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Introduction Basis and Components of Remedial Law Article VIII, Section 13, Constitution The conclusions of the Supreme

Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts. Civil Procedure (Section 3a, ROC) Ordinary Civil Action: one by which a party sues another for ...the enforcement or protection of a right, ...or the prevention or redress of a wrong Special Civil Action: similar to an ordinary civil action but subject to specific rules prescribed for it Special Proceedings -a remedy by which a party seeks to establish ...a status a right or a particular fact Criminal procedure -criminal Action: one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law Evidence R128.1 Evidence is the means Sanctioned by these rules Of ascertaining in a judicial proceedings The truth In relation to a matter of fact Importance of Procedural Rules REPUBLIC V. KENRICH DEV'T CORPORATION 498 SCRA 220 Facts: -Kenrick Development Corp built a perimeter wall which encroached upon some parcels of land occupied by ATO based on TCTs derived from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion. When ATO verified the TCTs with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), it was found that there were no record of TCT no. 17508 and its ascendant title. Land was also covered by Villamor Air Base. -so OSG, on behalf of LRA, filed a COMPLAINT FOR REVOCATION, ANNULMENT AND CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATES OF TITLE in behalf of RP vs. Kenrick and Alfonso Concepcion -Alfonso Concepcion cannot be found so alias summon by publication done -Kenrick allegedly filed an answer signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr as their counsel (but later on, during a Senate hearing, it was found that somebody else signed for Atty. Garlitos but he did not authorize such signing) -case punctuated by various incidents relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or continuances, MTDs, Motion to declare defendant in default, et al. -Pending hearing, Senate conducted hearing in aid of legislation on the issuances of fake titles and focused on how Kenrick was able to obtain title to lands wherein it built perimeter fence. Here is where atty. Garlitos denied that he signed the answer before the RTC -with that admission before the senate, OSG filed Urgent motion to declare Kenrick in default. - answer no signature of counsel so mere scrap of paper 1|S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ B a l b a s t r o _ C h a M e n d o z a

-RTC: granted, declared defendant in default, allowed RP to present evidence ex parte -MR: Denied, so petition for certiorari -CA: reversed RTC statements of Atty. Garlitos in the Senate hearing unreliable, not subject to cross examination Acts of Atty Garlitos after the filing of the answer: although he did not sign it, he prepared the draft of the answer and even if it was signed by another person, he did not contest it and even represented Kenrick in another case - these acts supposedly cured whatever defect the answer had ISSUE: WON CA erred ? YES. Kenrick is really in default, for their answer was not signed therefore the said pleading is deemed as a mere scrap of paper and thus they are not considered to have submitted any answer at all. On the alleged blanket authority given by Atty. Garlitos for anyone to sign the draft answer he prepared -acts of Kenrick was deemed to have adopted the statements of Atty. Garlitos (that the answer submitted was not signed by him therefore, they have submitted a defective answer) - adoptive admission -SIGNED PLEADING: signed by the counsel or the party himself; counsel's signature cannot be delegated and means that he certifies that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters. On liberal interpretation of rules (rules are mere technicalities .) Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid raison d etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice. 19 The Court s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals 20 is relevant: Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. 21 In this case, respondent failed to show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules. As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct. SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION V. CIR 492 SCRA 192 San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation was assessed by the BIR for DEFICIENCY miller's tax and manufacturer's sales tax. It was imposed on the sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products. SPMC opposed the assessment but their protest was denied. SPMC appealed to CTA. -CTA: cancelled deficiency manufacturer's tax on sales of corn and edible oils but not deficiency miller's tax. MR denied -SPMC appealed to CA BUT the attached VERIFICATION and CNFS to the appeal was WITHOUT THE CORPORATE SECRETARY'S CERTIFICATE, BOARD RESOLUTION OR POWER OF ATTORNEY but only with the SPMC's chief financial officer who did not appear to have authority to sign the verification and CNFS. MR DENIED ISSUE: WON CA should have given cognizance to the appeal? NO

On SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE (as the merits would allegedly show that SPMC was not liable for the miller's tax as the crude oil was sold to UNICHEM and UNICHEM exported it as an ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine) -R43.5 (appeals to CA from CTA): Needs pleading to be verified + CNFS. If w/o proper verification, treated as an unsigned pleading. If w/o CNFS, ground for dismissal. WHO MAY BE SIGNATORIES TO CORPORATION'S DOCUMENTS: only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by specific acts of the board of directors. In the absence of authority from the BoD, no person, not even the officers of the corporation, can bind the corporation. Here: AS SPMC'S PETITION DID NOT INDICATE THAT THE PERSON WHO SIGNED THE VERIFICATION/CNFS WAS AUTHORIZED BY BOD. WHY: IT ONLY RELIED ON THE ALLEGED POWER OF THE CHIEF FINANCING OFFICER TO REPRESENT SPMC IN ALL MATTERS REGARDING FINANCES OF CORPORATION - INCLUDING FILING OF SUITS BUT: no power of attorney, no authorization from the BoD = unsigned pleading strict compliance with procedural rules is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice. Substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance such as the requirement on non-forum shopping, as well as verification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction. Even if grant substantial compliance, SPMC still is liable for miller's tax -The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by the miller himself. -The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the interpretation advanced by SPMC. Nowhere did it provide that the exportation made by the purchaser of the materials enumerated in the exempting clause or the manufacturer of products utilizing the said materials was covered by the exemption. Since SPMC s situation was not within the ambit of the exemption, it was subject to the 3% miller s tax imposed under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. TRINIDAD V. ACAPULCO 493 SCRA 179 Facts Backstory: Acapulco owed Trinidad around P566k. Trinidad's version: as payment for the P566k, Acapulco gave him the Mercedez Benz she bought from Canete for P500k by way of dacion en pago. A deed of sale was executed to that effect. He did not give instructions to Acapulco to buy it from Canete, he did not borrow it from Acapulco and Acapulco did not demand for its return Acapulco's version: Acapulco was asked by Canete to sell the Mercedes Benz for P580k (but she could buy it herself for P500k). While she was finding a buyer, Trinidad borrowed the car from her and instructed her to buy the car from Canete herself then Trinidad would then pay her (so bayaran muna nya para mura bili then saka bibilhin ni Trinidad). However, after buying the Benz from Canete, Trinidad did not return the car and did not pay Acapulco, saying that he would just offset whatever Acapulco owes to him. As a result, the checks issued by Acapulco in favor of Canete (to pay the P500k) were not funded and bounced. Criminal charges were filed against her by Canete. -Acapulco filed Complaint for nullification of sale she made in favor of Trinidad, prayed that the car be returned to her and that Trinidad pay damages. -Trinidad alleged that there was dacion en pago between them (and alleged those above) -Pre-trial order focused on WON there was dacion en pago between them RTC: NO DACION EN PAGO because no common consent (for Acapulco); -MR :he alleged that there was implied consent on the part of Acapulco because she delivered the car herself after he threatened that he'll file an estafa case against her -Supplemental Motion: assuming no consent from Acapulco, there was legal compensation (since Acapulco owed him P566k and the cost of the car was P500k) -appealed to CA CA: affirm 2|S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ B a l b a s t r o _ C h a M e n d o z a

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

legal compensation allegation filed too late parties already agreed that the issue would only be WON there was dacion en pago dacion en pago was not present - Acapulco did not give consent no legal compensation (obligation in money not equivalent to delivery of car) admission that the sale price of the car was not paid by him (as he wanted that the car be given as payment for Acapulco's debts) entitled Acapulco to file action for rescission of sale

ISSUE: WON legal compensation argument of Trinidad should still be appreciated, though not expressly stated in his Answer to the Complaint before RTC, as his allegations in the answer and the facts proven in TC shows the presence of legal compensation HELD: For TRINIDAD. There's legal compensation On technical rules (late raising of issue of legal compensation): -Our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. The interest of justice dictates that the Court consider and resolve issues even though not particularly raised if it is necessary for the complete adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties and it falls within the issues already found by them. While it is true that petitioner failed to raise the issue of legal compensation at the earliest opportunity, this should not preclude the courts from appreciating the same especially in this case, where ignoring the same would only result to unnecessary and circuitous filing of cases. Indeed, the doctrine that higher courts are precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal, is subject to exceptions, such as when: a. grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; b. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; c. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; d. matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; e. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and f. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. ON WON there was LEGAL COMPENSATION -Compensation takes effect by operation of law even without the consent or knowledge of the parties concerned when all the requisites mentioned in Article 1279 of the Civil Code are present. This is in consonance with Article 1290 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Article 1290. When all the requisites mentioned in article 1279 are present, compensation takes effect by operation of law, and extinguishes both debts to the concurrent amount, even though the creditors and debtors are not aware of the compensation.

