DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST

FUENTES, JR. v. CA Julieto Malaspina with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur Alejandro Fuentes called Malaspina, put his arm around his shoulder & suddenly stabbed him in the abdomen w a hunting knife Alejandro ran Before he died, Malaspina said that it was Alejandro who stabbed him Pet claims it was his cousin Zolio Fuentes (Jonie) who killed Malaspina That he was talking to Malaspina but he ran when he heard someone w a bolo & spear would kill all those from San Isidro & he was from San Isidro he hid in his bros house There he met Zolio who admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina o Bec in a boxing match, Malaspina supposedly untied his gloves & punched him And that Zolio jumped out & escaped thru a window RTC: guilty of murder qualified by treachery CA affirmed * Addtl facts: Zolio supposedly confessed that he killed Malaspina Felicisimo (uncle) testified that Zolio confessed that he killed Malaspina in retaliation, showed him the knife, asked help in finding a lawyer, getting bail & working out a settlement but that the nxt day, Zolio was gone & Alejandro was arrested Station Commander P/Sgt Conde testified that after the crim information was for murder was filed, Felicisimo informed him of Zolios disclosure He told Felicisimo that he shld persuade Zolio to surrender if what he said was true That he went to San Isidro to investigate, but was told Zolio had fled I: WON the alleged confession of Zolio is admissible in evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule. NO.

captured & says hes not guilty, theres nothing that can bind Zolio legally to that statement

MOST IMPT REASON: bec the declarant is not unable to testify o No showing that Zolio is dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent (wc is what s38, R130 contemplates) o Mere absence from the jurisdiction dnst make him ipso facto unavailable under the rule Its incumbent on the defense to produce each & every pc of evidence wc can assure acquittal of the accused And the defense ddnt exert any serious effort to produce Zolio as witness The Ct is always for the admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify. Thus, exclusion is the prudent recourse as explained in Ppl v Toledo: The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence. PEOPLE v. BERNAL FACTS: Bernal, together with two others whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime of kidnapping. A plea of not guilty was entered by Bernal and trial ensued. The prosecution presented four witnesses and Bernal testified for his defense. On August 5, 1991, while Roberto Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men because he was going to fetch his child. Two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked him if he was Payat. When he said yes, one of them pulled out a handgun while the other handcuffed him and told him not to run because they were policemen and because he had a score to settle with them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the latters mother of the abduction.

Pet makes much of the alleged confession of Zolio since it is a declaration against penal interest and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. 1 of the exceptions to the hearsay rule is declarations made against interest The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity & trustworthiness

3 essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed. HERE, the declaration against penal interest attributed to Zolio ISNT admissible REASONS: patent untrustworthiness of the statement o Zoilo who is related to Alejandro had every motive to prevaricate o The same can be said of Alejandro and his uncle Felicisimo. the admission of such a statement may be shocking to the sense of justice o if the TC admitted the statement & acquitted Alejandro on that basis, then Zolio is later

The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of Enriquez, tends to establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernals wife Naty and this was the motive behind the formers kidnapping.

Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing.

On the other hand, the defense asserts that Openda, Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the police on August 5, 1991, and hence, was never kidnapped. On December 10, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment finding Bernal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for the abduction and disappearance of Openda, Jr. (Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code).

ISSUE/HOLDING: WON the lower court erred in giving weight and credence to the prosecution witnesses allegedly illusory testimonies and for convicting him when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. NO. RATIO: In kidnapping, what is important is to determine and prove the fact of seizure, and the subsequent disappearance of the victim will not exonerate an accused from prosecution therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can easily avoid punishment by the simple expedient of disposing of their victims bodies. For the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victims liberty, which is the essential element of the offense, must be duly proved. In the case at bar, Bernal indisputably acted in conspiracy with the two other unknown individuals as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only. The circumstances present in this case sufficiently indicate the participation of Bernal in the disappearance of Openda, Jr. The prosecution has profferred sufficient evidence to show that Bernal, together with his two companions, abducted Openda, Jr. on August 5, 1991. o Sagarino, a friend and neighbor of the victim, testified that he saw Bernal at the billiard hall at about 11:00 a.m. with his two companions and overheard him dispatching one of them to Tarsings Store to check if a certain person was still there. This person later turned out to be Openda, Jr. He added that after the latters presence was confirmed, the three men left the billiard hall. Minutes later, Openda, Jr., already handcuffed, passed by the billiard hall with Bernals companions. o Roberto Racasa, who knew both Bernal and the victim, the former being his neighbor and compadre, narrated that he and the victim were drinking at Tarsings Store on that day when Bernal passed by and had a drink with them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which, two men came to the store and asked for Payat. When Openda, Jr. confirmed that he was indeed Payat, he was handcuffed and taken away by the unidentified men. o Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernals wife Naty were having an affair. Undoubtedly, his wifes infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge. Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction.

