In Re Javaheri V JPMorgan Chase - UPDATE - Abbreviated Compendium

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WRI GHT DECI SI ON: CA FED CT ALLOWS CLAI MS FOR Failure t o Cont act , Wrongful Foreclosure, Quiet Tit le, Unj ust Enrichment , Declarat ory and I nj unct ive Relief Livingli...
ht t p: / / livinglies.wordpress.com/ ...s-claims-for-failure-t o-cont act -wrongful-foreclosure-quiet -t it le-unj ust -enrichment -declarat ory-and-inj unct ive-relief/ [ 6/ 28/ 2011 8: 52: 17 AM]
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J avaher i 35Or der -1
Editors Comment: The lesson in this decision is that a well-plead complaint will get
over the goal line. A badly worded complaint, after a couple tries may be dismissed
with prejudice even if you could have drafted a better claim. The Court would have
allowed a claim for fraud if Plaintiff (homeowner) had been more specific as to who
said what, where, when and how it resulted in damage.
J PM ACQUI SI TI ON OF WAMU DOES NOT TRANSFER THE
MORTGAGE, NOTE OR OBLI GATI ON
The other thing in this decision worthy of comment is that if you plead properly, you
prevent JPM from saying they own the loan just by virtue of their WAMU acquisition.
Drilling down in discovery you will discover that they did not acquire the loans, that they
paid a fraction of of the total assets now claimed, and that the idea that they could sell
the loans into pool AND still claim ownership of the obligation is just plain stupid and
unacceptable.
I would add that the allegation by them (and well written by you in your complaint for
Clients) that the loans were sold into the secondary market for securitization and sale
to investors (a) defeats the usual allegation that WAMU loans are not securitized and
(b) that discovery is required as to the money trail which will show that the transfers
were not accompanied by payment. Nor were they accompanied by documentation and
delivery of documents as required by the REMIC statute and the PSA.
The fact that the money trail will show that the loan was treated as though it was
securitized shows that the obligation left the table and went to Wall Street. But the
Rec ent Post s
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security instrument remained on the title registry in the name of WAMU. The
homeowner was on the right track here in pleading that the note did not properly
express a meeting of the minds but should have had more specificity, which means
that you need more knowledge about securitization or you need to get a COMBO
report and attach it as part of your position, summarizing the key points in your
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Following the money trail will probably lead to the conclusion that the loan was not in
default as to the creditor who was still getting paid despite the homeowners cessation
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Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor,
Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud Tagged: | bankruptcy, borrower, countrywide, disclosure,
foreclosure, foreclosure defense, foreclosure offense, foreclosures, fraud, JP Morgan, LOAN
MODIFICATION, modification, quiet title, rescission, RESPA, securitization, TILA audit,
trustee, WAMU, WEISBAND
JPM Whistle: My Boss Told Me, Were In The Foreclosure Not Modification
Business Supreme Ct Bond Decision: Standing and Cause of Action Closely Related
35 Responses
Abby i n CA, on June 27, 2011 at 1:17 pm said:
kudos to Judge Laura Taylor in California bkr court. She refuses to tolerate
fraudulent documents.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/58836880/THIS-JUDGE-WILL-NOT-TOLERATE-
FRAUDULENT-DOCUMENTS-Judge-Laura-Taylor-a-California-Bankruptcy-Judge-
Enters-Order-to-Show-Cause-OneWest-Bank-June-27-20
Kel l y L. Hansen , on June 26, 2011 at 5:15 am said:
I couldnt agree more with E. Tolles comment:
Ive said it before, and Ill say it again, all of these players need to be fitted for
matching bracelets and shown new living quarters in rooms with toilets for furniture and
bars blocking the view. And a lost key to boot.
Only when these criminals are prosecuted and doing time will it truly be safe to become
a homeowner again. Until then, why bother? At any moment your lender might decide
to steal your home and ruin your credit. Anyone and everyones home is up for
grabs even those homes that are not in default, and even those homes that are paid
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in full. This a time one is considered lucky NOT to be a homeowner.
j oanne , on June 25, 2011 at 7:08 pm said:
Carie,
By the way, if Chase took over WaMu, dont they have to show assignment for a
HELOC from WaMu to Chase? Is that supposed to be recorded?
They dont own it if it was securitized and any assignment would be bogus.
Heres what the judge said regarding the securitization of the loan:
Furthermore, in the face of these specific factual allegations, JPMorgans assertion
that the P&A Agreement suffices to establish their ownership of the Note is no longer
viable. Indeed, the P&A Agreement does not specifically identify Plaintiffs Note. (See
Dkt. No. 10, Exh. 2.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has now sufficiently alleged that
JPMorgan did not own his Note and therefore did not have the right to foreclose.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs
second claim for wrongful foreclosure and fifth claim to quiet title.
c ar i e, on June 25, 2011 at 3:47 pm said:
Chase is going down
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/25/madoff-jpmorgan-lawsuit-irving-
picard_n_884540.html
By the way, if Chase took over WaMu, dont they have to show assignment for a
HELOC from WaMu to Chase? Is that supposed to be recorded?
Thanks, Mr.GaultI asked re. that case because I was wondering if
rescission had anything to do with a previous commenter who said a lawyer in
Huston had threatened their Securities licenses and got them to pony up EVERY
single dime the homeowner had paid in to the servicing company from the date the
securitized audit showed the loan had been assigned to a REMIC Trust and according
to the PSA.
j ohngaul t , on June 24, 2011 at 10:29 pm said:
Well, heck. I swear I edited out the business about the 30k, but what made me
so mad about it was that the attorney didnt know jack and the case was dismissed
quickly, the 30k to the homeowner later.
I really think its important that people understand rescission, at least some of
the mechanics, the ones Im a little familiara with. So, Id like to add one more.
Say you got a loan for 100k, but you paid 5k to get it. (closing costs, points, whatever).
You then made 6k in payments before you rescinded under TILA.
The lender must give you back 5k + 6k = 11k before you are obligated to give back the
100k you borrowed. If these things happened, you each would be even, right? Where
you were before you got the loan and before they gave it to you.
Whatever both parties had in their wallets before the loan was made is now back in the
wallets.
But, as far as I know, borrowers usually ask for damages or like that for the violations
of TILA.
Because I have never seen a successful case that I can think of, I dont know how the
rest of it works. But I will say this. One of the reasons I know what I know is that I saw
an attorney take 30k from a homeowner to prosecute a tila case. Rescission is a
consequence to the lender and a remedy for the borrower for TILA violations, but its
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not the entire remedy for the homeowner.
@carie Wachovia is calling what they want to do the conditional rescission, I
guess, and saying they would release the lien concurrently with the borrow paying off
the loan. Like, I said , Wach wanted to skip litigation and not honor its own obligations.
Once the lender performs pursuant to the appl rules of rescission, then the borrower
has to tender the property it received out of the deal, which was the loan. That
propertyis not the house its the money the borrowers received, the loan proceeds.
I guess to do a rescission properly, the lender must first give back all the dough paid in,
maybe release the lien, then the borrower has to pay off the loan. But in this case, as
in all Ive ever seen, that is not all the borrower wants, He wants damages, etc. for the
Tila violations and like that.
There may be a right of offset which would preclude the borrower from having to pay
off the loan even if the lender gave back everything, incuding pts and closing costs, the
borrower paid for the loan. I dont know about that part of it, having never seen a
successful case. Most banksters pull a Wachovia or more likely even, get it dismissed
for lack of tender by the borrower, which is cr since they have to act first.
Itd be my thought the lender aint ever going to give those funds back. Theyd
probably cut a legitimate deal first., like better terms, knock off some principal, in other
words actually negotiate.
@carie,
On that FL rescission case: best I can tell is the homeowner filed a rescission case.
Wachovia didnt want to litigate so tried to say, as do most of them, that in order to
rescind, the h.o. had to tender the balance owing on the loan, Wachovia would then
release the lien. Gee, isnt that generous? Nice try, Wachovia. This is one of the few
courts which have actually followed the rules. Before the h.o. has to tender the
balance, the lender has to fork over every dime ever paid on the loan.
Wachovia wanted to skip everthing, its own obligatons which come first, and just make
the h.o. pay off the loan. The court said no, not happening.
He said were following the rules.
It looks like the h.o. rescinded, Wachovia did not
fork over the dough the h.o. had paid so I think the court said so now were going to
litigate. Ill read it again for anything else. This is only the second time I have seen a
court so rule in a rescission case.
Right on, E.Tolleby the way, are you the E.Tolle?
http://mariokenny.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/recission-case-in-tampa.pdf
Can anyone here describe this case in simple laymans terms? Thanks.
Mar k , on June 24, 2011 at 5:45 pm said:
My 1st was originated by Greenpoint Services in 04. Greenpoint (Capital One?)
disappeared in 07. It then went to Countrywide and now with B of A who is happily
taking the money and charging 6 bucks per month for the convenience of paying on
line. While the loan is presently current, I can see the day coming pretty soon when the
payment is going to be very difficult to make. If my loan was securitized what does that
mean for me?
spank i ebl ue, on June 24, 2011 at 4:34 pm said:
Wow. I am truely impressed. Thax for the help. I believe there is good advice
Horoski
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here. It sounds like the voice of experience to meand I AM a fighter. Thank you so
much.
E. Tol l e, on June 24, 2011 at 4:20 pm said:
spankieblue, welcome to the servicer merry-go-round. reach way out and try
and grab the brass ring.oh.you just missed it. Keep trying.
And then just keep documenting their fraud as they lead you down the path to
foreclosure. Id make a million bucks if I could sell this backstory to unsuspecting folks
who actually believe that: 1. .the servicer is actually working in your best interest to
achieve a workable modification that will keep you and your deserving family in your
sweet little home, and 2..that the servicer even has the capability to do a
modification in the first place.
These attorneys who dont understand securitization will gladly take the homeowners
money in a lackluster attempt at defense, only to end up suggesting a modification,
believing this to be the only way for the homeowner to go. Little do any of them know
that they are participating in a fraudulent scheme that attempts at correcting or at least
covering up the criminal behaviour of slews of dastardly jerks in finance. Ive said it
before, and Ill say it again, all of these players need to be fitted for matching bracelets
and shown new living quarters in rooms with toilets for furniture and bars blocking the
view. And a lost key to boot.
Yeah, spankieblue, Ive got an idea. Call your point of contact, fax your point
of contact, and plan on meeting their tails in court. Even tho you are the homeowner,
file a request for notice with your recorder, and get on with your life. If they try
anything sneaky with f/c docs, they darn well better notify you as a matter of law and
also pursuant to your recorded request for notice. Have your mom and your brother file
a request for notice, also. Hell, ask your co-workers. Dont have any? Ask your
neighbors. The county recorder needs the revenue. Dont know if theyll get noticed, but
prob couldnt hurt. Get a paralegal to type one up for you.
There are enough pleadings filed online at this site and that so you should be able to
fashion some kind of pleading in state court if they try to f/c. Or get a paralegal to help
you if no funds for attorney. If you have done anything by way of consideration for
modification, which I think you have by sending in the docs requested and I dont now
what else, you should have some grounds to say wait your honor, Ive been acting in
good faith here. Document everything.
Im not an attorney and this is not legal advice! People who cant pay or find good
representation have just got to start somewhere. Stop being held hostage by these
yeahoo -anti-modification loan servicers. It might be a mistake to try to act smarter than
you are before a judge, so dont. Many f/c attorneys who represent the homeowner
have sample pleadings at their web sites. Scribd is probably full of them. Print some
and take them to your local knowledgeable paralegal. That or get used to renting. I
think its that simple.
spank i ebl ue, on June 24, 2011 at 3:51 pm said:
I have been posting in these forums for a bit. I am trying to get a hamp loan
with wells fargo. After confirming that all paper work had been turned in a week ago
and no more was needed. I get mail saying they need more documents and are not
being specific. I cant quess which documents they need now. They have lost whole
sectionsasked for documents that are not in the orignal hamp requests. I have
supplied it all. My single point of contact is failing the new point of contact rules. So, I
am pressing for the paper work they say they dont have. I am simply going to fax all
the info they have asked forupdated.everyday untill the faxes are coming out of
their ears. It wont cost me anything. any suggestions please email me or comment
here. ty spankieblue@live.com
Ann , on June 24, 2011 at 2:47 pm said:
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Our courtrooms are public spaces. Historically, courtrooms are among the most sacred
of public grounds and our founding fathers, and generations of lawyers and statesmen
since our countrys founding took great risk and fought long odds to protect the
foundation and legacy that in this country trials occur in the full view of the public glare.
Our country has been lost, in large measure by my estimation, because the people took
too much for granted. In the good times we, the public, the stewards of the Constitution,
the keepers of our own liberty turned our backs on staying involved, remaining vigilant
and holding people, officials and the entire system accountable.
When We The People abandoned the public square and conceded the sacred territory
of our statehouses, our courtrooms all of that territory, all of those spaces were
consumed by partisan activists, corporations and officials, both elected and appointed
who used our government our republic, our freedoms to fulfill their own self interest. In
prior epochs of our nations history our legislators, our elected and appointed leaders
and the leaders of business respected a common interest in protecting liberty and the
rule of law and conforming their own self interest to that of the body politic. The
memories of that age fade like the fuzzy picture on a small black and white television,
a clothes hanger rabbit ear antenna perched and unstable on top.
The statesmen are gone and the patriots and protectors of our most sacred values
must choose between daily survival and the consequences of daring to remind others
that our liberty and freedom were once symbolized by a torch, a flame held high and
proud and brightly, but that flame is dim. And as a commentator noted..
Given the current state of things, Im sure there are a lot of people deliberately
deciding to adopt a low profile, politically or socially. A lot of this has to do not so much
with politics but what your neighbors or your coworkers will say about you, right? If you
tell them something that is actually happening in the world, you will be labeled a
conspiracy theorist; theyll look at you as if youre crazy. But what about the activists?
At a certain stage, the great mass of people will look around for leadership figures.
When the economic crisis comes, theyre going to want someone to tell them how to
get out of it. Theyre not going to know the answers themselves. The question is, will
there be activists, leadership figures, proposing the right solutions and how soon will
they come along?
And now the transcript:
KRAMER-1
http://www.scribd.com/my_document_collections/3011910
Abby i n CA, on June 24, 2011 at 2:27 pm said:
THERE IS A CAMPAIGN ON TO RESHAPE AMERICAS COURTS.
$45MILLION AND COUNTING BEING SPENT. SEE REPORT HERE
http://www.scribd.com/doc/58657917/IS-JUSTICE-IN-THE-USA-BEING-HIJACKED-A-
REPORT-VIA-SOROS
The other thing in this decision worthy of comment is that if you plead properly,
you prevent JPM from saying they own the loan just by virtue of their WAMU
acquisition.
Does that go for my Chase HELOCformerly WaMuthey are threatening foreclosure
on me because I had to default on the HELOC-the loan numbers arent even the
sameunderwater househavent filed Chap 7 yetwhat should I say in a letter to get
them to back off???
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The A Man , on June 24, 2011 at 12:01 pm said:
Joanne thank you for the compliment. It is the UD attorneys that deal with
similar cases. They know how to get straight to the point. What works. and what doesnt
work.
j ohngaul t , on June 24, 2011 at 11:12 am said:
Here is the second amended complaint:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/58645741/Javaheri-v-JP-Morgan-Chase-Post-Foreclosure-
Case-Judge-Wright
The ruling is at scribd, also.
Mar y Coc hr ane, on June 24, 2011 at 11:07 am said:
If the trust had purchased the mortgage loan they would have updated
themselves on the lien, deed, homeowners, etc.
Mar y Coc hr ane, on June 24, 2011 at 11:06 am said:
Yes, the Note recorded with County Recorder/Clerk is without rubber stamp.
They dont endorse to anyone unless special servicer picks up in foreclosure they
rubber stamp endorsements.
What about bankruptcy same thing?
j oann , on June 24, 2011 at 10:21 am said:
The A Man
Good suggestion. In my town there is legal aid for tenants but not for homeowners in or
out of foreclosure. Dont get that. Maybe we could say we are tenant fake debt slaves
to a feudal landlord fraud creditor getting away with the biggest land grab in history.
smal l f i sh f r i ed, on June 24, 2011 at 10:07 am said:
i wonder if the purchase of countrywide by Bank of America falls withing the
same sham claiming ownership for those properties as Wells fargo is doing with Wamu
properties, can anyone tell me ?
j oann , on June 24, 2011 at 9:52 am said:
We need a simple list of the cases of the last several months and those that
break daily with a one line description that spells out the significance or with selected
quotes that can get those asleep at the switch to wake up and look deeper including
the majority of attorneys and law firms that still do not have a clue. Homeowners trying
to have an informed conversation with anyone get nowhere. The widespread ignorance
is staggering. Even those attorneys who are supposedly defending foreclosures just
recommend modification intervention and other. All of the powers that be not just
attorneys are stuck on mere paperwork errors that will be fixed, owes someone, no
free house.
The A Man , on June 24, 2011 at 9:37 am said:
REgarding getting Attorneys onboard. I would look at getting in touch with
Attorneys that represent Tenants in Unlawful Detainer cases. or even Attorneys that
represent Landlords. Find out who the tough ones are.
davi dw , on June 24, 2011 at 8:58 am said:
Very instructive. Yesterday a motion to dismiss my adversary was granted in
part and denied in part, which was expected. So I have to amend and allege sufficient
Glossary
Litigation Terms
Glossary of Common Legal
Terms
Estate Terms
Concepts
Glossary of Loan Terms
Glossary of Money
Economic Terms
HUD Glossary
Money and Currency
Glossary
Mortgage Glossary
Partial Foreclosure Glossary:
For Beginners
RESPA Glossary
Securities Glossary For
Lawyers Claiming Securities-
Related Causes of Action
TILA Glossary
U.S. Treasury Glossary
Obama
Obamanomics
facts to make the complaint fly.
Read the civil minutes over and over. Its better than law school and easy to understand
if you have with a minimal legal foundation.
It would be interesting to read the plaintiffs original and amended pleadings to see how
he made the corrections and converted conclusory allegations to factual ones.
c ar i e, on June 24, 2011 at 8:48 am said:
Does anyone here know how a lawyer could threaten the securities licenses
of these peopleand get them to pony up all money paid to servicer from the time
the securitized audit showed the loan had been assigned to a REMIC Trust and
according to the PSA. This happening with some lawyerswhy not here???
If any lawyer in the So Cal area knows how to do that, please contact me:
cariemac9@gmail.com
M. KEI TH, on June 24, 2011 at 8:35 am said:
this case is:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Javaheri v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al.
Case 2:10-cv-08185-ODW -FFM June 2, 2011
available at:
http://www.chasechase.org/doxcc/Javaheri35Order.pdf
Nor a, on June 24, 2011 at 8:07 am said:
You are so right Neil, this case was recited better than many cases I had read,
it could have been even better if as you said the Plaintiff had more details on certain
issues. the more cases like this one come out the better we learn from them as to what
to cover and what not to cover. Things are turning around, and yes we need to get to
the nitty gritty about the specific loans. Neil, thank you for being there for the
homeowners and for pointing things out that were not obvious enough for many of us,
we appreciate you and your comments more than you know, thank you!
r dew ayne, on June 24, 2011 at 7:15 am said:
I would guest this defense should work against Countrywide/Bac loan.
t ony , on June 24, 2011 at 6:56 am said:
Makes sense people should use this defense if you have a Indymac loan with
Onewest claim they purchase everything. Or any other bank that the FDIC took over
and sold the portfolio to another bank.
Once used properly no bank will be able to have subject matter jurisdiction and take
control of the res of there own profit gain.
Pet er , on June 24, 2011 at 6:21 am said:
Very interesting commentary! Has anyone else noted that the parent of, or the
originating lender has signed off or stamped as a borrower on your Deed of Trust or
Note?
WRI GHT DECI SI ON: CA FED CT ALLOWS CLAI MS FOR Fai l ur e t o Cont ac t ,
Wr ongf ul For ec l osur e, Qui et Ti t l e, Unj ust Enr i c hment , Dec l ar at or y and
I nj unc t i ve Rel i ef | For ec l osur e New s Onl i ne, on June 24, 2011 at 6:01 am said:
[...] Source: Livingliess Weblog [...]
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From ChaseChase.org:
Federal District Court
Javaheri v. JPMorgan Chase, Case No. CV10-8185 ODW
Otis D. Wright II, Judge, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Los Angeles
Douglas Gillies, attorney for Daryoush Javaheri
Plaintiff sued to halt a foreclosure initiated by JPMorgan Chase and California Reconveyance
Co. Chase responded with a Motion to Dismiss. Two times the court granted Chase's motion
with leave to amend. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint and Chase again moved to
dismiss.
In opposing the motion, Plaintiff requested that the court take judicial notice of:
(1) the Congressional Oversight Panel November Oversight Report (COP Report) released on
November 16, 2010 -http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-111610-report.pdf
(2) Federal Reserve System Consent Order in the Matter of JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.,
Docket No. 11-023-B-HC and 11- 023-B-DEO, dated April 13, 2011 - www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/enforcement/enf20110413a5.pdf
Judge Wright denied Chase's motion to dismiss five causes of action - wrongful foreclosure,
quiet title, violation of Cal Civ. Code Sec. 2923.5, quasi contract, and declaratory relief.
Second Amended Complaint 4/12/2011
Chase's Motion to Dismiss SAC 4/28/2011
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 5/16/2011
Request for Judicial Notice 5/16/2011
Chase's Reply Memorandum 5/23/2011
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss 6/2/2011
Chase JPMorgan Chase - cases t hat could help you save your home
ht t p: / / www.chasechase.org/ cases.ht ml[ 6/ 18/ 2011 12: 04: 33 AM]

