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Asian Studies Review

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Culture, region, and Thai political diversity

Robert B. Albrittona; Sidthinat Prabudhanitisarnb a Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois University, b Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Chiang Mai University,

To cite this Article Albritton, Robert B. and Prabudhanitisarn, Sidthinat(1997) 'Culture, region, and Thai political

diversity', Asian Studies Review, 21: 1, 61 82 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/03147539708713141 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03147539708713141

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Culture, Region, and Thai Political Diversity

Robert B. Albritton Department of Political Science Northern Illinois University Sidthinat Prabudhanitisarn Department of Sociology and Anthropology Chiang Mai University Culture is not a primordial social force, as some scholars appear to assume. Rather, it represents adaptive responses of social groups to their environments. Because these "social groups" are more diverse than nations, a focus on "national" or "regional" cultures obscures this highly important differentiation occurring within nations on the basis of geography, ethnicity, or other social cleavages that reflect differentiations of natural or social environments. Furthermore, cross-cutting cleavages, such as formal culture-popular culture, urban-rural cultures, class cultures, occupational cultures, and other key social variables, appear to pose more important sources of behaviour than "traditional" cultural characteristics. Scholars have identified a variety of cultural streams in Thailand that correspond to sub-national social groupings. Even the older literature notes highly important cultural distinctions among interest groups, such as cultures of the military or the bureaucracy.1 This notion of distinct cultural variations associated with economic or political interests casts doubt on perspectives that posit national or regional cultures as homogenous or representative of single cultural streams. Recent analysis of attitudes and opinions of Thai respondents indicates that what are regarded as fundamental cultural sourcesnational, religious, and

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Fred W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966), pp. 326-29; Pisan Suriyamongkol, Institutionalization of Democratic Political Process in Thailand: A Three-Pronged Democratic Polity (Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, 1988), pp. 4-14; Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 323-31.

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ethnic identificationsmay be less profound than previously conceived. Suntaree Komin, for example, finds no significant differences between Thai Muslims and Buddhists in fundamental values and behavioural patterns beyond the sphere of religious belief.2 Sa-Idi, etal., find little variance in women's roles between Buddhist and Muslim communities in Pattani.3 More important, perhaps, for modern Thailand, are more fundamental cultural cleavages associated with modernisation and the movement toward status as a "newly industrialising country (NIC)". One source of this cleavage is a fundamental difference in perspectives between rural and urban areas,4 a source of political conflict in virtually all societies. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker have carried the distinction between rural and urban cultures a step further. They suggest that fundamental political and social cleavages in Thai society represent more than conventional antinomies between urban and rural classes; rather, the urban-rural cleavage represents a more fundamental division between those who have adapted their culture to accommodate participation in the global economy (urban-Bangkok) versus those who have benefited less (ruralprovinces) and who are repositories of traditional cultures and behaviours of the village:
Members of the new urban society had more and more difficulty finding [traditional Thai culture] relevant to their lives and lifestyles .... The [economic] boom stopped Thailand thinking of itself as a rural nation The urban middle class began to rework the practice of Buddhism to meet their new aspirations and to cope with their new insecurities. Popular culture began to change the meaning of a Chinese origin. Intellectuals and artists began to recast history to give better roots to the new urban society.5

More importantly, for students of politics, is the fact that culture is not, prima facie, the same as political culture. Although cultural patterns may contribute to formulations of political culture, theory has not established clearly how ethnicity, religion, or other cultural manifestations convert to specific attitudes or behav-

2 3

4 5

Suntaree Komin, Psychology of the Thai People (Bangkok: National Institute of Development Administration, 1991), pp. 91-94. Ann Sa-Idi, Kuson Nakachart Srisompob Jitpiromsri, Sunandpattira Nilchang and Dwight Y. King, "Women in Rural, Southern Thailand: A Study of Roles, Attitudes, and Ethno-religious Differences", Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 21 (1996), 81-98. Jim Logerfo, "Attitudes Toward Democracy among Bangkok and Rural Northern Thais", Asian Survey 36 (1996), 904-23. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand's Boom (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1996), pp. 137-40.

