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Bogot D.C. (Colombia) June 28th - July 22nd 2011 Course Coordinator: International Invited Lecturers: Julio Csar Vargas (COL) Nicolai Caicedo (UK) Neill C. Renton (UK) Ana Mara Cruz, (Japan, France) Felix Rivera (Consejo Colombiano de Seguridad) The U. S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB), as a result of the T2 Laboratories accident*, has recommended that the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) and the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) work together to add reactive hazards awareness to the B.S. chemical engineering curriculum [1]. Subsequently, the Safety and Chemical Engineering Education committee (SACHE a CCPS committee), recommended a broader approach, for example: a) teach the importance of process safety, b) teach the importance of understanding hazards including toxic, flammable, and reaction hazards, c) teach how to control and mitigate hazards to prevent accidents, and d) teach the importance of inherent safety [2].
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s there has been a world-wide steady rising trend in losses due to industrial accidents. Continuous development during the last few decades has modified the process operating conditions in order to gain efficiency of the process. Higher pressures and higher temperatures used in the industry nowadays mean higher stored energy which results in an increased risk in case of a sudden release. It is very important for process engineers to understand how technical safety is formulated and implemented as a main topic in the prevention and control of potential losses due to operational conditions and it shapes the direction and activities of the teamwork and the organisation. It has been recognised that engineering processes must involve safety management systems throughout all phases of the project, giving emphasis to the concept and design stages as a means of controlling the safety issues with a higher level of effectiveness. Moreover the new global challenges, have forced government agencies to introduce new legal requirements to assess and control industrial risks to people (individuals & society) and to the environment. At the same time companies want to demonstrate competitive advantages through social responsibility by the creation of high integrity engineering systems. In the global context many industries have already designed and implemented safety standards with the goal of reaching high levels of safety performance. Some of these industries include offshore and onshore oil and gas production, nuclear power plants, aerospace and process industries amongst others.
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board Investigation Report: T2 Laboratories, Inc. Runaway Reaction (Four Killed, 32 Injured), REPORT NO. 2008-3-I-FL, September 2009. Available On-line: http://www.csb.gov/UserFiles/file/T2%20Final%20Report.pdf [1] Willey R.J., Editorial Process Safety Progress 29 (2010) 1 [2] Louvar J. F. Editorial-Industry Teaches Process Safety in Universities Process Safety Progress 29 (2010) 97
CORE TOPICS
The aim of this course is to introduce participants to the concepts, theories and frameworks that will improve their understanding of technical safety and its impact on engineering processes. The focus of this course is on the nature of using safety concepts as a competitive strategy in the global context, providing tools to improve the Capital Expenditure (CAPEX), by reducing costs associated with premium insurances, fines, and shut downs and start-ups due to system failures. It examines how, in an engineering environment, competitive advantage might be developed through the application of technical safety elements that may be exploited in a cost-effective manner.
Module 1.
Key Features: Safety Management and National Regulation Safety Management & Legislation Prevention & Emergency Management Probability Theory Reliability and Maintenance - RAM Probability Failure on Demand PFD Redundancy Concept
Module 2.
The first approach to the safety process concept should be made in early stages of the project. Concept and design activities in an engineering project are by default the target when safety principles want to be applied. This is based on the fact that the sooner changes to improve safety are introduced the cheaper the cost. The risk assessment process takes into account historical failure data that has been collected for different elements and systems. Once these have been applied to the current project and analysed, figures for the expected performance can be generated which will be further compared against base lines called acceptance criteria. Key Features: Basic concepts in safety processes Hazards (Fire, Explosion) Accidents Reliability and Maintenance - RAM F-N Curves
Human Factors Human Failure The accident causation model Inherently Safe Design Concept Methods Mitigation Risk Identification Techniques Preliminary Hazards accidents - PHA HAZOP / HAZID Risk Analysis Techniques Bow Tie, Fault Tree Analysis, Even Tree Analysis, Safety Integrity Level analysis Quantitative Risk Analysis - QRA Safety Case Safety Model Safety Culture Accident Case studies
Module 3.
Historical data is usually the quickest way to determine the projects life cycle, although in many cases it is inappropriate to determine the loss of integrity frequency. If used the appropriateness [type of structure, geographical location] of the data should be assessed. On the other hand, reliable and comprehensive structural data are an essential requirement for the structural integrity assessment of an installation during its life cycle as this information will be useful when determining the total risk associated with the facility and its further impact in term of incidental risk. Moreover, reassessments carried out during safety inspections should be able to reflect deterioration of facilities structural elements in order to quantify reliability and availability of the assets involved in risk prevention. Key Features: Fatigue Failure Corrosion Reliability Predictions Extent of Structural Damage/Failure Remaining Life
Module 4.
Major Accident Hazards in Process Plants Identification, Causes & Consequences (16h)
(Ana Mara Cruz, July 18th to July 22nd)
Implementation of safety concepts and safety culture into a particular facility does not always avoid the occurrence of major accidents. Some of these accidents may lead to serious injury to people, damage to the environment, loss of assets not only close to but also further away from the site of the accident.
The measures to be implemented should respond not only to internal design and a particular operational mode, where different kinds of failures may be identified but also to the analysis of the potential consequences to people, property and the environment on site and offsite of a major chemical accident if one does occur. Key Features: Heath Safety Environmental Impact Assessment Environmental Hazards Hazardous Area Classification Propagation & Domino Effects Dispersion and CFD Models PROBIT functions F&E Prevention & Mitigation Releases Liquid Gas/Vapour Mitigation Fires Pool Fires Ball Fires Jet Fires Explosion Detonation Deflagration DDT Dust
SOURCE MATERIAL
As well as the handouts for the whole course the attendant is expected to make full use of at least the following sources.