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BOMBARDMENT OF VALPARAISO.

It,''
SPEECH
OF THE

IMBISI IHIif 11
FOREIGN AFFAIRS;
TOG-ETHER WITH THE

DIPLOMATIC

CIRCULARS,

11

1. *

KEP0KT OF THE SPANISH AMORAL,


&c. &c. &c.

E E P E R E E D TO T H

LONDON:

FEINTED BY J. H. SCHRDER, 45, ST. JtABY AXE, I.C.

S P E E C H
DELIVERED BY HIS EXCELLENCY

THE MINISTER FOB FOREIGN AFFAIRS


IN T H E CHAMBER O F DEPUTIES,
On the 22nd May, 1866.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs (M. BERMUDEZ DE CASTRO):

Messieurs the Deputies. The questions that have been put this evening by Senor Salazar y Mazarredo, in accordance with the notice previously given by him, are three; and agreeably to the promise I then made that I would reply to them this day, I will now proceed to do so as clearly and briefly as I possibly can. The first of the questions relates to the language used by Mr. Layard, Under Secretary of State, before the British Parliament, on the subject of the bombardment of Valparaiso. That gentleman stated, in the House of Commons, that the Spanish Government, taking as a pretext and endeavouring to find an excuse in the delay of Chile to reply in a definitive manner to the proposals of friendly- intervention which had been submitted to her, had desired to break off the negotiations ; but that France and England had opposed themselves, had protested against such conduct, and had conB

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tinued negotiating, in spite of the resistance of the Spanish Government. The second enquiry is to the effect that when news had been received of the projected bombardment of Valparaiso, the British Minister at this Court had held a conference with me, with the object of ascertaining whether this were really the fact; that he was furnished with instructions to remonstrate energetically with me should it be found correct; and that I had replied to his enquiries in an evasive and equivocal manner; that the conduct of the Spanish Government had been neither just or loyal (I do not know, gentlemen, how you would translate the word " fair " ) , and that it had been such as to cause the .Governments of France and England to be led into an error or deception. The third is, that while Mr. Layard recognised the full right of the Spanish Government to bombard the city of Valparaiso, we had, notwithstanding, committed an act of barbarism unworthy of a great and civilised nation. I shall subsequently refer to the two first assertions ; and will now commence by saying that a nation which only exercises a legitimate and indisputable right can never be charged with committing an act of barbarism unworthy of a civilised country; for it should be borne in mind that Mr. Layard admitted in Parliament that the Spanish Government had acted in conformity with the rules of war, and did not overstep those of international law. He likewise acknowledged (and it is of great importance this circumstance should be particularly recorded) that the apprehensions of a bombardment of Valparaiso were not of recent origin; that this question had been already under debate for some time, and that in consequence thereof the British merchants resident at that port had applied to the Chilian Government to pre-

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pare a place where the merchandise might safely be deposited beyond the reach of the cannon of our squadron; but that, not having been able to come to an agreement on account of motives of expense, this measure of precaution had not been carried into effect. It is requisite to take note of this circumstance ; because having once recognised the right to bombard, and this right not having been carried into effect suddenly, but after long previous notice, this recognition will hereafter prevent the raising of claims which, although fruitless in their results, as not founded upon justice, prove none the less vexatious when made the subject of debate between friendly Governments. And now, after having made these statements, I cannot comprehend how the epithet of " barbarous " can be applied to the bombardment of Valparaiso. No one acts barbarously"^ who proceeds strictly within the limits of the law, and 1 does not overstrain any of the powers it confers. The bombardment of Valparaiso lias been a subject of regret, all the more s painful as it regards a Republic against which we entertain no "> feeling whatever ^of bitterness or animosity, however serious s mayTiaVe^been the causes of complaint she has given us; but , its being carried into effect could not have been avoided unless the -Government had consented to sacrifice entirely the dignity and honour of the nation, and relinquished at the same time the important interests which have been entrusted to its care. This a very few words will be sufficient to prove. I do not intend to enter into the history of the war, or of its origin, that having been already explained to satiety in the reiterated circulars which have been issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, demonstrating the uttei unreasonableness exhibited by Chile in refusing to make a suitable satisfaction. I shall proceed to speak only of the
s

4 circumstances which have breaking out of hostilities. occurred subsequent to the

A s soon as the news reached Europe that General Pareja had declared the city of Valparaiso and other ports of the Republic of Chile to be in a state of blockade, the British, Minister presented himself to the Spanish Government in order to oifer to it, not mediation, as Mr. Layard has erroneously represented, but good offices .* This only was what the Government accepted, for it could never consent to receive the arbitration or mediation of any one when treating of questions of honour and dignity. The reply returned to Sir John Crampton accordingly was, that the British Government might submit a definite proposition as to the manner in which its good offices were to be employed; that Spain looked upon the war as a lamentable misfortune, as a calamity which she had done nothing to provoke; and that she ardently longed for peace, for the very reason that she was entirely free from any sentiment whatever of bitterness or animosity towards the Republic of Chile.f This conversation took place towards the end of November; and on the 7th of December the English Plenipotentiary and the French Ambassador simultaneously presented a memorandum, which they accompanied with such proposals for peace as, in their opinion, would be deemed acceptable and honourable by the two belligerent countries. These were as follows: first, that Chile.should address a note to the Spanish Plenipotentiary, declaring that she had had no intention to offend us ; that she desired to re-adjust her good understanding with us; and that she

* Vide Sir J. Crampton to Earl of Clarendon, Blue Book, No. 62. t Vide Sir J. Crampton to Earl of Clarendon, Blue Book, No. 26.

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would consider the treaty of peace and amity which existed with that Eepublic as much in force as if no war had taken place. Secondly, that Spain should reply in the same tone, declaring that she desired to maintain her good understanding with Chile, and that she entertained no designs either of conquest or of exclusive influence of any description in those regions; and lastly, that a corresponding mutual salute should be fired, cannon replying to cannon, to be commenced by Chile from her forts.* The Government desiring peace, not considering war advisable, and wishing to put an end to it by any honourable means, accepted these proposals; and before twenty-four hours had expired, replied to the Representatives of the two Governments that it consented to content itself with those satisfactions which they themselves had considered as consistent with the honour due to the two nations. It did not insist upon Chile's saluting the Spanish flag with 21 continuous guns, a vessel of our squadron to reply afterwards; it consented, on the contrary, that the salute should be fired simultaneously, gun replying to gun, Chile to commence; it renounced entirely every indemnity for war expenses, which General Pareja had previously declared should be demanded from the moment hostilities were begun ; in a word, it manifested its consent in toto, and without the slightest discussion or observation, to that which was proposed by the two friendly and allied nations, as honourable to both parties.t In pursuance of this agreement, new instructions were forthwith sent to the Commander of our fleet in the Pacific, and care was even taken that these should be transmitted in triplicate,

* Vide Sir J. Crampton to Earl of Clarendon, Blue Book, No. 67. t Vide Sir J. Crampton to Earl Russell, Blue Book, No. 75.

