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ARCILLAS V MONTEJO26 SCRA 197
MAKALINTAL ; November 29, 1968;
LORA
FACTS
- Eustaquio Arcillas died intestate.- Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of thedeceased, in the November 12 petition soughtthe cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name of the deceased and prayed for the issuance of anew certificate of title in the names of the heirs inthe enumerated proportions alleged in thepetition.- It was claimed that at various dates after thedeath of the deceased, several transactionsaffecting Lot No. 276 transpired, prominentamong which were the separate sales of theirrespective shares and participation executed by 4other children of the deceased in favor of co-heirVicente Arcillas.- 5 other children of the deceased filed a petitionon November 16 praying for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of AurelioArcillas, the petitioner preparatory to the finalsettlement of the deceased's estate. The petitionstates that the deceased left an estate consistingof real property in Zamboanga City with aprobable value of not less than P6,000 and thatdeceased left no debts remaining unpaid.- Petitioner filed his opposition to the November12 petition on the ground that inasmuch as LotNo. 276 was included in the estate of thedeceased for which a petition for administrationhad actually been filed and was awaitingresolution, that petition should be held inabeyance until after the Nov 16 petition wasclosed and terminated.- Respondent Judge issued an order temporarilyholding in abeyance resolution of the November12 petition until the termination of the intestateproceedings.- In his answer to the November 16 petitionGeronimo Arcillas, this time joined by VicenteArcillas and the widow Modesta Alfaro, opposedthe issuance of letters of administration arguingthat inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was the onlyproperty left by the deceased and the deceasedleft no debts, the petition for administration wasimproper.- Petitioner insisted that there were still otherproperties of the estate of the deceased besidesLot No. 276; he likewise took issue withrespondents' view that administrationproceedings could be dispensed with asserting,firstly, that there was no unanimity among theheirs for extrajudicial partition and, secondly, thatsome of the heirs had been unduly deprived of their participation in the estate.- Respondent court denied the November 16petition for the issuance of letters of administration and at the same time gave duecourse to the November 12 petition.- Unable to have this order reconsideredpetitioner filed the petition for certiorari withmandamus and preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
WON respondent Judge acted properly indismissing the administration proceedings underthe authority of Section 1, Rule 74 of the NewRules of Court upon averments that the estateleft no debts and all the heirs entitled to share inits distribution are all of age
HELD
- NO. Under Rule 74.1, if the decedent left no willand no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, withoutsecuring letters of administration, divide theestate among themselves as they see fit bymeans of a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds and should they disagree,they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.- Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan: sec.1 does notpreclude the heirs from instituting administration,proceedings, even if the estate has no debts orobligation, if they do not desire to resort for goodreasons to an ordinary action of partition. WhileSection 1 allows the heirs to divide the estateamong themselves as they may be fit, or toresort to an ordinary action of partition, it doesnot compel them to do so if they have goodreasons to take a different course of action. SaidSection is not mandatory or compulsory as maybe gleaned from the use made therein of theword may.- Having decided to institute administrationproceedings instead of resorting to the lessexpensive modes of settlement of the estate, i.e.extrajudicial settlement or ordinary action forpartition, the heirs may not then be rebuffed inthe exercise of their discretion granted underSection I of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court merelyon the ground that the expenses usually commonin administration proceedings may deplete thefunds of the estate.- The resultant delay and necessary expensesincurred thereafter are consequences which mustbe deemed to have been voluntarily assumed bythe heirs themselves so that they may not in thefuture be heard to complain of these matters.Besides, the truth or veracity of petitioner's claimas to the alleged existence of other properties of the deceased aside from the lot in question canbe more adequately ascertained in administrationproceedings rather than in any other action.
Disposition
Appealed orders set aside
CIRIACO FULE vs. ANASTASIO FULE
46 PHIL. 317; JOHNSON; Sept 30, 1924
MARGE
FACTS
-Saturnino Fule died intestate. Ciriaco Fule, one of the heirs, presented a petition in CFI Laguna forthe appointment of Cornelio Alcantara asadministrator of the estate. The petitioner allegedthat at the time of the death of Saturnino, he wasowner of P50T worth of real and personalproperty in San Pablo, Laguna and about P30T incash. CFI appointed Cornelio Alcantara as specialadministrator and required him to give a bond of P8T. Alcantara later presented in court aninventory of the alleged property of thedeceased.-Anastacio, et al opposed the petition and theappointment of the special administrator, allegingthat they were children of Saturnino Fule, thatthey were all of age, that the deceased had leftno debts and that his property had already beenpartitioned among his children during his lifetimein conformity with article 1056 of the Civil Code.-Judge Paredes revoked the appointment of thespecial administrator and ordered him to renderan account. He also denied Saturnino’s petitionand initially suggested that the latter amend hispetition and present an ordinary action forpartition.-Upon hearing on Saturnino’s MFR/MNT and theopposition thereto, the suggestion was withdrawnand the petition for the appointment of anadministrator was denied upon the principalground that all of the property of Saturnino Fulehad been in the possession of his heirs for many
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years before his death; and that at the time of hisdeath there were no debts and no property to beadministered. From that judgment the petitionerappealed.
