Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: This report gives a comprehensive assessment of the hazards of operational reactors, new 'evolutionary' designs and future reactor concepts. It also addresses the risks associated with the management of spent nuclear fuel. The first part of the report describes the characteristics and inherent flaws of the main reactor designs in operation today; the second part assesses the risks associated to new designs; the third part the 'ageing' of operational reactors; the fourth part the terrorist threat to nuclear power and the fifth and final part the risks associated with climate change impacts such as flooding on nuclear power. The main conclusions are: All operational reactors have very serious inherent safety flaws which cannot be

Eliminated by safety upgrading; A major accident in a light-water reactor the large majority of the reactors can lead

to radioactive releases equivalent to several times the release at Chernobyl and about 1000 times that released by a fission weapon. Relocation of the population can become necessary for large areas (up to 100.000 km2). The number of cancer deaths could exceed 1 million; New reactor lines are envisaged which are heralded as fundamentally safe. However,

apart from having their own specific safety problems, those new reactors would require enormous sums for their development, with uncertain outcome; The average age of the world's reactors is 21 years and many countries are planning to

extend the lifetime of their reactors beyond the original design lifetime. This leads to the degradation of critical components and the increase of severe incidents. The age-related degradation mechanisms are not well understood and difficult to predict; De-regulation (liberalisation) of electricity markets has pushed nuclear utilities to

decrease safety-related investments and limit staff. Utilities are also upgrading their reactors by increasing reactor pressure and operational temperature and the burn-up of the fuel. This accelerates ageing and decreases safety margins. Nuclear regulators are not always able to fully cope with this new regime; Highly radioactive spent fuel mostly is stored employing active cooling. If this fails,

this could lead to a major release of radioactivity, far more important than the 1986

Chernobyl accident; Reactors cannot be sufficiently protected against a terrorist threat. There are several

scenario's aside from a crash of an airliner on the reactor building which could Lead to a major accident; Climate change impacts, such as flooding, sea level rises and extreme droughts, seriously increase nuclear risks.

INTRODUCTION: This project mainly focuses on the nuclear disasters like equipment failures, nuclear meltdowns, and the release of radioactive materials at the Fukushima nuclear power plant due to the earthquake and tsunami on11 march 2011. This is maintained by Tokyo electric power company (TEPCO). This disaster is the largest nuclear accident occurred in Japan since 1986. On March 11, the largest earthquake on record struck Japan and generated a thirty-foot tsunami that inundated the country's northeast coast. The death toll is estimated at over thirteen thousand with thousands more missing, and the country is grappling with power shortages, search and rescue efforts, and the need to provide shelter and other services for victims. The disaster also caused a set of catastrophic events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. Over one hundred thousand people have been evacuated in the area surrounding the plant; some are already suffering from radiation exposure. Several powerful aftershocks have complicated search and rescue efforts and hampered official efforts at bringing the nuclear situation under control. The triple-fold crisis has ignited debate over the prospects for the Japanese economy and has significant implications for the future of nuclear power in Japan and around the world.

TheaccidentattheFukushimaDaiichinuclearpowerstationinJapanisoneofthemostseriousincomm ercialnuclearpowerplantoperatinghistory.MuchwillbelearnedthatmaybeapplicabletotheU.S.rea ctorfleet,nuclearfuelcyclefacilities,andsupportingsystems,andtheinternationalreactorfleet.Fore xample,lessonsfromFukushimaDaiichimaybeappliedtoemergencyresponseplanning,reactorop eratortraining,accidentscenariomodeling,humanfactorsengineering,radiationprotection,andacc identmitigation;aswellasinfluenceU.S.policiestowardsthenuclearfuelcycleincludingpowergene ration,andspentfuelstorage,reprocessing,anddisposal.TheNRCandDOENEhaveagreedtojointly sponsoranaccidentreconstructionstudyasameansofassessingsevereaccidentmodelingcapability. TheleadNRCofficewillbetheOfficeofNuclearRegulatoryResearchandtheleadDOENEofficewill betheOfficeofNuclearReactorTechnologies.Thestudyteamwillincludesubjectmatterexpertsfro m:ArgonneNationalLaboratory(ANL)IdahoNationalLaboratory(INL)OakRidgeNationalLa boratory(ORNL)SandiaNationalLaboratory(SNL)TheoveralleffortwillbeledbySNL.Thisjoint studyisconductedundertheauthorityoftheMemorandumofUnderstandingbetweentheU.S.NRCa ndU.S.DOEonCooperativeNuclearSafetyResearch,datedApril22,2009.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE: MAIN OBJECTIVES:

Company Background: The Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant ,is a disabled nuclear power plant located on a 3.5square-kilometre (860-acre) in the towns of Okuma and Futaba in the Futaba District of Fukushima Prefecture, Japan. It was first commissioned in 1971, the plant consists of six boiling water reactors .These light water reactors drove electrical generators with a combined power of 4.7 GWe. The Fukushima Daiichi is one of the 15 largest nuclear power stations in the world. Fukushima I was the first nuclear plant to be constructed and run entirely by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). The plant suffered major damage from the 9.0 earthquake and subsequent tsunami that hit Japan on March 11, 2011 and is not expected to reopen. The earthquake and tsunami disabled the reactor cooling systems, leading to nuclear radiation leaks and triggering a 30 km evacuation zone surrounding the plant. On April 20, 2011, the Japanese authorities declared the 20 km evacuation zone a no-go area which may only be entered under government supervision. The Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant, or Fukushima Dai-ni, is located to the south and also run by TEPCO.

ISSUES AND PROBLEMS: On 11 March 2011 an earthquake categorised as 9.0 MW on the moment magnitude scale occurred at 14:46 Japan Standard Time (JST) off the northeast coast of Japan. Units 4, 5 and 6 had been shut down prior to the earthquake for planned maintenance. The remaining reactors were shut down automatically after the earthquake, and the remaining decay heat of the fuel was being cooled with power from emergency generators. The subsequent destructive tsunami with waves of up to 14 meters (the reactors were designed to handle up to 5,7 meters) disabled emergency generators required to cool the reactors. Over the following three weeks there was evidence of partial nuclear meltdowns in units 1, 2 and 3: visible explosions, suspected to be caused by hydrogen gas, in units 1 and 3; a suspected explosion in unit 2, that may have damaged the primary containment vessel; and a possible uncovering of the units 1, 3 and 4 spent fuel pools. Radiation releases caused large evacuations, concern about food and water supplies, and treatment of nuclear workers. The events at units 1, 2 and 3 have been rated at Level 7 (major release of radioactive material with widespread health and environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures) on the International Nuclear Event Scale, and those at unit 4 as Level 3 (Serious Incident) events. On 3 April 2011, two bodies were discovered in the basement turbine room most likely because the workers ran there during the tsunami.

Meltdown
On 12 May, TEPCO engineers confirmed that a meltdown occurred, with molten fuel having fallen to [163] the bottom of the reactor's containment vessel. The utility said that fuel rods of the No. 1 reactor

are fully exposed, with the water level 1 meter (3.3 feet) below the base of the fuel assembly. According to a Japanese press report, there are holes in the base of the pressure vessel, and most of the fuel has probably melted. The nuclear fuel has possibly leaked into the containment vessel, which was damaged in an explosion during the crisis. This caused both the Japanese government and [164] TEPCO to be criticized for consistently underestimating the severity of the situation. The operator found the basement flooded with 4.2 meters of water. Workers were unable to observe the flooding situation due to high levels of radiation from the water. TEPCO estimates the nuclear fuel was exposed to the air less than five hours after the earthquake struck. Fuel rods melted away rapidly as the temperature inside the core reached 2,800 C within six hours. In less than 16 hours, the reactor core melted and dropped to the bottom of the pressure vessel, burning a hole through the vessel. By that time, water was pumped into the reactor in an effort to prevent the worst-case scenario overheating fuel melting its way through the containment and [165] discharging large amounts of radionuclides in the environment. In June the Japanese government confirmed that Unit 1 reactor vessel containment was breached, and pumped cooling water continues [14] to leak months after the disaster.

