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LIM V DIAZ-MILLAREZ
18 SCRA 371October 19, 1966; REGALA
FACTS
- Cirilo Lim, claiming to be a nephew of the late Jose Millarez who died intestate filed a petition forhis appointment as judicial administrator of theestate of the deceased.- The petition alleged that the deceased left norelatives such as descendants, ascendants orsurviving spouse, except collaterals.- Basilisa Diaz-Millarez, claiming to be a widow of the deceased filed an opposition on two grounds:1. that the petitioner has an adverse interest inthe estate; and2. that the properties of the estate are thesubject matter of a litigation between her asplaintiff and Cirilo Lim as defendant- When the case was called for hearing, bothparties manifested the existence of a litigationbetween them over the properties of the estate.- TC dismissed petition.- Failing in his motion for the reconsideration,petitioner Lim, brought the case to the CA whichcertified the appeal to SC.- In the Civil Case: Diaz-Millarez sought torecover from Lim 1/2 of the total amount of P22,000 allegedly delivered to him by her and thedeceased Millarez on various occasions and todeclare her as the owner of 1/2 of the profits andgains derived therefrom, on the ground that JoseMillarez and she used to live as husband and wifefor about 23 years and as such she is entitled to1/2 of the property held in common by them. Sheasserted further that since she contributedcapital and labor to the tobacco business in whichshe and the deceased were engaged and fromwhich they gave P22,000 in cash to Lim, shewould be entitled to 1/2 of the capital and 1/2 of the proceeds and profits derived from suchcapital.
ISSUE
WON Lim may be appointed as administrator of the estate of the deceased.
HELD
- NO. The claim which Basilisa has against Ciriloin the civil case is based on her declared right toone-half of the estate of the deceased.- It cannot, therefore, be denied that Cirilo Lim, asa relative of the deceased has some interestadverse to that of Basilisa. Shown to have someliabilities to Basilisa and to the estate as a whole,Cirilo cannot compatibly perform the duties of anadministrator.- In this jurisdiction, one is considered to beunsuitable for appointment as administratorwhen he has adverse interest of some kind orhostility to those immediately interested in theestate.- The determination of a person's suitability forthe office of judicial administrator rests, to agreat extent, in the sound judgment of the courtexercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appealunless the said court is clearly in error.
Disposition
Order appealed from affirmed.
TORRES vs. JAVIER
34 Phil. 383;Moreland; March 24, 1916
FACTS
-Two women are claiming to be the legal wife of deceased Tan Po Pic.Marta Torres objected to the appointment of anyexcept herself. Juan Cailles Tan Poo, on behalf of the Chinesewoman Yu Teng New, opposed the appointmentof Marta Torres.-The probate court being unable to determinewho, if either, was the lawful wife of thedeceased, appointed a disinterested third person(Juan L. Javier) to act as administrator.-This appeal is taken by Marta Torres from thatorder of appointment.
ISSUE
WON the probate court may validly appoint adisinterested third person as the administrator of the estate
HELD YES,
the court had a right in view of thecontroversy between the women to name adisinterested third person as administrator andleave the controversy between them to be settledin the administration proceedings at the propertime.-The probate court did not find as a fact thatthere was a wife in China. The court consideredthe facts and circumstances as they werepresented in the proceedings and upon the wholebelieved it for the best interest of all concernedto appoint as administrator a disinterested thirdperson, particularly in view of the fact that therewas likely to be litigation between Marta Torresand the Chinese wife as to which is in fact hislegal wife and entitled to an interest in the estateof the deceased Tan Po Pic.
Disposition
 Judgment affirmed.
PARAS V NARCISO
35 PHIL 244CARSON; November 16, 1916
FACTS:
- The trial court denied probate of the will of Mariano Magsino on the ground that the wil wasprepared and signed by the witnesses after hisdeath.
ISSUES:
WON the oppositor in the probate of the will hadsufficient interest to be allowed to maintain hisopposition
HELD:
YES
Ratio
 The admission to probate of a will may beopposed or contested by, and only by, personshaving some interest in the estate which will beaffected and concluded by the probate of theproposed will. However, the appellant herein didnot make an objection in the trial court as to theintervention of the oppositor.
Reasoning
The mere fact that a stranger hasbeen permitted to oppose or contest the probateof a will is not reversible error and does notinvalidate the proceedings where no objection isinterposed by any of the parties in interest .The judgment of the court in probate proceedings isnot based on the fact that there is or is notopposition to the probate of the will but upon theproduction of evidence which discloses that thereare or are not sufficient grounds for the probateof the will as propounded; and the reason for therule excluding strangers from contesting the will,is not that thereby the court may be preventedfrom learning facts which would justify ornecessitate a denial of probate, but rather thatthe courts and the litigants should not bemolested by the intervention in the proceedingsof persons with no interest in the estate which
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would entitle them to be heard with relationthereto.- In the case at bar, no objection was made as tothe intervention of the oppositor. Further, it is tobe observed that the judgment of the court wasbased on evidence submitted by the oppositor.No objection was made on the ground that it wassubmitted by a stranger. Having been admittedto record without objection, and beingcompetent, relevant and material, and conclusivein support of the judgment of the trial court, itwould be absurd for us to hold that the judgmentbelow erred in basing his judgment thereon,merely on the ground that on appeal it is made toappear or is admitted that the contestant had nointerest in the estate. Whether the contestanthad or had not any right to intervene, theevidence submitted at the trial without objection,conclusively sustains the findings of the trial judge on which he properly based his denial of probate.