ISSUE
WON the court a quo committed an error inrefusing to appoint an administrator for theestate of Saturnino Fule
HELD: NO
-Under the provisions of the Civil Code, the rightsto the succession of a person are transmittedfrom the moment of his death; in other words, theheirs succeed immediately to all of the propertyof the deceased ancestor. The property belongsto the heirs at the moment of the death of theancestor as completely as if the ancestor hadexecuted and delivered to them a deed for thesame before his death. In the absence of debtsexisting against the estate, the heirs may enterupon the administration of the said propertyimmediately. If they desire to administer it jointly,they may do so. If they desire to partition itamong themselves and can do this by mutualagreement, they have also the privilege. TheCode of Procedure in civil Actions provides howan estate may be divided by a petition forpartition in case they cannot mutually agree inthe division.-When the heirs are all of lawfully age and thereare no debts there is no reason why the estateshould be burdened with the cost and expensesof an administrator. The administrator has noright to intervene in any way whatsoever in thedivision of the state among the heirs when theyare adults and when there are no debts againstthe estate.-And even when there are debts against theestate, the heirs, all being of age, may pay thedebts and divide the property among themselvesaccording to their respective rights, as heirs or aslegatees in case of will, without probating thesame, and the effect of such division is to investeach party with a complete equitable title to theirparticular share of state. (Carter vs. Owens, 41Ala., 217.)
Disposition
 Judgment affirmed, withoutprejudice to the right of the Ciriaco to commencean action for partition of any property left bySaturnino Fule which had not already beenpartition among his heirs.
MALCOLM and OSTRAND, JJ., dissent 
citingthe policy of the law: that is to encourage definiteand final settlements. They argue that since theestate is alleged to be worth P80T, it is notunreasonable to suppose that there may havehad dealings with others from which claimsagainst the estate may arise, the existence of which cannot be definitely ascertained untilpublication of notice to claimants and creditorshas been made. It would seem to be the interestof all parties concerned to have the estatedefinitely settled and that can only be doneproperly through administration proceedings.-Re: Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, Bondad vs.Bondad, and Baldemor vs. Malangyaon: In allthree of the cases it is admitted that there wereno debts and considering the long period whichhad elapsed since the death of the deceased,there could be but little probability of any newclaimants appearing. Under such circumstancesthe court might well be justified in holding thatthe appointment of an administrator wasunnecessary.-In the present case we are confronted with anentirely different situation. Here there has beenno partition or distribution by agreement amongthe heirs, the petition for administration waspresented within three months after the death of the deceased, and the estate is large and itssettlement may give rise to unexpectedcomplications.
CASTILLO V CASTILLO
23 PHIL 364ARELLANO; November 5, 1912
MONCH
FACTS
- The subject of the suit is a parcel of land inBatangas owned by Simona Madlangbayan. Shedied 7 years ago. It is currently in the possessionof one of her children, Urbano Castillo. There areother descendants of hers who have the sameright to wit: A daughter and some grandchildrenof the deceased brother of full blood of UrbanoCastillo, named Pio Castillo; the daughter of asister of full blood of the same defendant, namedAlfonsa, likewise deceased; and a daughter of ahalf-brother of the said Urbano Castillo, namedEstefano Libingting, also deceased. Theydemanded division of the land- Defendant Urbano Castillo endeavored to provethat his mother had other property which duringher lifetime she disposed of to the benefit of some of the plaintiffs.- The trial court ordered that the land be dividedbetween the plaintiffs and defendant.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the heirs may demand division of theproperty2. WON Simona disposed of her property duringher lifetime for the benefit of the plaintiffs
HELD
1. YES
Reasoning
It is not a principle authorized by lawthat heirs of legal age may not demand thedivision of a real property, left them by theirpredecessor-in-interest and held by a coheir,without first initiating special intestateproceedings during which a judicial administratoris to be appointed, who alone is vested with thepersonality to claim the property that belongs tothe succession. On the contrary, such heirs areexpressly authorized to do so, unless for thereason of there being unpaid debts, judicialintervention becomes necessary, which was notalleged as a special defense in this suit.2. NO
Reasoning
Such is a question of fact, which maynot be entertained by the Court. The trial courthas already declared the document conveyingproperties to the plaintiffs to be false. And eventhough the said instrument were not false, thetrial court declared it to be void and ineffective. The alleged gift was in fact null and void sincethere was no acceptance from the donee.
HERNANDEZ V ANDAL
78 Phil. 196 TUAZON; March 29, 1947
ICE
FACTS-The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, theintervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez, andPedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not partieshere, are brother and sisters. They acquired incommon by descent from their father a parcel of land. Intervenors sold 1800 square meters of thisparcel, a portion which is particularly described inthe deed of conveyance to Zacarias Andal, thedefendant, and Andal's wife in consideration of P860.