Cascade of failures
[edit]Regulation

Nuclear opposition protesting following the disaster

Regulatory capture may have contributed to the cascade of failures which were revealed after the tsunami receded. Regulatory capture may have also contributed to the current situation. Critics argue that the government shares blame with regulatory agency for not heeding warnings, for not ensuring the independence of the nuclear industry's oversight while encouraging the expansion of nuclear [264] energy domestically and internationally. World media have argued that the Japanese nuclear regulatory system tends to side with and promote the nuclear industry because of amakudari (roughly translated as descent from heaven), in which senior regulators accept high paying jobs at the companies they once oversaw. To protect their potential future position in the industry, regulators seek to avoid taking positions that upset or embarrass the utilities they regulate. TEPCO's position as the largest electrical utility in Japan led it to be the most desirable position for retiring regulators, typically the "most senior officials went to work at Tepco, while those of lower ranks ended up at [265] smaller utilities" according to the New York Times.

In August 2011, several top energy officials were fired by the Japanese government; affected positions included the Vice-minister for Economy, Trade and Industry; the head of the Nuclear and [266] Industrial Safety Agency, and the head of the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. [edit]Accident

rating

Comparison of radiation levels for different nuclear events.

The severity of the nuclear accident is provisionally rated 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). This scale runs from 0, indicating an abnormal situation with no safety consequences, to 7, indicating an accident causing widespread contamination with serious health and environmental effects. Prior to Fukushima, the Chernobyl disaster was the only level 7 accident on record, while the Three Mile Island accident was a level 5 accident. Arnold Gundersen, a former nuclear power industry executive who served as an expert witness in the investigation of the Three Mile Island accident, said that "Fukushima is the biggest industrial catastrophe in the history of [268][269][neutrality is disputed] mankind." The Japan Atomic Energy Agency initially rated the situation at Unit 1 below both of these previous accidents; on 13 March it announced it was classifying the event at level 4, an "accident with local [270] consequences". On 18 March it raised its rating on Units 1, 2 and 3 to Level 5, an "accident with [271] wider consequences". It classified the situation at Unit 4 as a level 3 "serious incident". Several parties disputed the Japanese classifications, arguing that the situation was more severe than they were admitting at the time. On 14 March, three Russian experts stated that the nuclear accident [272] should be classified at Level 5, perhaps even Level 6. One day later, the French nuclear safety [273] authority ASN said that the Fukushima plant could be classified as a Level 6. as of 18 March, the French nuclear authorityand as of 15 March, the Finnish nuclear safety authorityestimated the [274][275] accidents at Fukushima to be at Level 6 on the INES. On 24 March, a scientific consultant for noted anti-nuclear environmental group Greenpeace, working with data from the [276] Austrian ZAMG and French IRSN, prepared an analysis in which he rated the total Fukushima [277] accident at INES level 7.

[267]

Radiation releases during the initial hydrogen explosions.

