THE SEA-RAIDERS OF MALAYA Piracy, Trade, and Authority on the Malay Peninsula, 1819-1914

By Scott Abel A Thesis submitted to the Graduate School-Newark Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey In partial fulfillment of requirements For the degree of Masters of Arts Graduate Program in History Written under the direction of Professor Amita Satyal and approved by _______________________ _______________________ _______________________ _______________________

Newark, New Jersey May, 2011

Abstract of the Thesis

The Sea-Raiders of Malaya Piracy, Trade, and Authority on the Malay Peninsula, 1819-1914 By Scott Abel Thesis Director: Professor Amita Satyal

For centuries piracy and marauding plagued the Straits of Melaka causing the capture of countless vessels, along with the death or captivity of many passengers and seafarers. The practice and suppression of piracy in the context of Malay society and British imperialism during the 19th century reveals its impact on British and Malaysian history. The study employs secondary historical sources for the argument regarding imperialism and piracy in the Straits of Melaka during the 19th century. The decentralized structure of authority and reliance on maritime trade in Malaya during the 19th century contributed to the flourishing of piracy. Previous studies on piracy in Malaya by Tarling and Anderson focused on its political and economic impact, but generally neglected the pirates themselves and the development of a colonial economy. The pirates were economically and politically powerful by raiding throughout Southeast Asia. The marauders from Malaya composed of diverse socio-economic and political backgrounds contributing to extensiveness of the plundering throughout the region. By the 19th century Great Britain became an established power in Malaya with an interest in suppressing what its administrators perceived as piracy to protect the lives and property of British subjects, but the diversity of the pirates made that difficult.

Perceptions on authority varied in each ethnic and political group, but the 19th century witnessed the transformation from a decentralized political structure to a more centralized one under British domination. British authorities actively suppressed piracy and marauding more than the Malay sultans. Piracy preyed on maritime trade, but also existed because of trading and societal conditions. Malay and Chinese seafarers seized vessels for supplemental income without consequence because a lack of centralized political leadership. Furthermore, many seafarers possessed the maritime and martial skills necessary to become marauders during times of strife and conflict. Great Britain reduced the amount of piracy in the Straits of Melaka through a variety of methods including extending political control along the straits, creating state mechanisms for limiting piracy, sustaining economic development, and deploying military power to the region. British domination shook Malaya from its traditions into a territory with a radically different economic and political system.

Introduction The Malays of the 19th and 20th centuries witnessed an unprecedented transformation of their land and society with changes for most of the population ranging from a more structured system of authority to alterations in the ethnic makeup of the population. Piracy, sea-raiding, and marauding restricted trade when left unchecked by authorities. European authority crept over the previous state structures in Southeast Asia over a period of centuries, lacking a single cause for expansion throughout the centuries. Rather, the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and British held portions of Southeast Asia from 1511 to 1974 with different ideas about administration and trade than indigenous powers. The pirates and sea-raiders of the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea came from a variety of socio-economic and political backgrounds and acted outside European authority. The study will focus on the British presence on the Malay Peninsula from the establishment of British Singapore in 1819 to 1914, along with the effects and responses to piracy by the British authorities. During times of political uncertainty and weakened state authority, pirates and sea-raiders grew in numbers and influence. The campaign against piracy by Great Britain was merely the first step in turning the various Malay states into European-style Industrial Age colonial states with some adjustments based on the British perception of the Malays culture. The searaiders influence in Malaya declined significantly by the 20th century in large part because of the establishment of British-influenced institutions. Pirate, sea-raider, or marauder describes an attacker of unknown and known support from a sultan or legitimate political leader in the study. The term pirate will not necessarily reflect the morality of the action at sea in the study, but the lack of

support from a sultan or other significant state leader. Pirates and sea-raiders sailed along the coast, pillaging trade in search of slave labor for sale elsewhere causing disturbances throughout Southeast Asia. 1.1 The Argument The pirates and sea-raiders impacted Malaya immensely during the 19th century, contributing to shifts in native populations by displacing coastal villagers and sea-traders through raiding. Native states in Malaya employed sea-raiders to patrol the coasts and collect additional revenue for the local rulers. The sea-raiders became symbols of authority in some instances, patrolling the sea for the state in maintenance of a local rulers power. Sometimes distinguishing between a pirate acting without the consent of the sultan or a legitimate agent of the state was difficult. The development of the British Straits Settlements altered the economic landscape of the region and brought naval forces into action against native seafarers. British authorities employed incidents of piracy as excuses for an intervention within the affairs of indigenous states in the name of fighting piracy. British authorities differentiated rarely between the sea-raiders acting on orders from a legitimate authority and those acting on their own. Counter-piracy denotes the British attempt to monopolize violence at sea against any action perceived as piracy by them regardless of native perceptions. The British perception generalized all sea-raiders as pirates, while British forces assaulted suspected pirate stronghold without discrimination between those responsible for raiding and those apart of the raiding economy. The virtual elimination of sea-raiding either supported or abetted by native states restructured the authority of the Malay states in favor of Great Britain.

Aside from the cause of piracy on the part of British intervention in British Malay in of itself, the condition of the Malay states encouraged sea-raiding during the 1860s and 1870s and also contributed to the intervention by Great Britain into the same territories. Piracy flourished during periods of weak states, conflict, poor interstate cooperation, and immense poverty. Malayas geography made piratical behavior much easier and provided plenty of hiding places for sea-raiders along the coasts. The social, economic, political, and geographic conditions of the Malay Peninsula during the 19th century made the suppression of piracy by any power difficult. For the weakening of sea-raiding a regional or global power required a strong political presence, while also creating economic development and a social policy that discouraged piracy. The Royal Navys attempt to destroy pirates within the Straits of Melaka marked the first step in the British governments attempt, not necessarily consciously, to consolidate control over the Malay Peninsula. The military policies of the British and East India Company governments sought the destruction of the sea-raiders through armed force. The Royal Navy and private navies in coordination with land forces assaulted marauder strongholds, along with firing upon suspected sea-raiders throughout the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea. The navies patrolled the seas to protect commerce and coastal populations from marauders throughout the 19th century. The Royal Navy bombarded fortifications and British infantry attacked local rulers for allegedly harboring suspected pirates. The military operations made sea-raiding more difficult but failed to stop its perpetrators completely because of the marauders integration within Malayas political, economic,

and social structure. The employment of nonmilitary means by British authorities to weakened the sea-raiders and their supporters to find income through other means. The nonmilitary policies enacted by British authorities included the establishment of various institutions that strengthened the British colonial system in Malaya at the expense of the sea-raiders influence. The limits of military action became apparent through the hit-and-run tactics of the sea-raiders and the inability of the naval forces to kill or capture more of them. Even the destruction of entire marauder villages and fleets simply pushed the marauders to hide elsewhere throughout the East Indies Archipelago. The Malay Peninsula possessed plenty of hiding spots in mangroves and forests along its coast for sea-raiders. To eliminate the sea-raider threat, Great Britain and other European powers needed the full cooperation of local rulers. Civil administrators convinced local rulers to adopt policies favorable to British interests and enhance economic development through public policy. The development of various institutions in Malaya connected segments of society to the British authorities through political, economic, and social policy. Diplomatic and political pressure on Malay states and Chinese factions weakened the support for marauders. British authorities employed strategies of gunboat diplomacy for the application of political pressure on native leaders, along with cooperation with native leaders through advisers and official residents as state administrators. Alliances with pro-Great Britain leaders in Malaya developed British authority there. The British intervention in Malay politics reformed the government through centralization and weakening piracy. Advisers and residents tax collection reform redirected state revenue from tribute, marauders, and stockades to centralized European-style custom duties. The

political and diplomatic actions of British authorities isolated marauders effectively from the rest of society despite their previous significance in society. British economic and social policy turned Malay society away from its reliance on piracy for income to more peaceful and compliant toward British to earn a living. Chinese firms grew through exports of tin to the West and improved efficiency with the importation of European and Australia techniques. The development of infrastructure by British colonial authorities permitted the shipment of greater quantities of natural resources from Malaya. The importation of rubber tree seedlings came through the British government, which also encouraged their growth before the en masse development of rubber plantations. The development of an English-style education system brought the youth of Malaya under the influence of British authorities. The development of civil administration more centralized than prior to the British intervention weakened sea-raiding as an institution. The development of a legal system with English influences prohibited sea-raiding by severing the bonds between marauders and native rulers. The sea-raider became a pirate in the eyes of the law because the state no longer sanctioned their actions. Stricter laws and regulations of maritime commerce, along with stricter enforcement contributed to the decline of piracy within the Straits of Melaka. Judicial reforms for the Straits Settlements for piracy trials resulted in higher conviction rates. Political alliances and anti-piracy clauses in treaties with native states assisted British authorities weaken their political opponents and the institution of sea-raiding in Malaya. British authorities in Malaya also weakened the Chinese secret societies significantly through the development

of police stations and anti-secret society laws. British law and its enforcers weakened the once-powerful marauders throughout Malaya. 1.2 Organization and Structure of the Study The study contains four main sections, each with a subject important to the history of maritime Malaya. Authority throughout the Malay Peninsula, the first chapter, decentralized gradually after the collapse of the Melaka Sultanate in the 16th century until the consolidation of British power in the 19th century. The second chapter on trade and society establishes the important links between piracy and the economy. Explanations of piracy and marauding within the third chapter will contend that various segments of society committed piratical acts for additional income. The fourth chapter will explain the counter-piracy strategies employed by the British authorities during the 19th century. The first chapter examines how a legitimate faction wielded its power into rightful authority and perception differentiated between pirate and official state warship. The decentralized and fractious nature of indigenous Malay politics increased the amount of piracy often because of conflict. When no clear leader emerged after the death of a sultan, factional splits in the state left the Straits of Melaka vulnerable to piratical assaults. The transition to British authority took decades while elements of the old political system remained in place. Eventually British officials dominated Malaya politics through treaties and force, deploying armed forces and other colonial machinery to clear the Straits of Melaka of opponents to British authority including suspected pirates. The second chapter on trade in Malaya will examine the trading patterns and their influences on the region. Maritime trade sailing through the Straits of Melaka tempted

seafarers into becoming sea-raiders even though sea-raiders were often traders themselves. The sea-raiders targeted vessels and their crews usually of non-European origin because of their numbers and vulnerability. Alterations in trade patterns also shifted toward and away from piracy, which ultimately pulled many inhabitants of Malaya away from work at sea to work on land. Developments in infrastructure and the exploitation of the land resulted in the profitability for working within the British system. Malaya as a British colony instituted secular education to prepare children for the workforce and maintain loyalties to the British crown. The employment of economic and social strategies made Malaya more valuable to Great Britain as a colony by making it wealthier and more powerful. The third chapter on sea-raiding will examine the reasons why seafarers risked their lives in capturing other vessels and their implements to accomplish such tasks. The political context revealed a relationship between marauders and political leaders. Marauding possessed a long history within Southeast Asia stretching into the colonial era, but the early decades of the 19th century witnessed particularly brutal raids. The increase of sea-raiding during this period related to the policies of British colonies along the Straits of Melaka. The rampant poverty and intermittent conflicts exacerbated piratical trends resulting in the capture and deaths of an untold amount of people. Pirates within the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea became the first serious resisters of British expansion into Malaya, although their goals were primarily economic rather than political. The marauders in that region came from a variety of backgrounds, whether poor fishermen in need of supplemental income or the members of the ruling class desirous of extra income.

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Great Britain and other nations developed their counter-piracy policy to protect their interests. The counter piracy chapter will examine the methods employed by the British authorities to minimize piracy in the Straits of Melaka and the South China Seas. British authorities employed military and non-military means to weaken the marauders that ultimately reduced the impact of sea-raiders on Malaya. The Royal Navy and private navies hunted pirates in defense of maritime commerce, while administrators and law enforcement made piratical activities more difficult. British authorities employed military strategies to destroy the marauders and their bases of power while isolating them from native rulers. Civilian officials promoted non-military means such as the development of a more effective justice system and developing infrastructure to deter potential pirates. Although British authorities never fully destroyed the pirates of the Straits of Melaka, they diminished the strength of the marauders until their impact was minimal. 1.3 Historiography of 19th Century Malaya and British Colonialism The historiography of the British involvement in Malaya tended to explain that British forces intervened in Perak and Selangor to end the civil disorder and eliminate anarchy, within a global trend in colonization.1 The disorder of the conflict spread
1

Sugta Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006); C. D. Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of British Political Control, (New York: Oxford UP, 1961); J. Kennedy, A History of Malaya AD 1400-1959, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1962); Frank Swettenham, British Malaya: An Account of the Origin and Progress of British Influence in Malaya, (New York: John Lane, 1907); C. Northcote Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-1877, (Kuala Lumpur: Kuala Lumpur University Press, 1964); K. Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, (New York: David McKay, 1964); Philip Loh, The Malay States: Political Change and Social Policy, 1877-1895, (New York: Oxford UP, 1969); Nicholas Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay World, (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1963); Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865-1915, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Carl Trocki, Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore 1784-1885, (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007); Barbara Andaya, Leonard Andaya, A History of Malaysia, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001); J. L. Anderson, Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 1750-1850: Some Economic Implications, Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, ed. by David J. Starkey, E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, and J. A. de Moor, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997).

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from land unto the sea, disturbing people of various backgrounds and means with piracy causing the suffering of innocent people. According to Sugta Bose, the British and Chinese capitalists lobbied the Colonial Office to alter policy to allow for greater protection of their tin-mining investments.2 Charles D. Cowan wrote specifically about the reasons for British intervention in Malaya, arguing that the British abandoned the policy of non-intervention because the potential for economic development with trade shifts in Malayas favor, the fracturing of the native Malay authority, along with the need for protection of British property and trade. Cowan also argued that Whitehall considered the previously mentioned issues, along with the actions of foreign powers. Finally, Cowan argued that Straits Settlements officials and governors acted on their own volition against the will of the policymakers in London, but upon the action of those officials, London did not concede its political gains.3 The mentioned historiography discussed the importance of political and economic factors that contributed to the British intervention in Malaya, but neglected the social aspects of the period that are important to understanding piracy in the Straits of Melaka. The British expansion throughout the Malay Peninsula resulted from a series of rapid economic, political, and social changes from the mid to late 19th century that shook the fabric of Malay society. The Malay Peninsula witnessed great change during the 19th century in large part because of the Industrial Age and the demand for goods that prompted a change in Malay society. The land witnessed an enormous influx of immigrants moving to Malaya and capital for development, exacerbating the societal
2

Sugta Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006), 50-51.
3

C. D. Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of British Political Control, (New York: Oxford UP, 1961), 263.

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problems and political tensions.4 Such issues, along with economic grievances contributed the flourishing of piracy in the region. Aspects of Malay society and cultural constructions contributed to the forcible seizure of vessels as part of a larger historical context of traditional sea-raiding. Pirates composed of no single group, but rather composed of a variety backgrounds and professions. The historiography in regard the history of Malaysia initiated with little focus on social history but included gradually more historical works with social history. Initially, social history of British Malaya and modern Malaysia initiated with the anthropological perspective because historians wrote about their own experiences during their stay in the territories. Frank Swettenham wrote about Malays during his time with them in Malaya through an anthropological manner. Charles Donald Cowan in 1961 and C. Northcote Parkinson in 1964 focused mostly on the politics and economics of the British intervention in Malaya, neglecting any significant note toward social history. That trend changed slowly as historians included more social history in their studies of Malaya such as K. G. Tregonning in 1964, who wrote about aspects of social. Philip Loh focused on British efforts to make Malaya a peaceful and productive colony by establishing a social framework through a variety of policies. Although social history became an important aspect of the historiography in time, the social history approach to piracy remained rare. The pirates and marauders operating from Malaya received some attention almost entirely within the context of British imperialism within the 18th and 19th centuries. Cowan and Parkinson focused on the domination of Malaya through the British perspective with piracy as a means for native factions to gain an advantage over the others. Cowan and Parkinson regarded piracy within the context of British imperialism
4

J. Kennedy, A History of Malaya AD 1400-1959, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1962),187-188.

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but not as a topic in itself. Nicholas Tarling wrote about piracy mainly within the political context of the native Malay states and the encroaching British imperialism. Tarling examined piracy within a social and economic context by placing first-hand accounts within his work, but provided little analysis on the social impact or causes of piracy and marauding. Eric Tagliacozzo focused on piracy as a means of resistance against the European-style state and colonial mechanisms. Pirates freed themselves from the constraints of the modern state by operating outside of it according to Tagliacozzo. Carl Trocki defined the Malay perception of piracy effectively, but focused mainly on their relationship with Johor and Lingga rather than the pirates themselves. The aforementioned works placed piracy within relation to the presence of British authorities because the primary sources were mostly within that context. Other historians focused more on the economic impact regarding piracy and how changing economies eventually weakened the prominence of pirates within Malaya. Leonard and Barbara Andaya placed marauding in the Straits of Melaka within the economic context of shifting demand for goods from Southeast Asia from China to Europe. Also, the Andayas wrote about the weakening marauding through political changes regarding the increased power of British Singapore and the shifts away from trade through native merchant vessels toward an increase of trade with Chinese and European vessels. J. L. Anderson evaluated the economic costs of piracy overall weakening the economy of the region through the massive inefficiencies brought about through forcible redistribution of goods and labor without adding any value to them. The Andayas and Anderson examined the British authorities efforts to counter piracy effectively through a combination of military operations and administrative actions.