JPMor gan Chase Too Bi g Not t o Fai l
"We got trouble right here in River City, with a capital T that rhymes with C and that stands for
CHASE"

HOME
CONTENTS
Federal Court
Bankruptcy
California
Other States
Exhibits
ARTI CLES
Homeowners'
Rebellion
by Ellen Brown
- - -
Underwater and
Not Walking Away:
Shame, Fear, and
Social
Management of a
Housing Crisis
by Brent T. White
- - -
How t o chase Chase
2. RESOURCES Pl eadi ngs, Or der s, and Ex hi bi t s
On this page you will find descriptions and links to various pleadings, orders, and exhibits filed
by attorneys as well as individuals representing themselves. Where the outcome is known, that
information is included. These documents are public records and are made available for your
information, but their accuracy, competency, and effectiveness have not been verified. Only a
judge can rule on a pleading and only an appellate court opinion that is certified for publication
can be cited as precedent. That said, it can be both educational and entertaining to see how the
great race is unfolding in the historic controversy of People v. Banks. For an entertaining public
outing of history's all-time greatest pickpockets, go see the documentary "Inside Job."
Feder al Di st r i ct Cour t
Javaheri v. JPMorgan Chase, Case No. CV10-8185 ODW
Otis D. Wright II, Judge, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Los Angeles
Douglas Gillies, attorney for Daryoush Javaheri
Co. Chase responded with a Motion to Dismiss. Two times the court granted Chase's motion
with leave to amend. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint and Chase again moved to
Where's The Note,
Who's The Holder
by Hon. Samuel L.
Bufford, Glen Ayer
- - -
The Great
Collapse
by Kurt Eggert
Connecticut Law
Review
- - -
Subprime
Meltdown
by James R. Barth,
Tong Li, et al.,
Milken Institute
- - -
HAMP=Foreclosure
so HAMP is a
fraud
by Patrick Pulatie
- - -
The Dream
Deferred
by Thomas Brom,
California Lawyer
COLUMNS
Margaret Carswell
Barbara Caldwell
LI NKS
WaMu Support
Shame The Banks
Foreclosure
Hamlet
Implode-O-Meter
Cal State Bar
HUD
- - -
Legal Notices
Send us an email
dismiss.
In opposing the motion, Plaintiff requested that the court take judicial notice of:
(1) the Congressional Oversight Panel November Oversight Report (COP Report) released on
November 16, 2010 - http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-111610-report.pdf
(2) Federal Reserve System Consent Order in the Matter of JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., Docket
No. 11-023-B-HC and 11- 023-B-DEO, dated April 13, 2011 -
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/enf20110413a5.pdf
Judge Wright denied Chase's motion to dismiss five causes of action - wrongful foreclosure,
quiet title, violation of Cal Civ. Code Sec. 2923.5, quasi contract, and declaratory relief.
Second Amended Complaint 4/12/2011
Chase's Motion to Dismiss SAC 4/28/2011
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 5/16/2011
Request for Judicial Notice 5/16/2011
Chase's Reply Memorandum 5/23/2011
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss 6/2/2011
Carswell v. JPMorgan Chase, Case No. CV10-5152 GW
George Wu, Judge, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Los Angeles
Douglas Gillies, attorney for Margaret Carswell
Co. on the grounds of failure to contract, wrongful foreclosure, unjust enrichment, RESPA and
TILA violations, and fraud. She asked for quiet title and declaratory relief. Chase responded with
a Motion to Dismiss. At a hearing on September 30, 2010, Judge Wu granted defendants'
motion to dismiss with leave to amend. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint was filed on October
18. It begins:
It was the biggest financial bubble in history. During the first decade of this century,
banks abandoned underwriting practices and caused a frenzy of real estate
speculation by issuing predatory loans that ultimately lowered property values in the
United States by 30-50%. Banks reaped the harvest. Kerry Killinger, CEO of
Washington Mutual, took home more than $100 million during the seven years that
he steered WaMu into the ground. Banks issued millions of predatory loans knowing
that the borrowers would default and lose their homes. As a direct, foreseeable,
proximate result, 15 million families are now in danger of foreclosure. If the legions of
dispossessed homeowners cannot present their grievances in the courts of this great
nation, their only recourse will be the streets.
Chase responded with yet another Motion to Dismiss, Carswell filed her Opposition to the
motion, and at hearing on January 6, 2011, Judge Wu asked Plaintiff for an Offer of Proof. Her
Offer of Proof included written argument, 19 exhibits, and a powerpoint presentation. Judge Wu
granted Chase's Motion to Dismiss, and Carswell appealed to the 9th Circuit (Case No. 11-
55423, 9TH Circuit).
Notice of Intent to Preserve Interest 1/28/2010
First Amended Complaint 10/18/2010
Declaration of Margaret Carswell 7/13/2010
Transcript of Hearing 9/30/2010 re: Motion to Dismiss
Chase's Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint 10/27/2010
Chase's Request for Judicial Notice 10/27/2010
Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 12/03/2010
Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice 12/03/2010 - Congressional Oversight Panel's Report
Transcript of Hearing 1/6/2011 re: Motion to Dismiss
Judge Wu's Order Dismissing FAC 1/06/2011
Plaintiff's Offer of Proof 1/28/2011
Declaration of Margaret Carswell 1/28/2011
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-19 re: Offer of Proof
Plaintiff's Exhibit 20 re: Offer of Proof - Powerpoint presentation
Chase's Response to Offer of Proof 1/31/2011
Judge Wu's Final Order of Dismissal 2/15/2011
Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal 3/15/2011
Khast v. Washington Mutual, JPMorgan Chase, and CRC, Case No. CV10-2168 IEG
Irma E. Gonzalez, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court, Southern District of California
Kaveh Khast in pro se
A loan mod nightmare where Khast did everything right except laugh out loud when WaMu told
him that he must stop making his mortgage payments for 90 days in order to qualify for a loan
modification. As Khast leaped through the constantly shifting hoops tossed in the air, first by
WaMu, then by Chase, filing no less than four applications, Chase issued a Notice of Trustee's
Sale.
Khast filed a pro se complaint in federal court which included a request for a Temporary
Restraining Order. The District Court granted a TRO to stop the sale. The court wrote that the
conduct by WAMU appeared to be "immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or
substantially injurious to consumers," and thus satisfied the "unfair" prong of California's Unfair
Competition Law, Cal. Bus.&Prof.Code 17200. Plaintiff stated that he possessed documents
which supported his contention that Defendant WAMU instructed him to purposefully enter into
default and assured him that, if he did so, WAMU would restructure his loan. Accordingly,
Plaintiff demonstrated that he was likely to succeed on the merits of his claim.
The court also relied upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel, whereby a promisor is bound
when he should reasonably expect a substantial change of position, either by act or
forbearance, in reliance on his promise. He who by his language or conduct leads another to do
what he would not otherwise have done shall not subject such person to loss or injury by
disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.
At a later hearing, the court denied a preliminary injunction when Chase argued that WaMu's
immoral conduct was a liability that was not assumed by Chase under the Purchase and
Assumption Agreement dated September 25, 2008. The court's TRO on October 26
nevertheless provides borrowers with ammunition to raise claims of unfair competition and
promissory estoppel.
Plaintiff's claims under TILA were dismissed because the 3-year Statute of Limitations had
passed and Plaintiff did not allege facts in support of suspending the limitations period under the
doctrine of equitable tolling. The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act did not apply because
mortgagees, servicers, and trustees are not "debt collectors" subject to FDCPA. The court
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367 over Plaintiff's state
law claims.
Complaint 10/10/2010
Temporary Restraining Order 10/26/2010
Order Denying Injunction 12/9/2010
Order of Dismissal 3/16/2011
Saxon Mortgage v. Hillery, Case No. C-08-4357
Edward M. Chen, U.S. Magistrate, Northern District of California
Thomas Spielbauer, attorney for Ruthie Hillery
Hillery obtained a home loan from New Century secured by a Deed of Trust, which named
MERS as nominee for New Century and its successors. MERS later attempted to assign the
Deed of Trust and the promissory note to Consumer. Consumer and the loan servicer then sued
Hillery. The court ruled that Consumer must demonstrate that it is the holder of the deed of trust
and the promissory note. In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 653 (S.D. Oh. 2007)
held that to show standing in a foreclosure action, the plaintiff must show that it is the holder of
the note and the mortgage at the time the complaint was filed. For there to be a valid
assignment, there must be more than just assignment of the deed alone; the note must also be
assigned. "The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an
incident...an assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the
latter alone is a nullity." Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872).
There was no evidence that MERS held the promissory note or was given the authority by New
Century to assign the note to Consumer. Without the note, Consumer lacked standing. If
Consumer did not have standing, then the loan servicer also lacked standing. A loan servicer
cannot bring an action without the holder of the note. In re Hwang, 393 B.R. 701, 712 (2008).
Order Granting Hillery's Motion to Dismiss dated 12/09/2008
Serrano v. GMAC Mortgage, Case No. 8:09-CV-00861-DOC
David O. Carter, Judge, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Los Angeles
Moses S. Hall, attorney for Ignacio Serrano
Plaintiff alleged in state court that GMAC initiated a non-judicial foreclosure sale and sold his
residence without complying with the notice requirements of Cal. Civil Code Sec. 2923.5 and
2924, and without attaching a declaration to the 2923.5 notice under penalty of perjury stating
that defendants tried with due diligence to contact the borrower. Defendants removed the case
to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The District Court granted defendants'
motion to dismiss without prejudice, and described in detail the defects in the Complaint with
directions how to correct the defects. Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint on
4/01/2010.
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Without Prejuduce 3/18/2010
Second Amended Complaint for Wrongful Foreclosure 4/01/2010
Sharma v. Provident Funding Associates, Case No. 3:2009-cv-05968
Vaughn R Walker, Judge, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California
Marc A. Fisher, attorney for Anilech and Parma Sharma
Defendants attempted to foreclose and plaintiffs sued in federal court, alleging that defendants
did not contact them as required by Cal Civ Code 2923.5. In considering plaintiffs' request for
an injunction to stop the foreclosure, the court found that plaintiffs had raised "serious questions
going to the merits" and would suffer irreparable injury if the sale were to proceed. Property is
considered unique. If defendants foreclosed, plaintiffs' injury would be irreparable because they
might be unable to reacquire it. Plaintiffs' remedy at law, damages, would be inadequate. On the
other hand, defendants would not suffer a high degree of harm if a preliminary injunction were
ordered. While they would not be able to sell the property immediately and would incur litigation
costs, when balanced against plaintiffs' potential loss, defendants' harm was outweighed.
The court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from selling the property while the
lawsuit was pending.
Complaint for Wrongful Foreclosure 12/21/2009
Points & Authorities In Support of TRO
Plaintiff's Declaration in Support of TRO
Order Granting Preliminary Injunction 1/08/10

Feder al Bank r upt cy Cour t
In re Salazar, No. 10-17456 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2011) Chap. 13
Margaret M. Mann, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, San Diego, CA
Francisco J. Aldana, attorney for Eleazar Salazar
600 B Street, Suite 2130, San Diego, California 92101
Cal Civil Code 2932.5 applies to Deeds of Trust as well as mortgages. It requires that if the
foreclosing beneficiary has acquired its claim by assignment, it must record its assignment of the
Deed of Trust before the trustee's sale.
MERS was not the beneficiary at the time of the foreclosure, even if it was initially the nominal
beneficiary under the DOT. The DOT does not grant MERS any authority apart from a nominal
role. MERS is not an extra-judicial commercial alternative to California's exhaustive nonjudicial
foreclosure law (Civil Code sections 2020-2955). This Court joins the courts in other states that
rejected MERS' offer of an alternative to the public recording system (citing In re Agard, below)
"The Court rejects the claim that MERS' limited role in the DOT provides it carte blanche
authority over the nonjudicial foreclosure process."
Salazar's Memo of Points & Authorites in Opposition to Relief from Stay
Opinion Denying Relief from Automatic Stay 4/12/2011
In re Agard, No. 10-77338, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 488, at *58-*59 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011)
Chap. 7
Robert E. Grossman, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, Central Islip, NY
George Bassias, Astoria, NY, attorney for Ferrel Agard
21-83 Steinway, Astoria, NY 11105
gbassias@yahoo.com
The membership rules of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, or MERS, don't make it an
agent of the banks that own the mortgages. "MERS's theory that it can act as a 'common agent'
for undisclosed principals is not supported by the law," Grossman wrote. "MERS did not have
authority, as 'nominee' or agent, to assign the mortgage absent a showing that it was given
specific written directions by its principal."
"MERS and its partners made the decision to create and operate under a business model that
was designed in large part to avoid the requirements of the traditional mortgage-recording
process," Grossman wrote. "The court does not accept the argument that because MERS may
be involved with 50 percent of all residential mortgages in the country, that is reason enough for
this court to turn a blind eye to the fact that this process does not comply with the law."
"Without more, this court finds that MERS's 'nominee' status and the rights bestowed upon
MERS within the mortgage itself, are insufficient to empower MERS to effectuate a valid
assignment of mortgage," the judge wrote. "MERS's position that it can be both the mortgagee
and an agent of the mortgagee is absurd, at best."
Grossman said parties coming to him to seek to lift the automatic ban on legal claims in cases
involving MERS will have to show they own both the mortgage and the note.
MERS appealed Judge Grossman's order on March 8, 2011.
In re: Hwang, 396 B.R. 757 (2008), Case No. 08-15337 Chapter 7
Samuel L. Bufford, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, Los Angeles
Robert K. Lee, attorney for Kang Jin Hwang
As the servicer on Hwang's promissory note, IndyMac was entitled to enforce the secured note
under California law, but it must also satisfy the procedural requirements of federal law to obtain
relief from the automatic stay in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. These requirements include
joining the owner of the note, because the owner of the note is the real party in interest under
Rule 17, and it is also a required party under Rule 19. IndyMac failed to join the owner of the
note, so its motion for relief from the automatic stay was denied.
Reversed on July 21, 2010. District Court Judge Philip Gutierrez reversed the Judge Bufford's
determination that IndyMac is not the real party in interest under Rule 17 and that Rule 19
requires the owner of the Note to join the Motion.
District Court Reversal of Judge Bufford's Order 7/21/2010
In re: Vargas, Case No. 08-17036 Chapter 7
Samuel L. Bufford, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, Los Angeles
Marcus Gomez, attorney for Raymond Vargas
Motion for Stay 7/03/2008
Order Denying MERS Relief from Stay 10/21/2009
First Amended Adversary Complaint Case No. 09-01135-SB 1/15/2010
Opposition to MERS Motion to Dismiss Complaint 2/24/2010
In re: Walker, Case No. 10-21656 Chapter 11
Ronald H. Sargis, Judge, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Sacramento
Mitchell L. Abdallah, attorney for Rickie Walker
MERS assigned the Deed of Trust for Debtor's property to Citibank, which filed a secured claim.
Debtor objected to the claim. Judge Sargis ruled that the promissory note and the Deed of Trust
are inseparable. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of
the Deed of Trust alone is a nullity. MERS was not the owner of the note, so it could not transfer
the note or the beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust. The bankruptcy court disallowed
Citibank's claim because it could not establish that it was the owner of the promissory note.
Objection to CitiBank Proof of Claim 4/06/2010
Declaration in Support of Objection 4/06/2010
Points & Authorities in Support of Objection 4/06/2010
Order Disallowing CitiBank Claim 5/20/2010