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iours toward government. Emphasis upon political entities, such as nations, leads scholars to blur distinctions between the two and the literature often implies political significance from highly personalised attitudes and opinions that, more appropriately, relate to concepts of personal efficacy, "post-materialism" and "achievement motivation",6 or to policy values or orientations.7 Although conventional wisdom suggests that religious differences in Thailand result in highly differentiated orientations to political activity, Albritton, et al., show that, in southern Thailand, there are no significant differences between Buddhists and Muslims in their evaluations of government actions, their political attentiveness, their political efficacy, or in measures of political culture.8 Except for cleavages in support for political parties, a result of interest-group mobilisation, there is little relevance for positing religious dimensions of culture as translating into political cleavages. Far more significant than religious differences for political orientations is "ethnic" diversity. Thai-speaking Muslims are more similar to Buddhists (who are also Thai-speaking) than to their Malay-speaking Muslim counterparts. In fact, ethnic cleavages, based upon language, are a source of political stress within the Muslim population of southern Thailand. But, even these stresses are largely interest-group and socioeconomic status related, rather than cultural in their origins.9 Thus, considerably more thought needs to be directed to the distinction between "culture" and "political culture". Elazar's typology conceives political culture as fundamentally distinct from its cultural streams. Although orientations toward government clearly flow from cultural norms and values, political culture represents specific orientations or attitudes as to the appropriate relationship of citizens to government. These orientations lead to specific forms of political organisation and activity, so that they exist prior to the institutions, procedures, and rules that frequently serve as products and, therefore, only indicators of more fundamental phenomena.10

9 10

Jim Granato, Ronald Inglehart and David Leblang, "The Effect of Cultural Values on Economic Development: Theory, Hypotheses, and Some Empirical Tests", American Journal of Political Science 40 (1996), 609-11. Robert S. Erilson, Gerald C. Wright, Jr. and John P. McIver, "Political Parties, Public Opinion, and State Policy in the United States", American Political Science Review 83 (1996), 729-50. Robert B. Albritton, Phan-Ngam Gothamasan, Noree Jaisai, Manop Jitpoosa, Sunandpattira Nilchang and Arin Sa-Idi, "Electoral Participation by Southern Thai Buddhists and Muslims", South East Asia Research 4 (1996), 127-56. Ibid. Robert W. Jackman and Ross A. Miller, "A Renaissance of Political Culture?", American Journal of Political Science 40 (1996), 632-59.

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Furthermore, Elazar acknowledges a more complex mixture of cultural streams than is represented by an analysis of national or regional cultures.11 Dran, et al., take this insight a step further by showing the peculiar configurations of political culture streams depending on the geographic boundaries chosen for analysis.12 Such discrete patterns of political culture are implied by Banfield's13 and Putnam's14 analyses, but not often emphasised within the context of cross-national research. Culture and Political Culture in Thailand
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This paper explores the applications of "culture" and "political culture" within the nation of Thailand. In fact, Thailand, like most societies, is a complex blend of a variety of cultural streams. Thai history has been, in most respects, a history of the hegemonisation of a geographic region by Bangkok (read also the former capitals of Sukothai and Ayuddiya) by the peculiar take of that cultural stream in language, religion, and patterns of political organisation.15 Still, impacts of Chinese cultural streams, Lao, Khmer, Karen, Malay, and a variety of indigenous cultures have influenced the mix that constitutes the Thai nation. Religious orientations of southern Thais constitute one of the most dramatic cleavages in cultural orientation. Although the national religion of Thailand is Theravada Buddhism, populations in the four southernmost provinces are predominantly Muslim (in excess of 70 per cent). Because of historical conflicts over assimilationist policies in the southern provinces {changwat), conventional wisdom assigns major political cleavages to religious differences between Buddhism and Islam. Recent analysis of political orientations among southern Thais, however, suggests otherwise. The basic sources of political cleavage lie not in religious orientations at all, but rather in ethnic differences represented by language. Muslims who speak Thai in the home, for example, tend to be significantly

11 12

13 14 15

Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, 3rd edn (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 124-35. Ellen M. Dran, Robert B. Albritton and Mikel Wyckoff, "Surrogate versus Direct Measures of Political Culture: Explaining Participation and Policy Attitudes in Illinois", Publius 21 (1991), 15-30. Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1958). Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). Chaiyan Ratchagool, The Rise and Fall of the Thai Absolute Monarchy (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1994), pp. 163-74; David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 255.