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Much of the historiography neglected the pirates themselves and their personal origins in much detail. Although a few historians explained the causes of piracy, only Tarling and Anderson to an extent looked extensively at the variety of ethnic and socioeconomic identities of the pirates and marauders but neither really focused on the reasons for the variety groups to risk their lives to loot other vessels. The socio-economic statuses and ethnic backgrounds of pirates were evident from the types of vessel and equipment they used to attack merchant and fishing vessels. Pirates rarely left witnesses to reveal their actions, so many accounts were witnesses of piratical attack from other vessels. Although Tarling most precisely placed the significance of piracy within the context of British imperialism through the deployment of naval forces, British authorities used a variety of administrative and economic tools to minimize piracy and other nuisances throughout British Malaya. The expansion upon the state social and economic mechanisms of control written by Loh and Tagliacozzo would reveal more about counterpiracy strategies. 1.4 The Geography of the Malay Peninsula and the Establishment of the Melaka Sultanate in Relation to Foreign Powers The geography of Malaya greatly influenced its politics, warfare, and economy throughout its history. A series of hills arose throughout the north and center of the Malay Peninsula forming the river valleys. Most inhabitants resided within the coastal flat areas along the river banks and the land between the sea and hills. Throughout the Malay Peninsula average rainfall ranged between 75 and 125 inches, although Perak witnessed around 175 inches of rain a year. A tropical rainforest covered the land from the coastal mangrove swamps to the hills further inland. The rainforests were so thick

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that walking through them required immense amounts of effort making travel by river preferable particularly before 1870. Once people removed the forest cover, rain quickly eroded the soil often pushing into pockets of fertile land.5 With the thickness of the rainforest residents of Malaya looked to the sea to make a living. The rivers and sea provided more opportunities for most of the people of the Malay Peninsula, whereas rainforest restricted movement and made grain agriculture more difficult.6 Prior to the presence of the European powers, the Malay Peninsula cradled one of the great kingdoms of Southeast Asia, the destruction of which and others similar to it contributed to the shaping of the development of the archipelagos seafaring peoples. Parameswara established the port-state of Melaka circa 1400 CE from a small village on the Melaka River populated by fishermen, who reputedly pirated foreign vessels on occasion. Melakas strategic location offered arable and defensible land, while being along the shortest oceanic route between Indian Ocean and China at a potential chokepoint in the Straits of Melaka.7 Threatened by foreign powers in the region such as Sukhothai and Majapahit, Parameswara negotiated with the Yongle emperor of Ming China after Admiral Zheng Hes 1403 expedition becoming a tributary state to Ming in 1405 in return for protection.8 Parameswara converted to Islam around 1409, assuming the name Muhammad Iskander Shah, although his descendants used both the Indic and

J. M. Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), 3-5. See map (Figure 1).

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 2; Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce: Expansion and Crisis, Vol. 1, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 205.
8

Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 206; Lea Williams, Southeast Asia: A History (New York: Oxford UP, 1976), 47.

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Islamic names until 1446.9 Melaka established itself with Ming protection in its early years as a regional power that eventually became extraordinarily wealthy. Melaka became the dominant power of the straits during the 15th century as trade flourished throughout the region. At the peak of its domination of the straits, Melaka annually imported Indian cloth valued at 460,000 cruzados, nearly the value of twenty tons of silver according one estimate. The citys population swelled to between 100,000 and 200,000 inhabitants according to contemporary accounts with 45 kilometers of continuous settlement from the Melaka River to the River Muar.10 Melakas power and the mass of trading vessels floating through its surrounding waters proved that the region once possessed a stable trading system where are a majority of merchants could trade peacefully without the harassment of state or piratical powers. Melaka provided political stability and economic influence that limited the effect of pirates in the straits. 1.5 The Arrival of the Europeans and the Disintegration of the Melaka Sultanate The fall of Melaka to a new power to the region sent shockwaves throughout the region, contributing to a gradual political disintegration on the Malay Peninsula and around the Straits of Melaka. Alfonso de Albuquerque brought new tactics and strategies from the Mediterranean Sea regarding warfare and trade. As the Portuguese governor, he conquered Melaka in 1511 in an attempt to control the Indian Ocean with its trade for Portugal by capturing key ports.11 The Portuguese failed to maintain the economic control of the Straits of Melaka that their predecessors managed, resulting in a fracturing
9

Williams, Southeast Asia: A History, 48.

1 10

Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 27, 69-70 K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750, (New York: Cambridge UP, 1985), 64, 69.
11

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of political power and the strengthening of their opponents power. Johor, Pahang, Pantani, and Aceh replaced Melaka as regional powers with Aceh in particular challenging Portuguese authority in the region with the assistance of the Ottoman Empire.12 Sultan Mahmud formerly of Melaka sought the conquest of his old capital with Malay help from his state of Johor. The sultan retreated from the Portuguese to Pahang and lived as his old vassals guest, to make matters worse, Ming China refused to help restore him to his capital. Mahmud campaigned from Bintang and later from an advance position by 1517 from a stronghold on the Muar River, assaulting Melaka from 1515 to 1519, 1523, and 1524 with no success. Portuguese forces retaliated, capturing the Muar stronghold and Bintang in 1526.13 Portugal shattered the power of old Melaka and its sultanate never recovered its prestige or control of the straits with the fall of its cosmopolitan capital. Unfortunately for Johor with the old Melaka dynasty at its head, the Portuguese were not the only threat the sultanate as other indigenous empires sought to take advantage of the power vacuum. Sultan Alauddin, Mahmuds son and heir, made peace with Portugal in 1536 and sought Acehs defeat through alliances of convenience with various other powers. Conflicts composed of brutal seaborne assaults on the enemy, during one of which Johor, allied with Perak and Siak defeated an Achinese fleet of 160 vessels in 1540 in the Straits of Melaka. Aceh revived, destroying Johor Lama and taking the sultan prisoner in 1564, but failed to dominate the region.14 Despite it naval power, Portugal failed to command the seas around Southeast Asia.15 The collapse of
1 12

Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 146.

1 13 14 15

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 35, 44. Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 46-47.

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Melakas power resulted in the inability for the sultans to command formerly loyal and obedient vassals and high ministers.16 Neither Portugal nor any of the indigenous powers brought peace to the Straits of Melaka, leaving it plagued with decades of war and discouraged trade. Without a sustained peace, the Malay Peninsula could not regain its position as the home to a great trading entrept. Even the entrance of a new power, the Dutch, in the region failed to fully consolidate power over the Straits of Melaka, rather, actions by the Dutch contributed to the addition of the migrants making a permanent home on the Malay Peninsula. Johor made a treaty with the Dutch to force the Portuguese from Melaka in 1606, but failed to do so for a few decades. Eventually under the leadership of Governor General Antonio van Diemen, Dutch forces captured Melaka in January of 1641 from the Portuguese.17 The Dutch controlled the old entrept, but actions in Sulawesi, otherwise known as Celebes, such as the capture of Makassar contributed to the arrival of a new group, the Bugis who the local Malays hired them for their seafaring and martial skills, despite being initially disliked as newcomers. By 1680, some of the Bugis settled in Selangor on the Malay Peninsula and survived through piracy, along with trading tin and gambier. In the 18th century the Bugis gained power over various Malay sultans and despite being nominally Johor vassal, they became so powerful that the Dutch generally left them in peace.18 Dutch did not unify the region under single authority or create a regional entrept open to all trade, leaving the Malay Peninsula politically fractured.
e

K. Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, (New York: David McKay, 1964), 47.
1 16

Barbara Andaya, Leonard Andaya, A History of Malaysia, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 112.
1 17 18

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 48; Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean, 84-85. Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 58-61.

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1.6 The Arrival of the English East India Company in Malaya The Malay Peninsula had a British presence since the later 18th century given its strategic significance, but limited its foreign policy in regard to native affairs. The ancient Malay State of Kedah ceded the first bit of territory on the Malay Peninsula to the British in hope of protections from foreign powers, particularly from the Kingdom of Siam on its northern border. Sultan Mohammed Jiwa of Kedah negotiated with Francis Light in 1770 to gain military support from the English East Indian Company, although initial attempts failed to reach an agreement for any company support. Francis Light befriended the new sultan, Abdullah, who hired Light to lobby the East India Company for their military support. The East India Company annexed Penang on August 11, 1786 for a settlement in the region, commencing the era of the British presence in Malaya.19 The East India Company intended to use Penang as a base that would not likely come under a large attack from the Dutch to assist in trade with China for the tea. Soon after its establishment, Penang attracted trading vessels from prahus to East Indiamen.20 Thus began the British territorial presence on the Malay Peninsula that eventually consumed it territorially. British intervention in the region did not automatically bring security to the region for all trade, but started their territorial presence on the Malay Peninsula. The transition of power over to the East India Company did not go over well given certain misunderstandings and perceived or actual breaking of agreements, making the Honorable Companys initial territorial acquisitions more forceful than perhaps originally
1 19

D. J. M. Tate, The Making of Modern Southeast Asia, Vol. 1 European Conquest, (New York: Oxford UP, 1971), 102, 104-106.
2 20

Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 70-75.

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expected. Light fought against an alliance of various Malay and Bugis factions, defeating them in battle and later acquired more territory from Kedah in 1800, which became known as Province Wellesley.21 The Directors of the East India Company created a noninterventionist policy for the Malay Peninsula that lasted for decades and aimed to maintain the presence on Penang on the cheap.22 The East India Company sought a trading post at Penang and generally neglected taking on a stronger role in the Straits of Melaka, permitting most of the Malay states to remain sovereign and resulting in a general lack of centralized authority in the region. The leasing of Singapore in January 1819 by Temenggong Daing Abdul Rahman of Johor permitted for the establishment of a British factory there. Stamford Raffles ensured that Singapore remained a port administered through free trade policies with William Farquhar stayed in Singapore as a British administrator. Generally, the East India Company gave substantial freedom to its territories along the Straits of Melaka, while foreign powers left the colonies alone. The Honorable Company wanted to minimize the cost of the territories in the Straits of Melaka, but Singapore grew anyway to become a major trading entrept for global trade routes. Penang, Melaka, and Singapore became the Straits Presidency in 1826 as an effort to consolidate administrative control.23 Despite the increase in trade, the straits trade remained vulnerable to piracy without significant political control along the coasts. Penang and Singapore were not the only British settlements on the Straits of Melaka, but even with additional trading ports, no one power possessed the willpower and ability to unify the peninsula yet. British forces captured Melaka from the Dutch in
21 2 22

Tate, The Making of Modern Southeast Asia, 105, 107.

23

Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 83, 87-88. Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 100-104, 106, 113-114.

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August 1795 without casualties and administered it until 1804 when Penang took over, whose officials wanted to destroy the port to eliminate competition. Ultimately, Stamford Raffles convinced the authorities otherwise, who ultimately demolished the fort in 1807 but spared the town. The 1814 Anglo-Dutch Convention returned Melaka to Dutch control, but the city reverted to British authorities because of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 exchanged Melaka for Fort Marlborough on the Sumatran side of the straits and declared that the two nations would not intervene on their counterparts side of the Straits of Melaka. In the Naning War of 1831 to 1832, Governor Fullerton engaged in an absurd conflict, although ultimately accomplished his mission in subduing his opponents ultimately cost the East India Company 100,000 with little gain.24 The treaty effectively limited Dutch control in the Straits of Melaka, granting security for the British possessions from the only other European power along the straits. The East India Company learned from the futility of the land military operations and avoided them when possible.

2 24

Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 93-97, 102, 111-112.

22

Map of Modern Western Malaysia (Figure 1)

McGinley, Mark. Mark McGinleys Fulbright in Malaysia: Penang-The Pearl of the Orient, January 3, 2011, http://markinmalaysia.blogspot.com/2011/01/penang-pearlof-orient.html (accessed April 2011).

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Map of the Straits Settlements: Extent of British Influence Prior to Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 (Figure 2)
Bartholomew, John and Company, Straits Settlements, The British Empire, http://www.britishempire.co.uk/images3/straitsmap.jpg (accessed April 2011).

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Chapter 1: Authority in 19th Century Malaya: The Establishment of Centralized Authority through British Influence Authority in the Malay Peninsula underwent a transformation because of the British intervention in the 19th century as part of its transformation from a traditional Malay political system to a more Europeanized governmental organization. British domination facilitated the transformation of the peninsula, while also creating mechanisms for the suppression of piracy. People throughout Malay society felt the new system of authority in Malaya from common peasants to the sultans. Various Malay institutions and professions possessed no place in British Malaya according to the bureaucratized administrators who replaced the indigenous Malay authorities. New authorities gained legitimacy as state administrators while the old authorities faded but often did not fully disappear. Maritime marauders lost the most legitimacy of any group, those formerly in the service of a chief or sultan became villainous pirates in the eyes of Europeans. 1.1 The River State: Malay Geography and Politics The indigenous Malay political system relied upon the river as its geographical focus, political authority flowed outwards from the rivers because of the mobility allowed from them. The mouth of the river possessed the capital of the Malay state because of strategic nature of the location as a place to collect tolls and taxes while controlling communication to the sea and beyond. The capital usually had a palace and a mosque as the two most dominant structures. Command of the river gave the ruler the ability to marshal forces in conflict and control his subjects, while the mountains and jungles provided for boundaries with other realms. In 1850, the population of Malaya remained

25

only around 300,000 inhabitants scattered throughout the peninsula, usually answering to a high degree of decentralized authority.25 The geography and politics of Malaya made its inhabitants highly reliant on the river and sea for survival. The rivers were the means of authority, whoever possessed its mouth controlled transportation and communication throughout the river valley. The hierarchy of the Malay political system relied heavily on the power on a few individual officials with the sultan usually as the leader of the state with a variety of supporting chiefs. In the early 19th century, autocratic politicians led Malay states through their personal power with their sultan as the leader who usually came from the royal family and appointed the major state officials. Negri Sembilan and Pahang were the two Malay states without a sultan, with a yang-di-pertuan besar and a bendahara as their respective heads of state. The sultan possessed power over life and death while unifying the state under his rule.26 The yellow umbrella composed of either silk or cotton, symbolized the power of the Malay sultans. The sultan, rajah class or the Malay nobility, and the chiefs commanded absolute power over the common people and commanded them to do their bidding.27 The leaders in society possessed absolute power over the common Malays, creating a society with immense political stratification. The sultan distributed authority throughout some of his constituents who became his officials, but the sultan lacked complete authority in matters of succession. The concept of kingship was not native to the Malays, but rather imported from India centuries before European contact. The Indian travelers conferred the hereditary title of
25 2 26

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 123.

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 124-125.

2 27

Frank Swettenham, British Malaya: An Account of the Origin and Progress of British Influence in Malaya, (New York: John Lane, 1907), 135, 142, 142.

26

rajah upon the river-state chiefs of the Malay Peninsula who formerly ruled by consensus, but a tenet of the ancient consensus system remained within the 19th century Malay system of kingship in regard to the succession of the ruler. The chiefs possessed the right to pass over the rajah muda, or heir apparent, to a candidate deemed more competent to rule. Such debate in regard to the succession of the ruler had potential for an armed dispute upon the old rulers demise, but despite such risks the system endured for centuries.28 The Malay kingship left a structure that granted power based on a hereditary succession in combination with political and military skill. The decentralized Malay political system mixed with a geography that emphasized the use of waterways for travel created a system that partially enabled maritime maundering. A cadre of royal officials helped sultan in the administration of his state dating back to more centralized administrations. The chief minister to the sultan was the bendahara, a Sanskrit title that translated to prime minister or commander-in-chief, who wielded significant power in government affairs. During the period of interregnum, the bendahara became the caretaker to the royal regalia until the new sultan ascended the throne. The temenggong, an ancient Malay title translated as chief of police or chief judge enforced laws, oversaw prisons, and even enforced the standardization of weights and measures during the Melaka Sultanate years.29 The sultan had other high officials at his disposal, including the laksamana or admiral, who defended the sultanate from the sea and guarded the river from state navies and pirates alike. The laksamana advised the sultan how far up the river to build his capital depending on the threat from invasion. Another maritime position was the shahbandar, which translated from Persian to harbor
28 2 29

Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 15, 38.

Tregonning, A History of Malaya, 39; C. Northcote Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-1877, (Kuala Lumpur: Kuala Lumpur University Press, 1964), 43.

27

master, who collected tolls and customs duties from vessels.30 Malay heritage bequeathed a framework of titles to the various leading subjects in the typical Malay sultanate. The significance of the most powerful officials below the sultan often related to maritime control, whether it was defense or revenue collection. The powerful ministers and other officials revealed the organization within the Malay political system as an essentially decentralized with significant amount of power placed within the hands of lesser authorities. Other important ministers to the sultan included the maharaja lela or general in English, the orang kaya besar meaning treasurer and the mantri, which translated to adviser.31 To assist the sultan in daily affairs the penghulu bendahari, or chief secretary, dealt with court correspondences and managed the royal household. The term penghulu derived from an earlier Malay administrative officer of the kampong, the most basic administrative unit in Malay society. Other important posts included the mandulika or governor, who possessed jurisdiction over local issues including the administration of justice and paid tribute to the sultan with the assistance of his chiefs.32 The Malay political system organized along administrative units each controlling various parts of the state, but the state generally remained decentralized with the sultan unable to command sufficient taxation or military might as displayed by the payment of tribute and the lack of direct control throughout the sultanate by the 19th century. In reality, the sultan was usually the most powerful chief rather than the executive or supreme authority of a centralized government.

30 3 31

Tregonning, A History of Malaya, 40.

Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 43.

3 32

Tregonning, A History of Malaya, 5, 40.

28

Political decentralization altered the previously mentioned state structure, making it more factional than during the height of the Melaka Sultanate. By the 19th century the old offices of the Melaka Sultanate that once consisted of a structured hierarchy became decentralized system with former high offices becoming the de facto rulers of a designated territory. The old title positions became virtually irrelevant to their actual duties by the time of the British intervention.33 The sultan still conferred the old titles to the aristocrats, which in combination with military power gave the holder significant status within Malay society. Although members of the aristocracy usually knew each other even when distantly related, the old unified Melaka Sultanate nonetheless decentralized over centuries.34 The decentralized political systems of Malaya fractured the military power of the old sultanate permitting chieftains to wield significant military power. Marauders either worked with permission chieftains or operated outside the political influences because of the weakness of the central state. 1.2 Political Administration within the Malay State The Malay system of taxation in the mid 19th century was informal and irregular with the rajah or chief making arbitrary demands from his populace regarding revenue while expecting absolute obedience and loyalty from his people. According to Frank Swettenham, the rajah expected absolute loyalty and obedience from his people as part of Malay tradition, failure to do so result in drakha, which translated to treason. The rulers taxed irregularly and possessed no accounting of the revenues. The rajahs taxed the people on their land as they pleased and charged a percentage of minerals from mining communities. The taxation method discouraged common folk from saving
33 3 34

Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, 19,

Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, 134.

29

because the rajah could simply seize any savings of food or material.35 Much of the taxation to support the state was tribute collected by the orang laut or sea people from vessels passing by the coast. Europeans often viewed these taxation methods as piracy.36 Malay chiefs and rajahs took materials within their territory expecting absolute compliance in a state system that many Europeans described as piratical. Chiefs and rajahs exercised great amounts of authority over the rest of society in regard to peoples lives on land, which left the commoners with virtually no opportunities to improve their lives. The rights between the rajahs and the raoyat or peasant class of subsistence farmers and fishermen were immensely disparate. Authorities had the right to demand labor from their people, called kerah, who worked on a variety of projects from constructing houses, mosques, and even accompanying their leader on long voyages. The village headmen usually brought the laborers to the work site, while Malay tradition suggested the laborers receive compensation through food, but this was not always the case.37 The common Malays possessed few rights, authority rested with the chiefs and rajahs who ruled with limited state structure often convincing people to live outside of their authority in regard to a life at sea. The Malays used debt-bondage as another means for a rajah or sultan to have the labor needed for various tasks. The Malay ruling class had the right to hold a debtor in bondage, which the formed the ranks of the rajahs retainers and servants because nobody received regular wages. Islamic law prohibited the enslavement of fellow Muslims so
35 3 36

Swettenham, British Malaya, 136-137, 142-143; Kennedy A History of Malaya, 127.

