordance with law. So that where no objection has been made at the trial, appellant must be taken to have waived his right to a preliminary investigation if in fact he was not given the benefit thereof. Failing to raise the issue of lack of preliminary investigation during the trial, appellant is now estopped to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. At any rate, absence of preliminary investigation merely affects the regularity of the proceedings but does not affect the trial courts jurisdiction or impair the validity of the information. 2. NO. The trial court based its conviction of accusedappellant for acts of lasciviousness against Aira Velasquez on the testimony of Regail Velasquez, Airas mother, who testified on what her daughter had told her. Aira herself was not presented in court, being a mere child of two and a half years old. (pls see orig copy re testimony) - As the SolGen contends, Airas acts and statements constitute exceptions to the hearsay rule because they were part of the res gestae. The inculpatory and spontaneous statements were: (1) Si Tatang kakayan na ku pu. (Tatang (accused-appellant) has been doing something to me.) (2) I-tatang kasi, kinayi ne pu ing pekpek ku kaya masakit ya. (Because Tatang has been doing something to my private part, that is why it hurts.) (3) She showed her mother her private part, which was swollen and oozing with pus, and then she gestured, by slightly opening or raising her right foot and using her right finger, to show what accusedappellant had done to it. We hold that Airas statements and acts constitute res gestae, as it was made immediately subsequent to a startling occurrence, uttered shortly thereafter by her with spontaneity, without prior opportunity to contrive the same. Regails account of Airas words and, more importantly, Airas gestures, constitutes independently relevant statements distinct from hearsay and admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been thus uttered. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement
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sexual organ, her mother was in the market and when appellant finally succeeded in inserting his sexual organ into Mary Joys, nobody was at home except her other brothers who were asleep. Evidently, in both instances, Mary Joys mother was not in the house. - Inconsistencies on minor or inconsequential matters do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecutions evidence as a whole, nor detract from the witnesses testimony. On the contrary, they strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the prosecution witnesses because they erase the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. A rape victim cannot be expected to keep an accurate account of her traumatic experience. Discrepancies could be caused by the natural fickleness of human memory. Mary Joys testimony is corroborated by medical findings of hymenal lacerations, which the trial court found meritorious. On the other hand, accused merely makes a bare denial of the charges against him. Accused said that there was always a large number of people in their house, such that he would have had no opportunity to commit the crimes charged against him. Rape has been known to be committed in places ordinarily considered as unlikely. The scene of the rape is not always nor necessarily isolated or secluded. It can be committed in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside an occupied house, and even in a room where other members of the family are sleeping. Among couples with big families who live in cramped quarters, the presence of other members of the family is not necessarily a deterrent to the commission of this crime. In this case, it is not impossible for the rape to have taken place inside a small room with five occupants therein, including accused-appellant and Mary Joy. DISPOSITION: Decision of RTC of Angeles finding Velasquez guilty of acts of lasciviousness and of rape is affirmed.
ABALLE v PEOPLE FERNAN; March 15, 1990 G.R. No. 64086 (jojo) NATURE Direct appeal from the decision of the CFI of Davao City, finding petitioner Peter Paul Aballe guilty of homicide.
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confession is competent evidence to positively link the accused to the aforesaid killing. ( Pls see orig copy re testimony) The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offenses charged may be given in evidence against him. The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance. Compliance with the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation is not applicable to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner, whereby the accused orally admitted having slain the victim. - Inappropriateness of penalty discussed
PEOPLE VS. TAMPUS G.R. No. L-44690 AQUINO, March 28, 1980 (cha) NATURE Automatic review of CFI judgment convicting Tampus of murder, sentencing him to death; co-accused Avila was also sentenced to death in another case but did not appeal in this case because his sentence was already under review FACTS -Tampus and Avila, members of the Oxo gang, avenged the stabbing of their co-gang member Rosales by stabbing Saminado, a member of the Batang Mindanao gang which was a hostile group to the Oxo gang. The accused and the victims were all prisoners in the national penitentiary and are in the emergency ward. -How it happened: at around 10 am, Saminado went to the toilet. Tampus and Avila followed Saminado and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Tampus inflicted 8 incised wounds while Avila stabbed Saminado 9 times. Afterwards, the two surrendered to a prison guard their knives, saying "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami." Saminado died 11am upon arrival in the prison hospital. -the officer of the day investigated the incident right away. 2 days after the killing, another prison guard
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incriminatory statement obtained in violation thereof is expressly declared "inadmissible in evidence."