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in order that it should be rendered impossible ever to accuse the Spanish Government, in case of loss, of not having faithfully carried out that to which it had bound itself. One copy of the instructions was entrusted to the British Government; another to the hands of the French Government ; and the third was forwarded direct by the Spanish Government. The instructions left Madrid on the 14th December, in order to be in time to reach the mail steamer which left Southampton on the 17th of the same month. Notwithstanding this, gentlemen, the Government, in the course of three days, found itself under the necessity of adopting certain measures of precaution, suggested by the suspicion that Chile, encouraged by the conduct of certain of the Foreign Diplomatic Agents resident in that Republic, would refuse to accept the good offices. 1 had myself remarked the attitude of partiality assumed by the Foreign Diplomatic Corps resident in Santiago, even previous to General Pareja's proclaiming the state of blockade; I had observed that it was to them probably to be attributed that the war had not been arrested at its commencement; I had noticed various steps which had been taken by the said Representatives against the wish of their respective Governments ; and these symptoms inspired me with the apprehension that Chile, encouraged by such partial conduct, and perhaps interpreting it in an erroneous sense, might refuse to accept the good offices which the Governments of England and France were about to offer to her. My apprehensions have, unfortunately, been all confirmed; the proofs of a partial influence have continued daily to augment in weight. The agents of certain Governments had exhibited great sympathy towards the Republic of Chile

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a sympathy which might be interpreted as a breach of neutrality ; and even although it may be true that in many cases the British Government, rendering justice to our observations, has gone so far as to remove some of its agents, yet as this measure could not be carried into effect until two or three months after the events, the effect had been already produced upon the minds of the Chileans. Consequently, under date of the 20th December, I addressed a communication to the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, and another to our Representative in London, in order that they might ascertain, in a confidential manner, what would be the opinion of the two Governments in case the Republic of Chile should refuse the good offices which both Governments were about to offer to it. The answer of the French Government was clear and explicit: it replied that if Chile were to refuse the good offices, the position of Spain would be exceedingly clear ; she was authorised to employ every description of hostility; which reply did not, however, exclude the right and liberty which France reserved to herself to form her opinion as to every particular act of the Spanish Government. That is to say, France, reserving to herself the full liberty of judgment and appreciation as to the acts of the Spanish Government, considered that when once the said good offices had been rejected, Spain was duly authorized to employ every kind of hostility. The answer of the British Government was distinct. Without any doubt whatever it was so convinced of the justice and moderation of Spain, that its only reply was that it could not discuss such a question, inasmuch as the very hypothesis that the Republic of Chile might refuse the proposals of the two Governments was not to be admitted.*
* Vide Sir J. Crampton to Karl of Clarendon, Blue Book, No. 106, and Ea of Clarendon to Sir J. Crampton, Bine Book, No. 113.

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In the meantime, Messieurs Deputies, what I had feared had come to pass. The Chileans, becoming emboldened, had infused into the war a character of much greater severity and harshness, which contrasted strongly with the mild terms of the blockade which General Pareja had established in Valparaisoa blockade so extremely benign that it had merited the eulogium of all the foreign residents, and not only of the commanders of the vessels belonging to the squadrons of friendly Powers, but of the consular body itself, and the diplomatic corps resident at Santiago. The Chilean Government, responding ungraciouslyresponding unworthilyto our moderation, began by sending out in all directions, as well to Europe as to America, numerous agents provided with letters of marque to enable them to attack and injure Spanish commerce. The inefficiency of the law in England to prevent similar armaments either animated or aided it in so doing, and the result is that the Spanish Government, in spite of its exertions, had to stand by and witness the departure of various suspicious vessels from British ports. Spanish subjects resident in Chile, instead of receiving beforehand the notice or advice usual amongst civilized nations to enable them to leave the Republican territory within a stated time, were sent into the interior, conveyed to Santiago, subjected to vexations and oppressions, and were even prohibited from disposing of their property and goods.* And here I reply to Senor Salazar y Mazarredo that the Government cannot abstain from characterising, in the severest terms, the infamous conduct observed by Chile towards

* Vide Mr. Thompson to Earls Russell and Clarendon, Blue Book, Nos. 73, 124, 134, and 188. Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Thompson, Blue Book, Nos. 85, and 86. Senor Covarrubias to Mr. Thompson, Blue Book, No. 187. " Lives of Spanish residents threatened."

9Spanish subjects, in return for the consideration shown here towards all the subjects of the Hispano-American Republics. That Government, availing itself of perverse means, flattering evil passions, protecting the revolutionists of Peru, was enabled, by means of false protestations that the question treated of was purely an American one, to excite the odium of those Republics, which proceeded to form alliances in violation ,of treaties, trampling upon all rights, as has occurred in the case of Peru, or forgetting bonds of complete amity, such as those which existed with tho Republics of Bolivia and Equador. But this did not suflice. Chile adopted a measure dishonourable and unworthy of a civilized country, viz. that of purchasing and introducing torpedoesinfernal engines invented to blow squadrons into the air, and occasion needless bloodshed and destruction.* We have proof of this in what has occurred at various points. Vessels, laden with combustible materials and different diabolical contrivances, have been blown up before their time in the Island of Tobago; in Panama, and at San Francisco, California; causing a greater loss of life than would have resulted in three or four naval engagements. Further, gentlemen, while all this was being done, the " Covadonga" was captured by a Chilean corvette, not in fair combat, but by usurping a foreign and neutral flag, which allowed her to approach within cannon shot. A corvette of 16 to 20 guns employed this treacherons artifice to seize a schooner of only two. And here, in answer to M. Salazar y Mazarredo, I declare that such an abuse of the British flag by the enemy's vessels is an act which I do not
* Vide Rear-Admiral Denman to Secretary of Admiralty, Blue Book, No. 175.

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feel called upon to characterise, but which I hold to be a piece of treachery which ought never to be practised by vessels belonging to the military service.* Upon the capture of the "Covadonga," new instructions were given to the acting Commander of the squadron, the death of General Pareja having already taken place. In these instructions he was told that since Spanish blood had been shedsince a Spanish vessel had been captured in an almost piratical mannerhe had no other alternative but to obtain a reparation for our arms; that for this purpose he was resolutely to search for the Peruvian and Chilean fleet, either capture or sink it, and afterwards to negotiate a peace ; that if it proved absolutely impossible for him to come up with the enemies' vessels on account of their withdrawing from the. pursuit of the Spanish squadron, no remedy would then be left, in view of the infamous conduct of Chile, but to bombard the ports of the Republic. These were the instructions which the Spanish Government gave to Brigadier Senor Mendez Nunez, who by the same packet received, not only his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, but that of Her Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary; thus furnishing an evident proof of the desire which animated the Spanish Government, even amidst so much treachery and so many insults, to make peace with that Republic. The Brigadier M. Mendez Nunez, in obedience to the orders of the Government, accordingly sought for the Chilo-Peruvian squadron, and for that purpose sent out the expedition with the particulars of which Messieurs the Deputies are already acquainted, since it resulted in the combat of Abtao. The enemies' vessels had

* Vide Mr. Thompson to Earl Russell, Blue Book, No. 109. signals of distress."

" She showed

11 taken refuge in places into which our ships could not penetrate on account of their greater draft of water, and where they were protected by two land batteries; here, notwithstanding, one frigate was destroyed; the boilers of another were blown u p ; and our ships did all the damage that was possible. The two Spanish frigates remained waiting several hour3 for the enemy, outside the inaccessible retreat in which he had taken refuge, provoking him to an engagement. Those same Chileans and Peruvians who now vaunt themselves so valiant, and who have depicted the combat of Abtao as a great triumph gained by them, did not then dare to come out with their seven or eight vessels to fight with two. And this fact is the best reply that can be made to the Chileans, who paint as a great victory that impunity which their vessels had obtained from being concealed amongst cliffs and rocks, where our ships could not close with them. The Spanish ships waited for them twelve or fourteen hours; they fired guns repeatedly to let them know they were there; yet, Messieurs the Deputies, not a single vessel ventured to come out. But this expedition did not suffice. A few days afterwards Brigadier M. Nunez proceeded there with the " Numancia " and " Blanca " ; but our gallant enemies had not only buried themselves in those localities where the water is exceedingly shallow, but had sunk a vessel in order more completely to prevent our entrance into that channel. Messieurs the Deputies, what was the commander to do when he thus proved the futility of all his efforts to bring about a regular combat, and this while not making an abuse of his superior resources ; by no means,-he first sent two frigates, and afterwards two others, and never employed all the forces at his command. What was he to do? I ask, when he found

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that the enemy's only warlike manoeuvre was ignominiously taking to flight to place himself under shelter from our guns \ It was then, gentlemen, that the bombardment of Valparaiso was decided upon. The manner in which the chief of the squadron has behaved on that occasion; the tact displayed by him in the negotiations which took place with the English and American Commodore and Minister ; and the scrupulous respect which was paid to private property; are shown in the published despatches. All the Deputies may see in them the noble and gallant conduct observed by the Brigadier Mendez Nunez. The American Commodore and General Kilpatrick, Minister for the United States, at once held a conference with him. They submitted to him various propositions of peace ; and M. Mendez Nunez, who held orders to proceed to energetic measures of hostility, desirous notwithstanding for peace, and becoming the faithful interpreter of the intentions of the Government, exercised that latitude which, as customary when sending instructions to so great a distance, had been left him by the Government, and replied that he took upon himself the responsibility of listening to the terms proposed for coming to an agreement. And what were these proposals, gentlemen \ Precisely the same as those which had formed the basis of the good offices of France and England ; the identical ones which had been characterised as highly honourable for both countries by the English and French Governments. The sole additional indispensable condition stipulated by M. Nunez was, the return of the schooner " Covadonga " in exchange for the twelve or fourteen or more prizes which were then in the hands of the Spanish squadron.