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closer to Buddhists in their political party orientations than to their Malayspeaking Muslim counterparts. Furthermore, significant differences in income and education, associated with ethnicity, appear to translate into an interestgroup-based politics with Malay-speaking Muslims on one side, Buddhists and Thai-speaking Muslims on the other. Thai-speaking Muslims tend to find commonalities of interests with Buddhists, rather than with political agendas of Malay-speaking Muslims.16 At a more fundamental level, however, there is little difference between Buddhists and Muslims or between Thai-speakers and Malay-speakers. No significant differences exist between these groups, for example, in terms of evaluations of government actions, of political efficacy, or at least one measure of political culture. Except for cleavages in associations with political parties, there are virtually no differences in political orientations that can be associated with cultural cleavages among southern Thais.17 Formal culture, popular culture, rural culture, urban culture, ethnicity, region and languageall provide a multiplicity of cultural streams that are linked, conceivably, to political cultures when defined as fundamental attitudes about relationships between citizens and their governments, and render problematic more broadly defined cultural orientations that are the subject of contemporary political discourse. Additionally, Phongpaichit and Baker argue explicitly and implicitly that political cultures are products of individual and societal interactions with rapidly changing forces of economic modernisation that restructure perceptual systems about the most appropriate roles of government.18 This study examines variations in political cultures and orientations in Thailand using a conceptual framework suggested by the discussion above. Based upon probability samples from two regions (north and south), the analysis examines variation attributable to three types of factors. First, the analysis examines variations associated with indicators of social structure: income and education. Second, the analysis treats ethnic and cultural streams, especially language and religion, as sources of political culture orientations. Finally, the paper posits a model based upon geographic regions and rural-urban cleavages a perspective consistent with the thesis that different experiences with social and economic developments within nations may be more important for shaping significant aspects of political culture than more gross indicators that coincide with national or global boundaries.

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16 17 18

Albritton, et al., op. cit., pp. 147-48. Ibid., pp. 150-52. Phongpaichit and Baker, op. cit., pp. 115-40.

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Data Acquisition The analysis that follows is based upon probability samples of respondents in two geographic regions of Thailand (north and south) in eight changwat (provinces): Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Phayao, and Phrae in the north and Narathiwat, Pattani, Satun, and Yala in the south. These samples were obtained coincident with 1992 Thai parliamentary elections. The latter point is important because political attitudes and opinions are more salient in the context of election campaigns. When election details represent a focus of the inquiry, the saliency of political parties, issues, and candidates in elections virtually dictate that surveys designed to elicit reliable responses be conducted in conjunction with election campaigns. The data for this study were obtained by a process of cluster sampling election precincts, followed by systematic sampling of individuals across selected precincts. The total number of respondents obtained by this method is 399 out of projected 400. The survey was stratified by region, yielding 250 respondents from the north and 149 from the south. The ratio of the samples of these regions is, thus, 1.68:1.00, when, in fact, the true population ratio is 2:1. For purposes of generalising to the whole population (across all eight changwat), the sample is weighted to conform to the true distribution. When comparing regions, however, the unweighted samples are used. Although the samples were obtained at elections in March (south) and in September (north), respondents are not significantly different on key indicators, such as policy attitudes or levels of interest in and knowledge of the election. Because the analysis undertaken here involves more stable attitudes than those associated with participation or party identificationpolitical efficacy and political culturewe do not believe that this poses a problem for the analysis. This procedure produces a sample that closely conforms to the distribution of the population across the eight changwat (provinces). Table 1 indicates that the sample presents a representative profile of the population by changwat; weighted, it provides an accurate representation by region. One interesting outcome of the survey was the under-sampling of women. Experts on Thailand, dubious as to the ability to conduct field surveys in Thai rural areas, expressed belief that such an effort would over-sample women. Results were contrary to this expectation. Because the survey in the southern region was conducted during Ramadan, a holy period of fasting for Muslims, most men identified for the survey were located at their homes. By contrast, women continued to work in their occupations. This meant that, in some cases, a substitution procedure required interviews with the male resident of the household. The result of this characteristic of the sampling procedure was a sample

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that included 38.1 per cent women, instead of the 49.2 per cent indicated by the national census, but still within the projected margin of error.19

Table 1 Comparison of the Sample Population to Actual Populations when Weighted by Region, 1992 Changwat
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% of Sample 29.3 16.0 10.7 10.7 11.0 10.8 4.9 6.7