J. L. Anderson, Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 1750-1850: Some Economic Implications, Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, ed. by David J. Starkey, E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, and J. A. de Moor, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), 89.
3 37

Swettenham, British Malaya, 143; Kennedy A History of Malaya, 127.

30

rajahs captured aboriginals or purchased Africans as slaves, but their numbers were few and treated little differently from debt-bondmen.38 The bondman remained such until he could pay off the debt, while carrying out the orders of the rajah or chief he owed. The debt also passed to his wife and descendants until paid, but the services rendered did not count toward eliminating the debt. If the debtor proved to be particularly valuable, the chief could provide him with food and clothing making it virtually impossible to pay off the debt. The chiefs also reserved the right to trade the bondman to other chiefs, requiring the bondman and his family to move elsewhere.39 The common Malay, the raoyat, possessed few rights and had the possibility of living as a virtual slave with little chance of ever becoming free. The treatment of the common Malays demonstrated the relative indifference Malay rulers and administrators had often toward their people and the vast amount of power they possessed over their people. There was an option of passive resistance for the common Malay to escape the chiefs or rajahs should conditions become unbearable. If the chiefs or other authority figures oppressed the common Malays by demanding too much or were unable to respond to a disaster, the chief risked losing his labor. Sometimes in the event of war or some calamity, the common folk left en masse to another district and the chief lost his tax base without labor or food.40 Moving was not as difficult prior to the presence of the British authorities because land was open to settlement. Land possessed little or no commercial value, if a particular plot was more productive than others, a chief could claim it for himself. Otherwise most Malays simply settled on unclaimed lands to grow
38 3 39

Swettenham, British Malaya, 141-142.

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 127.

4 40

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 127.

31

palm trees, fruit trees, and an acre or two of rice.41 Common Malays essentially expressed their power or rejected the legitimacy of authority with their feet by moving to a new district. Relocating to another district did not require the purchase of new property, making the move less difficult than with fixed properties. 1.3 The Autonomy of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya Not all authority rested within the traditional Malay authority by the 19th century because a new wave of immigrants refused to integrate within the traditional Malay societal structure. Chinese secret societies refused to add a layer to the diverse political heritage of Malaya, but rather developed their own relatively sovereign sphere of parallel political structure. The waves of Chinese immigration in the nineteenth century answered not to their Qing emperor, but to ritualistic secret societies that combined spiritual fulfillment with militancy. The Triad Brotherhood was the basis of the Chinese-Malay secret societies and had its basis in the 17th century as a group of rebels bent on overthrowing the Qing Dynasty. These societies eventually turned into bullies who extorted businessmen and traders of all levels to gain funds. Such groups became popular in the immigrant communities of Malaya with the offers of kinship to those of the same linguistic dialect in replacement of their old clan life that sometimes included non-ethnic Han Chinese.42 The parallel authority within each immigrant community throughout Malaya created new powers within the Malay Peninsula that challenged the status quo and ultimately threatened to derail the system of authority within the Malay states.

41 4 42

Swettenham, British Malaya, 136.

Wilfred Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 1, 21.

32

Chinese immigrants in Malaya joined secret societies that rejected the Malay power structure and gave authority to their secret society leaders, which accepted their authority as the most legitimate. Taking a blood-oath of loyalty in a secret ritual for membership in a secret society offered protection and kinship in a foreign land with different customs, languages, and religion. Even if the immigrant initially refused to join a secret society, the societies often compelled an individual to do so. The secret societies possessed great power, even to execute an individual within the Chinese community, which accepted the secret societies authority. The Chinese secret societies fought each other for economic gains and territory usually in preference to fighting with other parallel authorities such as the British administrators, whom they did not generally carry a personal grudge against.43 The development of the Chinese secret societies as a parallel system of government and justice alongside that of the Malay and British factions showed a territory where no single power controlled the others completely. 1.4 The Development of British Authority in Malaya Emanating from Singapore, Melaka, and Penang, British influence in native Malay states generally increased since the establishment of the Straits Settlement as a Crown Colony in 1867 until the outbreak of World War I. The Malay Peninsula states fell into three political categories depending on foreign influences with the transfer of the Straits Settlement to the Colonial Office. The first group of states fell under Siams sphere of influence such as Kelantan and Terengganu, along with Kedah and Perlis to a lesser extent given their proximity to Penang. Johor fell into the second group of being under the British sphere of influence because of its proximity to Singapore and its maharajahs anglophile tendencies. The third group composed of independent states that
43

Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, 2-3.

33

Great Britain had influence over at times but maintained sovereignty in a de jure sense.44 No native Malay state on the peninsula clearly dominated the rest by the mid 19th century permitting foreign powers to vie for influences within the indigenous states. After a few decades since the establishment of the Straits Settlements as a Crown Colony, the British administration gained authority over the Malay Peninsula. By 1875 the British established the first residency system in the region, which left nominal sovereignty with the sultan or state leader while letting the British resident govern in all manners except those of native religion and customs. The process of taking over governing was gradual until authority in most issues shifted to the residency. By 1895, the four Malay states with residents, Perak, Selangor, Pahang, and Negri Sembilan formed the Federated Malay States. A year later, authorities instituted the Straits Criminal Procedure Code as the laws of the federation. The Resident General led the Federated Malay States and answered to the Governor of the Straits Settlements.45 The 1909 Anglo-Siamese treaty transferred Siams authority over Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis to Great Britain. Johor fell into the British sphere of influence officially and received a General Adviser in 1914, but Johor and the other states maintained a degree of independence while under British protection.46 Great Britain dominated Malaya by 1914, removing all other foreign claims to the territory and making it the dominant authority there. 1.5 Conflict over Authority in Malaya between the Factions

44 45

Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 41.

Thomas Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007), 22, 23, 40, 42.
46

Tregonning, A History of Malaya, 171-173.

34

By becoming the greatest power within the Malay Peninsula and by exerting pressure on indigenous states, Great Britain gained a high degree of de facto power within the region. Great Britain exercised power in states before taking actual control over them through sympathetic princes within the Malay world. Tengku Ziauddin or Kudin, the younger brother of the Sultan of Kedah, married Arfah the daughter of Sultan Abdul Samad of Selangor after Raja Mahdi, her former fiance, failed to pay tribute to the sultan. Sultan Abdul Samad appointed Tengku Kudin as the Representative of the Sultan, which Europeans interpreted as the Viceroy, much to the chagrin of Selangor chiefs.47 The appointment of Tengku Kudin, despite being from Kedah, as an important figure in Selangor politics brought him into the complex political system without many allies. To help finance his participation in the Selangor Civil War, Kudin received support from his friend and financial backer J. G. Davidson of Singapore. Kudin used his financial backing in the assistance of Rajah Ismail to besiege the port city of Klang, employing five hundred supporters from Kedah. The assistance of Lieutenant De Fontaine, former French navy midshipman, provided expertise in the deployment of eighteen pounder carronades through dense jungle, which help annex the city in 1870.48 Kudin owed much of his success to foreign powers rather than native support, eventually foreigners with Kudins support played a much larger role in the state. The role of the British as an authority in Selangor increased because of Kudins successes during the war. Sultan Abdul Samad confirmed the opening of his territory to formal British influence on November 18, 1874. Governor Andrew Clarke recommended Frank Swettenham to the position of Resident to Selangor, but Lord Carnarvon overruled
47 4 48

Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 70-71.

Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 73, 76.

35

the installment because Swettenham was only 24 years old and nominated J. G. Davidson as resident on December 30. The appointment delighted Kudin because it secured Selangor from further war and probably his position, too.49 His appointment in Selangor was short-lived and Blomfield Douglass replaced him despite his need for a translator with Malay-speakers in 1876. Kudin became the dominant figure in politics as the President of the State Council formed in 1877, but resigned within year for a pension for him and his wife. Rajah Muda Musa, the son of Sultan Abdul Samad, took Kudins place as president, pleasing the chiefs of Selangor. Musa worked well enough with Douglass and remained in Langat with the sultan.50 The transition from native sovereignty to becoming a British residency took years and was complex but the perception of legitimacy or at least the passive acceptance on the behalf of chiefs consolidated British authority while minimizing armed conflict. The Malay opposition faltered against British domination throughout the Malay Peninsula, resulting in the establishment of British authority in certain states. In Selangor, years of war wore down the populace and the placement of a resident did not face much resistance. Rajah Mahdi gave up the war, spending his days in Singapore with tuberculosis. In Negri Sembilan, the state of Sungei Ujong received a resident for the whole of the confederation after the defeat of the Dato Bandar and the establishment of the Dato Klana as the undisputed ruler of the state.51 In these instances, Malay chiefs played a role in the establishment British authority without the Straits Settlements resorting to a full-scale British invasion.
49 5 50

Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 184-185, 193-194.

Philip Loh, The Malay States: Political Change and Social Policy, 1877-1895, (New York: Oxford UP, 1969), 13-20. 51 Swettenham, British Malaya, 190, 197.

36

The Malay state of Perak, however, experienced the wrath of the British Empire in ways that the other Malay states did not. The Pangkor Engagement of January 20, 1874 established the residency system in Perak, which gave the right of the British resident to collect taxes. The assassination of Resident James Birch on November 1, 1875 and the subsequent conflict nominally led by Sultan Abdullah prompted the Straits Settlements Governor William Jervois requested reinforcements that helped end the conflict by February.52 After the war, Davidson became Peraks resident but resigned shortly thereafter in March 1877. Hugh Low replaced him and sympathized more with Malay culture more than Davdison. Low attempted to make Yusuf, who Malay chiefs passed over twice for becoming sultan, an effective ruler for both the Malays and the British authorities. The Perak government also contained other Malays such as Rajah Dris and Dato Rajah Makhota who helped make decisions in what became a constitutional monarchy, but with the resident clearly in charge of state affairs by 1880.53 After the Perak War, the British colonialists possessed authority over the local government and rulers. The Chinese secret societies evaded the authority of the British administrators over a long period of time and through a variety of techniques. Making a deal with a central governing organization was impossible because the only centralized secret society existed in Singapore under the Ghee Hin Triad, but even that society left room for public disputes. Most organizations fought through murders, street riots, and other acts of violence for territory and economic gains making it impossible for the British authorities to deal with a single secret society to resolve the violence. Chinese secret societies often
52

Metcalf, Imperial Connections, 36, 68,

53

Loh, The Malay States, 3-13.

37

avoided the criminal justice system by making court testimonies difficult and subjecting potential opponents to pressure. The Chinese community feared the repercussions of the secret societies. The Malay states taxed the Chinese societies but could not control them as displayed by the civil wars.54 The secret societies managed to remain fairly independent from British control for years, but maintaining such abilities proved difficult. The British administrators gained a degree of authority over the Chinese secret societies, bringing the Chinese community in line with English Common Law. Initially, Straits Settlement governors considered the secret societies an issue for local police, but by 1866, Governor Cavenagh decided that dismantling the secret societies required more effort than that of the municipal police. An 1867 Penang riot resulted in the enactment of the Act for the Better Preservation of Peace, which prohibited the carrying of weapons and gave the governor the right to expel non-British subjects from the colony, along with other powers to disperse mobs. W. A. Pickering arrived in Singapore in 1872 as a translator for the Chinese and a year later became the protector who intermediated between the Chinese community and the colonial government. Pickering had some success, but the societies went underground. In 1888, Governor Clementi-Smith required all societies with ten or more people to register with the government and reserved the right to declare certain societies unlawful. Membership in an illegal secret society was punishable by six months in prison and three years in prison for managers. The government banned ownership of Triad paraphernalia and set up branches throughout Malay to settle disputes among the poor for the reduction of conflict. Despite such efforts, the secret societies continued to extort businesses.55 The colonial forces

54 55

Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, 1-4. Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, 4-7.

38

consolidated their authority within the cities with a degree of success that controlling secret societies remained important to maintaining British power. A degree of authority from the British administrators came from a lack of personal bitterness that inhabitants of Malaya felt at the time in regard to falling into the British Empire. The Chinese secret societies living in British territory usually did not personally resent the British government, but wanted to be left alone.56 During the bombardment of Kuala Selangor in 1871 by HMS Rinaldo, British targeted Rajah Mahmud and later British officials requested Sultan Abdul Samad hand him over to them.57 Rajah Mahmud fought against British forces in service of the Dato Bandar. Despite fighting against British forces, Rajah Mahmud joined the services of the Englishman Frank Swettenham and probably saved his life in the aftermath of Resident Birchs assassination in Perak. For his complicity in Birchs murder, the British government banished former Sultan Abdullah to the Seychelles, but he relocated eventually to Singapore.58 Mahmud and Abdullah lived amongst British subjects even after fighting them, and therefore they probably did not hate the British authorities. If a majority Malays and Chinese personally resented British authority, the colonial government could not have established a successful colony in Malaya. 1.6 Identity and the Civil Service within the Politics of Malaya British authority stemmed from its administrators and members of the armed forces who turned Malaya into a territory developed along European lines. The Malay Civil Service played an essential part in making Malaya a success story by acting
5 56

Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, 3.

5 57

C. D. Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 86-88.

5 58

Swettenham, British Malaya, 190, 203.

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independently to a large degree from Whitehall. The backgrounds of members of the Malay Civil Service were from relatively diverse social backgrounds. Her Majestys government dispatched Hugh Clifford, the nephew of the Seventh Lord and Governor Welds cousins son, to Perak. Frank Swettenham and William Maxwell graduated from minor Public Schools, whereas Tristram Speedy was the son of soldier serving in India before becoming a Sergeant Major in the Penang police force with Sikhs. Most of the Malay civil servants admired the Malays and their culture.59 Frank Swettenham advised Malay civil servants to participate in Malay culture and learn from it by participating in everyday life and speaking the Malay language in efforts to understand the culture while listening to opinions to earn the trust of the Malay people. In return, Swettenham explained, Malays placed loyalty, generosity, and hospitality to person who earned it even if they were a foreign agent.60 A significant degree of authority and legitimacy with the Malay people came from the ability of the Malay Civil Service to listen and work with them on the issues they cared about. A part of giving the British colonialists authority required a sense of common identity or purpose in Malaya. During the era of British colonialism in Malaya, the inhabitants of the land became British subjects in law when born in British Crown territory, but being born legally a British subject did not necessarily equate to being British culturally. The British Empire tied diversity of ethnic groups, especially in Malaya, in a manner much more challenging in nation-state system because the imperial system gave a sense of legal equality under the crown. A subject in a British protectorate allowed the individual to own a British passport. Though many Englishmen rejected
59

J. de Vere Allen, Malay Civil Service, 1874-1941 Colonial Bureaucracy/ Malayan Elite, Comparative Studies in Society and History 12, no. 2 (1970), 149, 155-156, 157; Loh, The Malay States, 72.
60

Swettenham, British Malaya, 133-134, 140.

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concepts of equality, a number embraced Malay culture such as police inspector Hubert Berkeley of Perak, who rode elephants, wore traditional Malay clothes, spoke fluent Malay, and often attended Malay shadow puppet shows. By 1907 in Singapore, the nationalism of Chinese-British subjects pleased the Duke of Connaught who was glad to see unity with the crown. In Perak and Singapore, pride in accepting British authority took some time to develop as during Queen Victorias Jubilee in 1887, the populace appeared less enthused regarding the event than ten years later during the Diamond Jubilee. The 1897 celebration showed greater national pride in Singapore, Penang, and Perak with parades, Union Jacks, fireworks, and Jubilee memorabilia.61 The acceptance of a British identity legitimized British colonial authority and integration within the empire. Conclusion Authority in the Malay Peninsula underwent a transformation from the establishment of the Straits Settlements as a Crown Colony in 1867 to the domination of Malaya by Great Britain by the end of the century. The independent Malay states possessed decentralized governments with local chiefs having a great deal of autonomy and independence from their leaders. With such a large number of relatively independent chiefs, pirates thrived in the Straits of Melaka when tolerated by the local rulers. British authority united the land in an unprecedented manner, placing constraints on local power while strengthening the central governments. Restrictions on factional power did not limit themselves to the Malay indigenous states, but also affected the Chinese secret societies, whose power weakened over the years. According to Emily Sadka, the newly-

61

Lynn Hollen Lees, Being British in Malaya, 1890-1940, The Journal of British Studies 48, no. 1 (2009): 76-101.

41

centralized authority based in Kuala Lumpur with executives focusing more on economic development rather than preserving the traditional way-of-life.62 The movement of the capital away from the mouth of a river symbolized the loss of authority once enjoyed by the river-state chiefs to the imperial administrators of the British Empire. The decentralized manner of native Malay politics and the harshness of political rule by the ruling class contributed greatly to the prevalence of marauding around Malaya. Political decentralization mixed with internal strife or conflict created conditions where marauding thrived, whereas coordination between various rulers and peace limited the extent of piracy. The increased power of British authorities in Malaya weakened the strength of the marauders greatly by the 20th century through greater centralization and coordination within the British political structure. British administrators managed political relationships with the relatively autonomous Chinese community through intermediaries and the ruling class of Malaya through residencies and councils. The management of formerly independent states in Malaya by British civil servants eroded the support marauders once enjoyed. A collective British identity emerged in Malaya during the late 19th century altering many perceptions regarding authority and consolidated British power. The increased centralization and coordination brought about by British authorities in Malaya weakened the marauders base of support, decreased the opportunities available to them during periods of conflict, and increased the opposition to the marauders until they became much less consequential by the 20th century.

62

Emily Sadka, The Protected Malay States: 1874-1895, (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1968), 373, 380.