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The conduct of the Chilean Government was the same as it always had been. The reply was a negative. They would not accept these conditions ; but said that if the Spanish Admiral would withdraw all his ships, leaving one only in the roadstead of Valparaiso, and present his credentials to the President of the Republic, they would not object to the reopening of negotiations. Such was the reply of the same haughty Republic which is not ashamed to turn her back upon an enemy. The second proposal made to the Brigadier Mendez Nunez by the American agents, in pursuance of their constant desire for conciliation, after the bombardment had been already announced, was to the effect that,supposing Valparaiso surrendered; supposing the city undefended ; supposing it might be considered prostrate at his feet, and the Brigader Mendez Nunez would promise to spare it a bombardment; then they would not hesitate to give the assurance that the Government of Chile would accept the conditions which the Spanish Commander had previously offered in vain. M. Mendez Nunez, animated with the utmost moderation, replied, that he assented; but desired that a single Minister should come from Santiago to confirm the offer. The reply to this was a negative. And lastly, gentlemen, came the disgraceful challenge in the form of a proposed international duel. This was proposed by the Chilean Minister of Marine, in a missive which caused Admiral Rodgers, who was to be appointed the judge, to declare to M. Mendez Nunez that the demand made was ridiculous ; and Admiral Denman to state, that if any motive were wanting to justify the bombardment of Valparaiso, it was furnished by a document which was unworthy of a civilized nation. How could the commander of the fleet

14 accept of an obsolete cartel of defiance which would transport us back into the middle ages, to exhibit ourselves at a tournament with a judge of the combat and a queen of beauty, to decide which was in the right ? And what did this absurd document propose 1 That the " Numancia" should be sent a distance off, and the Spanish fleet reduced to an equal strength with that of the Chilean and Peruvian combined. What would the Spanish Government have said, what would all Europe have said, if M. Mndez Nunez had accepted so derisive a challenge'! And what was the real object of it \ To gain time, to deceive, to await the arrival of the " Huscar," the " Independencia," and some other steamers which were on their way to Chile ; and, when they found themselves superior in numbers to lay down the law and, in compliance with the tactics common to Chile and the other Republics, ignore all the compromises previously entered into? And after all, if they really wanted to fight, had they not had the opportunity for 12 or 14 hours, to come out and fight, with the seven or eight vessels they had, two of our frigates, the " Blanca" and " Villa de Madrid V For what reason did they conceal themselves ? Why did they remain shut up 1 Why did they sink a vessel at the entrance of the strait in order to render it impossible for a single one of our vessels to approach ? If they really desired an engagement, an opportunity had been offered to them. Why had they declined if? How was it they had rather chosen to cover themselves with ignominy by refusing it 1 Such conduct only proved they had no other intention but to gain time, to await until the vessels they expected should arrive, and when they found themselves
* Vide Mr. Thompson to Earl Russell, Blue Boole, No. 101.

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possessed of a numerical superiority then to act as they have always done before. I believe, gentlemen, that when the treatment inflicted upon Spanish subjects; the piratical warfare carried on; the torpedoes ; the ships that were expected; and the injury they hoped to inflict upon our squadron by distributing explosive machines at the entrances of Callao and Valparaiso, are taken into consideration; I think that not a doubt can remain in any mind whatever that the bombardment of this last port was an act, painful indeed, but rendered necessary in order to save our honour; and this bombardment was provoked solely and exclusively by the pride and obstinacy of the Republic of Chile. I believe, gentlemen, I have demonstrated this ; and I will next pass on to the reply which I ought to make to the words uttered by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain. The first assertion was, that Spain, taking for an excuse and a pretext the delay which Chile had made in accepting the friendly offices which had been tendered to her, wished to break off the negotiation, and that France and England had opposed this, and continued to treat. The first thing I have to say with respect to this is, that Spain had neither accepted arbitration or mediation. Spain had accepted friendly offices; only she was her own mistress, and retained her freedom of action, if new events arose, without the French and English Governments being in a position to bind her to anything which she might deem unfitting.* The second is, that if the said friendly offices were
* Sir J. Crampton to Earl of Clarendon, Blue Book, No. 26. to Earl of Clarendon, Blue Book, No. 180. Earl Cowley

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still spoken of until the last moment, it was because Spain deemed it expedient to show, in a formal manner, that Chile had refused them. If Spain, at a later period, renounced the said friendly offices, it was in consequence of other considerations of which I shall give an account to the Congress. But it was highly fitting that it should be made patent that Chile had not accepted those good offices; and in effect, although they had been notified to her at the end of January, the whole of the months of February and March passed without her giving anything but evasive replies; alleging that she had to act in concert with her new ally the Republic of Peru, which in reality amounted to nothing more than a negative more or less cleverly disguised ; inasmuch as there had been ample time during two months to have made several return journeys between Lima and Valparaiso, and versa.* But yet further : it was of great importance for us to show convincingly that Chile had not accepted the friendly offices, because it was the intention of the Spanish Government, notwithstanding what had occurred with the " Covadonga," if peace had been concluded in accordance with the conditions proposed by France and England, before the receipt by Brigadier Mendez Nunez of the new instructions, to have approved of it, out of a just deference to the two friendly nations, and in order not to appear undesirous of an accommodation. vice

* Mr. Thompson to Earl Russell, Blue Book, No. 33. Mr. Thompson to Earl Clarendon, Blue Book, Nos. 147, 158, and 209. First official notification of friendly offices to Chile, 15th January. Arrival of the new Peruvian Minister at Santiago, 3rd March. Bombardment of Valparaiso, 31st March.

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It was, then, important to show all this, in orde r that the responsibility of ulte rior e ve nts might fall e xclusive ly upon that Powe r which should provoke the m by he r obstinacy. We withdre w ourse lve s from the frie ndly office s for anothe r reason, and this will afte rwards furnish a reply to the se cond charge made against us by the English Unde r Se cre tary of State. But how can Mr. Layard asse rt that we have with drawn ourse lve s, and that France and England have insiste d, in spite of our withdrawal, upon continuing to e xe rcise the ir mediation 1 How can he say this, gentlemen, except from an incomprehensible failure of me mory, whe n I hold in my hands a docume nt from France which state s pre cise ly the contrary \ And although I am aware that it is ve ry tire some for Congre ss to have to liste n to the re ading of official documents, ye t I think notwithstanding this one ought to be read, as it is of the highe st importance . On the 19th April of the pre se nt ye ar, the Fre nch Ministe r for Fore ign Affairs wrote the following ve rbal note :
V B E B NOTE.

1 April,

1866.