PEOPLE V REYES G.R. No. L-1846-48 BENGZON; January 18, 1948 (aida) NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI Pampanga FACTS - Vicente Gatchalian, Severino Austria, Pedro Reyes, Eusebio Perez, Gervasio Due and Marcelo Due were charged in two separate cases with the deaths of Benjamin Nery and Alfredo Laguitan. In another case, they were accused of causing physical injuries to Francisco Orsino. - April 19, 1946, Good Friday in Cacutud, Arayat, Pampanga While the pabasa was being performed, the appellants, assisted by Marcelo Due, Gervasio Due and one Peping and carrying pistols, approached Nery, Laguitan and Orsino who were members of the military police. - The three MPs were sitting on one corner, watching the proceedings. At gunpoint, the three MPs were driven to the road and when they were about ten meters away from where the pabasa was being done, they were shot from behind. Nery and Laguitan were killed instantly while Orsino fractured a leg which took 6 months to heal. - The motive for the killing was the conflict between the MPs and the Huks, the attackers being Huk members. - Six people testified for the prosecution, including Reyes. - Eusebio Perez said he was attending the pabasa and when he heard gunshots, he grabbed his wife and ran. The next day he saw three of the assailants including Maximo Austria and they said they were going into hiding because they had taken part in the shooting the night before. Perez did not mention Gatchalian. - Lt. Martinez testified that in the investigation conducted by Quintans, Gatchalian stated that each of them approached an MP and fired at them and that he was sure they would die. - Witnesses for the defense gave their own testimonies. - Segundo Guevara saw Gatchalian during the pabasa and when gunshots were heard, he saw Gatchalian run
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PEOPLE V TULAGAN G.R. No. L-68620 NARVASA; July 22, 1986 (rach)
FACTS - May 19, 1979: at about 11pm, Marlon Catungal, 19, died a violent death, succumbing to "Shock, due to severe hemorrhage, secondary to stab wound, anterior chest." - No one saw precisely how, where and when that single stab wound was inflicted, or by whom, but there seems to be no question (both prosecution and defense agreeing on this point) that the deceased was killed while attempting to flee from at least 2 men, identified as Freddie Eding Tulagan and Valentin "Satsoy" de Guzman. The chase began at or near the public hall of Bgy. Don Pedro, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, where a dance was being held on the occasion of the barrio fiesta, and ended, tragically for Catungal, at the porch (azotea) of the house of a certain Cesar Evangelista, some 300m away. The deceased appeared to have been carried, after he had been fatally stabbed, from the house of Evangelista to the shoulder of the provincial road about 10m away, where his corpse was later found by police investigators and barangay officials. - The only person with any claim to some sort of direct observation of the pursuit and its sanguinary ending is Bonifacio Ulanday, who gave a sworn statement before the provincial Fiscal at Dagupan City on June 6, 1979 and later testified before the TC. His version is as follows: 1. The chase began at the dance hall, at about 10pm, after Catungal was accosted by Satsoy and 3 other persons. 2. Catungal ran away when he saw Satsoy receive a "balisong" about a foot long from one of his companions. 3. Satsoy chased Catungal. His 3 other companions also chased Catungal. 4. Ulanday followed in such a way as to avoid being noticed by the pursuers, staying about 15m behind them. 5. Ulanday only lost sight of the 4 persons running after Catungal when said Catungal entered a certain yard; he did not witness how the 4 allegedly overtook Catunga;.he did not see any person who stabbed or killed Catungal. 6. Ulanday only saw 4 persons who lifted Catungal and placed him in front of a big house, at w/c time Catungal was motionless and blood was oozing from the body of Catungal; Ulanday also said in his statement before the Provincial Fiscal:
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Reasoning TC also said that: Aside from the evidence that accused Romeo Mendoza, Freddie Tulagan and Valentin de Guzman chased Marlon Catungal at May 19, 1979 at around 9pm, it was shown that upon the return of the three accused to the store at about 10:30pm, Natalia noticed blood stains on their hands and bodies. These circumstances and pieces of evidence have not been denied by accused Romie Mendoza. These constitute conclusive and decisive evidence of the guilt of accused Romeo Mendoza as one of the authors of the death of Marion Catungal. - This is completely contrary to the record. It is belied by the very decision itself, which in a later part states that Romie Mendoza DENIED that he appeared at Natalias store with Tulagan and de Guzman; and that he took part in the pursuit of the deceased. His counsel presented 2 witnesses who substantiated his denial. - TC also considers as an indication of guilt" the fact that Mendoza was arrested only 2yrs. after issuance of the warrant. - SC said that this signifies nothing insofar as the guilt of person arrested and his denial of complicity in the crime charged are concerned. Such circumstance can just as plausibly suggest that the officers charged with serving the warrant exhibited less than a desirable diligence and concern in the performance of