42

Chapter 2: Trade and Society in Malaya: The Development of a Colonial Economy through Resource Extraction and Education Malay society composed of many different ethnic groups and possessed a tradition of maritime trade in region at an important crossroads of the world. Seafaring was an essential form of travel throughout the Malay Archipelago as an important form of transportation. Therefore, many Malays possessed the seafaring skills necessary to sail effectively, along with the martial experience and equipment necessary to seize vessels. Traditional professions within the Malay world such as fishing and agriculture relied on nature, which was not always reliable. There was no single trade or societal issue that pushed people toward violence at sea rather an amalgamation of issues drove people to piratical activities, but changes in authority incurred punishment for committing such actions. Trends in the global economy and politics turned many Malays and other groups to new work within the sphere of British authority corresponding to its ascendancy in Malaya as it became more integrated into the British imperial system. The economy and society of Malaya during part of the 19th century created an environment where piracy thrived because the types of skills required for the economy and the variety of societal factions fighting for their interests. An economy dependant on fishing and sea trade gave seafaring skills to a large proportion of the workforce. Ethnicity partially delineated various factions with in Malayas politics and economy, which played an important role in determining the dominant political powers within Malaya. The economic development of Malaya came with increased foreign intervention ultimately leading to a degree of unification among the various Malay states. The economies of the British Straits Settlements altered the economy of the mainland by

43

increasing demand for native products creating imbalances within the societies of the Malay Peninsula. The imbalances created fertile ground for conflict between the various factions. The British economic policy and foreign-born businessmen influenced Malaya through improved mining, large plantations, and a secular education system built on imperial values. The increased economic and social influence of the centralized authority weakened the strength of pirates until they became a mere nuisance. 2.1 Early Malay Economy: Subsistence Farming, Trade, and Fishing Malays relied much of their economy prior to the 19th century on the growth of crops for subsistence agriculture as part of a centuries-old tradition. By the 15th century rice became the dominant staple crop of Southeast Asia, with Melaka importing large quantities of rice during its days as a great entrept. At the end of that century, thirty Siamese junks transported rice to Melaka a year, while Java exported between fifty and sixty junks with cargoes of rice a year as the regions largest producer of rice. The Malays of the region, especially after the fall of Melaka, became less reliant on rice as staple crop. Sumatrans consumed wild roots, leaves, and herbs when their rice crops failed, making them less vulnerable to famine than other more stratified cultures in China and India.63 For some of the other agriculture on the Malay Peninsula prior to the 19th century, farmers sold crops for export such as in Kedah that produced pepper during the 17th century for export.64 For Malays, rice remained an important staple in their diet and a significant part of their agricultural economy, but also relied on the maritime trade of agricultural products for their economy.

63

Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680: Vol. I The Lands Below the Winds, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 18-23.
6 64

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 201-202.

44

Besides agriculture, fishing was of great importance as the Malay fishermen remained the most renowned part of the economy of the Malay Peninsula for centuries. Fish and rice were the two most important staples in the Malay diet and Malays often drank fresh water as their chief drink.65 In John Crawfurds 1820 History of the Indian Archipelago, he noted the significance of fish, usually either dried or pickled for storage and commerce as part of the Malay daily diet. Crawfurd praised how effectively Malays caught their fish and the fishing trades importance to the overall economy. Malay fishing boats worked in teams by dragging seine nets together and in another technique set up nets on bamboo and cane enclosures to trap fish. Virtually all coastal families possessed small nets and lines for fishing. The extent of fishing astonished foreigners, even the Zheng He expedition noted the inexpensiveness of fish and that fishing was the most common male profession in Melaka.66 The importance of fishing was essential to the daily lives of the coastal and riverside settlements of the Malay Peninsula, contributing the seafaring ability of many Malays. With many Malays capable of sailing along an important trade route, there remained the possibility that fishermen in need of supplemental income resorted to piracy. 2.2 Ethnicity in Malaya: Power through Trade and Warfare Halfway through the 19th century, variety of ethnic groups from throughout the world inhabited the Malay Peninsula and sometimes allied with each other in various political struggles. Various groups composed of what became a collective Malay identity, composing of foreign Malays from Sumatra and natives alike. Some of the Sumatrans belonged to the Minangkabau people, who formed the confederacy of Negri
65 6 66

Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 5, 36.

Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 29, 243.

45

Sembilan.67 The Bugis, formerly of Celebes or Sulawesi, migrated to the Selangor estuaries by the 1680s and established their own sultanate in 1742 with its capital at Kuala Selangor.68 Other influential groups included the Arabs and the resurgent Chinese who established mining settlements starting in the 1820s. Indians remained a small community on the peninsulas west coast at the time.69 The ethnic groups of Malaya were not usually unified but usually then in turn divided into further groups, which sometimes fought each other despite relatively similar heritage. In many instances, friction between various groups led to conflict that often spilled over into the sea. The sea traders of the Straits of Melaka and beyond relied on maritime trade to survive, relying mostly on their own labor to collect goods. Much of the population composed of linguistic Malays, orang laut, and Bugis who relied upon the sea for their economic, social, and political way-of-life. These maritime peoples sailed in search of trading commodities along the various rivers, straits, islands, and swamps up to the coastline to live through maritime trade of various small goods.70 Maritime traders generally collected goods for trade between February and May financed if necessary through local chiefs who provisioned them in exchange for a percentage of their profit from trade with China.71 Traditionally, relatively small-scale trade for the orang laut and other maritime groups provided for relatively little demand without excessively depleting natural resources for long-distance trade over several months. The orang laut, Malays,
67 6 68

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 124; Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 156.

Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 270-272.

6 69

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 124.

7 70

Carl Trocki, Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore 17841885, (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007), 58.
7 71

Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 134.

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and Bugis were remarkable seafarers capable of sailing long distances with great skills at sea. Groups formed makeshift alliances to leverage their power for economic and political advantages, sometimes repeatedly switching sides within the same conflict. One group of Sumatran miners switched sides twice during the seven year Selangor Civil War seeking better conditions. The miners sided with Rajah Mahdi when he revolted against Rajah Abdullah in hopes of better mining conditions in 1866. Rajah Mahdi and his allies besieged the port city of Klang for control of the mines upriver taking it within the year. The Sumatran miners deserted Rajah Mahdi because of the equally poor conditions under his rule. During the second siege of Klang in 1869, the Sumatran miners allied with Tengku Kudin to attack Rajah Mahdi and his forces. Kudin allied with Yap Ah Loy, the Capitan China or leader for the Hai Sen Chinese of Kuala Lumpur, who also once allied with Mahdi.72 The Sumatran miners fought in their own interests but pledged loyalty to the faction that offered the best deal, fighting for their own interests as a group. The Sumatrans also displayed their independence with Malay society overall by pledging allegiance to the most favorable leader. 2.3 Singapore: The Emergence of an Entrept in Malaya The re-emergence of Singapore as a trading entrept brought the shifts in trade and in Malay society that brought British authority deeper into Malay affairs. Singapore developed along the lines of the traditional commercial port like Melaka, but with different political loyalties. Thomas Stamford Raffles wanted an open a route to China in the hopes of reaching that market for British exports. Singapore offered an abundance of drinking water and being at the opening of the Straits of Melaka, its establishment in
72

Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 284, 285.

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1819 prevented any revival of native Malay kingdoms through its competition as an entrept. Raffles created an economic policy that ensured free trade in Singapore, which made the port competitive in a world with protectionist tariffs commonplace. Furthermore, the perception of legitimacy regarding the acquisition of Singapore made it more difficult to justify its destruction through military action by native forces.73 Singapore offered great prospects for its inhabitants, bringing trade from throughout the world under the auspices of British authority. The presence of the port in British hands greatly shifted the balance of power in the region. The development of trade through Singapore brought British trade interests, among others, into the Malay world but did not intervene extensively within its societal and political structure for a few decades. At the time of its annexation in 1819 in accord with the Johor Sultanate, Singapore possessed between one hundred and two hundred inhabitants who were not numerous enough to transform the small fishing hamlet into a bustling port. Johor eventually became economically tied to Singapore, integrating the state to Singapore to the point when they became important parts of each others economy. The Straits Settlements of Penang, Singapore, and Melaka became the main centers of trade for the Malay Peninsula but operated outside of its traditional political structure.74 During its initial decades under the East India Company, the Straits Settlements focused generally on economic growth and trade to increase its importance and influence rather than dominate the peninsula militarily, leaving a power vacuum that piratical factions and sea raiders filled.

73 74

Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 114-117.

Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History, (Crows Nest, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2004), 86, 117.

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The population of Singapore was not of the traditional Malay composite, but more cosmopolitan with its inhabitants of various backgrounds and cultures. A large number of the immigrants sailed from India and China to work in Singapore, eventually overshadowing the native Malay population. Five years after its establishment, Singapore composed of over 10,000 inhabitants with Malays composing of over 4,500 and the Chinese accounting for 3,500. Twenty-five years after its incorporation, Chinese inhabitants achieved a majority of the population. By the mid 1840s, the overall population of Singapore reached 52,000 inhabitants with approximately 32,000 Chinese residents filling most of the trades throughout the port. In Singapore, many Chinese immigrants found commercial prosperity with some becoming wealthier than Europeans.75 The numbers and wealth of the Chinese allowed members of that community to have a significant amount of power within the region. Chinese maritime trade came to account for a significant component of the overall trade within the region giving or revealing Chinese seafarers skill in sea travel. The administration of Singapore under British authority coincided with shifts in trade patterns, particularly in regard to maritime trade. Native seafarers declined proportionally in Singapore with fewer native vessels calling there. From 1829 to 1830 Malay prahus composed of 23% of Singapores maritime trade in contrast to 1865-6 when prahus composed of 8% of vessels calling at Singapore.76 Besides European vessels, Chinese merchant vessels docked increasingly at Singapore, jumping from four large junks in 1821 to 143 in 1856-7. Rather than acting as a major port for English products for export to China as Raffles initially hoped, the Chinese importers purchased
75 7 76

Osborne, Southeast Asia, 117-118.

Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 135.

49

goods native to Malay lands, which became known as Straits Produce by the English. Chinese merchants usually purchased products from the marine and forest environments of Southeast Asia, such as camphor, beeswax, rattan palms, birds nests, and seaweed. Demand for forest goods resulted in a closer relationship between collectors of the products and the merchants, altering the traditional systems and straining the local ecology. The orang laut once sailed the seas of Southeast Asia as traders became agents for collecting forest resources by the mid 19th century, while the aboriginal forest dwellers extracted resources in greater quantities than before.77 The maritime economy of the Straits of Melaka changed from Malay domination to domination by other groups. Changed times brought certain traditionally maritime groups away from the sea to find work on land. 2.4 Agriculture and International Trade: The Changes in Malayas Economy The economic changes were not limited to Singapore Island, but spread throughout the Malay Peninsula, increasing the influence of the Chinese in the region initially through agricultural products. Johor developed economical links with Singapores merchant community given its close proximity, which allowed Johor to export fresh water and food to Singapore. Chinese agricultural settlements in Johor planted crops including gambier and pepper.78 Gambier helped develop Singapore during the 1830s especially with elimination of its duties in Great Britain in 1834, permitting the purchase by tanners for tanning leather black and others for dying in general. Chinese planters had more success than their European counterparts who attempted to grow coffee, cotton, and tea. In Melaka, Chinese planters combined gambier and pepper with
77 78

Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 136-137.

Osborne, Southeast Asia, 119.

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tapioca in concert with each other to improve the overall ecological and financial success of the plantations. The demand in China accounted for a higher proportion of revenue in Singapore of 19% in 1848-9 as opposed to 16% for Europe, although Chinese demand revenue later dropped to 12% and Europeans rose to 25% in 1868-9.79 Early Chinese planters helped Singapore succeed as a viable settlement and port while independently making inroads in Malay territory, thus growing foreign influence there. The commercial shift to Europe made piracy more difficult because the increased difficulty regarding the seizure of European vessels. The demand overseas for exports through the Straits Settlements shaped Malay society and trade even without the necessary presence of British authorities within the Malay states. The demand for products shipped through Singapore contributed to the accumulation of capital by Singapore residents including those originally from China. Europe and America increased demand for gutta percha, a type of tree used similarly to the rubber tree decades latter. The rise in demand came around the 1840s, the resin of which easily conformed to molds when heated and became particularly useful for the manufacture of buggy whips. Gutta percha rose even higher in demand with the discovery that processed resin sealed the submarine telegraph cables effectively. Malays and the orang asli80 of the forest brought much gutta percha to port for sale, for some as a substitute income for trading and piracy in the former group, creating revenue important for the survival of the Straits Settlements. The cultivation of the plant resin was deeply
79 8 80

Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 137, 139.

Orang asli, translates to original people, descend from the ancient inhabitants of the peninsula and live in isolated communities throughout the forests. Malays considered them savages and hunted them as slaves particularly during the 18th and 19th centuries. Slave traders hunted them down, killing all adult males and then selling the women and children into slavery or presented them as gifts to local rulers. Colin Nicholas, Orang Asli, http://www.magickriver.net/oa.htm.

51

flawed because the orang asli, often slaves held by Malays, harvested it directly from nature and usually in a manner that killed the tree, forsaking their animist ideals of appeasing the spirits to meet the demands of Malay and Chinese middlemen.81 The demand for gutta percha displayed the shift in demand for goods from the Straits Settlements toward Europe, which exemplified the economic and social shifts occurring in the Malay Peninsula. Former maritime Malay maritime traders and pirates found different ways to earn a living more in line with European economic demands. The mismanagement of the gutta percha plant suggested that Malay society failed to reach the demands of the European market on its own, rather requiring huge changes to the overall administration of Malay society if it were to meet that demand. Rather than cultivating gutta percha on a plantation and extracting the resin slowly in a relatively controlled process, harvesters of the plant caused ecological and economical problems by destroying too many gutta percha trees. Collecting enough resin for one pikul, roughly 62.5 kilograms required the destruction of ten full grown trees. The export sales of gutta percha to Singapore jumped from $5,239 in 1848 to $139,317 in 1866. British and Chinese investors shied away from investing in gutta percha enterprises mainly because of their reliance on the orang asli to collect the substance and the forced labor used by Malays to gain their services.82 The Malay business model was unworkable for the demands of the Europeans because it yielded too little and required the employment of morally questionable labor sources. To meet the demands of the foreign market, investors needed a new economic model that required a different labor source and more effective resource extraction methods.
81 8 82

Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 137-8.

Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 138, 139.

52

2.42 Mining in Malaya: The Development of an Industrialized Economy The need for a foreign business model became clear with the increased demand for the mining and extraction of tin, which native Malays generally devoted less of their lives to. By the 1850s politics and economics changed sufficiently with the Malay rulers recognition of the value of the Chinese laborers and the realization of Chinese financiers of the potential value of the tin deposits in the Malay Peninsula.83 Financiers found too few Malays willing to quit their lives as subsistence farmers for a new life in the tin mines. The mining settlements were relatively far away from traditional Malay villages during the 1840s and 1850s, leaving little reason start over as fulltime miners.84 The traditional Malay method for tin extraction required the digging of channels, filling it with a stream of water, and then the hauling of the soil into running water. The water washed away the soil and the miners collected the remaining tin, a process which permitted extraction on a small scale useful for subsistence farmers and fishermen. The Malay chiefs benefitted from the increased production of tin as the traditional methods yielded them little revenue, because the Chinese financiers promised mining rights fees and other forms of income.85 The invitation of foreigners to work on Malay land represented potential incomes that the indigenous Malays could not offer, letting the Chinese in appeared to be in their self-interest, but that was often not the case in the long term. The Chinese immigrants became quite successful by filling the tasks other groups neglected to do in large numbers, turning the economy of Malaya into a more
83 8 84

Osborne, Southeast Asia, 119.

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 129-130.

8 85

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 192.

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economically-developed society. A large number of the Chinese immigrants found employment in low-paying basic labor positions such as coolies at the mines. Others took positions as kitchen hands and gardeners, while more skilled laborers took careers in carpentry and as clerks. Few other groups filled positions such as small shopkeepers, which often succeeded because by moving into the rice industry.86 The Chinese method of extracting tin ore, know as the Lombong method, which started with trial boring in search of the mineral. After a successful trial, miners dug a large hole in the ground with tin bearing soil brought to the surface in baskets and dumped it into a water-carrying trough. In the trough, workers, sometimes women and children, separated the tin ore from other minerals with smelting sometimes done elsewhere. On site smelting included alternations of mangrove wood and coal under a brazier connected to pipes which drained away the molten metal.87 The Chinese techniques increased productivity but required dedicated miners rather than traditional Malay part-timers, along with a substantial amount of capital to pay for equipment and labor. The sheer numbers of workers required for mining molded the demographics of Malaya. Malay states possessing substantial tin deposits brought in more Chinese to extract the tin for sale on the global market, bringing in large numbers of fairly independent foreigners for work. In Perak, a minor chief named Long Jaafar brought Chinese miners to Larut to extract tin, which made him the wealthiest Malay in Perak and expanded his political power and independence greatly. His son, Ngah Ibrahim succeeded him in 1857 and the sultan confirmed his position a year later, along with receiving $200,000 a year by the early 1860s in tin revenues. Ibrahims income
86 8 87

Osborne, Southeast Asia, 122-123.

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 192-3.

54

permitted him to own a European-style bungalow, purchase two steam-powered yachts, and hire a Penang lawyer, along with enough power to convince the sultan to appoint him Mantri of Perak. At one point 40,000 Chinese resided in Larut in connection with the mining industry, to help control such a large population Ibrahim hired Penangs superintendant of police T. C. S. Speedy for security.88 The rapid rise of Larut and large increase in a population without a single political authority powerful enough to keep a peaceful society created social, economic, and political imbalances throughout the state leading to a significant amount of violence. Selangor also possessed an abundance of tin reserves within its lands leading to great opportunities in trade and society for that state. Rajah Jumaat attracted miners to extract tin in his district of Lukut, bringing in $120,000 a year in revenues with 2,000 miners. Rajah Abdullah, brother of Jumaat, received the Klang valley in place of Rajah Mahdi. Jumaat also pushed his candidate, Rajah Abdul Samad, successfully for sultan. In 1857, chiefs voted down a proposal for a centralized treasury and uniform tariffs to prevent income inequality. The development of mines in Klang valley flourished while miners exhausted the Lukut mines by 1860. Abdullahs new mines developed at Ulu Klang, a short distance from the river port and storage center at Kuala Lumpur. The populations swelled to five times that of the whole of Selangor in the 1840s with two prominent Chinese groups being Ghee Hin centered in Kanching, and Hai San around Kuala Lumpur and Ampong. Foreign financiers also partook in the Selangor economy with Abdullah renting tax farms to businessmen Tan Kim Cheng and W. H. M. Read.89 The indigenous chiefs refused to reform their political and economic system despite its
88 8 89

Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 273-274.

Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 282-284.

55

obvious problems. The arrival of foreigners in Selangor in large numbers created an imbalance in trade and society leading to problems of violence throughout the state in time with no native force capable of controlling all the factions without significant allies and a long war. Chinese labor and mining techniques helped but did not fully solve the mining problems and therefore used British help and technology to boost productivity and safety. To prevent flooding of the mines, Resident Hugh Low of Perak introduced the steam engine and centrifugal pump to the Chinese miners. Yap Ah Loy purchased two steam engines for greater depth of mining and improved safety for the miners, along with importing the techniques of hydraulic sluicing and gravel pumping from Australia. Furthermore, techniques such as tin dredging also increased the productivity on the mines in Malaya. Smelters developed in Singapore and Penang in 1887 and 1897 respectively made transport much more efficient.90 The development of the tin industry created great disparity within Malay society before the British intervention contributing to war and piracy in the region. The relationship between Yap Ah Loy and Europeans showed a degree of cooperation under the mantle of a centralized British authority. Improved logistics through a centralized planning made possible by the state made shipping more efficient during the late 19th century. The development of railroads permitted the transport of the metals from the mines to the ports much faster and in greater quantities than previously possible. The development of the steamship enabled much faster transport of goods from Malaya to Great Britain, a steamship sailed from Singapore to London in five weeks, which the Suez Canal cut even further upon its completion in 1869. The British tin plate manufacturing that increased dramatically since
90

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 193-194.