Openda, Jr.s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernals wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.: Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not

have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons. With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present provision, it is safe to assume that declaration against interest has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal. A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true. Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez, a declaration against his own interest is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment. Bernal highlights supposed inconsistencies in Sagarinos testimony. He alleges that the latter could not have seen the actual handcuffing because Tarsings Store could not be seen from the billiard hall. Sagarinos testimony shows that after Bernal and two others left the billiard hall, the latter came back with Openda, Jr., already handcuffed. Bernal wrongly inferred that Sagarino actually saw Openda, Jr. arrested. The lower court correctly rejected this argument. o If one had a direct view of Tarsings Store from the billiard hall, Bernal would not have requested his companion to check if Openda, Jr. was still drinking with Racasa. Another discrepancy pointed out arose from when Racasa said he saw Bernal return with his child because he was still in the store while Sagarino averred that it was quite a time before he saw Bernal again, alone. o The testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino are not absolutely inconsistent with each other as to be irreconcilable. Considering the proximity of the store from the billiard hall, there is a possibility that when Racasa saw Bernal with his son at the store, the latter could have already brought home his son before proceeding alone to the billiard hall where he was seen by Sagarino. Bernal would like the Court to dismiss Sagarinos testimony by imputing revenge as his motive for testifying. Bernals position is that no abduction or kidnapping ever took place but that an arrest was made by pursuing policemen. o This contention is quite improbable, if not highly preposterous. The trial court correctly appreciated the testimony of Sagarino, it being free from any ill-motive against Bernal. o If the latters allegations were true, then Sagarino should have been arrested by the police at the time he gave his testimony in court. o No such arrest was, however, made. The court a quo committed no error in finding the testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino sufficient to convict Bernal. o Sagarinos answers to the questions of the prosecutor and defense counsel clearly establish the participation of Bernal in the abduction or kidnapping of Openda, Jr. o Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself.

o The findings of fact of a trial court carry great weight and are entitled to respect on appeal, absent any strong and cogent reason to the contrary, since it is in a better position to decide the question of credibility of witnesses. The victim has yet to resurface. Considering the circumstances, it is safe to assume that Openda, Jr. is already dead. DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision dated November 18, 1993, is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellant Theodore Bernal. SO ORDERED. PAREL v. PRUDENCIO

Petition for review on certiorari FACTS: On Feb. 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Danilo Parel with the RTC Baguio. Prudencio is claiming that he is the owner of a twostorey residential house located at No. 61 Forbes Park National Reservation near Department of Public Service (DPS) compound, Baguio City He also claims that the house was constructed in 1972-1975 from his own funds and declared in his name in a tax declaration and that he has been paying the taxes on it ever since

construct their own houses on the reservation; that Prudencio failed to show proof of any contract, written or oral, express or implied, that the late Florentino and his family stayed on the house not as co-owners but as mere lessees, nor any other proof that would clearly establish his sole ownership of the house; and, that the late Florentino was the one who gathered the laborers for the construction of the house and paid their salaries. Thus, the RTC ruled that co-ownership existed between respondent and petitioners father, Florentino. From this, RTC concluded that Florentino and Prudencio had an agreement that Florentino would contribute money for the construction and once the house is completed, hati sila. RTC also questioned that Prudencio only claimed sole-ownership after 15 years. RTC did not give credence to the tax declaration as well as the several documents showing the City Assessors assessment of the property all in respondents name since tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership.

In 1973, when the 2nd floor of the house was already habitable, he allowed Parels parents to live there and supervise the construction below. When the house was finished, the Parel family was allowed to live there since they have no house of their own. Parels dad, Florentino, now deceased, was Prudencios wifes younger brother. In November 1985, Prudencio wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as the former was due for retirement and he needed the place. Danilos parents heeded this when they migrated to US in 1986, however, Danilo and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the ground floor of the house; and refused to leave despite many demands So Prudencio filed an action for recovery of possession, and also asked from Parel for a monthly rental (3k) from April 1988 until he leaves the premises, plus moral and exemplary damages and costs.