that duty as that the accused person sought to hide himself and evade arrest. - Certain relevant and significant considerations prevent this Court from giving faith and credit to the evidence given by Natalia Macaraeg (failed to mention de Guzmans we killed him statement on either of her 2 sworn statements); and the same is true with respect to Bonifacio Ulanday (who claims to be a friend yet after seeing lifeless body did nothing and saw no cause to inform Catungal's family about the death of their son or to report that matter to Macaraeg. He kept silent about what he knew until he chanced to meet Catungal's father in Dagupan City 2 weeks after the event). The Court cannot bring itself to accept the testimonial declarations of these two witnesses, which form the pillars of the prosecution's case, and this, particularly in view of the firm denials of the accused and the exculpatory testimony of Victoriano Deldio and Andres Nevado, as to whom no clear motive or reason to subvert the truth to favor said accused has been shown. - Given the fact that the victim's last moments are veiled in obscurity insofar as what evidence has been
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BORROMEO V CA G.R. No. L-31342 BARREDO; April 7, 1976 (apple) NATURE Cross-petitions for the review of the per curiam resolution of the CA FACTS -The main controversy here centers on the true nature of the three documents, Exhibits A, B and C, which on their faces are unquestionably deeds of absolute sale of the real properties therein described executed by the deceased Simeon Rallos on various dates in favor of Emmanuel Aznar, in Exhibits A and C, and his sister, Alma Aznar, in Exhibit B. -In his complaint in the court below, Juan T. Borromeo, as administrator of the estate of Simeon Rallos, alleged that these documents were in fact equitable mortgages to secure loans granted to Rallos by Matias Aznar, deceased father of Emmanuel and Alma -The trial court dismissed the said complaint and on appeal, said dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its original decision -Crispina Rallos Alcantara, who claimed to have been present when the transactions took place, testified to the effect that her deceased father merely borrowed money from the late Matias Aznar in the sums of P6,000.00 and P35,000.00 and to secure the repayment thereof mortgaged to the latter the properties described in Exhibits A, B and C. She testified that the transactions were disguised as absolute sales and Rallos was assured by Matias Aznar that he could exercise the right to repurchase the lots and would deliver to him the corresponding options in writing. -According to Borromeo (appellant), Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5, which, according to Crispina Rallos Alcantara, were her notations allegedly representing the deductions made by Matias Aznar for advance interest, attorney's fees and miscellanous expenses are corroborative of her testimony that the transactions in controversy were really loans with mortgages. -The CA, in its original decision, found the testimony of Crispina Rallos Alcantara unreliable and insufficient to justify the reformation of the instruments in question. The CA stated: While it is true that relationship does not disqualify a witness, it calls for a close scrutiny of
AIR FRANCE vs. CARRASCOSO 18 SCRA 155 SANCHEZ; Sep 28, 1966 (athe) NATURE: Review on certiorari FACTS Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a 'first class' round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff traveled in 'first class', but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man', who, the Manager alleged, had a 'better right to the seat. When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued; plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane. After transferring to the tourist class seat, one flight attendant approached him and requested from him his ticket and said that she will note of his transfer. He refused because for him it is tantamount to accepting his transfer. Later, he went to the pantry that was next to him and the purser was there. He told him that he recorded the incident in his notebook. He read it and translated to him because it was recorded in French. "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist
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cannot have anymore credibility than her own declarations given under oath in open court. -The extensive and repeated arguments of the parties relative to the issue of whether or not self-serving statements may be admitted in evidence as parts of the res gestae are very interesting and illuminating, but they are rather off tangent. The notes supposedly prepared by witness Alcantara during the transaction between her father and the Aznars do not partake at all of the nature of hearsay evidence. If anything, they constitute memoranda contemplated in Section 10 or Rule 1323 which provides: -As may be observed, this provision applies only when it is shown beforehand that there is need to refresh the memory of the witness, which is not the case here. -It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he support his open-court declaration with written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence, which is exactly the case of Crispina Alcantara. Disposition Petition dismissed. The per curiam resolution of the CA appealed is hereby reversed and the original decision of that court is affirmed.
