THE CAUSES OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-05 GEOPOLITICS, ORIENTALISM AND RUSSIAN FAR EASTERN POLICY.

The variety of explanations given in the historiography for the causes of Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 attributing the conflict to geostrategic causes and imperial expansion into northeast Asia along with domestic political, ideological and racial/ethnic causes for the conflict. As I researched this paper the question of geostrategic causes for the war became the most contentious among the authors with thesis supporting Russo-Japanese rivalry in Manchuriaand Siberia as the main cause of the war. Secondly and more straightforward is the case of the rivalry between the ministries of finance Sergei Witte, war, Aleksey Kuropatkin and foreign affairs Vladimir Lamsdorf and the Tsar Nicholas II and his associates such as the Guard's captain A.M Bezobrazov in creating Russian Far Eastern policy. In exploring the bureaucratic rivalry hypothesis authors assert their own villains as the ultimate cause of the war, with Witte and Bezobrazov being culprits and naturally opposed to each others aims. While ideological and racial conceptions for the cause of the Russo-Japanese can also be found in the historiography with thought of Esper Ukhtomskii and the Tsar Nicholas II's own experiences on his Grand Tour of the Orient being the major factors in explaining and legitimizing discourses for Russian designs in Asia. The Building of The Trans-Siberian Railroad: Witte, Pntration Pacifique and Russo-Japanese Rivalry in Manchuria. The issue of Russia's expansion into Manchuria may be taken up in tandem with Sergei Witte's ideologies of expansion and the construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad in the 1890s. David Schimmelpennininck van der Oye's book Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan1 explains Sergei Witte's ideologies of empire. Van der Oye posits that the Finance Minister's version of imperialism was personified by his idea of pntration pacifique or the 1Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, David. 2001. Toward the rising sun: Russian ideologies of empire and the path to war
with Japan. DeKalb, Ill: Northern Illinois University Press.

promotion of political influence through economic means rather than territorial conquest was unique among Russians of the day.2 While the German and British understood the power of investments, railways and banks Russia still saw the realm of diplomatic muscle with more traditional means, such as armed might and annexation.3 Even Lenin's Marxist interpretation of imperialism saw something particularly different in Witte's policies noting that, capitalist imperialism of the new type fully manifested itself with respect to Persia, Manchuria and Mongolia.4 When Witte took over as finance minister in 1891 he aimed to implement several reforms to to transform Russia into a modern, industrial economy worthy of the empire's status as a great power.5 Witte aimed to strengthen Russia's economy by bolstering the railway sector, creating the infrastructure necessary to industrialize the economy, enacting protective tariffs as well as converting the ruble to the gold standard.6 Another one of Witte's accomplishment at the ministry of finance was the building of the Trans-Siberian railroad, which was approved late in Alexader III's reign for strategic rather than economic grounds, where St. Petersburg aimed to strengthen its position in the Far East against Qing aims to recover the provinces they lost in 1886.7 What is particularly interesting to this paper were Witte's extra-ministerial activities vis-a-vis the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway and his dealings with the Chinese government for the construction of the Trans-Manchurian railroad also known as the CER he also built many other enterprises in northern China such as the Russo-Chinese Bank, fleets and his own army as a result of the construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad and exemplifying the practice and the ideology of pntration pacifique.8 Many of Witte's contemporaries didn't see the finance minister as having a coherent ideology because of his various changes in political course, and his tendency to intrigue and selfaggrandizement, and an apparent absence of integrity, making it seem that Witte only acted according
2Van der Oye, p.63 3Van der Oye, p.64 4Ibid. 5Van der Oye. p.68 6Van der Oye, p.68-69 7Van der Oye, p.69-70 8 Ibid.