It rejected the affidavit executed by Florentino declaring the house as owned by respondent saying that the affidavit should be read in its entirety to determine the purpose of its execution; that it was executed because of an advisement addressed to the late Florentino by the City Treasurer concerning the propertys tax assessment and Florentino, thought then that it should be the respondent who should pay the taxes; and that the affidavit cannot be accepted for being hearsay. From this decision, Prudencio appealed, decision reversed by CA, declaring him the sole owner. The CA found as meritorious respondents contention that since petitioner failed to formally offer in evidence any documentary evidence, there is nothing to refute the evidence offered by respondent. It ruled that the TCs statement that defendants occupancy of the house is due to a SPA executed by his parents is wanting of any concrete evidence on record; that said power of attorney was never offered, hence, could not be referred to as petitioners evidence to support his claim; that except for the bare testimonies of Candelario Regua, the carpenter-foreman, that it was Florentino who constructed the house and Corazon Garcia, the former barangay captain, who testified that the lot was allocated to petitioners father, there was no supporting document which would sufficiently establish factual bases for the trial courts conclusion; and that the rule on offer of evidence is mandatory.

Parel filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging that his parents are co-owners of the house (ground floor to Parel, 2nd floor to Prudencio), and that his parents spent their own resources in improving the house and that the construction workers were hired by Florentino, and that Florentino was an awardee of the land on which the house stands. He also claims that Prudencio had filed ejectment case as well as criminal cases against them involving the subject house, which were all dismissed. Parel asked for the dismissal of the complaint and prayed for damages and attorneys fees. RTC declared that the house is co-owned by Parel and Prudencio, so Prudencio cannot evict Parel. Parel was also ordered to pay moral and actual damages, atty.s fees, and costs. RTC concluded that the land was allocated to Florentino as part of a program of the former mayor of Baguio (Lardizabal) to allow lowly-paid govt workers to

The CA found the affidavit dated Sep. 24, 1973 of Florentino, petitioners father, stating that he is not the owner of the subject house but respondent, as conclusive proof of respondents sole ownership of the subject house as it is a declaration made by Florentino against his interest. It also gave weight to Prudencios tax declarations as sufficient to establish his case which constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Parel filed an MFR, denied. ISSUES: 1. 2. 3. WON Parel was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that his father was a co-owner of the house. NO. WON it was necessary to formally offer Parels documentary evidence. YES. WON Florentinos affidavit should be given weight as conclusive proof of Prudencios sole ownership.

YES.

ISSUE 3 muna: Petitioner argues that the CA erred in finding the affidavit of petitioners father declaring respondent as owner of the subject house as conclusive proof that respondent is the true and only owner of the house since the affidavit should be read in its entirety to determine the purpose for which it was executed. Prudencio had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint for recovery of possession of the ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner thereof. He presented the affidavit dated September 24, 1973 executed by Florentino and sworn to before the Assistant City Assessor of Baguio City, G.F. Lagasca, which reads:

Florentino entered the house against Prudencios will and that and action for ejectment should be his remedy; and even when a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner and his wife also in 1988 which was subsequently dismissed on the ground that respondents action should be an accion publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC. The building plan of the house was in the name of Prudencio and his wife and the house was built in accordance to said plan. Prudencio was the one paying the real estate property taxes on the house under his name since 1974, and the Parels did not pay this any time in their name. While tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. But in this case, the taxes, taken with the other circumstances, SC concludes that Prudencio is the sole owner of the house.

I, FLORENTINO PAREL, 42 years of age, employee, and residing at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, after having been sworn to according to law depose and say: That he is the occupant of a residential building located at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, Baguio City which is the subject of an advicement addressed to him emanating from the Office of the City Assessor, Baguio City, for assessment and declaration for taxation purposes; That I am not the owner of the building in question; That the building in question is owned by Mr. Simeon B. Prudencio who is presently residing at 55 Hyacinth, Roxas District, Quezon City. Further, affiant say not. Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successorsin-interest and against third persons. The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest. Based on the affidavit, it is safe to presume that he would not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his childrens interests as his heirs. A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.