DURAN V DURAN
Bengzon; June 14, 196730 SCRA 331
FACTS
-Pio Duran died without testament.-Subsequent to his death, Cipriano Duran, one of the surviving brothers, executed a publicinstrument assigning and renouncing hishereditary rights to the decedent's estate in favorof Josefina Duran for consideration.-A year later Cipriano Duran filed a petition forintestate proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate,further asking that he be named theadministrator. Josefina Duran filed an opposition,praying for its dismissal upon the ground that thepetitioner is not an "interested person" in theestate, in view of the deed of transfer andrenunciation afore-stated. Replying to this,Cipriano alleged that Josefina Duran was not thedecedents wife. Anent the deed of assignment,he contended that the same was procured thrufraud, with gross inadequacy of price and vitiatedby lesion.-Another brother of the decedent, Miguel Duran,filed a petition to be joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano. Josefina Duran moved to strike out saidpetition as an improper attempt to intervene inthe case.-Court of First Instance dismissed the action forlack of interest in the estate. Said lack of interestwas premised on the deed of transfer executedby Cipriano, regarding which the court declareditself without power to examine in saidproceedings, collaterally, the alleged fraud,inadequacy of price and lesion that would renderit rescissible or voidable.-Cipriano appeals relying on In Re Irene Santos.
ISSUE
WON an assignment by one heir of his share inthe estate to a co-heir amounts to a partitionneeding approval by the settlement court to beeffective and that the assigning heir does not losehis status as a person interested in the estate,even after said assignment is approved by thecourt.
HELD
 Yes, but such does not apply to the case at bar.-The situation in the Santos case involves anassignment between co-heirs pendente lite,during the course of settlement proceedings,properly and validly commenced. At the time of said assignment, therefore, the settlement courthad already acquired jurisdiction over theproperties of the estate. As a result, anyassignment regarding the same had to beapproved by said court. And since the approval of the court is not deemed final until the estate isclosed, the assigning heir remains an interestedperson in the proceedings even after saidapproval, which can be vacated, is given.In the present case, however, the assignmenttook place when no settlement proceedings waspending. The properties subject matter of theassignment were not under the jurisdiction of asettlement court. Allowing that the assignmentmust be deemed a partition as between theassignor and assignee, the same does not needcourt approval to be effective as between theparties. An extra judicial partition is valid asbetween the participants even if the requisites of Sec 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are notfollowed, since said requisites are for purposes of binding creditors and non-participating heirs only(Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 196). Should it becontended that said partition was attended withfraud, lesion or inadequacy of price, the remedyis to rescind or to annul the same in an action forthat purpose. And in the meanwhile, theassigning heir cannot initiate a settlementproceedings, for until the deed of assignment isannulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid andeffective against him, so that he is left withoutthat "interest" in the estate required to petitionfor settlement proceedings.Miguel Duran’s petition amounted to a petition tointervene in the settlement proceedings. As aptlyruled by the court a quo since there was really nosettlement proceedings in the first place, thepetition to intervene must be denied.Finally, although Josefina Duran prayed to beappointed administratrix, her doing so did notadmit to ratification of the petition for settlementunder the ruling in Eusebio vs. Valmores, sinceshe did so merely by way of an alternativeprayer, should her motion to dismiss fail. And saidmotion to dismiss was properly sustained.DispositionAffirmed
 JULITA RELUCIO V SAN JOSE
G.R. No. L-4783May 26, 1952
FACTS
- In special proceeding No. 70588 of the CFIMAnila, Julita Relucio, was appointedadministratrix of the testate estate of FelipeRelucio, Sr., qualifying on August 24, 1925- Upon petition filed June 27, 1950 by Lorenzo,Rolando and Leticia Relucio, CFI issued an orderon January 15, 1951, appointing Rolando Relucioas administrator in substitution of the petitioner-- In the order of March 20, 1951, the court merelymade reference to the letters of administrationissued in favor of Rolando Relucio and did notpass on the motion for immediate execution.- On April 3, 1951, Rolando Relucio filed a motionpraying that the petitioner be declared incontempt of court for failing to deliver to him,after demand, all papers, documents, titles andproperties of the estate under her administration.- In the order dated April 10, 1951, the CFI Maniladenied this motion for contempt and appointed
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the Equitable Banking Corporation as specialadministrator pending the appeal of thepetitioner from the order of January 15, 1951.- The court ruled that the appeal suspended theappointment of Rolando Relucio as administrator;but in the same breath it justified theappointment of the special administrator byarguing that, if the petitioner has to remain asadministratrix during the pendency of her appeal,"a removed administrator may easily nullify suchremoval by interposing an appeal."- Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration,the petitioner instituted in this Court the presentpetition for certiorari.
