Zain Lundell 0600384j The Exceptional State Long Essay ****************************************************************************** Political sociologists and scientists, for their

r part, do not attempt to define politics as a superstructure whose base is to be found at the supposedly real level of relations of production. They obtain their object of knowledge by constructing or delineating political facts, which they regard as particular facts and as distinct from other particular social facts, such as the economic, the juridical, the aesthetic, the scientific or the purely social... one effect of this fiction is immediately obvious: modern democratic societies are characterised by, among other things, the delimitation of a sphere of institutions, relations and activities which appears to be political, as distinct from other spheres which appear to be economic, juridical and so on. Political sociologists and scientists find the preconditions that define their object and their approach to knowledge in this mode of appearance of the political, without ever examining the form of society within which the division of reality into various sectors appears and is legitimated. (Lefort, 1988, pg 11). Claude Leforts1 Democracy and Political Theory is a translated version of his original Essais sur le Politique (Gould, 1991, pg 1) and is concerned with the underlying form of differing polities, most notably, the pre-modern, modern democratic and the totalitarian society. For Lefort, the use of political philosophy in the analyses of societies allows for a clearer picture to be painted of both democracy and totalitarianism, particularly in explaining how the former may give rise to the latter (Lefort, 1988, pg 19). This is highlighted by Leforts belief that tyranny and totalitarianism are not of the same kind, but rather that totalitarianism is born out of a counterrevolution against modernity. In order to illuminate these thoughts Lefort uses several conceptual tools. In the premodern ancien rgime, the kings body incarnated societys identity and assumed the place of power, while in modern democratic society there is no figure which
1

Claude Lefort was born in the year 1924 in France.

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incarnates societys identity, and as such, there is a disincarnation of societys identity and a desertion, but not deletion of the place of power. This allows one to understand the concept of legitimacy and how it operates within society, more specifically for Lefort, how power, law and knowledge are legitimately exercised in society and in relation to democracy and totalitarianism, whether they are married or independent (Flynn, 2005, pg xxiv). Further, the idea that modern democracy engenders an anxiety due to its reliance on debate and its inherent uncertainty2 creates a desire for a unified people, a People-as-One, where society is not in conflict but in complete harmony with itself, creating the image of the body a homogenous and harmonised society (Flynn, 2005, pg xxvi). However, as will be explained below, this is but an unrealisable phantasm and results in a necessity for the image of the machine which uses terror in order to prolong the phantasmic experience.3 In light of the above this essay will pursue three objectives. First an elucidation of Leforts work will be presented in order to understand his conception of the political as briefly outlined already, second; to understand whether, if in fact, his theory possesses practical credence case studies of Nazi Germany and Baathist Iraq will be explored. Finally, a brief critique of Leforts work will be spelled out in order to accurately assess credibility of Leforts work and the application of his theory to the two case studies. The Philosophy of Claude Lefort; Interpreting the Political4 A logical step from asserting the notion of the modern would be pointing to that from which it emerges, presumably the pre-modern. It is in the modern that political discourse is born together with society as a political entity or le politique. However, for Lefort, the modern does not connote a linear pattern of history where the premodern sets in order to allow the rise of

First, one cannot claim to be a De facto representative of the people in democracy. Each person must first compete for this title. Further, this title may be under continuous contention. Second, disregarding constitutional restraints etc., when a decision is reached, it is only certain as long as the majority wishes it to be so. The fluidity of democracy thus creates anxiety. 3 Lefort relies on the Machiavellian conception of society, that is, division as its foundation (Flynn, 2005, pg 59-78) 4 This heading is borrowed from Bernard Flynns book entitled, The Philosophy of Claude Lefort. Interpreting the Political.

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the modern, but rather, is used to describe the existence or non-existence of political discourse and its object, le politique (Flynn, 2005, pg 83). In the premodern Lefort characterises society as guided by divine providence and his use of Christianity does not imply a specifically Christian theory, but rather, he treats it as an indiscriminate fact of history when studying European societies (Flynn, 2005, pg 105). The premodern is characterised by both a set of moral principles thought to be unquestionable due to their divine nature and a society in which the social hierarchy is rigid. For Lefort this creates secure relations5 of dependence where security arises from the (near) solidity of social hierarchies while dependence is a consequence of differentiated social statuses (Lefort, 1988, pg 198). A sense of order and stability permeates the social atmosphere due to the rigidity of the social hierarchy where fixed notions of behaviour and rights pertaining to differing social rank exist. The monarch is seen as the zenith of the social order (Lefort, 1988, pg 198), highlighted by Tocqueville when he writes; Aristocracy had made a chain of all the members of the community, from the peasant to the king... (Tocqueville, Vol ii, pg 99). Lefort, following Ernst Kantorowiczs position, shows that in the premodern, the king has two bodies, one descending from nature and one from grace (Kantorowicz, 1957, pg 46). The King has absolute power as the divine representative and is the interlocker between God and the Kingdom. The king is thus the legitimate embodiment of law, power and knowledge in that his power allows him to justifiably exercise the above via his body of grace. This is so because the king, as the Man-Christ, is the link between the people and the divine and it is through his link (being his body of grace) that the will of the divine is carried out (Lefort, 1986, pg 254-256). It can be said then that the place of power is symbolically occupied by the king while power, law and knowledge flow from the embodiment of the place of power held by the King. Through this, the king represents the people to themselves and they exist in a phantasmic unity, seen as homogenous and non-competitive and symbolised by the body of the king (Flynn, 2005, pg 109110). But as Lefort notes, it is a phantasmic unity for very good reason. The kings other body,
5