ISSUE 1: Since Prudencio has established his claim of sole ownership, the burden of disproving so was shifted to Parel. So he has to prove that Florentio was a co-owner of the housel.

In Jison v. Court of Appeals, the SC said that: he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.

ISSUE 2:

There is also no evidence that Florentino revoked such affidavit, even when the criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling was filed by Prudencio, although this was dismissed because of absence of evidence that

Parel cited Bravo vs. Borja to support his claim that the rule that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered is not absolute, and that his evidence, though not formally offered were marked as exhibits in the presentation of testimonies of petitioners witnesses, and were part of the testimonies, and also that the evidence were part of a memorandum filed before the court. Parel also insists that even without the documentary evidence, his testimony as well as that of his witnesses substantiated his claim. Parels counsel asked that he be allowed to offer his documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not file the same. Thus, the CA did not consider the documentary evidence presented by petitioner. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a settled rule that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party

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Parel cannot rely on the Bravo case because there, the court allowed evidence on minority by admitting the certified true copy of the birth certificate attached to a motion for bail even if it was not formally offered in evidence, because it was properly filed in support of a motion for bail to prove petitioners minority which was never challenged by the prosecution and it already formed part of the records of the case.

8.

The rule referred to in the Bravo case was Section 7 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides: Section 7. Evidence on motion.- When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. Not Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which is the one applicable to the present case. Even if the documentary evidence would be considered, the evidence showing that the cases filed by Prudencio were dismissed, and the SPA of Parels parents did not establish co-ownership. The construction workers testimony that Florentino was the one who hired him, and the barangay captains allegation that he was allocated a lot does not overcome Florentinos own affidavit naming Prudencio as owner of the house. The fact that not one of the witnesses saw respondent during the construction of the said house does not establish that petitioners father and respondent co-owned the house. DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2000 and its Resolution dated November 28, 2000 are AFFIRMED. PHILIPPINE FREE PRESS v. CA ** (this is an interesting political case. I suggest you read the original. =). It involves many issues but I only put the one relevant to our topic) ** Evidence in Question: the testimony as to the supposed declaration made by Brig. Gen. Hans Menzi to Locsin to prove that there indeed was vitiation of consent in the sale of Phil. Free Press properties in favor of President Marcos. FACTS: 1. Philippine Free Press (PFP) is a domestic corporation engaged in the publication of Philippine Free Press Magazine, one of the . . . widely circulated political magazines in the Philippines. It was famous and prestigious even before the Martial Law. PFP bought a parcel of land in Makati and constructed an office building there with machineries, equipments, office furniture and fixture. When Pres. Marcos became the president, PFP printed articles highly critical of the Marcos admin, exposing the corruption and abuses of the regime. PFP also wrote articles exposing the plan of the Marcoses to impose a dictatorship in the guise of Martial Law.

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When the Martial Law was declared, soldiers surrounded PFPs office and forced out the employees and padlocked the establishment. Teddy Locsin, Jr. (the son) was informed of the declared Martial Law Teodoro Locsin, Sr., the president of PFP, was arrested and was brought to Camp Crame and was subsequently transferred to the max. security bloc at Fort Bonifacio. Locsin, Sr. was informed that no charges were to be filed against him and that he was to be provisionally released subject to the following conditions, to wit: (1) he remains under city arrest; xxx (5) he was not to publish the Philippine Free Press nor was he to do, say or write anything critical of the Marcos administration Publication of PFP ceased. The office building remained padlocked. It led to the financial ruin of the PFP. Employees demanded the payment of separation pay as a result of the cessation of its operation. Minority stockholders. Furthermore, made demands that Locsin, Sr. buy out their shares Important Fact: Locsin, Sr. was approached by the late Atty. Crispin Baizas with offers from then President Marcos for the acquisition of the PFP. However, Locsin, Sr. refused the offer stating that PFP was not for sale. Another Important Fact: A few months later, the late Secretary Guillermo De Vega approached Locsin, Sr. reiterating Marcoss offer to purchase the name and the assets of the PFP. MOST IMPORTANT FACT RELEVANT TO EVIDENCE: Locsin was contacted by Brig. General Hans Menzi, the former aide de camp of Marcos, concerning the sale of the PFP. He told Locsin that Marcos cannot be denied with the purchase of the name and assets of PFP. Locsin had no choice but to sell Locsin made a counteroffer that he will sell the assets if he is allowed to keep the name of the PFP. Marcos concurred with the offer and offered to pay 5,750,000.00 as purchase price on a take it or leave it basis. Menzi tendered to Locsin, Sr. a check for One Million (P1, 000,000.00) Pesos downpayment for the sale, . . . Locsin, Sr. accepted the check, subject to the condition that he will refund the same in case the sale will not push through. In 1973, the parties then executed 2 notarized Deeds of Sale covering the land, building, and the machineries of the PFP. Menzi paid the balanceof 4,750,000.00. The money was used by Locsin to pay out the separation pay of the employees and but out the shares of the minority stockholders and to settle all the obligations. Important Fact: In Feb 26, 1987, PFP filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale against the respondent and PCGG before the RTC on grounds of vitiated consent and gross inadequacy of purchase price. TC complaint was dismissed. CA affirmed but deleted the attorneys fees. Hence this petition.

