MALONG vs.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS (PNR) VII 126 5 Petition to review order of the CFI of Pangasinan, Branch II, Aug. 7, 1985 FACTS: Oct. 30, 1977 Jaime Aquino, son of petitioners Francisco & Rosalina Malong, was on board a PNR train. He sat near the door of a coach. The train was overloaded w/ passengers & baggage since All Saints Day was forthcoming. While the train was between Tarlac & Capas, Jaime fell from the train resulting to his death. Malongs spouse pray that the PNR be ordered to pay damages amounting toP136,370.00. CFI dismissed complaint saying that it had no jurisdiction over the case because PNR is a government instrumentality & any action against it is a suit against the State which is prohibited under Sec. 16, Art. XV, Constitution. ISSUE: WON the PNR shares the States immunity from suit. HELD: No. CFI dismissal reversed & set aside. Remanded for further proceedings. RATIO: 1. Manila Railroad Company, PNRs predecessor, was not immune from suit under its charter, Act. No. 5440. 2. PNR charter, RA No. 4156 amended by RA No. 6366 & PD No. 741, provides that PNR is a government instrumentality under government ownership during its 50-year term from 1964-2014. Its under the Office of the President. Its charter likewise provides that PNR is to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the Corporation Law, referring to sections 81-102 of the Corporation Law on railroad corporation not reproduced in the Corporation Code. Sec. 36 of the Corporation Code and Sec. 13(2) of the Corporation Law state that every corporation has the power to sue & be sued in its corporate name in every court.

Fontanilla v. Maliaman [February 27, 1991]Facts:

VII 127 5 R no.61045. The Solicitor General maintains that NIA on the strength of PD no. 552 and thecase of Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers Union that NIA doesnot perform solely and primarily propriety functions but is an agency of the governmenttasked with governmental functions and is therefore not liable for tortuous act of itsdriver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent. They filed a case for damages against NIA Issue : WON the NIA is a corporate body performing proprietary function Held : Yes NIA is a government agency with juridical personality separate and distinct fromthe government. It can be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. Ratio : As such, it is appropriate to consider certain doctrines from the American jurisprudence. O Irrigation district is a public quasi corporation organized however toconduct a business for the private benefit of the owners of land within its limits.They are members of the corporation, control its affairs, and alone are benefited byits operations. It is, in the administration of its business, the owner of its system in a proprietary rather than a public capacity, and must assume and bear the burdens of proprietary ownership. O Quasi-public corporation possessed some governmental powers andexercised some governmental functions, but held that the construction and operationof its irrigation canals and ditches was a proprietary rather than a governmentalfunction, and hence the district was responsible in damages for negligentconstruction or operation of its canal system.

Amigable vs. Cuenca [February 29, 1972] VII 129 5 Appeal from a decision of the COFI of Cebu Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 630 of Banilad Estate in CebuCity. There is no annotation (appearing at the back of the certificate) in favour of thegovernment of any right or interest in the property in the property . Without anyexpropriation proceeding the government used a portion of his property to widen theMango and Gorordo Avenues. These two avenues were already existing since 1921. , 1958 Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippinesrequesting payment for his lot. His claim was indorsed to the Auditor Genral whodisallowed it. The complaint wasamended in April 17, 1959. Defendants Republic of the Philippines and NicolasCuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highway. Amigable wanted torecover his property from the Government. grounds: O Action was premature because the claim was not filed with the Office of the Auditor General O Right of action for recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed

O Suit against the government and the government has not given its consentfor the suit o It was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involvedin the Construction of Mango Avenue. s consent. The government in this case did not giveits consent for the suit. Also, the claim for moral damages gas already prescribed. Issue : WON the Victoria Amable may properly sue the government? Held : Yes CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I 08.16.04 5 Ratio : Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal processof expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suitagainst the government without thereby violating the doctrine of immunity from suitwithout its consent. If the constitutional mandate that the owner is compensated for property taken for public use is to be respected. The doctrine of governmental immunityfrom suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Whenthe government takes any property for public use which is conditioned upon the paymentof just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits jurisdiction of a court. n is one of the attributes of ownership.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES VII 138 5 Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993 FACTS: Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at theUS Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)headquarters in Quezon City. Shes married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-Americanserviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco. ISSUES/RATIO:1.WON the case is under the RTCs jurisdiction - YES Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court(something like asking for Courts permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, itshould not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it isdeemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed tohave subjected itself to RTCs jurisdiction. 2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradfords motion todismiss. - NO Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary sothat Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in thecomplaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits thetruth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the SC. HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted. Lansang vs. Court of Appeals[February 23, 2000] VII 139 5 Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals Facts : the Blind, Inc. (GABI) was allegedly awarded a verbalcontract of lease in 1970 by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). NPDC is a government initiated civic body engaged in the development of national parksincluding Rizal Park. There was no document or instrument in record to show thegrantor of the verbal license to GABI. GABI was to remit to NPDC, 40% of the profits derived from operating thekiosks. (No written proof for this) Issues : CA erred in not holding that private respondents complaint against petitioner, as chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be suedwithout its consent. erred in not holding that petitioners act of terminating respondentGABIs concession is valid and done in the lawful performance of official duty. Held :(1) NO