It should be noted that Lefort explains the premodern organisation of society, not as a primitive attempt to explain the reason for man and his position in the world such as the Enlightenment does, but rather, it is a theory which sees premodern reasoning as an attempt to avert humanity and human history from closing in on itself (Flynn, 2005, pg 123)

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that is, his real body or his body of flesh serves two important roles in understanding le politique. First, as Lefort notes in Democracy and Political Theory, the kings body of flesh serves to enchant the people insofar as it is a body capable of human experiences, both emotional and physical such as love, anger, hope and procreation and thus effects an unconscious mediation between the human and the divine (Lefort, 2000, pg 245). Perhaps relatedly, an eroticopolitico relationship between the kings natural body and the people exists whereby the kings natural body becomes the object of the peoples love: his marriages, his paternity, his liaisons, his festivals, his amusement and his feasts, and, also, his weakness and even his cruelties (Flynn, 2005, pg 117) attracts the gaze of all (Lefort, 2000, pg 245). The peoples love thus serves to create both the divine to the human and the human to the divine (Flynn, 2005, pg 131). Simply put, the reflection of a king as embodying the quality of humanness imbued in the imagination of the people, assures that the king and the people are conjoined (Lefort, 2000, pg 245). Secondly, and importantly, his body of flesh serves to undermine the phantasmic unity of the kingdom. This is so as the kings personal agenda, associated with his real body, creates conflict and recognises competing interests which serves to create factionalism an important expos on the actual heterogeneity of society (Flynn, 2005, pg 116). As pointed out above, the premodern is characterised by a set of moral principles thought to be unquestionable due to their divine nature. To question or put forward competing conceptions of truth6 would be to question Gods will and therefore commit an act of heresy, a crime punishable by death. The conflict of the kings two bodies, however, allows for the realisation of competing interests which permeate social organisation and modalities, and as such, rights are born. Rights are not then, for Lefort, intrinsically part of man. In other words, rights are not born within the human being, but rather, are born out of a need to challenge the apolitical system of the premodern. They are thus constructed for man by man and are, as a result, historically based (Lefort, 1986, pg 28). Here then is the disincorporation of the place of power where the pre-determined life path is diluted. This lead to what Lefort terms the dissolution of the
markers of certainty within society (Lefort, 1988, pg 488). This allows society to formulate its own
6

Absolute knowledge exists and emanates from the divine.

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views and in doing so, any proclaimed absolute truth can be contested. For the first time politics, that is, the contestation for outcomes in society is legitimated (Swan, 1989, pg 223) the body of the king in which power, law and knowledge are housed, from which they flow, is shattered power , law and knowledge leak into an environment where they become the matter of legitimate questioning7. In Leforts view this allows for the creation of liberties and political rights which constitute political freedom. Notably he sees this as necessary for democracy to exist. In the modern the place of power is empty, but not effaced. This is so, as there is no single holder of an absolute and unquestionable truth, but rather, truth is contested through debate and selected via election. The salient point then is that, democracy creates truth as it moves along the string of time and consequently there is never an ultimate truth as the people always have an ability to question an ability afforded by the conferring of rights. Further, truth is seen as nothing more than a truth pursued at a certain point in time by the people or as Lefort writes, Democratic society, in contrast, is a theatre of constant change... (Lefort, 1986, pg 199). This marks a break from the premodern where truth was conceived of in theologico-political terms and results in the commission of the dissolution of the markers of certainty (Lefort, 1986, pg 19). What Lefort pays particular attention to is the way in which this questioning is constitutive of society and therefore heterogeneity and conflict are seen as ineliminable from democracy (Gould, 1991, pg 3). Leforts Theory of Number points out that elections or the notion of suffrage allows for the breakdown of the social or the disincorporation of individuals which leads to the recognition of the plurality of society (Lefort, 1986, pg 303). The significance of this is highlighted by Tocqueville as he notes that the process of atomization destroys ongoing certainty and social identity (Tocqueville, Vol ii, pg 99), or in Marxs infamous words, All that is solid, melts into air. However, in the modern this is celebrated in that there is a celebration of being political and an intrinsic importance in it as contestation is what democracy flourishes
7

Rights and power are no longer conjoined but are separate. Rights now dictate what power may or may not be.

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upon, while premodern construction is inherently apolitical. Lefort thus sees democracy as an extraordinary polity in that it gives rise to the fact that individuals become entities which must be counted in a universal suffrage, substituting the place of the universal invested in the body politic (Lefort, 1986, pg 303). However, what gave rise to a desire for certainty, for stability and ultimately for the People-as-One was the atomization of society as Lefort notes; However with this came the danger of numbers, the danger of numbers is greater than the danger of an intervention by the masses on the political scene, the idea of number as such is opposed to the idea of the substance of society because number breaks down unity, destroys identity (Lefort, 1986, pg 303). Simultaneously there is an emergence of the mass or the people which is ambiguous because in the first instance the individual wishes to have the right to be free from constraint and affords himself rights to make this possible while in the second, through the role which democracy plays, he wishes to be led by the social in that the rights given to him are determined not by himself but by society as a whole (Gould, 1991, pg 341). By appealing to ideals of unity and harmony, which were realised in past pure, harmonised and prosperous Nations, the notion of the People-as-One becomes attractive. For Lefort totalitarianism it is not born of nothing, rather it is the sign of a political mutation, which can only be explained by grasping its relationship with that of democracy. According to him, it is from democracy that totalitarianism arises. Totalitarianism is built on the belief of unity and a denial of division where law, power and knowledge are conjoined and the state, together with civil society, are fused in a harmonious relationship. There is thus a belief in the complete harmony and homogeneity of le politique, highlighted by the dilution of the individual I into the totalitarian us (Lefort, 1986, pg 251-252). Totalitarianism seeks to provide this certainty by creating an all inclusive conception of human life whereby peoples identity is fixed and security discovered by sharing in the realisation of the common project (Flynn, 2005, pg 134). What affords the ideals of totalitarianism such sway is the double phenomenon which relates to a desire for stability; however, under democracy this is not afforded 8. Thus one is able to see, and importantly so, that the conditions which give rise to a revolt against
8

See in particular pg 3-4 of this essay and pg 198, Chapter 10, in Leforts Democracy and Political Theory, Polity Press, 1988.

