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PRELIMINARY CHAPTER
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

I. REPUBLIC ACT 386

A. CIVIL LAW / CIVIL CODE

Civil Law - the mass oI precepts which determines
and regulates those relation oI assistance, authority
and obedience existing among members oI the Iamily
as well as among members oI a society Ior the
protection oI private interests. (Sanchez Roman)

Civil Code - collection oI laws which regulates the
private relations oI the members oI civil society,
determining their respective rights and obligations
with reIerence to persons, things and civil acts.
(Tolentino)

Q: Does the CC contains an effectivity clause?
Yes. One year aIter its publication, the code took
eIIect.

Q: When does the CC took effect?
ugust 30, 1950

Q: Can we conclude that it was published on August
3, 1949?
In Lara vs. Del Rosario, the SC said that the
reckoning date is the actual date oI circulation. The
SC emphasized the importance oI publication -
publication as an exercise oI due process. Published
on July 1949, the copies oI the CC were simply
stored. SC decided to make use oI the date oI
circulation (ugust 30, 1949) and not the date oI
publication (July 19, 1949) because the purpose oI
publication is deIeated when copies oI the CC were
released.

Lara vs. Del Rosario, 2 April 1954
Facts Del Rosario owner oI 25 taxi cabs operated a
taxi business. He employed 3 mechanics and 49
drivers. On September 4, 1950, without giving said
mechanics and drivers 30 days advance notice, Del
Rosario sold his 25 taxi cabs to La Mallorca, a
transportation company, as a result oI which the
employees lost their jobs.

They brought this action against Del Rosario to
recover compensation Ior overtime work and services
rendered on Sundays and legal holidays provided Ior
in rticle 302 oI the Code oI Commerce because oI
the Iailure oI their employer to give them 1 month
notice.

Issue Whether or not the Civil Code is applicable.

Held s to the month pay under rticle 302 oI the
Code oI Commerce, rticle 2270 oI the Civil Code
appears to




have repealed said rticle 302 when it repealed the
provisions oI the Code oI Commerce governing
agency.


This repeal took place on ugust 30, 1950, when the
New Civil Code went into eIIect, that is, 1 year aIter
its publication in the oIIicial gazette.

The SC ruled that the Civil Code took eIIect on
ugust 30, 1950, 1 year aIter its circulation, ugust
30, 1949 and not Irom the publication on July 19,
1949 Ior copies were not released on such date.

Note:
The Lara Case at the outset looks like a labor case.
On the issue oI what law is applicable, the SC said
that the CC took eIIect repealing the Code oI
Commerce.

July 19, 1949 publication
ugust 30, 1949 circulation
ugust 30, 1950 eIIectivity

B. CIVIL LAW / COMMON LAW

Common Law system oI jurisprudence based on
judicial precedents rather than statutory laws or
legislative enactments. It does not consist oI absolute,
Iixed and inIlexible rules but rather oI broad,
comprehensive principles based on justice, reason
and common sense.

II. LAWS

Law rule oI conduct, just and obligatory,
promulgated by legitimate authority Ior common
observance and beneIit. (Sanchez Roman)
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*ReIers not just to statutes but also includes
executive order, presidential decrees, administrative
rules, central bank circulars. Includes those enacted
by those exercising quasi-legislative Iunction.

A. PUBLICATION - ARTICLE 2 OF THE
CIVIL CODE AS AMENDED BY E.O. 200

`G.R.: Publication is an indispensable requisite Ior
the eIIectivity oI the laws (Tanada vs. Tuvera)
`Exceptions:
1. The Law is interpretative in nature
2. Law is internal in nature
3. Letters oI instructions rules to be Iollowed by
subordinates
4. Municipal ordinances are covered by the Local
Government Code.

Cases:

1. 1aada vs. 1uvera, 24 April 1985
Facts Tanada, Sarmiento and the Movement oI
ttorneys Ior Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism
(MBINI) seek a writ oI mandamus to compel
respondent public oIIicials to publish in the oIIicial
gazette oI various PDs, LOIs, GOs, proclamations,
Eos, Letters oI Implementation and Os.

Respondents contend that publication in the
oIIicial gazette is not a sine qua non requirement Ior
the eIIectivity iI laws where the laws themselves
provide Ior their own eIIectivity dates so publication
in the oIIicial gazette is not necessary.

Issue Whether or not publication is an indispensable
requisite Ior the eIIectivity oI laws.

Held Publication is an indispensable requisite Ior the
eIIectivity oI laws. ll statutes including those oI
local application and private laws shall be published
as a condition Ior their eIIectivity, which shall begin
15 days aIter publication unless a diIIerent eIIectivity
date is Iixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are PDs and Eos promulgated
by the President in the exercise oI legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or at present directly conIerred by the
Constitution.

dministrative Rules and Regulations must also
be published iI their purpose is to enIorce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.

The purpose oI publication is to give adequate
notice oI the various laws xxx PDs that provide Ior
Iines, IorIeitures or penalties shall be published.
Other PDs which apply only to particular persons or
class oI persons such as Os and Eos need not be
published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.

Notes:
\ Branches of the Gov`t Legislative, Executive,
Judicial (separation oI powers)
\ Amendment No. 6 of 1973 Constitution - The
president is given the power to enact laws.

!eople vs. Que !o Lay, C.R. L-791
Facts Que Po Lay is appealing Irom the decision oI
the CFI Iinding him guilty oI violating CB Circular
20 and sentencing him to suIIer 6 months
imprisonment xxx. The charge was that Que who was
in possession oI a Ioreign exchange consisting oI
U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders
amounting to $7,000 Iailed to sell them to CB. The
appeal oI Que is based on the claim that the said
circular was not published in the oIIicial gazette. The
Solicitor General contended that publication is not
necessary.

Issue W/N not the CB Circular should be published.

Held CB Circular iI punitive in nature should be
published. s a rule, circulars and regulations which
prescribes a penalty Ior its violation should be
published beIore becoming eIIective on the general
principle and theory that beIore the public is bound
by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must Iirst be published and the
people oIIicially and speciIically inIormed oI said
contents and penalities.

3. !hil. Int'l vs. 1udge Angeles, 21 October 199
Facts The controversy springs Irom the issuance by
the PITC oI an O under which applications to the
PITC Ior importation Irom China must be
accompanied by a viable and conIirmed Export
Program oI Philippine Products. For Iailure to
comply with their undertakings to submit export
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credits equivalent to the value oI their importation as
required by the O, Iurther import applications were
withheld by PITC.

Issue W/N the O should be published.

Held dministrative rules and regulations must be
published iI their purpose is to enIorce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

4. 1udge Dadole vs. COA, 3 December 22
Facts Local Budget Circular 55 issued by the DBM
which reduced the monthly allowances given by
Local Governments to RTC and MTC judges was
questioned in this case. Petitioner judges Iiled a
protest against the notices.

Issue W/N the DBM circular is valid.

Held LBC 55 is void on account oI its lack oI
publication. dministrative rules and regulations
must be published iI their purpose is to enIorce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. Interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel oI an administrative agency and the public
need not be published. Neither is publication required
oI the so called LOIs issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
Iollowed be their subordinates in the perIormance oI
their duties.

B. WHERE SHOULD PUBLICATION TAKE
PLACE?
`G.R.:
1. OIIicial Gazette or
2. Newspaper oI General Circulation
(Basa vs. Mercado)

`Exception: The case oI Hagonoy Market Vendor
ssociation vs. Municipality oI Hagonoy Bulacan.
Cases:

1. Basa vs. Mercado, 1 !IL 3
Facts The judge oI CFI Pampanga allowed and
probated the last will and testament oI Ines Basa (the
deceased). The same judge approved the account oI
the administrator oI the estate, declared him the only
heir oI the deceased and closed the administration
proceedings. The petitioners Iiled a motion in which
they prayed that the said proceedings be re-opened
and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to act in
the matter because there was a Iailure to comply with
requirements as to publication oI notice and hearing
prescribed in the Code oI Civil Procedure. They also
contend that the weekly newspaper 'Ing Katipunan
in which the notice and hearing was published was
not a newspaper oI general circulation in the province
oI Pampanga.

Issue W/N the Ing Katipunan is a NGC. (What is a
NGC?)

Held It is a NGC Ior the Iollowing reasons
1. It is published Ior the dissemination oI local
news and general inIormation
2. It has a bona Iide subscription list oI paying
subscribers
3. It is published at regular intervals (the trial
court ordered the publication to be made in
said newspaper precisely because it was a
NGC)
4. It is not a newspaper devoted to the interests
or published Ior the entertainment oI a
particular class, proIession, trade, calling,
race or religious denomination.

2. agonoy vs. Municipality, February 22
Facts The Sangguniang Bayan oI Hagonoy Bulacan
enacted an ordinance which increased the stall rentals
oI the market vendors in Hagonoy. rticle 3 oI the
said ordinance provided that it shall take eIIect upon
approval. The ordinance was posted Irom November
4 to 25, 1996. In the last week oI November 1997,
petitioners were personally given copies and were
inIormed that it shall be enIorced on January 1998.
The petitioners contended that the subject ordinance
was not posted as required by law.

Issue W/N the ordinance was posted as required by
law.

Held n ordinance which increased the stall rentals
oI the market vendors has complied with the
publication requirement when the same was posted in
3 conspicuous places since there was no newspaper
oI local circulation in the municipality which is in
accordance with Section 188 oI the LGC.

C. EFFECTIVITY
`G.R.: Law shall take eIIect on the date it is
expressly provided to take eIIect.
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`Exception: II no such date is made aIter 15 days
Iollowing the completion oI its publication.
Cases:

1. La Bugal - B'laan vs. Ramos, 27 1anuary 24
Facts Pres. quino issued EO 279 authorizing the
DENR Secretary to accept, consider, and evaluate
proposals Irom Ioreign-owned corporations Ior
contracts involving technical or Iinancial assistance
etc. Pres. Ramos approved R.. 7942 to govern the
exploration, development, utilization and processing
oI mineral resources. Iter publication in 2 NGCs,
the DENR Secretary issued DENR Os otherwise
known as Implementing Rules and Regulations oI
R.. 7942. Petitioner contended that the EOs did not
come into eIIect.

Issue Whether the EOs did not come into eIIect.

Held ccording to petitioners EO 279 was signed
into law by Pres. quino on July 25, 1987, 2 days
beIore the opening oI the Congress on July 27, 1987.
Section 8 oI the said EO states that the same shall
take eIIect immediately. This provision according to
petitioner runs counter to Section 1 oI EO 200 which
provides that laws shall take eIIect xxx (now rticle
2 oI the CC). On that premise, petitioners contend
that EO 279 could have only taken eIIect 15 days
aIter its publication at which time Congress had
already convened and the President`s power to
legislate had ceased. Petitioner`s contention has no
merit. There is nothing in EO 200 that prevents a law
Irom taking eIIect on a date other than even beIore
the 15 day period aIter its publication. Indeed, this
is the very essence oI the phrase 'unless it is
otherwise provided. Section 1 oI EO 200 thereIore
applies only when a statute does not provide Ior its
own date oI eIIectivity. Thus, EO 278 became
eIIective immediately upon its publication in the
oIIicial gazette on ugust 3, 1987.

2. CIR vs. Lhuillier, 15 1uly 23
Facts CIR issued a Memorandum Order 15-91
imposing a 5 lending investor`s tax on pawnshops.
The BIR issued an assessment against Lhuillier
demanding payment oI deIiciency tax. Lhuillier
contended that the said memo is a new and additional
tax measure on pawnshops which Congress could
enact.

Issue W/N the said memoranda are valid even
without publication.

Held n interpretative rule is designed to provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency
is in charge oI enIorcing xxx Whether an
administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature,
its applicability needs nothing Iurther than its bare
issuance Ior it gives no real consequence more than
what the law itselI has already prescribed. When the
administrative agency goes beyond merely providing
Ior the means that can Iacilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation oI the law but
substantially increases the burden oI those governed,
it behooves the agency to accord at least to those
directly aIIected a chance to be heard and thereaIter
to be duly inIormed.

The said orders cannot be viewed simply as
implementing rules or directive measures revoking in
the process previous rulings oI past commissioners
xxx The due observance oI the requirements oI
publication should not have been ignored.

NOTE: PUBLICATION / EFFECTIVITY

Q: 1he Recto Law was approved by the Senate on
1anuary 1, 25. It contains an effectivity clause
which "should take effect immediately after the
signing of the !resident". When does the law take
effect?
|Steps (1) Take into consideration the ruling in
Tanada. (2) Take note oI the general rule and the
exception. (3) Determine what kind oI law is
involved. (4) pply rticle 2. (5) Find out iI there is
a NGC|
G.R.: II the law has eIIectivity clause, Iollow the
eIIectivity clause.
EXC.: pply the 15-day period counted aIter the
publication iI there is no eIIectivity clause.

Q: What is the purpose of publication?
To inIorm the public

Note:
\ Tabloids are published at regular intervals

III. ARTICLE 3 - IGNORATIA 1URIS NON
EXCUSAT

Q: Why ignorance of the law excuses no one?
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rticle 2 does not emphasize publication but
eIIectivity.

Presumption Every person is presumed to know the
law, since the government has already complied with
the requirement oI publication.

G.R.: Ignorance oI the law excuses no one Irom
compliance therein.

EXC.:
1. Ignorance oI Iact may excuse a party Irom
the legal consequences oI his conduct.
(Ignoratia Facti)
Ex. Ignorance oI Ioreign law is a mistake oI
Iact.
2. Mistake as to diIIicult questions which is the
same as mistake oI Iact. Read rticles 526,
1334, 2154 and 2155 CC

Cases:
1. Miaque vs. 1udge !amonag, 28 March 23
Facts Complainants who were connected with the
Daily InIormer (a widely circulated newspaper in
Western Visayas) were charged beIore the MTC by
Judge Pamonag oI the crime oI libel. Respondent
judge conducted a preliminary investigation and
thereaIter issued warrants Ior the arrest oI the
complainants. Complainants Iiled an administrative
case against the judge Ior gross ignorance oI the law.
They contended that the judge neither has authority
to conduct a preliminary investigation not to issue
warrants Ior their arrest. The judge said that it was his
Iirst libel case and that he issued the warrants in good
Iaith.

Issue W/N respondent is guilty oI gross ignorance oI
the law.

Held Judges are expected more than just cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. They
must know the law and apply them properly in good
Iaith. The provisions oI rticle 360 oI the RPC on the
persons authorized to conduct preliminary
investigation in libel cases is so elementary, not to
know it constitutes gross ignorance oI the law.

2. Estate of Boo vs. Cee, 3 March 1922
Facts Cheong Boo, a native oI China died intestate
in Zamboanga. He leIt property worth P100,000. The
estate oI the deceased was claimed on one hand by
Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a
marriage contracted by Boo with Tan Dit in China in
1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand by
Mora dong who alleged that she had been lawIully
married to Boo in 1896. Gee introduced in evidence a
document in Chinese stating the marriage ceremony
that too place in moy, China.

Issue W/N the document presented by Gee may be
recognized here in the Philippines.

Held Ignorance oI a Ioreign law is not ignorance oI
the law but oI Iact because such Ioreign law must be
Iirst alleged and proved as a matter oI Iact, there
being no judicial notice oI said Ioreign law. The
Chinese marriage was not adequately proved.

Processual Presumption iI the Ioreign law is not
properly alleged and proved, the presumption is that
it is the same as our own law. (Estate oI Suntay vs.
Suntay)

3. Suntay vs. Suntay, 31 1uly 1954
Facts On May 14, 1934, Jose Suntay died in moy,
China. He married twice, the Iirst time to Manuela
Cruz with whom he had several children now
residing in the Philippines and the second time to
Maria Billian with whom he had a son. polonio
(son oI Manuela) Iiled Jose`s intestate in the CFI.
Maria also instituted the present proceedings Ior the
probate oI a will allegedly leIt by the deceased.
ccording to Silvino (son oI Maria), beIore the
deceased died in China, the deceased leIt a will with
Go Toh, Barreto and Lopez as attesting witnesses. Go
Toh arrived in the Philippines with the will,
unIortunately, the sons oI Manuela snatched it. Go
Toh said that the will was already probated in China.

Issue W/N the Philippine court may recognize the
probate oI the will in China.

Held Where it appears that the proceedings in the
court oI a Ioreign country were held Ior the purpose
oI taking the testimony oI 2 attesting witnesses to the
will and the order oI the probate court did not purport
to allow the will, the proceedings cannot be deemed
to be Ior the probate oI the will as it was not done in
accordance with the basic and Iundamental concepts
and principles Iollowed in the probate and allowance
oI wills. The will in this case cannot be allowed.

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In the absence oI prooI that the municipal district
court oI moy, China is a probate court and on the
Chinese Law oI Procedure in probate matters, it may
be presumed that the proceedings in the matter oI
probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are
the same as those provided Ior in our laws on the
subject. (Processual Presumption)

IV. ARTICLE 4 - RETROACTIVITY VS.
PROSPECTIVITY

`G.R.: Prospectivity oI laws

`EXC.:
When law can be given retroactive effect:
1. Law expressly provides Ior its retroactivity.
But in no case must an ex post Iacto law be
passed.
2. Law is curative in nature (laws intended to
correct errors or irregularities incurred in
judicial or administrative proceedings.
3. Law is remedial in nature - there are no
vested rights in rules oI procedure (Medina
vs. C)
4. Law is penal but Iavorable to the accused
(rt. 22 oI the RPC)
5. Laws creating new rights provided that no
vested right is impaired (rt. 2253, Par. 2;
Quizana vs. Redugerio)
6. Emergency laws authorized by the police
power oI the government.

Notes:
\ Law is penal but Iavorable to the accused.
Examples.
Case oI Robin Padilla there was a bill proposed
reducing the sentence oI illegal possession oI
Iirearms. The bill was authored by Senator Ramon
Revilla, Sr..
The President decided to remove the death
penalty. Convicts who are in the death row were not
punished because oI the law.

Q: Does the Family Code contain a retroactivity
clause?
Yes. rticle 256 oI the Family Code provides that
this code shall have retroactive eIIect insoIar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the CC or other laws.

Q: An illegitimate child was born prior to the
effectivity of the FC, will the provision of
retroactivity under the FC apply to the illegitimate
child?
II the Iather died prior to the eIIectivity oI the FC,
compulsory heirs already acquired vested rights even
iI the distribution oI property has not yet taken place.
II the Iather died during the eIIectivity oI the FC,
retroactivity applies because assuming the Iather has
legitimate child, there is no vested right yet.

Cases:

1. Medina Investigation vs. CA, 2 March 21
Facts Taburnal was hired by petitioner as security
guard and was assigned to benson, Inc. Taburnal
was relieved due to violations pursuant to his service
contract. He then Iiled a case against his employer.
The labor arbiter ruled in Iavor oI Taburnal.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which dismissed the
same Ior lack oI jurisdiction. Petitioner Iiled a
petition Ior certiorari in the C which dismissed the
petition Ior having been Iiled beyond the 60-day
reglementary period. C ruled that the petition was
Iiled on the 67
th
day since petitioners received on
November 10, 1999 the order dated ugust 26, 1999
oI the NLRC and the MR was Iiled on 19 November
1999. Copy oI the order denying the said motion was
received by petitioners on 3 pril 2000 while the
petition was Iiled with the C on 31 May 2000.
Petitioners contended that their petition was within
the period that the amendment under .M. 00-2-03
oI the SC wherein the 60-day period to Iile a petition
Ior certiorari is reckoned Irom receipt oI the
resolution denying the MR should be deemed
applicable.

Issue W/N the said .M. may be retroactively
applied.

Held The amendment should be deemed applicable.
It took eIIect on 1 September 2000. Remedial statutes
or statutes relating to remedies or modes oI
procedures which do not create or take away vested
rights but only operate in Iurtherance oI the remedy
or conIirmation oI rights already existing, do not
come within the legal conception oI a retroactive law
or the general rule against retroactive operation oI
statutes. Statutes regulating the procedure oI the
courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time oI their
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passage. The retroactive application oI procedural
laws is not violative oI any right oI a person who may
Ieel that he is adversely aIIected. The reason is that as
a general rule, no vested right may attach to nor arise
Irom procedural laws.

2. Elvira Yu Oh vs. CA, 1une 23
Facts SpeciIic perIormance was Iiled against Elvira
Ior Iailure to pay the pieces oI jewelry she purchased
Irom Solid Gold International. compromise
agreement was entered between Solid Gold and
Elvira wherein the latter issued post dated checks.
The said checks bounced. The RTC Iound Elvira
guilty oI violation oI BP 22. Elvira appealed to the
C alleging that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
oIIense. Elvira contended that the C erred in not
resolving the jurisdictional issue in her Iavor,
thereby, unjustly depriving her oI the legal beneIits oI
giving retroactive eIIect to the provisions oI R 7691
expanding the jurisdiction oI the inIerior courts
(MTC) to cover the oIIenses involved in her case.
Issue W/N laws deIining jurisdiction oI courts
should be given retroactive eIIect.

Held Laws deIining jurisdiction oI courts are
substantive in nature and not procedural Ior they do
not reIer to the manner oI trying cases but to the
authority oI the courts to hear and decide certain
cases in the various instances oI which they are
susceptible. R 7691 is a substantive law and not a
penal law as nowhere in its provision deIines a crime
neither does it provide a penalty oI any kind.
Jurisdiction is determined by the law in Iorce at the
time oI the Iiling oI the complaint and once acquired,
jurisdiction is not aIIected by subsequent legislative
enactments placing jurisdiction in another tribunal.
Hence, the contention oI Elvira is incorrect.

3. Quizana vs. Redugerio, 7 May 1959
Facts The action is based on an actionable document
which states that in the event that the deIendants
Iailed to pay Quizana the amount oI P550, the Iormer
will transIer the land speciIied in the agreement.
When the deIendants Iailed to pay, the oIIered to
pledge the land and transIer possession thereoI to the
plaintiII but the latter reIused the oIIer.

Issue W/N the second part oI the written obligation
in which the obligors agreed and promised to deliver
a mortgage over the land upon their Iailure to pay the
debt is valid upon the plaintiII.

Held This second part oI the obligation in question is
what is known in law as a Iacultative obligation
deIined in rticle 1206 oI the CC. This is a new
provision and is not Iound in the Old Spanish Civil
Code which was in Iorce at the time oI the execution
oI this agreement. There is nothing in the agreement
which would argue against its enIorcement. It is not
contrary to law or public morals or public policy and
notwithstanding the absence oI any legal provision at
the time it was entered into governing it, as the
parties had Ireely and voluntarily entered into it, there
is no ground or reason why it should not be given
eIIect. It is a new right which should be declared
eIIective at once.

V. ARTICLE 6 - WAIVER OF RIGHTS

`G.R.: Rights may be waived.

`EXC.:
1. Unless waiver is contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals or good customs.
2. Waiver is prejudicial to a third person.

For waiver to be valid there must be:
1. vested right
2. voluntary relinquishment oI such vested
right.
3. The person waiving must know oI the
existence oI his right.

Notes:
\ Vitiated consent should not be present
\ ctual right should be existing.

Q: In students' field trip, the parents are made to
sign a waiver. Is this in accordance with Article ?
(The right involved here is the right to Iile an
action Ior damages against the school iI something
would happen in the Iield trip).
Up to now, there is no SC decision regarding this
matter. This happens also in hospitals beIore
operation. Contrary to public policy will not be
applied since up to now it is being practiced.
There is no existing right yet. No actual right. Even iI
you keep on signing the waiver, it does not give any
eIIect because there is no right existing.