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*** EVIDENCE OFFERED BY LOCSIN TO PROVE THAT THERE INDEED IS VITIATION OF CONSENT (apparently CA said that it is HEARSAY EVIDENCE) the testimonies of Messrs. Locsin, Sr. and Teodoro Locsin, Jr. (the Locsins, collectively), which, in gist, established the following facts: (1) the widely circulated Free Press magazine, which, prior to the declaration of Martial Law, took the strongest critical stand against the Marcos administration, was closed down on the eve of such declaration, which closure eventually drove petitioner to financial ruin;

(2) upon Marcos orders, Mr. Locsin, Sr. was arrested and detained for over 2 months without charges and, together with his family, was threatened with execution; (3) Mr. Locsin, Sr. was provisionally released on the condition that he refrains from reopening Free Press and writing anything critical of the Marcos administration; and (4) Mr. Locsin, Sr. and his family remained fearful of reprisals from Marcos until the 1986 EDSA Revolution. ISSUE: WON this testimony is admissible in evidence? HELD: NO. It is hearsay evidence. Furthermore, it did not fall under the exception. RATIO: (1) RULE: Section 36, Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence that any evidence, . . . is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand. Consequently, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule (2) EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: Section 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads: The declaration made by a person deceased or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons. (3) RULE AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BAR The testimonies of Locsin, Sr. and Locsin, Jr. regarding Menzis alleged implied threat that Marcos cannot be denied and that [respondent] was to be the corporate vehicle for Marcoss takeover of the Free Press is hearsay as Menzi already passed away and is no longer in a position to defend himself; the same can be said of the offers to purchase made by Atty. Crispin Baizas and Secretary Guillermo de Vega who are also both dead (4) EXCEPTION IS INAPPLICABLE IN THE CAB in assessing the probative value of Gen. Menzis supposed declaration against interest, i.e., that he was acting for the late President Marcos when he purportedly coerced Mr. Locsin, Sr. to sell the Free Press property, we are loathed to give it the evidentiary weight petitioner endeavors to impress upon us. For, the Locsins can hardly be considered as disinterested witnesses. They are likely to gain the most from the annulment of the subject contracts. The only declaration supposedly made by Gen. Menzi which can conceivably be labeled as adverse to his interest could be that he was acting in behalf of Marcos in offering to acquire the physical assets of petitioner. Far from making a statement contrary to his own interest, a declaration conveying the notion that the declarant possessed the authority to speak and to act for the President of the Republic can hardly be considered as a declaration against interest ***PFP further argued that the testimonies are not hearsay because Hearsay evidence has been defined as the evidence not of what the witness knows

himself but of what he has heard from others Teodoro Locsin, Sr. and Teodoro Locsin, Jr. were in fact testifying to matters of their own personal knowledge because they were either parties to the said conversation or were present at the time the said statements were made. ***BUT! Court said Even if petitioner succeeds in halving its testimonial evidence, one-half purporting to quote the words of a live witness and the other half purporting to quote what the live witness heard from one already dead, the other pertaining to the dead shall nevertheless remain hearsay in character. The all too familiar rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge. There can be no quibbling that petitioners witnesses cannot testify respecting what President Marcos said to Gen. Menzi about the acquisition of petitioners newspaper, if any there be, precisely because none of said witnesses ever had an opportunity to hear what the two talked about. (My view: Locsin lost by mere technicality. I pity him.)