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democracy are not due to exploitation or even misery; but rather, due to a fundamental upheaval against the regime (Flynn, 2005, pg 133) or mode of political organisation (Flynn, 2005, pg 133). As Lefort notes; ...he imagines a society which would accord spontaneously with itself, a multiplicity of activities which would be transparent to one another and which would unfold in a homogenous time and space, a way of producing, living together, communicating, associating, thinking feeling, [and] teaching which

would express a single way of being. (Lefort, 1986, pg 270). In looking at this revolt, one is able to see that the ability of human rights and liberty (democracy) to survive is based upon the continued empty place of power whereby the guardians of power (public authority) do not appropriate it. Under democracy/the modern, the very notion of occupying the place of power should be impossible. This is so as power is held not by any individual, but by society as a whole. Those who exercise power do so, on behalf of society, and exercise that power in accordance with the wishes of society. However, it is totalitarianisms goal to occupy the place of power once more (Lefort, 1988, pg 255). As pointed out earlier, Lefort sees totalitarian societies as contingent on democratic ones (Flynn, 2005, pg 139). The rights inherent in a democratic state allow society to move in ways that are limited only by imagination which may include a step backwards into a position where the place of power is occupied (by the party or Egocrat), which would constitute a totalitarian society. Lefort highlights this by pointing out that to recognise a human right is to inherently acknowledge the right to have rights. As a result, rights generate other rights and open up the flood gates for an unforeseeable and potentially endless democratic adventure (Swan, 1989, pg 223). This may result in oppressive or unfree forms of society being created because democracy does not guarantee a better society, rather, it only allows for the maximisation of choice in relation to those conceptions of society until the place of power is again occupied9. One should be able to see the importance of this point in that although democracy/the modern
9

Lefort notes that once the place of power is again occupied, then that society does not constitute a modern/ democratic society. The place of power must be empty in order for the modern to exist, in order for democracy to exist (Lefort, 1986, pg 285)

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may allow for the maximisation of choice and freedom, it contains the ability to abolish these freedoms by the people choosing not to be free (choosing for the place of power to be occupied again)10. For totalitarianism then, the Good Society is one which accords spontaneously with itself (Lefort, 1986, pg 270) and allows for the uniting and harmonising of society. Part of this unity and harmony is engendered by the phantasm of the People-as-One11. This phantasm conceives of a society which spontaneously accords with itself, is transparent and which unfolds in a homogenous time and space (Lefort, 1986, pg 270). The logical reverse of this is to deny all heterogeneity or as Lefort puts it; ...the very notion of social heterogeneity... is rejected, the notion of a variety of modes of life, behaviour, belief, opinion, in so far as this notion radically contradicts the image of a society in harmony with itself (Lefort, 1986, pg 285).To realise the concept of the People-as-One Lefort points out two vital processes which serve to erase the divisions between society and state and the signs of internal social division (Lefort, 1986, pg 286) because social consensus is not spontaneous, but rather something that must be shaped on an ongoing basis. The first process involves the occupying of the place of power, and as such, the Leader is seen not only as reflective of the peoples wishes, but intrinsically fused with the people. He embodies the people and their desires. The Leader, known as the Egocrat or the Party which embodies the peoples desires and carries these desires out is seen to occupy the place of power. The second process involves othering, a process whereby enemies are identified or created and consequently expelled from the body politic, known by Lefort as Social Prophylaxis (Lefort, 1986, pg 287). Othering serves two purposes. First, it serves to expel those from the body, who are not in sync with the project (either members of the Ancien Regime or members who seek to destabilise the system) thereby banishing possible opposition to the established Regime. Second, because the integrity of the body is always at stake, it serves to assure the body of its own identity by expelling its waste matter, or as if it had to close in upon itself by withdrawing from the outside, by averting the threat of an intrusion by
10

See in particular Bernards Flynns discussion on the Algerian Revolution, pg 197-198 & 227, Chapter 9, The Philosophy of Claude Lefort, Interpreting the Political. Northwestern University Press. 11 It is a phantasm because, as noted earlier, division is inherent in any form of society. Here Lefort relies on the Machiavellian conception of society, that is, division as its foundation (Flynn, 2005, pg 59-78).