Washington Mutual Inc. Bankruptcy, Case No. 08-12229 Chapter 11
Mary F. Walrath, Judge, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Deleware
The Washington Mutual, Inc. Chapter 11 Voluntary Bankruptcy Petition was filed by WaMu on
September 26, 2008. The filing fee was $1,039. As of December 31, 2010, 6,500 documents
have been filed. Here is the docket:
WaMu Bankruptcy Docket 12/31/2010
Cal i f or ni a St at e Cour t
Mabry v. Superior Court and Aurora Loan Services
185 Cal.App.4th 208, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201 (4th Dist. June 2, 2010)
California Court of Appeal, 4th District, Division 3
California Supreme Court, Petition for Review denied August 18, 2010.
Moses S. Hall, attorney for Terry and Michael Mabry
The Mabrys sued to enjoin a trustee's sale of their home, alleging that Aurora's notice of default
did not include a declaration required by Cal. Civil Code 2923.5, and that the bank did not
explore alternatives to foreclosure with the borrowers. The trial court refused to stop the sale.
The Mabrys filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandate and the Court of Appeal granted a stay to
enjoin the sale. Oral argument was heard in Santa Ana on May 18, 2010.
Aurora argued that a borrower cannot sue a lender that fails to contact the borrower to discuss
alternatives to foreclosure before filing a notice of default, as required by 2923.5, because
2923.5 does not explicitly give homeowners a "private right of action." Aurora also argued that
a declaration under penalty of perjury is not required because a trustee, who ordinarily files the
notice of default, could not have personal knowledge of a bank's attempts to contact the
borrower. Nobody mentioned that the trustee is not authorized by the statute to make the
declaration. 2923.5 states that a notice of default "shall include a declaration from the
mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent that it has contacted the borrower..."
The Court of Appeal ruled that a borrower has a private right of action under 2923.5 and is not
required to tender the full amount of the mortgage as a prerequisite to filing suit, since that would
defeat the purpose of the statute. Under the court's narrow construction of the statute, 2923.5
merely adds a procedural step in the foreclosure process. Since the statute is not substantive, it
is not preempted by federal law. The declaration specified in 2923.5 does not have to be
signed under penalty of perjury. The borrower's remedy is limited to getting a postponement of a
foreclosure while the lender files a new notice of default that complies with 2923.5. If the lender
ignores the statute and makes no attempt to contact the borrower before selling the property,
the violation does not cloud the title acquired by a third party purchaser at the foreclosure sale.
Therefore 2923.5 claims must be raised in court before the sale. It is a question of fact for the
trial court to determine whether the lender actually attempted to contact the borrower before
filing a notice of default. If the lender takes the property at the foreclosure sale, its title is not
clouded by its failure to comply with the statute. Finally, the case is not suitable for class action
treatment if the lender asserts that it attempted to comply with the statute because each
borrower will present "highly-individuated facts."
In a petition for review to the California Supreme Court, the Mabrys noted that more than 100
federal district court opinions have considered 2923.5 and an overwhelming majority have
rejected a private right of action under the statute. The petition for review was denied.
After the case was remanded to the trial court, Mabry's motion for preliminary injunction was
granted. The trial court found that the Notice of Default contained the form language required by
the statute, i.e. that the lender contacted the borrower, tried with due diligence to contact the
borrower, etc. However, the declaration on the Notice of Default was not made under panalty of
perjury, and therefore had no evidentiary value to show whether the defendant satisfied 2923.5
Court of Appeal's Stay of Foreclosure Sale 11/25/2009
Opinion of Court of Appeal, Fourth District 6/2/2010
Petition for review, California Supreme Court 7/13/2010. Denied 8/18/2010.
Order Granting Preliminary Injunction Orange County Superior Court 12/17/2010.
Herrera v. Deutsche Bank
California Court of Appeal, Case # C065630, 3rd District (May 31, 2011 - unpublished opinion)
A trial court errs in taking judicial notice of disputed facts contained within recorded documents.
A matter ordinarily is subject to judicial notice only if the matter is reasonably beyond dispute.
"Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or
accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning." Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184
Cal.App.3d 369, 374. While courts take judicial notice of public records, they do not take notice
of the truth of matters stated therein. Love v. Wolf (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 378, 403. "When
judicial notice is taken of a document . . . the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the
document are disputable." StorMedia, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 457, fn. 9.
In Herrera, the Substitution of Trustee recited that Deutsche Bank "is the present beneficiary
under" the 2003 deed of trust. This fact was hearsay and disputed. Therefore, the trial court
could not take judicial notice of it. Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates,
(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106. Nor would taking judicial notice of the Assignment of Deed of
Trust establish that the Deutsche Bank was the beneficiary under the deed of trust. A recitation
that JPMorgan Chase Bank is the successor in interest to Long Beach Mortgage Company,
through Washington Mutual, is hearsay. Plaintiffs disputed the truthfulness of the contents of all
of the recorded documents.
A supporting declaration must be made on personal knowledge and "show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated." Code Civ. Proc., 437c, subd. (d). Deborah
Brignac's declaration did not affirmatively show that she can competently testify that the bank is
the beneficiary under the deed of trust. At most, her declaration shows she can testify as to what
the Assignment of Deed of Trust "indicates." The factual contents of the assignment were
hearsay and defendants offered no exception to the hearsay rule to make these factual matters
admissible.
At oral argument, defendants contended that the recorded documents were actually business
records and admissible under the business record exception. However, Brignac did not provide
any information in her declaration establishing that the sources of the information and the
manner and time of preparation would indicate trustworthiness. (Evid. Code, 1271 (d).
A declaration that the Substitution of Trustee by Deutsch Bank made CRC trustee would require
admissible evidence that the bank was the beneficiary under the 2003 deed of trust and thus
had the authority to substitute the trustee. Because defendants failed to present facts to
establish that the bank was beneficiary and CRC was trustee under the 2003 deed of trust, and
therefore had authority to conduct the foreclosure sale, triable issues of material fact remain.
Gillies v. California Reconveyance Co. and JPMorgan Chase
California Court of Appeal, Case # B224995, 2nd District, Division 6
Douglas Gillies, Appellant in pro per
Gillies sued to enjoin a trustee's sale, alleging that CRC's Notice of Default (NOD) did not
include a declaration required by Cal. Civil Code 2923.5, the NOD mailed to the homeowner
was not a copy of the recorded NOD, and the Notice of Default and Notice of Trustee's Sale did
not state the name of trustor, as required by Cal. Civil Code 2924. Oral argument was heard on
March 9, 2010, at the California Court of Appeal in Ventura CA.
Appellants' Reply Brief concludes:
Defendants assert that quiet title is not available as a remedy to a California
homeowner against an out-of-state bank that presumes to sell title to his property on
the courthouse steps at a fraction of its value to a bona fide purchaser, i.e. anyone
with a cashier's check, despite the fact that the homeowner and the bank have never
done business with each other, the bank has made no effort to produce a note or any
evidence of authorization from a lender to support its claim, and it has not given the
homeowner any assurance that his payments are being forwarded to the lender. The
requirement of tender can't be imposed on homeowners to the enrichment of every
carpetbagger, con man, or East Coast city slicker who files a notice with the County
Recorder to stake his claim.
Respondents argue that recording a notice of default or a notice of trustee's sale
does not affect Plaintiff's ownership right in the property. Selling it does.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's demurrer. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing was
denied. Stay tuned for the next lawsuit.
Appellant's Opening Brief
Response Brief filed by Chase Bank and California Reconveyance
Appellant's Reply Brief
Decision of Court of Appeal
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing - filed April 21; denied April 23, 2011
Cabalu v. Mission Bishop Real Estate
Superior Court of California, Alameda County
Brian A. Angelini, attorney for Cecil and Natividad Cabalu
Complaint to Set Aside Trustee's Sale -filed August 2009
Davies v. NDEX West, Case No. INC 090697
Randall White, Judge, Superior Court of California, Riverside County
Brian W. Davies, in pro per
Complaint for Fraud dated 4/08/2010
Edstrom v. NDEX West, Wells Fargo Bank, et. al., Case No. 20100314
Superior Court of California, Eldorado County
Richard Hall, attorney for Daniel and Teri Anne Edstrom
A 61-page complaint with 29 causes of action to enjoin a trustee's sale of plaintiffs' residence,
requesting a judicial sale instead of a non-judicial sale, declaratory relief, compensatory
damages including emotional and mental distress, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and
rescission.
Complaint to Stay Foreclosure 5/24/2010
Order to Show Cause 5/25/2010
Moreno v. Ameriquest
Superior Court of California, Contra Costa County
Thomas Spielbauer, attorney for Gloria and Carlos Moreno
Complaint for declaratory relief and fraud against lender for misrepresenting the terms of the
loan, promising fixed rate with one small step after two years both orally and in the Truth In
Lending Statement. Loan was actually variable rate with negative amortization. Morenos would
have qualified for fixed rate 5% for 30 years, but instead received an exploding 7% ARM. Notary
rushed plaintiffs through signing of documents with little explanation. Complaint requests a
declaration the note is invalid, unconscionable and unenforceable and the Notice of Trustees
Sale is invalid.
Complaint for Fraud dated January 2008
Ot her St at e Cour t s
JPMorgan Chase Bank v. George, Case No. 10865/06
Arthur M. Schack, Supreme Court Judge, Kings County, New York
Edward Roberts, attorney for Gertrude George
Order Vacating Foreclosure Sale and Dismissing Chase's Complaint decided 5/04/2010
Fl or i da Judge t osses f or ecl osur e l aw sui t
Homeow ner s di sput e w ho ow ns mor t gage
by Steve Patterson
St. Augustine Record
June 15, 2010
Changing stories about who owns a mortgage and seemingly fresh evidence from a long-closed
bank led a judge to throw out a foreclosure lawsuit. It's the second time in as many months that
Circuit Judge J. Michael Traynor has dismissed with prejudice a foreclosure case where
homeowners disputed who owns the mortgage. Lawyers representing New York-based M&T
Bank gave three separate accounts of the ownership, with documentation that kept changing.
"The court has been misled by the plaintiff from the beginning," the judge wrote in his order. He
added that documents filed by M&T's lawyers seemed to contradict each other and "have
changed as needed to benefit the plaintiff."
The latest account was that Wells Fargo owned the note, and M&T was a servicer, a company
paid to handle payments and other responsibilities tied to a mortgage. To believe that, the judge
wrote, the "plaintiff is asking the court to ignore the documents filed in the first two complaints."
He added that Wells Fargo can still sue on its own, if it has evidence that it owns the mortgage.
More and more foreclosure cases are being argued on shaky evidence, said James Kowalski, a
Jacksonville attorney who represented homeowners Lisa and Larry Smith in the fight over their
oceanfront home. "I think it's very representative of what the banks and their lawyers are
currently doing in court," Kowalski said.
He said lawyers bringing the lawsuits are often pressed by their clients to close the cases
quickly. But it's up to lawyers to present solid evidence and arguments. "We are supposed to be
better than that," Kowalski said. "We are supposed to be officers of the court."
Ex hi bi t s
Depar t ment of Tr easur y and FDI C Repor t on WaMu, 4/16/2010
The Offices of Inspector General for Department of the Treasury and Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation released its evaluation of the regulatory oversight of Washington Mutual on April 16.
The table of contents tells the story. WaMu pursued a high-risk lending strategy which included
systematic underwriting weaknesses. They didn't care if borrowers could pay back their loans.
WaMu did not have adequate controls in place to manage its reckless "high-risk" strategy. OTS
examiners found weaknesses in WaMu's strategy, operations, and asset portfolio but looked the
other way.
Evaluation of Federal Oversight of WaMu released 4/16/2010
OCC Advi sor y Let t er s
How could the regulators allow this breakdown to happen? Was it really fraud when banks
arranged loans for homeowners who would inevitably go into defrault, sold them to Wall Street
to be bundled into securities, then purchased insurance so that the bank would collect the
unpaid balances when the borrowers lost their homes? Did anybody really know that repealing
Glass-Steagall and permitting Wall Street banks to get under the covers with Main Street banks
would cause so many borrowers to lose their homes? The Glass-Steagall Act, enacted in 1933,
barred any institution from acting as any combination of an investment bank, a commercial bank,
and an insurance company. It was repealed in 1999, and the repercussions have been
immense.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued Advisory Letter 2000-7 only months
after Glass-Steagall was repealed. It warned regulators to be on the lookout for indications of
predatory or abusive lending practices, including Collateral or Equity Stripping - loans made in
reliance on the liquidation value of the borrower's home or other collateral, rather than the
borrower's independent ability to repay, with the possible or intended result of foreclosure or the
need to refinance under duress.
Proving fraud is a painstaking process. Getting inside the mind of a crook requires a careful
foundation, and admissable evidence is not always easy to obtain. Many courts will take judicial
notice of official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States
and of any state of the United States. See Cal Evidence Code Sec. 452(c).
Here is a set of smoking guns in the form of a series of Advisory Letters issued by OCC:
OCC Advisory Letter 2000-7 July 25, 2000
OCC Advisory Letter 2000-9 August 29, 2000
OCC Advisory Letter 2002-3 March 22, 2002
OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2 February 21, 2003
OCC Advisory Letter 2003-3 February 21, 2003
Guidance from OCC, FDIC, OTS, and Federal Reserve October 4, 2005

