Charles University in Prague Faculty of Social Sciences Seminar: JSM437 - Civil Society in Central Europe Teacher: Pavol Fri

Student: Kristin Kretzschmar

Paper

Civil Society and Democracy in Central and Eastern European countries

Table of contents 1. Introduction 2. Theory of Civil Society 2.1 Sources and Definition 2.2 Interrelation of Civil Society and Democracy 3. Civil Society in Central and Eastern European countries 3.1 Communist Period 3.2 Transitional Period 3.3 Consolidation Period 4. Explanation of the weak civil society 5. Conclusion 6. References

1. Introduction The concept of civil society experienced a revival during the third wave of democratization, as Huntington termed it, especially within the framework of the fall of communist regimes and democratization in Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) 1. There is general consent that there were complex causes, but especially for CEEC mass mobilization and increasing activity of the civil society were assumed of having an important impact on democratization. Furthermore the strength of civil society is associated with democracy, democratic performance and the general strength of democracy (Carothers & Barndt, 1999: 19, Howard, 2003: 165). Many scholars argue, that eventually the strong oppositional associations led to the transition. But after the encompassing enthusiasm of the transition, civil society in CEEC experienced a specific development during the 1990s. Even though institutionally democracy was established, the politic culture was not as vivid as it is thought to be needed in order to consolidate democracy. However, by now the democracy in CEEC can be considered consolidated and since 2004 all of them are members of the European Union. Therefore it is arguable that the concept of civil society simply can be generalized for CEEC, since the communist legacy equipped the new democracies with unique features. In other words: political systems which characterize the CEECs constitute a particular variant of democracy that is specific to this part of this world, we argue that it is possible to talk about a sui gener is post-communist model which is influenced by the legacy of communism and, at the same time, by both the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary Western democracy." ({Kaldor 1977 #23}: 61). In order to prove this thesis three steps will be taken: at first very shortly the concept of civil society and its connection to democracy will be reviewed. In a second step the civil society in CEEC will characterized in the periods of communism, transformation and consolidation. In a last step different approaches are presented in order to explain the fairly low participation in those countries following the transformation. 2. Theory of Civil Society 2.1 Sources and Definition The term civil society was introduced by Aristotle, who perceived it equal to the state. It was used to describe the polity: an association of citizen and to to clearly draw a line between the people organized within the polity and the ones from outside (Adloff, 2005: 17f). In modern science this perception has changed. It is now perceived as a sector different from the state, a realm where people have the opportunity to communicate their interests and associate. Therefore it is also considered the third sector besides the politics and economics (Carothers & Barndt, 1999: 18). A common
1 Even though Central and Eastern European countries refers to many countires, in this paper the focus will be on Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, respectively the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

definition of civil society is the structural-operational definition, advocated by Anheier and Salamon. So defined, the non-profit sector is a set of organizations that are: formally constituted; nongovernmental in basic structure; self-governing; non-profit-distributing; and voluntary to some meaningful extent. (Anheier & Salamon, 1992b: 268). It is argued, that this definition is more precise than other attempts, such as the legal or economic definition, since shortcomings are compensated due to the broad catalog of properties, which also allow to distinguish between the different kinds of non-profit organizations (ibid., 1992a: 139f). Often a normative property is added and it is assumed that civil society is for the public good, but that must not always be the case. Although many civic activists may feel they speak for the public good, the public interest is a highly contested domain. Clean air is a public good, but so are low energy costs. (Carothers & Barndt, 1999: 21). 2.2 Interrelation of Civil Society and Democracy Even though in the scope of this paper it is not adequate to discuss different definitions of democracy, it is sufficient to point out that many definitions of democracy include participation ({Letki 2004 #7}: 665). The idea of connecting civil society to democracy may be traced back to the work of Tocqueville, who argued At the present time, the liberty of association has become a necessary guaranty against the tyranny of the majority. (Tocqueville, 1863: 246). Therefore he connects the privilege to associate with the stability of the democracy (Adloff, 2005: 37f). In contemporary studies several arguments have been made and different approaches may be distinguished. Firstly Putnam argues, that participation leads to more trust and higher social capital. This in turn is considered a prerequisite of democracy as shown in Putnams study of Italy (Kunioka & Woller, 1999: 578f). Furthermore it is argued that due to participation specific values, which are also part of the social capital theory, can be learned (Letki, 2004: 664). Those values, such as tolerance, have the potential to mitigate conflicts and to resolve cleavages in the society and promote a sense of community (Tusalem, 2007: 365). Additionally Skocpol will be taken in consideration. He puts the main focus on the structures provided by civil society in order to influence the political outcome, therefore the civil society is seen as a mediator between citizens and state.(Howard, 2003: 167). Summarized one could consider Civil Society as a forum for active participation and the fulfillment of democratic ideals." (Fagin, 1997: 573), including both: the structure and democratic values. Therefore following two functions can be fulfilled: First, an active citizenry makes it easier for the public to hold government accountable for its decisions. [] Second participation in civic life can be transforming. (Uslaner & Badescu, 2003: 219). However, critics argue that the effect of civil society on democracy should not be overvalued (Howard, 2003: 166). Furthermore it is arguable, that the concept the more the better (Carothers & Barndt, 1999: 21) can be applied on civil society in or3