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alien elements (Lefort, 1986, pg 287 ). Lefort thus relies on Hegels notion of identity construction in that he believes that the thesis must always be defined in relation to the antithesis. In other words, the People-as-One can only be conceptualised vis--vis another a double negation is thus essential. As Lefort (1986, pg 287) notes; For the People-as-One can be both represented and affirmed only by a great Other; in the initial period it can be so only by that great individual whom Solzhenitsyn has so aptly called the Egocrat. But the same image is also combined with the image of the element alien to the people, with the image of its enemy... The definition of the enemy is constitutive of the identity of the people. For Lefort the campaign against the enemy is feverish and this fever is good in that it signals that there is some enemy in society, some evil to combat, thereby negating the idea of internal division or division of the People-as-One. Thus, according to this conception, there is a need for the notion of the People-as-One to be engineered on a continuous basis through the process of Othering and the masking of societys actual heterogeneity, accomplished by what Lefort terms the Machine (Lefort, 1986, pg 288). Lefort sees the Machine as the Great Organiser in that it is the Machine which goes about moulding and manipulating society into the shape of the People-as-One. This is necessary due to the fact that society does not accord spontaneously with itself and must, as a result, be manipulated into a phantasmic unity the Machine covers the cracks of heterogeneity and expels the Other (social prophylaxis) (Lefort, 1986, pg 288). Terror, employed by the Machine, therefore becomes essential to the totalitarian project. This is so as Terror ensures that citizenry do not veer from the conception of the People-as-One by bridging the gap between the symbolic order and the real (Flynn, 2005, pg 134). The Machiavellian conception of division as inherent in society thus leads to the employment of Terror in order to hold society together. As Al Khalil (1989, pg 5) notes, Terror is the glue which holds society together. It is important to note, however, that Terror should not be seen solely as the violence perpetuated against the Other, but rather, as Lefort (1986, pg 114) notes, it should be seen as the ways in which society is made to conform to the notion of the People-as-One as a result of fear. Accordingly, it can be said that Terror may operate in overt
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and hidden forms. In the final analyses it can be said that Terror acts to repress the true form of the social in two ways. The first is the repression of conflict and/or dissent as both act to undermine the unity of the social and secondly, it works to create an identity of the body politic through the process of social prophylaxis (Flynn, 2005, pg xxviii). This new (totalitarian) society is thus presented as a single organisation comprising a network of micro-organisations; furthermore, it is presented paradoxically as that great automation... (Lefort, 1986, pg 301). The social is seen as both an organisation and at the same time, it is seen as organisable. The effect of this is to see man as imprinted in the organisation in the first instance and simultaneously as the organiser or social engineer in the second (Lefort, 1986, pg 301). Thus for Lefort, the key concepts here are the image of the body and the image of the machine, and the key idea is the way in which the two contradict each other. The contradiction arises due to the fact that the Machine which proceeds to shape society is inherently contradictory to the image of the body, which sees society as spontaneously according with itself which sees society as harmonious and homogenous. The very need for the Machine thus undermines the phantasmic unity and the apparently organic or natural constitution of the body. As Lefort (1986, pg 301) notes; ...the image of the body is altered when it comes into contact with that of the Machine. The latter contradicts the logic of identification; the communist us is itself dissolved. The notion of the organisation, even though it gives rise to that of the organiser, poses a threat to the substance of the body politic, making the social appear at the boundaries of the inorganic A final point about the Lefortian concept of totalitarianism is that democratic totalitarianism is impossible. This is because rights are constitutive of a democratic state and once the right to contest and question conceptions of life is eroded there can no longer be a democratic society (Lefort, 1986, pg 310). Totalitarianism is born out of the destruction of democracy. This point is highlighted by the striking workers in Poland (Flynn, 2005, pg 25). Even though there was no wish to be political, the demand for some sort of change is political in itself because by asking for change they asked for the right to be heard and the right to ask for change (there may be
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other rights involved). This is in conflict of the totalitarian ideology which sees society as spontaneously according with itself (Lefort, 1986, pg 310).

Germany To understand whether Leforts work possesses practical credence this essay will turn to Nazi Germany, specifically looking at the decade of 1932 1942. This period has been chosen in order to give focus to two points. Firstly, how policy and ideology was used to solidify the notion of the People-as-One and second, how monopolies on law and knowledge were used to entrench the power of the Nazis or in Leforts terms, how law, power and knowledge were fused in order to deny division within society. Admittedly the two are interrelated in that the denial of division concretises the notion of the People-as-One, however, as will be shown, there are some important theoretical as well as practical differences. To do this, the essay will explore the German Ideology of National Socialism, as well as look at practical facts which occurred in the decade under analyses. Germans were left feeling alienated after the First World War due to the humiliation of defeat and the harsh policies imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. It was through these hardships that the German community lost pride in their nation. A loss of group attachment or sense of belonging within communities led to this feeling of alienation (Bendix, 1956, pg 606). Furthermore, there was a broad perception that moral and cultural values were being eroded, highlighted by one womans comment; away from liberalism, toward obligation; away from the career woman, toward the housewife and mother (Bridenthal et al, 1984, pg 164). The hopelessness of the people was reflected in the suicide rate which was four times that of Great Britain and not surprisingly then, men and women flocked to the polls in support of Hitler and his party for its promise of restoration of normality for which people longed (Gellately, 2001, pg 10-11). It was on the 5th March 1933 that the Nazi Party came into power via democratic elections, led by Adolf Hitler. It was Hitler to whom the people looked to for solidity, a sense of belonging and hope to rebuild Germany to her glorious past. Already one is able to see the desire for a homogenised and certain life path, or as Lefort would suggest, a People-as-One
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the longing for traditional and uniform ways of life as seen in the opposition to career woman in terms of the former and a path of development which would lead to a rekindling of Germanys glorious past in terms of the latter. Hitlers project acknowledged the desire for a homogenised body politic and it was the goal of the Nazis to realise this through their National Socialist ideology. The first step in realising this was the destruction of the communists as they represented a competing ideology and as such, compromised the anti-pluralistic ideology of the Nazis (Nicholls, 1968, pg 170). However, as noted above, because the integrity of the body is always at stake, there is a continuous effort to assure the body of its own identity by expelling its waste matter (Lefort, 1986, pg 287). It was through National Socialism and its positing of an ideal German race (the Aryan race) that the Nazis were able to further engender a commonality among citizens. Of course this meant, through the process of Othering that some were foreign to the ideal race, and as such, undesirable. These undesirables, fell prey to what Lefort terms social prophylaxis. Thus in terms of Nazi ideology, race played a pivotal role in creating a People-as-One by designating those as incompatible with the project as racially inferior. This is highlighted by Gellately (2001, pg 93) when he explains how even common criminals were seen in a racial light by ascribing their faults as biologically predetermined and as such, they were of inferior racial being. The operating principle for German Criminal policy came to be known as Prevention is better than reacting whereby preventative action was sought in relation to crime. This resulted in the justification and subsequent mass sterilisation of dangerous habitual offenders in order to prevent uncommitted future crimes naturally, Nazi puppets in the judiciary determined who was a dangerous habitual offender (Gellately, 2001, pg 93). Hitler used plebiscites to further entrench the concept of the People-as-One a homogenous and self-according group where results ranged from 90 to 99.9 percent. This was done by doctoring plebiscite results (for which much evidence exists) as well as counting spoilt ballots or those left blank as yes. At times communities were reported to have voted 100 percent for Hitler when it was surely not the case (Gellately, 2001, pg 15-16). Another means of creating the People-as-One was by sealing the ruptures that separated the people, state and judiciary.