% of Actual Population 27.0 20.4 9.9 9.7 11.1 10.5 4.4 7.0

North: Chiang Mai Chiang Rai Phayao Phrae South: Narathiwat Pattani Satun Yala

Source: Survey data and National Statistical Office, Thailand, 1990 data

Attentiveness, Efficacy, and Political Culture A major focus of the data-gathering was on factors affecting electoral attentiveness of the population. Measures of attentiveness included self-reporting of level of interest in the election and a rigorous measure of knowledge of the election the ability to name candidates and to match those candidates with the appropriate political party. As in most democracies, level of electoral interest was related significantly to socioeconomic status, specifically, level of education and level of income. Table 2 shows the impact of level of education on level of electoral interest (level of income has an almost identical impact). Nearly 50 per cent of respondents expressed high levels of interest in contemporary elections.

19

Albritton, et al., op. cit., p. 133.

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Table 2 Respondent's Interest in Parliamentary Elections as a Function of Level of Education (weighted by region)
Level of Education (%) Level of Interest
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Less than Elementary 16.9 31.4 51.7 96 21.6%

Elementary 14.1 43.9 42.0 240 54.2%

Secondary 10.3 42.0 47.7 52 11.8%

PostSecondary

Row Total 55 12.5%

Very Little Average A Great Deal Column Total

26.1 73.9 55 12.4%

172 38.7% 216 48.7% 443 100.0%

Chi-Square = 24.054

Cramer's V = 0.16471

Significance = 0.0005

The ability to match parties with candidates was also highly related to educational attainment (as well as income). Well over 60 per cent of persons with at least a post-secondary education were able to match at least three or more candidates with their correct political party and 38 per cent were able to identify four or more (Table 3). In these regions of Thailand, factors affecting voter attentiveness are consistent with experiences of other democracies. One of the most significant factors affecting political attentiveness in most democracies is the level of political efficacy, that is, a belief in the political effectiveness of individuals operating in democratic systems. The data also include a political efficacy score based upon traditional measures of the concept in National Election Studies of the United States.20 Analysis of variance of these scores shows that beliefs in efficacy of political citizenship are also highly associated with levels of education (Table 4).

20 Ibid., 1996, Appendix I.

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Table 3 Knowledge of Elections, Expressed as Ability to Associate Candidates with Parties in Parliamentary Elections as a Function of Education (weighted sample) Number of Candidates Respondent can Match
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Level of Education (%) Less than Elementary 43.1 14.5 8.3 24.7 9.4 Elementary 25.5 11.3 20.4 21.8 20.9 240 54.1% Secondary 17.5 17.2 19.1 34.0 12.2 PostSecondary 3.9 12.8 12.8 31.2 39.3 Row Total

0 1 2 3 4

114 25.6% 57 12.9% 74 16.7% 111 25.1% 88 19.7% 444 100.0%

Column Total

96 21.5%

52 11.7%

56 12.6%

Chi-Square = 52.435

Cramer's V = 0.19834

Significance = 0.0000

One intriguing result of the analysis is that level of income has virtually no impact on sense of political efficacy. Only education appears to structure orientations toward the political system in this regard. Although income and education are highly correlated, effects of these factors are often independent of each other in affecting attitudes and opinions in Thailand. The data also include indicators of respondents' understanding of relationships of citizens to government. The indicators are based upon Daniel Elazar's typology that yields scores on three dimensions of citizen orientation: individualistic culture, moralistic culture, and traditionalistic culture. Questions indicating these three dimensions produce corresponding factors.21 In contrast to the US context in which individualistic political culture characterises the population as a

21

Ibid., p. 143.

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whole, the most important dimension of Thai political orientation proves to be traditionalism.22 This means that a major differentiation in Thai society revolves around the degree to which citizens accept elite domination of political leadership.

Table 4 Analysis of Variance of Impacts of Education on Political Efficacy and Political Culture (weighted by region) N Political Efficacv Less than elementary Elementary Secondary Post-secondary Total R = Political Culture (Traditionalism') Less than elementary Elementary Secondary Post-secondary Total R = 70 170 44 -0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.19 0.905 81 182 48 53 364 0.30 7.66 8.39 9.50 8.69 11.38 0.000 Mean F-Ratio F-Prob,

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55
339 0.02

-0.01

Using factor scores based upon the traditionalism factor, the data are analysed for correspondences with education and income. Neither of these demographic characteristics appear to be related to any of the dimensions of political culture (Table 4). The sources of political culture appear to be rooted in characteristics other than socioeconomic status, a finding that suggests an independent role for political culture from conventional behavioural models. Considerable insight into this finding comes from an analysis of differences between Buddhists and Muslims in the southern Thai sample.