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the 1850s powered economic growth for the Malay Peninsula.91 The success of Chinese miners through the adoption of European techniques helped certain factions become extraordinarily powerful and wealthy. Development of Industrial Age infrastructure required a centralized government system to facilitate long-distant trade of high volume goods and coordinate protection against raiders. 2.43 Plantations: British Authorities and a Developing Economy Rubber became a symbol for British Malaya and modernization because British botanists brought the rubber plant to Malaya for plantation agriculture. After the Kew Botanical Gardens collected rubber plant seedlings in 1876 twenty-two seedlings arrived at the Singapore Botanical Garden in 1877 and eventually Hugh Lows Residency in Kuala Kangsar, Perak. Planting the rubber trees required substantial patience because rubber trees required five to six years before tapping. Henry Ridley, Director of the Gardens of Singapore, set out to convince planters to grow rubber as early as 1888. In 1896, Tan Chay Yan of Melaka agreed to plant four acres and a British coffee estate agreed to plant five acres of rubber. By 1905 the production of rubber throughout Malaya reached 200 tons, while Ridley improved the tapping methods to increase output while minimizing damage to the tree. By World War I the demand for rubber skyrocketed and production in Malaya soon followed.92 With the help of British botanists, Malaya became an exporter of rubber throughout the global market and became a valuable resource provider to Great Britain increasing its wealth immensely. Foreigners introduced many new types of flora through the plantations, particularly after the British intervention in Malaya. By 1875 palm oil arrived in
91 9 92

Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 139, 194.

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 203-204.

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Singapore as seeds to be planted in botanical gardens and by the 1900s planters grew it around Kuala Lumpur. Europeans also brought the pineapple to Singapore in 1888 from where it spread to Johor, Selangor, and Perak.93 Around 200,000 Indians migrated to Malaya by 1913, many from South India particularly as plantation laborers. Tamils sometimes worked on the plantations, but also worked in other positions than basic laborers such as clerks and overseers. Sydney W. Moorhouse, a planter from Ceylon, started a rubber growing company in 1905 and eventually grew to 16,000 of rubber trees by 1916.94 Foreigners brought new plants to Malaya to grown for export on a scale not seen before on the Malay Peninsula, the revenues from which helped develop a BritishMalay territory with industrial infrastructure and a significant education system. 2.5 Education: The Imperial Influences in Society The development of a British-style education system in Malaya revealed Great Britains intended societal and economic objectives. Governor Cavenagh secured funds for schools from the British India Office in London to develop a school system without the brutal punishments suffered in indigenous Malay religious schools. The construction of schools before the interventions displayed how the Straits Settlements considered public education important. The number of secular Malay schools and pupils increased from 596 pupils in sixteen schools in 1872 to 7,218 students in 189 schools in 1892. The Malay schools taught pupils the British Industrial Age habits of industry, punctuality, and obedience, along with the basic skills necessary to be a part of an industrializing society.95 The British-Malay education system reinforced British values in a society
93 9 94

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 205-209.

Metcalf, Imperial Connections, 51-52.

9 95

Loh, The Malay States, 156, 161, 162, 167.

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mostly alien to them in order to develop a society integrated into the British imperial system. The British colonialists implemented the Malay school system in part to weaken the old Malay power structure and reinforce British authority. By 1879 British authorities in Selangor made education mandatory to increase attendance, an idea that Rajah Mahmud rejected by refusing to send his children or any of his people to the government Malay schools. To enforce such dramatic changes on Malay society administrators threatened fines and summonses to the parents of children who failed to attend school. Frank Swettenham refused the teaching of English in Malay public schools in Selangor, which the next acting resident discontinued. William Maxwell, Resident of Selangor starting in 1889 offered the sons of the Malay nobility an English education to make future leaders sympathetic to Great Britain.96 British authorities sought to control the power of the old nobility, which basically possessed most of the political power prior to British intervention. The development of English-style education in Malaya helped modernize Malay society but in a manner that protected British imperial power. According to Swettenham prior to the introduction of the British education system, boys finished school often became troublemakers in accordance with Malay beliefs regarding the suitable showing of a spirit. Wealthier sons at times committed violent acts and robbery in particular.97 British authorities developed a safe education to prevent the application of ideas contradictory to British imperial power. Not every aspect of education in British Malay developed around pragmatic political goals, because British administrators possessed
9 96

Loh, The Malay States, 163, 165-168.

9 97

Swettenham, British Malaya, 135-6.

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some genuine humanitarian concerns by believing the utility of education had the means to improve the lives of ordinary Malays. The education system maintained political stability in Malaya with the old social order in place but with significantly less power, while developing the Malayan economy.98 Swettenham summed up the transition through describing Malay boys in 1874 as armed with two or three weapons but carried books and slates by the 20th century.99 The preservation of British authority required that the children of chiefs and rajahs keep the social statuses of their parents when they came of age and develop the Malayan economy with British ideas to maintain social stability. British authorities employed education to maintain their perception of order within Malaya to keep children out of trouble such as piracy. Conclusion The westernization of the Malay society by British authorities maintained the social structure while mostly eliminating the roots of forms of unrest such as piracy by economic development. The indigenous systems of trade proved inadequate for the demands of the industrialized world, whereas the traditional Malay society failed to provide the labor or techniques required to meet the enormous economic demands of the West. The development of an industrialized economy in coordination with political reforms reduced acts of piracy in the Straits of Melaka. The development of a colonial education system increased productivity of the common Malays while teaching the sons of rajahs and chiefs to accept British culture and domination. The introduction of ideas from Great Britain regarding trade and society demilitarized the once powerful Malay chiefs and rajahs, while giving other ethnic groups economic value within Malaya.
9 98

Loh, The Malay States, 169-170, 174-175.

9 99

Swettenham, British Malaya, 135.

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The economy and society of Malaya made piracy a likely profession for a significant proportion of the seafarers within the Straits of Melaka during the early decades of the 19th century. Most people within the peninsula lived directly from the land or sea, whether harvesting in agriculture or collecting fish from the sea. Farmers and fishermen alike usually lived near the coast or on a river, making sea-raiding a possible alternative during years when nature failed to provide a good harvest. In the event of a famine, foreign trading vessels provided a stopgap measure to allow indigenous Malays to provide food for themselves and their families at the expense of sea traders. Furthermore the decentralized politics of Malaya meant commoners rarely received outside help in the event of a catastrophe. Commoners rarely possessed any personal storage for their own food by the early 19th century because chiefs and rajahs simply took it, therefore making starvation difficult to avoid without a generous ruler to alleviate famine. Resorting to piracy presented a risky, but plausible alternative for commoners watching their families starve or die of diseases associated with malnutrition. The fractious and diverse nature of society in Malaya contributed to intermittent but intense warfare and piracy. Some ethnic groups established their own states independent of foreign powers to an extent such as the Bugis of Selangor. Many of these various factions posed a potential threat to peaceful commerce within the Straits of Melaka in the event of war or some crisis, which held a strong potential for piracy because of the multiple authorities created within each ethnic group. Various factions often based on ethnicity, sometimes loosely, fought for their own interests, switching sides when convenient and possessing little solid political loyalty to any single faction. Some ethnic groups, including the orang laut specialized in maritime skills for trading

61

purposes giving them a great amount of skill in regard to seafaring, while only trading for some months of the year. A variety of factions each with their own political goals often composed of many of people with an expertise in seafaring as part of their culture, which made piracy a means to achieve individual wealth or collective dominance. The emergence of the Straits Settlements under British control and an increase of demand of products from Malaya helped weaken native piracy but strengthened Chinese pirates. Malays and other groups found the exploitation of land resources as profitable, making a life at sea less attractive. The exploitation of resources including tin and rubber, along with other products increased the wealth of many, especially certain Europeans and Chinese who possessed interests throughout the Malay Peninsula by the beginning of the 20th century. The wealthy merchants and financiers possessed a grave interest in the economic development of Malaya. Their opponents included native rulers who restricted trade or failed eventually to keep up with infrastructure development and especially the sea-raiders who pushed up shipping costs by threatening vessels and cargoes. Armed conflict presented the financiers with particular difficulties regarding their investments in warzone with limited trade, which encouraged British intervention. Economics and society played an important role regarding the sea-raiders and their supporters, but also their opponents once the economy of Malaya shifted from the favor of the sea raiders. The economic presence of the British colonies depressed the power of other states in the region by attracting trade from other ports while applying minimal protection of vessels at sea for years. Sea-raiders and pirates filled the political vacuum of in the Malay world and attacked the most vulnerable craft and communities. The strategically important Straits of Melaka and South China Sea needed centralized

62

authority for the flourishing of peaceful trade or at least coordination between various authorities to prevent piracy.

63

Sampan (Figure 2)
Pearson Scott Foresman, Sampan, Jul, 24 2010, http://www.cliparts101.com/free_clipart/19139/sampan_ship.aspx (accessed April 10, 2011).

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Chapter 3: Piracy and Marauding: Piratical Seafarers in Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea The Straits of Melaka created a maritime chokepoint between China and India, along with a significant opportunity for traders throughout Southeast Asia. The abundance of trade in a politically fragmented region offered many opportunities for Malay and Chinese seafarers to engage in violence for the sake of capturing a prize vessel. The Malay and Chinese groups used their respective political groups as cover for their actions depending on the political circumstances. Piracy and marauding grew out of particular social, economic, and political conditions counter to the ideal structure of an industrialized European state. The marauders became numerous because of an uncoordinated plurality of political authorities, ample economic targets of opportunity, and large quantities of skilled seafarers willing to commit violent acts at sea. Piratical behavior in the Straits of Melaka around formed out of opportunism in the absence of a capable authority in an economic system that offered maritime merchants and fishermen the option of being a maritime predator, too. Piracy was not unique to any particular location along the Straits of Melaka by the beginning of the 19th century, because pirates targeted victims sailing through the gauntlet. The profession of the inhabitants of Singapore prior to Raffles according to Swettenham was probably, piracy, citing Hiyat Abdullah, which also depicted Colonel Farquhar disposing of the vast amount skulls under his command at Singapore. Pirates prowled the Straits of Johor particularly from 1819 to 1840 to steal cargo and capture men, women, and children for sale as slaves. Even when pirates misidentified warships for peaceful traders, the pirates often fought to the death in the fury of their assault rather

65

than surrender. Swettenham admitted to the lack of sources in evaluating the effect of piracy on commerce as he lacked the evidence to determine whether it was a nuisance or strategic threat.100 Milton Osborne suggested a combination of pirates and fishermen inhabited Singapore prior to 1819.101 The few inhabitants of pre-modern Singapore likely fished for daily food, but also resorted to piracy when opportunities arose because they possessed the necessary skills and little other economic opportunity. Regardless of the commercial significance of piracy, the political ramifications for the perception of the region being infested with pirates resulted in great political repercussions and changes even to the most powerful of rulers. 3.1 Who Were the Pirates? Class and Ethnicity in Piracy Various segments of society composed the vaunted sea-raiders of the Straits of Melaka, coming from a variety of social structures within Malay society. The orang laut partook in piracy after their seasonal trading expedition financed by local chiefs for victuals in exchange for an investment return. The annual monsoon provided the wind in the direction necessary for sailing up the Straits of Melaka to ambush trading vessels for their cargo, along with the passengers and crew for sale as slaves.102 Seafarers conducted regular trade until the Southeast monsoon winds in June when they conducted piracy throughout the Straits of Melaka until October, often with the tacit support of local rulers in return for a percentage of the profit.103 The orang laut or other groups not under any legitimate chief in the Malay world became perompak or pirates who sailed as renegades
100 101

Swettenham, British Malaya, 81.

Osborne, Southeast Asia, 117.

102

Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 134.

103

Presgrave to Murchison, December 5, 1828, Straits Settlement Factory Records 159, quoted in Nicholas Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay World, (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1963), 39-40.

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while some orang laut became hereditary outlaws without a fixed home. At times, a chief or rajah in economic need or a foreigner enlisted perompak to reverse their fortunes. In economic slowdowns, piracy became worse because more rulers resorted to plunder to make up for revenue shortfalls.104 In the waters around the Malay Peninsula, traders and chiefs became sea-raiders during particular seasons and periods of economic distress, which revealed piracy often not as a permanent profession but rather a temporary means to alleviate financial problems or to supplement existing income. Many rulers financed pirate expeditions, perpetuating piracy as a means to supplement their jurisdictions labor and supply of materials.105 Sultans also supported raids, particularly in the Sulu Archipelago the raiders from which became the most feared raiders of the Malay world by the mid 19th century.106 In particular, the Sultan of Terengganu likely supported piracy, while the Bendahara of Pahang likely turned a blind eye to orang raoyat piracy according to a British commentator.107 The Johor Sultanate, for example, enacted legitimate naval operations because of the hereditary right to enforce their traditions. Traditionally, the sultan delegated tax collection, cargo investigation, and intelligence gathering to his laksmana or temenggong.108 In many cases actions by sultans possessed legitimacy because they exercised their rights as leaders of a sovereign state to patrol their waters for recognized purposes. Chiefs also

104 105

Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 68.

L. Mills, British Malaya 1824-1867, Journal of the Malayan Branch o the Royal Asiatic Society, (Oct. 1923), 216-217.
106

Anderson, Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 88-90.

107

Presgrave to Murchison, December 5, 1828, Straits Settlement Factory Records 159, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 40.
108

Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 60, 69.

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participated in maritime activities of less legitimacy by supporting piratical missions without the overt support of the sultan or his chief ministers. The ruling class did not monopolize marauding at sea as people of a variety of classes became pirates to increase their incomes, often through joining less-renowned members of the ruling class. Pirates also acted without the consent of the local ruler in their operations, the raoyat plundered vessels without their leadership or consent of the ruling class and often sought patronage from another ruler. The pirates sold their plunder in ports such as Singapore and hid in other ports such as Pahang, Terengganu, and Kelantan to evade capture by authorities.109 Orang laut became pirates or perompak through following poorer rajahs and foreigners in their attempt to gain wealth through raiding.110 Although less-reputable rulers raided for their own economic gain in search of goods and scarce labor, obtaining such assets enhanced the prestige of the raiding leader. By 1825, merchants and rulers alike participated in raiding to improve their incomes through, in their perception, an honorable manner.111 The decentralized political authority permitted pirates operations without the sultans support to survive so long as the various states refused to tackle piracy in a concerted effort. Chinese merchant vessels also partook in piracy to supplement the income of their crews and owners. Emerging after 1840, Chinese pirates menaced the Straits of Melaka and increased their attacks significantly by the 1860s while other pirate groups declined. Chinese pirate vessels occasionally included Europeans to provide expertise in armaments and serve as officers, while European crewmembers were virtually
109 110

Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 80, 83, 86.

Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 68.

111

Mills, British Malaya, 216.

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nonexistent in Malay pirate prahus.112 British officials meanwhile recognized that suspected Chinese pirates adapted to the British legal system to avoid hanging from the gallows. Depositions placed Chinese junks attacking other vessels, but officials hardly made arrests lacking specific evidence against particular owner or crew while pirate vessels outfitted in Singapore. Chinese pirates gathered arms and intelligence regarding shipping in Singapore by exploiting loose laws and poor enforcement. Even if British authorities accused a Chinese merchantman of piracy, the Chinese community in Singapore defended Chinese merchants through the law with great success generally because a lack of evidence. Therefore, Chinese pirates challenged the prosecution more than the Malays because of their adept use of the legal system.113 The existence of Chinese pirates in the Straits of Melaka based in Singapore revealed how virtually any person with adequate capital or maritime experience possessed the potential to be a pirate in the region regardless of national origin. For the inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula, nearly any person regardless of class or ethnicity could potentially become a pirate, particularly with the necessary maritime skills, which amounted to a significant proportion of the population because much of Malay society relied on fishing and maritime history. Impoverished fishermen coordinated their attacks on unsuspecting vessels and quickly disengaged upon capture of their target vessel. Pirates also included traders, merchants, and less-fortunate noblemen who seized their target vessels to supplement their incomes. Even the heads of state supported raiding missions of questionable legitimacy to improve their own status. Foreigners to Southeast Asia also conducted piracy with the assistance of Singapore as an
112 113

Mills, British Malaya, 223.

Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 207-08, 215-217, 224.

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open and economically liberal port. Piracy gave any person, virtually regardless of social status, a means to express their political authority, albeit often unrecognized by most of society, over the crew of another vessel for economic gain. 3.2 Tools of the Trade: Vessels and Weapons of the Pirates and Sea-Raiders Some fishermen in the Straits of Melaka also raided foreign vessels to gain a supplemental income based on opportunism. Sampan piracy was perhaps the most difficult form of piracy to eradicate. According to Governor Butterworth of the Straits Settlements a flotilla of fifteen to twenty sampans, small low-draft vessels, with four to seven crewmen fished and hunted for turtles until their prey came leeward of the sampans. The sampans attacked the vessel with fish darts and spears normally used for fishing and hunting to suppress the crew while stealing the cargo. If the sampans came under attack, the vessels fled through a shoal where deep-draft vessels ran aground. After beaching the sampans, the crew fled into the jungle with the plunder. If sampans sailed into jungle-lined rivers or creeks, authorities had great difficulty determining their location after they entered the waterways because of the mangroves and the forest. Sometimes the crew of sampans used the rivers as cover upon ambushing unsuspecting craft and then quickly retreated into the forest. Malay villages along the coast usually possessed the sampans necessary for such piratical missions.114 Sampan pirates were usually common fishermen supplementing their income through a highly decentralized level of organization. Sampan piracy revealed that pirates were also common folk searching to improve their lives at the expense of vessels and their crews. Armed with

114

Butterworth to Beadon, December 21, 1844; Congaltons memo, December 17, 1843, East India Company and India Boards Collections 103298, 17, 21, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 209, 210.

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basic fishermens equipment, even the humblest of seafarers in the Straits of Melaka participated in piracy during the 19th century. The sampans lacked of firepower providing for a significant weakness regarding their viability as a pirate vessel and making other vessels preferable for marauders. The crews of other native pirate vessels and warships in the Malay world armed themselves more effectively. In the early 19th century Malay prahus were maritime vessels almost as effective their European counterparts of similar size. According to one account, eighty seafarers operated prahus by sail and oar, permitting the vessels to sail faster than their British counterparts in the early years of British-controlled Penang. Pirates and states armed their prahus with guns, impressive arsenals, and towing lines for capturing prizes. The low-draft prahus cleared shoals much easier than their European counterparts, while possessing planking and shields for some protection against enemy fire.115 Thomas J. Newbold gave a similar description of the war prahus as being fast particularly because of skilled paddlers. Usually weighing eight to ten tons burthen, prahus used low-caliber swivel guns capable of long range at the bow, center, and stern with musket shot resistant wooden bulwarks called apilans to protect the crew in combat. The crew armed themselves with a variety of close-combat weapons such as krises, spears, and hatchets, but also firearms such as muskets and blunderbusses.116 Malay war prahus possessed the speed and the equipment to pose a threat to most vessels sailing the Straits of Melaka, save heavily-armed European ships.

