Ford Motor Company

uurlng Lhe laLe 1980s lnLo Lhe 1990s lord Lxplorers equlpped wlLh llresLone Wllderness Llres were
llnked Lo nearly 130 deaLhs and more Lhan 300 ln[urles ln Lhe unlLed SLaLes alone ln 1999 Lhe flrsL
faLallLles occurred ln Saudl Arabla and noL much laLer slmllar accldenLs were reporLed ln
venezuela lord lmmedlaLely
reacLed by blamlng Lhe weaLher and vehlcle owners for underlnflaLlng Lhelr Llres
Powever lord also began replaclng Llres lL was noL unLll March 2000 when a lord
Lxplorer rollover ln 1exas uSA lefL one of Lhe car occupanLs bralndamaged and
parapleglc LhaL Lhe Amerlcan auLhorlLles lnLervened Lrlggerlng a masslve Llre recall
and a lawsulL broughL by Lhe vlcLlm's famlly 1he case was seLLled ouL of courL ln
!anuary 2001 (8owe 2001) buL by LhaL Llme many more cases and faLallLles were
reporLed and Lherefore nelLher lord nor llresLone could conLlnue blamlng Lhe weaLher
or car owners 1hey lnsLead were blamlng each oLher 1he magnlLude and complexlLy of Lhe
problem was such LhaL nelLher lord nor
llresLone could provlde an accepLable explanaLlon Concerned abouL Lhe company's boLLom llne
and lLs repuLaLlon lord MoLor Company employed whaL mlghL be called an lgnore lL and lL wlll go
away" approach Lo crlsls communlcaLlons
8oLh companles denled
responslblllLy and dld noL reacL as cusLomers mlghL have expecLed buL lnsLead chose Lo
blame each oLher 1he approach Laken by lord and llresLone Lo Lhe managemenL of
Lhe crlsls noL only severely damaged Lhelr cenLuryold relaLlonshlp buL also enabled
oLher parLles Lo explolL Lhls opporLunlLy for commerclal galn


1he lack of a coheslve crlsls communlcaLlons sLraLegy palred wlLh poor managemenL declslons resulLed
ln a sLock prlce drop of $1178 per share Lven greaLer was Lhe damage Lo Lhe company's repuLaLlon
1oday Lhe lord/llresLone debacle ls consldered by many Lo be a LexLbook example of whaL noL Lo do
when faclng a crlsls
$o what did Ford do wrong?
O They didn't put customer safety and needs first.
- They covered up the safety defects for more than 10 years.
- They didn't immediately recall the product once it started
to fail.
O They had no crisis communications plan in place.
- And even when the situation continued drawing national and
international attention, they held off on any formal plan.
O They were reactive, not proactive.
- Jnce committed to a recall, they were slow in approaching
the public and media.
- They ignored a corrective engineering proposal to enhance
the stability of the Explorer, cited among the worst
vehicles for rollovers.
O They weren't a resource for information on the situation.
- Ford CEJ Jacques Nassar didn't attend early House
subcommittee hearings on the issue.
- They didn't hold regular press briefings or press
conferences.
- They didn't provide a way, place or site for consumers to
find the latest information on the tires, the Explorers or
the situation.
- Consumers were left in the dark about how the company was
going to fix the problem.
O They pointed fingers, rather than take responsibility.
- Ford Motor Company repeatedly blamed Firestone tires, in
spite of the fact that crash statistics showed that the
Explorer had a higher incidence of tire-related accidents
than other sport-utility vehicles, no matter the brand of
tire.
- Ford released documents showing that Firestone had received
a disproportionate amount of complaints about the
Wilderness series since 1997.
- Rather than focusing on fixing the problem, they tried to
pass the buck.