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This is because not to do so would inherently acknowledge difference, for example; why would there be a need for a system of checks-and-balances if the People-as-One signified a homogenous entity, in complete harmony and according spontaneously with itself? This was done by putting forward Adolf Hitler as Fhrer of Germany and as such, recognising that all authority flowed from Him12. Hitler, by occupying the place of power, embodied the desires of the people and erased the boundaries between state, judiciary and society they were fused into one body, however, as Lefort would note, Hitler was the head, the Egocrat. As early as 4 February 1933 a presidential decree was promulgated for the protection of the German people. Although mild by later standards, it restricted freedom of expression, permitted certain forms of censorship, banned publications, and outlawed meetings and demonstrations when the police judged that they constituted a direct danger to public security (Gellately, 2001, pg 17). This serves to illustrate what occurred in Germany after Hitlers rise to power a gradual erosion of civil liberties. The laws promulgated took an increasingly radical form as time passed with a specific emphasis on maintaining the racial purity of the German Aryan race. For example, the Ordinance against parasites on the body politic highlights the manner in which the Nazis sought to internalise the concept of racial purity within The Law. In addition to the above ordinance, the Reichstag Fire Decree suspended until further notice the constitutional guarantees of personal liberty; made it possible for police to arrest and detain anyone they saw fit and to impose restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly and association while people found guilty of social unrest would be subject to harsh prison sentences and even the death penalty (Gellately, 2001, pg 1819). It should be made clear that the laws were framed in an extremely vague manner, and deliberately so. This allowed Hitlers security forces to determine what The Law meant as they saw fit. Furthermore, the judiciary, seen as puppets of the ruling regime, not only interpreted The Law to Hitlers and the Nazis advantage but came to be seen as enforcers of Nazi will (Nicholls, 1968, pg 169). However, the existence of courts should not detract attention from the way in which the Nazi regime blatantly bypassed the legal system. As stated by Dr Werner, a key figure behind the construction of Nazi Law;
12

A capital h to signify his God-like Status

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... from the point of view of the leadership of the state, it is not whether or not giving lawyers access to clients will help in the battle against the states deadly enemies. Lawyers questions are...incompatible with the state Leaderships trust in the organisations given the mission to defend against the attacks of enemies (Gellately, 2001, pg 40). This was then later codified into law when Hitler promulgated a Decree, barring lawyers access to anyone held in protective custody (Gellately, 2001, pg 40). The creation of the Nuremburg Laws, technically known as the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour highlighted the way in which the Nazi law sought to penetrate private life. In order to maintain the racial purity of the Volk, sexual relations between Jews and non-Jews were forbidden while the definition of who constituted a Jew was left largely unaddressed, and purposefully so (Gellately, 2001, pg 122). Furthermore, through law, it became compulsory to join the Hitler Youth group if one met the requirements. Members were subjected to regimented activities and were forbidden to listen to unsavoury music such as Jazz (as many of the prominent Jazz artists of the time were blacks) and embark on unsupervised outings in the country side (where Nazi propaganda did not reach). In effect what the Nazis did was envelop society in a casing of laws which they used to their advantage, consolidating their power and moulding society into a form that was both in agreement with their ideology and at the same time easier to control through the increased power they were able to wield over society. The monopolisation of knowledge was similarly used in order to entrench the power of the Nazi regime and limit the extent to which heterogeneity could manifest itself by indoctrinating the German people to Nazi ideology. As mentioned earlier, it became compulsory to join the Hitler Youth Movement if one met the requirements. This, however, was only the tip of the ice-berg. All movements which were not associated to Nazism were disbanded, including Catholic youth groups and other voluntary organisations (Gellately, 2001, pg 116). Nazi associated movements became institutions of Nazi ideology dissemination, where women were taught how to lead an Aryan life and children taught of Aryan racial superiority and the omnipotence of the Fhrer.
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Furthermore, the curriculum was changed for school going children and many were taught Nazi ideology with resources that emphasised crude German Fatherland romanticism, while textbooks and books which contained any semblance of anti-Nazi thought were burnt in mass book burning rituals. The Nazi regime realised the need for an ideologically homogenous society and embarked on the above to realise this homogeneity so much so that a special ministry was set up. Joseph Goebbels headed this ministry, called the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda. It was primarily tasked with the job of conquering the German people to Nazi ideology (Reuth, 1993, pg 172). As Goebbels himself stated, ...the actual purpose is to set in motion a mental mobilisation of the masses, to work on them until they can no longer resist us (Goebbels, 1933, pg 157). To do this, Goebbels embarked on a mass censorization of the printing press and radio and regurgitated propaganda to the people. For example, Jews were often blamed for sabotaging German war machinery when in fact they were destroyed by the Allies and concentration camps were lauded for protecting those which mobs would target and providing their occupants with humane living conditions as well as education. This is highlighted by the re-education of social outsiders who had not committed a crime yet, but were, due to genetics, going to commit a crime in the future. This supposed re-education taught them the lessons of hard work and committing to the community of the people (Gellately, 2001, pg 13 & 121-150). However, it should be noted that the motivation behind this was not only to achieve a firm grasp on power, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to return the German people to their rightful place in Europe and the world, it was a project to reorganise German people into a conception that was seen as superior and right in short, it was their destiny to be that which Nazi ideology espoused. In looking at how the Nazis monopolised knowledge, one is able to see how they were able to reconstitute the conception of the body politic. The portrayal of Nazi ideology as the only ideology gave people little opportunity to think in other ways, particularly children. Through this, the Nazis were able to merge state and society by putting forward a common ideology