Home Legal Notices
To add your comments or for permission to reprint, contact Editor, ChaseChase.org
2011 Concensus Designs, I nc. | All Right s Reserved
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
In the Matter of
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.
New York, New York
and
EMC MORTGAGE CORPORATION
Lewisville, Texas
Docket No. 11-023-B-HC
11-023-B-DEO
CONSENT ORDER
WHEREAS, JPMorgan Chase & Co., New York, New York ("JPMC"), a registered bank
holding company, owns and controls JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, Columbus,
Ohio (the "Bank"), a national bank, and numerous direct and indirect nonbank subsidiaries,
including EMC Mortgage Corporation, Lewisville, Texas ("EMC") and its direct and indirect
subsidiaries;
WHEREAS, JPMC has engaged in the business of servicing residential mortgage loans
through non-bank subsidiaries, including EMC and its subsidiaries (collectively, the "Mortgage
Servicing Companies"), as well as through the Bank. The Mortgage Servicing Companies have
serviced residential mortgage loans that are held in the portfolios of: (a) EMC and its
subsidiaries; (b) the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, and the Government National Mortgage Association (collectively, the "GSEs"); and
(c) various investors, including securitization trusts pursuant to Pooling and Servicing [page break]
Page 2
Agreements and similar agreements (collectively, the "Servicing Portfolio"). The Mortgage
Servicing Companies have had substantial responsibilities with respect to the Servicing Portfolio
for the initiation and handling of foreclosure proceedings, and loss mitigation activities ("Loss
Mitigation" or "Loss Mitigation Activities" include activities related to special forbearances,
repayment plans, modifications, short refinances, short sales, cash-for-keys, and deeds-in-lieu of
foreclosure);
WHEREAS, on or about April 1, 2011, JPMC transferred all of the residential mortgage
loan servicing rights and certain related assets and liabilities of the Mortgage Servicing
Companies to the Bank (the "EMC Servicing Rights Transfer"). Following consummation of
that transfer, the Mortgage Servicing Companies are no longer in the business of residential
mortgage loan servicing, and only the Bank is conducting residential mortgage loan servicing
within the JPMC organization;
WHEREAS, JPMC, through the Bank and the Mortgage Servicing Companies,
collectively, is the third largest servicer of residential mortgages in the United States and services
a portfolio of 8.5 million residential mortgage loans. During the recent financial crisis, a
substantially larger number of residential mortgage loans became past due than in earlier years.
Many of the past due mortgages have resulted in foreclosure actions. From January 1, 2009, to
December 31, 2010, the Mortgage Servicing Companies initiated 256,179 foreclosure actions;
WHEREAS, in connection with the process leading to certain foreclosures involving the
Servicing Portfolio, the Mortgage Servicing Companies allegedly:
(a) Filed or caused to be filed in state courts and in connection with bankruptcy
proceedings in federal courts numerous affidavits executed by employees of the
Mortgage Servicing Companies or employees of third-party providers making various [page break]
Page 3
assertions, such as the ownership of the mortgage note and mortgage, the amount of
principal and interest due, and the fees and expenses chargeable to the borrower, in which
the affiant represented that the assertions in the affidavit were made based on personal
knowledge or based on a review by the affiant of the relevant books and records, when, in
many cases, they were not based on such knowledge or review;
(b) Filed or caused to be filed in state courts and in connection with bankruptcy
proceedings in federal courts or in the local land record offices, numerous affidavits and
other mortgage-related documents that were not properly notarized, including those not
signed or affirmed in the presence of a notary;
(c) Litigated foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings and initiated non-judicial
foreclosures without always confirming that documentation of ownership was in order at
the appropriate time, including confirming that the promissory note and mortgage
document were properly endorsed or assigned and, if necessary, in the possession of the
appropriate party;
(d) Failed to respond in a sufficient and timely manner to the increased level of
foreclosures by increasing financial, staffing, and managerial resources to ensure that the
Mortgage Servicing Companies adequately handled the foreclosure process;
failed to respond in a sufficient and timely manner to the increased level of Loss
Mitigation Activities to ensure timely, effective and efficient communication with
borrowers with respect to Loss Mitigation Activities and foreclosure activities; and full
exploration of Loss Mitigation options or programs prior to completion of foreclosure
activities; and [page break]
Page 4
(e) Failed to have adequate internal controls, policies and procedures, compliance
risk management, internal audit, training, and oversight of the foreclosure process,
including sufficient oversight of outside counsel and other third-party providers handling
foreclosure-related services with respect to the Servicing Portfolio.
WHEREAS, the practices set forth above allegedly constitute unsafe or unsound banking
practices;
WHEREAS, as part of a horizontal review of various major residential mortgage
servicers conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Board of
Governors"), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the "FDIC"), the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (the "OCC"), and the Office of Thrift Supervision, examiners from
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the "Reserve Bank") have reviewed certain residential
mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure-related processes at the Mortgage Servicing Companies,
and examiners from the OCC have reviewed certain residential mortgage loan servicing and
foreclosure-related practices at the Bank;
WHEREAS, the Bank and the OCC have entered into a consent order to address areas of
weakness identified by the OCC in residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation,
foreclosure activities, and related functions (the "OCC Consent Order"). Following the EMC
Servicing Rights Transfer, the Servicing Portfolio will be subject to the terms of the OCC
Consent Order;
WHEREAS, in the OCC Consent Order, the OCC has made findings, which the Bank
neither admitted nor denied, that there were unsafe or unsound practices with respect to the
manner in which the Bank handled various foreclosure and related activities; [page break]
Page 5
WHEREAS, it is the common goal of the Board of Governors, the Reserve Bank, JPMC,
and the Mortgage Servicing Companies (to the extent that the Mortgage Loan Servicing
Companies engage in residential mortgage loan servicing in the future) ensure that the
consolidated organization operates in a safe and sound manner and in compliance with the terms
of mortgage loan documentation and related agreements with borrowers, all applicable state and
federal laws (including the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act),
rules, regulations, and court orders, as well as the Membership Rules of MERSCORP, Inc. and
MERS, Inc. (collectively, "MERS"), servicing guides with GSEs or investors, and other
contractual obligations including those with the Federal Housing Administration and those
required by the Home Affordable Modification Program ("HAMP"), and loss share agreements
with the FDIC (collectively, "Legal Requirements");
WHEREAS, after the conduct set forth above became known, JPMC and the Mortgage
Servicing Companies have been taking steps to remediate the filing of and reliance on inaccurate
affidavits in foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings;
WHEREAS, the boards of directors of JPMC and EMC, at duly constituted meetings,
adopted resolutions authorizing and directing Frank J. Bisignano, and Anthony J. Horan to enter
into this Consent Order to Cease and Desist (the "Order") on behalf of JPMC and EMC,
respectively, and consenting to compliance with each and every applicable provision of this
Order by JPMC and EMC, and their institution-affiliated parties, as defined in sections 3(u) and
8(b)(3) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended (the "FDI Act") (12 U.S.C. 1813(u)
and 1818(b)(3)), and waiving any and all rights that JPMC and EMC may have pursuant to
section 8 of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1818), including, but not limited to: (i) the issuance of a
notice of charges; (ii) a hearing for the purpose of taking evidence on any matters set forth in this [page break]
Page 6
Order; (iii) judicial review of this Order; (iv) contest the issuance of this Order by the Board of
Governors; and (v) challenge or contest, in any manner, the basis, issuance, validity, terms,
effectiveness or enforceability of this Order or any provision hereof.
NOW, THEREFORE, before the filing of any notices, or taking of any testimony or
adjudication of or finding on any issues of fact or law herein, and without this Order constituting
an admission by JPMC, EMC or its subsidiaries, of any allegation made or implied by the Board
of Governors in connection with this matter, and solely for the purpose of settling this matter
without a formal proceeding being filed and without the necessity for protracted or extended
hearings or testimony, it is hereby ordered by the Board of Governors that, pursuant to
sections 8(b)(1) and (3) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1818(b)(1) and 1818(b)(3)), JPMC and
EMC, and their institution-affiliated parties shall cease and desist and take affirmative action, as
follows:
Source of Strength
1. The board of directors of JPMC shall take appropriate steps to fully utilize
JPMC' s financial and managerial resources, pursuant to section 225.4(a) of Regulation Y of the
Board of Governors (12 C.F.R. 225.4(a)), to serve as a source of strength to the Bank,
including, but not limited to, taking steps to ensure that the Bank complies with the Consent
Order issued by the OCC regarding the Bank' s residential mortgage loan servicing activities.
Board Oversight
2. Within 60 days of this Order, the board of directors of JPMC shall submit to the
Reserve Bank an acceptable written plan to strengthen the board' s oversight of JPMC' s
enterprise-wide risk management ("ERM"), internal audit, and compliance programs concerning [page break]
Page 7
the residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities conducted
through the Bank. The plan shall, at a minimum, address, consider, and include:
(a) Policies to be adopted by the board of directors of JPMC that are designed
to ensure that the ERM program provides proper risk management oversight with respect to the
Bank' s residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities,
particularly with respect to compliance with the Legal Requirements, and supervisory standards
and guidance of the Board of Governors as they develop;
(b) policies and procedures adopted by JPMC to ensure that the ERM
program provides proper risk management of independent contractors, consulting firms, law
firms, or other third parties who are engaged to support residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss
Mitigation, or foreclosure activities or operations, including their compliance with the Legal
Requirements and JPMC' s internal policies and procedures, consistent with supervisory
guidance of the Board of Governors;
(c) steps to ensure that JPMC' s ERM, audit, and compliance programs have
adequate levels and types of officers and staff dedicated to overseeing the Bank' s residential
mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities, and that these programs
have officers and staff with the requisite qualifications, skills, and abilities to comply with the
requirements of this Order; and
(d) steps to improve the information and reports that will be regularly
reviewed by the board of directors of JPMC or authorized committee of the board of directors
regarding residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities and
operations, including compliance risk assessments and the status and results of measures taken, [page break]
Page 8
or to be taken, to remediate deficiencies in residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation,
and foreclosure activities, and to comply with this Order.
Foreclosure Review
3. (a) Within 45 days of this Order, JPMC and EMC shall retain one or more
independent consultant(s) acceptable to the Reserve Bank to conduct an independent review of
certain residential mortgage loan foreclosure actions (including judicial and non-judicial
foreclosures and related bankruptcy proceedings, and other related litigation) regarding
individual borrowers with respect to the Servicing Portfolio that was serviced by EMC. The
review shall include actions or proceedings (including foreclosures that were in process or
completed) for residential mortgage loans serviced by the Mortgage Servicing Companies
whether brought in the name of the JPMC, the Mortgage Servicing Companies, the investor, or
any agent for the mortgage note holder (including MERS) that have been pending at any time
from January 1, 2009, to December 31, 2010, as well as residential foreclosure sales that
occurred during this time period ("Foreclosure Review"). The purpose of the Foreclosure
Review shall be to determine, at a minimum:
(i) whether, at the time the foreclosure action was initiated or the
pleading or affidavit filed (including in bankruptcy proceedings and in defending suits brought
by borrowers), the foreclosing party or agent of the party had properly documented ownership of