22

Ibid., p. 145.

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The Role of Culture in Thai Political Culture Social stratification by socioeconomic status and education is one of the most critical factors differentiating Buddhists and Muslims in southern Thailand. Table 5 shows the strong association between ethnicity and level of education for these diverse cultural groups in the southern Thai sample. The association between ethnicity and level of income is virtually identical.23 Table 5
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Level of Education by Ethnicity in Southern Thai Sample

Ethnicity Level of Education Less than elementary Elementary Secondary or higher Column Total ThaiBuddhists 4.3 37.0 58.7 46 31.5% ThaiMuslims 15.8 52.6 31.6 19 13.0% MalayMuslims 28.4 51.9 19.8 81 55.5% Row Total 28 19.2% 69 47.3% 49 33.6% 146 100.0%

Chi-Square = 23.770

Cramer's V = 0.28532

Significance = 0.00009

Table 5 also shows that Thai-speaking Muslims are significantly better off than their Malay-speaking counterparts, in terms of education. Although Buddhists are characterised by significantly higher levels of income and education than either of their Muslim counterparts, Thai-speaking Muslims also have a significant advantage relative to Malay-speakers in the four southern provinces. Because Buddhists have significantly higher levels of education and income

23

Ibid., 1996, Table 5.

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those characteristics associated with higher levels of political knowledge and interestone would expect that Buddhists would have higher levels of political interest in and knowledge of the election. Tables 6 and 7 do not support this expectation. The data reveal no significant differences among Thai-speaking Buddhists, Thai-speaking Muslims, and Malay-speaking Muslims. Although higher levels of education and income promote higher levels of interest in and knowledge of the election, Muslims, both Thai-speaking and Malay-speaking, who lag behind their Buddhist counterparts on socioeconomic dimensions, appear to have compensated with levels of interest and knowledge higher than expected. Controlling for socioeconomic status, Muslims outperform Buddhists in their knowledge of and interest in the parliamentary elections.

Table 6 Interest of Respondents in Thai Parliamentary Elections by Ethnicity in Southern Thailand

Ethnicity Level of Interest in the Election Very little Average Very much Column Total ThaiBuddhists 8.7 45.7 45.7 46 31.5% ThaiMuslims 15.8 31.6 52.6 19 13.0% MalayMuslims 17.3 46.9 35.8 81 55.5% Row Total 21 14.4% 65 44.5% 60 41.1% 146 100.0%

Chi-Square = 3.767

Cramer's V = 0.11357

Significance = 0.43852

Because citizens with lower levels of education tend to have a lower sense of political efficacy, one might expect to find that Muslims in southern Thailand score lower on this political indicator. On the other hand, the finding of no

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significant differences between Buddhists and Muslims in political attentiveness suggests that there would be no marked differences between Buddhists and Muslims in political efficacy.

Table 7 Number of Candidates Respondent can Identify by Political Party as a Function of Ethnicity in Southern Thailand (unweighted sample)
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Number of Candidates Correctly Identified 0 1 2 3 or more Column Total

Ethnicity (%) ThaiBuddhists LOO 21.7 19.6 19.6 39.1 46 31.3% 60.0 20 13.6% ThaiMuslims 2.00 30.0 10.0 Malay-Muslims 3.00 30.9 Row Total

41 27.9% 18 12.2% 22 15.0% 66 44.9% 147 100.0%

8.6

16.0
44.4 81 55.1%

Chi-Square = 8.934

Cramer's V = 0.17432

Significance = 0.17731

An analysis of variance shows no significant differences between Buddhists and Muslims. Although scores of Buddhists are slightly higher than those of Malayspeaking Muslims, these differences are well within chance probabilities, that is, not statistically significant. Furthermore, Thai-speaking Muslims have higher political efficacy scores than Buddhists, but these differences are non-significant as well. In fact, the only significant difference is that Thai-speaking Muslims appear to feel more politically efficacious than their Malay-speaking Muslim counterparts (Table 8).

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Table 8 Analysis of Variance in Indicators of Political Efficacy and Political Culture by Ethnicity in Southern Thailand: Thai-Buddhists, Thai-Muslims and Malay-Muslims

N
Political Efficacv
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Mean

F-Ratio

F-Prob.