ce of their duties. RULE: Suit must be regardedas one against the state where satisfaction of the judgement against the state where thesatisfaction of the judgement against public official concerned will require the state itself to perform positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay thedamages awarded to the plaintiff.

SHAUF vs. COURT OF APPEALS VII MISNUMBERED 1 5 Petition for certiorari to review the decision of CA FACTS: 1990: Petitioner, Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American whois a member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor inthe Base Education Office at Clark Air Base. She boasts of related working experienceand being a qualified dependent locally available. By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equalemployment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination byreason of her sex (female), color (brown) and national origin (Filipino by birth). ISSUE: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US ArmedForces HELD: Respondents ordered, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100K asmoral damages, P20K for attys fees.

Republic vs. Sandoval [March 19, 1993] VII 140 5 Petition for Certiorari to review the orders of the RTC of Manila, Branch 9 Facts : Popularlyknown as the Black Thursday or the Mendiola Massacre. Twelve people died and theheirs of these people are seeking for retribution. (Girls d ko naisasama ang details ngmassacre the gist is that the people marched to Mendiola because of failed agrarianreforms and the police and military were there to defend the palace. There were shootingand no one knows who started it. End result = some people were killed.) Aquino issued AO no. 11 which created the Citizens MendiolaCommission and in their report the recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals. The most significant recommendation that theymade was that the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident becompensated by the government. This recommendation of the commission was the basisof the claim for damages by the petitioners. to dismiss on the ground thatthe State cannot be sued without its consent. The petitioner maintained that the State haswaived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights. Issue : WON the State has waived its immunity from suit Held : No

PNB vs. PABALAN VII 141 5 Original Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari & Mandamus w/ Preliminary Injunction FACTS: Dec. 17, 1970 writ of execution was issued w/ a notice of garnishment for the sumof P12,724.66. Said amount belongs to the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration& deposited with PNBs La Union branch. Execution of writ & garnishment was delayed since PNB objected to thegarnishment & questioned WON Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration really had fundsdeposited w/ PNB La Union. ISSUE: WON funds of public corporations w/c can sue & be sued are exempt fromgarnishment. HELD: No. Petition dismissed.

Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals [October 1, 1990] VII 142 5 Petition for review of the decision of the court of appeals Facts -shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated by the petitioner Municipal of Makati against Admiral Finance Creditor Consortium, Inc., Home Building System &Realty Corporation and Arceli P. Jo.

4, 1987 The RTC judge fixed the appraised value of the property atP5,291,666 and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160 which was earlier received. The decision became final and executory. a branch but the sheriff was informed that a hold code was placed on the account of the petitioner Issue : WON the account of the City of Makati with PNB can be levied for a money judgement against the City. Held : No

Jose Nessia v. Jesus Fermin VII MISNUMBERED 2 5 Petition for review of the decision of CA, 1993 FACTS: 1993: Respondent Mayor Fermin of Victorias, Negros Occidental, ignoreddeliberately and refused incessantly to reimburse travel expenses incurred by petitioner Nessia, then Deputy Municipal Assessor of Victorias. Hence, the latter filed thiscomplaint to recover damages and reimbursement of expenses. Petitioner further assertsthat vouchers were ignored because he defied the Mayors request to register and vote inVictorias in the 1980 local elections. Respondent claims that he never received any vouchers indicating expenses. Andeven if he did, they wouldnt be approved for payment because they were submitted lateand was in excess of the budgetary appropriations. Municipality of Victorias sided withFermin. ISSUE: WON respondents inaction on Nessias claim is punishable HELD: Petition granted. Trial courts decision granted and reaffirmed.