the promissory note and mortgage (or deed of trust) under relevant state law, or was otherwise a
proper party to the action as a result of agency or other similar status;
(ii) whether the foreclosure was in accordance with applicable federal
and state laws, including but not limited to, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act and the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code; [page break]
Page 9
(iii) whether, with respect to non-judicial foreclosures, the procedures
followed with respect to the foreclosure sale (including the calculation of the default period, the
amounts due, and compliance with notice periods) and post-sale confirmation were in
accordance with the terms of the mortgage loan and state law requirements;
(iv) whether a foreclosure sale occurred when the borrower had
requested a loan modification or other loss mitigation and the request was under consideration,
when the loan was performing in accordance with a trial or permanent loan modification, or
when the loan had not been in default for a sufficient period to authorize foreclosure pursuant to
terms of the mortgage loan documentation and related agreements;
(v) whether any delinquent borrower' s account was charged fees or
penalties that were not permissible under the terms of the borrower' s loan documents, state or
federal law, or were otherwise unreasonable. For purposes of this Order, a fee or penalty is
"otherwise unreasonable" if it was assessed: (i) for the purpose of protecting the secured party' s
interest in the mortgaged property, and the fee or penalty was assessed at a frequency or rate,
was of a type or amount, or was for a purpose that was in fact not needed to protect the secured
party' s interest; (ii) for services performed and the fee charged was substantially in excess of the
fair market value of the service; (iii) for services performed, and the services were not actually
performed; or (iv) at an amount or rate that exceeds what was customarily charged in the market
for such a fee or penalty, and the mortgage instruments or other documents executed by the
borrower did not disclose the amount or rate that the lender or servicer would charge for such a
fee or penalty;
(vi) whether Loss Mitigation Activities with respect to foreclosed loans
were handled in accordance with the requirements of HAMP, if applicable, and consistent with [page break]
Page 10
the policies and procedures applicable to the Mortgage Servicing Companies' proprietary loan
modifications or other Loss Mitigation programs, such that each borrower had an adequate
opportunity to apply for a Loss Mitigation option or program, any such application was handled
appropriately, and a final decision was made on a reasoned basis and was communicated to the
borrower before the foreclosure sale; and
(vii) whether any errors, misrepresentations, or other deficiencies
identified in the Foreclosure Review resulted in financial injury to the borrower or the owner of
the mortgage loan.
(b) The independent consultant(s) shall prepare a written report detailing the
findings of the Foreclosure Review (the "Foreclosure Report"). JPMC and EMC shall provide to
the Reserve Bank a copy of the Foreclosure Report at the same time that the report is provided to
them.
(c) Within 30 days of receipt of the Foreclosure Report, JPMC and EMC shall
submit to the Reserve Bank an acceptable plan to:
(i) remediate, as appropriate, errors, misrepresentations, or other
deficiencies in any foreclosure filing or other proceeding;
(ii) reimburse or otherwise provide appropriate remediation to the
borrower for any impermissible or otherwise unreasonable penalties, fees or expenses, or for
other financial injury identified in paragraph 3 of this Order;
(iii) make appropriate adjustments for the account of JPMC, the GSEs,
or any investor; and
(iv) take appropriate steps to remediate any foreclosure sale where the
foreclosure was not authorized as described in paragraph 3. [page break]
Page 11
(d) Within 60 days after the Reserve Bank accepts the plan described in
paragraph 3(c), the JPMC and EMC shall make all reimbursement and remediation payments and
provide all credits required by such plan, and provide the Reserve Bank with a report detailing
such payments and credits;
(e) JPMC shall take all steps necessary to ensure that the Bank provides any
cooperation needed by the independent consultant(s) to complete the independent review.
4. Within 5 days of the engagement of the independent consultant(s) described in
paragraph 3 of this Order, but prior to the commencement of the Foreclosure Review, JPMC and
EMC shall submit to the Reserve Bank for approval an engagement letter that sets forth:
(a) The methodology for conducting the Foreclosure Review, including:
(i) a description of the information systems and documents to be reviewed, including the
selection criteria for cases to be reviewed; (ii) the criteria for evaluating the reasonableness of
fees and penalties under paragraph 3(a)(v); (iii) other procedures necessary to make the required
determinations (such as through interviews of employees and third parties and a process for the
receipt and review of borrower claims and complaints); and (iv) any proposed sampling
techniques. In setting the scope and review methodology, the independent consultant may
consider any work already done by JPMC, EMC, or other third-parties on behalf of JPMC or
EMC. With respect to sampling techniques, the engagement letter shall contain a full description
of the statistical basis for the sampling methods chosen, as well as procedures to increase the size
of the sample depending on the results of initial sampling;
(b) the expertise and resources to be dedicated to the Foreclosure Review;
(c) completion of the Foreclosure Review and the Foreclosure Report within
120 days of the start of the engagement; and [page break]
Page 12
(d) a written commitment that any workpapers associated with the
Foreclosure Review will be made available to the Reserve Bank upon request.
Compliance Program
5. Within 60 days of this Order, JPMC shall submit to the Reserve Bank an
acceptable written plan to enhance its enterprise-wide compliance program ("ECP") with respect
to its oversight of residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities
and operations. The enhanced plan shall be based on an evaluation of the effectiveness of
JPMC' s current ECP in the areas of residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and
foreclosure activities and operations, and recommendations to strengthen the ECP in these areas.
The plan shall, at a minimum, be designed to:
(a) Ensure that the fundamental elements of the ECP and any enhancements
or revisions thereto, including a comprehensive annual risk assessment, encompass residential
mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities;
(b) ensure compliance with the Legal Requirements and supervisory guidance
of the Board of Governors; and
(c) ensure that policies, procedures, and processes are updated on an ongoing
basis as necessary to incorporate new or changes to the Legal Requirements and supervisory
guidance of the Board of Governors.
Audit
acceptable written plan to enhance the internal audit program with respect to residential
mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities and operations. The plan
shall be based on an evaluation of the effectiveness of JPMC' s current internal audit program in [page break]
Page 13
the areas of residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities and
operations, and shall include recommendations to strengthen the internal audit program in these
areas. The plan shall, at a minimum, be designed to:
(a) Ensure that the internal audit program encompasses residential mortgage
loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities;
(b) periodically review the effectiveness of the ECP and ERM with respect to
residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities, and compliance
with the Legal Requirements and supervisory guidance of the Board of Governors;
(c) ensure that adequate qualified staffing of the audit function is provided for
(d) ensure timely resolution of audit findings and follow-up reviews to ensure
completion and effectiveness of corrective measures;
(e) ensure that comprehensive documentation, tracking, and reporting of the
status and resolution of audit findings are submitted to the audit committee; and
(f) establish escalation procedures for resolving any differences of opinion
between audit staff and management concerning audit exceptions and recommendations, with
any disputes to be resolved by the audit committee.
Risk Management
acceptable written plan to enhance its ERM program with respect to its oversight of residential
mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities and operations. The
enhanced plan shall be based on an evaluation of the effectiveness of JPMC' s current ERM
program in the areas of residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure [page break]
Page 14
activities and operations, and recommendations to strengthen the risk management program in
these areas. The plan shall, at a minimum, be designed to:
(a) Ensure that the fundamental elements of the risk management program
and any enhancements or revisions thereto, including a comprehensive annual risk assessment,
encompass residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities;
(b) ensure that the risk management program complies with supervisory
guidance of the Board of Governors, including, but not limited to, the guidance entitled,
"Compliance Risk Management Programs and Oversight at Large Banking Organizations with
Complex Compliance Profiles," dated October 16, 2008 (SR 08-08/CA 08-11); and
(c) establish limits for compliance, legal, and reputational risks and provide
for regular review of risk limits by appropriate senior management and the board of directors or
authorized committee of the board of directors.
Approval, Implementation, and Progress Reports
8. (a) JPMC and EMC, as applicable, shall submit written plans and an
engagement letter that are acceptable to the Reserve Bank within the applicable time periods set
forth in paragraphs 2, 3(c), 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this Order. Independent consultant(s) acceptable to
the Reserve Bank shall be retained by JPMC and EMC within the applicable period set forth in
paragraph 3(a) of this Order.
(b) Within 10 days of approval by the Reserve Bank, JPMC and EMC, as
applicable, shall adopt the approved plans. Upon adoption, JPMC and EMC, as applicable, shall
implement the approved plans, and thereafter fully comply with them.
(c) During the term of this Order, the approved plans and engagement letter
shall not be amended or rescinded without the prior written approval of the Reserve Bank. [page break]
Page 15
(d) During the term of this Order, JPMC and EMC, as applicable, shall revise
the approved plans as necessary to incorporate new or changes to the Legal Requirements and
supervisory guidance of the Board of Governors. The revised plans shall be submitted to the
Reserve Bank for approval at the same time as the progress reports described in paragraph 9 of
this Order.
9. Within 30 days after the end of each calendar quarter following the date of this
Order, JPMC' s and EMC' s boards of directors shall jointly submit to the Reserve Bank written
progress reports detailing the form and manner of all actions taken to secure compliance with the
provisions of this Order and the results thereof. The Reserve Bank may, in writing, discontinue
the requirement for progress reports or modify the reporting schedule.
Notices
10. All communications regarding this Order shall be sent to:
(a) Ms. Barbara Yelcich
Assistant Vice President
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
33 Liberty Street
New York, New York 10045
(b) Mr. David Lowman
Chief Executive Office
Chase Home Lending
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
194 Wood Avenue South
Iselin, New Jersey 08830
(c) Mr. Anthony J. Horan
Senior Vice President and Assistant Secretary
EMC Mortgage Corporation
270 Park Avenue, 38
th
Floor
New York, New York 10017 [page break]
Page 16
Miscellaneous
11. The provisions of this Order shall be binding on JPMC, EMC and each of their
institution-affiliated parties in their capacities as such, and their successors and assigns.
12. Each provision of this Order shall remain effective and enforceable until stayed,
modified, terminated, or suspended in writing by the Reserve Bank.
13. Notwithstanding any provision of this Order, the Reserve Bank may, in its sole
discretion, grant written extensions of time to JPMC and EMC to comply with any provision of
this Order.
14. The provisions of this Order shall not bar, estop, or otherwise prevent the Board
of Governors, the Reserve Bank, or any other federal or state agency or department from taking
any further or other action affecting JPMC, EMC, or any of their current or former institution-
affiliated parties or their successors or assigns, or any other of JPMC' s subsidiaries. [page break]
Page 17
15. Nothing in this Order, express or implied, shall give to any person or entity, other
than the parties hereto, and their successors hereunder, any benefit or any legal or equitable right,
remedy, or claim under this Order.
By Order of the Board of Governors effective this 13
th
day of April, 2011.
Signed by: Frank J. Bisignano
Chief Administrative Officer
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
Signed by: Jennifer J. Johnson
Secretary of the Board
Signed by: Anthony J. Horan
Senior Vice President
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Dar yoush Javaher i v. JP Mor gan Chase Bank
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Pl ai nt i f f : Daryoush Javaheri
Def endant s: California Reconveyance Co., DOES and JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A.