The Asahi Shimbun newspaper reported on 26 March that the accident might warrant level 6, based [278] on its calculations. The Wall Street Journal stated that Japan's NISA would make any decision on [279] raising the level. INES level 6, or "serious accident", had only been applied to the Kyshtym disaster (Soviet Union, 1957), while the only level 7 was Chernobyl (Soviet Union, 1986). Previous level 5 accidents included the Windscale fire (United Kingdom, 1957); the Lucens reactor (Switzerland, 1969); Three Mile Island (United States, 1979); and the Goinia accident (Brazil, 1987). Assessing "seriousness" as partial or full meltdown at a civilian plant, The New York Times reported on 3 April that based on remote sensing, computer "simulations suggest that the number of serious accidents has suddenly doubled, with three of the reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi complex in some stage of meltdown." The Times counted three previous civilian meltdowns, from World Nuclear Association information: Three Mile Island; Saint-Laurent Nuclear Power Plant (France, 1980, INES [280] level 4); and Chernobyl. On 11 April, the Japanese Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) temporarily raised the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi to Level 7 on the INES scale, by considering the whole event and not considering each reactor as an individual event per se (rated between 3 and 5). This would make Fukushima the second Level 7 "major accident" in the history of the nuclear industry; having said that, radiation released as a result of the events at Fukushima was, as of 12 April, only approximately 10% of that released as a result of the accident at Chernobyl (1986), also rated as INES Level [267][281] 7. However, the largest study, as of 21 October 2011, on Fukushima fallout concludes that Fukushima was "the largest radioactive noble gas release in history not related to nuclear bomb [282][283] testing. The release is a factor of 2.5 higher than the Chernobyl 133Xe source term." Arnold Gundersen said Fukushima has 20 times the potential to be released than Chernobyl. Hot spots are being found 60 to 70 kilometres away from the reactor (further away than they were found from Chernobyl), and the amount of radiation in many of them is the amount that caused areas to be [284] declared no-man's-land for Chernobyl. In off-the-record-interviews with Japanese newspapers like the Tokyo Shimbun, Naoto Kan, former premier minister of Japan, revealed that there were moments he believed the disaster could have surpassed Chernobyl, many times. At first Tepco denied that fuel-cores were melted, after all cooling functions were lost. Trade minister, Banri Kaieda, mentioned that Tepco seriously considered pulling away all staff-members from the plant and leaving it abandoned. Kan could not accept this: "Withdrawing from the plant was out of the question, If that had happened, Tokyo would be deserted by now. It was a critical moment for Japan's survival. It could have been a led to leaks of dozens of times more radiation than Chernobyl." That might have "compromised the very existence of the [citation needed] Japanese nation". Tepco's president at that time, Masataka Shimizu, was never clear in his answers, and TEPCO failed to obey the orders to vent one of the overheating reactors, In an interview to the Asahi Shimbun newspaper. Kan revealed, that he went to the plant itself and inspected the plant from above in a helicopter because: "I felt I had to go there in person and speak to the people in charge or I would never have known what was going on." The American Government was seriously concerned about the Japanese response to the accident: Kan said: "We were not told straight out, but it was obvious [citation needed] that they questioned whether we were really taking this seriously." Kan did defend his changed attitude to a non-nuclear energy policy with the following remarks: "If there is a risk of accidents that could make half the land mass of our country uninhabitable, then we [285] cannot afford to take that risk."