SEC. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such case the writing must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.
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an exception to the hearsay rule as part of res gestae (Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence) HELD 1. NO - The documentary evidence may be considered exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official records, nevertheless, none of these documents categorically stated that the perpetrators were members of the CPP/NPA. > police blotter: a group of persons accompanied by one (1) woman all believed to be CPP/NPA more or less 20 persons suspected to be CPP/NPA, > certification from the Bacolod Police station: some 20 or more armed men believed to be members of the New Peoples Army NPA, > fire investigation report: (I)t is therefore believed by this Investigating Team that the cause of the fire is intentional, and the armed men suspected to be members of the CPP/NPA were the ones responsible - All these documents show that indeed, the suspected executor of the fire were believed to be members of the CPP/NPA. But suspicion alone is not sufficient, preponderance of evidence being the quantum of proof. 2. NO - The only person who seems to be so sure that that the CPP-NPA had a hand in the burning of DYHB was Lt. Col. Torres. However, though his testimony is persuasive, it cannot be admit as conclusive proof that the CPP-NPA was really involved in the incident considering that he admitted that he did not personally see the armed men even as he tried to pursue them. Note that when Lt. Col. Torres was presented as witness, he was presented as an ordinary witness only and not an expert witness. Hence, his opinion on the identity or membership of the armed men with the CPP-NPA is not admissible in evidence. 3. NO - Under Section 22, Rule 130 RoC. An admission is competent only when the declarant, or someone identified in legal interest with him, is a party to the action. 4. YES - In insurance cases, where a risk is excepted by the terms of a policy which insures against other perils or hazards, loss from such a risk constitutes a defense which the insurer may urge, since it has not assumed that risk, and from this it follows that an insurer seeking
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[Yeah, I know this digest is very long. Sorry, but I assure you the case is even longer. The portions of the Courts ruling relevant to the topic in the outline have been italicized for easier reference. ^_^] Version of the Prosecution -Nov 4, 1998, abt 6pm: Cecilia Santos called her husband Lito and their neighbor and kumpare Artemio Pantinople for supper. After eating, Artemio returned to the bench in front of the Santos store and sat on it together with his three children. Lito was still eating supper in their kitchen when he heard a gunshot. From a distance of about 10meters, he also noticed smoke and fire coming from the muzzle of a big gun. Moments later, he saw Artemio clasping his chest and staggering backwards to the direction of Litos kitchen. Artemio shouted to him, Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan, (Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain). Lito did not approach Artemio right after the shooting incident because Cecilia warned him that he might also be shot. Lito did not see the person who shot Artemio because his attention was then focused on Artemio. -Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, the wife of Artemio, coming from her house towards the direction where Artemio was sprawled on the ground. Ernita was hysterical, jumping and shouting, Kapitan, bakit mo binaril and aking asawa. She also repeatedly cried for help. Lito then went out of their house and approached Artemio who was lying dead near a banana trunk more than 5meters from his house. Some of their neighbors answered Ernitas call for help and approached them. -When the shooting incident happened [abt 7:30pm], Litos house was illumined by a lamp. Their open-type kitchen (no walls) gave him an unobstructed view of Artemio who was about 5meters away from where he was positioned at that time. Although there was a gemilina tree growing in the space in between his house and the store of Artemio, the same did not block his view of Artemio. Likewise, the coconut trees and young banana plants growing at the scene of the crime did not affect his view. -At the same instance, Ernita was also in their kitchen preparing milk for her baby who was then lying on the floor of their kitchen. When she was about to put the bottle into the babys mouth, she suddenly heard the sound of a gunburst followed by a shout, Help me Pre, I was shot by the captain. She immediately pushed open the window of their kitchen and saw the accused wearing a black jacket and camouflage pants running towards the direction of the back portion of Litos
MARTURILLAS V PEOPLE G.R. No. 163217; PANGANIBAN; Apr 18, 2006 (marge) NATURE Petition for Review seeking to set aside [1] CA Decision affirming (with modifications as to the award of damages) the RTC Davao City Decision finding Celestino Marturillas (former Brgy Capt of Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City) guilty of homicide in Criminal Case No. 42091-98; and the CA resolution denying MR. FACTS