Case Number : 2: 2010cv08185
Fi l ed: Oct ober 29, 2010

Cour t : California Cent ral Dist rict Court
i i ,: Ot is D Wright
Ref er r i ng Judge: Frederick F. Mumm

Nat ur e of Sui t : Ot her - Ot her

Avai l abl e Case Document s
The following document s for t his case are available for you t o view or download.
Dat e Fi l ed # Document Text
June 2, 2011 36 MI NUTES (I N CHAMBERS): ORDER Grant ing in part and Denying in part
Defendant 's Mot ion t o Dismiss Plaint iff's Second Amended Complaint 30 (Filed
4/ 28/ 11} by Judge Ot is D Wright I I . For t he foregoing reasons, Defendant s Mot ion t o
Dismiss is GRANTED in Part and DENI ED in Part . (See Order for Det ails). (sch)
March 24, 2011 28 MI NUTES (I N CHAMBERS) by Judge Ot is D Wright , I I : grant ing 23 Defendant ,
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Mot ion t o Dismiss plaint iffs first amended complaint .
Plaint iff shall have t went y (20) days from t he dat e of t his Order in which t o amend
his Complaint , provided t hat he can, in good fait h, allege sufficient fact s t o support
his claims. I f Plaint iff fails t o do so, all claims against WaMu will be dismissed wit h
prej udice. (lc)
January 11, 2011 20 MI NUTES (I N CHAMBERS) by Judge Ot is D Wright , I I : Court grant s Defendant s,
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and California Reconveyance Companys Mot ion t o
dismiss complaint { 9] .Plaint iff shall have t went y (20) days from t he dat e of t his Order
t o amend his Complaint . I f Plaint iff fails t o do so, all claims will be dismissed wit h
prej udice. (lc)
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Pl ai nt i f f : Dar yoush Javaher i
Represent ed By: Douglas Crawford Gillies
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Def endant : Cal i f or ni a Reconveyance Co.
Represent ed By: Theodore E Bacon
Def endant : DOES
Def endant : JP Mor gan Chase Bank N.A.
Represent ed By: Theodore E Bacon
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA (Western Division - Los Angeles)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:10-cv-08185-ODW -FFM

Daryoush Javaheri v. JP Morgan Chase Bank
N.A. et al
Assigned to: Judge Otis D Wright, II
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Frederick F.
Mumm
Demand: $5,000,000
Related Case: 2:11-cv-10072-ODW-FFM
Cause: 28:1331 Fed. Question

Date Filed: 10/29/2010
Jury Demand: Plaintiff
Nature of Suit: 220 Real
Property: Foreclosure
Jurisdiction: Federal Question
Plaintiff
Daryoush Javaheri represented by Douglas Crawford Gillies
Douglas Gillies
3756 Torino Drive
Santa Barbara, CA 93105
805-682-7033
Email:
douglasgillies@gmail.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.