115

Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865-1915, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 112.
116

Thomas J. Newbold, Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 37-39.

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The largest war prahus posed a great threat to the shipping of the Straits of Melaka and the villages along the coast. Some of the largest native pirate vessels sailing through the Straits of Melaka were over ninety feet in length with a double-tiered set of oars with a sharp bow and wide beam. Builders placed a gun port for a six to twenty-four pounder usually brass gun at the bow of the vessel with numerous swivel guns elsewhere. When needed the crews lowered or raised the mast with its large mainsail and an ensign with great speed. The largest prahus possessed an armed crew from the ruling class numbering fifty to eighty seafaring warriors. The large native raiding vessels in the region possessed a hold for captured victims from the Straits of Melaka and elsewhere often for months before sale as slaves in a far-off land.117 The large war prahus devastated the coast of Malay lands, proving more than a match for the native seafarers throughout the region. To successfully resist the large sea-raider vessels states required a centralized state to coordinate a navy and fight the marauders. Malays possessed a variety of specialized vessels each designed to complete a specific purpose relevant to piracy. Malay seafaring communities usually possessed three types of vessels with specific uses known as the penjajaps, kakaps, and paduakans. Malay marauders used the penjajap prahus as a light but long vessel capable of hiding in the mangroves creeks of Malaya. The vessel usually possessed two masts without a deck and the only cover from the sun being an awning for the headman. Marauder crews armed their penjajaps with swivel guns for considerable firepower against other vessels. Malay flotillas employed patrol vessels or kakap prahus as a one mast small vessel steered by one rudder. A crew of eight to ten skilled warriors sailed small patrol vessel to

117

Horace St. John, The Indian Archipelago: Its History and Present State, (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1853), 119, 120, 149.

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gather intelligence for a larger vessel or a flotilla. The paduakan possessed a single mast with one lateen sail and weighed twenty to fifty tons burthen that a helmsman steered by two rudders.118 Being the largest of the three vessels, Malays sailed the paduakan for long-distance voyages with significant cargoes. The combination of vessels gave the marauder a variety of options for raiding with vessels capable of specialized tasks making the seafarers of Malaya formidable and versatile. The participation of Chinese merchant junks in piracy showed that large infusions of capital went into pirate voyages, permitting the capture of medium-sized vessels. Chinese pirate junks in the region displaced seventy to one hundred fifty tons, but the largest weighed 200 tons. As for armaments, vessels possessed up to twenty-five large guns with a crew ranging from one to two hundred seafarers. The size of the vessels and number of the crew made them formidable opponents for most vessels.119 The Cantonese trading junks looked exactly like the pirate junks, making distinguishing the pirate vessels from peaceful traders nearly impossible for patrolling Royal Navy warships.120 Petty Chinese pirates, those not organized into large fleets, usually supplied from one port, which was likely Singapore for 19th century Chinese pirates in Southeast Asia. Particularly in expeditions with low overhead, Chinese pirates used basic fishing implements including knives and bamboo pikes. Most attacks by Chinese pirates depended on swift attacks with the pirate crew quickly stealing their objective and then retreating to avoid capture, relying on chance for a prize and economic survival.121
118 119

St. John, The Indian Archipelago: Its History and Present State, 183, 184.

Mill, British Malaya, 223.

120

Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 215.

121

Dian Murray, Living and Working Condition in Chinese Pirate Communities, 1750-1850, Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, ed. by

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Chinese pirates operating around the Malay Peninsula capitalized on the laws and politics of the Straits Settlements to survive. The pirate junks distinguished little from the merchant vessels because the merchants and the pirates were often one in the same alternating between trade and piracy as enterprises. 3.3 Causes of Piracy: Societal, Economic, and Political Contributions No single aspect of Malaya and the Straits of Melaka or its history caused piracy to thrive there during most of the 19th century, but rather a variety of factors contributed to its development. Traditionally, historians cited the oppressive policies of the Portuguese and Dutch overlords as being a significant cause of piracy for centuries in the Straits of Melaka. William Dampier blamed Dutch economic policies for pushing Malays toward piracy by 1689.122 Swettenham blamed the Portuguese and the Dutch partially for driving the Malays to piracy, along with Anderson who placed Portuguese and Dutch monopolistic trading policies for squeezing the Malays out of peaceful trade and into piracy.123 Although there may be some truth to such a statement, the historians risked over simplification through notions that Europeans for centuries gave natives no alternatives than piracy. Piracy in the Straits of Melaka was an economic and political action that sought to enrich or even empower the perpetrator using a long tradition of maritime experience including military operations. 3.31 Maritime Traditions: Sea-Raiding, Trade, and Warfare By the 19th century Malays possessed centuries of experience regarding naval warfare and a tradition of raiding by seafarers. Traditional Malay warfare involved quick
David Starkey, E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, and J. A. de Moor, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), 58-59, 61.
122

Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 10-11.

123

Swettenham, British Malaya, 140; Anderson, Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 93.

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attacks, looting, and withdrawals while the local population and ruler retreated into the jungle. When Portuguese Governor Albuquerque captured Melaka in 1511, the sultan and the court retreated into the jungle when defeat appeared imminent, expecting the Portuguese to loot the city and depart, but the Portuguese remained in Melaka.124 The heritage of sea-raiding remained in the 19th century and played into piracy, giving prestige to the most successful raiders such as the orang laut from Galang Island. Sultan Husain of Johor explained to Raffles that piracy brought no disgrace to its perpetrators in defense of the raiding tradition, which generally targeted native vessels.125 Governor Sir Andrew Clarke of the Straits Settlements considered the entire Selangor royal family as thoroughbred pirates, during the 1870s particularly in regard to the pirate activities off their territory.126 The Malays, Bugis, and orang laut, elites considered raiding an activity based on centuries of tradition as a means to obtain wealth and prestige. The European belief regarding the evilness of piracy contrasted greatly with Malay concepts of wealth, raiding, and respectability. Hardly distinguishable at times, native merchants sometimes operated as pirates to provide supplemental income through less-peaceful means. The Chinese merchant vessels were not the only to alternate between peaceful trader and violent pirate. Being opportunistic, Malay seafarers switched between piracy and peaceful trading depending on their best interests at any given time.127 Malays and other Southeast Asians relied on maritime trade for the basis of their economies since before colonial times. The monsoon winds permitted vessels to sail up the Straits of Melaka for pirate raids on native vessels
124 125

Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 89.

Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 133-134.

126 127

Sadka, The Protected Malay States, 48. Mills, British Malaya, 218.

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for loot and slaves. Governor Fullerton of the Straits Settlements commented in 1828 that a Malay sailor could practice both peaceful trade and piracy. Trade competition became more difficult by the 19th century particularly with the increased presence of foreign trade and the introduction of steam-powered vessels.128 In the face of increased competition, native merchants potentially sought alternative means such as piracy to earn a living. The annual monsoon brought a wind that permitted sea-raiders to sail into the Straits of Melaka, but the change in winds meant an end to the season and the resumption of regular trade. Pirates raided in one season and traded peacefully in the next, revealing that the same merchant vessels and crew engaged peaceful trade, but in also in violent raids. 3.32 Pirates and Authority: Raiding as a Power Grab The Malay political states system relied on piratical raids as an expression of power for rulers and those seeking political power. Political figures used piracy as a means to gain authority over people.129 One example of leaders using pirates for conventional war was the 1869 siege of Klang already mentioned, but besides the Sumatran miners under Dato Dagang joining Tengku Kudin, Ilanun pirates from Riau also joined the surprise assault on forts surrounding Klang.130 Piracy became a means for princes and petty nobles to gain power, the anak rajah, literally child king, pirates thrived particularly with a decentralization of authority. Anak rajah piracy became particularly prevalent during succession disputes, such as Kedah and Siak, while Riau failed to control its anak rajah particularly after 1784. By the late 18th century many
128

Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 134-136.

129

Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 11,

130

Charles D. Cowan, Nineteenth- Century Malaya, 72, 73.

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Malay states experienced succession disputes including Negri Sembilan and Perak.131 The decentralization of Malay states contributed greatly to the increase of sea-raiding during the 18th and 19th centuries particularly with succession disputes, along with the royalty and nobility fighting for more power and wealth through piracy. According to the British perception, pirates challenged centralized authority directly, which required a response to protect the colonial trade system that was less effective with a variety of chiefs vying for power. Sea-raiders came into the service of the sultans or other recognized rulers to reinforce their authority, making them an extension of the state prior to the increased influence of Great Britain. The Johor Sultanate employed roughly a third of orang laut to protect their traders, while harassing the shipping of other states.132 The orang laut constituted a significant proportion of the temenggongs power-base by patrolling the coast of Johor and contributing flotillas of ten to twenty prahus each with a crew and a nakhoda, master of the vessel, in times of war.133 By the early 19th century sultans no longer possessed the power to defend against piracy and therefore used permission to raid as a payment to their supporters.134 The patronage of the orang laut not only increased the power and prestige of Johor, but also bought off a large segment of the otherwise dangerous seafarers from damaging Johors interests. The failure to limit the sea-raiders power brought devastation to the lands and merchant fleets of Johor, severely limiting the ability of the state to function.
131 132

Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 113.

Anderson, Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 89.

133

Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 58-59.

134

Mills, British Malaya, 218.

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Piratical power limited the authority of the rulers of Johor by defying their authority and wrecking the Johor economy. By 1784, Johors population suffered gravely from the piratical raids leaving entire areas bare of populations particularly in the west coast of Johor. In 1824, maritime peoples numbered between 6,000 and 10,000 within the temenggongs jurisdiction, many of whom took advantage of the power vacuum with Temenggong Daing Ibrahim rise to his fathers old position in 1826 at the age of fifteen, which contributed to ten years of rampant piracy. Not all chiefs recognized the legitimacy of Ibrahims authority or even that of the Sultan Husain of Johor and rather split into factions claiming loyalty to the Sultan of Lingga instead.135 The early 19th century Malay chiefs used sea-raiding to achieve political power and prestige as part of the state system. Europeans regarded private warfare between factions for greater authority as piracy.136 Native chiefs, nobles, and members of royal families used piratical behavior and sea-raiding as their chief expression of political power with raiding more common in years of political upheaval. Raiding and piracy worked within the Malay state system that placed authority within decentralized chiefs, whom raiding often supported. 3.4 Raiding Economy: Economic Causes for Piracy and It Results Seafarers used piracy and sea-raiding ultimately for economic survival or gaining more political prestige. Economic hardship forced Malays to find alternative means to survive making piracy a tempting alternative to starvation. A murrain killed most buffaloes in Selangor, making rice cultivation extraordinarily difficult and forced people to either starve or survive as pirates during the early years of Sultan Abdul Samads
135 136

Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 58-59, 71, 76.

Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 10-11.

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reign.137 Economic hardship contributed to piracy with people left with little alternative for survival, economic hardship was hardly unique to the Malay Peninsula during the 19th century. David Starkey provided an economic framework for understanding piracy in general and J. L. Anderson wrote an analysis regarding types of Malay piracy. Starkeys market approach, though intended for the Atlantic economy, revealed the pirates and sea-raiders economic reasons for risking their lives for the chance of capturing vessels at sea. The supply perspective regarded land, capital, and labor for the basis of overall productivity of the pirate, while the demand perspective offered the pirate compensation for his services often for a good otherwise difficult to obtain. Pirates needed land to construct, maintain, and beach or dock their vessels, along with adequate amounts of capital such as vessels, victuals, and arms required for capturing other vessels. For an enterprise a nakhoda or anak rajah required a crew capable of rowing, sailing, and fighting, which required plenty of manpower.138 The Malay pirates were also enterprising businessmen who usually pirated native trading vessels rather than large well-armed European merchantmen for a share of the cargo and slaves.139 Therefore, Malay pirates possessed similarities with their European pirate counterparts an ocean away because the market framework applied to Southeast Asian piracy, too. Pirates needed adequate land, capital, and labor, along with a demand for their services for successful enterprises. Raiders and pirates possessed no lack of land to hide, the numerous estuaries, river, and other hiding spots on the Malay Peninsula offered plenty of foliage for cover. With centuries, if not millennia of maritime experience native
137 138

Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 42.

David Starkey, class lecture notes, Piracy and Privateering in the Atlantic Economy, c. 1560-1856, 2007.
139

Mills, British Malaya, 214.

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seafarers were extraordinarily skilled, while the archipelago possessed plentiful amounts of vessels for transport. Maritime vessels were not a luxury but a necessity for large proportions of the coastal populations reliant on fishing and trade. Prior to the British intervention in Malaya, Malay men carried weapons around all the time, usually arming themselves with daggers, spears, a gun, and a sword. The most prized Malay weapon was a kris, a type of sword, which a Malay man took with him wherever he went.140 Such accounts showed that heavy weaponry, but also basic fishing equipment was easily available as a form of capital. The amount of skilled labor for seafaring was a likely substantial part of the overall labor market, but the amount of available labor varied. In instances of natural disaster, piracy flourished because labor from farming and petty trade needed work in other professions. Warfare forced labor away from peaceful tasks because trading became difficult, if not impossible, especially with prohibitions or blockades against it. The demands for labor increased in regard to seafarers to enact blockades or raids on the enemy during periods of conflict. Chiefs possibly considered followers of rulers with questionable legitimacy as pirates. A high degree of demand for piracy as a service revolved around the demand for slave labor and additional revenue particularly in times of war. The early 19th century witnessed an increased demand for labor so rulers resorted to enslavement because of the scarcity of labor. The Sulu Sultanate encouraged slave-raiding by the Iranun and Balaging sea-raiders during the 19th century, making them the most feared raiders in the Malay world.141 Malay chiefs often taxed the profits of the pirates operating from their territory142 and therefore possessed little reason to counter it. During times of war, rajahs
140 141 142

Swettenham, British Malaya, 146. Anderson, Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 88.

Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 26.

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encouraged plundering for taxation to fund their own war efforts, which needed more revenue than in peacetime to pay for additional costs. The decentralized political system of the pre-colonial Malaya led by chiefs seeking power and prestige pushed the peninsula into intermittent conflict, which increased piracy. The demand for goods and the weakness of the state resulted in piratical behavior of astonishing proportions, including a naval blockade of Pahang by pirates costing traders $200,000.143 The pirates ability to operate tied with the weakness of the state and the demand for revenue by local chiefs or the demand for slaves by foreign ones. J. L. Anderson described three types of piracy within the Malay context of 1750 to 1850, parasitic, episodic, and intrinsic in an attempt to understand the costs of piracy to an economy. Parasitic piracy grew off the trade, particularly off European expansionist trade but usually indirectly as function of trade. The parasitic piracy redirected trade and increased costs for merchants who needed more protection against raiders for more weapons, making trade less efficient. Another type of piracy included episodic piracy when seafarers resorted to raiding as opportunism when other seagoing activities failed to support them.144 Anderson defined intrinsic piracy as raiding was intrinsic to the functioning of the native states because piracy provided the necessary revenue for the running of the state because little other ways to tax. The revenue contributed to the economic productivity, political power, and prestige for the state and its leaders. Anderson concluded that piracy increased costs for overall production, causing market prices to increase and taking money out of the economy, along with threatening maritime trade with annihilation.145 The underlining factor in Andersons analysis remained the
143

144 145

Anderson, Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 95. Anderson, Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 88-89.

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tendency to toward warfare and sea-raiding, whether legitimate or illegitimate, as a means for seafaring people of Malaya to survive regardless of the cost to the maritime trader. Conclusion The seafaring Malays used raiding at sea for economic, social, and political gains from the ranks of petty fishermen to the most powerful sultans, which increased during political decentralization, wartime, and other calamities. The geography of the Malay Peninsula and its surrounding seas provided cover for raiders with plenty of hiding places from even the most powerful of enemies, including the Royal Navy. Sultans and chiefs deployed sea-raiders as political patrons who patrolled the local trade routes in exchange for goods. The difference between a legitimate sea-raider and a perompak or pirate was not always clear because of the constant ambiguity regarding the legitimacy of the supporting chief. Malays distinguished between illicit actions at sea and the practice of recognized authority, but difficulty with such distinctions coincided with an overall decentralized political authority. Times of openly and violent questioning of authority witnessed an increase of piracy and raiding. British authorities needed a native partner to negotiate and acquiesce when necessary, whereas piracy inherently created a plurality of authority and hampered trade by increasing costs for merchants. Piracy represented the prime naval challenger to British naval authority and inhibited trade necessary for the Straits Settlements to be profitable.

Anderson, Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 89-90, 92-94.

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Chapter 4: Breaking the Sea-Raiders: The Establishment of British Authority in Malaya through the Destruction of the Sea-Raiders Power The implementation of anti-piracy policies by Great Britain arose with the contradictory interests of pirates and the British Empire. Pirates created much trouble for the East India Company by depriving their settlements of trade income requiring counterpiracy efforts by British forces. The Royal Navy and private navies implemented strategies to weaken the impact of the pirates, including patrolling sea lanes and destroying pirate bases. British authorities also implemented technological advantages and developed infrastructure to weaken pirates and other opponents of Great Britain. The technological advancements permitted faster communications and transport resulting in rapid responses to armed opposition. The Straits Settlements employed a judiciary to process suspected pirates and pressured native states to prosecute those accused of piracy. The variety of strategies employed by British authorities took their toll on the sea-raiders making the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea safer from pirates over the course of decades. Raiding as a form of political power consolidated the dominance of particular rulers in Southeast Asian through systems of political patronage that held up the remnants of the traditional Malay political system during the early 19th century. British authorities conceived of sea-raiding as a form of piracy regardless of the legitimacy of the action in Malay eyes and sought its suppression to replicate their own worldview of trade and the state in Southeast Asia. By the 19th century inability of the Malay trading system to produce enough raw materials to meet the industrial demand of Europe and America became apparent, requiring large changes to the political system dominated by the raiding

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policies of local chiefs. Malays failed to extract enough tin to meet foreign export demands leading to the introduction of Chinese laborers and techniques. The destruction of raiding as an important Southeast Asian institution became vital to British authorities to protect their settlements and the trade necessary for their survival. Eventually economic prosperity and military force secured the settlements. The further destruction of the institution of raiding became necessary for the strengthening of British dominance and the further integration of the Malay Peninsula into the West-led global economic system. Sea-raiders increased costs for all producers, created greater uncertainty in marketplaces, and challenged British authority. To break the power of the sea-raiders, British authorities developed a strategy involving military force, foreign political pressure, imposition of a judiciary, and eventually domination of Malay territory. 4.1 Consequences of Piracy: The Effects of Pirate Raids on the British Settlements of Balambangan and Penang The effectiveness of raids in Southeast Asia posed a threat to the existence of the European colonies with renewed British interest in the region by the 18th century. The English East India Company expanded its role in Southeast Asia, receiving the island of Balambangan off northern Borneo from the Sultan of Sulu in 1762 and finally inhabited the settlement in 1773. Sailing to Dutch ports became expensive with heavy tolls on company vessels in the China trade. Balambangan offered a potential port-of-call for a route to China used in 1757-8 by Commodore Wilson. Pirates raided the colony within two years, destroying it as a useful port.146 The destruction of Balambangan showed that piracy posed a threat to British colonies, requiring military protection for future settlements, regardless of the land grants by local sultans. Pirate raids represented a
146

Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 73-74.