The Marquis de Le ma has hande d to the Ministe r for Fore ign Affairs the copy of a de spatch, addre sse d hy His Exce lle ncy M. Be rmude z de Castro to the Ambassador of He r Catholic Maje sty in London, in which, afte r re fe rring to the good unde rstanding which had be e n e stablishe d be twe e n the Gove rn ments of France and England, with the vie w of bringing about a conciliation of the diffe re nce s which had be e n raise d be twe e n Spain and Chile , He r Catholic Maje sty's First Secretary of State e xpre sse d the de sire of his Gove rn ment to be made acquainte d with the re sult of the steps take n by the Fre nch and English age nts with the Cabine t of Santiago. The Ministe r for Fore ign Affairs cannot be tte r re ply to this communication than by re lating what has passe d. The Impe rial Gove rnme nt haste ne d to transmit to the ConsulGe ne ral of France at Santiago the me morandum which had be e n drawn up be twe e n France and England, as soon as the Spanish Gove rnme nt had notifie d its adhesion to the said docume nt. At the same time it e njoine d the Consul. General of France to e mploy his good office s, in conce rt with his colle ague

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of England, in order that the Chilean Government might accept the conclusions. This situation of affairs was very speedily modified. On the one side Her Catholic Majesty's Ambassador informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs that in consequence of the measures of confiscation adopted in Chile against Spaniards, of the issue of letters of marque by the Government of the Republic, of the equipment of privateers, and finally of the unexpected attack made upon the Spanish schooner " Covadonga " by a Chilean corvette sailing under cover of a neutral flag, the Spanish Cabinet found itself compelled to consult nothing but what her honour dictated, and to obtain vengeance for the blood which had been shed. On the other hand, the Government of Chile, rendering justice to the intentions which had actuated France and England in their intervention between the belligerents, declared that by effect of the treaty entered into with Perna treaty to which the Republic of the Equator and the United States of Colombia had just declared their adherenceit was unable to enter into any arrangement whatever separately, and that consequently it considered any discussion of the conditions formulated in the memorandum to be inopportune. The Government of Chile further refused, for the same motives, to conclude an armistice which, as a last resource, was proposed by France and England. In this state of affairs no other resource was left for the mediatorial Powers but to suspend their proceedings, and await more favourable circumstances. As regards the Cabinet of Madrid, it will assuredly acknowledge that the Emperor's Government has done everything in its power in order to bring to a termination the war between Spain and Chile ; and that if the conciliatory action of France and England has been interrupted, it has been from the effect of circumstances which it was out of the power of both Powers to modify; and especially in consequence of the resolution announced by the Cabinet of Madrid, to obtain, before all, reparation for the new offences on the part of Chile.

This is the most conclusive reply which could be given to Mr. Layard, to show that Spain had neither withdrawn herself on account of the motive he imputes, nor had France or England insisted upon leading her in a direction in which she no longer desired to proceed. It was likewise stated by Mr. Layard that upon the British Minister at this Court presenting himself to me in consequence of the rumours which had circulated relative to orders having been forwarded to the Commander of the fleet to

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bombard Valparaiso, I had been vague in my expressions; that I did not conduct myself with due candour and fairness, and that I led the Governments of France and England into an error or misconception, as they did not expect such a measure would be adopted. Well, then, as I stated at the commencement, when the seizure of the " Covadonga" took place, new instructions had been issued to proceed with greater severity against the Republic of Chile ; but the Spanish Government, always desiring to proceed in harmony with nations such as those of France and England, to whom she is united by such a good understandinganxious not to take a single step without their previous knowledge, as was due after we had accepted their good officeshastened to give an account of the new aspect affairs had assumed, and of the conduct it proposed to follow in view of the events which had occurred* I have the communication here, gentlemen. It is somewhat lengthy, and I am afraid it would be deemed tedious by the Congress if I were to read it entire, however important its contents really are, and however much it would serve to throw light upon the question. Really, gentlemen, I am almost afraid to read it entire, it being so long. [Several Deputies : Let it be read.] On the 26th of January instructions were sent to the Commander of the squadron, and on the following day, the 27th, this circular was sent to H.M's. Ambassador at Paris, and to the Ministers in London and Washington :

* Sir J. Crampton to Earl of Clarendon, Blue Book, No. 124. Clarendon to Sir J. Crampton, Blue Book, Nos. 125 and 128.

Earl of

c 2

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To the Representatives of H. M. in Paris, London & Washington.
Madrid, 27t?t January, 1866. MOST EXCELLENT SIB,The circular of the 7th August last, and the other papers referring to the Chilean question, which were published in the Official Gazette, and subsequently submitted to the Cortes, have made your Excel, lency acquainted with the origin of the lamentable conflict which has taken place with that Republic; and the extreme care with which the Government of the Queen has endeavoured, within the limits of the decorum due to itself> to avoid a definitive rupture with the Cabinet of Santiago. All these efforts, and its constant good will, were unfortunately not sufficient to attain the noble end which it proposed; yet, notwithstanding, when the tenacious resistance of the Chilean Government had rendered necessary the employment of ccercive measures to obtain the reparation which was refused to the voice of reason and justice, the Spanish squadron confined itself to the establishing of the blockade of some of the Chilean ports, observing, in effecting this, the greatest possible lenity and moderation, with the approbation of H. M.'s Government, which was solicitous to exhibit the moderation of its conduct, divesting all its proceedings towards the Republic of Chile of every character of animosity. This was the state of the question when the Governments of the two friendly nations to which we are bound by relations of mutual sympathy and reciprocal regard, prompted by the warmest desire to bring about a pacific setttlement of these differences, made the tender to H. M.'s Government of their good offices, in order to bring about so desirable a result. The Spanish Government was deeply grateful for this pledge of friendship, and accepted them at once, without hesitating a single instant in so doing. It had not to make any sacrifice of passion or resentment, for it entertained no animosity whatever against Chile; but rather deplored the necessity in which it saw itself placed, in having to exact by force of arms what it had in vain sought after by the pacific means of diplomacy. On the other hand, and while this was occurring in Europe, the Government of the Republic, interpreting as a want of energy what was the consequence solely of our ideas of moderation and temperance, continued to follow an unjustifiable course of proceeding, in notable contrast to our own, and which it would not be too venturesome to ascribe to the stimulus of that partiality which the proceedings of the Diplomatic Corps residing at Santiago have revealed from the commencement. It may perhaps also be attributed to the influence produced in the mind of the Chilean Government by acts such as those of the Commander of the English frigate " Mutine," who received on board his ship, with military honours, the Authority of a blockaded port, while within its waters, and in the very presence of the blockadcr who had allowed his ship to enter. Emboldened by

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these facts and others of a not less significant character, or else yielding to an inexplicable sentiment of animosity against their former metropolis, the Chilean Government has replied with violence and passion to the generosity and moderation observed by the Government of Spain. While the hostilities of our force were very far from assuming a directly aggressive character, the blockade being of the least possible severity, the most arbitrary measures were adopted in Chile against unoffending Spanish subjects, who, by their industry and wealth, had powerfully contributed to the prosperity of the Republic, and who are now forced to see the fruit of their labour ruined and their persons injured and outraged, solely on account of their nationality. Agents were sent to Europe and America, provided with letters of marque, for the purpose of equipping vessels to hunt down and destroy our commerce, while Spain has desisted from employing similar aggression, although it was in her power and right to do s o ; and lastly, a Chilean vessel of war, the corvette " Esmeralda," usurping a neutral flag, and having recourse to means more suitable for corsairs and pirates than a military marine endued with the smallest sentiment of honour and self-respect, made an attack upon the Spanish schooner " Covadonga," which being very inferior both in tonnage and armament, was captured, and her officers and crew made prisoners, after an engagement as unequal as it was obstinate. Spanish blood has been the first shed, not in fair fight, but in consequence of an attack of an almost piratical character, attended with circumstances which cannot be justified by the laws of honourable warfare, and which, having nevertheless been approved, applauded, and even gloried in by the Government of Chile, have brought about a new situation of affairs, which does not admit of the further exercise of those considerations hitherto observed. The death of General Pareja has left Spain without a Plenipotentiary invested with full powers to carry into execution the settlement agreed upon with France and England when accepting their good offices, under circumstances certainly very different from those at present existing. Your Excellency will accordingly endeavour to convince the Government to which you are accredited that while always grateful for the proofs of friendship and deference We owe to the said two nations, it has become impossible for us, at the time of conferring new powers upon the Commander of the squadron, to ignore the situation of affairs which has been created by the conduct of the Chilean Government; nor is it possible at present to effect a peace without avenging the blood which has been shed, and the insult which has been received by our flag. We have not now to treat of offences of a more or less serious character, which by their nature would allow of negotiation, or be susceptible of arrangement as to the satisfaction to be received. The good offices, which out of deference towards the two Governments tendering them, and in order to furnish a proof of the rectitude of her intentions, had been accepted by