Sanchez vs. CA, 29 September 1997
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Facts Rosalia Lugod is the only child oI Spouses
Juan Sanchez and Maria VillaIranca while rturo
Lugod, Evelyn Lugod-Ranises and Robert Lugod are
the legitimate children oI Rosalia (private
respondents). Petitioners are the illegitimate children
oI Juan Sanchez. Following the death oI her mother
Maria, Rosalia Iiled a petition Ior letters
administration over the estate oI her mother and the
estate oI her Iather Juan. The petitioners Iiled a
petition Ior letters administration over the intestate
estate oI Juan, which petition was opposed by Rosalia
xxx The parties executed a compromise agreement
wherein they agreed to divide the properties oI Juan.
Rosalia, the appointed administratix Iailed to deliver
some properties to the petitioners. The trial court in
deciding the case did not Iollow the compromise
agreement. The C dismissed the petitioner`s
petition.

Issue W/N the compromise agreement is valid.

Held compromise agreement entered into by the
heirs regarding their proportionate share in the estate
oI their deceased Iather does not constitute
relinquishment oI a right to properties which were
not known.

Such waiver is valid because the parties waived a
known and existing interest their hereditary right
which was already vested in them by reason oI the
death oI their Iather. rticle 777 provides that the
right to succession is transmitted Irom the moment oI
the death oI the decedent.

Vested Right - is one whose existence, eIIectivity
and extent does not depend upon events Ioreign to the
will oI the holder.

G.R. It is not possible to waive obligations and
duties.

EXC.
1. When authorized by law (Obligation is
concomitant oI a right that is waived.
Examples Read rticles 488 and 662 oI the
CC)
2. When authorized by the holder oI the
correlative right.

VI. ARTICLE 8 - 1UDICIAL DECISIONS
HAVE THE FORCE AND EFFECT OF A LAW

Doctrine of Stare Decisis When a court has laid
down a principle oI law as applicable to a certain set
oI Iacts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to
all Iuture cases where the Iacts are substantially the
same.

Horizontal Stare Decisis a division oI the SC may
or may not Iollow the decision oI another division.
(SC is divided by several divisions, usually, in 1
division there are 5 justices)

Vertical Stare Decisis courts have no option but to
Iollow the decisions or orders oI the SC. This is
obligatory on the part oI the courts because judicial
decisions have the Iorce and eIIect oI a law. Judicial
decisions are called 'judge-made laws. Vertical
stare decisis happens when SC had ruled en banc.

Ratio Decidendi / Obiter Dictum
Parts of a Decision:
1. Ratio Decidendi - it is the principle which the
case established. It is the reason Ior the decision.

2. Obiter Dictum opinions necessary to the
determination oI a case not binding and cannot have
the Iorce oI judicial precedents (People vs.
Macadaeg)

Cases:

1. !eople vs. Macadaeg, 28 May 1952
Facts ntonio Guillermo was convicted oI murder.
The petitioner contended that the CFI ruled in its
judgment oI conviction that ntonio is not entitled to
the beneIits oI amnesty because the murders oI which
he was convicted were committed 'not in Iurtherance
oI the resistance movement but in the course oI a
Iratricidal striIe between 2 rival guerilla units. The
7
th
Guerilla mnesty Commission composed oI Hon.
Macadaeg, Pecson and San Jose together with
convicted ntonio opposed the petition alleging that
the decision oI the court does not prevent ntonio
Irom invoking his right to the provisions oI amnesty
because said right was not at issue at the trial oI the
case against him and the pronouncement oI the court
is not Iinal and conclusive and is merely an obiter
dictum.

Issue W/N the pronouncement oI the court is obiter
dictum.
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Held Iinding oI a court is deemed a
pronouncement on a material issue and is not an
obiter dictum. It is Iinal and conclusive against
parties involved and may not under the principle oI
res judicata be again raised in issue by them in any
tribunal, judicial or administrative.
The ruling oI the court that ntonio is not entitled
to the beneIits oI amnesty is not an obiter dictum but
is a ruling oI the court on an issue expressly raised by
the party on Iacts or evidence adduced in the course
oI the trial oI this case.

2. 1ala Realty vs. Banco Filipino, 2 1une 2
Facts BF Iaced a legal problem with respect to its
branch site holdings. The General Banking ct
provides that banks may only invest in real estate up
to 50 oI their net worth. To address the problem, its
major stockholders agreed tot set up an entity to
which its existing branch sites Ior BF with all such
branch sites including those unloaded to be leased to
BF. BF sold 11 real estate properties to Tala
including the Davao branch site (subject oI this suit).
Tala leased the same branch to BF. The petition
stems Irom an action oI ejectment wherein the issue
was which oI the 2 diIIerent contracts oI lease
presented by each party governs them. Tala presented
an 11 year lease agreement. BF presented a 20 year
lease contract. MTC and RTC both reIused to
exercise jurisdiction. The C ruled that since other
similar ejectment suits were brought beIore it in
which the 20-year lease contract was upheld, it ruled
in Iavor oI BF.

Issue W/N stare decisis should be applied in this
case to resolve the issue oI which oI the 2 contracts
should be pronounced as valid.

Held It is the better practice that when a court has
laid down a principle oI law as applicable to a certain
set oI Iacts, it will adhere to that principle and apply
it to all Iuture cases where the Iacts are substantially
the same. Even though the locations oI the properties
are diIIerent in the 2 cases, the conclusion reached in
one can very well be applied in the other inasmuch as
not only are the parties the same but more
importantly the issue is one and the same and hence
should no longer be re-litigated.

3. 1ung Chin ui vs. Rodriguez, 2 April 21
Facts Petitioner a Taiwanese arrived in this country
as temporary visitor. He was arrested by policemen
who turned him over to the BID. summary
deportation order was issued Iinding him guilty oI
possessing a tampered passport. Petitioner Iiled
beIore the RTC a petition Ior Habeas Corpus. The
RTC granted the petition. Respondents Iiled an
appeal and was given due course by the RTC. The
petitioner appealed but the C ruled in Iavor oI
respondents. During the pendency oI the proceedings
beIore the C, petitioner Iiled a petition Ior certiorari
in the SC contending that the RTC should have
rejected the appeal oI the respondents being Iiled late
or beyond the 48-hour period provided under the
Rules oI Court. The SC denied the petition.

Issue Is the reglementary period within which to
appeal in habeas corpus cases 48 hours Irom notice oI
the decision appealed Irom (as petitioner contends) or
is it 15 days similar to other cases (as contended by
respondents)?
Held This court already rejected the same arguments
oI the petitioner in G.R. 137571. Pertinent portions oI
that decision are reproduced below The
reglementary period Ior Iiling an appeal in a habeas
corpus case is now similar to that in ordinary civil
actions (Sec. 3, Rule 41, ROC).

Stare decisis presupposes that the Iacts oI the
precedent and the case to which it is applied are
substantially the same. Where a Iinding oI court was
based on a procedure oI law that has been repealed,
the Iacts under the same cannot be relied upon by
courts on the succeeding cases.

VII. ARTICLE 14 - PENAL LAW - THEORY
OF TERRITORIALITY

`G.R.: Penal law Iollows the theory oI territoriality
and generality regardless oI nationality.

`EXC.:
1. Principles oI Public International Law on
diplomatic immunity.
2. Presence oI treaty stipulations.

Exterritoriality territorial jurisdiction oI one state
Iorms an extension oI the territory oI another state.
Example Embassy

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Extraterritoriality exemption by virtue oI treaty
stipulation.
Example mbassador

Schneckenburger vs. Moran, 31 1uly 193
Facts Petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul
oI Uruguay at Manila. He was charged in the CFI oI
Manila with the crime oI IalsiIication oI a private
document. He objected to the jurisdiction oI the court
on the ground that both under the constitutions oI
U.S. and the Philippines, the court below had no
jurisdiction to try him.

Issue W/N a consul is immune Irom suit.

Held consul is not entitled to the privileges and
immunities oI an ambassador or minister but is
subject to the laws and regulations oI the country to
which he is accredited. consul is not exempt Irom
criminal prosecution Ior violations oI the laws oI the
country where he resides.

VIII. ARTICLE 15 - PRINCIPLE OF
NATIONALITY

Note: Civil laws pertaining to Iamily rights / duties,
status, condition, legal capacity Iollow the principle
oI nationality.

Read: R.. 9225 Dual Citizenship ct
Sec. 2, R.A. 9225 Declaration oI Policy ll
Philippine citizens who become citizens oI another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship subject to conditions.

Sec. 3, R.A. 9225 Retention oI Philippine
Citizenship Natural-born citizens oI the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason
oI their naturalization as citizens oI a Ioreign country
are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the Iollowing oath oI
allegiance to the republic xxx.

Derivative Citizenship (Sec. 4, R.. 9225) The
unmarried child whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted, below 18 years oI age oI those who re-
acquire Philippine Citizenship upon eIIectivity oI this
act shall be deemed citizens oI the Philippines.

Cases:

1. Roehr vs. Rodriguez, 2 1une 23
Facts Petitioner, a German and a resident oI
Germany married Carmen Rodriguez (a Filipina) in
Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was ratiIied in
Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out oI their union were
born Carolynne and lexandra. Carmen Iiled a
petition Ior declaration oI nullity oI her marriage
beIore the RTC. Petitioner Iiled a motion to dismiss
but was denied by the court. Petitioner also obtained
a decree oI divorce in Germany. The CFI oI Germany
dissolved the marriage but parental custody Ior the
children was granted to petitioner. Petitioner now
alleges that there is nothing leIt to be tackled by the
Philippine Court as there are no conjugal assets
alleged in the petition and the custody oI the children
had already been awarded to petitioner.

Issue W/N the court may retain jurisdiction over the
case despite the Iact that the petitioner has already
obtained a decree oI divorce Irom the German Court.

Held Divorce decrees obtained by Ioreigners in other
countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction but the
legal eIIects thereoI custody, care and support oI
children must still be determined by our courts.

BeIore our courts can give the eIIect oI res
judicata to a Ioreign judgment such as the award oI
custody to petitioner by the German Court, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had
been given ample opportunity to do so on the grounds
allowed under Section 50, Rule 39, ROC (now
Section 48, Rule 39) 'The eIIect oI a judgment oI a
tribunal oI a Ioreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce judgment is as Iollows
(a) In case oI a judgment upon a speciIic thing,
the judgment is conclusive upon the title to
the thing.
(b) In case oI a judgment against a person, the
judgment is presumptive evidence oI a right
as between the parties and their successors-
in-interest by a subsequent title but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence oI a
want oI jurisdiction, want oI notice to the
party, xxx.

Exceptional Case:
2. Jan Dorn vs. Romillo, 8 October 1985
Facts lice Van Dorn is a citizen oI the Philippines
while private respondent (Richard Upton) is a citizen
oI U.S. They were married in Hong Kong. They
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established their residence in the Philippines and
begot 2 children. The parties were divorced in
Nevada, U.S. and remained and that lice re-married
in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Richard
Iiled a suit against lice stating that lice`s business
in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property oI the parties
and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting oI that business and that Richard be
declared with right to manage that conjugal property.
lice contended that respondent is estopped Irom
laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because
oI the representation he made in the divorce
proceedings beIore the merican Court that they had
no community oI property. Respondent avers that the
divorce decree cannot prevail over the prohibitive
laws oI the Philippines.

Issue W/N the decree oI divorce is valid in the
Philippines.

Held The decree is binding on Richard as an
merican citizen. For instance, Richard cannot sue
lice as her husband in any State oI the Union.

Owing to the nationality principle (rticle 15)
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept oI public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad which
may be recognized in the Philippines provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada, released Richard Irom their
marriage Irom the standards oI merican law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. Pursuant to his
national law, Richard is no longer the husband oI
lice. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as lice`s husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. He is bound by the decision oI
his own country`s court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him and whose decision he does not
repudiate. Richard`s contention that under our laws,
lice is considered married to him cannot be just.

Take Note: Article 26, Par. 2, Family Code iI
alien spouse obtained the decree oI divorce, Filipino
spouse will have the right to remarry.

Q: 1uan and Maria would like to get married. 1he
problem is 1uan is in the !hilippines and Maria is
in Spain working. Maria is only 1 years old and
1uan is 21 years old. Maria learned that under
Spanish law, the marrying age for female is 14
years old and for male is 1 years old. Under the
Spanish law, marriage by proxy is allowed. 1uan
has no money to go in Spain. 1heir marriage (by
proxy) was then celebrated in Spain. Is the marriage
valid?
(BeIore answering, you are compelled to apply
rticle 15 Nationality Theory applies). Legal
capacity Ior as long as Maria is a Filipina, the
Family Code governs her. The marrying age here is
18 years old.

Regarding marriage by proxy up to now there are
conIlicting decisions. lternative answers
1. ProI. Sta. Maria Null and void but not on
the argument that under the Philippine law
during marriage ceremony they should be
physically present.
2. Considering marriage ceremony is merely
Iormal, applying rticle 17 lex loci
celebrationis (law oI the place where the
contract is celebrated). But this rticle is
conIined only to Iorms and solemnities
meaning extrinsic validity oI the contract, as
long as it is valid there and not prohibited
here, marriage by proxy is valid here. (What
is prohibited is incestuous marriage,
bigamous marriage xxx). rticle 17 does not
include intrinsic validity. rticle 17 applies
only to Iorms and solemnities.

Notes:
\ rticle 17 may be applied as a general rule.
Exception exterritoriality.
\ To answer connect Family Code to rticle 17 and
state authority.
\ II the problem is too general, make a qualiIication.
II intrinsic, apply rticle 15. II extrinsic, apply
rticle 17.

Q: Assuming the marriage is valid, 1uan fell in love
with another. Does Maria have the right to sue
1uan?
pply rticle 14. (Remember the case oI Mark
Jimenez and Rod Strunk. Mark extradition case.
Rod alleged crime was committed here in the
Philippines.) Territoriality theory applies.

Q: If a spouse married another in ongkong, may
you as the first spouse file a criminal case of bigamy
or a civil case here in the !hilippines?
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II criminal case, it cannot be Iiled here because
rticle 14 provides that penal laws are only applied
in crimes committed here in the Philippines.
Regarding the civil case, it will prosper because
rticle 15 provides liability Ior violation oI such.

Q: David married Chato in the !hilippines. A week
after David decided to go back to Saudi Arabia to
work. David fell in love with Ayce in Saudi. David
was able to get a certification capacitating him to
marry. 1hey got married. Chato learned of the
marriage. What are the possible cases?
(beIore answering, this requires you to apply
rticles 14 and 15. II criminal case, no choice but
Chato has to go to Saudi rabia and Iind out iI Saudi
will allow her to Iile a case Ior bigamy. II she cannot
Iile, she has to wait Ior the husband to go back here
together with the yce and continue to live together
and the case now is concubinage. II David was the
only one who came back, no crime or case to be Iiled.
Note that adultery and concubinage are not crimes
against the state, They are personal.

Notes:
\ rt. 17 reIers to extrinsic validity
\ rt. 15 reIers to intrinsic validity
\ rt. 16, par. 2 aIIirmation oI what contains in
rt. 15
\ II there are Ioreign places involved in the case,
what law should govern, just remember rticles 14 to
17 because you can apply them simultaneously. They
do not contradict each other.
\ Foreigner executing a will remember lex loci
celebrationis, national law, domiciliary law.

Q: Why is it that in intestate succession, national
law of the decedent is followed?
rt. 15 when it comes to Iamily right (right to
succession is a Iamily right) then it Iollows that
national law should govern.

IX. ARTICLE 16 - LAW GOVERNING REAL
PROPERTY

Note II the problem involves property, apply the lex
situs.

`G.R.: Lex rei sitae
` EXC: Intestate and testamentary succession
(a) Order oI succession
(b) mount oI successional right
(c) Intrinsic validity oI will (rt. 16)
(d) Legal capacity to succeed

Renvoi Doctrine / Transmission Theory
'reIerring back. Decedent is a national oI one
country and a domicile oI another. When the conIlict
rule oI the Iorum reIers a matter to a Ioreign law Ior
decision. (Bellis vs. Bellis)

Forum Non Conveniens a doctrine whereby a
court oI law having Iull jurisdiction over a case
brought in a proper venue or district declines to
determine the case on its merit because justice would
be better served by the trial over the case in another
jurisdiction.

Long - arm Statute reIers to authorized
substituted service.

Cases:

1. Miciano vs. Brimo, 1 Aovember 1927
Facts The partition oI the estate leIt by the deceased
Joseph Brimo is in question in this case. The judicial
administrator oI the estate Iiled a scheme oI partition.
ndre Brimo, one oI the brothers oI the deceased
opposed it. He contended that the partition in
question puts into eIIect the provisions oI Joseph
Brimo`s will (which states that Joseph`s will shall be
governed by Philippine laws) which are not in
accordance with the laws oI his Turkish nationality,
Ior which reason they are void as being in violation
oI rticle 10 (now rt. 16) oI the CC.

Issue W/N Philippine laws may govern the will oI
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish.

Held ndre did not prove that said testamentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish
laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence
showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter and
in the absence oI evidence oI such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those oI the Philippines.
There is no evidence in the record that the national
law oI the testator was violated in the testamentary
dispositions in question which not being contrary to
our laws must be complied with and executed.
ThereIore, the approval oI the scheme oI partition is
not erroneous.

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Regarding the exclusion oI ndre as legatee,
inasmuch as he is one oI the persons designated as
such in the will, which says 'xxx the institution oI
legatees in this will is conditional and the condition is
that the instituted legatees must respect the testator`s
will to distribute his property, not in accordance with
the laws oI his nationality but in accordance with the
laws oI the Philippines xxx. II this condition is
valid, any legatee who Iails to comply with the will
like ndre is prevented Irom receiving his legacy.
Said condition is void being contrary to law Ior
rticle 792 provides that impossible conditions shall
be considered as not imposed xxx Said condition is
contrary to law because it expressly ignores the
testator`s national law.

2. Bellis vs. Bellis, 1une 197
Facts mos Bellis was a citizen and resident oI
Texas at the time oI his death. BeIore he dies, he had
made 2 wills, one disposing oI his Texas properties,
the other disposing oI his Philippine properties. In
both wills, his recognized illegitimate children were
not given anything. Texas has no conIlicts rule (rule
oI Private International Law) governing successional
rights. Furthermore, under Texas law, there are no
compulsory heirs and thereIore no legitimes. The
illegitimate children opposed the wills on the ground
that they have been deprived oI their legitimes to
which they would be entitled, iI Philippine law were
to apply.

Issues (1) W/N the illegitimate children are entitled
to their legitimes. (2) W/N renvoi doctrine may be
applied in this case.

Held Where the parties call Ior the application oI the
Miciano case and the renvoi doctrine, the same
cannot be made because Iirst, the Miciano case
cannot apply since under the decedent`s national law
(Texas), the system oI legitimes doed not apply to
estate oI a citizen oI Texas. Second, the illegitimate
children cannot call Ior the application oI the renvoi
doctrine, there being no conIlict oI laws involved.

The renvoi doctrine usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national in one country and domiciled
in another. It does not apply to a case where the
decedent was a citizen oI Texas and was domiciled
therein at the time oI his death.

provision in a Ioreigner`s will that his properties
should be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not in accordance with his national law is
void, being contrary to rticle 15 oI the CC.

3. Aznar vs. Carcia, 31 1anuary 193
Facts Edward Christensen was a citizen oI U.S. and
a resident oI CaliIornia. Edward executed a will in
Manila bequeathing to Maria Lucy Christensen all his
income and property and to Maria Helen Christensen
(his acknowledged natural child) P3,600. Opposition
to the approval oI the project oI partition was Iiled by
Helen insoIar as it deprives her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child. The court below ruled
that as Edward was a citizen oI U.S. at the time oI his
death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity oI
the provisions in his will are to be governed by the
law oI CaliIornia, U.S.. Helen contended that
Philippine law should be applied

Issue W/N Philippine law should be applied in this
case.

Held Where the testator was a citizen oI CaliIornia
and domiciled in the Philippines, the amount oI
successional rights should be governed by his
national law. However, since the conIlict oI law rules
oI CaliIornia provides that in case oI citizens who are
residents oI another country, the law oI the country oI
domicile should apply, then Philippine law on
legitimes was applied. Hence, under Philippine laws,
the acknowledged natural daughter cannot be
deprived oI her legitime.

X. ARTICLE 17 - LAW GOVERNING
EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS,
WILLS, PUBLIC INSTRUMENTS.

`G.R. Lex loci celebrationis (Iorms and solemnities)
or locus regit actum.

Application of General Rule:
(1) rt. 815 wills made by Filipinos abroad may be
in the Iorm established by such country.
Exc:
(a) 2
nd
par, rt. 17 (diplomatic or consular
oIIicials)
(b) rticle 819 in relation to rt. 818 joint
wills executed abroad, not valid in the
Philippines
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(c) rt. 816 Will made by an alien abroad
maybe executed according to Iormalities
prescribed by law where he resides, his
country or what civil code prescribes.
(d) rt, 817 will made by an alien in the
Philippines executed in accordance with law
oI his country or law allowed by his country.

(2) rt. 26, Family Code marriages contracted by
Filipinos abroad in accordance with laws in Iorce in
the said country.
Exc.:
(a) rt. 35, par 1 - age
(b) rt. 35, par. 4 bigamous marriage
(c) rt. 35, par. 5 mistake oI identity
(d) rt. 35, par. 6 void under rt. 53
(e) rt. 36 psychological incapacity
(I) rt. 37 incestuous marriage
(g) rt. 38 void Ior reasons oI public policy


HUMAN RELATIONS

I. ARTICLE 19 - ABUSE OF RIGHT IS
ACTIONABLE

`G.R. Breach oI promise to marry, not actionable
(Gashem Shookat vs. C; Hermosisima vs. C)

`EXC. Breach oI promise to marry some act or
event civil action Ior damages (Pe vs. Pe; Wassmer
vs. Velez)

Cases:

1. Cashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA, 219 SCRA 115
Facts Marilou Gonzales Iiled a complaint Ior
damages against petitioner Ior the alleged violation oI
their argument to get married. Marilou alleges that
she is 22 years old and pretty lass oI good moral
character while petitioner is an Iranian. The latter
countered and proposed to marry her. Petitioner
Iorced her to live with him but petitioner`s attitude
towards her started to change, he maltreated and
threatened to kill her. Petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement.

Issue W/N a breach oI promise to marry is an
actionable wrong.

Held The existing rule is that a breach oI promise to
marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This
notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision,
rticle 21, which is designed to expand the concept
oI torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy Ior the untold number oI moral wrongs which
is impossible Ior human Ioresight to speciIically
enumerate and punish in the statute books.

In the light oI the above laudable purpose oI rt.
21, the SC held that where a man`s promise to marry
is in Iact the proximate cause oI the acceptance oI his
love by a woman and his representation to IulIill his
promise, thereaIter becomes the proximate cause oI
the giving herselI unto him in a sexual congress,
when in reality he had no intention oI marrying her,
and that the promise was only a subtle scheme to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, such would
justiIy the award oI damages pursuant to rt. 21, not
because oI such promise to marry but because oI the
Iraud and deceit behind it and the willIul injury to her
honor and reputation. Such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.