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and at the same time, through mass co-operation (due to peoples ideological stance), able to cement their hold on power over the people. In conclusion it can be seen how the desire for a People-as-One results in the breaking down of barriers between institutions. Law, power and knowledge become fused in order to carry out the predetermined life path of the people. In Nazi Germany this was highlighted by the peoples longing for a Germany rooted in its powerful past. This resulted in a move away from democracy to that of totalitarianism whereby the place of power was once again occupied. The people to a large degree willingly allowed this to happen13 and resulted in the marriage of law, power and knowledge. As Lefort noted, it is most likely in times of hardship that the place of power will occupied again this is what occurred in Germany as Hitler came to power in dire times when the German economy was ravaged by hyperinflation and the unemployment rate was soaring. It seems as though Leforts analyses helps shed light on the underlying motivation for certain types of polities.

Iraq The second case study turns to Saddam Husseins Iraq, particularly focusing on the late 1960s to the early 1980s. This period has been chosen in order to give focus to a single point how the notion of the People-as-One was created in Iraq, with an emphasis on the way in which, and to what extent Othering and that which was employed by the Machine Terror, were used to construct a single social identity. In 1941, the Iraqi experiment that posited a unified Arab nation was terminated. However, the rise of the Baath Party in the 1960s and its essential theoretical core, being pan-Arabism, which posited the existence of a single Arab nation and the establishment of a single Arab state sought to rekindle at least some of the ideals which Faisal had first proposed in the 1930s (Tripp, 2000, pg 186). In contrast to previous totalitarian regimes such as Hitlers Germany or
13

It must be highlighted that Gellatelys book is a study on the extent to which the Germans willingly participated in and allowed the Nazi regime to carry out its wishes. He finds that, to an alarmingly large degree, the people willingly helped in the perpetration and perpetuation of Nazi ideology.

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Stalins USSR, Saddam Husseins Iraq did not posit a single notion of Truth, and in doing so, the Baath party created a lot more legroom in the formulation and interpretation of ideology and policy. This can be partly ascribed to the Baaths fairly imprecise slogan, being, Freedom, Unity, Socialism. Further, this vagueness allowed the Baath and Saddam to maximise their following by appealing to a broad range of ideals as Tripp (2000, pg 173) notes, the lack of a coherent ideology allowed the Baath to represent itself as a confederation of cliques. Unity and thus the creation of the People-as-One were originally envisioned as a single Arab state, where a single Arab nation would exist a Pan-Arabic ideal.14 However, the Pan-Arabic ideal was pursued only if Iraq gained most from it, or alternatively, if Saddam was posited as the leader of the Pan-Arabic ideal (Baram, 1991, pg 122). The fluidity of the People-as-One is further highlighted by the fact that Iranians were on the one hand, seen to be part of the People-as-One by reason of their placement within the Middle-East, their common hostility towards Israel and Imperial Powers and their predominantly Islamic faith15. However, on the other hand, Iranians were excluded from the conceptualisation of the People-as-One by portraying unity, not as the commonality described above, but rather, as those who descended from Mesopotamia and were not Persian, but Arab (Baram, 1991, pg 50). This serves to highlight the fluid and nebulous nature of Baathist ideology. As noted above, the notion of the People-as-One relies on an Other to affirm its own identity. This is because, as Hegel notes, the thesis must always be defined in relation to the anti-thesis. In other words, the People-as-One can only be conceptualised vis--vis another a double negation is thus essential. The result is that the Baath as well as Saddam laboured intensely to create an enemy. For example, large investments were directed toward archaeological studies within Iraq in order to uncover the history of the great ancient cultures of Mesopotamia and trace the link from those great ancient cultures to the Iraq of the day. By doing so, the leaders of Iraq were able to engender a common identity among Iraqis by positing a shared cultural heritage. Also, it allowed for the creation of outsiders by excluding those who did not share this common cultural identity, serving to justify possible hostility towards these groups.
14 15

To some the ultimate goal was the creation of a homogenous Muslim-Brotherhood. This ties into the notion of a Muslim-Brotherhood.