22
Spain, can no longer be entertained, unless a state of affairs similar to that which existed when the proposals for a settlement were presented by England and France, shall be again established; that is to say, not until the stain shall have been washed out, and the indisevibable act of aggression committed by the " Esmeralda" corvette duly chastised. It is in this spirit that the orders which have been this day communicated to the chief of the Spanish squadron have been dictated, and he has been especially enjoined that, ceasing to observe those measures of moderation and lenity which have been used up to the present time, refusing to listen any longer to those generous sentiments which are so little understood, and so ill requited by the Government of Chile, and solely bearing in mind the duty of preserving the dignity of the Spanish flag at the height it merits; he is to employ every description of hostility authorized by the law of nations, carrying out those measures to the utmost limit allowed by the laws of war, and nob suffering any of those considerations which up to the present time have kept the Spanish forces from attacking the Chilean maritime fortresses to be an obstacle hindering the employment of any description whatever of military operations; inasmuch as the responsibility of the consequences must fall upon the Government of the Republic, which by its unjustifiable proceedings has provoked a situation in which those indulgent considerations which we had with so much good faith hitherto observed have no longer room for existence. In this conjuncture Her Majesty's Governmentthe whole of whose acts relating to the conllict arisen in Chile, have been previously announced to the Cabinets of friendly Powersin proof of the rectitude of the views by which it is actuated, is desirous that the Government of the country where you reside should be made fully aware of the particulars I have expressed. With this end in view, it is Her Majesty's wish that you should inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the country in which you reside of the eonteuts of this despatch, taking care that he shall be entirely convinced of the right which exists on the part of Spain to justify her adoption of a line of action different from that she has hitherto observed. The Government of Chile has committed the first sanguinary aggression; the first lives sacrificed have been those of Spaniards; the forces which, by a semi-piratical attack, have driven us to seek for reparation at whatever cost, were Chilean; those governing Powers which, by rashly sacrificing the benefits of peace upon the altars of their unbending pride, have rendered a pacific bolution of the conflict impossible, have been likewise Chilean. The Queen's Government would therefore fail in the most sacred of its duties were it not to endeavour to wash entirely away every stain which could cast a stigma upon the honour of her arms. Towards this object it directs its endeavours; but it is anxious in the first place to make it patent that the responsibility of the evils which may arise therefrom rests exclusively upon the Government of the Republic, which provokes and compels us to a sanguinary war; and that the Government of Spain faithful and constant to its ever frank and loyal policy, makes known her

23
intentions beforehand, setting forth the causes which justify them, in order to preclude the possibility of objects unsuitable to the uprightness of her character ever being imputed to her. Notwithstanding all I have above stated, your Excellency can assure the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the country to which you are accredited, that when once an equal footing shall have been re-established by means of an honourable and indispensable reprisal, the Government of Her Majesty the Queen will find itself again disposed as before to enter into pacific relations with the Republic of Chile, should that Government desire it.
(Signed) M. BEBMUDEZ DE CASTEO.

Is it possible to announce in a clearer or more decisive manner the intention to have recourse to every class of hostility, and that the bombardment of maritime places was about to be ensue % It will be now necessary for me to read the reply received from the Marquis de Molins, Her Majesty's Minister in London, giving an account of the conversation held by him with Lord Clarendon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon the occasion of making his Lordship acquainted with the above despatch, upon the 3rd February : H. M.'s Minister in London to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.
London, February 3rd, 1866. # * # # #

I will now inform your Excellency that at two o'clock I called to have an interview with the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and to communicate to him the contents referred to in the Royal Order, No. 34. His Excellency attributed great importance to this communication, and appeared to be deeply ail'ected by its tenor, and (in the course of our interview, enquired] whether it meant to say that supposing the good officss should be adopted and a treaty stipulated in consequence, and according to the tenor of the same, the said treaty would not obtain its ratification from Spain. I protested that I neither could or ought to enter upon any such hypotheses; that the scope of my communication was limited to a matter which, independently of its being imperative on me to submit, appeared to me to be of a common sense character, namely, that since the acceptance of the

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friendly offices, fresh and serious events had occurred: such as insults to natives of Spain; the equipment of privateers ; provocations; combats under extraordinary circumstances; seizure of vessels; killed and wounded, and capture of prisoners: that the whole of these aggressions had come from the side of Chile, and that they had constituted a new situation to which anterior solutions were no longer applicable. That, nevertheless, our desire for peace was the same, our gratitude to Prance and England had undergone no change, and that our favourable disposition to enter into pacific relations with the Republic continued to exist in the same form. The noble lord made no change in his argument, not did I in mine; but he lamented the deplorable results which, and with reason, he stated he had foreseen from the beginning, in which I hastened to coincide; requesting him to take notice, notwithstanding, that the responsibility rested entirely upon the Republic, which had never done or accepted anything whatever towards an accomodation.
(Signed) T H E MAEQTTIS OV MOLINS.

Another new proof that the English Government was fully acquainted with our determination is furnished by the following despatch addressed to me by the Marquis of Molins, under date of 23rd April, from which it appears that Lord Clarendon, speaking on the subject of the bombardment of Valparaiso, expressed his opinion that that event would not terminate the war, but only envenom i t :
London, 23rd April, 1866. # # # # # Scarcely, in fact, had Lord Clarendon expressed to me his thanks for the friendly disposition and diligence exhibited by Her Majesty's Government in the said affair, when, changing the conversation, he told me that some bad news had just been communicated to him, of which he had had no previous information himself, neither did he suppose I was in possession of any, namely: that orders had been given to Mendez Nunez to bombard Valparaiso, and return immediately. " Have you been told anything about this of late ? " his Lordship enquired. The question having been placed by the Minister on the footing I desired, I replied: " I am not aware, in effect, whether such instructions have been recently issued; but I do remember, and we spoke on that very subject in a conference I held with you, that towards the end of January the Chief of our squadron had been commanded to destroy that of the enemy at any cost; and that if the latter should artfully withdraw itself out of our reach,

25
then he was to bombard any of the enemy's ports, including that of Valparaiso, endeavouring to inflict the least possible damage upon neutral residents, and giving them previous notice of hostilities; for," I added on ray own account, " t h e time has now arrived to terminate in one way or the other a question in which we have the right on our side, and wherein the enemy only seeks to gain time." Lord Clarendon only replied to m e : " But that would not terminate the war, it would only embitter (envenimerait) it." At this moment a porter entered to announce the arrival of a large number of Members of Parliament. The Minister rose, making me an apology; and when standing, observed to me, that his communication concerning friendly offices had been misunderstood at Madrid; that Chile had neither accepted or rejected them, but had referred to Peru. Being aware that it wa3 not his Excellency's design to enter into a discussion upon the subject of my visit, I did not attempt to lengthen i t ; and without being able to amplify upon the two points of which he had spoken to me, nor to refer to the matter of the torpedoes, which I was anxious to do, I politely took my leave.
(Signed) T H E MABQUIS DE MOLINS.