der to create a stable democracy. Best know example is Weimar-Germany, which had a vivid civic culture, but In the end, the density of civil society facilitated the Nazis' rapid creation of a dynamic political machine. (ibid.: 23). Therefore civil society also always carries the danger that the participation and citizens commitment to a cause will not work out as intended in the first place (Kunioka & Woller, 1999: 579) and sometimes antidemocratic ideas and values can be transmitted within the networks of civil society (Tusalem, 2007: 362). 3. Civil Society in Central and Eastern European countries 3.1 Communist Period In CEEC the civil society bases upon a long tradition, since its foundations were laid already in the 13th century in the frameworks of the catholic church. Furthermore there was for example a strong civil society during the first Czechoslovak republic, which renewed its activity after the war, but was interrupted by the creation of the communist regime. Generally in the communist regimes voluntary associations were centralized and replaced by communist institutions, such as the National Front as an umbrella organization (Fri, Goulli, Toepler, & Salamon, 1999: 289f), which under control of the communist party. In those umbrella organizations participation often was forced or inevitable in order to get ahead but not voluntary (Kunioka & Woller, 1999: 581). Therefore it is arguable if those associations can be considered civil society, since the definition included the attribute voluntarism. Still, formal membership in those organizations was high, but usually with the motive to show support to the regime in order to get ahead, as following example from the Czech Republic demonstrates: "The full degree of organized and state-controlled public life is reflected in the 1972 statistical records of the National Front's Central Committee, which showed 19 million National Front memberships in a country with a total population of 14.5 million at that time, indication the extend of multiple memberships." (Fri, Deverov, Pajas, & ilhnova, 1998: 4). Besides the high level of participation, people did not learn to trust either institutions or associations, since there was always the possibility that a member of the secret policy was present. Trust rather was put into private networks. Those were created in order to assist each other and to compensate economic shortcomings (Howard, 2003: 174). 3.2 Transitional Period Those economic shortcomings and the related economic crisis eventually lead to the dissatisfaction with the regime and people associated (Gill, 2002 : 15). For those associations, or dissident networks the term civil society was central in order to define the realm of action outside of the state (Ehrke, 2000: 21). Still the influence of civil society in CEEC can not be generalized, two transitional patterns can be identified for the considered countries, as summarized in Table 1.

The Patterns differentiate in terms of the role civil society played. While in Poland and Hungary Civil Society was able to be negotiate with the communist party, which eventually lead to the trans formation of the party, in pattern Czechoslovakia the round table negotiations did not include the old leaders. The Polish civil society during the transformation based upon some dissident networks which were created in the frame of the catholic church (Goll: 5). In 1980 Solidarno was found. Even though it was outlawed in 1981, it kept importance and high support. When the crisis continued the authorities started negotiations with Solidarno in 1989. Therefore the round table negotiations consisted of civil society and political leaders (Gill, 2002: 24). In Czechoslovakia, due to the strict policy against associations since the Prague Spring in 1968, the associations emerged later, in 1989 in the frame of the demonstrations. Those associations Obansk frum and Verejnos proti nsiliu negotiated among themselves without creating structures, that could replace communism itself (ibid.: 36).
Tab. 1: Patterns of regime change Label (Goll: 4) Countries Civil Society strong (Goll: 4) Description Civil society forces emerge and become sufficiently strong that, when the perception of crisis takes hold within the regime and the regime splits, the more liberal side of the regime sees those society-based forces as appropriate partners for meaningful negotiations. (Gill, 2002: 24) negotiated regime change Poland, Hungary weak The old regime collapses without any substantive negotiation with civil society forces. Those emergent forces then negotiate among themselves about the future outlines of the political process. (Gill, 2002: 35) collapse of the regime Czechoslovakia/ Czech Republic, Slovakia

3.3 Consolidation period In regard of the Third wave of democratization Fukuyama was very optimistic about the future of democracy and civil society: Western civilization had triumphed over all types of authoritarian systems. Most notorious was the communist system that destroyed civil society in much of Europe (and elsewhere). The new democratic era would lead to a rebirth of civic engagement. (Uslaner & Badescu, 2003: 219). On the other hand it was argued that participation, especially voting: should then be expected to decline in subsequent elections as the excitement of the transition wears off and voters learn that elections are not a panacea." (Kostadinova & Power, 2007: 363). After the transformation two further possible future scenarios especially for CEEC were described by scholars: the prevalence of apathy, lack of interest and low participation in politics(Letki, 2004: 665) was being feared; but contrariwise it was argued that patterns of political engagement created under Communism, such as protests and street demonstrations, may destabilize the fragile, 5