Defendant
JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. represented by Frances Q Jett
AlvaradoSmith APC
633 West 5th Street Suite
1100
Los Angeles, CA 90071
213-229-2400
Fax: 213-229-2499
Email:
fjett@alvaradosmith.com

Theodore E Bacon
AlvaradoSmith APC
633 West Fifth Street Suite
1100
Los Angeles, CA 90071
213-229-2400
Fax: 213-229-2499
Email:
tbacon@AlvaradoSmith.com

Defendant
California Reconveyance Co.
TERMINATED: 01/29/2011
represented by Frances Q Jett
(See above for address)

Theodore E Bacon
(See above for address)

Defendant
DOES
1-150, inclusive

Date Filed # Docket Text
10/29/2010 1 COMPLAINT against Defendants California Reconveyance
Co., DOES, JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. Case assigned to
Judge Otis D Wright, II for all further proceedings. Discovery
referred to Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm.(Filing fee $
350 PAID) Jury Demanded, filed by plaintiff Daryoush
Javaheri.(car) (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/3/2010:
# 1 Ntc of Asgmt, # 2 Summons, # 3 Civil Cover Sheet) (mg).
(Entered: 10/29/2010)
10/29/2010 21 DAY Summons Issued re Complaint - (Discovery) 1 as to
Defendants California Reconveyance Co., DOES 1-150,
inclusive, JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. (car) (Entered:
10/29/2010)
10/29/2010 2 CERTIFICATION AND NOTICE of Interested Parties filed by
Plaintiff Daryoush Javaheri, identifying Other Affiliate Bank of
America, Other Affiliate Washington Mutual Bank for
Daryoush Javaheri. (car) (mg). (Entered: 10/29/2010)
10/29/2010 3 PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE APPLICATION for Temporary
Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary
Injunction - Immediate Relief Sought, filed by plaintiff
Daryoush Javaheri. Lodged Proposed Order.(car) (Additional
attachment(s) added on 11/2/2010: # 1 Proposed Order)
(mg). (Entered: 10/29/2010)
10/29/2010 4 PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES In Support of Ex Parte Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re:
Preliminary Injunction 3 to Prevent Foreclosure, filed by
Plaintiff Daryoush Javaheri. (car) (mg). (Entered: 10/29/2010)
10/29/2010 5 CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH EFFORT of Douglas Gillies
In Support of EX PARTE APPLICATION for Temporary
Restraining Order EX PARTE APPLICATION for Order to
Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction 3 filed by Plaintiff
Daryoush Javaheri. (car) (mg). (Entered: 10/29/2010)
10/29/2010 6 ORDER by Judge Otis D Wright, II: denying 3 defendants Ex
Parte Application for temporary restraining order. (lc)
(Entered: 11/02/2010)
11/03/2010 7 STANDING ORDER by Judge Otis D Wright, II, (sce)
(Entered: 11/03/2010)
11/03/2010 8 NOTICE of Lis Pendens filed by Plaintiff Daryoush Javaheri.
(Gillies, Douglas) (Entered: 11/03/2010)
11/22/2010 9 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case {as to
Plaintiff's Complaint} filed by defendants California
Reconveyance Co., JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A.. Motion set
for hearing on 12/27/2010 at 01:30 PM before Judge Otis D
Wright II. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Jett, Frances)
(Entered: 11/22/2010)
11/22/2010 10 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE filed by defendants
California Reconveyance Co., JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A..
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 and 2)(Jett, Frances) (Entered:
11/22/2010)
11/23/2010 11 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed
Documents. The following error(s) was found: Local Rule 7.1-
1 No Certification of Interested Parties. In response to this
notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct
document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take
other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not
take any action in response to this notice unless and until the
court directs you to do so. (lc) (Entered: 11/23/2010)
12/07/2010 12 Joint STIPULATION to Continue Hearing on Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss from 12/27/2010 to 1/10/2011 filed by
Defendant California Reconveyance Co., JP Morgan Chase
Bank N.A.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order re Stipulation
to Continue Hearing on Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss)(Bacon, Theodore) (Entered: 12/07/2010)
12/13/2010 13 ORDER Re Stipulation to Continue Hearing on Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss 12 by Judge Otis D Wright II. It is hereby
ordered that the hearing on Defendants Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs Complaint 9 is continued from December 27, 2010 to
January 10, 2011 at 1:30 p.m. Opposition and reply papers
will be due in the above court per local rule 7-9. (sch)
(Entered: 12/14/2010)
12/18/2010 14 MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Plaintiff Daryoush
Javaheri. (Gillies, Douglas) (Entered: 12/18/2010)
12/19/2010 15 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Exhibit 4 filed by Plaintiff
Daryoush Javaheri. (Gillies, Douglas) (Entered: 12/19/2010)
12/23/2010 18 REPLY in support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint (cont'd for
hrg to 01/10/2011} filed by Defendants California
Reconveyance Co., JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A.. (Jett,
Frances) (Entered: 12/23/2010)
01/03/2011 22 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT against defendants
Daryoush Javaheri amending Complaint - (Discovery) 1 Jury
demand,filed by plaintiff Daryoush Javaheri (lc) (Additional
attachment(s) added on 2/2/2011: # 1 exhibits) (lc). (Entered:
02/01/2011)
01/06/2011 19 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Judge Otis D Wright, II:
The hearing on the above-referenced motion, scheduled for
January 10, 2011 at 1:30 p.m., is hereby VACATED. The
matter stands submitted. An order will issue. (rne) (Entered:
01/06/2011)
01/11/2011 20 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge Otis D Wright, II: Court
grants Defendants, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and
California Reconveyance Companys Motion to dismiss
complaint {9].Plaintiff shall have twenty (20) days from the
date of this Order to amend his Complaint. If Plaintiff fails to
do so, all claims will be dismissed with prejudice. (lc)
(Entered: 01/12/2011)
01/29/2011 21 REQUEST to Dismiss defendant California Reconveyance
Co. filed by Plaintiff Daryoush Javaheri. (Gillies, Douglas)
(Entered: 01/29/2011)
02/17/2011 23 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss
Case {Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint} filed by defendant
JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A.. Motion set for hearing on
3/21/2011 at 01:30 PM before Judge Otis D Wright II.
(Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Jett, Frances) (Entered:
02/17/2011)
02/17/2011 24 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE (in support of Motion to
Dismiss First Amended Complaint) filed by defendant JP
Morgan Chase Bank N.A.. (Jett, Frances) (Entered:
02/17/2011)
02/28/2011 25 MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Plaintiff Daryoush
Javaheri. (Gillies, Douglas) (Entered: 02/28/2011)
03/07/2011 26 REPLY in Support of JPMorgan's Motion to Dismiss First
Amended Complaint filed by Defendant JP Morgan Chase
Bank N.A.. (Jett, Frances) (Entered: 03/07/2011)
03/15/2011 27 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Judge Otis D Wright, II:
Vacating Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
First Amended Complaint 23 (Filed 2/17/11). The hearing on
the above-referenced motion, scheduled for March 21, 2011
at 1:30 p.m., is hereby VACATED. The matter stands
submitted. An order will issue. (rne) (Entered: 03/15/2011)
03/24/2011 28 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge Otis D Wright, II:
granting 23 Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Motion
to Dismiss plaintiffs first amended complaint. Plaintiff shall
have twenty (20) days from the date of this Order in which to
amend his Complaint, provided that he can, in good faith,
allege sufficient facts to support his claims. If Plaintiff fails to
do so, all claims against WaMu will be dismissed with
prejudice. (lc) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
04/12/2011 29 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT against defendants
DOES 1-50, JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. amending First
Amended Complaint 22 ;Jury Demand filed by plaintiff
Daryoush Javaheri (lc) (lc). (Entered: 04/13/2011)
04/28/2011 30 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss
Case (Second Amended Complaint) filed by defendant JP
Morgan Chase Bank N.A.. Motion set for hearing on 6/6/2011
at 01:30 PM before Judge Otis D Wright II. (Attachments:
# 1 Proposed Order)(Jett, Frances) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
04/28/2011 31 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE re MOTION to Dismiss
Case (Second Amended Complaint) MOTION to Dismiss
Case (Second Amended Complaint) 30 filed by defendant JP
Morgan Chase Bank N.A.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A -
C)(Jett, Frances) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
05/16/2011 32 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to MOTION to Dismiss
Case (Second Amended Complaint) 30 filed by Plaintiff
05/16/2011 33 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE re MOTION to Dismiss
Case (Second Amended Complaint) 30 filed by Plaintiff
05/23/2011 34 REPLY in support MOTION to Dismiss Case (Second
Amended Complaint) MOTION to Dismiss Case (Second
Amended Complaint) 30 filed by Defendant JP Morgan Chase
Bank N.A.. (Jett, Frances) (Entered: 05/23/2011)
05/31/2011 35 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER Vacating Motion to
Dismiss Case 30 by Judge Otis D Wright II. The hearing on
the above-referenced motion, scheduled for June 6, 2011 at
1:30 p.m. is hereby VACATED. The matter stands submitted.
An order will issue. (sch) (Entered: 05/31/2011)
06/02/2011 36 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER Granting in part and
Denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint 30 (Filed 4/28/11} by Judge Otis
D Wright II. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED in Part and DENIED in Part. (See
Order for Details). (sch) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
06/28/2011 37 ANSWER to Amended Complaint 29 SECOND filed by
defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A..(Jett, Frances)
(Entered: 06/28/2011)
06/29/2011 38 ORDER setting Scheduling Conference set for 9/12/2011 at
01:30 PM; compliance with FRCP 26(f) and filing of report
and other instructions. Counsel for plaintiff shall immediately
serve this Order on all parties, including any new parties to
the action by Judge Otis D Wright II. (sch) (Entered:
06/29/2011)
Documents RE: Answer to Complaint 37 . The following
error(s) was found: Local Rule 7.1-1 No Certification of
Interested Parties. In response to this notice the court may
order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the
document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems
appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this
notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (sch)
(Entered: 06/29/2011)
07/14/2011 40 Certification and Notice of Interested Parties filed by
defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., identifying JPMorgan
and California Reconveyance Co.. (Bacon, Theodore)
(Entered: 07/14/2011)
08/29/2011 41 JOINT REPORT of [FRCP 26(f)] filed by Defendant JP
Morgan Chase Bank N.A.. (Bacon, Theodore) (Entered:
08/29/2011)
Documents RE: Report 41 . The following error(s) was found:
Incorrect event selected. The correct event is: Joint Rule 26(f)
Discovery Plan. In response to this notice the court may order
(1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the
document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems
appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this
notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (lc)
(Entered: 08/30/2011)
08/30/2011 43 MINUTE OF (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER Vacating Scheduling
Conference by Judge Otis D Wright II. The Court is in receipt
of the parties' Joint Rule 26(f) Report. The Court has reviewed
the report and deems a scheduling conference unnecessary.
Accordingly, the scheduling conference presently set for
September 12, 2011 at 1:30 p.m., is hereby VACATED, and
no appearances are necessary. A Scheduling and Case
Management Order will issue. (sch) (Entered: 08/30/2011)
08/30/2011 44 ORDER by Judge Otis D Wright, II: Granted the NOTICE
AND REQUEST of Settlement Procedure Selection (Sp2). For
Settlement Procedure No. 2, counsel are responsible for
contacting the settlement officer at the appropriate time to
arrange for further proceedings. Upon obtaining the
settlement officer's consent to serve, counsel shall file Form
ADR-02 (Stipulation Regarding Selection of Attorney
Settlement Officer) with the court. (lom) (Entered: 08/31/2011)
08/30/2011 45 SCHEDULING AND CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER by
Judge Otis D Wright, II, The Court has implemented the
parties' suggested dates with only minor adjustments. If
counsel fail to file the required Pre-Trial documents or fail to
appear at the Pre-Trial conference and such failure is not
otherwise satisfactorily explained to the Court: (a) the cause
shall stand dismissed for failure to prosecute. Jury Trial set for
9/18/2012 09:00 a.m.; File Final pretrial exhibit stipulation by
09/13/2012; Hearings on Motions in Limine on 09/10/2012 at
3:00 p.m.;Final Pretrial Conference set for 8/27/2012 03:00
p.m. Last day to conduct Settlement Conference 07/23/2012;
Last day for hearing Motions 07/30/2012; Discovery cut-off
6/18/2012; Last day to amend pleadings or add parties due by
12/5/2011. (See document for details) (ys) (Entered:
08/31/2011)