2. ermosisima vs. CA, 19 !IL 29
Facts Soledad Cagigas (complainant), Iiled a
complaint Ior the acknowledgment oI her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as natural child oI said petitioner, as
well as Ior support oI said chills and moral damages
Ior alleged breach oI promise. Petitioner admitted the
paternity oI the child and expressed willingness to
support the latter but denied having ever promised to
marry the complainant. Judgment was rendered
declaring Chris as the natural daughter oI the
deIendant and ordering deIendant to pay actual,
compensatory and moral damages.

Issue W/N moral damages are recoverable under our
laws Ior breach oI promise to marry.

Held It is the intent oI the Congress not to sanction
actions Ior breach oI promise to marry. However,
when the breach oI promise to marry has been
precipitated by seduction, moral damages may be
recovered.

There is no seduction in this case where the
woman was willing to have intimate relations with a
man. In such a case, the man cannot be said to be
morally guilty oI seduction.
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Where a woman, who was an insurance agent and
Iormer high school teacher, around 36 years oI age
and approximately 10 years older than the man
overwhelmed by her love Ior a man approximately 10
years younger than her, had intimate relations with
him, because she wanted to bind him by having a
Iruit oI their engagement even beIore they has the
beneIit oI clergy, it cannot be said that he is morally
guilty oI seduction.

3. !e vs. !e, 3 May 192
Facts married man (lIonso Pe), who was the
adopted son oI a relative oI a girl`s Iather and who
has the same Iamily name as the girl, became very
close to the girl and her Iamily. In 1952, the man
Irequented the house oI the girl (Lolita) on the pretext
oI desiring to teach her how to pray the rosary. The 2
eventually Iell in love. In 1957, the lIonso asked
Lolita to date him. Lolita came to him and never
came back. Lolita`s parents, brothers and sisters now
sue the deIendant under rticle 21.

Issue W/N the complaint is actionable.

HeldThe SC, applying rt. 21 ruled that indeed he, a
married man, has seduced Lolita through an
ingenious and tricky scheme to the extent oI making
her Iall in love with him. Verily, he has committed
and injury to Lolita`s Iamily in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy.

4. Wassmer vs. Jelez, 12 SCRA 48
Facts Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer,
Iollowing their mutual promise oI love, decided to
get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day.
On September 4, 1954, Velez leIt a note Ior his bride-
to-be stating that their wedding should be postponed
because the mother oI Francisco opposes it. The next
day, he sent another telegram telling Wassmer that
Velez will return soon. ThereaIter, Velez did not
appear nor was he heard Irom again. Wassmer sued
Velez Ior damages.

Issue W/N breach oI promise to marry is an
actionable wrong.

Held Mere breach oI promise to marry is not
actionable wrong, but to Iormally set a wedding and
go through all the preparations thereIore, only to
walk out oI it when the marriage is about to be
solemnized is quite diIIerent. Obviously, it is
contrary to good customs and the deIendant
consequently must be held answerable Ior damages in
accordance with rticle 21.
5. Sea Com vs. CA, 25 Aovember 1999
Facts Seacom is a corporation engaged in the
business oI selling and distributing agricultural
machinery, products and equipment. Seacom and J II
entered into a dealership agreement whereby Seacom
appointed the Iormer as exclusive dealer in the city
and province oI Iloilo and Capiz. In the course oI the
business relationship, JII allegedly incurred a balance
oI P18,843 Ior unpaid deliveries and Seacom brought
an action to recover said amount plus interest. JII
alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII contracted to sell
24 units oI power tillers to a group oI Iarmers but
Seacom taking advantage oI the said inIormation and
in bad Iaith, went directly to the Iarmers and dealt
with and sold 21 units thereby depriving JII oI
unrealized proIits.

Issue W/N Seacom was in bad Iaith.

Held Yes. The principle oI abuse oI rights under rt.
19 departs Irom the classical theory that 'he who uses
a right injures no one. The modern tendency is to
depart Irom the classical and traditional theory, and
to grant indemnity Ior damages in cases where there
is abuse oI rights even when the act is not illicit.

rticle 19 was intended to expand the concept oI
torts by granting adequate legal remedy Ior untold
number oI moral wrongs which is impossible Ior
human Ioresight to provide speciIically in statutory
law.

bsence oI good Iaith is essential to abuse oI
right. Good Iaith is an honest intention to abstain
Irom taking any conscientious advantage oI another.

The elements oI abuse oI rights under rt. 19, are
(1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad Iaith; (3) Ior the sole intent oI
prejudicing or injuring another.

Note legal right ceases to exist when the law
granting it has not been complied with.

. Metrobank vs. Wong, 2 1une 21
Facts Mindanao Grains (MG) applied Ior a credit
accommodation with Metrobank (MB) to Iinance its
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rice and corn warehousing business. s a security Ior
such credit accommodation, respondent executed a
REM in Iavor oI MB. Due to MG`s Iailure to pay the
obligation, MB extrajudicially Ioreclosed the
property. MG requested to postpone the scheduled
auction. MG paid P20,000 Ior the postponement oI
the auction sale. The same would be postponed Ior 60
days. Despite payment, the sheriII proceeded with the
auction sale. new TCT was issued in the name oI
MB. Respondent unaware oI the Ioregoing
developments applied Ior a credit accommodation
with Producers Bank using as security the same TCT
which contains the mortgage to MB. It was only then
that he learned that his property was already
Ioreclosed.
Issue W/N MB was in bad Iaith.

Held bank must exercise its right to Ioreclose a
mortgage upon the mortgagor`s Iailure to pay his
obligation in accordance with the clear mandate oI
the law granting such right. Each and every
requirement oI the law must be complied with, lest,
the valid exercise oI the right would end.

It must be remembered that the exercise oI a right
ends when the right disappears and it disappears
when it is abused especially to prejudice others.

7. Alegui vs. CA, March 22
Facts residential apartment located in
Mandaluyong City was Iormerly owned by SeraIia
real estate, a company owned by the Barettos. For
more than 20 years, unit no. 15 was leased by SeraIia
to Sps. Genguyon. In a letter, the tenants were
inIormed that the assets oI SeraIia had already been
transIerred to .B. Baretto Enterprises. pprehensive
that they were about to be ejected, the tenants Iormed
the an organization called the Baretto partment
Tenants ssociation. They elected rlegui as VP and
Lu as auditor. Believing that negotiations were still
on going, the Genguyons were surprised to learn that
the unit they were leasing had already been sold to
Lu. Lu then sold it to rlegui.

Issue W/N Lu and rlegui were in bad Iaith.

Held While constructive trusts arising out oI Iraud or
duress be an actionable wrong, SC declared herein
that constructive trust may also arise out oI abuse oI
conIidence which is now also be an actionable
wrong. Such that where oIIicers oI an association oI
tenants were tasked to negotiate the purchase oI units
leased by tenant members, acted to purchase the
units on themselves instead, violated the trust and
conIidence reposed on them. The acts oI Lu and
rlegui directly violate the principles enunciated in
rt. 19.

8. Ramos vs. CA, 11 April 22
Facts Ramos was advised to undergo an operation
Ior the removal oI a stone in her gall bladder. By 730
.M., Erlinda was already being prepared Ior
operation. She was accompanied by Cruz, her sister-
in-law who was the Dean oI the College oI Nursing
at Capitol Medical Center. Her surgeon, Dr. Hosaka,
arrived late (1215 P.M.). Dr. Gutierrez
(anesthesiologist) improperly intubated Erlinda. Dr.
Hosaka instructed another doctor to intubate the
patient. Erlinda was placed in a trendelenburg
position a position where the head oI the patient is
placed in a position lower than her Ieet. The
operation did not go well. Erlinda stayed in the ICU
Ior a month until she died. Petitioners Iiled with the
RTC a civil case Ior damages.

Issue W/N private respondents were liable Ior
damages.

Held Dr. Hosaka`s irresponsible conduct oI arriving
very late Ior the scheduled operation oI Erlinda is
violative not only oI his duty as a physician but also
oI rticle 19.

9. Lui vs. Matillano, 27 May 24
Facts Lariosa was employed as laborer in a store
owned by Ben and Kiao. djacent to the said store
was another store owned by Kiao`s son, Lui. On
October 1988, Lariosa was taken ill and was
permitted to take the day oII. He went to the house oI
his aunt (Matillano). Lariosa reported Ior work the
day aIter but Kiao told him that his employment was
terminated. He was able to collect only his
backwages. He withdrew money Irom his bank
account and bought a cassette and sunglasses. Lariosa
was accused oI robbery he allegedly stole money
Irom Ben. Lui mauled Lariosa and Iorced the latter to
admit the crime. Lui together with Pat. Leo Rojas
went to the house oI Sps. Matillano and took pants,
Iloor mat and ladies shoes. They also went to
Lariosa`s girlIriend and Iorcibly took the cassette and
sunglasses. Lariosa executed an uncounseled
conIession where he stated that he stole P40,00 to
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buy appliances, cassette etc. Lariosa sued Lui but the
case was dismissed. Sps. Matillano sued Lui Ior
damages.

Issue W/N petitioners were liable Ior damages.

Held Under rticles 19 and 32 in relation to rticle
21, the dismissal oI the complaint against petitioners
are oI no relevance to the civil complaint Ior damages
Iiled by the injured party against them. The action Ior
damages may still proceed despite the dismissal oI
the criminal and administrative actions.

1. MWSS vs. Act 1heater, 17 1une 24
Facts 4 employees oI ct Theater were apprehended
by the member oI the police Iorce Ior allegedly
tampering water meter. On account oI the incident,
the respondent`s water service connection was cut
oII. ct Theater Iiled a civil case against MWSS
alleging that the latter acted arbitrarily in cutting oII
the respondent`s water service connection without
prior notice. Due to lack oI water, the health and
sanitation oI respondent`s surroundings and patrons
were aIIected.

Issue W/N the act oI MWSS in cutting oII the
respondent`s water service connection without prior
notice is prejudicial to the latter justiIying the award
oI damages under rticle 19.

Held right is a power, privilege or immunity
guaranteed under the constitution, statute or
decisional law, or recognized as a result oI long
usage, constitutive oI a legally enIorceable claim oI
one person against that other.

However, the exercise oI right is not without
limitations. Having the right should not be conIused
with the manner by which such right to be exercised.
rticle 19 oI the CC precisely sets the norms Ior the
exercise oI one`s rights which is that it must be
exercised in a manner in conIormity with justice and
give every person what is due him.

11. Aikko otel vs. Reyes, 28 February 25
Facts Iormal party was held at Nikko Hotel. The
party was Ior invitation only thrown Ior the hotel`s
manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person
(Roberto Reyes a.k.a. may Bisaya) who was clearly
uninvited by the celebrant. The organizer, Ms. Lim,
approached Reyes and told him to leave. ccording
to Ms. Lim, she politely approached Reyes.
ccording to Reyes, Ms. Lim humiliated him. Due to
his traumatic experience, he Iiled a case Ior damages
against Nikko hotel and Lim. Nikko hotel contended
that pursuant to the doctrine oI volenti non Iit injuria,
they cannot be made liable Ior damages as Reyes
assumed the risk oI being asked to leave as he was a
gate crasher.

Issue W/N Nikko hotel should be held liable Ior
damages.

Held The doctrine cannot be used as a shield against
an actionable wrong since the parties herein, although
having a right to ask a gate crasher Irom leaving the
hotel was still under the obligation (as required by
rticles 19 and 21) to treat such person Iairly in order
not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.

rticle19 known to contain the principle oI abuse
oI rights is not a panacea Ior all human hurts and
social grievances. The object oI this article is to set
standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise oI one`s right but also in the perIormance oI
one`s duties. When this article is violated, an action
Ior damages is proper under rticles 20 and 21. The
common theme under rticles 19 and 21 is that the
act complained oI must be intentional.

Note Reyes did not win in this case Ior pieces oI
evidence were presented that the hotel did not abuse
its right.

Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria reIers to selI-
inIlicted injury, which precludes the recovery oI
damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily
exposed himselI to danger, even iI he is not negligent
in doing so.

Damnum Absque Injuria he who uses a right
injure no one.

Q: What is the reason behind Damnum Absque
Injuria?
For as long as the person is exercising his right
provided under rticle 19, he cannot be held liable.
But iI there is an abuse oI the right, he can now be
held liable. Example Nuisance (can be abated
judicially or extrajudicially)

II. ARTICLE 20 - CONTRARY TO LAW
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Francisco vs. CA, 29 Aovember 1999
Facts . Francisco Realty oI which dalia Francisco
is the president entered into a land development and
construction contract with Herby Construction
represented by its president Jaime Ong, pursuant to a
housing project Iinanced by GSIS. Herby Iiled a
complaint against Francisco and GSIS Ior the
collection oI unpaid balance under the project. They
entered into a compromise agreement. In 1979, aIter
an examination oI the records oI the GSIS, Ong
discovered that Diaz and Francisco had executed 7
checks drawn against Insular Bank and payable to
Herby. Ong claims that these checks were never
delivered to Herby. Upon inquiry with Diaz, Ong
learned that the GSIS gave Francisco the custody oI
the checks. Francisco Iorged the signature oI Ong to
make it appear that Herby had indorsed the checks.

Issue W/N petitioners are liable Ior damages Ior
Iorging the signature oI Ong.

Held Forging the signature oI another without his
knowledge or consent Ior the purpose oI indorsing a
check and depositing the same under the Iorger`s
account is contrary to law. Under the law, every
person who contrary to law, willIully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemniIy the latter
Ior the same.

III. ARTICLE 21 - CONTRARY TO MORALS,
GOOD CUSTOMS, PUBLIC POLICY

Cases:

1. Arafiles vs. !hilippine 1ournalists, 25 March
24
Facts On pril 14, 1987, while Morales, a reporter
oI People`s Journal was at the WPD, Ermelita, an
employee oI National Institute oI tmospheric
Sciences (NIS), lodged a complaint against
petitioner (NIS director) Ior Iorcible abduction with
rape and Iorcible abduction with attempted rape.
Morales thereupon personally interviewed Ermelita
Ior the purpose oI reporting the same in the next issue
oI People`s Journal. He tried to contract raIiles to
veriIy Ermelita`s story but Iailed. Morales` report
appeared as a headline on People`s Journal. Petitioner
instituted a complaint Ior damages arising thereIrom.

Issue W/N raIiles may recover damages.

Held In order that a discreditable imputation to a
public oIIicial be actionable, it must either be a Ialse
allegation oI Iact or a comment based on Ialse
supposition. II the comment is an expression oI
opinion based on established Iacts then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken as
long as it might be reasonably inIerred Irom the Iacts.
Here, the girl-victim gave her statement in the
presence oI the media who subsequently interviewed
her.

In actions Ior damages Ior libel, it is axiomatic
that the published work alleged contain libelous
material must be examined and viewed as a whole.
The presentation oI the news item which is the
subject oI petitioner`s complaint may have been in a
sensational manner but it is not illegal per se. The
newspapers must be given such leeway and tolerance
to enable them to courageously perIorm their
important role in our democracy.

2. Buag vs. CA, 1 1uly 1992
Facts Bunag brought Cirilo to a motel where she was
raped. Bunag promised to marry Cirilo. They lived
together as husband and wiIe Ior 21 days and Iiled
their respective applications Ior a marriage license.
Iter leaving Cirilo, Bunag Iiled an aIIidavit
withdrawing his application Ior marriage license.
complaint Ior damages Ior alleged breach oI promise
to marry was Iiled by Cirilo against Bunag.

Issue W/N Cirilo is entitled to damages.

Held The acts oI petitioner irremissibly constitute
acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are
grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions
which indisputably warrant and abundantly justiIy
the award oI moral and exemplary damages pursuant
to rticle 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10 oI
rt. 2219, 2229 and 2234.

IV. ARTICLE 22 - ACCION IN REM VERSO -
NO MISTAKE

Principle of Unjust Enrichment applied in rticle
22 (acquisition oI something) and rticle 23, Civil
Code (one beneIited thru act or event causing damage
to another).

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Q: What is the unjust enrichment provision in
property?
rticle 719 regardless oI the amount, you are
required to give to the public oIIicer and proper
notice is given to the public. It is only aIter the lapse
oI 6 months when the Iinder could acquire ownership
over it.

Provisions on builder, planter sower any
expenses which involve necessary or useIul expenses
oI the builder, planter or sower, he has the right to
retain it in his possession until being reimbursed by
the owner, otherwise, tantamount to unjust
enrichment.

Negotiorum Gestio (rt. 2144) anyone who
voluntarily takes charge oI the agency or
management oI the business oI property oI another
without any knowledge oI the latter shall continue
doing the same until the termination oI the neglect or
abandonment oI said property.

Solutio Indebiti the juridical relation which is
created when something is received when there is no
right to demand and it was unduly delivered through
mistake, obligation to return it arises.

Cases:

1. .L. Carlos vs. Marina, 29 1anuary 24
Facts Marina properties entered into a contract
(construction oI Phase 3 oI Marina Bay Homes) with
H.L. Carlos Ior 365 days. H.L. Carlos instituted a
case Ior sum oI money against Marina seeking the
payment oI P14,000,000.

Issues: (1) W/N there was unjust enrichment; (2)
W/N H.L. Carlos may recover a reasonable value oI
the services it rendered.

Held There is unjust enrichment under rticle 22
when a person is unjustly beneIited and such beneIit
is derived at the expense oI or with damages to
another. Under the principle oI quantum meruit, a
contractor is allowed to recover the reasonable value
oI the thing or service rendered despite the lack oI
written contract in order to avoid unjust enrichment.
Quantum meruit means that in action Ior work and
labor, payment shall be made in such amount as the
plaintiII reasonably deserves. To deny payment Ior a
building almost completed and already occupied
would be to permit unjust enrichment at the expense
oI the contractor.

2. Aguilar vs. CA, 7 1uly 2
Facts guilar entered into a lease agreement with
Sps. Juguilon. Petitioner paid advance rentals. To
comply with their obligations, the spouses vacated
the second Iloor but they moved back because the
spouses` own building is under construction. guilar
instituted an action Ior speciIic perIormance against
the spouses. It prayed that the spouses be ordered to
deliver to him the entire property which was the
subject matter oI the lease contract.

Issue W/N there was unjust enrichment.

Held It is but Iair that the spouses made to pay a Iair
rental value Ior the use and occupation oI a portion oI
the leased premises Irom the time they have returned
to said building. It would be unjust enrichment Ior
the private respondents to demand rent Ior the entire
leased premises when they themselves are at the
same time occupying a portion thereoI.

V. ARTICLE 24 - COURT`S PROTECTION OF
THE UNDERDOG

Parens Patriae sovereign power oI the state in
saIeguarding persons under disability.

VI. ARTICLE 29 - PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT / PREPONDERANCE
OF EVIDENCE; ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL
ACTION / RELIEF FROM CIVIL LIABILITY

EXC. Criminal case does not exist.

VII. INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
(ARTICLE 31) CIVIL OBLIGATION NOT
ARISING FROM A FELONY

Independent Civil Action one brought distinctly
and separately Irom the criminal case (Sec. 3 Rule
111, ROC)

(A) ART. 32 - BREACH OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER
RIGHTS
(B) ART. 33 - DEFAMATION, FRAUD,
PHYSICAL IN1URIES
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(C) ART. 34 - REFUSAL OR FAILURE OF
CITY / MUNICIPAL POLICE TO GIVE
PROTECTION
(D) ART. 2177 - QUASI DELICT OR CULPA
- AQUILIANA

Sarmiento & Limpin vs. CA, 27 December 22
Facts Limpin and postol doing business under the
name oI Davao Libra Industrial Sales Iiled an
application Ior an irrevocable domestic letter oI credit
with ssociated Bank Ior the amount oI P495K in
Iavor oI LS Parts Hardware Ior the purchase oI scrap
irons. The Bank issued a trust receipt. The deIendants
Limpin and postol Iailed to comply with their
undertaking under the trust receipt. DeIendants claim
that they cannot be held liable as the scrap iron were
lost when the vessel transporting them sunk. RTC
and C ruled against petitioners. Petitioners now
contends that C had departed Irom the applicable
basic principle and procedure to the case embodying
ssociated Bank`s claim Ior the civil liability oI
P495K not having been expressly reserved by it, has
been not only impliedly but in Iact expressly
instituted in criminal case.

the applicable basic principle and procedure to the
case embodying ssociated Bank`s claim Ior the civil
liability oI P495K not having been expressly reserved
by it, has been not only impliedly but in Iact
expressly instituted in criminal case.

Issue W/N the civil liability is deemed instituted

Held While a reading oI Rule 111 shows that the
oIIended party is required to make a reservation oI
his right to institute a separate civil action,
jurisprudence instructs that such reservation may not
necessarily be express but may be implied which may
be inIerred not only Irom the acts oI the oIIended
party but also Irom acts other than those oI the latter.

Nothing in the records at hand shows that private
respondent ever attempted to enIorce its right to
recover civil liability during the prosecution oI the
criminal action against petitioners.

VIII. ARTICLE 30 - CIVIL OBLIGATIONS
ARISING FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSE.

ARTICLE 35 - RESERVATION OF CIVIL
ACTION SHOULD BE MADE BEFORE THE
PROSECUTION PRESENTS EVIDENCE

(A) ARTICLE 100, RPC, PERSON
CRIMINALLY LIABLE IS ALSO CIVILLY
LIABLE

G.R.: Extinction oI penal action does not carry
extinction oI civil action (Sec. 2, Rule 111, ROC)

Reason: Quantum oI evidence in civil case =
criminal case

EXC. II acquittal is based on a Iinding that the
accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to
him (Western vs. Salas)

Western vs. Salas, 21 August 1997
Held Where the acquittal is on a Iinding that the
deIendant did not commit the crime complained oI, a
civil action 'ex-delicto cannot prosper. cquittal in
a criminal action bars the civil action arising
thereIrom where the judgment oI acquittal holds that
the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed
to him.

(B) EFFECT OF DEATH OF THE ACCUSED
TO THE CIVIL LIABILITY (SEC. 4, RULE 111,
ROC)

Cases:

1. !eople vs. Sendaydiego, 2 1anuary 1978
Held Death oI the deIendant during the appeal or
beIore the judgment oI conviction by the lower court
become Iinal and executory extinguished his criminal
liability but his civil liability survives.
(BNDONED!)

2. !eople vs. Bayotas, 2 September 1994
Held Death oI the accused pending oI his conviction
extinguished his criminal liability as well as his civil
liability based solely thereon. This means that iI the
civil action is one called ex delicto or arising Irom
the crime, the death oI the accused extinguishes both
the criminal and civil aspect oI the case.

However, a civil action not arising Irom the crime
such as those arising Irom other sources oI obligation
which is not a crime (such as law, contracts, quasi-
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contracts and delicts) the claim Ior civil liability
survives notwithstanding the death oI the accused.

Where that civil action survives, an action Ior
recovery Irom such may be pursued only by way oI
Iiling a separate civil action. This separate civil
action may be enIorced either against the executor,
administrator oI the estate oI the accused depending
on the source oI the obligation.

Prescription will not lie against the Iiling oI a
separate civil action when the oIIended party opted to
institute the civil action simultaneously with the
criminal action and then later, the civil action was
extinguished together with the criminal action aIter
the death oI the accused.

The statute oI limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency oI the
criminal case and conIormably with provisions oI
rticle 1155 oI the CC, that should avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation oI right by
prescription.