Thai-Buddhists Thai-Muslims Malay-Muslims Total Thai-Buddhists Thai-Muslims Total Thai-Muslims Malay-Muslims Total Thai-Buddhists Malay-Muslims Total Political Culture Traditionalistic: Thai-Buddhists Thai-Muslims Malay-Muslims Total Thai-Buddhists Thai-Muslims Malay-Muslims Total Thai-Buddhists Thai-Muslims Malay-Muslims Total

36 18 69 123 36 18 54 18 69 87 36 69 105

9.0833 10.0000 8.8261 9.0833 10.0000 10.0000 8.8261 9.0833 8.8261

2.3966

0.0954

2.8691

0.0963

4.5451

0.0359*

0.3710

0.5438

39 18 63 120 39 18 63 120 39 18 63 120

-0.0561 -0.1601 0.0285 -0.0818 0.0577 0.0439 -0.0352 -0.0611 0.0625

0.2785

0.7574

Individualistic:

0.2164

0.8058

Moralistic:

0.1694

0.8444

* Sig. < 0.05

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The data also include scores on the dimension of traditionalism in political culture. Although southern Thais also differentiate themselves in understanding their relationship to government along dimensions suggested by Elazar, analysis shows that these dimensions of political culture do not discriminate between Buddhist and Muslim communities. The one area showing marked differences between Buddhists and Muslims in southern Thailand is in identification with political parties by the respective groups. Over three-fourths of respondents naming at least one political party named either New Aspirations, Democrat, or Moral Unity parties. On this dimension, there are clear demarcations between Buddhists and Muslims. Table 9 shows that Buddhists strongly identify with the Democrat Party, while Malay-speaking Muslims identify with New Aspirations. Table 9 Identification with Major Political Parties by Southern Thai Ethnicity

Ethnicity Party ID Kwam Wang Mai Samakeetam Prachatipat Column Total ThaiBuddhists. 32.4 2.9 64.7 34 34.3% ThaiMuslims 38.5 15.4 46.2 13 13.1% MalayMuslims 67.3 19.2 13.5 52 52.5% Row Total 51 51.5% 13 13.1% 35 35.4% 99 100.0%

Chi-Square = 25.347

Cramer's V = 0.35779

Significance = 0.00004

One of the most interesting aspects of the study is that Thai-speaking Muslims are closer to Buddhists in partisan identification than they are to Malay-speaking Muslims (Table 9), a finding that argues for an interest-group basis for party politics, rather than a cultural interpretation. These cleavages between Thai-

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speaking Muslims and Malay-speaking Muslims became an even more pronounced political division during the 1995 parliamentary elections, when Muslim representatives were elected to all parliamentary seats in the four southern provinces. To summarise, the data show clear stratification by education and income coinciding with ethnic orientations: Thai-speaking Buddhists, Thai-speaking Muslims, and Malay-speaking Muslims. However, Muslims compensate for the impact of these disparities on electoral attentiveness and political efficacy to equal (and sometimes exceed) Buddhists. Even potent indicators of culture, such as language and religion, do not differentiate the populations of southern Thailand as far as political interest, knowledge, efficacy, and, most importantly, political culture are concerned. The major source of differentiation comes about in their respective orientations to political parties aggregating interests of Buddhists and Muslims in the politics of the region, a finding that points more to interest-based, rather than cultural, distinctions. Regional Differences in Thai Political Orientations The major hypothesis of this study is that Thai society is highly differentiated by values and political orientations associated with geographic regions of the country and with an urban-rural cleavage. In order to test these hypotheses, the analysis compares regions by the variables discussed aboveinterest in elections, knowledge of elections, sense of political efficacy, and political culture. In examining the association of these variables with the urban-rural cleavage, the analysis shows little difference in levels of political interest. There are significant differences between these areas in terms of political knowledge (p < 0.006), political efficacy (p < 0.017), and political culture (traditionalism) (p < 0.038). However, these associations prove to be largely a function of differences in educational levels. When relative impacts of the urban-rural cleavage are examined controlling for education, the role of the urban-rural indicator vanishes (Table 10). One problem with this finding lies in the examination of differences between "municipal" and "non-municipal" areas, with some of the municipal areas being communities of only ten thousand peoplehardly different from their surroundings. Logerfo's findings of differences in political orientations in a comparison of respondents in Bangkok and northern Thai provinces are more likely to reveal effects of the rural-urban cleavage by maximising variance on this indicator. However, because he does not control for education, the true role of urban-rural culture is inconclusive.24

24

Logerfo, op cit., p p . 920-23.