[edit]Casualties Major news source reporting at least 2 TEPCO employees confirmed dead from "disaster conditions" [286] following the earthquake. "The two workers, aged 21 and 24, sustained multiple external injuries and were believed to have died from blood loss, TEPCO said. Their bodies were decontaminated as [287] radiation has been spewing from the plant for three weeks." 45 patients were reported dead after the evacuation of a hospital in Futaba. Some of them "were [288] suffering from dehydration because they had not eaten anything for three days". The Associated Press has reported that fourteen senior citizens died after being moved from their [289] hospital which was in the Fukushima plant evacuation zone. According to the Japanese Government, over 160,000 people in the general population were [290] screened in March 2011 for radiation exposure and no case was found which affects health. Thirty [291] workers conducting operations at the plant had exposure levels greater than 100 mSv. In April 2011, the United States Department of Energy published projections of the radiation risks over the next year for people living in the neighborhood of the plant. Potential exposure could exceed 20 mSv/year (2 rems/year) in some areas up to 50 kilometers from the plant. That is the level at which relocation would be considered in the USA, and it is a level that could cause roughly one extra cancer case in 500 young adults. However, natural radiation levels are higher in some part of the world than the projected level mentioned above, and about 4 people out of 10 can be expected to develop [292][293] cancer without exposure to radiation. Further, the radiation exposure resulting from the accident for most people living in Fukushima is so small compared to background radiation that it may [294] be impossible to find statistically significant evidence of increases in cancer. As of September 2011, six workers at the Fukushima Daiichi site have exceeded lifetime legal limits [295] for radiation and more than 300 have received significant radiation doses. As of September 2011, there were no deaths or serious injuries due to direct radiation exposures. Cancer deaths due to accumulated radiation exposures cannot be ruled out, and according to one [296] expert, might be in the order of 100 cases. Frank N. von Hippel, a U.S. scientist, has estimated that on the order of 1,000 people will die from cancer as a result of their exposure to radiation from the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, that is, an increase of 0.1 percent in the incidence of cancer, and much less than the approximately 20,000 people killed directly by the earthquake and tsunami. Because contaminated milk was interdicted in Japan the number of (mostly non-fatal) thyroid cancer cases will probably be less than 1 percent of similar cases at Chernobyl. Von Hippel added that fear of ionizing radiation could have long-term [21] psychological effects on a large portion of the population in the contaminated areas. [edit]Investigations On 7 June 2011 a government-appointed committee of 10 people convened to investigate the accident. The panel was headed by Yotaro Hatamura, professor emeritus of the University of Tokyo, and included Yukio Takasu, Michio Furukawa, the mayor of Kawamata, Fukushima, and author Kunio [297][298] Yanagida, considered an expert on crisis management. As part of the government inquiry, the House of Representatives of Japan's special science committee directed TEPCO to submit to them its manuals and procedures for dealing with reactor accidents. TEPCO responded by submitting manuals with most of the text blotted out. In response, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency ordered TEPCO to resubmit the manuals by 28 September [299] 2011 without hiding any of the content. TEPCO replied that it would comply with the order.

On 24 October NISA published a large portion of Tokyo Electric Power Company's procedural manuals for nuclear accidents. These were the manuals that the operator of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant earlier did sent to the Lower House with most of the contents blacked out, saying that this information should be kept secret to protect its intellectual property rights, and that disclosure would offer information to possible terrorists. NISA ordered TEPCO to sent the manuals without any redaction, as the law orders. 200 pages were released from the accident procedural manuals used for Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. All their contents were published, only the names of individuals were left out. From these documents could be concluded: TEPCO did not make sufficient preparations to cope with critical nuclear accidents. After the batteries and power supply boards were inundated on 11 March, almost all electricity sources were lost TEPCO did not envision such a power failure or any kind of prolonged power loss. TEPCO thought that in a serious incident, venting pressure in the reactor containment vessels or carrying out other safety procedures would still be possible, because emergency power sources would still be available.

The agency said, the decision to publish the manuals was taken, for transparency in the search what caused the nuclear accident in Fukushim and also to establish better safety measures for the [300] future. On 24 October 2011 the first meeting was held by a group of 6 nuclear energy specialists invited by NISA to dicuss the lessons to be learned from the accidents in Fukushima. Their first remarks were: Japanese nuclear power plants should have multiple power sources plants should be able to maintain electricity during an earthquake or other emergencies TEPCO should examine why the equipment failed to work and should take appropriate actions to prevent such failures in the future

According to professor Tadashi Narabayashi of the Hokkaido University Graduate School, plant operators should arrange emergency power supplies with other utilities. These discussion should be completed in March 2012, in order to be able to implement their conclusions into the new safety[301] regulations by the new nuclear safety agency to be launched in April 2012. [edit]Insurance According to Munich Re, a major reinsurer, the private insurance industry will not be significantly [302] affected by the accidents at the Fukushima nuclear power plant. Swiss Re similarly states "Coverage for nuclear facilities in Japan excludes earthquake shock, fire following earthquake and tsunami, for both physical damage and liability. Swiss Re believes that the incident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant is unlikely to result in a significant direct loss for the property & casualty [303] insurance industry." [edit]Radiation

releases

Main article: Radiation effects from Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster

Map of contaminated areas around the plant (22 March-3 April).

Fukushima dose rate comparison to other incidents and standards, with graph of recorded radiation levels and specific accident events from 11 to 30 March.