(C) SEC. 1, RULE 111, ROC - UNDER THE 1998
RULES ON CRIMPRO INSTITUTION OF
CIVIL ACTION WITH CRIMINAL ACTION
WAS EXTENDED TO ARTICLES 32, 33, 34
AND 2177 OF THE CC. UNDER THE 2000
REVISED RULES ON CRIMPRO, ONLY CIVIL
LIABILITY ARISING FROM OFFENSE
CHARGED IS DEEMED INSTITUTED WITH
THE CRIMINAL CASE

G.R. Civil liability arising Irom the oIIense charged
is deemed instituted with the criminal action.

EXC.:
(1) OIIended party waives civil action
(2) OIIended party reserves the right to institute
it separately
(3) Civil action instituted beIore criminal action.

Note:
The reservation oI the right to institute separately the
civil action shall be made beIore the prosecution
starts presenting its evidence and under
circumstances aIIording the oIIended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

Sarmiento vs. CA, 27 December 22
Held The reservation to Iile a separate civil action
may not be necessarily be express but may be implied
which may be inIerred not only Irom the acts oI the
oIIended party.

Failure oI the court to make any pronouncement,
Iavorable or unIavorable as to the civil liability oI the
accused amounts to a reservation oI the right to have
the civil liability litigated and determined in a
separate action, Ior nowhere in the ROC is it
provided that iI the court Iails to determine the civil
liability, it becomes no longer enIorceable.

The appearance oI the oIIended party in the
criminal case through a private prosecutor may not
per se be considered either as an implied election to
have his claim Ior damages determined in said
proceedings or a waiver oI his right to have it
determined separately. He must actually or actively
intervene in the criminal proceedings as to leave no
doubt with respect to his intention to press a claim Ior
damages in the same action.

In the present case, the withdrawal oI appearance
oI oIIended party`s counsel in the early stage oI the
criminal proceedings is a clear intention oI not
submitting its claim Ior civil liability against the
deIendant in the criminal case.

Note:
Due to the dual concept oI civil liability, more than
one civil action to recover civil liability arising Irom
the same act or omission is allowed, only limitation is
against double jeopardy.

Cases:
1. Ace aulers vs. CA, 23 August 2
Held In negligence cases the oIIended party has the
option between an action Ior enIorcement oI civil
liability based on culpa criminal under rticle 100 oI
the RPC and an action Ior recovery oI damages based
on culpa aquiliana under rticle 2177 oI the CC.

rticle 2177 however, precludes recovery oI
damages twice Ior the same negligent act or
omission. Where accused has been criminally
charged (granting recoverable indemnity) and in the
separate civil action, damages has been awarded, the
oIIended party may only be entitled to the bigger
award oI the two, iI the amounts vary.

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Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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2. Maccay vs. Sps. Aobela, 31 March 25
Held court trying a criminal case cannot grant the
award oI damages in Iavor oI the accused. The court
trying a criminal case should limit itselI to the
criminal and civil liability oI the accused. lso, under
Sec. 1(a), ROC, the accused cannot Iile a counter-
claim, cross-claim or 3
rd
party complaint, the subject
matter thereoI should be litigated in a separate civil
action.

Discussion of Articles 29 to 35

2 Groups:
1. First group rticles 29, 30 and 35. With
reservation. Relate these articles to rticle 100 oI the
RPC and Sec. 1, Rule 111, ROC.
2. Second group rticles 31-34 and 2176. Even
without reservation.

Q: Why grouped?
because in the Iirst group, a person criminally
liable is also civilly liable. May arise Irom tort.

Q: What are the sources of obligation?
law, contract, quasi-contract, delict, quasi-delict.

Examples
Slapping incident in public can be a slander by deed.
2 liabilities may arise, one civil and one criminal.

Vehicular accident and the passengers died. Civil
case damages. Criminal case reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide.

Q: What are the possible sources?
Quasi delict important element is negligence.
Even without reservation, civil case may be Iiled.
However, iI pursuing based on delict, reservation
should be made.

X. ARTICLE 36 - PRE1UDICIAL QUESTION.
SEE SECTIONS 6 AND 7, RULE 111, ROC

Prejudicial Question one which must be decided
Iirst beIore a criminal action may be instituted or may
proceed because a decision therein is vital to the
judgment in the criminal case.

Elements of Prejudicial Question: (memorize)
(1) Civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action
(2) Resolution oI such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
(3) Jurisdiction to try said issue must be lodged
in another tribunal
(4) Civil action must be Iiled Iirst beIore the
criminal action

O the issue in the criminal case is entirely
diIIerent in the civil case but the issue in the
latter is intimately related with the Iormer

Tip: In the Bar Exam

1) Immediately identiIy what are the 2 cases
involve. s a rule 1 civil 1 criminal case
2) The civil case should be Iiled Iirst.
a. II the criminal case preceded the
civil and it appeared that the
accused Iiled the civil case, it
would show that he Iiled it to
beneIit him, iI the accuse Iiled a
motion to suspend the criminal
case, base on the existence oI a PQ.
3) pursuant to elements, go back to criminal
case and determine how is the crime
committed (elements)
4) go back to the civil case, iI the civil case
would be decided in Iavor oI the accused,
would it have any eIIect as to the elements
oI crime, iI yes, there is PQ, iI no eIIect no
PQ

Example:

1) Declaration oI Nullity oI Marriage (Civil)
Bigamy (Criminal Case)

2) ssuming that the Nullity is Iiled ahead,
then go to elements oI Bigamy.

3) Elements oI Bigamy Bigamy is committed
by any married person (a) Iirst valid
marriage (b) not yet legally dissolve during
the existence oI the Iirst marriage (c) accuse
contracted second marriage (d) which has all
the essential and Iormal requisites oI a
marriage

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Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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Effect of First Marriage as a Nullity
Q: If the first marriage is a nullity, will it affect the
Bigamy case; does it mean that the accused did not
commit Bigamy?
No, when the accused contracted the 2
nd
marriage,
the Iirst marriage is still existing (one oI the
elements) so iI later on it will be declared void, it
will not negate the Iact that at the time he contracted
the 2
nd
marriage, there already is bigamy since at the
time oI 2
nd
Marriage, the 1
st
marriage is yet to be
declared as annulled

ThereIore all elements oI Bigamy is present, the
nullity oI the 1
st
marriage has no eIIect even iI later
on declare void.

Effect of Second Marriage as a Nullity
II the ground oI declaration oI nullity oI 2
nd

marriage is absence oI Marriage License, iI the 2
nd

marriage is declared void, will it aIIect element oI
Bigamy (Element number 4), that Ior bigamy to exist
2
nd
marriage should also be valid, iI there is no
Marriage License, then the 4
th
element is not present
hence there is PQ.

Q: If the ground is psychological incapacity, will the
answer be the same?
No, Psychological Incapacity is not an essential or
Iormal requisite oI Marriage, although is a ground Ior
declaration oI Nullity oI marriage

It would not have any eIIect in Bigamy case, even
iI later annulled because at the time 2
nd
marriage was
contracted, it has all element oI a valid marriage, it
just happen that psychological incapacity is a ground
at present under the Family Code and such ground
has no retroactive eIIect as to the decisions oI
Nullity, why? II the ground is PI, children born
beIore the declaration oI nullity will remain
legitimate, but iI the ground is lack oI essential or
Iormal requisites oI marriage, children although born
beIore the declaration oI nullity they will be
considered illegitimate, because the decision can be
given a retroactive application.

Example: Annulment of Contract on the ground
of fraud (Civil). BP 22 (Criminal case)

(2) Granting the civil case was Iiled ahead oI
criminal case.
(3) BP 22 is violated by issuing a check which
has not been suIIiciently Iunded.
(4) iI the contract will be annulled on the ground oI
Iraud, will it aIIect the decision in BP 22, NO,
because, in BP 22, regardless oI the reason Ior the
bouncing oI the check, what is material is that upon
issuing, there is no Iund Irom which is may be drawn,
that is why there is no deIense in BP 22.

Q: Is the civil case in this instance a PQ in BP 22?
No, because even iI the contract is subsequently
annulled the violation oI the law has nothing to do
with whether or not the contract was later on
annulled.

Ex: Estafa (Criminal Case) Annulment of
Contract (Civil).

Q: What is one of the important element in the
commission of Estafa?
Fraud, so iI in the annulment case the existence oI
Iraud had been established and the contract was
annulled, it is then possible that it would have an
eIIect upon the existence oI estaIa because iI it is
prove that the complainant in the criminal case has
commited Iraud Ior the annulment oI contract, then it
Iollows that the deIendant in criminal case did not
commit estaIa. Here there is a PQ.

1udge 1amin, 1992
SC gave an exceptional case, that even iI there are
2 civil case, there can be a PQ, this is an isolated
case. Because as a general rule, Ior a PQ to exist
there must be 1 civil and 1 criminal. In this case, it
involves a cadastral case and ejectment case, and the
court ruled that even iI there are 2 civil cases there is
a PQ, because in this case, deIendant in the ejectment
case is claiming that the property were he is in
possession belongs to him. II the cadastral
proceeding will push through and will be rendered in
his Iavor, then it will Iollow that he is not an illegal
settler, that the property really belongs to him.

Umikting vs. CA, 27
Here it involves an intra-corporate issue. There is
an authority given by the corporation to a third
person to act in behalI oI the corp. The other case is
an estaIa case. SC held that the resolution oI the
issue raise in the intra-corporate dispute will
determine the guilt or innocence oI respondent Ior the
crime oI estaIa Iiled against him. One oI the element
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oI the crime oI estaIa is with abuse oI conIidence
under rt 315 par 1(b), is a demand made by the
oIIended party to the oIIender. Under the
circumstance since the allege oIIended party, the
validity oI the demand to deliver the subject vehicle
rest upon the authority oI the person making such
demand. Here this is a special kind oI estaIa, where
one oI the elements is the authority oI the person who
made the demand, it just that in the civil case the
issue is whether or not there was really an authority
given to the person who made the demand. So iI it
can be shown that there was really an authority then
it Iollows that there is no estaIa committed. Here
there is also a PQ.

PERSONS

I. CLASSIFICATION OF PERSONS
() Natural Person
(B) Juridical Person

Q: What if in the problem, the question would be
multiple choice and you will be ask to identify who
is a juridical person.

Note Co-ownership does not have a juridical
personality, a partnership does.

a. Co-ownership
b. Partnership
c. Credit Union
d. Department oI Justice
e. OIIice oI the Ombudsman
I. Local Gov`t oI Kalookan

II. ARTICLE 37 - 1URIDICAL CAPACITY /
CAPACITY TO ACT

Juridical person, has its own juridical personality.

Juridical Capacity is diIIerent Irom capacity to act.

1uridical Capacity Iitness to be the subject oI legal
relations. Presupposes personality and is inseparable
Irom it.

Capacity to Act power to do or carry out acts that
will have juridical eIIect. Can be acquired or may be
lost by a person in varying degrees.

Q: 1rue or False, a person that has juridical
capacity has capacity to act?
False, because even iI one has juridical capacity,
there maybe certain restriction in ones capacity to
act)

Example Buboy and Bell has juridical capacity but
they do not have the capacity to take the BR exam,
iI their educational attainment restrict their capacity,
because they may be college graduate but not a law
graduate.

Q: 1rue of False: person with a capacity to act, has
a juridical capacity?
True, because iI one has the capacity to act it
Iollows that the said person can enter into any
juridical relationship, who may be a natural or
juridical person that has a juridical capacity.

III. ARTICLES 38 AND 39 - RESTRICTIONS
ON CAPACITY TO ACT

Incapacity is the restriction oI a person`s capacity
to act.

rt 38-39, restriction on capactity to act , we do not
apply the Expression Unios Rule. There are ceratin
resriction which might not appear in the enumeration
but may still be considered as a restriction to once
capacity to act. So iI one desires to practice the
proIession oI law in the Philippines, but he is not a
Filipino citizen, his nationality would be considered
as a restriction on his capacity to practice law in the
Phil.

2 Classes of Restriction / Incapacity:
(1) Natural incapacity
(a) Due to lack oI development minority
(b) Due to disease insanity, deaI-mute,
impotency

(2) Civil incapacity
(a) Due to crime civil interdiction
(b) Due to public policy Iamily relations,
domicile,
Nationality, insolvency, absence

IV. ARTICLE 40 - CIVIL PERSONALITY
ARTICLE 41

Article 40 and 41
Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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Birth determines Personality. But a conceived
child should be considered born Ior all purposes
Iavorable to it.

De 1esus vs. Syquia & Celuz, 58 !IL 88
The case oI De Jesus has something to do with a
donation to a conceived child. In the latter case, it
involves a claim Ior damages Ior an aborted child. In
the Iormer, the donation as considered as valid and
binding to the conceive child, even iI the child was
not yet born. Why? Take note oI the phrase, shall be
considered born (even iI still conceive), Ior purposes
Iavorable to it. The word Iavorable is important,
because even iI the child still inside the womb, there
is an act perIormed by a third person in Iavor oI the
conceive child, but that act is not Iavorable to the
conceived child, the provisional personality being
given to the conceived child will not be applicable.
rt 40, apply only iI the act perIormed by the third
person is Iavorable. Ex in the will oI the biological
Iather, it allege that he is acknowledging the child
being conceive by his longtime live in partner Maria,
he will donate his house and lot to the baby being
conceived by Maria. The act oI acknowledgment and
donation is both Iavorable.

But what iI the biological Iather would state
that all his obligation will also be assumed by my
child with Maria, the same can no longer be
considered as Iavorable, hence the provisional
personality oI the child will no longer be applicable
to the conceive child

That presumptive personality should become
conclusive later on and the law gives the requirement
Ior it to be conclusive and the law requires that 'iI the
child had an intra-uterine liIe oI less that 7 months, it
should be alive Ior at least 24 hours Irom the time oI
its complete delivery, but iI the child has intra-uterine
liIe oI 7 months or more, it need not survive Ior 24
hrs. what is important is that it is alive Irom the time
it is completely delivered.

Going back to the case oI baby oI Maria, can
she claim the inheritance or demand Ior support aIter
the birth oI the child, yes, provided that, applying rt
41, 'iI the child is less than 7 month, it survived Ior
24 hrs, because iI it did not survive even iI there is a
donation in a will, the child did not acquire juridical
capacity, hence legally speaking has never become a
natural person. But iI the child survives Ior 24 hrs,
then aIter lapse oI 24 hrs he died, can Maria still
recover the donation? YES, because the 24 hrs
requirement has been complied with, assuming it had
less than 7 months oI intra-uterine liIe, thus legally
speaking when it was born it was considered as a
natural person, the mother being a compulsory claim,
has the right to claim the donation given to the child.

But iI the child is 7 months or more, then
aIter delivery it cried, then died, Maria, may still get
the donation because the child need not live Ior at
least 24 hrs.

ssuming the problem given is so general,
and it did not state how old is the child when it was
delivered, you must make a qualiIication, provided
that the act is involve is Iavorable to the conceive
child, otherwise no need to make a qualiIication, in
that sense, the conceived child never had a
presumptive personality to speak oI.

Presumptive personality pertains only to a
conceived child. It does not apply to corporation
about to be registered, the law is very clear, it
pertains only to a conceived child.

Limjoco vs. Estate of Fragante, 1948
SC held that the estate oI the deceased is a
juridical person. So that in succession although the
deIinition oI succession includes transIer oI rights
property and obligation, strictly speaking the
obligation is not being transIerred. Why? Because,
prior to partition, the creditors will be the to be
settled Iirst, they can sue the estate because it is a
considered a juridical person.

ARTICLE 43 - PRESUMPTION ON
SURVIVORSHIP / SIMULTANEOUS DEATH.
FACTS ARE UNKNOWN - APPLIES
WHENEVER PARTIES WHO DIED ARE
CALLED TO SUCCEED EACH OTHER.
OTHERWISE, SEC. 3 PAR 11, RULE 131 OF
THE ROC ON DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS
APPLIES.

Note: See Rule 131, Sec. 5 (KK), ROC

Q: Assuming that 1uan and maria got drowned in a
flood cause by overflowing of the dam, who was the
first one who perished? Will article 43 be applied?
Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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No, even iI they have been living together as
husband and wiIe Ior more that 10 years, but not
legally married, he cannot apply rticle 43 because
this article will only apply iI people involve is called
to succeed to each other, that why this should be
connected to the rules on succession as to who is
considered as a compulsory heir. II live in partner,
no application. Presumption on survivorship
involves person who died are called to succeed to
each other legally.

Q: What if in the will the name is written as
voluntary heir?
Instituted heir but not compulsory heir, so still not
applicable.

Rule 131 Sec 3 and 5
Gives the presumption as to who died ahead oI
whom. In the bar exam, stick to this presumption.


Domicile and Residence

In Civil Law
Domicile there is an element oI permanence, place
where one intends to return

Residence temporary in character

In Political Law (Election Law in particular)
The distinction has disappeared.

FAMILY CODE - EFFECTIVITY August 3, 1988

Under rticle 256, the Family Code may be given
retroactive eIIect, provided that it will not aIIect
vested rights.

One might encounter a problem in the bar exam
wherein, iI the date is indicated, that serves a warning
whether the Iamily code or the civil code would
apply. II there is no date, then the new civil code
would apply. Sometimes the situation would Iall
under the phrase 'provided that it will not aIIect
vested rights Case oI Ty vs. C.

Marriage

Article 1 (memorize)

Q: It says there that a contract of marriage is a
special contract. Why special?
Because in an ordinary contract, there is a meeting
oI the mind but at the same time parties have the
discretion to enter into any kind oI stipulation. But in
a contract oI marriage parties do not have the
discretion to enter into any kind oI stipulation.

Acebedo vs. Aroceros
n instrument entitled kasunduan executed by the
husband and the wiIe was declared null and void Ior
being against public policy.

Parties are not allowed to stipulate Ior themselves
their separation and allow the other party to marry oI
the other in the absence oI judicial intervention. That
is an agreement that is against the law. the deIinition
oI rticle 1 (FC), is explicit, its only during an ante-
nuptial agreement that a party can enter into a
stipulation as to what kind oI property relationship
would govern the properties that they would acquire
during their marriage.

But when it comes to right and obligations, they
are imposed by law not by the parties to a marriage.

Q: A, felt like he likes more to play with dolls than
robots, so after taking the bar, A went to ongkong
and when he return back in the !hilippines, he
completely change. A married B (a guy also), after
several attempt they were not blessed with a child,
later B found out that A is a guy. Is the marriage
considered valid? Would the marriage be voidable
on the ground of fraud? Can that be considered
fraud in the first place?
Take note that the enumeration oI Iraud in the FC
is exclusive, so cannot Iall under Fraud? But can it
be use as a ground Ior declaration oI nullity oI
marriage? YES, on the ground oI legal capacity ---
marriage is a union between a man and a woman.

Silverio vs. Republic
Has something to do with a guy who later on
became a woman. He had a sexual transplant. He
Iiled a petition Ior correction oI entry in his birth
certiIicate he wants to change his name and his sex to
a Iemale. SC held that entry in the birth certiIicate
should reIer to data at the time oI birth not to any
event which would later transpire. The trial judge
erroneously grants the petition to change the sex oI
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the petitioner, because at the time oI his birth
petitioner is a man not a woman.

There is a case, where a girl, who had a sexual
transplant and change her genital organ into a penis.
However until now she remains to have 2 ovaries and
1 uterus, so notwithstanding her transplant, they
cannot together with her wiIe, produce a child. So
they decided to have an artiIicial insemination,
wherein she herselI got impregnated. II in case, a
problem in the bar would be ask whether the
marriage is valid, just stick with rticle 1, a marriage
is a union between a man and a woman. Marriage
with the same sex cannot be considered valid here in
the Phil, unless the deIinition would be amended.

Another Component of Legal Capacity - Age
Under the Spanish Civil Code, the marrying age is
still 14 Ior Iemale, 16 Ior male. Under Canon Law,
14 Ior Iemale 16 Ior male. ssuming that one
decided to solemnized the marriage oI below 18 since
that is the marrying age under the Canon Law,
remember that Canon Law would always submit to
Civil Law.

!arental Consent between the ages - 18 to 21,
absence oI which will only makes the marriage
voidable.

!arental Advice between the ages - 21 to 25,
absence oI which would not make the validity oI
marriage.

Q: Is there a contradiction as to age of 18-21 /21 -
25?
No, what is the reason? Because in application
Ior marriage, one cannot consider himselI to be
exactly 21, remember rt 13, 1 day is equals to 24
hours, and in every second that passes, one gets
older, and that`s the reason why the law states 18-21 /
21-25. That is why in our birth certiIicate we could
see the hour and time oI our birth, this means Ior
instance that we are 21 years oI age at that particular
hour and minute and aIter that lapse, we get older by
another second or minute Ior that matter.

Carcia Recio vs. Recio
The absence oI certiIicate oI legal capacity is
merely an irregularity in complying with the Iormal
requirement oI procuring a marriage. n irregularity
which will not aIIect the validity oI the marriage.

Why? Because it`s diIIerent iI what is absent is
the marriage license not the certiIicate oI legal
capacity. It is diIIerent however, iI one oI the
contracting parties is a Ioreigner, because a Ioreigner
who contracts marriage here in the Philippines
would not be able to obtain a marriage license. So in
lieu oI the marriage license, the Ioreigner would have
to secure a certiIicate Irom his embassy that he has
the capacity to contract a marriage. The same thing
with Filipino who would contract marriage abroad,
they did not have to secure the license Irom the Phil,
the certiIicate coming Irom the Phil Embassy suIIice.

Consent Freely Given
nother essential requisite oI marriage, absence oI
which would make the marriage void ab intio. (Vices
oI Consent)

Note: iI in the bar the question has something to do
with the vices oI consent in marriage, answer the
question in relation to contracts in general

Legal Capacity and Consent Ireely given are the
essential elements. rticle 15 in relation to rticle
17, the Iormer speaks oI nationality theory, iI one is
going to marry abroad, one has to make sure, that the
essential requirements as to Legal Capacity e.g. age
and sex, and consent Ireely given, the law that
governs should be the Family Code Ior Filipino
where ever they may be Iound.

s to the Iormal requisites, the authority oI the
solemnizing oIIicer, marriage license, marriage
ceremony, connecting with article 17 oI the Civil
Code, lex loci celebrationis, extrinsic elements. So iI
one would marry abroad, iI in that country, marriage
license is not an element, the marriage would be valid
here in the Phil. pplying rticle 17 oI the Civil
Code, in relation to the Family Code. Because it
does not Iall under any oI the prohibited marriages, in
the same way when we speak oI marriage by Proxy.

Authority of Solemnizing Officer
Memorize: persons who are given the authority to
solemnize marriage.

Q: Mayor of Manila, celebrated the marriage
August 2, 1998, is the marriage valid?
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Remember, iI there`s a date, it serves a warning
because, the law that is applicable would either be the
Civil Code or the Family Code.

Yes, under the Civil Code the Mayor is one oI
those persons authorize to celebrate marriage. That
authority is however taken away Irom him by the
Family Code.

Q: What if the marriage is celebrated on 1an. 1,
1991, is the marriage valid?
No, remember that the Local Government Code
took eIIect one year aIter its promulgation on Jan. 1,
1991, hence eIIective on Jan 1, 1992, that is the only
time when the authority oI the Mayor was given back
to solemnize marriage.

Time frame: ugust 3 1988 Dec 31, 1991, a
Mayor has yet no authority to solemnize marriage.