to his ambitions.9 But on the other hand, the finance minister's lectures given to the Tsar's younger brother, Mikhail Aleksandrovich in 1900-1901 which were later compiled into the book, Lessons on National and Government Economics, show that Witte indeed had a logic behind his ideologies for Russia and its future. Witte attended university in 1860s, that generation was intensely rebellious focusing on their passion for progress, materialism and the use of scientific reason, which put Witte among the Westernizing wing of the intelligentsia10 Witte like Karl Marx viewed history teleologically, that peoples advanced through differing stages of socioeconomic development and varying modes of production, while disagreeing with the final result; Witte saw that reaching the final stage as desirable as it assured nothing less than man's emancipation from the yoke of nature. And ultimately the only way to reach those goals was by encouraging industrialization along the lines prescribed by Prussian economist Friedrich List.11 Another important part of Sergei Witte's ideology was the importance of peace and the deleterious effects on prosperity of militarism. In one of his lectures to Grand Duke Mikhail, Witte said this: When we consider that spending on the military deprives the state of cash it could devote instead to raising the cultural and productive levels of it population, we see even more heavily the burden of maintaining large armies weighs on the governments of Europe.12 Witte saw militarism as something that sapped away at a state's economic and productive capabilities, arguing that the future battles between European powers will be fought not on the battle field but economically. Witte said that conflicts between great powers would center around trying to acquire commercial influence over nations that were at a lower level of development, and that authority exercised by the metropolitan over their colonies were more exercised not by the force of arms but by trade.13 These economic and pacifist ideas joined a third strand of Witte's though to justify Russian expansion eastward, the

9 Ibid. 10 Van der Oye, p.71 11 Van der Oye, p.71-72 12 Ibid 13 Van der Oye, p.73

superiority of white civilization and its mission. Witte in another one of his lectures to the Grand Duke said Russia's task abroad is both praceful and, even more fundamentally cultural in nature. Russia's mission in the East must be to protect and enlighten them.14 His goal in the Orient much the same as it was in Russia itself was to move them towards modernization in the European mode, Witte thought the best way of doing so was by spreading of Russian economic interests in the Far East, such as the Trans-Siberian railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) through Manchuria, the goal as always was pntration pacifique, through economics not annexation through military means. 15 Sergei Witte in his time as Russia's finance minister and through the construction of the Trans-Siberian and CERs brought Russia into the Far East and more specifically into Manchuria. Witte wanted to base Russian expansion on imminently Victorian liberal ideals of trade, financial and railway imperialism and peace, while stressing the power of Westernization and progress to advance supposedly backward oriental peoples. While his goals were based on economic ideals the reality of Russian expansion into Manchuria and East Asia worried Japan and its designs. Russo-Japanese Rivalry in Manchuria 1895-1902: Port Arthur, the Boxer Rebellion and the Open Door. While Witte's intentions for expansion into the Far East was tempered by his ideology of pntration pacifique, the reality of conditions in Manchuria especially as viewed from Tokyo, the Meiji government saw Russian designs on Manchuria very differently from Witte, especially relating to Port Arthur, the Russian occupation of Manchuria intervention resulting from the Boxer Rebellion and maintenance of the balance of power and the Open Door policy in Manchuria. A classic work of the diplomatic and political history of the Russo-Japanese rivalry in Manchuria, Dr. Paul Hibbert Clyde wrote International Rivalries in Manchuria 1689-1922, which was published in 1926.16 This view of the
14 Van der Oye, p.74 15 Van der Oye, p.75 16 Clyde, Paul Hibbert. 1926. International rivalries in Manchuria, 1689-1922. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/2858340.html.