Radioactive material has been released from the Fukushima containment vessels as the result of deliberate venting to reduce gaseous pressure, deliberate discharge of coolant water into the sea, and accidental or uncontrolled events. Concerns about the possibility of a large scale radiation leak resulted in 20 km exclusion zone being set up around the power plant and people within the 20 30 km zone being advised to stay indoors. Later, the UK, France and some other countries told their nationals to consider leaving Tokyo, in response to fears of spreading radioactive [304] contamination. The Fukushima accident has led to trace amounts of radiation, including iodine131, caesium-134 andcaesium-137, being observed around the world (New York State, Alaska, [305][306][307] Hawaii, Oregon, California, Montreal, and Austria). Large amounts of radioactive isotopes have also been released into the Pacific Ocean. According to one expert, the release of radioactivity is about one-tenth that from the Chernobyl [21] disaster and the contaminated area is also about one-tenth that that of Chernobyl. In March 2011, Japanese officials announced that "radioactive iodine-131 exceeding safety limits for [308] infants had been detected at 18 water-purification plants in Tokyo and five other prefectures". As of July 2011, the Japanese government has been unable to control the spread of radioactive material into the nations food. Radioactive material has been detected in a range of produce, including spinach, tea leaves, milk, fish and beef, up to 200 miles from the nuclear plant. Inside the 12-mile [309][310] evacuation zone around the plant, all farming has been abandoned. As of August 2011, the crippled Fukushima nuclear plant is still leaking low levels of radiation and areas surrounding it could remain uninhabitable for decades due to high radiation. It could take more than 20 years before residents could safely return to areas with current radiation readings of 200 [311] millisieverts per year, and a decade for areas at 100 millisieverts per year.

The total amount of iodine-131 and caesium-137 released into the atmosphere has been estimated to [312][313] exceed 10% of the emissions from the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. The accidents were rated at level 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale. On 24 August 2011, the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) of Japan published the results of the recalculation of the total amount of radioactive materials released into the air during the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. The total amounts released between 11 March and 5 17 16 April were revised downwards to 1.3 10 Bq for iodine-131 and 1.1 10 Bq for caesium-137. 17 16 [314] Earlier estimations were 1.5 10 Bq and 1.2 10 Bq. On 8 September 2011 a group of Japanese scientists working for the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, the Kyoto University and other institutes, published the results of a recalculation of the total amount of radioactive material released into the ocean: between late March through April they found a total of 15,000 TBq for the combined amount of iodine-131 and caesium-137. This was more than triple the figure of 4,720 TBq estimated by the plant-owner. TEPCO made only a calculation about the releases from the plant in April and May into the sea. The new calculations were needed because a large portion of the airborne radioactive substances would enter the seawater when it came down as [315] rain. In the first half of September 2011 the amount of radioactive substances released from the plant was about 200 million becquerels per hour, according to TEPCO, this was approximately one four-millionth [316] of the level of the initial stages of the accident in March. According to a report (published 29 October 2011) of the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety in France the pollution of the Pacific Ocean was probably 30 times bigger than TEPCO reported in May 2011. The French institute calculated, that between 21 March 21 and 15 July around 27.1 quadrillion becquerels (= 27.100.000.000.000.000) entered the ocean, on 8 April 2011 already 82 percent of this unprecedented quantity had flown into the sea. The location of the plant on the coast with very strong currents contributed to the very fast pollution of a large part of the Pacific ocean, the contamination on marine life in remote waters would likely wane from autumn, but the radioactive pollution in the waters on the coastal area of the prefecture Fukushima, northeast of Tokyo will remain significant for a long time, regarding the 30 years half-life of this Ce[317][318] 137 isotope. Based on worldwide measurements of iodine-131 and caesium-137, it was suggested that the releases of those isotopes from Fukushima are of the same order of magnitude as those [319][20] from Chernobyl in 1986, not confirmed by the following tables:

Iod-131 (TBq) reportdate place period of disposal from to

Caesium-137 (TBq) source from to

2002

Chernobyl

25 April June 1986

1 600 000

1 920 000

59 000

111 000 NEA

[320]

22 March

Fukushima 12 15 March 2011

400 000

3 000

30 000 ZAMG

[321]

2011

2 April 2011

Fukushima 12 19 March 2011

10 000

700 000

1 000

70 000 ZAMG

[322]

12 April 2011

Fukushima

11 March 5 [323] April

150 000

12 000

NSC

[324]

12 April 2011

Fukushima 11 17 March 2011

130 000

6 100

NISA

[324]

7 June 2011

Fukushima 11 17 March 2011

160 000

15 000

NISA

[325]

reportdate

place

period of disposal

amount (TBq)

source

12 April 2011

Chernobyl 25 April June 1986

5 200 000 NISA

[324]

12 April 2011

Fukushima 11 March 5 April 2011

630 000 NSC

[323][324]

12 April 2011

Fukushima 11 17 March 2011

370 000 NISA

[324]

April 2011

Fukushima 4 April 2011

154 NSC

[323]

25 April 2011

Fukushima 24 April 2011

24 NSC

[323]

67 June 2011 Fukushima 11 17 March 2011

770 000 NISA

[325][326]

7 June 2011

Fukushima 11 17 March 2011

840 000 NISA

[citation needed]

17 August 2011 Fukushima 316 August 2011

0.07 Government

[327]

23 August 2011 Fukushima 12 March - 5 April 2011

630.000 NISA

[328]

Decontaminated water

[329]

Week from Tons

Plantcapacity utilisation

29. June

6380

76 %

6. July

6130

73 %

13. July

4510

54 %

20. July

4870

58 %

27. July

6190

74 %

3. August

6720

80 %

10. August 7420

88 %

Issues/problems identification: Critical analysis

http://www.countercurrents.org/hamer050411.htm

1. The danger of accidents such as Chernobyl , Fukushima , Three Mile Island & Windscale. #2. The danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons. #3. The problem of disposing of nuclear waste.

#4. Nuclear Power generation can supply only a small fraction of the world's energy needs. #5. If careful accounting is made the CO2 emitted by: Constructing nuclear power plants, running them, mining & refining the uranium & decommissioning the plants is comparable to that emitted by coal-fired plants. #6. Nuclear power generation is heavily subsidized & if it were not for these subsidies, (nuclear power) would not be able to compete with wind energy or solar energy. It is vital that the subsidies be shifted from nuclear power to the development of various forms of renewable energy.
Possibility of criticality
Reports of 13 observations of neutron beams 1.5 km "southwest of the plant's No. 1 and 2 reactors" from 13 to 16 March raised the possibility that nuclear fission could have occurred after the initial [151] SCRAMing of the reactors at Fukushima Daiichi. 16 March reports that fuel rods in the spent fuel pool at Unit 4 could have been exposed to air appeared to indicate that fission may have occurred in [152] that fuel pool. Later reports of exceptionally high iodine-134 levels appeared to confirm this theory [153] because very high levels of iodine-134 would be indicative of fission reactions. The same report [154] also showed high measurements of chlorine-38, which some nuclear experts used to calculate that [155][156] fission must be occurring in Unit 1. Despite TEPCO suggesting the iodine-134 report was inaccurate, the IAEA appeared to accept the chlorine-based analysis as a valid theory suggesting fission when it stated at a press conference that "melted fuel in the No. 1 reactor building may be [157] causing isolated, uncontrolled nuclear chain reactions". However, TEPCO confirmed its concern about the accuracy of the high iodine and chlorine report by formally retracting the report on 21 [158] April, which eliminated both the exceptionally high iodine-134 and chlorine-38 levels as proof of criticality. TEPCO did not appear to comment on the criticality concern when withdrawing its [159][160] report, but the IAEA has not withdrawn its comments, and some off-site experts find the [161][162] currently-measured iodine-134 levels higher than expected.