The Congress has now before it the manner in which, as far back as the month of February, the change of instructions and our intention to have recourse to every measure of hostility, without regard to any species of consideration, and without allowing the obstacles which had hitherto detained us (which arose from our excessive respect for neutral interests) to hinder us in future from attacking the enemy's sea-ports, was announced to the British Government, and I do not think it can be called ambiguous or doubtful to say that the phrase to attack the enemy's sea-ports is equivalent in meaning to that of attacking them with guns. And thus, when Mr. Crampton, H. B. M's. Minister at this Court, came to ask me whether it was true that a Cabinet courier had been despatched by the Government to New York, bearing orders for the bombardment of Valparaiso, I replied that it was utterly false, for the Government was accustomed to forward its orders by the direct route, which was the

26
Isthmus of Panama ; that the statement that such a courier had gone to New York was without foundation ; and I added that Lord Clarendon was aware what were the instructions and intentions of the Spanish Government, inasmuch as they had been communicated to him by our Minister in London. I had nothing more to say. From whence, then, does Mr. Layard draw the inference that I have been deficient in frankness, and that by my equivocal and ambiguous replies I had led France and England into an error, after the despatch which I have just read, and which was communicated by the Spanish Minister to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain on the 3rd of February ? Could anything be clearer ? I think, gentlemen, it is unnecessary for me to say more in order to prove that Mr. Layard has either committed a lamentable mistake or he has not a sufficiently intimate acquaintance with what passes in the Foreign Office. There is one other point, gentlemen, on which I have to touch, and it is the last. The Under Secretary of State of Great Britain, at the same moment that he acknowledged that in the bombardment of Valparaiso we had done nothing more than exercise a right given to us by the laws of war, declared that it was an act of the greatest barbarismthese are the actual wordsand altogether unworthy of a great civilized nation. I have shown, gentlemen, that it was a necessary act; I have shown and stated what I believe must be the conscientious conviction of every one, that the exercise of a right can never be termed a barbarism; such a right itself might be a barbarism. The barbarism, if such exists, must consist in the right which all Europe acknowledges, and which she has not yet struck out of her code, as she has done with others. That, indeed, would be a barbarism

27
which separated itself from the rights of nations and the laws of warfare, and this is what we have not done. It is always usual, gentlemen, for persons who occupy an official position to be very sparing in characterizing the acts of friendly Governments ; but now that Mr. Layard has broken through this custom by qualifying in such severe terms those of the Spanish Government, I may ask in my turn: Is England a power entitled to comment in this grave and severe manner upon certain acts which are very far indeed from resembling others which she herself has committed in the course of her relations with other nations 1 It is not my wish to speak either of the bombardment of Copenhagen or of the capture of our frigates during a time of full peace. All this I look upon as appertaining to history gone by. Let us come to facts of which we have all been eye-witnesses, which must be present to the memories of even the youngest of the Deputies who sit on these benches. What did England do in that very South America, in the year 1844, with the city of Arica, the second in importance of Peru, under the pretence of an insult committed upon the British Consul % Without previous notice, without a declaration of war, she bombarded that defenceless place. What was done by her in the Canton river in 1856, on account of the Chinese having taken possession of a vessel which without any right whatever was carrying the British flag % Without anything beyond a previous notice of some hourswithout a previous declaration of warshe bombarded Canton, and landed the British marines, who proceeded to set on fire a quarter of the city and the Viceroy's palace. How did England act a few years back at Djeddah, a port on the Red Sea ? A vessel presented herself there demanding the execution of

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certain criminals; the Turkish local authority replied that it had not power to decree life or death, and that it was awaiting orders from the Grand Sultan to concede what was demanded; yet notwithstanding, Djeddah was bombarded, and without declaration of war. Now all these acts, gentlemen, have been carried into effect against international law, for in neither case had they been preceded by a declaration of war. Is it just that we should be called an uncivilized people, or is it fair to say we commit acts of barbarity, when, in a war which has been regularly declared and carried on, we make use of a right which is not denied to be ours, and which we exert as sparingly as possible % Let this show you, gentlemen, of what contradiction and injustice men are capable; and I think the lesson we ought to derive from it is that we should be only united the more closely together, to cast from us imputations which we do not merit. I believe I have replied at length to the questions of M. Salazar. All that remains for me to do is just to say a few words, which doubtless Messieurs the Deputies will be glad to hear, relative to our future conduct in America. We desire peace ; we are always disposed and decided upon accepting it in terms suitable to the decorum of the nation ; but, at the same time, if the American Republics in alliance with Chile continue to exhibit hostility and animosity which they have hitherto done, we consider that the honour and decorum of the nation demand that we should still pursue an energetic policy, and not suffer the injuries which have been inflicted upon us to pass with impunity. After a rectification made by M- Salazar y Mazarredo,

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The Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bermudez de Castro) said : I promise M. Salazar y Mazarredo to hear in mind the observations made by him, and I will endeavour to have all the documents which interest Spain printed in some foreign language.

OFFICIAL

DOCUMENTS

R E F E R R E D TO BY HIS EXCELLENCY.

To Her Majesty's Representatives in Foreign Countries.


Madrid, 2it7i May, 1866. Although Her Majesty's Government has justified superabundantly and opportunely the right which rests with it in the questions occurring with the Republic of Chile and her allies, and does not consider it necessary to give an especial account of the resolutions it may adopt in pursuance of its legitimate rights; yet, in order to render still more clear the uprightness and generosity of its conduct, it conceives it to be convenient to show that, when not actuated by any motive of impatient rancour, but compelled by the pressing necessity of avenging the outrage done to the national honour, it has had recourse to the extreme measure of bombarding the port and city of Valparaiso. A succinct and exact account of the circumstances which have preceded and given origin to this determination, will suffice to convince you that these circumstances had arrived at such a pitch that no possible terms remained by which it could be either suspended or avoided. Spain, notwithstanding the tenacious refusal on the part of Chile to afford her the moderate satisfaction she demanded in the shape of reparation and compensation, confined her first hostile demonstration to the blockade of the Chilean ports, which was effected in the least rigorous manner; as may be proved by the testimony of various foreign naval and diplomatic officials. No one can be ignorant that our squadron avoided as far as possible every description of injury to the interests of neutrals; that it consented to the entrance into the blockaded ports of the English Company's steamers, having on board not merely the mails, but even the agents of the enemy's Government ; and that this indulgence on our part was carried to the extreme point, not only of returning some vessels which had been legitimately captured, but lastly, to the restriction of the original limits over which the blockade extended itself.

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While hostilities in the Pacific were being thus reduced, Spain, waiving her rights, accepted the friendly offices which were at that juncture simultaneously proposed to her by France and England; and in consequence thereof consented to admit a form of conciliation which, in the opinion of those two Powers, was conceived in terms equally honourable and decorous for both of the contending parties. In the same manner, affording a fresh proof of her moderation and good faith, she had agreed, in accordance with a suggestion from the United States, not to exercise, immediately, hostilities of a stronger nature, in order to afford time to the Representative of the Union to counsel the Government of Santiago in a conciliatory sense. In this way Spain has from the commencement furnished proof of the sincerity of her intentions, which have been exempt from all unjust irritation ; neither the desire to humiliate her adversaries or to occasion needless annoyances having ever entered into her designs, and without her admitting even the bare possibility of a departure from established usages,by causing annoyance under any pretence whatever to the natives of the enemy's country residing in the Peninsula, who have throughout enjoyed, and continue to enjoy at the present moment, the corapletest liberty and security. This noble and generous behaviour has been responded to by Chile from the very commencement with a constant and implacable animosity. The Government of Chile began by forbidding Spanish subjects to leave the Republic, and, contrary to the custom observed by civilized nations, obliged them to take up their abode in the interior, prohibiting at the same time any disposal of the large amount of their property and funds, from which cause the ruin of many amongst them naturally ensued. Not content with this unusually rigorous measure, she sent out emissaries in all directions in order to stimulate the fitting out of cruisers to prey upon our commerce; purchased torpedoes and combustible materials to be employed in the destruction of our fleet, occasioning thereby the numerous explosions which have caused so many disasters in Tobago, Colon, and San Francisco de California; provoked us in the most unqualifiable manner by the treacherous seizure of the "Covadonga;" de-naturalized the question by giving to it an American character which it could never possess; and either by using threats against some of the weaker Governments, or by offering her material aid to unpopular ones, succeeded in inducing three Republics with whom we were maintaining friendly relations to declare war against us without any motive whatever, and, to our serious injury, close against us the ports of the Pacific; and finally, the Government of Santiago, instead of listening to the counsels prompted by a benevolent impartiality, refused for the space of two months to accept the friendly offices of France and England, and to admit their proposals, availing itself of dilatory pretences to obviate giving a categorical reply, and in order to prolong the intolerable situation of affairs. Each and all of these separate acts of hostility would have afforded just ground for the immediate employment of violent measures; but more than