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house, he instructed Kagawad Jimmy Balugo to contact the Bunawan Police Station and inform them what transpired. Not knowing the radio frequency of the local police, Kagawad Balugo instead radioed officials of nearby Brgy San Isidro requesting them to contact the Bunawan PNP for police assistance since someone was shot in their locality. Moments later, PO2 Mariano Operario and another police officer arrived at Marturillas house, informing him that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio Pantinople. Upon their invitation, Marturillas immediately went with the said police officers for questioning at the Bunawan Police Station, taking with him his government-issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14 ammunition which he turned over for safe keeping with the Bunawan PNP. Such fact is reflected in Bunawan PNPs police blotter to have occurred at around 10:45 pm, Nov 4, 1998. -Nov 5, 1998: Marturillas was subjected to paraffin testing by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Davao City. The next day, the PNP Crime Laboratory released Physical Sciences Report No. C-074-98 finding Marturillas NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates. -On this same day, PO2 Operario, after preparing all the affidavits of Ernita Pantinople and her witnesses, prepared and transmitted a Complaint to the City Prosecution Office recommending that Marturillas be indicted for Murder. [see case for full text of the affidavits]. On the basis of these affidavits, then 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor Raul B. Bendigo issued a Resolution finding sufficient evidence to indict Accused for the crime of Homicide and not Murder as alleged in the Affidavit-Complaint. -Defense witness Ronito Bedero testified that on the night Artemio Pantinople was shot, he was at his house and he saw an unidentified armed man flee from the crime scene who later joined two other armed men near a nangka tree not far from where deceased was shot. All three later fled on foot towards the direction of the Purok Center in Brgy Gatungan. He noticed that one of the three men was armed with a rifle but could not make out their identities since the area where the three men converged was a very dark place. After the three men disappeared, he saw from the opposite direction Marturillas and his team of kagawads and 3 SCAA members going to the scene of the crime but they did not reach the crime scene. A little later, he saw the Marturillas group return to where they came from.
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the identification of persons. In this case, the full moon and the light coming from two fluorescent lamps of a nearby store were sufficient to illumine the place where petitioner was; and to enable the eyewitness to identify him as the person who was present at the crime scene. Settled is the rule that when conditions of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Even where the circumstances were less favorable, the familiarity of Ernita with the face of petitioner considerably reduced any error in her identification of him. Neither was there any indication that Ernita was impelled by ill motives in positively identifying petitioner. Re: Inconsistency Between Affidavit and Testimony -Although Ernita stated in her testimony that she had recognized the victim as her husband through his voice, it cannot necessarily be inferred that she did not see him. Although she recognized him as the victim, she was still hoping that it was not really he. Thus, the statement in her Affidavit that she was surprised to see that her husband was the victim of the shooting. Ex parte affidavits are usually incomplete, as these are frequently prepared by administering officers and cast in their language and understanding of what affiants have said. Nevertheless, the alleged inconsistency is inconsequential to the ascertainment of the presence of petitioner at the crime scene. They referred only to that point wherein Ernita ascertained the identity of Artemio as the victim. They did not relate to Ernitas identification of petitioner as the person running away from the crime scene immediately after she heard a gunshot. Re: Statements Uttered Contemporaneous with the Crime -It was to be expected that, after seeing the victim stagger and hearing the cry for help, Santos would shift his attention to the person who had uttered the plea Help me pre, I was shot by the captain. A shift in his focus of attention would sufficiently explain why Santos was not able to see the assailant. Santos never pointed to petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime. His statements corroborated those of Ernita and therefore simply added credence to the prosecutions version of the facts. If it were true that he had an ulterior motive, it would have been very easy for him to say that he had seen petitioner shoot the victim. Re: Dying Declaration
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no opportunity to concoct a story against petitioner; and it related to the circumstances of the shooting. 2. YES. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to sustain the conviction of petitioner. The dying declaration made by the victim immediately prior to his death constitutes evidence of the highest order as to the cause of his death and of the identity of the assailant. This damning evidence, coupled with the proven facts presented by the prosecution, leads to the logical conclusion that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. SC considered the ff: a. Santos testified that he had heard a gunshot; and seen smoke coming from the muzzle of a gun, as well as the victim staggering backwards while shouting, Help me pre, I was shot by the captain. b. Ernita testified that she had heard a gunshot and her husbands utterance, Help me pre, I was shot by the captain, then saw petitioner in a black jacket and camouflage pants running away from the crime scene while carrying a firearm. c. Ernitas statement, Captain, why did you shoot my husband? was established as part of the res