Q: What if the parties believe in good faith that the
Mayor had the authority to solemnize in marriage,
is the marriage valid?
No, ignorance oI the law excuses no one in
compliance therewith. in the Family Code, when we
reIer to circumstance oI Good Faith, it should reIer to
a mistake oI Fact not a mistake oI law. Remember
that as long as the state has enacted a law, even iI
one did not read it, ignorance thereto excuses no one
Irom complying therewith, and since under the
Family Code, a Mayor is not given the authority to
solemnized marriage, good Iaith oI the contracting
parties would not make the marriage valid.

Laxamana vs. Baltazar, 92 !IL 32
Q: What if the Jice-Mayor solemnized the marriage
is it valid?
II the Vice-Mayor is acting as a Mayor the
marriage is valid. So make a qualiIication. So
otherwise, iI he is acting in his capacity as a Vice-
Mayor, the marriage is null and void. Because a Vice
mayor is not given the authority under the Local
Government Code to solemnized Marriage.

Q: 1ustice Zenaida Elipanio, celebrated the
marriage of A and B, is the marriage valid?
No, take note that Justice Zenaida Elipanio is not
one oI the justices oI the Regular Court, but only oI
the OIIice oI the court dministrator, but only with a
title oI the justice. Even iI she assume the position oI
the justice, she is not one oI those authorize to
solemnize marriage because only the justices oI the
SC, C, CT, Sandiganbayan, RTC, which are
allowed to solemnized marriage.

nother example, the Secretary oI DOJ, we
address him as Justice Raul Gonzales but he is not a
justice or even a member oI the Judiciary but he
holds a title oI a justice.

Likewise Labor rbiters, are address as judge,
because their position is co-equal with judges oI
RTC, however they still do not Iall within the
enumeration and thereIore any marriage celebrated
by them is null and void.

Note: so Iind out who are incumbent at present and
as to known Mayor oI Metropolitan Manila.

Aavarro vs. 1udge Domagtoy, 19 1uly 199
Involves a judge solemnizing a marriage outside
his territorial jurisdiction. ccording to this ruling,
that it is simply considered as an irregularity.

Q: What if it is the Mayor who celebrates marriage
outside his territorial jurisdiction?
pply by analogy the ruling in Navarro, because
so Iar there is yet no Supreme Court Ruling regarding
that matter.

(Mam`s opinon she does not agree with the
ruling, it would have been better daw iI the reason
given by the ponente is that the parties believe in
Good Faith, that a judge can celebrate marriage even
outside his territorial jurisdiction, because the
jurisdiction oI a judge can only be known by lawyers
or law students somehow. But Ior purposes oI the
bar, stick with ruling in Navarro case, that it is
merely considered as an irregularity.

Priest, rabbi, imam, ministers of the Church

Example Mike Velarde oI El Shaddai does not have
the authority to solemnize marriage. He is still a
catholic. El Shaddai, is recognized group oI the
Roman Catholic and that he is not a clergy merely
that head oI such group. Hence a marriage
solemnized by him is null and void because he is not
a priest

Ship Captain, Airplane chief, military
commander, general consul, vice consul
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Immediately connect to marriage under
exceptional character, why? Because this people are
given the authority in cases where time is oI the
essence. One oI the parties is in articulo mortis,
which is the common Iactor. For them to be given
the authority, make sure that the elements are all
present, otherwise iI one is absent ignorance oI the
law excuses no one Irom compliance therewith, good
Iaith oI the contracting parties would not make the
marriage valid.

Example marriage celebrated by a ship captain not
on voyage between parties where in not one oI them
is at the point oI death, void. So with a vice consul
who return here in the Phil, and solemnized a
marriage here, is void.
s in the case oI the Military Commander,
take note that there must be no Chaplain, iI there is
then it is the chaplain that is given the authority not
the Military Commander.

Q: What if in the airplane, some one is in articulo
mortis and there is a priest, who should solemnized?
. Priest, under any circumstance has the authority to
solemnized Ior as long as they have such license to
celebrate marriage, the presence oI the ship captain or
airship captain does not remove such authority Irom
the priest. The authority oI the captains are invoke
only incases where there are no other person
authorize by law to solemnized marriage are present.

Q: Marriage solemnized by a consul between one of
the parties is a Filipino and foreigner is this valid?
2 OPTIONS
(1) not valid, Iocus on the provision oI the Iamily
code, that a consul is only given authority to
solemnized in the place where he is appointed as
a consul and between Filipino citizen
(2) valid, iI the argument is base under article 17
lex loci celebracionis. Remember that the
authority to solemnized marriage is merely a
Iormal element, and under rticle 17, lex loci
celebracionis, reIerring to extrinsic elements,
which is also known as a Iormal element, iI in
the country where the marriage was celebrated,
and the consul is assigned, and the law oI the
country gives the consul the authority to
solemnized such marriage, iI it is valid in that
country and it not prohibited here, it is valid in
the Philippines.

Good Faith reIers only to Mistake oI Fact and not
Law because oI the presence oI rticle 3, ignorance
oI the law excuse no one.

Q: A, an ex-seminarian, frustrated seminarian,
volunteered as a sacristan, one day, a marriage was
about to be celebrated, the pries was not available so
he ask A to call another priest. A pretended to be
assistant priest and celebrated the marriage, is the
marriage valid?
YES, remember that a priest is one oI those
authorized to solemnized marriage, so iI the parties
believe in good Iaith that he is the priest, Valid, this
involves a mistake oI Iact.
But iI in the problem Justice Raul Gonzales
celebrated the marriage, it is not valid, because he is
not authorized by law to do so. Even iI the parties
are in good Iaith, but since Justice Gonzales is not
one oI those enumerated under the law that has the
authority to solemnized marriage, the marriage is not
valid. (Mistake oI law)

Marriage License

Note How to compute the liIe existence oI Marriage
license. It should be 120 days counted Irom date oI
issuance. Why? Even iI a document is presented by
the contracting parties beIore the solemnizing oIIicer,
and the marriage is celebrated and it would appear
that the 120 days had lapse, the marriage is void ab
initio, ground lack oI marriage license. There is no
extension oI such liIetime.

It is advisable to Iile application at least 2 or
3 weeks beIore the intended day oI the marriage,
because the posting is only Ior 10 days.

In cases where the 120 days had lapse and a
marriage has been contracted, it is void, so iI the civil
registrar reIuse to record the same because oI such
Iact, then it would be better Ior the parties to secure
Iirst another marriage license and then Ior the priest
to solemnized the marriage again even iI the canon
law prohibits another solemnization between the
same parties, the civil code must be upheld.

utomatic upon lapse oI 120 days, marriage
license no longer eIIective

Case Cosca v. Palaypayon
Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio

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The judge, solemnize a marriage without a
marriage license, what the parties merely did is that
they executed an aIIidavit oI cohabitation. Judge
Iailed to realized, that, though the parties had been
cohabiting Ior 6 years, at the time they did so, they
were still minors. But in this case, the marriage was
not declared void since the same was not the issue at
bar. The judge was reprimanded

Following the doctrine in Minal, the
impediment should not be existing Ior at least 5
years, it should be continuous.

Case: Seguia v. Cardenas
The certiIication issued by the LCR, must
categorically state, that the particular entry, document
could not be Iound in their oIIice despite diligent
search

In this case, there was no search conducted,
the individual involve merely presumed that there`s
no such document that exist.

So in the case oI marriage license to be as
prooI, ask in the LCR a certiIication, since in the
marriage contract itselI, it states there the marriage
license no, date oI issue.

So to determine iI there really is a marriage
license, go to the LCR that issued the marriage
license. So iI there is no such marriage license in
their Iile list, then ask Ior certiIication providing that
LCR exerted eIIort to look Ior the marriage license

Note Memorize Marriage oI Exceptional Character

Question: Why are they called marriages oI
Exceptional Character? Because, the law considers
the validity oI the marriage even iI it was celebrated
without a marriage license.

1. Articulo mortis

Case oI Soriano aIter the celebration oI the marriage
without marriage license between one oI the parties
who was really sick which later on survived, will that
aIIect the validity oI the marriage? NO,
notwithstanding the survival oI the party at the point
oI death, it would not make the marriage void.

What iI celebrated between a living and a
decease, is the marriage valid? it must be
considered that a decease has no longer juridical
capacity and no longer consider a natural person.
dead person cannot give a consent Ireely given.

2. In remote place

Reason contracting parties cannot go to the oIIice oI
LCR, to Iile an application oI marriage license. But
what is ironical in this case is that it is the duty oI the
solemnizing oIIicer, that he executes an aIIidavit
stating that beIore he solemnize the marriage he
makes sure to Iind out whether the contracting parties
have the capacity, which aIIidavit should be attach to
the marriage contract which should be Iiled beIore
the LCR where the marriage took place.

Ironic because oI the priest has the access to
the LCR, then how come that the parties could claim
that they are in the remote place

3. Marriage in Articulo Mortis in a Ship or a
Plane

Connect this to people who had the special
authority under exceptional cases to solemnized the
marriage (irplane ChieI and a Ship Captain)

4. Marriage in Articulo Mortis within the zone of
Military Operation.

Ex was diagnosed to have only 10 more days to
live, can a marriage be validly celebrated iI a person
was diagnosed to die aIter 10 days, can we consider
him in articulo mortis? NO, because, Ior a person to
be considered in articulo mortis, consider the actual
status oI the person at the time the marriage is
actually being celebrated. The Iact that he was given
only 10 days to live as presumed by the doctor,
cannot deemed to be one in a condition oI articulo
mortis.

5. Ethnic Cultural Communities

Examples iIugao, aetas, kalinga


6. Cohabitation For 5 Years
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Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio

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To be considered as marriage under exceptional
character, the impediment should not be existing
exclusively, continuously, Ior 5 years.

Impediment this is construed in its general term,
embracing all kinds oI impediment including
minority.

Example: both at 1 years old the parties started
cohabiting with one another for 5 years, can their
marriage be considered under exceptional character
as cohabitation for 5 years? Case oI Borja-Manzano
v. Judge Sanchez, an administrative matter, where the
SC simply stated, the circumstances which should be
considered in an aIIidavit oI cohabitation, and one oI
them 'there is no impediment existing at the time the
marriage is celebrated. Does this mean that the
Borja Doctrine replaced the doctrine in Ninal Case?
(Opinion oI maam it did not abandon), but what
should be considered is the underlying reason why
cohabitation Ior 5 years is deemed marriage under
exceptional character, which is.. The Philippine law
does not accept a common law relationship, but
would like to protect the rights oI common law
spouses, (that`s why the prohibition Ior donation
between husband and wiIe is also applicable to
them,.. The Philippine law does not accept a
common law relationship, but would like to protect
the rights oI common law spouses, (that`s why the
prohibition Ior donation between husband and wiIe is
also applicable to them, rt 147 and 148, also tells us
the property relation oI common law spouse, which is
Co-ownership, however despite all oI this the Family
Code would not tolerate any kind oI illicit
relationship, so iI we would conclude that Manzano
abandon the ruling in Ninal, it would deIeat the
purpose oI cohabitation.

This one is considered as marriage under
exceptional character (reason) to encourage common
law spouses to legitimize their union.

Q: What if the question is that A and B for the first
2 years had been living together for with
impediment but for the last 3 years until the
celebration of their marriage, there was no
impediment, how would you answer this?

(Option 1) stick to the ruling in Ninal, always
invoking the underlying reason behind the provision.

(Option 2) invoke the Manzano ruling, where in iI
we would try to analyze it, the statement was more oI
an obiter, because it was not the main issue, it merely
reIers that one oI the things included in the aIIidavit
oI cohabitation, and one oI them is that there is no
impediment existing at the time oI solemnization oI
marriage.

Q: If the solemnizing officer learned that a day
before the marriage, the parties just applied for a
marriage license, does the officer have the right to
refuse to solemnize their marriage?
No, because, they are not duty bound to determine
whether license has been really issued. II application
oI marriage license was made on the same day the
marriage was solemnize, there was merely an
irregularity and the person involved in the irregularity
would be sanctioned Ior that, because there should be
a 10 day publication requirement beIore a marriage
license can be issued.

Marriage Ceremony

Q: If the Rector of San Sebastian celebrates the
marriage in a place outside the church, is the
marriage valid?
Yes, even iI the Family Code states, inside the
private chamber or church, when it comes to the
place where the marriage would be held, it can be
change, upon the request oI the contracting parties

When it comes to location the place can be
change, but what is importance in marriage ceremony
is that 'the parties personally in Iront oI the oIIicer
and exchange their vows or I dos. In that sense, a
marriage is a consensual contract base on perIection.

The absence oI a marriage contract will not negate
the existence oI a celebrated marriage. In the absence
oI the witnesses, who are the sponsor, the
solemnizing oIIicer may testiIy that the marriage was
celebrated, notwithstanding that one oI the parties
should hide the marriage contract.

In remedial law, text massaging is already
accepted as evidence. 1he question is if the
marriage was celebrated through the use of an
internet "international conference or video
conference is the marriage valid? t the time the
Iamily Code was enacted, there is yet to cellphones
and internet, applying the rule on statutory
Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
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construction, in the interpretation oI the provision,
one rule is that take into consideration the
circumstances when the law was enacted. When the
Family Code was enacted, the Iramers included the
marriage ceremony, personal appearance and
declaration oI consent, beIore the solemnizing
oIIicer, that means that they should be physically
present in Iront oI the solemnizing oIIicer.

Loria Case
There was Iailure on the part oI one oI the parties
to aIIix their signature on the marriage contract, does
it mean that there is no marriage celebrated? NO,
marriage is a consensual contract not a Iormal
contract, even iI it is not signed it will not negate the
celebration oI a valid marriage.

Intestate Estate of Del Cado
Under Rule 131, Sec. 3 par. 9 (a) one oI the
disputable presumptions unless contradicted, 'man
and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wiIe entered into a lawIul oI contract oI marriage,
absence oI marriage contract is not a prooI that no
marriage took place, once presumption arises other
evidence may be presented.

There is always a presumption that when a
marriage is celebrated it is presumed to be valid
unless declare otherwise.

s we see it, witnesses are not part oI requisites 2
witnesses; the authority oI solemnizing oIIicer is a
Iorma requisite, if the marriage is celebrated without
witnesses is this valid? YES, because it is neither a
Iormal requisite nor an essential requisite. We cannot
say that it Iorms part oI the marriage ceremony
because, marriage ceremony reIers only to the
physical presence oI the parties beIore the
solemnizing oIIicer at the time oI the exchange oI
their I do`s. bsence oI witnesses is merely an
irregularity which will not aIIect the validity oI the
marriage.

Eugenio vs. Jelez
The controversy involves the corpse oI the
decease, as between the legitimate and common law
spouse. SC held the word spouse in article 144 oI the
Civil Code; reIer to a lawIully wedded spouse.
Philippine law does not recognize common law
marriage.

Marriage Celebrated Abroad
Connect rticle 15, 17, rt 35 parg 1,4,5 6, 36,
37, 28.

Lex Loci Celebrationis iI it is valid there, it is
valid here and it is not prohibited here, it will be valid
in the Philippines, provided that it only involves as to
the Iormal requisites (authority oI oIIicer, marriage
license and marriage ceremony)

But iI it involves legal capacity, consent Ireely
given, iI it valid there not here, it will not be valid in
the Philippines.
Example II a Filipino married to same sex abroad,
that is an essential element 'legal capacity we do not
apply rt 17 but rt 15 oI the Civil Code in relation
to the Family Code.

Note: II it involves the issue oI validity oI marriage,
enumerate the essential and Iormal requisites. II
there is the presence oI all the essential and Iormal
requisites and it does not Iall under the prohibited
marriage, it is valid.

Iter considering iI there is a ground oI nullity, go
now to annulment. BeIore doing so, remember the
prescriptive period oI annulment, iI it has prescribed
there is no need to go thru the grounds oI annulment.
Prescriptive period, usually 5 years except, insanity
and lack oI parental consent, the prescriptive period
oI the parent is diIIerent but Ior the parties it is still 5
years.

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

A. To Live Together (Art. 68)

Illusorio vs. Illusorio-Buildner
The parties at the time that the case was Iiled and
the case was decided the husband was still alive, and
it was the wiIe who Iile a case Ior mandatory
injunction against the husband.

It must be remembered, that a marriage is a
special contract, and what makes it special is that the
parties cannot stipulate on the terms and conditions
and unlike in an ordinary contract, wherein incase
there is a breach oI the terms, the remedy would be
speciIic perIormance or rescission. Here, iI one oI the
spouses would not like to live with other spouse, is it
proper to file a petition for mandatory injunction,
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asking the court to compel the husband directing
him to live with the wife? No, SC held that the living
together is something personal between the husband
and the wiIe, its also the same thing with respect to
other obligation, (to remain IaithIul, mutual respect),
this obligation although imposed by law, the court
cannot intervene and compel the other spouse to be
bound by the same. The case was dismissed. No
mandatory injunction can be Iiled in order to compel
the spouse to live with one another.

Q: Does it mean that in this case if the other spouse
refuse, is there no other recourse?
. NO, there are sanctions Ior this breach oI
obligation.

(1) The one who leaves the conjugal dwelling
shall not be entitled Ior support
(2) ggrieved party may apply Ior receivership,
authority with sole administrator oI the
conjugal partnership or absolute community
(3) File a petition Ior separation, or dissolution
or conjugal partnership or community
property.

Arroyo vs. Jasques de Arroyo
Here the SC gave an exception, when the spouse
will be allowed not to continue living with the other
spouse.

In this case, every time the husband would have a
sexual intercourse with his wiIe, he would demand
barbaric means oI having sex.

II there is already a physical violence involve, the
law allows the spouse to leave the conjugal dwelling
and that would not amount to abandonment..

In this case, this abandonment would not
constitute as a ground Ior legal separation, only when
there is a bad Iaith in the abandonment which is a
ground. In this case, SC allows it as an excuse Ior
the wiIe not IulIill her obligation to live with his
husband

Even in the Family Code rt 69, as when the
spouses do not agree where to live, then the court
would intervene, but in reality the Family court
would still throw the issue back at the parties because
it is a personal decision on their part.

Case when one is allowed to live separately Irom the
spouse
(1) One should live abroad in the practice oI
proIession / compelling reason
(2) Marital Rape

B. Mutual Love, Respect and Fidelity

Sanction for Breach:
1. Ground Ior Legal Separation
Under the 1950 Civil Code, there is only 2
grounds, attempt against the liIe and adultery and
concubinage. Now, rt. 55 (8), FC 'Sexual
InIidelity or perversion.

This is Iavorable to women, because it is easier a
woman Ior adultery and diIIicult Ior a man to be
convicted oI concubinage.

2. Incapacity to Succeed

3. Disinheritance

4. pply to court Ior RelieI (rt 72, FC) reIers Ior
damages.


C. Mutual Help and Support
In relation to support, the support should not only
be limited to Iinancial support, but also taking care oI
the Iamily.

!elayo vs. Lauron
Here, the wiIe, became pregnant and it was the in-
laws who accompanied her to the hospital, and the
husband was not there. The in-laws were asked to
pay Ior the medical bill which was reIuse. SC said,
do not have the obligation to pay Ior the hospital bill
but it is the husband. Spouses are the Iirst in the list
who have the obligation to give support.

D. 1oint Management of the Household

1ader Manalo vs. Sps. Camaisa
This one should be connected with the property
relationship oI the spouse, iI the property relationship
is one oI conjugal partnership or absolute community
and there is disposition in the property that Iorms part
thereoI, under the FC the requirement is that there
must be a written consent oI the other spouse.
bsence oI which, then the sale would be void.
Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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Note / tips: that it is possible in the bar a date might
be given. Remember the eIIectivity oI the FC is
ugust 3, 1988. Why? II the transaction took place
beIore the eIIectivity oI the Family Code, and there is
no written consent, what is the status oI the contract
oI sale? Under the 1950 Civil Code, the contract oI
sale is merely voidable not void ab initio as when it
happen aIter the eIIectivity oI FC.

ReIer to Civil code rt 166, compare to provision
oI the Family Code as to the disposition oI property
that Iorms part oI the CP or C, and which is stated
in this ruling.

E. Right to Exercise Legitimate Profession
There is no need Ior consent. Spouse not in
agreement oI the proIession may object thereto only
on valid serious and moral grounds.

Ayala Investment vs. CA
Here, it should still be connected with the issue oI
property relationship, because it is a question oI, iI
one oI the spouses wanted to obtain a loan,
Q: Is there a need to secure first the consent of the
other spouse?
No, the written consent only involves the
disposition oI property not when in cases oI securing
a loan. Then iI this loan would redound to the beneIit
oI the Iamily, then the creditor could seek relieI Irom
the CP or C, in this case iI the CP or C would not
be oblige to pay the creditor it would amount to
unjust enrichment. It is the creditors burden to prove
that the same redounded to the beneIit oI the Iamily.
That is the reason why at present, it is their practice
that in securing a loan the other spouse is also
required to aIIix his signature although the same is
not required by law.

TITLE V
THE FAMILY


Q: Who are the members of the family? (Memorize)

Art. 150. Family relations include those
(1) Between husband and wiIe;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) mong brothers and sisters, whether oI the Iull or
halI-blood.

Reason: Knowledge oI the members oI the Iamily
will help you answer the question whether or not the
Iamily home is exempted Irom attachment. Under the
Constitution, the State would like to protect the
interest oI the members oI the Iamily by making sure
that the Iamily has a place where they can stay so in
relation to Iamily home, the Iamily home is generally
exempted Irom attachment provided that only
members oI the Iamily are the one actually in
possession oI the Iamily home.

Q: Is sister-in-law or daughter-in-law member of
family?
SC ruled NO! So iI sila lang ang nakitira sa Iamily
home pedeng iattach..

Q: Is Caregiver or yaya member of family?
Kahit na sa Filipino setting we do not consider a
yaya an ordinary yaya but treat them as member oI
the Iamily. BUT remember that the enumeration
under the FC is EXCLUSIVE..expressio unius
rule..iI it is not included in the enumeration, it is
deemed excluded..thereIore iI none oI them is in
possession oI the Iamily home..it is subject Ior
attachment..

EARNEST EFFORT TO COMPROMISE
Art. 151. No suit between members oI the same
Iamily shall prosper unless it should appear Irom the
veriIied complaint or petition that earnest eIIorts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have Iailed. II it is shown that no such eIIorts
were in Iact made, the same case must be dismissed.

This rules shall not apply to cases which may not
be the subject oI compromise under the Civil Code.

Now connect it to your remedial law..this reIers to
cases involving members oI the Iamily and SC said
that beIore the court can acquire jurisdiction over it
there should be a prooI that earnest eIIort to
compromise was entered into..or the parties tried to
compromise..ang problema nga lang in reality and
based on experience iI it is conIlict between members
oI the Iamily, they seldom compromise..although that
is a requirement under remedial law and even under
the FC..

Alvarez vs. Ramirez Marital DisqualiIication Rule
(MDR). Sa remedial law..di ka pede maging witness
kc asawa mo un..pedeng maging Iavorable kc sa
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kanya..SC ruled that the marital disqualiIication rule
is applicable only iI walang strained relationship
between the husband and the wiIe.

But what happened in this case? sinunog ng
lalaki ung bahay ng kapatid nya na alam nya na ung
asawa nya nasa loob ng bahay..SC ruled that it is
obvious..strained na ung relationship..gusto ng
ihawin ng asawa ung babae..bakit mo pa iaapply ung
earnest eIIort?!? Eh papatayin na ung babae..kaya
tayo may marital disqualiIication rule pare di
mastrain ung relationship..eh kung strain na talaga
bkit pa iaapply ang MDR..

iyas Saving
SC ruled in relation to earnest eIIort to
compromise that will only be applicable iI the parties
involved in the case are the members oI the Iamily..iI
there is already a stranger or a third person who is
involved in the case this earnest eIIort to compromise
is not anymore applicable..