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"by any other means has the nature of the conflict been seriously changed by the capture of the "Covadonga." After an aggression of this description, it became absolutely necessary to apply a prompt remedy to these provocations tmd offensive acts, which could consist in nothing less than the obtaining a corresponding reparation at any price. In this view our Government, as soon as it received intelligence of the event, communicated its instructions to the "Commander of the squadron; and in consequence thereof our naval forces set out in search of the enemy, with the intention of bringing on an open and decisive engagement. The attack against the squadron of the allied Republics was entrusted to the charge of two frigates only; but the intention was rendered fruitless, for our adversaries concealed their vessels in a locality safe and inapproachable to our forces, and from which a second attempt did not succeed in drawing them out. No other resource now remained but to have recourse to a bombardment, as the last and only means of rendering effectual the employment of forcible measures. The situation had become absolutely insupportable. At the end of six months' duration of an ineffectual blockade, it was neither possible, or just, or dignified, to continue indefinitely to preserve a disadvantageous attitude, nor to suffer from day to day fresh insults on the part of an enemy who systematically evaded an engagement. But even when this extremity had arrived, the chief of the squadron, before pointing his guns against Valparaiso, still faithfully interpreting and even carrying to their utmost limits the conciliatory wishes of the Government, made the offer to Chile, not once but on two occasions, of an honourable means of averting the attack, by the acceptance of the identical proposals which, under very different and much less serious circumstances, had been made by England and France. The definitive answer given by Chile to this chivalrous offer, was the despatch of a disgraceful challenge, equivalent to a fresh insult, at the very moment when the threatened blow was imminent. Not a single admissible pretence remained therefore for the suspension of the bombardment; and, being placed in the inevitable alternative to choose between an ignominious endurance or the adoption of a measure of chastisement more than sufficiently justified, the Commander of the squadron was unable to vacillate for a moment, and directed the fire to be opened, yet not without previously adopting every due precaution in favour of humanity and the interests of neutrals. The Chilean Government had, no doubt, imagined that by disarming the forts upon her coasts, and by evading engagements calculated to bring the power of its arms to the test, nothing was to hinder its being allowed to insult and commit hostilities against us with impunity, secure under the shelter of its own weakness. It is very easy to comprehend that should the principle of the inviolability of unarmed places be once admitted, weak and defenceless nations would be enabled, without any responsibility, to commit outrages upon others, and lay aside the most sacred obligations which justice imposes. I t results then, that in whatever way the matter be considered, Spain has, D

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In adopting the determination to bombard Valparaiso, only proceeded under the obligation of necessity, and at the same time upon the basis of a right which no one assuredly will dispute being fully hers. With regard to the immediate consequences of the bombardment, Spain is the first to lament the losses accruing thereon to subjects of friendly nations; but at the same time she is conscious that these are only evils inherent to war, and to which foreigners established in belligerent countries are unavoidably exposed. The vain efforts she has employed to prevent such injuries are well known, and on the other hand none have had to suffer greater or more direct ones than the subjects of Spain who are detained in Chile. I conceive it to be unnecessary, after pointing out the foregoing facts, to insist upon demonstrating upon which side are reason, legality, generosity, and the greatest sacrifices, and which party is chargeable with obstinacy, rancour, and bad faith; but I must not conclude without the reiteration of a solemn protest, which, under actual circumstances, will confirm conclusively the loyalty of our views. Spain sincerely deplores the necessity in which she has been placed to proceed with all rigom* against the Chilean Government; persists in declaring that neither the desire for revenge nor hatred inspires her with any animosity whatever against the Republics which have become her adversaries, and that she has always been disposed to conclude an honourable peace j but at the same time everts her just right by establishing once for all, that inasmuch as the blind, obstinacy evinced in the conduct of Chile and her allies has prevented the re-establishment of peace, and provoked inevitable measures of coercion j and inasmuch as her pride and tortuous designs, not less than the slight consideration paid by her to friends and enemies, are the true origin of the injuries which have been occasioned, ancl have caused the war to become disastrous in its consequences to all, it is upon Chile and her allies exclusively that the blame and the responsibility of all its consequences must fall. (Signed) M . BEBMTOEZ DE CASIBO.

To H. M.'s Plenipotentiary in Washington, Commandancy-General of H. Ik's Squadron in the Pacific.


MOST EXCELLENT SIR,In order that your Excellency may be enabled to form an exact idea of the different events which have occurred within the last fortnight, I have the honour to communicate a resume of the most recent events; the pressure of time preventing me furnishing your Excellency, as I could wish, with a full copy of the despatches I am about to transmit to the Ministers of State and Marine.

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On the 17th of last month I was invited to dine with Commodore Rodgers, on board his flag-ship. During the dinner the Commodore expressed to me his ardent wishes for the termination of our differences with Chile, giving me to understand that if I were invested with full powers he did not consider it would be difficult; and upon my answering that such powers had been conferred upon ine, he told me that he was immediately about to place himself in communication with his Minister to see whether between them they could succeed in bringing about a peace. Accordingly, a few days afterwards I received a visit from the Commodore, accompanied by General Kilpafcrick; both appeared to be animated by the best feelings; they invited me to have an interview with them, which although it was to be deemed private and confidential, might perhaps result in the termination of the war. I assented. The American Minister informed me that although the conference was to be deemed strictly confidential, and in no way official, the Republican Minister for Foreign Affairs was aware of the step which was being taken, and that he was as much interested in bringing about the object proposed as the Commodore, who had taken the initiative. The Commodore set forth a series of observations in order to demonstrate the inconveniences which, in his judgment, would result to Spain from the prolongation of the war, insinuating that an unforeseen embarrassment would arise should it be proposed to bombard Valparaiso, and suggested what in his opinion might be considered equally honourable to both belligerents, v i z . : the suspension of hostilities; the presentation of my credentials; a fresh examination of the various charges against Chile, with the previous affirmation of peace by a reciprocal salute of 21 guns, in the following manner:The Spanish and Chilean flags having been hoisted on board the flag-ships of the English and American squadrons, would be saluted by the guns of b o t h ; a Chilean fort and the Spanish squadron to join in the same salute, in such a way that amidst the smoke and the noise it would never he known who had fired the first shot. As your Excellency may suppose, I at once rejected this arrangement; at the same time acknowledging the good feeling with which it had been proposed, and stating in the first place that the instructions of my Government were so positive that whatever might be the difficulties I should have to overeomej I would either obtain from Chile the satisfaction she owed us or perish in the attempt, inasmuch as my Government had ordered me to prefer sinking in the waters of the Pacific to returning dishonoured to Spain. Notwithstanding, as I felt animated by the sincerest desire for reconciliation, I ventured to take upon myself the immense responsibility of demanding no further satisfaction than that set down in the arrangement proposed by France and England and accepted by Spain (with which I presume your Excellency to bo acquainted); only adding the return of the " Covadonga," with her flag, arms, and crew, in exchange for the prizes and