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strategic threat to British interests in the region, reducing the amount of commerce through looting and raiding, which presented British authorities with policy difficulties for decades. Penang also suffered from piracy although it survived through a higher trade volume and by adopting policies that made business more difficult for pirates. Pirates usually attacked smaller vessels near Penang, seizing them in significant numbers. The evening proved a particularly difficult time for seafarers to conduct business at sea because the cover of darkness provided pirates with the opportunity to plunder. Pirates kidnapped seafarers anchored within Georgetowns jetty and captured some within one hundred yards of the shore at night, selling them into slavery elsewhere. Pirates usually operated close by from various islands or from the Prye River as staging points for raids on Penang. The purchase of mainland territory in 1800 denied the operating space for pirates to operate and provided the inhabitants of Georgetown with a closer food supply. The land became known as Province Wellesley, which after 1821 Malay refugees fleeing Siamese military might populated the province significantly.147 The purchase of more territory represented the willingness of the Honorable Company to deal with piracy through the purchase of more territory. Controlling land on the Malay Peninsula provided an effective means to control the levels of piracy in the surrounding seas. 4.2 Naval Strategies: Attempts to Eliminate Piracy by the Royal Navy The most obvious response to repel seaborne raiders was the deployment of warships to the East Indies to engage and destroy suspected pirates, because armed force was the only way to protect property and lives directly from armed raiders. The support of warships in the region cost British taxpayers and the East India Company a significant
147

Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 84-85.

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amount of funds, making the deployment of sufficient warships a challenge. The destruction of Malay war prahus or Malay sailing vessels required the presence of strong European naval forces armed well enough to combat experienced Malay seafarers. British officials ordered the engagement of sea-raiders fully aware of the complicity of local rulers in their safe harbor if not outright support. British policy sought the protection of peaceful trade and British interests, permitting the Straits Settlements to thrive and grow. The deployment of naval forces meant an armed conflict between British forces and sea-raiders often of unclear political loyalties. Governor Bonham noted that with the death of Sultan Husain in 1835, various chiefs supported the Sultan of Lingga placing unfriendly marauders in a potentially threatening position south of Singapore in places such as Galang. Bonham viewed the pirates switch of allegiances from the houses of his allies to Lingga as a need to place the inhabitants under the restraint of some chiefs who can be made responsible for their behaviour.148 The Straits Settlements Governor wanted the elimination of marauding as part of breaking the power of the various chiefs in the region by placing them under authorities friendly to the East India Company. The raiders posed a threat to the commerce of Singapore with their bases so close to the port, which required British naval forces to weaken their power for the safety of commerce. 4.21 Counter-Piracy Naval Operations and the War on Piracy British forces launched military operations against the suspected pirates despite the questionable legal right to do so without the full consent of the Dutch administrators. Captain Chads of Andromache a British 28-gun frigate sailed into the Straits of Melaka to

148

Bonham to Murchison, June 4, 1836, East India Company and India Boards Collections 69433, 53, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 80; Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 80.

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find and destroy suspected pirates. Andromache and a few gunboats successfully destroyed five prahus that attacked them in June 1836, freeing some captive Vietnamese seafarers in the process.149 Chads deemed Galang the largest pirate center in the region and sought a victory with the destruction of its harbor because he believed all its inhabitants participated to the pirate trade somehow. Despite the Dutch refusal to participate, Chads and the flotilla of British vessels attacked Galang anyway, destroying three villages, fourteen large prahus, thirty to forty smaller prahus, and numerous smaller vessels. During the raid, an officer and his crew of a gunboat recognized the prahus that earlier burned an English brig after stealing her cargo. The action saw two British seamen wounded and a few Malays dead, but most suspected pirates and villagers managed to escape the attack. The British flotilla rescued a Vietnamese junk and crew, saving the Vietnamese from certain slavery.150 The British raid weakened the suspected pirates by destroying their vessels, but also limited their ability to trade peacefully and fish. British naval actions such as the raid on Galang made living as a seafarer much more difficult than prior to the stepped-up military presence. British authorities implemented a variety of strategies to eliminate suspected pirates, along with establishing naval dominance and protect less-threatening traders. Between 1825 and 1850 authorities rewarded Royal Navy and East India Company warships crews for killed or captured pirates. In a few years during the 1840s, British warships received 42,000 for the killing and capturing of suspected pirates. Unfortunately for the seafarers of the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea, the crews of the warships proved overly effective and likely destroyed peaceful traders along
149 150

Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 81, 83, 244.

Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 84.

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with pirates in the region. A Singapore newspaper proclaimed that native shipping declined because of the naval operations that destroyed vessels indiscriminately. An orang laut seafarer lamented the destruction of his vessel in Tuhfat al-Nafis at the hands of a British warship.151 British strategies eliminated many of the native prahus, whether peaceful traders or violent raiders, effectively wresting agency at sea from traditional seafarers. Though brutal and probably unfair, the strategy of ransoming suspected pirates reduced piracy in the region, but also decreased trade in Singapore as a side-effect. 4.22 The Royal Navy and the Chinese Pirates of Malaya The Chinese in Malaya grew to a large population, which also contributed to piracy in the region, resulting in retaliation by British forces against hostile Chinese forces and their Malay allies. The Chinese population of Malaya resorted to piracy and spared no nationality or ethnicity as its target. Perhaps the most famous instance of Chinese piracy in the straits prompted a significant response by British forces. Kim Seng Cheong with a cargo of piece goods and foodstuffs departed Penang on June 14, 1871 and disappeared prompting an owner Ong Hong Buan to sail for Singapore with a letter from Lieutenant-Governor Arthur Birch regarding the owners plight. En route to Singapore onboard the steamer Historian, Ong Hong Buan spotted a vessel remarkably similar to Kim Seng Cheong and believing that the vessel was his, complained to Colonel Anson in Singapore that pirates stole his vessel. Anson dispatched Pluto, a government steamer, to search for the missing junk with a police detachment on board. The detachment spotted the missing vessel in the Selangor River on June 28 and confirmed the identity of the vessel through inscriptions reading Kim Seng Cheong, along with

151

Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 135.

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finding the captured helmsman.152 Pirates slaughtered much of the crew, along with passengers totaling thirty-four people after sneaking aboard as passengers. The junk was worth around $1,500, while the cargo was worth $7,000, so finding the cargo was also important.153 The police detachment remarkably found the stolen vessel but investigated further without fully comprehending what they stepped into. Suppressing piracy proved too important for the British policemen because the severity of the crime warranted justice regardless of whom they antagonized, but the consequences of their actions caused more difficulties. The following actions by the Straits Settlements and Royal Navy revealed the depths of their determination to destroy pirates hiding places without fully understanding its consequences. Although Rajah Musa, the son of the sultan, assisted Captain Bradberry of Pluto and Inspector George Cox of the police detachment to recover the stolen goods, Syed Mashor and Rajah Mahmud opposed the British detachment. Forced to swim to Pluto the landing party received further humiliation at the guns of a stockade but suffered no casualties.154 The Britons learned the difficult way that Rajah Mahdi controlled Kuala Selangor, but arrested nine Chinese suspected pirates and retrieved part of the cargo.155 The British detachment achieved much of their mission, but decided that capturing the suspected pirates, the cargo, and the missing vessel was not enough. For the British authorities to demand that the port no longer harbor pirates became important enough to risk military action against native rulers. An attempt to
152 153

Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 85-86.

Parkinson, British Intervention, 48.

154

Parkinson, British Intervention, 48-50.

155

Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 86-87.

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negotiate with the local rulers failed, resulting in a firefight that killed one Briton. On July 4, HMS Rinaldo opened fire upon the Selangor forts in retaliation, steamed past the fort, and eventually silenced the native guns. The engagement cost one British seaman his life because of heatstroke during the engagement. The 19th Madras Native Infantry from Penang landed to disabled the guns and destroyed much of the town for the sake of denying safe haven to pirates.156 British forces essentially went to war for the sake of defeating piracy, along with directly challenging the de facto native ruler to achieve this purpose. But the destruction at Kuala Selangor in the name of suppressing piracy was only the beginning of an increased role of British authorities within native Malay politics. The possibility that the Selangor Civil War encouraged piracy by forcing local rulers to grant safe have to pirates for funding their war chests disturbed the British authorities enough to apply direct pressure to local rulers to isolate unfriendly chiefs. Colonel Anson ordered Colonial Secretary Wilfred Birch and Auditor General C. J. Irving to Langat to speak with Sultan Abdul Samad and delivered his letter regarding piracy. Anson demanded the surrender of pirates, along with Rajah Mahdi and Rajah Mahmud, but also the promise never to harbor pirates again. Birch also demanded the reappointment of Tengku Kudin, which Anson did not request. The guns of HMS Teazer pressured Sultan Abdul Samad to favor British demands, which were against the policies of London. Anson and Birch made their own policy decisions regarding Selangor and neglected to consult Sultan Abdul Samad before the actual bombardment.157 Straits Settlement officials employed gunboat diplomacy to fight piracy and their alleged

156 157

Parkinson, British Intervention, 50-52.

Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 87-92.

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supporters among the chiefs. British imperialism initially attacked suspected pirates and their alleged safe haven as part of an attempt to increase British influence in Malaya. Further piratical actions within the Straits of Melaka increased Great Britains presence within Malay and Chinese politics. Unlike with the Selangor Incident in 1871, the Chinese of Larut required no safe harbor with local Malay rulers because their power was overt as the local rulers failed to dislodge them. The strategy employed by both sides during the Larut war focused on cutting off enemy trade through stockades and blockades to weaken them. In one instance, Ghee Hin junks fired upon Fair Malacca, hitting her thirty-five times, reports of which convinced Governor Ord to dispatch gunboats to the coast of Perak.158 Pirates plundered vessels of all nationalities almost daily, while British gunboats patrolled the coast of Perak but possessed too heavy a draft to navigate the shallow waters, resulting in a miserable campaign with brutal heat and heavy rains. Pirates easily escaped through mazes of mangroves or hid in seemingly peaceful villages and even plundered vessels within sight of British crews, often waiting until darkness to attack.159 In one particular instance in 1873, pirates slaughtered the crews of two Penang junks within view of HMS Avon and even managed to escape. Governor Clarke realized that he needed more naval forces to fight the sea-raiders, but even Colonel Anson opposed direct intervention within Perak.160 Piracy proved itself as a formidable extension of Ghee Hin power that British forces found difficult to eliminate. Breaking the power of the Ghee Hin pirates would restore the peaceful traders to sail safely through the Straits of Melaka.
158 159

Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 113-118.

Swettenham, British Malaya, 125, 126.

160

Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 179.

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The destruction of the stockades guarding the Larut River proved most difficult, but was important for the destruction of the Ghee Hins power in Malaya. The boats of HMS Midge came under fire from Ghee Hin pirates in the Larut Rivers estuary, resulting in a battle that injured half the boats crews while wounding two officers seriously without the capture of any pirate vessels. The British gunboats successfully destroyed the stockade and multiple junks. In response, the Ghee Hin faction assaulted various British police stations and destroyed the mantris house during the night.161 Even during the 1870s, pirates proved themselves worth adversaries of the Royal Navy through clever use of the surrounding waters. The power that secret societies possessed came under attack directly through naval actions because of their threat to peaceful trade and British power. The nature of piracy and raiding made naval force a limited solution to the political challenges for British authorities. The destruction of Malay vessels during the attack on Galang symbolized the fate for many of the orang laut forced from their maritime traditions in the name of counter-piracy. The reduction of piracy by force and the increased competition from Chinese, Indian, European, and Arab traders placed the native traders in decline. Changes in technology made native seafarers less competitive against the steamships that traveled against the wind with remarkable speed. The orang laut witnessed the decline of their role in the maritime world during the 19th century, which forced changes in their way-of-life perhaps previously unimaginable.162 Naval power was the most overt form of counter-piracy used by the British Empire and the destruction wrought by the Royal Navy and the East India Company was only one part of

161 162

Swettenham, British Malaya, 126.

Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 135-136.

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an imperial system bent on destroying sea-raiding and bases of power unfriendly to British interests. 4.3 Imperial Technology: Industrial Age Equipment and Policy British administrators brought in new technology to the Malay Peninsula to increase their power in the region, because industrial technology brought key advantages to British forces over Malay and Chinese forces. By 1837, steamships provided firepower in an effective manner that previous more traditional warships failed to accomplish. Previously, pirates attacked trading vessels within sight of the British warships without recourse. Steam-powered vessels attacked and destroyed raider strongholds throughout the Malay world, proving more effective than a number of windpowered sloops-of-war despite often being relatively small.163 Steam launches in particular supported the British colonial effort in the Straits Settlements, providing valuable services including transportation for various purposes. The steam launches proved themselves as multipurpose vessels for supplying lighthouses, maintaining beacons, and surveying bodies of water for the purpose of maintaining a British presence.164 Steam-powered vessels gave British naval forces a huge advantage over native prahus, permitting warships to sail against the wind without an entire deck of oarsmen who constantly needed water and food. Steam-power also provided services for civil functions necessary for the maintenance of the state and commerce. Improvements in communications technology permitted imperial authorities to suppress unwanted activities. Before the advent of the telegraph, Singapore and Penang communicated via maritime vessels that took some time to deliver and varied with sea
163 164

Mills, British Malaya, 225-226.

Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 59.

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and weather conditions. The development of the telegraph system between Singapore and Penang in 1870 and its connection Madras a year later certainly made communication much faster than before. Wireless communication in the 20th century made tracking piratical actions and other illicit activities easier.165 The rapid mobilization of British forces from India to Malaya in less than one month permitted the quick destruction of native forces during the Perak War.166 British forces displayed the effectiveness of communication and steam transportation technologies with the quick deployment of military might, which would not have been possible without the new technologies. Navigation equipment potentially disrupted piracy by allowing authorities to better see into the darkness and enforce laws. Aside from guiding vessels through the Straits of Melaka safely during the night, lighthouses provided a means for the authorities to look out for piracy and smuggling. Other navigational equipment such as buoys and beacons illuminated the straits as tools for both navigation and state control. Watchtowers along the coast provided the colonial authorities with a means to observe vessels and report misbehavior.167 The navigational tools provided Great Britain with additional power at sea by permitting foreign traders to safely navigate treacherous waters without fully knowing the straits. Away from the main ports and their garrisons, lighthouses were static and vulnerable to assault, but their presences at strategically important locations were prominent reminders to people of Great Britains power. The lighthouses in particular acted as symbols of the British presence, permitting the
165 166

Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 78-80.

Metcalf, Imperial Connections, 68.

167

Tagliacozzo, , Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 82-84.

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enforcement of British laws and a degree of control by illuminating the darkness used for hiding actions deemed illicit by British authorities. 4.4 British and Selangor Judicial Machinery: The Courts and the Suppression of Piracy through Legal Processes The British legal system prevented the unjust detainment of individuals suspected of committing crimes and therefore government officials did not possess the right to arbitrarily arrest people or detain property. The legal system processed suspects based on the merits of each case rather than on mere accusation in theory, but the legal system of the Straits Settlements initially made trials for suspected pirates difficult. Lawmakers and politicians reformed the local judicial system to better process and convict suspected pirates to reduce the overall crime within and around the colony. The British legal system showed that the state took serious offense to piratical actions as an extension of the British Empire. The lines between judicial and political were not always clear in cases of piracy because politicians used the judicial system to weaken their political opponents and convince native Malays, particularly rulers that they best side with the British authorities in disputes. Politically slanted policies weakened the impartiality of the legal systems in Malaya but weakened the bonds between political rulers and marauders. British authorities sided with politicians deemed friendliest to their goals in Malaya rather than creating a justice system that prosecuted any individual suspected of harboring pirates. Throughout the Selangor Civil War both factions participated in piratical acts including the forces of Tengku Kudin, who ultimately won the war with military assistance from neighboring Pahang.168 British authorities did not side with
168

Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 57, 71.

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Kudin because he was innocent of supporting pirates, but rather because he was friendlier to British interest and needed outside support to hold his gains in Selangor. The Straits Settlements administrators were pragmatic in their war against piracy because finding pirates and limiting their impact required the assistance of native leaders. Suppressing piracy within the principles of equality in any justice system was simply unrealistic because pirates hid throughout the west coast of Malaya often with the support of native rulers. The Straits Settlements required the support of the local states to weaken the impact of the marauders, while the implementation of a judiciary became a tool to deter piracy. The inadequacies of the Straits Settlements judicial system for admiralty cases particularly in cases of piracy made enforcement of admiralty laws difficult to prosecute. The merchants of Singapore throughout 1835 petitioned the Indian government and Parliament to deal with the suspected pirates. Although piracy affected European shipping substantially less than the devastated native shipping, Singapore needed the native traders to an extent for its prosperity. Singaporean petitioners with the support of Governor Bonham of the Straits Settlements requested the permission of the local courts to prosecute suspected pirates. The older system required the authorities to ship the suspected pirates and the witnesses to Kolkata for an Admiralty trial, which too often was beyond the capacity of the local governments. Even if the suspected pirates arrived in court across the Bay of Bengal, the prosecution had difficulty receiving convictions with a lack of evidence because many of the witnesses refused to travel such a long distance to court. The Straits Settlements finally received its own Admiralty courts through act of Parliament in 1837.169 The presence of an effective judiciary permitted greater
169

Mills, British Malaya, 231-232.