historiography can be seen with a basis on Japanese resentment to the fulfillment of Russian designs in Manchuria at the expense of Japanese ones. This is best exemplified by the Triple Intervention at the Treaty of Shimonoseki which gave Port Arthur to Russia who hadn't even participated in the SinoJapanese War of 1894-1895. Dr. Hibbert cites that in the Treaty of Shimonoseki the Japanese government wanted as reparation for China's defeat in the war the cession of the Liadong peninsula to Japan and ts major cities and fortresses including Port Arthur.17 But the so-called Triple Intervention by the French, German and Russian government reversed this treaty, the Western powers cited that possession of the Liaotung Peninsula by the latter would not only constitute a constant menace to the capital of China, but would render the independence of Korea illusory and thus jeopardize the permanent peace of the Far East.18 The Triple Intervention was undertaken by the Russian, German and French governments for various reasons. St. Petersburg and Witte saw the inherent opportunity in taking Manchuria and the Liadong peninsula from Japanese hands to assist in development of the Trans-Siberian railroad; Paris came to the assistance of their new Russian allies; while in Berlin, Bismarck and von Bulow, thought nothing of sacrificing friendship with Tokyo, to keep their biggest threat, St. Petersburg happy.19 The terms of the Triple Intervention and the retrogression of the Liaodong Peninsula and Northern Manchuria to the government in Peking suited Witte's plans. Which called for bypassing the route of the Trans-Siberian line from across the Amur to a shorter route through Manchuria to Vladivostok20 Li Hongzhang attended Nicholas II's coronation as representing the Qing dynasty and the Chinese government where he met with Witte and came to agreement on the building of the CER to be financed by the RussoChinese Bank and the conclusion of a secret defensive alliance between Russia and China against Japan.21 In 1897, Germany moved to seize the port of Kiaochow in Shandong province, in response the

17 18 19 20 21

Clyde, p.31-33 Clyde, p.34 Clyde, p.34-36 Clyde p.44-49 Clyde p.53-55

ministers of war, foreign affairs convinced the Tsar to seize Port Arthur and Talienwan (Dalny) against Witte's wishes.22 To which Witte remarked on the sudden aggressive turn in Russia's Far Eastern policy, it was natural for the young emperor to follow the advice of his Foreign Minister and Minister of War, which was in agreement with his own thirst for military glory and conquest.23 In an incredibly tough statement Dr. Clyde notes that the agreement: by which, among other things, Russia secured a lease of Port Arthur was accomplished only after bribery had been resorted to on the part of Russian officials. Russian policy, as manifested in this act, was, as Witte himself said, a violation of traditional relations with China, a fatal step which finally resulted in the Russo-Japanese War. Dr. Clyde's argument is that starting with the occupation of Dalny and Port Arthur by the late winter of 1898, Russia's aims in Manchuria had changed, as Witte became more and more marginalized within the government, while the ministers of war and foreign affairs became stronger voices in the Tsar's council. These voices wanted to assure the sovereignty and primacy of Russian interests in Manchuria, especially through the construction of more railroads and by not allowing any foreign power to do the same in Russia's sphere of influence, which would soon lead to the formulation of the Open Door policy by the United States government. In July of 1900, in reaction to the Boxer Rebellion moving to Manchuria, the Russian government had move to occupy it. For the first time asserting military power in China where the Russian army took Newchang and Harbin, changing Manchuria from a Russian sphere of influence to an area of Russian military and civil domination.24 Dr. Clyde cites a comment Wittea made to reference of the Russian intervention in Manchuria saying it would result in distrust on the part of the Chinese, jealousy and malevolence in Europe, and alarm in Japan.25 The Russo-Chinese impasse regarding the occupation of Manchuria did most one very important thing it showed which of the powers predominant in China believed in the Open Door policy and China's territorial integrity. Dr. Clyde makes that case that the United States, Great Britain and Japan were in favor of the Open Door policy while France,
22 Clyde p.66-69 23 Ibid. 24 Clyde, p.83-85 25 Ibid.

Germany and Russia, the villains of the intervention of 1895, where not fully behind the Open Door policy.26 Japan feeling threatened by the Russian presence in Manchuria and especially in the Liaodong Peninsula and St. Petersburg's cordial relationships with Paris and Berlin sought to strengthen its position, which did by signing a defensive alliance in January of 1902.27 The announcement of the Anglo-Japanese alliance noticeably sped up the Russo-Chinese negotiations over evacuation of Manchuria over the next 12 months after the signing of the agreement in April of 1902. 28 Van der Oye and Dr. Clyde's analysis agree primarily on the point of the importance of Sergei Witte's activities and energies in expanding Russian influence into Manchuria by the manner of exploiting railroad concessions and by economic and definitely non-aggressive means. Witte's ideology of penetration pacifique is what had brought Manchuria into Russia's so-called sphere of influence but what ultimately caused the war according to Dr. Clyde was the preeminence of other men more keen on territorial expansion such as the Minister of War Aleksey Kuropatkin and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mihail Muraviev over Witte's vision of penetration pacifique. Russian designs in Manchuria especially in the Liaodong Peninsula acted to bring Japanese and British interests together in opposition to Russian expansion.