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Table 10 Analysis of Variance in Indicators of Political Efficacy and Political Culture by Urban-Rural Location of Respondents, Controlling for Education F-Test Political Efficacv Main Effects Urban-Rural Education Interaction R = Political Culture ^Traditionalism} Main Effects Urban-Rural Education Interaction R = 1.463 3.551 0.476 2.934 0.138 0.213 0.061 0.699 0.034 8.780 2.438 9.593 0.308 0.316 0.000 0.119 0.000 0.820 Sig. of F

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Examination of the impacts of region (north-south) on the measures of political orientation produces a very different result. Table 11 shows that there is virtually no differentiation by region, in terms of political knowledge. Although both regions are characterised by relatively high levels of political knowledge, they do not differ on this indicator in significant respects. Here, region has no more impact than religion or ethnicity. When political efficacy is examined, however, the picture is quite different. An analysis of variance of political efficacy scores shows that southern Thais are considerably more "efficacious" politically than respondents in the northern provinces (Table 12). Table 12 also shows that political culture is significantly differentiated by region. Southern Thais are significantly more "traditionalist" in their political orientations than northern Thai counterparts, although they do not differ significantly on "moralistic" or "individualistic" dimensions. One plausible rival hypothesis to this finding is that the analysis really represents comparisons between northern Thai Buddhists and southern Thai Muslims, who compose two-thirds of the southern Thai sample. In order to test this hypothesis, Table 13 presents an analysis identical to Table 12, with Muslims omitted from the sample, thus comparing northern Thai Buddhists with southern Thai Buddhists.

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Table 11 Effects of Region (North-South) on Knowledge of Elections Number of Candidates Respondent can Identify with Political Party 0
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Region (%) North 24.8 13.2 17.2 26.0 18.8 250 62.7% South 27.5 12.1 15.4 22.8 22.1 149 37.3%

Row Total 103 25.8% 51 12.8% 66 16.5% 99 24.8% 80 20.1% 399 100.0%

1 2 3 4 Column Total

Chi-Square = 1.437

Cramer's V = 0.06000

Significance = 0.838

The results indicate that region is clearly the operative cause of differences between southern and northern Thais. The analysis, presented in Table 13, is virtually identical to that in Table 12, in which Muslims are included. The results simply reinforce the previous finding that there are no significant differences between Buddhists and Muslims and enhance the probability that political efficacy and political culture are functions of regional differences.

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Table 12 Analysis of Variance in Indicators of Political Efficacy and Political Culture by Region (North-South) N Political Efficacv North South Total R = Political Culture (Traditionalism) North South Total R = 189 113 302 0.199 -0.15 0.26 12.329 0.001 202 125 327 0.260 8.08 9.08 23.640 0.000 Mean F-Test Sig. of F

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Table 13 Analysis of Variance in Indicators of Political Efficacy and Political Culture by Region (Buddhists only) N Political Efficacv North South Total R = Political Culture (Traditionalism") North South Total R = 187 40 227 0.150 -0.15 0.25 5.182 0.024 200 38 238 0.222 8.07 9.11 33.895 0.001 Mean F-Test Sig. Of F

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Finally, we consider the possibility that educational differences that have significant impacts on political efficacy (though not on political culture) may override regional variations in producing differences in political efficacy or political traditionalism. Table 14 presents an analysis of these possibilities in a factorial design that enables us to examine the relative impacts of education and region.