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Lastly, it served to justify the extermination of those that were incompatible with the project by positing them as racially inferior to the superior descendants of Mesopotamia (Baram, 1991, pg 50). Further, Jews, Kurds and Persians were seen to be dangers to the homogeneity and unity of the body politic and were constructed as the other by being accused of associating and assisting Imperial Powers (Imperial Powers were also an Other to the Iraqi body politic). In doing so, associating with groups that were Iraqi enemies resulted in the automatic exclusion of them from the body politic. Finally, it should be noted that the image of the Other was not only flexible, but ever changing, in part allowed by the flexibility of Baath Ideology. 16 This is illustrated by the fact that there were groups considered to be the Other at all times and groups who were considered to be the Other or allies at times convenient to the regime. For example, the Jews were regarded as Other at all times, however, the United States of America, who were seen as the Imperialist enemies by Saddam and his party, were seen at the very least as helpers or maybe even friends (arguably even allies) during the Iran-Iraq war due to their assistance, being the supply of munitions and aid to Iraq during the war (Al-Khalil, 1998, pg 224). Since the 1960s Terror too was used in order seal the cracks of division within the body politic. Al-Khalil (1998, pg 38) argues that the second Baathist republic in Iraq (1968-2003) was undoubtedly a totalitarian regime, highlighted by the excessive and self-perpetuating cycle of Terror that gripped the populace throughout Baathist rule. This was done in order to affirm a central tenet of totalitarian regimes in general, as well as of Baathist ideology; the denial of division within society. For example, Saddam or the Baathist party who occupied the place of power as either the Egocrat or Party respectively could not be seen to be questioned as this would contradict how they conceptualised Saddam as Supreme Leader, embodying the will of the people17. Thus Al-Khalil argues, in line with Leforts theory, that Terror was a necessary tool, needed for the very survival of the regime.

16 17

See pages 16 & 17 above. The purpose of this essay is not to determine who occupied the place of power. Furthermore, even if Saddam was seen as the Supreme Leader, it may still be argued that the Party occupied the place of power and merely

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In order to perpetrate Terror, the party, among other tools, employed the use of the National Guard, similar to that used by Hitler during Nazi-Germany rule. Saddam had, in the early 1960s, started the construction of the Jihaz Haneen which would be used to target enemies of the people by harassing and intimidating unfriendly factions. This organisation came to be known as the Ann, or Internal State Security, and was reconfigured into three separate entities, namely the Ann, which was mandated to handle internal security, the Mukhabarat, which was involved in Party intelligence and the Estikhbat, responsible for military intelligence. These organisations were largely responsible for turning Iraq into what Al-Khalil deems the Republic of Fear. The National Guard18 was intimately involved in the kidnapping, torture and murder of those deemed as Other. For example, the period of 1968-1973 was characterised by a series of show trials whereby those deemed historic enemies,19 or as Lefort terms it, members of the ancient regime were hanged in public. The perceived20 support of these public executions reported by the media and government created a sense of legitimacy in that support was seen as a legitimating factor (Al-Khalil, 1998, pg 58). Further, these organisations were used to purge Baath party members deemed to be spies in other words, their loyalty was questioned21 and they were thus executed. These initial acts of Terror were mainly associated with members of the ancien regime, and perpetrated by the National Guard, however, as Lefort notes, division is inherent within society and it becomes necessary to hide the cracks of heterogeneity society is itself not self according. This resulted in Terror becoming increasingly directed toward the general populace Terror thus evolved into a secret force to which the entire population was subjected (Al-Khalil, 1989, pg 271). Networks of informers were created and infiltrated everyday Iraqi life. Groupings including Gentlemens clubs, societies and sports teams were targeted and children were encouraged to place the Baath before their parents by reporting any unbecoming behaviour
used Saddams position as a tool in its objective. Saddam as Supreme Leader could therefore be seen as part of the Machine which the Party used to further its aims. 18 The National Guard is made up of the Ann, Mukhabarat and the Estikhbat post reconfiguration and only the Ann pre reconfiguration. 19 Jews, Persians and Kurds as examples. 20 Percieved due to the fact that propaganda and lies used to create support for these executions. Support thus seems greater than it actually was. 21 Objectively, it could be argued that their loyalty to Saddam and not the party was questioned.

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(Al-Khalil, 1981, pg 75-79). Also, as occurred under Nazi-Germany, mass organisations were created which were affiliated to the Baath Party and were used to disseminate Baath ideology. Any other organisations were banned and deemed counter-revolutionary. The consequences were at the very least two-fold. First, thinking in differing ways to that which Baathist ideology groomed people was made extraordinarily difficult, and second, to think in such differing ways was seen as counter-revolutionary and as a logical step, dangerous. People were thus pressured into thinking in a homogenous manner, not only through acts of Terror, but through fear of not thinking in a certain way. Terror may also be said to have been perpetrated through the arbitrary arrest, detainment and execution of various intellectuals, members of civil society and medical professionals. This occurred only after the Baath had both consolidated and firmly tightened their grip on power and when any serious contenders to Baath power had been eliminated. This seems to suggest then that the motivation behind these acts was to instil fear into the populace or leave a gap in the possible leadership of the counter-revolution, or both (Al-Khalil, 1989, pg 58-61). One could then argue, as Al-Khalil does, that fear was used to disincentivise opposition as well as glue the Iraqi body politic together (Al-Khalil, 1989, pg 275). Further, by the regime naming and shaming over one thousand individuals, and thus by extension their families, and with promises to release additional lists, Al-Khalil (1998, pg 16) argues that the Baath leadership instilled fear into the populace via the fear of ostracisation (for example, fear of associating with the families of those who had members appear on the list) and punishment without due process the latter highlighted by the way in which the regime set up Revolutionary Courts to deal with spies, agents, and enemies of the people. These courts were presided over by military staff with no legal training and were required to hear charges of conspiracy to overthrow the government and espionage on behalf of the United States, Israel or Iran, further; in these courts forced confessions were common (Zaher, 1986, pg 142). A final point is that the fear experienced by Iraqi people would have been intensified by the perceived or actual omnipresent nature of Saddam and the Baath. Actual omnipresence was

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constructed via the creation of vast informer networks as outlined above22 as well as the operation of the National Guard and the perceived omnipresent nature via the mass publicising of Saddam Hussein and Baath leadership highlighted by the fact that Saddams image was plastered in almost all public spaces (Al-Khalil, 1981, pg 110). In conclusion it can be seen that the way in which the People-as-One was constructed within Iraq under Baath rule was fluid owing to the vague ideological stance taken by the Baath. Further, it allowed the Baath and Saddam considerable freedom in the creation of ideology and implementation of policy. Othering, used to rid the body of possible contestation and affirm itself of its own identity was created through the creation of enemies seen as counterrevolutionaries. However, the Other was also created via rejecting those who were not Arab, were Imperialists, or who did not have a link with the great civilisation of Mesopotamia. The fluid nature of Baath ideology thus allowed for the fluidity of the Other and the regime found itself positing groups as Others when it most suited them to do so. Finally, it can be seen that Terror, both overt and covert, was used not only to rid the body politic of dissent, but also to stifle the birth of new dissent and thus acted as the glue which held the Iraqi body politic together.