Siberia and Russo-Japanese Rivalry in Northeast Asia Eva-Maria Stolberg writes in her article,29 that the Russo-Japanese War cannot be understood without the Siberian background. This military conflict was the first significant outburst in the RussoJapanese rivalry that started during the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway and Chinese Eastern Railway.30 Stolberg writes that the purpose of building of the Trans-Siberian railroad had a geopolitical, but also a psychological impact, citing Russian transportation minster K.N Pos'iet
26 Clyde, p.96-97 27 Clyde p.97-98 28 Clyde, p.99 29Kowner, Rotem, and Ben-Ami Shillony. 2007. Rethinking the Russo-Japanese war, 1904-05. Folkestone: Global Oriental. The Unknown Enemy; The Siberian Frontier and the Russo-Japanese Rivalry, 1890s-1920s. pp.46-63 30 Stolberg, p.46

statement that China's and Japan's great population density would pose a threat to deserted Siberia.31 Tsarist policymakers had a vision of the Trans-Siberian railway as a way to first strengthen Russia's defenses there and as springboard for a strategic and economic infiltration of northern Mongolia and especially of Manchuria.32 Japanese economic expansion into Siberia gave Russian ministers pause and gave credence to the growth of a yellow peril in the Siberian hinterland. Both K. N Pos'iet and the governor of Priamur province Pavel Unterberger, saw the growth of Japanese economic power in Siberia undermining Russian hegemony there, with Pos'iet warning that Siberia would become a Japanese colony and Unterberger saying that Japanese influence would weaken Russian culture and civilization in Siberia. 33 The factor of Japanese economic expansion along with Russian fear of a yellow peril joined with geopolitical rivalry in Northeast Asia that was a result of Japanese confidence in the wake of the Meiji reformation and Russia's humiliation as a military power, after the Crimean War.34 Stolberg posits that under Alexander III the Russian government aimed to encourage migration to the Amur territory by the construction of a railroad and that this would serve as springboard for the colonization of nearby Manchuria.35 Although this policy would only prove to be successful in colonizing Siberia, the dream of a Yellow Russia was not realized as it was seen as imperialism from above and not broadly accepted by the population.36 In opposition to St. Petersburg's policies, Siberians stressed Siberia's role in acting as a bulwark against the 'Yellow Peril;' while Ivan Sikorskii, a Russian Darwinist, saw Siberia as a battlefield for the future racial struggle between Russians and Japanese; and a Siberian contemporary noted, Why die for a Russian Manchuria when the Siberian homeland needs more development. 37 Ultimately, the underpopulation of the Siberian hinterland, the lack of topographical knowledge of the Amur and Ussuri regions by the Russians, and the Siberian population's lack of desire to fight a war of conquest in Manchuria, led to Russia's defeat in the Russo31 32 33 34 35 36 37 Stoberg, p.47 Ibid. Stolberg, p.48 Stolberg, pp.48-49 Ibid Ibid. Stolberg, pp.52-55