Table 14 Analysis of Variance in Indicators of Political Efficacy and Political Culture by Region (North-South) Controlling for Education F-Test Political Efficacv Main Effects Region Education Interaction R = Political Culture (Traditionalism") Main Effects Region Education Interaction R = 4.402 15.196 1.632 4.602 0.233 0.002 0.000 0.182 0.004 14.389 22.312 10.929 3.518 0.387 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 Sig. of F

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As in Table 4, the analysis still shows strong, positive impacts of education on political efficacy. However, Table 14 also indicates significant independent effects of region, producing even higher levels of political efficacy. Furthermore, the effects of region are considerably stronger than even education. The clear implication is that while social status, as education, contributes significantly, factors associated with region are even more significant in accounting for sense of political efficacy. Table 14 also supports the earlier analysis of the relationship between education, region, and traditionalistic political culture. As in Table 4, education proves to have no significant impact, but region continues to have a highly substantial impact in producing traditional political culture. The more complex

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factorial design thus supports the analysis in Table 12, while ruling out possible spurious associations with differences in educational levels by region. The analysis in Tables 12-14 documents strong impacts of region on orientations of northern and southern Thais toward politics. Southern Thais turn out to have substantially higher levels of political efficacy, but also higher levels of traditionalism, that is, acceptance of elite-dominated politics. By contrast, northern Thais are less oriented toward an elite-dominated political culture, but, at the same time, are less politically efficacious. Sources of Political Diversity in Thailand
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Analyses of the data show a complex resolution of social forces affecting political orientations in Thailand. Clearly, levels of education and incomethat is, socioeconomic status in societysubstantially account for levels of political interest and knowledge. This finding is consistent with expectations based upon studies across a wide variety of polities and cultures. One conclusion, then, is that the behavioural model is one stream affecting orientations toward political experience. But, equally clearly, socioeconomic status or class interest is not the only factor affecting political orientations of the Thai people. There are cleavages in cultural experiences between rural and non-rural society. However, these prove to be the result of a spurious relationship with education. By far the most significant component for explaining political efficacy and political culture is "region". Results of the analysis show large and significant diversity in sense of political efficacy and traditionalism in political culture that are based only in regional contexts. Even when other factors are controlled, region stands out as a potent predictor of citizen orientations on these variables. What are the characteristics of "region" that result in diverse levels of political efficacy and political culture? This is a more difficult question. One hypothesis is that northern and southern regions represent diverse cultural streams of history, geography, and economic orientation that produce attitudes toward democracy and the state represented by Logerfo's typology. We believe that the varied cultural experiences form the nexus between "culture" and "political culture" in the case of Thailand. The problem is that "region" remains a "dummy" variable whose content is opaque to scholars. It "explains", but does not "reveal" the intricacies or complexities of the role of regional variations on Thai political orientations. What is important for this study, however, is the clearly identifiable diversity that exists within the nation of Thailand across regions. This demonstrates that "political culture" has its origins, not only in historic, ethnic streams, but also in the interactions with contemporary forces of modernisation and development.

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Phongpaichit and Baker are right to emphasise the evolution of culture and political culture in encounters with these forces. The picture presented here (of a dynamic, evolutionary, cultural development), creates problems for notions of static and enduring value systems rooted in European or Asian value perspectives. As Phongpaichit and Baker argue, Thai culture has adapted to the forces of world markets and an increasingly global society. This is no different from the European experience. As Weber and others have noted, the cultural synthesis of European society was hostile to nascent capitalism; Protestantism evolved as an ethos-environment that could accommodate and provide cultural support as an adaptation to free markets and capitalistic enterprise, not as their cause. Today, Asian cultures are adapting to demands of market economies and those cultures will change to the extent that is necessary in order to accommodate the new economic forces. Democracy is the political ethos that is most accommodating to market forcesbut not in all respects. To the extent that mass publics are left out of national economic developments, democracy may make demands for constraints on pure free-market enterprise. These widespread and diverse encounters with modernisation and development are, apparently, highly varied within nationsacross socioeconomic backgrounds, regional, urban and other geographical features of a nation. For all their weaknesses as measurements, diversities of northern and southern regions of Thailand may be more accurate descriptors of true Thai culture than any "dummy" variable representing Thailand as a whole. Identification of this deep and widespread cultural diversity in Thailand has broad implications. If culture is a set of shared values and practices, as most scholars agree, the boundaries of those shared values and practices is not a casual matter. If nations, or even regions of the world, are assumed to be their confines, what does it say about the role of culture if variance within nations or regions turns out to be greater than variations among them? At the very least, it would be mortal for the East-West cultural relativity debate over indigenous democracies25 and would provide support for applications of general theoretical frameworks to politics of nations instead of an emphasis on idiosyncrasies of societies, rather than their universalities. Now that Thailand has achieved its gargantuan objective of nation-building, scholars can turn their attention to these dimensions, that may prove far more significant for understanding political culture and its effects than comparisons of national and global-regional characteristics.

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Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (1993).