Since it takes place ipso jure, when used as a defense, it retroacts to the date when all its requisites are fulfilled. Article 1279 provides that in order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary: that each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other; that both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;

that the two debts be due; that they be liquidated and demandable; that over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor. Here, petitioner s stance is that legal compensation has taken place and operates even against the will of the parties because: respondent and petitioner were personally both creditor and debtor of each other; the monetary obligation of respondent was P566,000.00 and that of the petitioner was P500,000.00 showing that both indebtedness were monetary obligations the amount of which were also both known and liquidated; - of no moment if the other obligation was the delivery of the car both monetary obligations had become due and demandable petitioner s obligation as shown in the deed of sale and respondent s indebtedness as shown in the dishonored checks; and neither of the debts or obligations are subject of a controversy commenced by a third person.

f. g. h. i. j. k. l. m. n.

Rescission and revocation of adoption; Hospitalization of insane persons; Habeas corpus; Change of name; Voluntary dissolution of corporations; Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children; Constitution of family home; Declaration of absence and death; Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. (Underscoring supplied) CIVIL CODE Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) FAMILY CODE Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) RULES OF COURT ON WHEN RECORD ON APPEAL REQUIRED Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving petitioner s Notice of Appeal, provides: Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) By the trial court s citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision, inter alia: xxx Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) x x x,

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS 458 SCRA 200 (2005) Facts: -Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc wanted a declaration of the presumptive death of her husband Clemente Jomoc, who has been absent for 9 years, to be able to marry again. -RTC: granted it, declared her husband presumptively dead basis: Article 41,par2, FC: four consecutive years only required; must institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of absentee spouse -Republic, through OSG, sought to appeal by filing ONLY A NOTICE OF APPEAL -TC disapporved the Notice of appeal: based on Rule 41, Section 2(a), there should also be a RECORD OF APPEAL filed and served as the present case was a special proceeding -OSG filed MR: denied -OSG filed Petition for certiorari before CA: declaration of presumptive death is NOT A SPECIAL PROCEEDING or a case of multiple or separate appeals which would require a record on appeal -CA: denied Petition for certiorari: (1) OSG failed to attach CTC of assailed order (TC's denial of MR) (2) OSG failed to attach a copy of the order declaring Clemente Jomoc presumptively dead ---based on (1) and (2) alone + Rule 46.3: the case should have been dismissed! (3) Declaration of presumptive death is a SPECIAL PROCEEDING as it merely seeks for a declaration of the trial court of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse. It does not seek enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of a right or a COA that can be enforced ISSUE: WON THE DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH OF AN ABSENTEE SPOUSE IS A SPECIAL PROCEEDIGN OR A SUMMARY PROCEEDING (IF NOT A SPECIAL PROCEEDING, DOES NOT NEED A RECORD ON APPEAL) HELD: it is NOT A SPECIAL RPOCEEDING! RULE 72: SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL RULES Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the following: a. Settlement of estate of deceased persons; b. Escheat; c. Guardianship and custody of children; d. Trustees; e. Adoption; 3|S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ B a l b a s t r o _ C h a M e n d o z a

there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court s order sufficed. That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows: Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), seals the case in petitioner s favor. *IN SHORT, SINCE THE TRIAL COURT USED THE FAMILY CODE, AND THE FAMILY CODE DESIGNATES SUCH CASES AS A SUMMARY PROCEEDING AND NOT A SPECIAL PROCEEDING, IT IS NOT A SPECIAL PROCEEDING Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioner s petition before the appellate court. Petitioner s failure to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial court s order denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule. As for petitioner s failure to submit copy of the trial court s order granting the petition for declaration of presumptive death, contrary to the appellate court s observation that petitioner was also assailing it, petitioner s 8-page petition filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely having assailed the order disapproving the Notice of Appeal. DEFINITION: R2.2, ROC Cause of action defined: a COA -is the act or omission By which a party violates the right of another DISTINGUISHED FROM CIVIL ACTION R2.1 AND 2.2 R2.1: Ordinary Civil Actions, basis of every civil action Must be based on a cause of action R2.2 COA SUBJECT MATTER RULE 72.1, ROC Rules of Special proceedings are provided for in the following cases: a. Settlement of estate of deceased persons b. Escheat c. Guardianship and custody of children d. Trustees e. Adoption f. Rescission and revocation of adoption g. Hospitalization of insane persons h. Habeas corpus i. Change of name j. Voluntary dissolution of corporations k. Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children l. Constitution of family home 4|S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ B a l b a s t r o _ C h a M e n d o z a

m. n.

Declaration of absence and death Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry

APPLICABILITY OF RULES OF CIVIL ACTIONS RULE 12.2, ROC In the absence of special provisions The rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be As far as practicable Be applicable in special proceedings