Critique In the last section of this essay, a critique of Lefort will be explored in order to properly evaluate the theory elucidated above. Admittedly, the case studies have not drawn on the impending critique in their application of Leforts theory; however, it will serve to point out some of the perceived short-comings of Leforts work as regarded by some. Lefort understands the term social as applying to the public as a whole, however, in doing so, he does not account for the ways in which democracy may serve to impact or influence institutions of a smaller scale than the public as a whole (Gould, 1991, pg 338). For example, in many firms where cooperative behaviour is needed, or where groups pursue common
22

See page 19.

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objectives, democratic participation is often an existent form of organisation. In keeping with Leforts notion of the social, one could argue that his conception is overly encompassing in that it does not allow room for le Politique to flourish in non- totalistic forms. As Gould (1991, pg 343) aptly puts it; Because he [Lefort] construes the alternatives as organic, totalistic sociality on the one hand and division or political conflict on the other, there seems to be no space left for the important phenomenon of non-totalistic and non-conflictual common activity. Such common activity, I would hold, is defined by shared goals and joint or cooperative activity to realize such goals. Lefort seems unable to acknowledge this sort of common activity -which is usually on a smaller scale than the common or public interest of society as a whole - because he identifies the common interest or the public good with an overarching one which opens the way to social domination and political control ostensibly in the interests of society as a whole. Further, Lefort focuses intensely on the fact that the dissolution of the markers of certainty brings about democracy which essentially institutionalises conflict (Lefort, 1986, pg 17). To illustrate this, Lefort uses both voting and elections which, for Gould, is a narrow conception of the democratic process in that it fails to consider the importance of democratic participation in decision making contexts other than voting in elections (Gould, 1991, pg 340). Thus one could argue that Lefort fails to account for the ways in which consensus may be reached by ways other than voting for example consensus through compromise. Relatedly, Leforts theory of multi-party democracy is problematic. This is so as it is seen as a sort of American pluralist theory of democracy where democracy is conceived of as a system whose essential existence is to maintain equilibrium among groups with conflicting interests, by periodic elections... (Gould, 1991, pg 340). The problem arises from the fact that this conception of democracy to the instrumentalist function of maintaining political equilibrium and excludes such factors as common interests and participation (Gould, 1991, pg 340).

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Conclusion For Lefort, the modern can be seen as a revolt against the apolitical and totalitarianism can be seen as born of the indeterminacy of the modern. The totalitarian ideal thus seeks to fuse Law, Power and Knowledge in order to create what Lefort terms the People-as-One. In both Nazi Germany and Baathist Iraq the result was the employment of Terror in order to deny individualism and seal the cracks of heterogeneity a result of the inherent division of society. However, the way in which Leforts theory fails to recognise the subtleties that may occur within society serves to undermine his all encompassing conceptualisation of the social. Further, even though Lefort does not explicitly divulge into the subject of support and compliance, Gellately does show how propaganda and false belief serves to foster mass support for totalitarian regimes while Al-Khalil illuminates the way in which fear produces mass compliance for totalitarian regimes. Nevertheless, Leforts conceptual schema serves to highlight the way in which totalitarian societies eventually develop a need for Terror in order to hide the inherent division within society. Furthermore, his theory serves to highlight the ways in which society serves to legitimate the source of law, power and knowledge and the way in which these may operate. In relation to Germany and Iraq, Leforts theory definitely serves to paint a clearer picture of why those societies organised themselves in the manner they did and helps one to garner a more fruitful understanding of le Politique.

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References Al-Khalil, S. Republic of Fear: the Politics of Modern Iraq, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. Baram, A. Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Bathist Iraq, 1968 89, New York: St Martins Press, 1991. Bendix, R. Social Stratification and Political Power, American Political Science Review, Vol 46, 1952. Flynn, B. The Philosophy of Claude Lefort, Interpreting the Political, Northwestern University Press, 2005. Gellately, R. Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Goebbels, J. Die zukunftige Arbeit und Gestaltung des deustchen Runfunks, speech delivered on 25 March 1933, in Heiber. Gould, C. Claude Lefort on Modern Democracy, in Praxis International, 1991 (3 + 4), pp 337 345. Kantorowicz, E. The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology, Princeton University,Press,1957.

Lefort, C. Democracy and Political Theory, translated by David Macey, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988. Lefort, C. The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism, edited and introduced by John B. Nicholls, A. Weimer and the Rise of Hitler, Macmillan, New York, 1968. Reuth, R., Translated by Winston, K. Goebbels, Constable, London, 1993.

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Thompson, Cambridge, Mass.: Mit Press, 1986. Tocqueville, A. de. Democracy in America. 2 Vols. Vintage Books, New York, 1990. Tripp, C. A History of Iraq, second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Zaher, U. Political Developments in Iraq 1963 1980, in Saddams Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?, CADRI (eds.), London: Zed Books, 1986.

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