ISSUE
WON appointment of EPCIB as SPECIALADMINISTRATOR is proper
HELD
- NO. The case does not fall under anycircumstance in which a special administratormay be appointed.- The cases in which a special administrator maybe appointed are specified in section 1 of Rule 81of the Rules of Court which provides as follows:"When there is delay in granting letterstestamentary or of administration occasioned byan appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, or from any other cause, the court mayappoint a special administrator to collect andtake charge of the estate of the deceased andexecutors or administrators thereuponappointed."- A special administrator may also be appointedin a case covered by section 8 of Rule 87 whichprovides as follows: "If the executor oradministrator has a claim against the estate herepresents, he shall give notice thereof, inwriting, to the court, and the court shall appoint aspecial administrator who shall, in the adjustmentof such claim, have the same power and besubject to the same liability as the generaladministrator or executor in the settlement of other claims. The court may order the executor oradministrator to pay to the special administratornecessary funds to defend such claim."- Pending her appeal from the order of January15, 1951, the petitioner had the right to act asadministratrix. If the respondent Judge haddecreed the immediate execution of the order of  January 15, 1951, Rolando Relucio would then bethe administrator pending petitioner's appeal.Consequently, the respondent Judge exceededhis jurisdiction in appointing the respondentEquitable Banking Corporation as specialadministrator.
MALOLES V PHILLIPS
324 SCRA 172MENDOZA; Jan 31, 2000
NATURE
Review on certiorari of 2 CA decisions which ruledthat petitioner has no right to intervene in thesettlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos.
FACTS
-July 20, 1995: Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino,Makati resident, filed a petition for probate of hiswill in RTC-Makati, Branch 61, docketed as Sp.Proc. No. M-4223. Dr. De Santos alleged that hehad no compulsory heirs; that he had named inhis will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo deSantos Foundation, Inc; that he disposed by hiswill his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2M; and that copies of said willwere in the custody of the named executrix,private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.-Feb 16, 1996: Judge Gorospe issued an ordergranting the petition and allowing the will. Dr. DeSantos died 10 days later.-April 3, 1996: petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II fileda motion for intervention claiming that, as theonly child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister)and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. DeSantos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditorof the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for thereconsideration of the order allowing the will andthe issuance of letters of administration in hisname.-On the other hand, Phillips, the will’s designatedexecutrix, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later,however, she moved to withdraw her motion. Thiswas granted, while petitioner was required to filea memorandum of authorities in support of hisclaim that said court still had jurisdiction to allowhis intervention.-Petitioner filed his memorandum of authoritieson May 13, 1996. Meanwhile, Phillips, whowithdrew her motion for the issuance of letterstestamentary, refiled a petition for the same withthe Makati RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343, assigned to Branch 65.-Upon Phillip's motion, Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order, dated June 28, 1996,appointing her as special administrator of Dr. DeSantos's estate.-Petitioner sought to intervene in M-4343 and toset aside the appointment of Phillips as specialadministrator. He reiterated that he was thenearest of kin of the testator; that he came toknow of the existence of M-4343 only byaccident; that the probate proceedings in M-4223before Branch 61 of the same court was stillpending; that Phillips misdeclared the true worthof the testator's estate; that Phillips was not fit tobe the special administrator of the estate; andthat petitioner should be given letters of administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.-Aug 28, 1996: Judge Abad Santos ordered thetransfer of M-4343 to Branch 61, on the groundthat it is related to the case before Judge Gorospeof RTC Branch 61.-It appears, however, that in M-4223, JudgeGorospe had denied on Aug 26, 1996 petitioner'smotion for intervention. Petitioner brought thismatter to the CA which upheld the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention.-Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order,dated Sep 4, 1996, returning the records of M-4343 to Branch 65. The order states that there isno related case involving the ESTATE OFDECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending beforeBranch 61; there is, however, a case filed byARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner under Rule 76for the Allowance of his will during his lifetimedocketed as M-4223 which was already decidedon 16 Feb 1996 and has become final; after itbecame final, Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed aMOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequentlywithdrawn after Branch 61 ruled that the motioncould not be admitted as the subject matterinvolves a separate case under Rule 78, andmovant withdrew her motion and filed M-4343;Octavio de Santos Maloles II filed a MOTION FORINTERVENTION before M-4223 and this wasalready DENIED likewise for the same groundsthat the matter is for a separate case to be filedunder Rule 78.
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