gestae. d. The version of the events given by petitioner is simply implausible. As the incumbent barangay captain, it should have been his responsibility to go immediately to the crime scene and investigate the shooting. If he were really innocent, he should not have simply left. e. The prosecution was able to establish motive on the part of petitioner. The victims wife positively testified that prior to the shooting, her husband was trying to close a real estate transaction which petitioner tried to block. This showed petitioners antagonism towards the victim. -These pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it was petitioner who shot and killed the victim. Where an eyewitness saw the accused with a gun seconds after the gunshot and the victims fall, the reasonable conclusion is that the accused had killed the victim. -To be sure, conviction in a criminal case does not require a degree of proof that, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. That some pieces of the above-mentioned evidence are circumstantial does not diminish the fact that they are
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lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the admission of its exhibits and its sub-markings. - CA dismissed the petition as it appeared that there was no sufficient showing by NAPOCOR that there was GAD. It appeared that the pieces of documentary evidence which were denied admission were not properly identified by any competent witness. Also, they found that the judge acted within the pale of his discretion when he denied admission of said documentary evidence for in Sec 3 of Rule 130 of the RoC, when the subject of inquiry are the contents of documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original documents themselves, except in certain cases specifically so enumerated therein, and the petitioner has not shown that the non-presentation or non-production of its original documentary pieces of evidence falls under such exceptions. Lastly, the CA said that the information (in said exhibits) were not received, retrieved or produced electronically and that NAPOCOR had not properly authenticated such evidence as electronic documents. - Hence, the instant petition wherein NAPOCOR insists that the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based on its own premise that an "electronic document" as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Rather, "electronic document" can also refer to other modes of written expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the sections catch-all proviso: "any printout or output, readable by sight or other means". ISSUE: WON the photocopies are indeed electronic documents as contemplated in RA No. 8792 or the IRR of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence/ WON said electronic documents qualify under the one of the exceptions of Best Evidence Rule so that those may be admitted as documentary evidence HELD: NO/NO. Reasoning: -A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by NAPOCOR will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may
NAPOCOR v. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR. [BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, & WALLEM SHIPPING, INC.]
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guard on duty, on the nape and ordered Lani and Ariel to lie face-down. The robbers took the duffel bags and the gun of Dimas. - Right after the robbery, Dimas told Ariel that one of the robbers is his fellow guard, Pepito Capila. He then called reported the incident to the police, the Meralco security division, and the security agency. - The police arrived at the scene 10 min after the call. When questioned by SPO4 Maximo, Dimas said that one of the robbers is Pepito Capila, his fellow sekyu. - A criminal case for robbery was filed with the RTC against Pepito and Dimas and 4 others. The prosecution evidence included of the testimony of SPO4 Maximo and Ariel, but not of Dimas. RTC acquitted everyone except Pepito. Pepito appealed to CA on the ground that the RTC erroneously admitted in evidence Dimas statement that Pepito is one of the robbers for being hearsay and that he was denied due process for not being given a chance to cross examine Dimas because Dimas didnt testify. CA affirmed RTC decision. ISSUES 1. WON the statement of Dimas is admissible 2. WON Pepito was denied due process HELD 1. YES. The statement of Dimas is part of the res gestae. - Res gestae is a Latin phrase which literally means things done. As an exception to the hearsay rule, it refers to those exclamations and statements by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as spontaneous reactions or utterances inspired by the excitement of the occasion, and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and fabricate a false statement. - The reason for the rule is human experience. It has been shown that under certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, the state of nervous excitement which occurs in a spectator may produce a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions produced by the external shock. As the statements or utterances are made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, such statements or utterances may be taken as expressing
CAPILA v. PEOPLE GR No. 146161. July 17, 2006. Sandoval-Gutierrez (ina) FACTS - Lani and Ariel, employees of Pilipinas Bank, went to the Meralco collection office in JP Rizal, Makati to get the collection totaling around P1.3M. They packed the money in duffel bags and padlocked them. While waiting for the armored van, two armed men approached them. The robbers hit Dimas dela Cruz, the
107
A2010
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