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-After the sale the plaintiff attempted torepurchase the land sold to Andal. Andal, it isalleged, refused to part with the property.Cresencia Hernandez; the plaintiff, was the onlywitness to testify on her own behalf. Substantiallyshe reiterated the allegations in her twocomplaints. Zacarias Andal, the defendant, alsotestified. He said that he was in possession of theland in question until he returned it to theintervenors. He declared that the plaintiff offeredto repurchase the land from him long after hehad bought it, that is when she was about to fileher action.Defendant and intervenors asked that evidencebe allowed to prove that a parol partition amongthe five brother and sisters had been made.Counsel for the plaintiff objected asserting that"under the Rules of Court agreement affectingreal estate may not be proved except by meansof writing subscribed by the person against whomthe p roof is offered." Upon this objection, thecourt ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of theRules of Court (Statute of Frauds) as well asunder article 1248 of the Civil Code, parolevidence of partition was inadmissible, addingthat to decide the case it had enough with thetestimony and evidence offered by the parties.
ISSUE
WON under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as under article1248 of the Civil Code, parol evidence of partitionwas inadmissible
HELD
No. There is a conflict of authority as to whether anagreement of partition is such a contract as isrequired to be in writing under the statute of frauds. One line of authorities holds theaffirmative view; other authorities say no. Thereason for the rule that excludes partition fromthe operation of the statute of frauds is thatpartition is not a conveyance but simply aseparation and designation of that part of theland which belongs to each tenant in common. The differences in the conclusions reached are"due perhaps to varied phraseology of thestatutes" in the several states. However the casemay be, as enacted in the Philippines, first insection 335 of the former Code of Civil Procedure,and now in Rule 123, section 21, of the Rules of Court, the law has been uniformly interpreted in along line of cases to be applicable to executoryand not to completed or executed contracts. Inthis jurisdiction performance of the contract takesit out of the operation of the statute. The statuteof frauds does not declare the contracts thereinenumerate void and of no legal effect, but onlymakes ineffective the action for specificperformance.
 
(Almirol and Cariño vs. Monserrat,supra.)On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity haveenforced oral partition when it has beencompletely or partly performed."Regardless of whether a parol partition oragreement to partition is valid and enforceable atlaw, equity will in proper cases, where the parolpartition has actually been consummated by thetaking of possession in severalty and the exerciseof ownership by the parties of the respectiveportions set off to each, recognize and enforcesuch parol partition and the rights of the partiesthereunder. Thus, it has been he]d or stated in anumber of cases involving an oral partition underwhich the parties went into possession, exercisedacts of ownership, or otherwise partly performedthe partition agreement, that equity will confirmsuch partition and in a proper case decree title inaccordance with the possession in severalty."In numerous cases it has been held or statedthat parol partitions may be sustained on theground of estoppel of the parties to assert therights of a tenant in common as to parts of landdivided by parol partition as to which possessionin severalty was taken and acts of individualownership were exercised. And a court of equitywill recognize the agreement and decree it to bevalid and effectual for the purpose of concludingthe right of the parties as between each other tohold their respective parts in severalty."A parol partition may also be sustained on theground that the parties thereto have acquiescedin and ratified the partition by taking possessionin severalty, exercising acts of ownership withrespect thereto, or otherwise recognizing theexistence of the partition."A number of cases have specifically applied thedoctrine of part performance, or have stated thata part performance is necessary, to take a parolpartition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was apartition in fact between tenants in common, anda part performance, a court of equity would haveregard to and enforce such partition agreed to bythe parties." (40 Amer. Jur., 15-18.)It is on the effects of rule 74, section 1, of theRules of Court on a parol partition, that there aresharp divergences of opinion among themembers of this Court. This section reads:"If the decedent left no debts and the heirs andlegatees are all of age, or the minors arerepresented by their judicial guardians, theparties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate amongthemselves as they see fit by means of a publicinstrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do soin an ordinary action of partition. If there is onlyone heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate tohimself the entire estate by means of an affidavitfiled in the office of the register of deeds. It shallbe presumed that the decedent left no debts if nocreditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent."It is contended that under this rule a verbalpartition is entirely void and cannot be validatedby any acts of the parties short of the executionof a public document and its registration.As a general proposition, transactions, so far asthe affect the parties, are required to be reducedto writing either as a condition of jural validity oras a means of providing evidence to prove thetransactions. Written form exacted by the statuteof frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposesonly." (Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 171.) Thedecisions of this Court which we have noticedwere predicated on this assumption. The CivilCode, too requires the accomplishment of acts orcontracts in a public instrument, not in order tovalidate the act or contract but only to insure itsefficacy so that after the existence of the acts orcontracts has been admitted, the party boundmay be compelled to execute the document(Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs. Hernaez, 45 Phil.,746.)Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and notmerely evidential or partition? In other words, iswriting the that confers legal validity upon theagreement? There no indications in thephraseology of this rule which justify anaffirmative answer to these questions. It must benote that where the law intends a writing or otherformality be the essential requisite to the validityof the transaction, it says so in clear andnequivocal terms. Thus, the statute of frauds as
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