Japanese War. Stolberg's arguments are based on the linkages between the Siberian and Manchurian border and hinterlands in the development of Russo-Japanese rivalry leading up the war in 1904-05. While St. Petersburg and the local governors saw Manchuria as a key area to shore up the security of the Siberian agricultural, commercial and economic interests, Tokyo saw Siberia as a great undeveloped expanse up for the taking, as shown by the growth of Japanese enterprises in Siberia in the decade before the war. More importantly was the view held by many Russians that the growth of Japanese interests in Siberia constituted a yellow peril and that protecting Russian territory, civilization and population against foreign invasion was more important than conquest in Manchuria. Russian Orientalism Esper Ukhtomskii The Thinking Head of Official Asiatism38 Marlene Laruelle argues in this article that at the end of the 19th century Russia like other Western powers crafted many discourses of legitimation to assist the imperial advance of western powers into Asia and Africa using political, economic, cultural and scientific lines of argumentation39 Laruelle argues that Russia's desires for expansion into Asia were served by a kind of romantic imperialism best embodied by the myth of the White Tsar.40 Especially as developed by Prince Esper Esperovich Ukhtomskii. Ukhtomskii's first passion was with Russia's Orient and its people where his first job after school was working at the Department of Non-Orthodox Religious Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior, where he traveled among the Buddhist, Buriats and Kalmyk nationalities of the empire, Ukhtomskii was highly critical of the government's policy of Russification and the aggressive promotion of orthodoxy.41 In 1890, Ukhtomskii was chosen to go with the Tsarevich Nicholas on his grand tour of

38 Laruelle, Marlene. 2008. "The White Tsar" Romantic Imperialism in Russia's Legitimizing of Conquering the Far East. Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University. http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39550. p.113-134 39 Laruelle, p.113 40 Ibid. 41 Laruelle, p.123

the Orient, where he was charged with writing and publishing travel notebooks, he would become good friends with Nicholas and close councilor to the young Tsar.42 In 1895, Ukhtomskii became the editor of the Sankt-Petersburgskie Vedomosti, where he hoped to turn it into an openly conservative newspaper, turned against the West, in he could promote his Asiophile ideas and defend the minorities of the Empire. Where he told its readers to avoid to slavishly follow the scientific road of the West which would lead to catastrophes of a revolutionary nature and the Vedomosti would become somewhat of an unofficial outlet for the government's opinions on the Orient.43 The writing and publication of the Tsarevich's travel notebooks in 1893 constituted for Ukhtomskii the first manifesto of his Asiatism. Laruelle says that Ukhtomskii was part of a ThirdWorldism ahead of its time in which he pictured an alliance between Russia and/or China or Japan as a coalition against the Anglo-Saxon maritime world, but ultimately Asia could be used by Russia to oppose the West and the injustices committed by the white man.44 Ukhtomskii never gave up the idea of annexing part of Asia into the empire, like Witte he did not see this mission as a violent or military endeavor, Ukhtomskii said that Russia's advance into the Orient was due to the demands of Nature (stikhiinoe) and he denied the existence of any borders before the Pacific ocean.45 Laruelle, casts Ukhtomskii's plans as making Russia into a third world much like Ancient Scythia, that straddled both the Western and the Oriental words.46 But ultimately Ukhtomskii casts Russia's future as more Asian than European, as he rejected the materialist and atheist West, made Russia the heir to the Mongol Empire, and asserted the role of autocracy as an Asian value and used the myth of the White Tsar to provide culturalist cover for justifying Russian autocracy: 'All the peoples of the Orient know the power of the White Tsar, at whose feet lies all Asia which is related to him.'47
42 43 44 45 46 47 Ibid. Laruelle, p.124 Laruelle, p.126 Ibid. Laruelle, p.127 Laruelle pp.127-133

Laruelle's arguments lie on the ideas of Esper Ukhtomskii, based on the discourse ofs cultural and historical Asiatism, the myth of the White Tsar and of geography to legitimize Russian expansion into Asia. Ukhtomskii's claims that Russia was on a historical mission to join the West and the Orient and that unlike other European powers who only wanted to exploit Asian nations; Russia' could use its cultural connections to Asia to legitimize Russian expansion.