new democracies (ibid.: 665). Even though many new organizations were formed within the new legal framework, participation soon after the transformation decreased again. During the 1990s the CEEC the levels of participation and strength of civil society are below the level, which are considered necessary for a new democracy to consolidate and therefore the first scenario seems to be more accurate (ibid.: 674). The weak civil society during the 1990s is exemplified with the figures in Table 2.
Tab. 2: Assortment of figures symbolizing weak Civil Society in CEEC during the 1990s Poland Structures: Number of NGOs per one million population (Gill, 2002: 115) Participation :Associational Membership 1995-97 (WVS, Howard, 2003: 168) Values: Preference of Strong Leader (NDB III, Kunioka & Woller, 1999: 584); scale: 0=agree, 1=disagree Institutional Trust (NDB III, Kunioka & Woller, 1999: 584); scale: 1= no trust; 7=greatest trust 648 n/a 0.70 3.57 Czech Republic 2669 1.07 0.82 4.02 Slovakia 1797 1.12 0.77 3.80 Hungary 3921 0.82 0.70 3.77

Even though fairly high number of NGOs can be observed, the general associational membership is fairly low. The World Values Survey showed an incredibly low organizational membership for postcommunist states with only 0.91 in average, whereas the average of older democracies is 2.39 and of general post-authoritarian democracies 1.82 (Howard, 2003: 168). Using data from the New Democracies Barometer III (NDB), it was found that in CEEC strong leaders were preferred over parliament, representing democratic values and that the institutional trust is also relatively low. By arguing, that higher level of civil society will ultimately lead to stabilized democracy, on will strive upon the case of Slovakia. This case often was put into contrast to the Czech Republic. Slovakia had during the 90s democratic deficits, but still the participation was higher than in Czech Republic, which was able to introduce formal democratic procedures faster (Kaldor & Vejvoda, 1977: 80). 4. Explanation of the weak civil society Even though the civil society was not as strong as expected, all four countries are now democratic. Above the merit of civil society for democratic transformation and democracy was argued, but one may also ask, to what extend democracy challenges civil society, especially in regard of the findings for CEEC. Reasons for the weak civil society have been analyzed frequently and a set of causes can be identified. Firstly it needs to be mentioned that the possibility to actively participate in order to bring forward interested was fairly new in those countries (Letki, 2004: 665). Howard identifies three factors, that may restrain civil society in CEEC: mistrust, strong interpersonal networks and post-communist disappointment. The explained mistrust toward organizations was not wiped away 6

right after the revolution. The people learned to mistrust, and kept this attitude (Howard, 2003: 174f). But not only institutional mistrust conserved, but also interpersonal trust further declined due to the emergence of ethnic tensions in CEEC, which were restrained under communist rule (Uslaner & Badescu, 2003: 221f). On the other hand where the small private networks still worked basing upon trust to people you know very good, the people did not see the need to participate in public organizations. The last point was the disappointment. The fast shrinking enthusiasm was summarized by the Hungarian sociologist Elmr Hankiss as follows: "If 1989 was the annus mirabilis, then 1990 was the annus esperantiae, 1991 the annus miserabilis and 1992 the annus desillusionis or realismis." (Kaldor & Vejvoda, 1977: 61). Often the high expectations in the future were not fulfilled. Although one could conceivably argue that disappointed people would become more active in protesting against the current system, the general expectation of this hypothesis is that people who are disappointed are less likely to participate in voluntary organizations, and that their disenchantment or frustration will be associated with increasing passivity and withdraw. (Howard, 2003: 176): Furthermore Goll argues, that many organizations had problems to find members, since the people were tired of participation after the enduring mass mobilization during communism (Goll: 6) 5. Conclusion It is obvious, that the generalizations from Western perspective can not simply be applied to the CEEC. Firstly in many Western countries there has been a long tradition of democracy, in which citizen were socialized to trust and participate. But even in those countries the participation decreased heavily over the past decade, as Putnam argues in Bowling alone. Also generalizations made for post-authoritarian states may not always be valid for CEEC, since the legacy of communism and the socialization during communism created a new framework which results in different structures of participation and trust. Therefore the democratic structures interrelated differently with the civil society, in terms of the level of civil society, that can be considered necessary for consolidation, than in Western democracies. Nevertheless, one can not deny, that civil society is positively correlated with democracy: compared with other post-communist states the CEEC achieved better values, that their eastern neighbors, which also needed longer to stabilize democracy, or still could not do so, such as Ukraine or Belarus. 6. References Adloff, F. (2005). Zivilgesellschaft: Theorie und politische Praxis. Campus-Studium. Frankfurt/Main: Campus-Verl. Anheier, H. K., & Salamon, L. M. (1992a). In search of the non-profit sector I: The question of definitions. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 3(2), 125151. 7

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