Q: Why?
kc kawawa naman ung third person.di ba kapag
sinabi nating earnest eIIort to
compromise..madedelay ang lititgation..kay why mo
hahayaang madelay ang litigation just to give the
members oI the Iamily to compromise at the expense
oI third person..

Martinez vs. Martinez
SC ruled that the phrase 'members oI the Iamily
must be construed in relation to RT. 150 oI the FC

rt. 150. Family relations include those
(1) Between husband and wiIe;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Between ascendants and descendants;
(4) mong brothers and sisters, whether oI the Iull or
halI-blood.

BUT a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included
in the enumeration.

Santos vs. Santos
Q: Kpag walang earnest effort to compromise, if
there is no proof, what will the court do?
The court will have to dismiss the case.

Q: What happened in this case?
Dito ang nangyari ininvoke nya ung Iailure to
compromise dun sa action to revive judgment..isnt in
your remedial law, you are given a period oI 5 years
on which to execute the judgment otherwise you Iile
an action to revive the judgment..ang ginawa dito,
action to revive na..so para mprevent ang action Ior
revival, niraise nya ang issue na walang earnest eIIort
to compromise..

SC ruled that it is not applicable to an action
revive judgment.. that earnest eIIort to compromise
can only applicable in an original action but not in an
action to revive judgment..

FAMILY HOME (FH)

*EXCEPTION FROM ATTACHMENT will only
apply iI members oI the Iamily are the ones in
possession oI the Iamily home. ThereIore, iI none oI
the Iamily members is staying in the Iamily home, it
will be then be anymore exempted Irom attachment

This is one provision in the FC that could NOT BE
GIVEN RETROCTIVE PLLICTION.

Q: Why?
Under the 1950 CC, beIore a house and lot can be
considered as a FH, there is a need Ior a judicial or
extrajudicial constitution, this is not automatic..under
the FC, its automatic..in other words, Ior as long as
the house and lot belongs to one or both oI the
spouses and members oI the Iamily are staying there
without any act, automatically it is deemed instituted
as a FH

Q: Kung kinasal na ang magulang natin tapos
walang ginawang steps before para maging F sya,
assuming na under 195CC ung marriage, tapos
dahil effective na ngayon ang FC, may the FC
regarding constitution of the F be now given
retroactive application?
IT DEPENDS. Whether or not there was a loan
obtained beIore the eIIectivity oI the FC. Take note
oI RT 256FC 'this code shall be given retroactive
application provided that it will not affect vested
right. ThereIore, iI a loan was already obtained
beIore the eIIectivity oI the FC by any oI the spouses
then this provision regarding the constitution oI the
FH under the FC cannot be given retroactive
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application because creditors have already acquired
a vested right on the property of the spouses..

OPINION NI MM That is why in the problem,
too general..no indication whether there is a loan
obtained or not. I will SUGGEST, you make a
qualiIication provided that we are talking oI a
situation wherein the spouse got married beIore the
eIIectivity oI the FC. Kapag ung problem, nakasulat
naman na kinasal aIter the eIIectivity oI the FC, no
need to qualiIy because it is automatic without
judicial or extrajudicial constitution. PROVIDED
that the house and lot belongs to anyone or both
spouses..

Q: !ampagulo.. Si 1uan at Maria nagpakasal after
the effectivity of the FC, Aagupahahan..1988..after
1yrs dun pa rin sila nakatira..Can that apartment
be considered as a F?
No, one requirement is that it should be owned by
one or both oI the spouses.. that is the reason why it
is exempted Irom attachment.. to protect the interest
oI the members oI the Iamily..

!atricio vs. Lario III
The FH deemed constituted Irom the time it is
occupied as a Iamily residence. Occupancy oI the
Iamily oI the FH either by the owner or by any oI its
beneIiciaries must be actual. Something real.
ctually existing. Not merely possible. Not
constructive possession. Connect it to your property,
isn`t possession can be actual or constructive
possession. So here Ior it to be protected Irom
exemption. It must be actual not constructive
possession and it should be occupied by the
members oI the Iamily as enumerated under the FC.

Note: rt. 153. The Iamily home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot Irom the time it is
occupied as a Iamily residence. From the time oI its
constitution and so long as any oI its beneIiciaries
actually resides therein, the Iamily home continues to
be such and is exempt Irom execution, Iorced sale or
attachment except as hereinaIter provided and to the
extent oI the value allowed by law.

LIFE EXISTENCE
Note: Art. 159. The Iamily home shall continue
despite the death oI one or both spouses or oI the
unmarried head oI the Iamily Ior a period oI ten years
or Ior as long as there is a minor beneIiciary, and the
heirs cannot partition the same unless the court Iinds
compelling reasons thereIor. This rule shall apply
regardless oI whoever owns the property or
constituted the Iamily home.

Q: !ano na kapag namatay?
It will continue Ior period oI 10yrs Irom the death
oI one oI the spouses or Ior as long as there is a
minor child..a minor beneIiciary oI the FH..

Q: Kapag namatay ung magasawa, ang naiwanang
anak ay ung 1yr old..how long?
More than 10yrs pa.. 'Ior as long as there is a
minor child..in this case, till magreach sya ng 18yrs
old tsaka lang magteterminate ang existence ng FH..

NOT EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION
Note: rt. 155. The Iamily home shall be exempt
Irom execution, Iorced sale or attachment except
(1) For nonpayment oI taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution oI the
Iamily home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises
beIore or aIter such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
service or Iurnished material Ior the construction oI
the building.

(1) Taxes under this provision reIer only to
real estate taxes.

Q: What if di ka nagbayad ng income tax?
Wala syang kinalaman dito..thereIore, exempted
pa rin Irom attachment

OPINION NI MM Very ironical kc sabi ng State..
I will protect the Iamily..pero sabi ng State, iI di ka
nagbayad ng real property tax, the State I will not
protect you..I will get your FH..(',)

(2) debts incurred prior to the constitution oI
the Iamily home

- It is in consonance with rt256FC because
creditors already have acquired vested right..connect
it with..

(3) debts secured by mortgages on the
premises beIore or aIter such constitution

Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics,
architects, builders, materialmen and others
who have rendered service or Iurnished
material Ior the construction oI the building.

Q: Debt to laborers, kapag di ka nagbayad ng
katulong, kasama ba ito dito?
No.Included lang dito ay ang laborers who only
work Ior the construction oI the FH..

Sps. Jarsola vs. CA
SC only made mention about when it is
constituted as a FH..Irom the time it is occupied as a
FH..no need Ior judicial or extra-judicial
constitution..

Modiquillo Case
Kapag nangutang na beIore eIIectivity oI the FC,
you cannot give anymore a retroactive application to
this provision on creation oI the FH..WHY? because
it will aIIect the vested right oI the creditors..

TITLE VI
PATERNITY AND FILIATION

Make sure you know the meaning of the
following:
. Paternity
- relationship between a Iather and a child
B. Maternity
C. Filiation
D. Legitimate
E. Illegitimate
F. dopted Child

Presumption: II a child is born in a lawIul marriage,
the child is presumed to be legitimate.

SSS vs. Aguas
SC ruled that the presumption becomes conclusive
iI there is absence oI prooI oI physical impossibility
to have sexual intercourse with a wiIe and the action
oI impugning the legitimacy or illegitimacy is
something personal to the husband

Note: Art. 166. Legitimacy oI a child may be
impugned only on the Iollowing grounds
(1) That it was physically impossible Ior the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wiIe
within the Iirst 120 days oI the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth oI the child because
oI
(a) the physical incapacity oI the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wiIe;
(b) the Iact that the husband and wiIe were living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was
not possible; or
(c) serious illness oI the husband, which
absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;

(2) That it is proved that Ior biological or other
scientiIic reasons, the child could not have been that
oI the husband, except in the instance provided in the
second paragraph oI rticle 164; or

(3) That in case oI children conceived through
artiIicial insemination, the written authorization or
ratiIication oI either parent was obtained through
mistake, Iraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
inIluence.

Concepcion vs. CA
In this case, mother denying that the child is her
own child..SC ruled that maternity is never
uncertain..every reasonable presumption must be
made in Iavor oI legitimacy..WHY? because only the
woman knows who is the real Iather oI her child..

Note: Art. 167. The child shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress.

Art. 168. II the marriage is terminated and the
mother contracted another marriage within three
hundred days aIter such termination oI the Iormer
marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence oI
prooI to the contrary
(1) child born beIore one hundred eighty days
aIter the solemnization oI the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during the former
marriage, provided it be born within three hundred
days aIter the termination oI the Iormer marriage;
(2) child born aIter one hundred eighty days
Iollowing the celebration oI the subsequent marriage
is considered to have been conceived during such
marriage, even though it be born within the three
hundred days aIter the termination oI the Iormer
marriage.

Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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In 1950CC, iI the husband died, the wiIe is not
allowed to contract marriage immediately.so there
is a grace period Ior the issuance oI a marraiage
license. Why? because the law woul not like to have
a problem regarding paternity and Iiliation oI a child..

Now in case iI there is any issue regarding the
paterninty and Iiliation, iI you will notice the
prominent numbers in paternity and Iiliation, you
have three
1. 120 days
2. 180 days
3. 300 days

RECKONING POINT beIore or aIter 180 days Irom
the second marriage but within 300 days Irom the
Iirst marriage
Reason: (SEX EDUCTION NI MM) That is the
time that there is a meeting oI mind oI the sperm and
egg cell.. Ior girls having regular menstruation,
28days.divide by 2 equals 14..thereIore, Ior you to
have saIe sex, count 7 days Irom the Iirst
menstruation and then count 21 to 28 because that
time the woman is not in ovulation.. 120 days
is time the Ietus is being made. Etcetera.

REMEDIES:
1. Remedy given to a husband who does not like to
acknowldge the child as his own childACTION
TO IMPUGN THE LEGITIMACY OR
ILLEGITIMACY OF THE CHILD. ssuming that
the relation is one oI common law relationship.

2. If it is the child who is suffering or not treated
well, what is his remedy? The child is given a
remedy to Iile an ACTION TO CLAIM
LEGITIMACY OR ILLEGITIMACY a.k.a.
AC1IOA FOR COM!ULSORY RECOCAI1IOA.

In remedial law, anybody can Iile an action.
Nobody is prohibited to Iile an action..but the
question is are you the proper party in Iiling the
action? In other words, we connect now the
substantive law with remedial law.

Q: 1uan Dela Cruz, a child, who was not
acknowledged by the father and the mother file an
action in behalf of the child for compulsory
recognition. If you were the judge, how will you
decide the action filed by the mother?
BeIore answering, consider Iirst the Iollowing (1)
Is the mother the proper party in interest? Is she the
real party to Iile an action? (2) Same thing as to the
remedy to the husband, Is the sister oI the Iather the
party in interest to impugn the legitimacy or
illegitimacy oI the child?

Next step, look iI there is any date given in the
problem. II there is, check iI it is within the
prescriptive period. NOTE PRESCRIPTION rt.
169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy oI a child born
aIter three hundred days Iollowing the termination oI
the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such
legitimacy or illegitimacy.

Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy oI
the child shall be brought within one year Irom the
knowledge oI the birth or its recording in the civil
register, iI the husband or, in a proper case, any oI his
heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where
the birth took place or was recorded.

II the husband or, in his deIault, all oI his heirs do
not reside at the place oI birth as deIined in the Iirst
paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall
be two years iI they should reside in the Philippines;
and three years iI abroad. II the birth oI the child has
been concealed Irom or was unknown to the husband
or his heirs, the period shall be counted Irom the
discovery or knowledge oI the birth oI the child or oI
the Iact oI registration oI said birth, whichever is
earlier.

Then, is there a ground or proof of filiation? In
action to impugn, the real party is the husband. This
is the general rule. Study the exception when heirs
oI the husband may impugn the Iiliation. But take
note connect the 'heirs on who are the compulsory
heir in succession. ThereIore, iI it does not Iall within
the exception, expression unius rule, the judge must
dismissed the case because he is not the real party in
interest.

NOTE: EXCEPTIONS TO IMPUGN
Art. 171. The heirs oI the husband may impugn the
Iiliation oI the child within the period prescribed in
the preceding article only in the Iollowing cases
(1) II the husband should died beIore the
expiration oI the period Iixed Ior bringing his action;
(2) II he should die aIter the Iiling oI the complaint
without having desisted thereIrom; or
Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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(3) II the child was born aIter the death oI the
husband.

Liao Case
In this case, the child is who Iiled the
action..impugning his legitimacy..kc ang nangyari
dito..ung second husband nung nanay nya ay mas
mayaman kaysa tatay nya..so sabi ng bata, hindi who
ako ang anak..hindi ako legitimate.SC ruled that
impugning one`s legitimacy is personal to the
husband or to the Iather and not to the child..

Q: What about the action to claim legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child? Does the law require that
it must be filed during the lifetime of the putitative
father?
s you could see, the provision is silent on the
matter..so meaning, as long as the child is alive..the
child can Iile the action, even iI the Iather is dead..but
there is an exception, iI the child Iiling the action is
illegitimate and the prooI oI Iiliation presented by the
child is open and continuous possession..the FC
required that the action must be Iiled not just during
the liIetime oI the child but also during at the liIetime
oI the putitative Iather..That is the only exception that
requiring that the Iather must be alive at the time oI
the Iiling oI the action.

Note: Art. 172. The Iiliation oI legitimate children is
established by any oI the Iollowing
(1) The record oI birth appearing in the civil
register or a Iinal judgment; or
(2) n admission oI legitimate Iiliation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence oI the Ioregoing evidence, the
legitimate Iiliation shall be proved by
(1) The open and continuous possession oI the
status oI a legitimate child; or
(2) ny other means allowed by the Rules oI Court
and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)


Q: Are there cases wherein the heirs of the child
can file the action?
s we have said, it is the general rule that it is the
child should Iile the action. Exception, the heirs oI
the child can Iile the action iI the two cases when
the child DIE during (1) minority and (2) in a state oI
insanity. But with respect to remedy oI husband, 3
ang exception.

Note: Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may
be brought by the child during his or her liIetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state oI insanity. In these
cases, the heirs shall have a period oI Iive years
within which to institute the action.

Q: When to file?
II it is a remedy given to the husband, there are
three important numbers 1, 2 and 3 years. Remember
the rule on exception and its application. Know
where the child was born and the residence oI the
Iather.

Q: If the child is born was born in the same
residence of the father, what rule applies?
The Iather is given a period oI one year Irom the
knowledge or registration oI the birth
certiIicate..although oI course, iI you will notice,
based on due process, it should be counted Irom the
knowledge oI the Iather..1yr..hindi lang dapat alam
nyo kung anong year iaapply but kung kelan kayo
magbibilang..kc baka alam nyo 1 year tapos expired
na pla..

2 yrs applies iI the child was born in a place which
is diIIerent Irom the place where the Iather
resides..so..

Q: If sa Cardinal Santos ipinanganak ang bata
tapos ang father ay residing sa Espana,
Manila..what year will you apply? 1yr or 2yrs?
2yrs kc Cardinal Santos is in San Juan and you
know that Espana is in Manila..unless iI Espana,
Madrid..then in this case, 3yrs will apply..

Q: What if it is the heir of the husband filing the
case, what is the prescription period?
pply the same prescriptive period..1, 2 or 3 years

Q: What if the case is filed by the child?
t anytime during the liIetime oI the child as a
general rule..but take note again oI the exception

Q:What is the prescription given to heirs of the
child?
5 years counted Irom the death oI the child during
minority or in state oI necessity.

Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio

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Regarding CTION FOR COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION, remember the ground under rt
172 FC prooI oI Iiliations.

On the other hand, regarding the impugning oI the
Iather, take note oI rt 166 FC. GROUNDS

(1) That it was physically impossible Ior the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wiIe
within the Iirst 120 days oI the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth oI the child because
oI

(a) the physical incapacity oI the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wiIe;
(b) the Iact that the husband and wiIe were living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was
not possible; or
(c) serious illness oI the husband, which absolutely
prevented sexual intercourse;

*Serious illness is the kind oI illness that will
really aIIect or prevent the man`s capacity to have
sexual intercourse.

Andal Case
SC that even iI the husband is already suIIering on
chronic tubercolosis, this provision will not
apply..not serious illness that will aIIect man`s
capacity to have sexual intercourse

Q: ow about if the husband has prostate cancer?
This provision will not apply. Pede pa rin. May
capacity pa rin to have sexual intercourse

Q: What if paralyzed?
Must qualiIy. II taas or baba ang paralyzed..iI taas
lang, pde pa rin gumana ung nasa baba..or better, Ior
this provision to apply, the man should be Iully
paralyzed

*Living separately means not only that the
husband is leaving the conjugal dwelling.

Q: What if ung babae nasa Calaoocan tapos ung
lalaki nasa Mandaluyong?
It will not apply kc pede pa rin magkaroon ng
sexual intercourse..may probability pa rin na magkita

ThereIore, husband must be abroad..there is no
possibility kc na makabuo..

(2) That it is proved that Ior biological or other
scientiIic reasons, the child could not have been that
oI the husband, except in the instance provided in the
second paragraph oI rticle 164; or

*titigan mo ung bata..iI obvious Irom the
appearance oI the child na di mo anak..un na..except
thru artiIicial insemination..

That in case oI children conceived through artiIicial
insemination, the written authorization or ratiIication
oI either parent was obtained
(1) through mistake, Iraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue inIluence.

*there must be a written consent. It must be Ireely
given because any vitiated consent is a ground Ior the
annulment

Q: When is the written consent be given?
It must be given beIore the birth oI the child.

Q: What if it was given after the child was born?
can the subsequent written be valid?
No, because the law requires it to be given beIore

Q: What will be the remedy of the husband?
The only remedy is to adopt the child

ao vs. CA
Blood testing grouping is conclusive as to none
paternity but it is not a prooI oI Iiliation because it
does not Iollow that iI you are blood type , your
child should be blood type ..

Q: What about action given to the child?
rt172 FC provides Ior prooI aIIiliation and these
prooIs oI aIIiliation is categorized into two (1)
primary prooI oI Iiliation and secondary prooI oI
Iiliation.

PRIMARY PROOF OF FILIATION
(1) The record oI birth appearing in the civil
register or a Iinal judgment; or
(2) n admission oI legitimate Iiliation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.

*Birth CertiIicate

Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio

1
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Roces Case
II the birth certiIicate is not signed by the Iather,
the birth certiIicate cannot be accepted as prooI oI
Iiliation even iI in the birth certiIicate indicates the
name oI the Iather

In the old birth certiIicate, the Iorm only provides
a box which indicates whether legitimate or
illegitimate. But now, at the back there is aIIidavit oI
acknowledgment..

EXCEPTION: Ilano Case
It was the Iather who Iilled up the blank Iorm oI
the birth certiIicate. nd gives all the
inIormation...ang ginagawa kc ay pinapaIill-up ng
nurse using pencil or iniinterview then ittype ng
nurse..pero nung binilik na ung typewritten Iorm, the
Iather was not able to sign kc he was not around then
the mother signed.

There was an issue on paternity and Iiliation. The
Iather reIused to acknowledge the child and the child
presented the birth certiIicate. Which was unsigned
but considering the circumstances that prevailed at
the time oI the delivery oI the child, SC ruled that
even iI the birth certiIicate was unsigned since the
Iather was the one who gave all the inIormation, as
an exception to the general rule. Here, the birth
certiIicate was admitted as evidence..

So iI a question will be asked in the bar exam..its
too general.

Q: 1uan Dela Cruz presented a birth certificate as
proogf of filiation and unsigned birth certificate, is
it admissible in evidence as proof of filiation?
You must qualiIy..invoking the ruling in case oI
Roces and Ilano

!eople vs. De Lantin, 27
Reiterated the case oI Roces

Labagala Case
Reiterated the case oI Ilano

Q: Give an example of public and private
document that could be used as proof of filiation.
Remember the ante-nuptial agreement. Those
stipulations that has nothing to do with the
celebration oI marriage and the marriage did not take
place and iI that is acknowledgement oI a child that
could be considered as a public document or a private
handwritten instrument

nother example, Last will and testament. II it is
a notarial will, it is public instrument. II it is a
holographic will, it is a private instrument wherein
the testator does not only disposes property but also
acknowledges the child being conceived by the
common law spouse or by the wiIe. (parecio vs.
Paraguya)

SECONDARY PROOF OF FILIATION
In the absence oI the Ioregoing evidence, the
legitimate Iiliation shall be proved by
(1) The open and continuous possession oI the
status oI a legitimate child; or
(2) ny other means allowed by the Rules oI Court
and special laws.

Q:Cive examples of open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Baruieco Case
Where the Iather or the husband accompanied the
pregnant woman in the hospital and paid the hospital
bill. That is the example oI open and continuous
possession..

lso, using the surname, those children born
beIore the eIectivity oI the FC and under the CC
there is no prohibition against the use surname.
lthough ngayon mahirap na, regarding the
illegitimate child using the surname oI the biological
Iather. BeIore your application can be accepted you
have to attach document proving that you were
already acknowledged by your biological Iather

lso, kada buwan pumupunta ka sa taong ito at
kinukuha ang allowance mo..or biniyaran ang tuition
Iee mo..

Q: Examples of means allowed by ROC.
Mendoza vs. CA
Included in the phrase 'other means are the
baptismal certiIicate, judicial admission, Iamily bible
in which his name was entered, common reputation
respecting pedigree, admission by silence, testimony
oI witness (Rule 130 ROC)

Q: ow about DAA? What is the position of the
court?
Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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s early as the Case oI Tecson, case involving
FPJ. That is when Ior the Iirst time the SC made
mention oI DN. The SC said that lower court is not
prevented Irom accepting DN as prooI oI Iiliation.
lthough, SC in the case oI errera vs. Alva said
that court should be cautious in giving credence to
DN. It is not enough that child`s DN proIile
matches that oI the putative Iather. The court should
require 99.9 as minimum value oI probability oI
paternity. The court should consider how samples
were collected and handled because there could be a
possibility oI contamination. DN test does not
involve getting sample oI your blood. But pwedeng
scrape your skin or hair with the root. Scrape the
tongue.

OPINION NI MM which it would be better iI
you legally adopt the child because DN is already
accepted in adoption so iI later on somebody will run
aIter the child and it will be proven that you are not
the biological parent. The one claiming has the right
on the child. kc may DN na tayo. lthough
adoption cost P50,000-60,000.and should be
perIormed simultaneously with the Iather and the
child with the consent oI the biological mother..

Cruz vs. Cristobal
Early ruling, that baptismal certiIicate is not
acceptable..it is only a piece oI document that proves
that the sacrament oI baptism was perIormed..it is a
private instrument but in this case, medyo
kumambyo, horizontal stare decisis, the SC baptismal
certiIicate is one oI the acceptable documentary
evidence to prooI Iiliation in accordance oI ROC.

Q: Examples of private instrument.
Love letters, text message and also email
messages

Q: If the question has nothing to do with artificial
insemination but test tube baby or cloning, how will
you answer?
By analogy, apply the provision regarding
artiIicial insemination because the Iramers never
probably realized that there could be a test tube baby
or cloned baby in the Iuture.