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prosecution by the government of suspected pirates, making conviction rates higher because more witnesses spoke in court. Admiralty jurisdiction brought more seafarers effectively under British legal influence after 1837 for the Straits Settlements because trials became much easier for the prosecution. Witnesses to piracy in the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea found traveling to Straits Settlements courts much easier than sailing to Kolkata to testify, which made convictions much easier. 4.41 The Straits Settlements Legal System and Piracy British authorities in the Straits Settlements wrote laws that made it more difficult to conduct piratical operations, particularly aimed at suspected Chinese pirates using Singapore as their homeport but local officials had great difficulty in receiving permission to enact rather draconian laws. As already mentioned, the Chinese community adeptly defended themselves against accusations of piracy despite reports of Chinese junks illegally seizing other vessels. Reports of Chinese piracy up and down the coast persuaded Governor Blundell of the Straits Settlements to pursue a more aggressive policy against them. Blundell wanted more authority from the Indian government in regard to the search and seizure of suspected pirates at sea, but his requests were unacceptable because its enforcement would breach international law. The governor permitted government officials to board vessels and detain suspected pirate vessels for six months without evidence of piracy in 1854. Though the orders gave much power to officials within the harbor, Blundell wanted even more power to defeat the pirates at sea.170 The effort to weaken and destroy pirates in the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea required stronger legal measures by various governments. The Straits

170

Edmonstone to Blundell, February 28, 1856, East India Company and India Boards Collections 189619, 48, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 224-225; Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 224-225.

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Settlements government possessed a large number or restrictions on its aims to eliminate piracy because of constraints set by the Indian government and international law. The Straits Settlements required stronger anti-piracy laws to scale down the native and Chinese piratical acts to strengthen the British presence while building their vision of commerce in the region. In 1856 officials discovered four Chinese junks heavily armed for combat, giving reason for temporary detention. British officials dismounted the guns of the vessels, leaving five or six guns mounted for defensive purposes while placing the excessive dismounted guns below decks. The British officials released the four junks to go about their business without meeting legal or physical opposition from the owners for the temporary seizure of questionable legality.171 The laws permitting the detention of excessively armed merchant vessels passed in May 1857, but British lawmakers minimized the legal hassles to merchants to avoid risking loss of trade in Singapore to other ports in the region.172 The laws in Singapore made obtaining excessive amounts of arms more difficult while maintaining liberal economic policies to keep Singapore competitive as the major shipping hub in the region. The merchant community of Singapore showed willingness to accept anti-piracy laws to an extent that did not severely interfere with regular business, making a political alliance more feasible between British officials in Singapore and the merchant community composed of Europeans and Chinese. British laws targeted the pirates support in British-held Singapore as part of a strategy to break marauders away from their political and economic support. Police enforced laws to weaken the power of the Chinese secret societies and piratical
171

Blundell to Secretary, May 27, 1856, East India Company and India Boards Collections 189619, 50, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 225-226.
172

Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 225-228.

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marauders. The Ordinance for the Suppression of Piracy 1866 permitted greater punishments for the suppliers of pirates and for the purchasers of goods stolen by pirates. The ordinance increased the cost of victuals for pirates while selling pirated loot became more difficult.173 Singapores police stations existed along the coasts initially and spread later to the islands interior to enforce laws particularly regarding pirates and secret societies. Eventually British authorities placed hundreds of streetlamps by the docks to assist police prevent illegal actions there.174 Authorities in the Straits Settlements focused on the elimination of support of pirates to break their power and convince them to work within the sphere of British legality. The development of ordinances and infrastructure increased the challenges for pirates convincing a significant number to cease piratical acts revealing the increasing strength of British authorities. 4.42 The Prosecution of Piracy within the Native States Piracy occurring outside of British jurisdiction presented legal problems for its administrators who possessed no right to prosecute suspected perpetrators. In November 1873, pirates seized a Chinese vessel from Melaka off the Jurga River near the sultans residence in Kuala Langat, Selangor. Piracy became such a problem that crews found supplying the North Sands lightship difficult.175 Other attacks included the seizure of vessel on December 3, 1873 and an assault on the Cape Rachado Lighthouse in January 1874. Governor Sir Andrew Clarke headed to Kuala Langat with six Royal Navy warships as support to demand justice for the recent piratical attacks.176 The raids emanated from the domain of Sultan Abdul Samad of Selangor, who previously agreed
173 174

Anderson, Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 102.

Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 62-64.

175 176

Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 189-190. Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 288, 304.

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not to harbor pirates. Clarke wished the imposition of British ideals of the era regarding piracy by cutting the ties between the state and the sea-raiders. British administrators pressured sovereign states to prosecute suspects within their own legal system despite the dubious credibility of native trials. The piracy trials at Kuala Langat in 1874 symbolized the imposition of British power over the sultan came through an attempt of bringing suspected pirates to justice. Aside from the overwhelming firepower from warships bearing down upon the sultan, the threat to his power became particularly obvious because the most important prosecutor. People generally believed that the sultans son organized the raid while receiving the protection of the sultan and who responded when learning of the accusation that his son was a pirate by calling the actions boys play. The China Squadron under Sir Charles Shadwell took Clarke to Kuala Langat and also picked up Tengku Kudin for the trial. The sultan agreed to Clarkes demands that the suspects be tried with Kudin and three other chiefs as prosecutors, along with the destruction of various stockades along the river. The accused received a lecture on the severity of disrupting the lighthouse system with British representatives Macnair and J. G. Davidson, Kudins backer at the trial. The sole survivor of the attack identified the trials defendants as the pirates resulting in their conviction. The sultan dispatched a kris for the executions, leaving Kudin with greater authority within Selangor.177 The trial and the executions effectively revealed the fate of anak rajah piracy within Malaya, the British authorities showed their new authority within the region.

177

Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 189-191; Swettenham, British Malaya, 183; Swettenhams description of the sultans reaction showed the disparity in regard for piratical actions between British and Malay authorities.

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The trial, however, was less about justice as much as the imposition of British authority and perspective on piracy or other trade obstructions. The trial gave Kudin more power by showing the extent of his British backing and protected British interests by opening up trade while protecting certain assets. The trial certainly gave Clarke an opportunity for a show of force and weakened his Malay political opponents. Frank Swettenham later discovered that the executed defendants were likely innocent because the witness probably never saw the faces of the assailants during the chaos in the dark of night of the attack. Swettenham also noted that despite the injustice regarding the executions the general populace understood the main point of the trial, suppressing piracy on the Selangor coast and consolidating Kudins power.178 Raiding was the chief expression of antagonism against British authority in the region for decades, but the breaking of the power of the chiefs and anak rajahs decreased organized sea-raiding within the region. Conclusion The conflict with the raiders required native allies willing to assist the Straits Settlements and therefore Great Britains power grew often at the expense of other native powers, sometimes weakening opponents through military action. Nicholas Tarling argued that Malay marauding was the political remnant to the old empires of the Malay world and that British influence in the region came about through the suppression of suspected pirates, along with Great Britain being the greatest power in the region.179 The complications of native Malay politics made distinctions between various factions difficult for foreigners to fully comprehend because of its decentralized nature. The
178

179

Swettenham, British Malaya, 183-184. Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 19, 20.

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Temenggong of Johor assisted British forces weaken piracy particularly from 1843 to 1848 thus earning the support of Straits Settlements Governor Butterworth. Malay pirates rarely attacked large European vessels, doing so usually in calm weather or sneaking aboard while in harbor, but an overwhelming majority of vessels composed of native victims.180 Great Britain employed a variety of means, not just military, to ensure safe trade throughout the Straits of Melaka regardless of the nationality or ethnicity of the traders. While protecting peaceful traders while weakening the inhibitors of trade such as pirates, raiders, and local chiefs imposed the contemporary British ideals regarding trade and politics, while making various alliances with anglophile chiefs to support their own influence. The Malay sea-raiders gave the native rulers the farthest reach of power over any other of their assets, posing the greatest threat to the security of the British colonies and their trade. Breaking the power of the sea-raiders was the first step for British authorities to gain considerable influence with local rulers who usually relied on the support of local chiefs. The European and Chinese merchants of Singapore led the demands for intervention in Malay politics particularly by the 1870s.181 Piracy prompted further involvement by British authorities. For instance, a piratical incident in July 1874 resulted in Swettenham advising Sultan Abdul Samad by August. The relationship between the sultan and Swettenham went well enough that the sultan paid $1,000 a month for Swettenhams expenses, while allowing Swettenham to manage import and export
180

Mills, British Malaya, 214, 221, 223.

181

One estimate by Chinese merchants placed losses to piracy at 2% of the total trade or $15,000 to $20,000 a year, but the actual losses were probably much higher. One incident of piracy of a sampan resulted in a loss of cargo worth $10,000. The underestimation was likely to hide the true costs of piracy to avoid paying higher taxes to British authorities. Anderson, Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 94-95.

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duties.182 Despite the stronger relationship with the native rulers, piracy continued around Singapore with attacks in 1884 and 1909,183 but piracy no longer posed the threat as it did earlier in the 19th century because the British counter-piracy and opposition to raiding proved effective. British authorities broke the power of the indigenous chiefs and weakened the Chinese secret societies through conducting anti-piracy operations making Great Britain the most powerful political force in Malaya. Great Britain employed a variety of military and non-military strategies for the suppression of piracy in the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea. The military strategies relied heavily on the Royal Navy and private flotillas to patrol sea lanes and attack suspected pirate havens. Technology gave Great Britain a large advantage over the sea-raiders through faster deployments and various tactical advantages. Although British campaigns often dispersed marauders, completely destroying them was virtually impossible because large numbers usually slipped away into the cover of trees or in a maze of estuaries. British authorities employed political, economic, and judicial strategies to protect the interests of British subjects. Employing the resident system, British authorities centralized the native Malay political system by taking power away from the chiefs and placing it in nominal hands of the sultan but the administration really fell to British administrators. More control of the coastland made piracy more difficult because the leadership no longer supported it in any significance. Economic development through tin mining, infrastructure projects, and non-indigenous agricultural goods such as rubber shifted attention away from marauding as an income for many living in Malaya. The development of an education system demilitarized the youth of
182

Wythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, 172-173, 188.

183

Mills, British Malaya, 234-235.

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Malaya and imbued them with sympathy toward Great Britain. Legal systems within Malaya became more effective in convicting suspected pirates, deterring others from partaking in raids. The strategies employed by British authorities weakened the power and impact of the sea-raiders of the Malay Peninsula.

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Conclusion In the time since the end of 19th century few historians wrote about the sea-raiders of Malaya for the sake of better understanding them in a socio-economic context because the sea-raiders themselves left few known historical records regarding their profession. Instead, more historians focused on the attempted eradication of piracy within the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea by British, Dutch, French, and Spanish authorities during the 19th century. Historians wrote generally about the sea-raiders of Malaya in the context of the increased role of Europeans throughout Southeast Asia as imperial powers. Sea-raiding as a profession was important to the history of Southeast Asia and Europe colonialism because sea-power was a critical component of political power and economic wealth. Malayas inhabitants of lesser means employed sea-raiding as a survival technique that revealed an important aspect of their lives as perpetrators, while victims lost their lives or freedom as slaves in some faraway land. A variety of factors contributed to the prevalence of sea-raiding during the 19th century around the Malay Peninsula stemming from often uncooperative and decentralized authorities, a largely maritime economy, along with a tradition of maritime raiding. Raiding at sea became particularly prevalent during years of warfare when commerce stalled and people found their way-of-life threatened with destruction. Although natural disasters pushed individuals toward sea-raiding, the flexibility of Malay society absorbed the shock to an extent that did not make sea-raiding inevitable. War and internal conflict contributed more to the danger for fishing and merchant vessels more than any single natural factor. The sea-raiders came from a variety of backgrounds from

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throughout society including humble fishermen, maritime traders, and retainers of the sultan. The sea-raiders acted as the first line of defense against the onslaught of western imperialism by challenging directly their power and indirectly through attacking Asian traders who traded in the Straits Settlements. The defense may not have been conscious because the sea-raiders were often primarily businessmen, but the native Malay state also deployed raiders for naval patrols and tax collectors. Early raids on British settlements revealed the vulnerability of the settlements to local sea-raiders because a lack of adequate defenses and the sheer number of raiders. Piracy and state-sponsored searaiding threatened the Straits Settlements during its early years by siphoning away the maritime trade the colonies needed to survive. The sea became the most disputed space between the sea-raiders and the British authorities in the early years of the British presence in Malaya. The attributes of the native political system contributed to piracy while making commerce more difficult for the merchants and financiers of the Straits Settlements. To increase exports from Malaya, British authorities weakened the power of the chiefs to sever the connections between the chiefs and the sea-raiders. Required payment of arbitrary tolls and other taxes set by chiefs from one fiefdom to the next made developing industrial infrastructure for large-scale exports extremely difficult. Furthermore, intermittent internal struggles between various factions throughout Malaya in part caused by disputes over tin revenue made internal and external trade more difficult and less profitable. Raiders as agents of the native state or other factions attacked vessels in

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contradiction to the interests of the Straits Settlements because of decreased trade and increased shipping costs suffered by the colony. The development of a two-part counter-piracy strategy included the suppression of suspected pirates by military force and the weakening of pirates through non-military means. The Royal Navy and the counter-piracy navies of the Straits Settlements attacked suspected pirates and their vessels. Squadrons attacked the suspected operating bases of sea-raiders, conducted sea patrols, and defended British interests. British authorities weakened the Malays sea-power through the destruction of their maritime vessels at the guns of the Royal Navy and private navies loyal to the Straits Settlements. The devastation of the Malay maritime society through British armed forces was insufficient to break the power of the native and Chinese sea-raiders, because the abundant numbers of seafarers possessed enough vessels and equipment for the continuation of sea-raiding. Sea-raiders had plenty of places to hide from the patrols of British warships throughout Malaya. Therefore, the British authorities needed a nonmilitary solution to break the power of the sea-raiders. The development of civil infrastructure and other economic projects enhanced the power of the colonial government making piracy more difficult. The political and economic development on the mainland potentially dissuaded those contemplating piracy to find work in a different profession. The growing economy of Malaya through the development of the mining and agriculture industries made investing in more peaceful enterprises more rewarding and less-risky than sea-raiding. The importation of seeds to Malaya for agricultural development in plantations by colonial authorities eventually became important to the accumulation of wealth in Malaya. The rubber and palm oil

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industries drew labor from other industries and locations while giving immense returns on investment. The colonial government encouraged economic growth in Malaya through a variety of successful programs making sea-raiding a much less relevant industry by the 20th century. British-Malay public education brought more people in Malaya under British influence. British policy placed particular attention toward educating the children of the elite to be sympathetic to Great Britain through an education system, which eventually taught them the English language. The public education system taught Malays English Industrial Age values to become more productive members of a colonial society without learning too much to become troublesome to British authorities. The values emphasized increased economic growth while maintaining the social structure of Malaya despite its inherent contradictions. The schools reinforced loyalty to the colonial system while placing control over the students lives dissuading them from violence including a life of sea-raiding. British authorities pressured native Malay rulers to end support for sea-raiders and punish them when caught. British officials signed treaties with Malay rulers sometimes within sight of a British warship forbidding the support of piracy or the harboring of pirates. Close relationships between the Straits Settlements and some Malay states such as Johor and Pahang prior to an official annexation by Great Britain convinced the states to deny safe haven to sea-raiders. Straits Settlements officials and investors backed Malay leaders friendly to foreign investment and British authority in Malaya. Diplomacy and political pressure convinced leaders of Malay states to end their support for searaiding to avoid the displeasure of British authorities.

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The development of an English-style legal system weakened the impact of the sea-raiders while maintaining good relations with the merchant community through the perception of fairness and equality under the law. The Straits Settlements legal system separated the activities of sea-raiders from merchants of Singapore who supplied the piratical voyages. The implementation of a legal system assured merchants of the protection their property from sea-raiders without the infringement upon their rights. Failure to respect the merchants might send their business elsewhere in the region and therefore the Straits Settlements needed a relatively fair legal system for the separation of sea-raiders and peaceful businessmen. The success of the Straits Settlements legal system increased the costs of sea-raiding, which decreased the seafarers and merchants participation in sea-raiding. Great Britains use of military force, civic reform, and economic growth reduced the impact of piracy and sea-raiding on the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea. The erosion of sea-raiding as an institution among other events broke the power of the native chiefs who once possessed great control over their people and land. Their traditions were incompatible with 19th century British ideals regarding trade and politics, which made the breaking of the chiefs power necessary before further significant investment. Sea-raiding was an important expression of the chiefs power because it was an important source of income. British authorities saw all sea-raiders as pirates, who threatened the interests of Great Britain in the region. The strategy to weaken the searaiders required the assistance of reliable Malay chiefs who opposed sea-raiding, but the strategy required the compliance of many Malay leaders along the straits rather than a few. Therefore the weakening of sea-raiders required decades of combat operations,

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negotiations with local leaders, economic development, and institution building by British authorities. The extent of sea-raiding decreased during periods of leadership and cooperation but sea-raiders never fully disappeared during years of effective authority. Decentralized political systems with little or no cooperation placed little check on marauders. Future studies could investigate the effect of the relationship between the indigenous rulers of Malaya and the merchants or their relationship with the orang laut. Studies could also examine the impact of British colonialism on the maritime cultures of Malaya in great depth. Malaya possessed a tradition of the sea-raiding that considered it an honorable profession. Many societies in the region required seafaring skills of many of its inhabitants, which provided the labor for increases of sea-raiding, whereas wars and leadership disputes provided the spark for periods of rampant piracy and sea-raiding. British authorities severely weakened the sea-raiders not only through destroying them at sea, but also by controlling the land from which pirates operated often through nonmilitary means.

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Glossary: anak rajah: child descendants of sultan; younger members of ruling class apilans: wooden bulwarks on Malay vessels to provide cover from projectiles bendahara: chancellor; prime minister; a high degree of independent power [Sanskrit] dato: chief; lord; not related to nobility drakha: treason; punishable by death kampong: basic administrative unit; large house; compound [Malay] kakap: a Malay skiff with one mast kerah: mandatory labor for commoners kris: sword found in Malaya; prized possession of its owner [Malay and Javanese] laksamana: admiral; in charge of the fleet; important minister in sultan-era Melaka maharaja lela: military general [Sanskrit] mandulika: governor; sent tribute to the sultan mantri: adviser; secretary of state; administrator for executive [Malay] nakhoda: master of a vessel; supercargo; owner or owners representative [Malay] orang kaya besar: treasurer [Malay] orang laut: sea people; resided in Riau archipelago in the southern Straits of Melaka paduakan: a relatively large single mast Malay vessel penghulu: basic administrator; headman; ancient position of leadership [Malay] penghulu bendahari: secretary for the sultan penjajap: a long sailing vessel with two masts perompak: pirate; someone acting without consent of sultan prahus: Malay sailing vessel; also spelled proa, perahus, prahu [Malay]

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rajah: ruler; leader [Sanskrit] raoyat: commoner; possessed few rights by 19th century [Sanskrit] rajah muda: heir apparent; required consent of chiefs before becoming sultan sampan: Asian boat often used for fishing shahbandar: harbormaster; important minister in sultan-era Melaka [Persian] sultan: leader of the state; king; emerged with adaptation of Islam temenggong: chief of police; chief judge; maintained peace and order [Malay] tengku: prince; used for Malay royalty yang-di-pertuan besar: leader of the confederacy of Negri Sembilan

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