Nicholas II and the Japanese Body48 Rotem Kowner's article focuses on the situations creating Nicholas II's attitudes towards the Japanese in the period leading up to the Russo-Japanese war, which he says that was a mixture of Orientalist fondness and racial hatred, and the Tsar's frequent references to the Japanese as makaki (little monkeys).49 Kowner's goal in this article is to: examine the sources of Nicholas' attitude toward the Japanese and the effect it had on the decision-making during the period that preceded the Russo-Japanese war. The contention of this paper is that Nicholas' image of the Japanese, shaped by what he had seen during his visit and the stereotypes he was exposed to before and after led him to perceive of the Japanese as feminine, weak and inferior.50 Which Kowner argues was the main reason for the Russian underestimation of Japanese abilites and ultimately the loss in Russia's part in the war.51 Kowner creates a vision of the Japanese as a feminine race of viewing the Orient in feminine and sensual terms, making the Japanese especially women into yellow toys, kittens, children, dolls to be conquered and abandoned.52 This feminization of the Japanese made European observers to forget Japan's militant past and to see feminine qualities in the population as a whole.53 Europeans also created the myth of Japanese childishness as epitomized by Baron Joseph von

48 Kowner, R. 1998. "Nicholas II and the Japanese Body: Images and Decision-Making on the Eve of the Russo-Japanese War". PSYCHOHISTORY REVIEW. 26 (3): 211-252. 49 Kowner, p.212 50 Kowner, pp.212-213 51 Kowner, p.213 52 Kowner, pp.223-225 53 Kowner, p.225

Huber everyone knows that Japanese people are gentle, amiable, civil, gay, good-natured and childish.54 Along with this European view of childishness, the physical stature as a key to conceptions of the Japanese, with the French novelist Pierre Loti giving the prefix little to almost all of his characters.55 But more disturbingly this image of the Japanese as children was a projection of the pseudo-scientific ideas of the 19th century which looked at all non-white others as immature races.56 Such as the idea of racial recapitulation which argued that superior races repeat the adult stage of inferior races during their own growth.57 These ideas along with the Darwinist concepts of evolution that would make Europeans see people of other races as ape-like, which created the European image of the Japanese as a little monkey 58 These cultural and pseudo-scientific ideas were the intellectual milieu of late 19th and early 20th century Europe including Russia. Images of the Japanese even if gained by direct experience were shaped by racial and cultural Orientalism which operated on a hierarchical view of the world with the European West on top and all others on the bottom. The view of Japan and the Orient as whole as inhabited by feminine, simian, little children undoubtedly formed Russian views of fighting a war against the Japanese and how easy that undertaking would be while ignoring the reality of the situation. Van der Oye, Laruelle and Kowner generally agree on the point that Russia saw Asians as backwards and as inferior people and that the Russian empire could use to advance either their economic, sociocultural or military objectives to aggrandize St. Petersburg and the Tsar. Whereas Kowner's and Laruelle's interpretations of Russia's Orientalism towards China and Japan do not match up, with Kowner seeing Japanese intentions as mainly aggressive and militaristic while Laruelle stresses the cultural emphasis of Esper Ukhtomskii's vision for the creation of an Asian Russian Empire.

54 55 56 57 58

Ibid. Ibid. Kowner, p.226 Ibid. Kowner, p.227

Russian Far Eastern Policy- The Bezobrazov Clique and Bureaucratic Paralysis Much of the traditional historiography for the direct reasons for the Russo-Japanese war in the strict sense agrees with the thesis that Russia's movement towards war against Japan was created by the rise of the Alexander Mikhailovich Bezobrazov and his circle group or clique in the Tsar's eyes with the simultaneous loss of esteem in Sergei Witte and his policies along with much discord and a lack of united decision-making in the build up to the war Andrew Malozemoff59 and David S. Crist60 give a picture of the Tsarist government and its ministers as being disorganized, fractious and more inclined to bureaucratic bickering than towards accomplishing anything productive. Crist writes in the introduction to his article that the Russia's difficult situation in the Far East called for the : formulation of an intelligent, uniform, and definite Far Eastern policy; but, unfortunately, no such response was made by the Russian ministers, who continued to procrastinate, to haggle among themselves, and to vie with one another for political power and the tsar's favor. Such obvious weakness offered less responsible but more aggressive persons the opportunity they had long awaited. These persons had a definite, clean-cut, and aggressive plan for Russian action in Manchuria and Korea, and by the autumn of 1902 they had succeeded in winning the Tsar over to their viewpoint. While Malozemoff agrees that the main reason for the Russia's inability to proactively formulate Far Eastern policy was not directly caused by the activities of the Bezobrazov group but that its existence in the court and the government, helped to promote and crystallize the opposition to Witte and the policy of evacuation of Manchuria. It also contributed to forcing Russian policy in the Far East into the state of indecision and procrastination which exasperated the Japanese and provided them with a plausible casus belli for the opening of military operations against Russia.61 Both Malozemoff and Crist argue that the immediate causes for the war against Japan was not necessarily Russia's or the Tsar's interests in Bezobrazov's Korean Yalu Timber concession but that the addition of Bezobrazov and his colleagues gave the Tsar something that government itself in the persons
59 Malozemoff, Andrew. 1958. Russian Far Eastern policy, 1881-1904, with special emphasis on the causes of the RussoJapanese War. Berkeley: University of California Press.