36
prisoners which I had in my possession. I made known at the same time that if, by eight in the morning of the 27th, I had not received a reply accepting the proposed arrangement, I would transmit to the Diplomatic Corps a manifest, fixing a final period for opening fire upon Valparaiso. Both the Minister and the Commodore deemed my proposals honourable. General Kilpatrick undertook to labour unceasingly with the object of bringing the Chilean Government to accept them, informing me that, strange to say, his predecessor, Mr. Nelson, had been the pereon who had been most opposed to any concession being made to us, in consequence of which unpleasant words had been exchanged between them. On the following day he left for Santiago, animated by the best wishes and no few expectations. On the 27th, before eight o'clock in the morning, General Kilpatrick, in company with Commodore Rodgers, presented themselves on board Her Majesty's ship in which I write, to communicate to me the result of their proceedings, as they had both spontaneously undertaken to do. Their negotiations had been fruitless. The Government of Chile protesting against the short delay granted, declared that it was materially impossible to call together and consult the accredited Representatives of the allies in Chile. In consequence of this reply I represented to the Minister of the United States that, in accordance with the intention I had expressed, I would transmit the manifest to him after the expiration of an hour. The Commodore then explained to me, with greater clearness, what was meant by the unforeseen embarrassment to which he had alluded in our former interview, stating that he would probably be unable to remain a passive spectator of the destruction of a defenceless town ; that he might perhaps have to oppose it by force, adding that he thought the commander of the naval forces of Great Britain would co-operate with him for a similar object ; to which I immediately replied I should feel great regret in coming into collision with persons who, like himself, exhibited an interest on behalf of Spain and her agents ; but that regret should not prevent me from carrying into effect the orders of my Government. He praised my decision, entreating me that whatever might be the consequences of the conflict, I should ever believe in his constant friendship and esteemwords which were repeated by General Kilpatrick. One hour afterwards I forwarded my manifest to the American Minister, in order, that through him, it might come to the knowledge of the Foreign Diplomatic body. I enclose a copy of the said document for your Excellency's information. On the 29th the American Commodore again visited me, accompanied by the Secretary of Legation, with the ostensible object of handing to me the answer to the manifest; and upon doing so he informed me that he had entertained the intention to oppose by force the bombardment of Valparaiso, inasmuch as he had been under the impression that Spain had no right to proceed to such extremity, justice being on the side of Chile; but that he had since convinced bimself that justice as well as moderation and dignity rested entirely on the side of Spain ; on which account, he would not only not act

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in opposition, but would leave the waters of the bay free, from whence it was his purpose to depart at eight o'clock on the morning of the 31st. Upon my representing how very painful it was to me to find myself under' the necessity of employing extreme measures, he stated that he bad still one plan to propose, which was that I should issue a manifest announcing, that inasmuch as there was nothing to prevent my bombarding the city, I pardoned it; that he believed such an act of generosity on my part would bo appreciated by the Government of Chile, which in its turn would declare that in return for the maguaminity displayed by Spain it agreed to accede to her demand. I replied, that notwithstanding my responsibility would be enormous, still I accepted the proposal on behalf of peace; provided always a member of the Government would personally guarantee to me, in the presence of the Representative of the United States, that my procedure would be appreciated and reciprocated. My acquiescence in the project of the Commodore having been conveyed on shore, was rudely rejected, and, in exchange, another proposed to me of so ridiculous a nature that it only excited the laughter of the Commanders of the naval forces of England and the United States; for what it proposed was an international duel, couched in the most insulting and digraceful terms, to the effect that inasmuch as I did not dare venture to proceed to Chiloe in search of their ships, they would send out a force to fight with one equal in strength, in the opinion of Commodore Rodgers; and that the result of the duel would be the termination of the war, without however stating what that was to be. I at once comprehended that so ridiculous a pretension could only place me in a false position, and was solely for the purpose of furnishing sensational matter to the public prints. My only answer was to authorize the American Commodore, as bearer of the communication, to state in my name that proposals of such a description did not even merit a reply. I have the satisfaction of knowing that both the Commodore, as well as' the English Admiral, approved of my answer. Indeed, the disagreeable impression produced on the mind of the Admiral, when made acquainted with the conduct of the Government of Chile, induced him to lose his prudent reserve, and declare to m e " Brigadier, the letter yon have just received is sufficient in itself to justify the step you are about to adopt. You have acted in the most dignified and proper manner, and your generosity has been very ill responded to on the part of the Government of this country." On the 29th of March Admiral Denman also came to see m e ; he represented to me that he had been informed by the American Commodore of my interviews with the Minster of the United States; that the rules of war did not authorize the destruction of defenceless places, inhabited almost exclusively by foreigners; that it would be impossible for him to stand by passively; that he would have to adopt measures, but he did not know what they might be, and. he begged. me not to commence my operations before

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the arrival of the mail from Europe. I represented to him that the question of right was for my Government to decide; but as a military man I would obey the orders I had received j and that whatever might be the attitude adopted by the naval forces Btationed in the bay, and however powerful they might be, although with great pain to myself, I should make no hesitation in the fulfilment of my duty. I have the satisfaction of knowing that the Admiral was capable of appreciating my sentiments; for, pressing my hand, he assured meas the American Commodore had already doneI might always rely upon his friendship and esteem. On the 21st of March the Representatives of England and Prance came on board my ship. These gentlemen, instead of presenting themselves in the character of friendly and completely neutral adjusters, exhibited on the contrary the utmost partiality in favour of Chile; observing that the brief period granted to the Government wherein to accept my proposals made it appear as if it were acting under the pressure of force; besides, that it had not had time to put itself in harmony with its allies; that they thought a longer period of time should be given; concluding by observing that they had serious motives for apprehension that the lives of the Spaniards now detained in Santiago would be endangered from the moment on which the bombardment should commence. I represented to them that six months had now elapsed since the commencement of the war; and that the Government of Chile, which now complained of the short space of time, had not occupied itself until the present moment in presenting any project of arrangement, which led to the presumption that it did not desire i t ; that the proposals submitted by me were those of their own respective Governments; and that fear lest a savage butchery of Spanish subjects might be committed should not deter me from the fulfilment of my duty. Such a massacre, should it ever occur, would be chastised by a fresh and terrible measure of severity. They coldly took their leave. On the 30th I received from the same agents a project of arrangement, in which they suggested the suspension of hostilities, the withdrawal of the squadron under my command, and the presentation of my credentials; projects entirely inadmissible, as your Excellency is aware, and which prove in a very strong manner the little earnestness of the wishes animating the Representatives of England and France, to contribute to an arrangement. Upon the 31st, at eight o'clock a.m., the foreign vessels of war having put to sea, the bay was left free. I fired two cannon shots without ball from this ship, announcing, as was agreed upon, that one hour afterwards I should open fire upon the town. At a quarter past nine the " Blanca " frigate opened fire upon the Custom House depots and a small fort, and she was immediately followed by the frigate " Villa de Madrid." At the same time the schooner " Vencedora " directed her fire upon the

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Intendencia, and the " Resolucin" frigate upon the Railway Station, all being government buildings. After two hours' firing the Custom House became a mass of flame; the fort had suffered considerable damage, and the Intendencia and the Railway Station were more or less injured. The flames spread to the town in consequence of a grenade rebounding from the Intendencia and exploding in the interior of a druggist's shop. The Chilean Government had resolved not to adopt any measures of defence, and consequently issued positive orders that not a shot should be fired. They reckoned that the squadrons of England and the United States would forcibly oppose the bombardment; and also believed that our fleet would on no account dare to open fire against the town. In consequence of the Chilean Government refusing to accede to the desire of the foreign merchants to withdraw their goods from the Custom House, a claim has been sent in by them for remuneration for damages and loss. Such are the particulars I am able to give to your Excellency. Roadstead of Valparaiso, On board the "Numancia," 2nd April, 1866. (Signed) CASTO MNDEZ NTOTEZ.

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