ILLEGITMATE CHILDREN
Q: What are the rights of the legitimate children?
Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right
(1) To bear the surnames oI the Iather and the
mother, in conIormity with the provisions oI the Civil
Code on Surnames;
(2) To receive support Irom their parents, their
ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and
sisters, in conIormity with the provisions oI this Code
on Support; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other
successional rights granted to them by the Civil
Code.

Q: ow about an illegitimate filiation? ow it is
establish? What are their rights?
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate Iiliation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same
period speciIied in rticle 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph oI rticle
172, in which case the action may be brought during
the liIetime oI the alleged parent.

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname
and shall be under the parental authority oI their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conIormity
with this Code. The legitime oI each illegitimate
child shall consist oI one-halI oI the legitime oI a
legitimate child. Except Ior this modiIication, all
other provisions in the Civil Code governing
successional rights shall remain in Iorce.

Rights oI illegitimate children, as long as the child
is recognized, the child is entitled to support,
inheritance and with the new law. N CT
LLOWING THE CHILD TO USE THE
SURNME OF THE BIOLOGICL FTHER (R..
9255) abandoned the ruling in MOSESGELT.

LEGITIMATED CHILDREN
rt. 177. Only children conceived and born outside
oI wedlock oI parents who, at the time oI the
conception oI the Iormer, were not disqualiIied by
any impediment to marry each other may be
legitimated.

*The FC code makes used oI the word
CONCIEVED and BORN NOT CONCIEVED or
BORN..you go back to your statcon. The eIIect oI
using 'and is not the same as the eIIect oI using
'or in the provision. II it is ND it is mandatory
Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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that both should be present. II it is OR, it means that
you have a choice either or the child can be
legitimated iI the child is conceived and born.

Q: 1he parents should not have any legal
impediment to marry each other..because if there is
legal impediment to marry each other and when
born the child is born, there was no more legal
impediment..what is the remedy?
doption not legitimation by subsequent
marriage..

Q: What should be done if the child can be
legitimated by subsequent marriage?
The parents need only toexecute an aIIidavit that
when the child was conceived and born.. there was no
legal impediment to marry each other existing
between them and later on they got married..attaching
birth certiIicate oI the child and marriage contract
and submitting them to the civil registrar oIIice
where the birth certiIicate oI the child is registered..

Q: Would there be new birth certificate be issued?
None. What will happen is that the civil registrar
will make an annotation that the child is legitimated
by subsequent marriage.


RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATED
Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same
rights as legitimate children.

ACTION TO IMPUGN
Art. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by
those who are prejudiced in their rights, within five
years Irom the time their cause oI action accrues.

ADOPTION

DOMESTIC ADOPTION vs. INTER-COUNTRY
ADOPTION
Q: When will you apply the Inter-Country
Adoption? Will you apply it only if a foreigner is
applying for adoption?
No. it is not only applicable Ior Ioreigner who is
Iiling Ior adoption but also it could be applied iI a
Filipino is applying Ior adoption. You can use Inter-
country doption, iI petition Ior adoption is Iiled
abroad but iI in the Philippines, apply domestic
adoption.

Q: Where will you file if it is Inter-country?
we have Inter-country adoption board..now what
you have to do is to go to the Philippine Embassy and
inquire Irom the Philippine embassy and you can Iile
your petition Ior adoption there..

Q: Can any child be legally adopted?
s long as the child be declared legally available
for adoption and the child is a minor child then he
can be qualiIied to be adopted..unlike beIore..you can
just adopt any child who you can see in the street,it is
automatic..also, iI you saw a baby in Iront oI your
door, you can adopt it the baby BUT NOW, you need
to bring the child to DSWD or any orphanage.
WHY? so that they can do the declaration oI the child
as legally available Ior adoption..iI not, so that it will
be less expensive, in our petition Ior adoption the
prayer would be to (1) ask the court to declare the
child legally available Ior adoption and (2) to grant
the petition Ior adoption note that declaration can be
judicial or extrajudicial..

Q: In Inter-country, it uses the word "legally-free
child" does it have any difference from legally
avaible for adoption?
No. It is simply a question oI semantics..t the
same time, it could also be done judicially or
extajudicially

Q: Who may adopt?
at least 16yrs older than the adoptee

Q: Is it absolute?
No. exception
1. iI the adopting parent is the biological parent oI
the child to be adopted (or the spouse oI such
parent)
Example Nabuntis ka nung minor k then later on
gusto mo ng angkinin ung bata..pwede kahit di yrs
ung gap..S old law, 15yrs sa youth and welIare
code..ang explanation ay nadagdagan kc ang
marrying age..OPINION NI MM di sya pabor sa
rason na un. It would probably bec oI the moral
ascendancy that should be exerted by the adopting
parent toward the adopted child. lthough, why
16yrs oI all ages. Just because it is the law

In Domestic doption, ALIEN now may adopt
provided that he has the qualiIications oI a Filipino
who can adopt plus additional requirements..

Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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NOTE: REQUIREMENTS

FILIPINO CITIZEN
1. legal age, in possession oI Iull civil capacity
and legal rights;
2. good moral character, has not convicted oI any
crime involving moral turptitude,
3. emotionally and psychologically capable oI
caring Ior children
4. at least 16years older than the adoptee (waived
when the adopter is the biological parent oI the
adoptee, or is the spouse oI the adoptee`s
parent)

ALIEN
1. Same as the qualiIications oI Filipino citizen
2. His/her country has diplomatic relations with
the Republic oI the Philippines
3. he/she has been living in the Philippines Ior at
least 3 continuous years prior to the Iiling Ior
adoption and maintains such residence until the
adoption is enterd
4. he/she has been certiIied by his her diplomatic
or consular oIIice or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal
capacity to adopt in his or her country
5. his/her government allows the adoptee to enter
his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter

RESIDENCY and CERTIFICTION oI the alien`s
qualiIication to adopt in his/her country may be
waived Ior the Iollowing
1. Iormer citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
within the 4
th
degree oI consanguinity or aIIinity
2. One who seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter oI his/her Filipino spouse
3. One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks
to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within
the 4
th
degree oI consanguinity or aIIinity oI the
Filipino spouse

HUSBND ND WIFE SHLL JOINTLY DOPT
except in the Iollowing cases
1. iI one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter oI the other
2. iI one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter. Provided,
however, that the other spouse has signiIied
his/her consent thereto
3. iI spouses are legally separated Irom each
other

*In inter-country, the adopter must be at least 27
years old

Alin bang bansa ang wala tayong diplomatic
relation? tingnan natin kc baka ung bata or
magaapon nanggaling sa bansa na wala tayong
diplomatic relation..di open ang lahat sa
pilipinas..Baka kc un ang question sa bar..Ung
resdidency requirements..yan ang requisites sa FC.
s a rule sa FC, alien cannot adopt unless he has the
qualiIications but in Domestic adoption. lien can
adopt provided that he has the all qualiIications oI
the Filipino who are qualiIied to may adopt and a
residence oI the Philippines Ior three years. lso
take note..who are included in 4
th
degree? hanapin
ang common..sa tatay 1degree..sa kapatid 2
degrees..Affinity kamag-anak mo lang dahil asawa
mo.

Q: Who may be adopted? MEMORIZE
In DOMESTIC DOPTION, the Iollowing may
be adopted
1. any person below 18 years oI age who has
been administratively or judicilally declared
available Ior adoption
2. the legitimates son/daughter oI one spouse
by the other spouse
3. as illegitimate son/daughter by a qualiIied
adopter to improve his /her status to that oI
legitimacy;
4. a person oI legal age iI, prior to the
adoption, said person has been consistently
considered and treated by the adopter(s) as
his or her own child since minority
5. a child whose adoption has been previously
rescinded
6. a child whose biological or adoptive
parents(s) has died; provided, that no
proceedings shall be initiated within
6months Irom the time oI death oI said
parent(s)

In Inter-country, only a legally free child may be the
subject oI inter-country adoption

Q: Whose written consent is necessary? (memorize)
why it is necessary especially when it involves
legitmate and adopted child, 1years?
because ultimately it will lessen their successional
rights..lumillit ang share..in actual cases, tinatanong
Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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talaga ng judge ang bata..gunu din ang biological
parent in cases oI biological right, hindi na sya
magiging compulsory heir, pde lang testate
succession but not intestate succession..testate
succession iI he/she is instituted as an heir..

SEC. 9 (Domestic); WHOSE COSENT IS
NECESSRY TO THE DOPTION
1. the adoptee, iI 10 years oI age or over
2. the biological parent(s) oI the child, iI known,
or the legal guardian or the proper government
instrumentality which has legal custody oI the
child
3. the legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, iI 10
years oI age or over
4. the illegitimate sons/daughters, iI 10 years oI
age or over, oI the adopter iI living with said
adopter and the latter`s spouse, II nay
5. the spouse, iI any, oI the person adopting or to
be adopted

Q: Is guardian allowed to adopt?
Only aIter the termination oI the guardianship
and clearance oI his/her Iinancial accountabilities.

1amargo Case
During the pendency oI the petition Ior adoption.
The prospective adoptive child cause an injury to a
third person..in relation to the FC rt127-128, who
should be liable? The parents.bakit dapat maging
liable ang parents? Because the parents has actual
supervision oI the child. When a petition Ior
adoption is granted, the decision granting the
petition Ior adoption would retroact when the child
was born. This is the only Iirst time that the local
civil registry will cancel the original birth certiIicate
and new birth certiIicate will be issued kc ang
makikita nung bta..name oI Iather ay ung adopting
Iather..name nung mother ay adopting mother..so
hindi nya malalaman based on the document na
inampon lang sya..kaso ung ibang civil registrar
nagkakamali kahit nakastate na sa implementing
rules the birth certiIicate should not show that the
child was simply adopted.

So ang nangyari sa case na ito, nung nagkaroon
na ng decision, inampon na ung bata so syempre
mangongolekta na ung relatives nung batang
nasaktan..sabi nung biological parent dapat hindi
kami ung liable..dapat ung adopting parents..kc ung
adoption decision retroacted to the date when the
child was born so wala na kaming problema, wala
kamiong liability..SC ruled that wrong..this is an
exceptional case wherein the decision regarding the
adoption was not given retroactive
application.WHY? because it will be unIair Ior the
adopting parent. SC said at the adopted child causes
injury to third person, the biological parent were the
ones actual custody and supervision oI the
child..thereIore, even iI the petition Ior adoption was
already granted..the biological parent should still be
liable Ior the injury caused by the adopted child
because when it happened, the are the ones who has
actual custody and supervision oI the child..

Kang Case
Written consent oI the biological parents is
indispensable unless the parents already abandoned
the child

Q: What are the effects of adoption?
1. parental authority vested on the adopter
2. considered as legitimate son/daughter oI the
adopter
3. successional right

`Remember that adoption is strictly personal
between the adopting parent and the adopted
child..that is why in relation to succession, as held in
the case oI Mariategue vs. CA, there is no right oI
representation iI the adopted child predeceased the
adopting parent. Why? because the relationship is
strictly between the adopting parent and the adopted
child

Q no ngayon ang mangyayari sa share ng adopted
child?
di ba sa succession may tinatawag tayong
accretion..di pede ang right oI representation.. di rin
pede ang substitution..kc ang substitution pede lang
sya sa testate succession..so accretion in Iavor oI the
surviving legitimate children who are the compulsory
heirs..ung anak ng adopted, wala makukuha unless
the anak oI the adopted was instituted as a voluntary
heir

RESCISSION is only applicable or a remedy
available to the child

Q: What about the adopting parent?if maldita pla
ung inamapon, ano gagawin nya?
disinheritance
Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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Stephanie Astorga Carcia Case
Here the petitioner is a single parent, lalaki
nagampon sya..di ba kapag nagampon ka mas
maganda may wiIe para at least kumpleto ang
magiging pangalan ng bata..may middle name may
surname..ang question ditto ng nagampon ay kawawa
naman ung inampon ko kung walang siyang middle
name..alangan naming gamiting nung inampon ang
middle name ng nagampon kc magiging magkapatid
sila..tatay na nya kapatid nanaya..so the petitioner ask
the court to allow the child to retain the middle name
(the surname oI the mother)..Ior the Iirst time the SC
emphasizing the importance oI the middle name..it
traces the maternal lineage. SC granted the
petition..allowed the child to retain the surname oI
the mother as the middle name. Even iI the child was
already adopted

Republic vs. ernandez
ng gusto ng nagampon palitan din ang
pangalan.. SC ruled No..ang right lang ay palitan ang
surname pero ung pangalan..you need to connect it
now with ROC, change oI name. it provides when
allowed to change name (ex. Humiliating,
embaracing). Change oI name is not allowed in
adoption but through ROC.

Ching Ling Case
doption is not a mode oI acquiring or changing
one`s citizenship..so iI your adopting parent is an
merican citizen..then it is not automatic that you
become an merican citizen..because citizenship is a
political right but not a civil right..although, you need
to connect it now with dual citizenship act..
derivative citizenship it presupposes that the
unmarried child, below 18yrs oI age, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted XXX ..naampon na
sya tapos nagkataon ung tatay gusto ulit magreaquire
ng Philippine citizenship..no need to take oath oI
allegiance ung bata..susundin na ung citizenship ng
tatay


TITLE VIII
SUPPORT

ART.195 and 199 MEMORIZE

PERSONS OBLIGED TO SUPPORT
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions oI the succeeding
articles, the Iollowing are obliged to support each
other to the whole extent set Iorth in the preceding
article
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children oI the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children oI the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether oI Iull or
halI-blood

ORDER OF SUPPORT
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged
to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
Iollowing persons in the order herein provided
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.

Q: Assuming that you got married, does it mean
that your obligation to give support to your parents
or brothers or sisters is deemed terminated?
s you could see, there is no provision in support
that provides when obligation to give support is
terminated. This is the only case when there is the
decision and the decision does not become Iinal in
the sense that any amount that reIlects therein in the
decision can be changed depending on the needs oI
the recipient and the means oI the giver..

Going back to the question, what the law gives
you is to Iollow the order oI support. Who should be
given preIerence against the other?

Question ni mam sa mga nga student. II may pera
ang mga lalaki kanino ibibgay sa nanay o
asawa?sabi daw ng mga student nya ay sa nanay but
she said na mali un.. base sa order oI preIerence,
dapat sa asawa.biblical basisonce you are married
you have to leave your mother and go to your wiIe
XXX (',) the support given to the mother must be
Irom exclusive property not Irom conjugal
partnership or absolute community oI property

Quisumbing Case
Unborn child entitled to support

Lacson Case
Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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Connected with the provision oI unjust
enrichment.iI the biological Iather did not give
support but it was the uncle, the uncle has the right to
demand Ior the reimbursement oI the expenses he
incurred in the child..otherwise,the biological Iather
is unjustly enriching himselI at the expense oI the
uncle..

!atricio vs. Dayo
Involves waiver oI right..the SC gives the
Iollowing characteristics oI support.. it is personal,
based on Iamily ties..that is why in relation to
property there is distinction between real right and
personal right..right to support is a personal right..it
cannot be transmitted ..in relation to succession,
based on the deIinition oI sussession..it enumerated
what can be transmitted aIter the death..one oI the
thing that can be transmitted is a right..but it reIers to
a real right not a personal right. Example oI personal
right is support..it is intransmissible, it cannot be
renounced, that is why in RT 6 FC.. there can be no
valid waiver oI right to support nor can be renounced
nor be compromised..Iree Irom attachment or
execution..it variable in amount..this why the
decision cannot be Iinal because the amount involve
is always subject to change

TITLE IX
PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Correlate it with CHILD BUSE CT and RT
19 CC, thereIore iI the parents are at Iault, they
could be liable criminally or Ior damages,
respectively.

CUSTODY OF THE CHILD
Q: What if there is a conflict between the husband
and the wife, to whom the custody be awarded?
In relation to custody, iI the child is below 7yrs
old..the custody is generally given to the mother.
Why? because we have tender age presumption
which means that the beast interest oI the child is
considered by the court..it the child is below 7yrs
old they say the manner how the mother raises the
child is diIIerent as to how the Iather will raise his
own child..so the law preIers the mother to take care
oI the child..

Camboa and 1onog Cases
SC gave exception to that rule.

GENERAL RULE: iI the child is below 7yrs
old, the custody is awarded to the mother

EXCEPTION: Ior compelling reasons

Q: Cive examples of those compelling reasons
when the custody should not be awarded to the
mother
1. Neglect
2. bandonment
3. Unemployment
4. Immorality
5. Habitual drunkenness
6. Drug addiction
7. Maltreatment oI child
8. Insanity
9. IIliction with a communicable disease

ThereIore, it the mother is not suIIering Irom any
oI these then the custody shall be automatically
awarded to the mother.

Sagala vs. CA
Custody oI child entrusted to mother in law is
simply a temporary custody. Why? because parental
authority is inalienable. It cannot be transIerred..

!erez Case
The custody oI a child below 7 years oI age is
given to the mother because oI the basic need oI the
child Ior a mothers loving care

Q: What is the remedy if you want to regain the
custody of a child?
File a PETITION FOR HBES CORPUS

Q: Where do you file? Does it fall within exclusive
jurisdiction of the family court? Because in your
remedial law, there is a special court created that
will handle the cases of the family called a FAMILY
COUR1. Is it only the Family court where you can
file?
Madrinial vs. Madrinial
The Iamily court act oI 1997 (R.. 8369) did not
divest the C and SC the jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases involving custody oI minors..in other
words, the Family court has concurrent jurisdiction
with C and SC when it comes to petition Ior habeas
corpus..aIIirmed by M03-03-04 oI SC dated pril
22,2004..the Family court is vested with original and
exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases not in habeas
Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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corpus..it means that petition Ior custody is diIIerent
Irom petition Ior habeas corpus cases.thereIore, iI
you are Iiling a petition Ior custody oI the child, the
Iamily court has only the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to handle the case the case..on the other
hand, EXMPLE oI petition Ior habeas corpus II the
grandparent will get the custody oI the child tapos
itatago..so what is the remedy?Iile a petition Ior
habeas corpus..
- in this case, it ruled that regarding habeas
corpus..there is concurrent jurisdiction with Family
court, C and SC

Bondadjai vs. Bondadjai
II the custody was awarded to the wiIe, it does
not deprive the husband oI the parental authority..
parental authority is retained.. what is not given to
the Iather is simply the custody over the child.. that
is why the Iather has the right to visit the child..

Laxamana Case
The choice oI child Ior 7yrs or above, should be
ascertained. lthough oI course, Iamily court do not
like to call the child in the witness stand and ask the
child to make a choice because it becomes traumatic
on the part oI the child..thereIore, usually the court
will throw back again to the parents and ask them to
settle it amicably..

Q: !arental preference rule vs. maternal
preference rule?
In maternal preference, custody oI the mother
over the child is preIerred than that oI the Iather..
Why? because it has something to do with
ethymological deIinition oI marriage..marriage is
taken Irom two latin words..mater (mother) and
munium (oIIice/responsibility) because oI the
9month period oI pregnancy wherein there is much
bonding between mother and child..

Parental preference rule that the custody oI the
child should only be given to the parent..that is why
the kind oI authority between the parental authority
given to the parents and the substitute parental
authority being exercised by the
grandparents..parents should always exercise
parental authority..although, Filipino setting
assuming that the wiIe work abroad..uasually the
wiIe leaves the custody to her parents..mali
ito..because it is a violation oI parental preIerence
rule..parents are vested oI custody oI their child
against other person including the grandparents..

Krisna vs. IAC
No Iinality oI custody oI judgment

Santos case
It is only in the absence oI both parents, that
grandparents can exercise substitute parental
authorithy..iI wala lolo o lola, elder brother or
sister..iI none, guardian..

Substitute parental authority over the child
Note: Art. 216. In deIault oI parents or a judicially
appointed guardian, the Iollowing person shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the child in
the order indicated
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in rt.
214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one
years oI age, unless unIit or disqualiIied; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one
years oI age, unless unIit or disqualiIied.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian
over the property oI the child becomes necessary, the
same order oI preIerence shall be observed.

Q: What is the difference between AR1 218 FC vs.
AR1 218 CC?
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers,
or the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child are shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody.

uthority and responsibility shall apply to all
authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises oI the school, entity or institution.

ART 2180. Lastly, teachers or heads oI
establishments oI arts and trades shall be liable Ior
damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

ART 2180 reIers to torts and damages (quasi-
delict)..it does not take into consideration the age oI
the students..law is silent.. ART 218 it explicitly
provides that it reIers to minor children and they
could be held liable iI something happened to minor
child in an authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or
Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio


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institution. The school, its administrators and
teachers, or the individual, entity or institution will be
liable. BUT in ART 2180 the school does not have
any liability..the liability is only shared between the
teacher and the head oI the school.
ART 218 we are talking about minor children
wherein the teacher, school and the administrator can
be held responsible..their liability is solidary and
principal.. connect it with ART 219 FC

Art. 129. Those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding rticle shall be
principally and solidarily liable Ior damages caused
by the acts or omissions oI the unemancipated minor.
The parents, judicial guardians or the persons
exercising substitute parental authority over said
minor shall be subsidiarily liable.

The respective liabilities oI those reIerred to in the
preceding paragraph shall not apply iI it is proved
that they exercised the proper diligence required
under the particular circumstances.

ll other cases not covered by this and the
preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions
oI the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.

*considering that their liability is principal.. iI the
judgment cannot be enIorced on them, you may run
aIter the parents oI the minor child who caused injury
to another minor child

But take note oI the diIIerence Iorm ART 221
FC

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable Ior the
injuries and damages caused by the acts or
omissions oI their unemancipated children living in
their company and under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate deIenses provided by law.

*The liability oI parents is primary..this
contemplates a situation wherein it is outside oI the
school premises not relate to school activities..dito
hindi na hahabulin ang teacher kundi ung parents
na..thereIore, principal ung parents

BUT iI nangyari sa school, ang unang liable ay
teacher, school and head oI school..also, ang liability
ay principal and solidary..solidary liability means
that you could enIorce the entire judgment against
one solidary debtor and that soldary debtor should
now run aIter the other co-solidary debtors..but iI
they cannot IulIill the judgment, then you can run
aIter the biological parent who caused injury..because
parents are subsidiary liable

Illustrated in CSE ESCONDE and AMADORA
up to ST. MARY`S ACADEMY vs. KAPITANOS

RT 2180. When provision reIers to school. It only
limited to school oI arts and trade based on the
provision as embodied in the Civil code

Esconde Case
SC ruled that RT2180(7) reIers to teachers or
heads oI establishments oI arts and trades..not to
academic educational institution..BUT in the case oI
AMADORA.RT 2180 should apply to all
school..academic and non-acdemic..also, held in case
oI PALISOC

Saygozo vs. IAC
SC ruled that recess is included in the phrase
'attendance in the school..thereIore iI the child is in
the canteen and there is something happened to the
child..the parents can still run aIter the teacher,
school and head oI the school..what is the deIense oI
the latter? Observance oI diligence oI the good Iather
oI the Iamily..which is the same deIense under RT
2180..

There was a camping..tapos nawawala na ung 3
bata..tapos nakita ung 3 bata lumulutang ung bata sa
dagat..di nakita nung teacher na lumangoy at
nalunod ung bata..in this case, even it happened
outside the school since it is related to school
activity..the teacher is liable..the same in the case
where bumaligtad ang bus during Iield trip sa avilon
zoo..XXXXXX

That is the reason why the tuition Iee in
elementary is higher than in college..probably
because oI the responsibility being assumed by the
teacher, school and administrator..