60 Crist, David S. 1942. "Russia's Far Eastern Policy in the Making". The Journal of Modern History. 14 (3).
61 Malozemoff, p.177

of Witte, Lamsdorf and Kuropatkin were not giving the Tsar a definite, clean-cut, and aggressive plan for Russian action in Manchuria and Korea.62 Van der Oye in the historiographical introduction to his Towards the Rising Sun says that Malozemoff's intentions in writing his book was to rehabilitate Sergei Witte and to downplay the impact of the of the Bezobrazov group, and was meant as a rebuttal to Boris Romanov's Russia in Manchuria, which villainized Witte63 The details are far too many to be addressed in the few lines remaining in this work, but the essence of a reading of both Malozemoff's and Crist's works give credence to the theory that Russian new forward policy in the Far East, Witte's marginalization and eventual firing and the disagreements and lack of unity in decision-making between the ministries of war, finance and foreign affairs and the Tsar himself vis-a-vis Manchurian evacuation and Russo-Japanese spheres of influence in Manchuria and Korea ultimately led to war with Japan.

Conclusion Historiographies about the causes of wars ultimately distill themselves to studying the geopolitical and Rankean histories of the two countries involved and the region being fought over. In the case of the Russo-Japanese war, Russo-Japanese rivalry in Northeast Asia has been addressed by studying its influence Manchuria and Siberia (with an additional literature on Korea). The study of both Tsarist Russia's domestic, bureaucratic and foreign policies have been written about in the historiography, with the emphasis with the conflict between the so-called Bezobrazov Clique and Sergei Witte for control of Russia's Far Eastern policy and the effects it had on Russian policymakers and decision-making in the lead up to the war. But narratives surrounding the Triple Intervention, high level contracts between Beijing and St. Petersburg and multilateral concerns in China surrounding the Boxer Rebellion, the Open Door policy and the creation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance have been written about in classically Rankean terms.
62 See n.61 supra. 63 Toward the Rising Sun, p.7

On the other hand since the 1970s and 80s with the rise of popularity and acceptance of Edward Said's magnum opus Orientalism, there have been markedly different ways of examining events that once were confined to Rankean explanation. David S. van der Oye, Marlene Laruelle and Rotem Kowner write intellectual histories of the causes for Russian imperialism and expansionism in Asia, while Kowner focuses on Russian attitudes towards the Japanese as they were shaped by Orientalist discourses. Be it van der Oye's focus on Witte's vision of imperialism as a mission civilisatrice to Yellow Asia; Or Laruelle's narratives of Esper Ukhtomskii's Asiatic vision and the myth of the White Tsar as a way to legitimize Russian expansion into Asia. Finally Rotem Kowner hones in on cultural and pseudo-scientific discourses that infatilized, minimized and feminized the Japanese and ultimately led to a major underestimation of their military strength and led to Russia's defeat in a war they thought they would surely win. Both Rankean and Saidian/Orientalist views lend some credence for the causes of the Russo-Japanese war and point out the weakness and lack of organization that would ultimately lead to Russia's defeat.