City of Caloocan vs. Allarde [September 10, 2003] VII 143 5 Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts: Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of AssistantCity Administrator and 17 other positions via the ordinace no. 1749. The affectedemployees assailed the legality of the abolition and in 1973 the CFI declared that it wasillegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back salaries and other emoluments. The City government appealed the decision but it was also dismissed. 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 in partial payment of her backwages. Remaining balance = P530,761.91 The others were paid in full. budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocanwere arguing that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. Issues and Ratio1. WON the garnishment of the funds of the City if Caloocan still needed authority of the Mayor to be released NO idered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a 3 rd person., or money owed by such 3 rd person or garnishee to the defendant. PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government remains government funds and may not be subject togarnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law.Based on consideration of Public Policy. State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, asappropriated by law. EXCEPTION: When there is a corresponding appropriation asrequired by law. In such a case monetary judgement may be legally enforced by judicial process. government funds deposited in thePNB are exempt from execution or garnishment, this rule does not apply if an ordinancehas already been enacted for the payment of the Citys obligation. Thesum that was indicated in the ordinance was deemed automatically segregated from other budgetary allocation of the City of Caloocan and earmarked solely for the Citysmonetary obligation to her. A valid appropriation lifts its exemption from execution.The appropriation was duly signed and approved by the council and the mayor. 2. WON the levy and sale at public auction of 3 motor vehicles owned by the Citycannot be attached nor sold in an execution sale to satisfy a money judgement againstthe City of Caloocan. MOOT CASE Judge Allarde already the levy on the three vehicles thereby formally discharging them fromthe jurisdiction of this court. 3. WON the auction of the vehicle was valid. YES Sheriff complied with the rules on public auction and the administrative complaintacknowledges that fact. Petitioner cannot now be heard to impugn the validity of the auctionsale.

Ocampo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal [GR 158466, 15 June 2004]

VII 144 6

Facts: On 23 May 2001, the Manila City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Mario B. Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez, the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila pursuant to the 14 May 2001 elections. He was credited with 32,097 votes or a margin of 768 votes over Pablo V. Ocampo who obtained 31,329 votes. On 31 May 2001, Ocampo filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) an electoral protest against Crespo, impugning the election in 807 precincts in the 6th District of Manila on the following grounds: (1) misreading of votes garnered by Ocampo; (2) falsification of election returns; (3) substitution of election returns; (4) use of marked, spurious, fake and stray ballots; and (5) presence of ballots written by one person or two persons (HRET Case 01024). Ocampo prayed that a revision and appreciation of the ballots in the 807 contested precincts be conducted; and that, thereafter, he be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila. On 18 June 2001, Crespo filed his answer with counterprotest5 vehemently denying that he engaged in massive vote buying. After the preliminary conference between the parties on 12 July 2001, the HRET issued a Resolution6 limiting the issues to: first, whether massive vote-buying was committed by Crespo; and second, whether Ocampo can be proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the 6th District of Manila. Meanwhile, on 6 March 2003, the HRET, in HRET Cases 01-020 (Bienvenido Abante & Prudencio Jalandoni vs. Mario Crespo), and 01-023 (Rosenda Ann M. Ocampo vs. Mario Crespo), issued Resolutions declaring that Crespo is "ineligible for the Office of Representative of Sixth District of Manila for lack of residence in the district" and ordering "him to vacate his office." Crespo filed a motion for reconsideration therein but was denied. On 12 March 2003, Ocampo filed a motion to implement Section 6 of Republic Act 6646. On 26 March 2003, Crespo filed an opposition to Ocampos motion to implement the said provision. On 27 March 2003, the HRET issued a Resolution holding that Crespo was guilty of vote-buying and disqualifying him as Congressman of the 6th District of Manila. Anent the second issue of whether Ocampo can be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman, the HRET held that a second placer cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified candidates,a nd thus held the Ocampo cannot be proclaimed as the duly elected representative of the Sixth legislative District of Manila. Ocampo filed a partial motion for reconsideration but was denied. Ocampo filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Ocampo may be proclaimed the winner after Crespo was disqualified by the HRET. Held: Section 6 of RA 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government. Herein, Crespo was declared disqualified almost 22 months after the 14 May 2001 elections. Obviously, the requirement of "final judgment before election" is absent. On the other hand, subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner. This principle has been reiterated in a number the Court's decisions, such as Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, Abella vs. COMELEC, Benito vs. COMELEC and Domino vs. COMELEC. As a matter of fact, even as early as 1912, it was held that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is found to be ineligible for the office for which he was elected. In Geronimo vs. Ramos, if the winning candidate is not qualified and cannot qualify for the office to which he was elected, a permanent vacancy is thus created. The second placer is just that, a second placer he lost in the elections, he was repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters. He could not be proclaimed winner as he could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates. To rule otherwise is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electroral process and the sociological and psychological

underpinnings behind voters preferences. At any rate, the petition has become moot and academic. The Twelfth Congress formally adjourned on 11 June 2004. And on 17 May 2004, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bienvenido Abante the duly elected Congressman of the Sixth District of Manila pursuant to the 10 May 2004 elections.