EMANCIPATION
Under 1950 CC, there are two modes oI
emancipation
1. contracting marriage
2. attainment oI the age oI majority
Clvll lAw RFvlFw 1
Ally. mn. Iizn Ioez - Ronrio

0
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because marrying age is 14 Ior Iemale and 16
Ior male and at that time the legal age is 21..

eIIect oI emancipation parental authority is
terminated

NOW, there is only one mode oI emancipation
because oI the Iact that the marrying age is 18 and the
legal age is reduced to 18..it is the attainment oI the
age oI majority

Q: If meron k ginawang kalokohan when 18yrs old
k, does it mean wala ng cause of action ang victim
against your parents?Considering AR1 23..you are
already emancipated..therefore the parental
authority is terminated upon reaching the age of
majority
R.. 6809. Even iI you are 18years oI age or those
18-21..and still living with their parents and causes
injury to third person..the parents can still be held
liable Ior it but iI paglagpas mo ng 21 kahit na nasa
nanay ka pa..bahala ka na sa sarili mo just in case you
cause injury to third person..di na liable ang
parents..no more VICARIOUS LIBILITY oI
parents..

Escano vs. Cil
Nag-asawa na sya pero nakatira pa rin sya sa
magulang nya tapos nagkaroon ng problema..SC
ruled that basta nandun ka pa sa parents mo kahit
nagpakasal ka na..parents can still be held
liable.BUT under RA6809, nagkaroon ng
limitation..til 18-21years old na lang..

NULLITY, ANNULMENT, LEGAL
SEPARATION

Nullity - status oI marriage is void ab initio, which
means Irom the very start no marriage was celebrated
even iI there was a marriage ceremony perIormed.

Annulment- marriage is voidable, valid until
annulled.

L.S- marriage is valid at the time it was celebrated.

In remedial law who is the real party in interest.
Secure a copy oI .M. 02-11-10, tells us about new
rules in Iiling a petition Ior declaration oI nullity,
annulment and L.S.

In the case oI Ninal Ior purposes oI resolving the
issue regarding succession or inheritance, the heirs oI
any oI the spouses can Iile a petition Ior declaration
oI nullity oI marriage. But by virtue the said rule
.M. a petition Ior declaration oI nullity oI void
marriage may be Iiled solely by the husband or the
wiIe.

Enrico vs. eirs of Cely
SC categorically abandoned the ruling in Ninal.
The heirs do not have the right to Iile a petition Ior
nullity even Ior purposes oI setting the issue on
inheritance. Only the husband or the wiIe can be
considered real party in interest

Q: Why did I say injured party no statutory
reference?
. Bec. There is no injured party when it comes to
grounds Ior declaration oI nullity. II you will recall in
rt. 4, the absence oI any essential/Iormal requisites
will render the marriage null and void.

Can you consider a party in bad Iaith, iI 4
th
cousins Iell
in love? or Can we say that the husband or the wiIe is
in bad Iaith iI there is lack oI marriage license/lack oI
legal capacity/psychological incapacitated. That is the
reason why when it comes to who is the real party in
interest, we do not use the word injured party, iI it is a
petition Ior nullity. Under the rules, it is simply the
husband or the wiIe. Nobody can be considered as an
injured party in a petition Ior declaration oI nullity.

Salmingo vs. Rudica
Dito nakialam ung pubic prosecutor, kasi dib a iI
you Iile a petition Ior declaration oI nullity the state
will always intervene because oI the constitutional
mandate that the state will protect the sanctity oI
marriage and in order to Iind out whether there is a
collusion bet. The parties, the state representative who
can be the public prosecutor or oIIice oI Sol. Gen. will
appeal in court. In this case S.C said one who is not a
real party in interest in a complaint Ior declaration oI
nullity cannot ask Ior the setting aside therein. His
invocation oI the states interest in protecting the
sanctity oI marriage does give him the standing to
question the decision by law. It is the prosecuting atty.
Or Iiscal or Sol. Gen. who represents the interest oI the
state. But as I have said the role oI the Iiscal or Sol.
Gen. is simply to Iind out whether or not there is a
collusion bet. The parties when the petition was Iiled.
Here a 3
rd
person Iiled a petition Ior declaration oI
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nullity and he is invoking Ior the interest oI the state.
SC said, no you are not a real party in interest.

Annulment
Q: Who can file the case?
Only the injured party/aggrieved party.

Q: Why is there such a thing as injured party in
annulment?
One ground 4 annulment is Iraud. In ROC, iI you
will go to court, you have to go there with a clean
hands so iI you are the one who committed Iraud, you
cannot Iile a petition Ior annulment. So only the
injured party can Iile but there are exceptions
1. Lack oI parental consent- the parent where
consent was not obtained can Iile a petition
Ior annulment
2. Insanity- the relative can Iile a petition Ior
annulment.

Legal Separation
Just like in annulment, iI you will look at the
grounds oI L.S there is really an injured party. Ex.
Repeated physical violence, so kung ikaw ang
boksingero, hindi ikaw pwede mgdemanda, ung
sinasktn ang pwede.

Prescriptive period
Nullity - the 10-year prescriptive period has been
repealed so Iorget about it, it imprescriptible, so even
iI you were married beIore the eIIectivity oI the FC,
still you can Iile a petition, Ior the reason that it is
void ab initio so why put prescriptive period.

Annulment - 5yrs. is the prescriptive period Ior
Iiling a petition. Memorize rt.7-when do you start
counting the 5-yr period.
Ex. Fraud- upon the discovery and not Irm the
celebration oI the marriage.

But take note oI the exceptions considering there are
3
rd
persons who can Iile, you need to connect that to
the prescriptive period. So iI it is the parent whose
consent was not obtained, the parent can Iile beIore
the child reaches the age oI 21.

Q: What happen if the parent was not able to file
the petition and the child is already 21 or above 21?
So you have to apply the 5-yr period but this time
relate it to the spouse who did not obtain the consent
oI the parent so the spouse who got married upon
reaching the age oI 21 still given 5 years counted Irm
21. Meaning to say until he/she reaches 26 yrs old.

Iter 26 or pg 27 na cya, iI he/she did not Iile- the
marriage was already rariIied by cohabitation.
RatiIication is only applicable in a voidable marriage.

II insanity, any oI the relatives oI the insane may
Iile. BeIore the death oI either party or during lucid
interval.

L.S - 5 years.

How to impugn? Can it be attacked directly or
collaterally?
Void marriage- it can be attacked collaterally w/c
means that is not the main issue in the case Iile. It
was simply brought out as a consequence in attacking
the principal issue in the case.

Voidable marriage- cannot be attacked collaterally.
There shld be a separate action to annul.

L.S- it is not applicable bec. The marriage is valid.

Grounds
Memorize the grounds. But the easiest way, 1
st
apply
rt.4, the absence oI any oI the essential/Iormal
requisites. Then go to list oI prohibited marriages.

Domingo vs. C.A
Prior judicial declaration oI marriage shld not be
simply construed as necessary only Ior the purposes
oI contracting a subsequent marriage. There is also
need Ior judicial declaration oI the Iirst marriage Ior
the purpose oI setting the issue regarding inheritance
etc. it is not only limited to contracting a subsequent
marriage. rt.40 shld be extensive, it shld not only
Ior the sole purpose oI contracting subsequent
marriage.

Molina Doctrine
SC said, it enumerates what are the elements that
shld be present so that a petition Ior declaration oI
nullity on the ground oI P.I. can be granted, the impt.
Elements are
1. Medically proven
2. Permanent and incurable
N.B. there are 8 in the list, but these 2 are most impt.

Ching Ming Choi
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He wants to remain a virgin all thru his liIe. He
does not like to have sex. In canon law, iI marriage is
not consummated it is a ground Ior annulment. But in
this case it is tantamount to P.I. it was discovered that
Ching Ming Choi is not e but She in a man`s body.

Marcos vs. Marcos
Not related by blood but bec. OI employment
contract. II you read this case, these 2 people used to
be member oI the PSG they became unemployed.
Nainis ung babae xe cya lng wrkng. lthough in this
case the SC denied the petition. What the SC
emphasize here, a person can be considered P.I. even
iI he was not personally interviewed by a
psychologist. Moreso khit ndi nainterview or
naexmine the psychologist may give a
recommendation or declaration that respondent is P.I.
Basis?- the testimony oI the relatives oI the resp.,
who testiIied that since birth that has been the
behavior oI the resp. the psychologist will trace the
Iamily background.

Republic vs. Dagdag
Root cause must be medically identiIied.

Buenaventura case
Petitioner wants the person who was declared P.I.
to pay damages. SC said no, it is not his Iault to be
P.I. at the same time there is possibility that the
petitioner may be declared as P.I.

!aras vs. !aras
The disposition oI a disbarment case cannot be
conclusive on an action Ior declaration oI nullity,
because it was based on immorality, it is not a
ground.
Take note oI the gravity oI P.I.
1. Gravity
2. Judicial antecedents
3. Incurability

Q: If you have been declared as !.I. do you still
have the capacity to enter into a subsequent
marriage?
2 suggested answers
1. There is such a thing as relative P.I. meaning
to say, resp. might be P.I. to the 1
st
spouse but
not on the 2
nd
spouse.
2. Ma`am Lopez`s Opinion- take into
consideration the requisites oI P.I. accdg. To
Molina case there shld be an element oI
permanence and incurability.

Incest rules - memorize rt.37

The new rules oI declaration oI nullity oI marriage
under .M 02-11-10 relaxed the requirement oI
expert opinion reIerring to a
psychologist/psychiatrist. Sec.2 par.b - the petition
need not allege expert opinion but simply complete
Iacts oI he physical maniIestation indicative oI said
incapacity.

Memorize marriages against public policy.
Bigamous Marriage
Q: 1uan married, after disappearing for several
years contracted a second marriage. Is the 2
nd

marriage valid?
s a general as that you may qualiIy, it`s because
oI the so called judicial declaration oI presumptive
death oI the absent spouse. Disappearance is diIIerent
Irom abandonment. What rts. 40 & 41 contemplate
is disappearance under circumstances beyond the
control oI men.
Example Disappeared because oI earthquake. II you
want to marry again you have to Iile a petition Ior
declaration oI the presumptive death oI the absent
spouse. Which is diIIerent under the 1950 CC-
absences Ior 7 consecutive years may be suIIicient to
give you the capacity to contract subsequent
marriage, iI you have a well-Iounded belieI that your
spouse is dead. Filipinos abuse that provision, that is
why in the FC when iI your spouse disappeared under
circumstances beyond your control, you need to ask
the court to declare your husband/wiIe dead.
EIIect oI declaration this will give you the chance to
contract a 2
nd
marriage.

Q: If you contracted a 2
nd
marriage, does it mean to
say that the 1
st
marriage is already terminated?
No, the 1
st
marriage accdg. To the FC is simply
suspended. In eIIect, the 2
nd
marriage although
allowed by law is bigamous but this is a case that
even it is bigamous it is considered valid- why
valid?- bec. BeIore the contracting the 2
nd
marriage
there was a judicial declaration oI presumptive death
oI the absent spouse.

Q: What happens if absent spouse re-appeared?
It depends, iI there is an execution oI aIIidavit oI
reappearance Iiled beIore the LCR where the
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marriage contract is registered automatically, the 2
nd

marriage according to FC is deemed terminated in
w/c case, the suspension oI the 1
st
marriage is deemed
liIted.

Q: What happens to the children assuming they are
children in the 2
nd
marriage?
The children will remain legitimate.

Under the Spanish CC, the moment there is a judicial
declaration oI presumptive death oI the absent
spouse, automatically, the 1
st
marriage is terminated,
and the 2
nd
marriage will remain to be valid.

Q: Assuming that the person who re-appeared have
decided not to file ad affidavit of reappearance, will
it give him the capacity to contract a subsequent
marriage?
No, remedy-he should go to court and Iile a
petition Ior the declaration oI nullity oI his Iirst
marriage.

Q: Aside from the absent spouse, who may file an
affidavit of reappearance?
The present spouse, but the law does not make it
mandatory the law says 'may Iile

Annulment of Marriage
Take note when it comes to Iraud, you have to apply
rule on statutory const. 'expresio unios- what is not
include is deemed excluded.

Fraud

Ducat vs. Aquino
SC said, kpg 7 mnths na un babae kalokohan na
un kng s2vhn may deceit pa. Why? II the woman is
pregnant, it is only up to the 4
th
mnth wherein you
cannot see that the woman is pregnant or not. The
moment that it is already in the 5
th
mnth,
automatically bgla n lng lalaki ung tyan. SC said in
this case iI 7 mnths n un babae, u cnt later on claim
that there was Iraud/deceit-non disclosure oI
pregnancy. But iI the woman is 4 mnths pregy or
below 4 mnths then that is when you can invoke
Iraud. What makes it Iraud is not the pregnancy per
se, it`s not the STD, it`s not the homosexuality, but
the non-disclosure w/c makes it a ground Ior
annulment.

Anaya case
Non-disclosure oI pre-marital relationship does
not constitute Iraud.

So memorize the 4 circumstances constituting
Iraud.

Jillanueva vs. CA
Lack oI cohabitation per se is not a ground to
annul a marriage. It only becomes when it arises as a
result oI the perpetration Ior any oI the grounds Ior
annulling marriage.

Luis vs.Atienza
lawyer is involved in this case. The lawyer
alleges that he was threatened by the Iather oI the
girl. The Iather said that iI you will not marry my
daughter, I will Iile a disbarment case. SC said that is
not a kind oI intimidation/Iorce w/c can vitiate
consent.

The kind oI intimidation w/c can vitiate consent is
something that there is really a threat on imminent
danger to one`s liIe or property or liIe oI one`s
relative. II you connect it to the justiIying
circumstance under the RPC-selI-deIense.

Macarubo vs. Atty. Macarubo
Macarubo got married. He Iiled a petition Ior
annulment alleging that he was 'napikot, the court
annulled. 2
nd
marriage- he claimed again 'napikot ulit
aq SC said it is unimaginable Ior a lawyer taking
into consideration his proIession. 1
st
time acceptable
'shot gun wedding but 2
nd
time around 'shot gun
wedding ulit, SC said 1 incident oI a shot wedding is
believable but in succession would tack one`s
credibility especially accdg. to SC it s not easy to
believe that a lawyer would be easily coward to enter
into marriage.

Impotency
Male or Iemale may be impotent. Impotency just like
P.I. shld be permanent and incurable.

1imenez vs. Rep
SC said to Iind out whether it is incurable the
spouse can be physically examined even when there
is an opposition. That would not be a violation oI
constitutional rights.
Sarao case
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Considering that the operation oI the wiIe was
successIul the impotency as a ground Ior annulment
cannot be accepted.

Q: !ano mgiging impotent ang babae?
Depende sa opening ng vaginal canal. II the
opening is too small and there iI diIIiculty Ior
penetration.

Q: Eh kng sa lalaki?
There is diIIiculty in ejaculation. It has something
to do w/ the size oI the penis.

STD
BeIore it was not a ground. Bqt? Xe dati d uso ang
prosti. huh?

Grounds for L.S.
Make a code, impt. Un code ni ma`am alm nyo na
n.hehehe
1. Repeated physical violence- it is not simple
violence.. it has to be repeated.
2. bandonment

Ong vs.Ong
The abandonment should be w/o justiIiable reason
Ior it to be a ground Ior L.S. in this case the wiIe leIt
the conjugal dwelling because she was physically
abused. It was the husband who Iiled a petition Ior
L.S. on the ground oI abandonment. SC said it cannot
be abandonment, pnu k ndi i2wah eh inaabuso mu
asawa mu. So Ior it to be a ground 4 legal separation
it should be.

t least 1 year
w/o justiIiable reason
3. attempt oI the respondent x x x tgnan sa
codal.hehe
4. Iinal judgment- connect it to ROC ok.un
time Irame kng kelan un period.na Iinl
judgment n tlga.
5. Lesbianism/homosexuality, iI there is no
disclosure-Iraud, iI there is-groubd Ior LS.

Effects
Q: Declaration/annulment/LS, they say it is a
package deal, why?
Because all oI these should appear in the decision,
it is not just a ruling that the petition is granted.
Petition should embody what would be the eIIect in
relation to the status oI the child the custody, the
prop. Relationship, donation propter nuptias,
succession. Some Iamily court they might have
overlooked it so Ior practical purposes, when you
become practitioners and you will be handling a case,
I suggest you include it in your prayer.

Yu vs. Yu
SC citing rts. 49 & 50 oI the FC, the issue about the
custody oI the child is deemed impleaded in the
petition Ior declaration oI nullity, together w/
support, dissolution oI property, presumptive
legitime. So SC said lahat dapat nandon, kya lng
nakakalimutan ng Iamily court so para hindi
makalimutan, ilgay nyo n sa prayer nyo kya nga
package deal sya.

1. Marriage bond
Nullity - marriage is dissolved.
Annulment - it is proper to say the marriage
bond is dissolved, bec. It is voidable, valid until
annulled.
L.S - marriage bond is not dissolved, it will
remain to be valid but there is simply a
separation Irom bed & board.

2. Status of children
Children born beIore the declaration oI nullity
will remain to be legitimate.

So iI aIter declaration gen, rule children are
legitimate, except- iI the ground is P.I. under rt.
36 or under rt.53 w/c reIers to non-delivery oI
the presumptive legitime and the registration
requirement beIore you contract a subsequent
marriage, under these 2 cases iI the children are
born beIore the declaration oI nullity and later n
the marriage becomes null and void, they will
remain to be legitimate.

Which means that iI you are talking about the
other grounds Ior example- lack oI legal
capacity, absence oI marriage license, kng ung
declaration oI nullity ngawa lng aIter 50 yrs so
aIter 50 yrs s2vhn mu sa anak mo illegitimate k
pla. Because the decision in the declaration oI
nullity as a gen.rule will retroact on the date oI
the celebration oI the marriage except iI the
ground is 36 & 53.

Q: What is the status of the child if it is annulment?
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They will remain to be legitimate iI conceived or
born. Remember when we were talking about
legitimated children by subsequent marriage, the law
requires conceived and born. Here conceived or born
so either or. BeIore the decree..

Q: In LS what is the status of the child?
Legitimate because the marriage bond is not
dissolved.

3. Property relationship
We discussed under rts. 147 & 148 reIer to
co-ownership in relation to a common law
relationship and void marriages. We now
connect it here, what are void marriages Ialling
under 147/148. s mentioned, iI there is an
element oI bad Iaith and I can only think- Ior it
Iall under 147/148, the co-ownership under 148
wherein there is a need Ior a prooI oI actual
contribution, iI he marriage is declared null &
void on the ground oI bigamy. Because he is in
bad Iaith but majority be governed by 147
because it`s not your Iault, kea dib a here is no
injured party in declaration oI nullity.

In annulment, apply the provision in the creation oI
property relationship. So in the absence oI ante-
nuptial agreement- presumption-~ absolute
community. In case oI an ante-nuptial agreement, the
property relationship agreed upon by the parties- that
is the one that would be dissolved in annulment oI
marriage, why? Because we are talking about a
marriage that is voidable, valid until annulled & what
is the effect? We said in annulment there is an
injured party & as an assumption the spouse in bad
Iaith IorIeits, what is IorIeited is the share in the
proIits. ProIits lng ndi kabuuan, kxe kng kbuuan
kwa2 nmn. Wla n nga aswa, ala p property.

In LS, same eIIect, kng anu ang property relationship
agreed upon, iI there is an ante-nuptial agreement or
in the absence, you Iollow the applicable property
relationship, Iollowing the presumption oI the law.

4. Custody of children
Kea kng cnv nt applicable sa nullity kze wla nga,
void ab initio so tlgang dpt sa nanay. Kea nga d b
under the FC shall carry the surname oI the
mother ngkataon lng we have a new law
allowing an illegitimate child to carry the
surname oI the Iather.

In annulment, here the court will always take into
consideration the diIIerent doctrines I mentioned a
while ago. Presumption maternal preIerence rule and
the parental preIerence rule.
In LS, usually gnun din.

5. Inheritance
Nullity - disqualiIied to inherit oI the spouse is
in bad Iaith.
Annulment - spouse in bad Iaith, disqualiIied to
inherit.
LS - oIIending spouse, disqualiIied to inherit.

6. Donation by reason of marriage/donation
propter nuptias
Nullity - remain valid except iI donee
contradicted in bad Iaith in w/c case it is revoked
by operation oI law.
Annulment - bsta kpg may bad Iaith, the
revocation is by operation oI law pero kng
ti2gnan mu sa.ala kasunod eh..sorry.
LS - revocation by innocent spouse.

7. Delivery of presumptive legitime
Q: After the decision of marriage, what should
u do?
Delivery oI presumptive legitime and
recording oI judgment. Otherwise iI you will
contract a 2
nd
marriage, iI you will not do this,
then eiher oI the spouse in the 2
nd
marriage can
make this a ground Ior declaration oI nullity Ior
non-compliance w/ this requirement.

R.A. 9048-Gigondo Law-clerical error act
The changing oI name/nickname. Do not be
conIused this w/ the change oI name in ROC.
What is contemplated in R 9048 are cases
involving those people wherein supposedly you
have 2 names in your birth certiIicate.

IIidavit is not applicable in passport. The
law does not reIer to those cases when Ior
example she wants to change her name because
it is ridiculous.

But iI Ior example her name is Pedro but she
has been using Pedra all throughout the years
Irom elementary up to college. So what will
Pedra do, produce all documents showing that
since grade 1 the name Pedra has been appearing
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consistently. This is not because it is humiliating
or embarrassing based on records because that is
the name that you have been habitually using.

Typographical error - only 1
st
name &
nickname allowed, surname not allowed

Other examples w/c can be changed- entry-
birthday, nationality, all typographical- S change
to Z

Female nging male-~ pero Iemale tlage cya-
~Congressman it is clerical error but to Court it
is substantive, iI this will be asked in the bar, just
stick to what is written in the title..typographical
error or clerical error or change oI Iirst name or
nickname.

Effectivity of RA 9048: pril 22, 2001

Case oI petition Ior the change oI name Julio
Karulasan. SC said the person who should Iile
the petition should be the concerned person
himselI. In this case it was the mother who Iiled
on behalI oI his child. Reason oI the mother, her
child will go to Singapore, and Singaporeans
might not pronounce 'karulasan properly at bka
pgtawanan sya. SC said let the child decide Ior
himselI. The mother is not real party in interest.

Republic vs. Co, 27
Publication oI the order oI hearing under Sec.
4 oI Rule 108 cures the Iailure to implead an
indispensable party.

Silverio vs.Republic
Person who had a sexual transplant/sex re-
assignment. It was granted by the lower court on
ground oI equity. SC what should be reIlected in
the birth certiIicate are inIormation on data at the
time oI the actual birth. SC made mention oI R
9048 - grounds Ior changed oI 1
st
name
1. Petitioner Iinds 1
st
name, nickname to be
ridiculous tainted w/ dishonor or extremely
diIIicult to write or pronounce.
2. 1
st
name or nickname has been habitually
and continuously used by petitioner and
have been publicly known by that 1
st

name/nickname in the community.

That is why I`ve said you execute an aIIidavit Ior
the change oI name and then you attach documents
showing that since elementary you have been using
that name. Change oI sex and name in the Silverio
case was not allowed.