VILLAVICENCIO vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, 39 Phil.778 Issue:

VII 145 6

The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor. Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc. That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions; For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. Held: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ, 101 PHIL. 1155

VII 148 6

Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was

protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between thePhilippines and China was violated according to him.

Issue: Whether

or

Not

Republic

Act

1180

is

valid

exercise

of

police

power.

Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.

In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 985 Facts:

VII 149 6

Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils. without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city of filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in spain. He was allowed to practice law profession in spain under the provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of profession between the republic of the phils. Issue: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar. Held: The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees between the republic of the phils. and spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. said treaty was intende to govern filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in spain. The treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the phils., for the reason the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the supreme court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the phils. The power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the congress of the phils. People v Lagman and Zosa, 66 Phil. 13 VII 150 6

Facts: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. 45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of filing of the information. The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo

de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs. In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

Held: The Court held that The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. The right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of this country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Feb., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment. The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason of the actual existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

VII 151 6

FACTS: Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the congregation. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral conduct." HELD: Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is remanded to the RTC. Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondents stance that the respondents conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Courts action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the compelling state interest test. The government

must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the states compelling interest which can override respondents religious belief and practice.

Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections [GR 161872, 13 April 2004] En Banc, Tinga (J): 12 concur

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Facts: Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on 17 December 2003. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to Pamatongs Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution 6558 dated 17 January 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include Pamatong as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy. On 15 January 2004, Pamatong moved for reconsideration of Resolution 6558. The COMELEC, acting on Pamatongs Motion for Reconsideration (SPP [MP] 04-001) and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution 6604 dated 11 February 2004. The COMELEC declared Pamatong and 35 others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for Pamatong. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired. Pamatong filed the Petition For Writ of Certiorari, seeking to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, Pamatong argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. Pamatong likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Pamatong claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidates bio-data and his program of government. Issue: Whether there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly, to seek the presidency. Held: There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly, to seek the presidency. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties." Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." The provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive

measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution 645210 dated 10 December 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. Herein, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights [GR 100150, 5 January 1994] En Banc, Vitug (J): 12 concur Facts: A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the Roque Fermo, et. al. (being the officers and members of the North Edsa Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, Fermo, et. al. were given a grace-period of 3 days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, Fermo, et. al. were informed by Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) against Brigido R. Simon, Carlos Quimpo, Carlito Abelardo, and Generoso Ocampo, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Simon of Quezon City to stop the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA (CHR Case 90-1580). On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing Simon, et. al. "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering Simon, et. al. to appear before the CHR. On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by Fermo, et. al. on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 Simon, et. al. carried out the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of Fermo, et. al. to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed Simon, et. al. to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." A motion to dismiss, dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. During the 12 September 1990 hearing, Simon, et. al. moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved, and likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts. In an Order, dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited Simon, et. al. in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March 1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying Simon, et.al.'s motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss. In an Order, dated 25 April 1991, Simon, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration was denied. Simon, et. al. filed the petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary VII 156 7

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injunction, questioning the extent of the authority and power of the CHR, and praying that the CHR be prohibited from further hearing and investigating CHR Case 90 1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al." Issue: Whether the CHR has the power to issue the order to desist against the demolition of Fermo, et. al.s stalls, and to cite Mayor Simon, et. al. for contempt for proceeding to demolish said stalls despite the CHR order. Held: Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights." Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations; such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." Herein, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by Fermo, at. al. on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park." More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, the Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if its is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining herein, the Court not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of Fermo, et. al. can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution. On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) herein, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. As held in Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, "The constitutional provision directing the CHR to 'provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection' may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. 'Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law'. It is never derived by implication. Evidently, the 'preventive measures and legal aid services' mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued `by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose."

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