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Case 2:10-cv-08185-ODW -FFM Document 29 Filed 04/12/11 Page 1 of 101 Page ID
#:560

1 DOUGLAS GILLIES, ESQ. (CA 53602)
2 douglasgillies@gmail.com
3756 Torino Drive
3 Santa Barbara, CA 93105
4 (805) 682-7033
5 Attorney for Plaintiff
6 DARYOUSHJAVAHERI
7
"--0 ----;-;ri
l
:7rED;-----,
rill!K, us, DISTRICT COURT
APR' 22011
~ ~ N T R A l DISTlllCT or CALIfORNIA
. '" DEPUTY
8
9
10
11 DARYOUSH JAV AHERI,
12
Plaintiff,
13 v.
14 JP MORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.,
15 and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
16
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25
26
27
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Defendants.
Second Amended Complaint
- 1 -
) No. CV10 8185 ODW (FFMx)
) SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
) 1) Violation of Cal Civ. Code 2923.5
) 2) Wrongful Foreclosure
) 3) Quasi Contract
) 4) No Contract
) 5) Quiet Title
) 6) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
) 7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional
) Distress
)
) Jury Trial Demanded

Second Amended Complaint - 2 -

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INDEX
INTRODUCTION 3
PARTIESANDJURISDICTION 4
JURYTRIALDEMAND 5
CLAIMFORRELIEF 5
BACKGROUNDFACTS 5
FIRSTCAUSEOFACTIONVIOLATIONOFCALCIVCODE2923.5 7
SECONDCAUSEOFACTIONWRONGFULFORECLOSURE 10
THIRDCAUSEOFACTIONQUASICONTRACT 14
FOURTHCAUSEOFACTION-NOCONTRACT 15
FIFTHCAUSEOFACTION-QUIETTITLE 18
SIXTHCAUSEOFACTION-DECLARATORY&INJUNCTIVERELIEF 19
SEVENTHCAUSEOFACTION-INTENTIONALINFLICTIONOFEMOTIONALDISTRESS 21
PRAYER 22
VERIFICATION 23
PLAINTIFF'SEXHIBITS 24
#:561


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INTRODUCTION
1. During the past decade, Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu) and JPMorgan
Chase Bank (Chase) abandoned traditional underwriting practices and contributed
to a frenzy of real estate speculation by issuing predatory loans that ultimately
lowered property values in the United States by 30-60%. Kerry Killinger, CEO of
Washington Mutual, took home more than $100 million during the seven years he
steered WaMu into bankruptcy. In March 2011, the FDIC filed a sixty-page
complaint against Killinger and Stephen Rotella, a former WaMU COO, alleging
gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent conveyance. FDIC v.
Kerry Killinger, Stephen Rotella, et. al., Case No. 2:11-cv-00459 USDC (WD WA
Mar. 16, 2011) .
2. WaMu issued millions of predatory loans between 2001 and 2008 with the
knowledge that borrowers, including Plaintiff, would default and lose their homes.
WaMu filled in fictitious figures on Plaintiff's loan application so that it would
meet underwriting standards and WaMu could earn fees when it sold the loan to
investors and then acted as serviver without any risk of loss when the borrower
defaulted. Such blatant, systematic, and inexcusable acts of fraud constituted a
criminal enterprise. As a direct, foreseeable result of WaMu's illegal behavior, over
a million families will lose their homes if the courts do not intervene and permit
the borrowers to conduct discovery in order to determine who owns their loans.
3. Plaintiff DARYOUSH JAVAHERI is facing illegal foreclosure of his
home at a Trustee's Sale, currently scheduled for April 26, 2011. The loan
application he submitted to Washington Mutual, attached as Exhibit 1, shows that
his loan application consisted only of his name and address and three account
numbers. The rest of the application was filled in by unknown employees of
WaMu on or about September 8, 2006, to meet underwriting standards so that
WaMu would collect fees when it sold the loan to unsuspecting investors in
mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations.
#:562


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PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
4. Plaintiff DARYOUSH JAVAHERI is the owner of the single-family
residence located at 10809 Wellworth Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90024,
APN 4325-005-014 (the Wellworth Property). He acquired it by a Grant Deed
recorded on December 11, 2006. The legal description is:
Lot 8 in Block 31 of Tract No 7803 in the City of Los Angeles, County of
Los Angeles, State of California, as per map recorded in Book 88, Pages 73
to 75 inclusive of Maps, in the Office of the County Recorder of said
County.
5. Defendant JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
(Chase), a New York corporation licensed to do business in California, claims to
be a note holder, beneficiary, or servicer for investment trusts of a Note secured by
the Wellworth Property.
6. Defendants Does 1-50, inclusive, are sued under fictitious names. When
their true names and capacities are known, Plaintiff will amend this Complaint and
insert their names and capacities. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon
alleges that each of these fictitiously named defendants is legally responsible,
negligently or in some other actionable manner, for the events and happenings
hereinafter referred to and proximately thereby caused the injuries and damages to
plaintiff as hereinafter alleged, or claims some right, title, estate, lien, or interest in
the residence adverse to Plaintiffs title and their claims constitute a cloud on
Plaintiffs title to the property, or participated in unlawful or fraudulent acts that
resulted in injury to Plaintiff's person or property. Upon information and belief,
Does 1-30 claim to have become successors in interest to the Subject Mortgage by
virtue of Plaintiff's loan having been made a part of a securitization process
wherein certain residential mortgages and the promissory notes based thereon were
securitized by aggregating a large number of promissory notes into a mortgage
loan pool, then selling security interests in that pool of mortgages to investors by
#:563
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way of items called Secondary Vehicles.
7. There is diversity of citizenship between Plaintiff and Defendant Chase,
and the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of
$75,000. This court has jurisdiction of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332(a).
Declaratory relief is authorized under 28 U.S.C. 2210.

JURY TRIAL DEMAND
8. Plaintiff demands a jury trial on all issues.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF
9. Plaintiff brings this action against JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA ("Chase")
and Does 1 through 50 for attempting to sell Plaintiff's Wellworth Property at a
trustee's sale and deprive Plaintiff of his residence without a lawful claim to the
Property. Plaintiff seeks to clear his title of Chase's claim.

BACKGROUND FACTS
10. Plaintiff is the owner of the Wellworth Property under the terms of a
Grant Deed executed by Helene Caron in favor of Daryoush Javaheri dated
October 19, 2006 (Exhibit 1).
11. To finance his purchase of the Wellworth Property, Plaintiff submitted a
loan application to Washington Mutual Bank ("WaMu") on September 8, 2006. A
copy of Plaintiff's Uniform Residential Loan Application, furnished to him by
WaMu with instructions to leave virtually all of the items blank, is attached hereto
as Exhibit 2.
12. Plaintiff purportedly signed an Adjustable Rate Note (Exhibit 3)
(hereinafter "Note") and a Deed of Trust (Exhibit 4) on November 14, 2006, at
Chicago Title Company. He was not given an opportunity to review the
documents, other than to quickly initial or sign some pages. After he signed, a
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Chicago Title Company employee informed Plaintiff that WaMu would forward
the final documents to him. Plaintiff did not receive any documents from Chicago
Title or WaMu.
13. Plaintiff is named as Borrower on the Note and on the Deed of Trust
dated November 14, 2007 ("DOT"). Washington Mutual Bank, FA is identified on
the DOT as "Lender" as well as "the beneficiary under this security agreement."
Chicago Title Company is named as Trustee.
14. Plaintiff is informed and believes that between November 15 and
November 30, 2007, WaMu transferred Plaintiff's Note to Washington Mutual
Mortgage Securities Corporation. The Note was then sold to an investment trust
and became a part of, or was subject to, a Loan Pool, a Pooling and Servicing
Agreement, a Collateralized Debt Obligation, a Mortgage-Backed Security, a
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate, a Credit Default Swap, an Investment Trust,
and/or a Special Purpose Vehicle. The security is identified as Standard & Poor
CUSIP # 31379XQC2, Pool Number 432551. Thereafter, WaMu acted solely as a
servicer of the loan, and was neither Lender nor Beneficiary after November 2007.
15. CHASE claims to be the note holder, lender, beneficiary, and servicer
for investment trusts of the Subject Mortgage. Chase has not recorded its claim of
ownership of the purported mortgage.
16. Plaintiff is informed and believes that California Reconveyance
Company (CRC) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Chase.
17. On August 16, 2010, CRC recorded a Notice of Trustee's Sale ("NOTS")
stating that the Wellworth Property would be sold at public auction on September
7, 2010. The NOTS bears the purported signature of Deborah Brignac, Vice
President of California Reconveyance Company, as Trustee. The NOTS included
an unsigned "declaration" pursuant to Cal. Civil Code Section 2923.54 bearing the
name of Ann Thorn, First Vice President, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National
Association. Chase is identified as a servicer on the NOTS.
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF CAL CIV CODE 2923.5
18. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 17.
19. On or about March 22, 2010, Chase Home Finance LLC in Jacksonville
FL mailed to Plaintiff a Notice of Collection Activity, attached hereto as Exhibit 5,
stating that Plaintiff had not made his monthly payments since November 2009. It
stated, "You may cure this default within thirty (30) days from date of letter" (sic)
and "your home loan may be eligible for a loan modification program."
20. Within 30 days, Plaintiff's lawyer, Fariba Banayan, faxed a letter to
Chase offices in Jacksonville FL, Columbus OH, and Glendale CO requesting the
bank's assistance to rectify the account. It stated, in part, "This office has been
retained to represent Daryoush Javaheri in reference to the above stated loan. All
future communications with Mr. Javaheri in this regard should be conducted
through this office. Please provide my client with the alternatives available to
him at this time regarding this loan." The letter is attached as Exhibit 6. Chase did
not respond to Mr. Banayan's timely request for assistance.
21. California Civil Code 2923.5 provides that a borrower may designate
an attorney to discuss options with the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent,
on the borrower's behalf, to avoid foreclosure. 2923.5 (a) states:
(1) A mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent may not file a
notice of default pursuant to Section 2924 until 30 days after contact is
made as required by paragraph (2) or 30 days after satisfying the due
diligence requirements as described in subdivision (g).
(2) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall contact the
borrower in person or by telephone in order to assess the borrower's
financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid
foreclosure. During the initial contact, the mortgagee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent shall advise the borrower that he or she has the right to
request a subsequent meeting and, if requested, the mortgagee, beneficiary,
or authorized agent shall schedule the meeting to occur within 14 days. The
assessment of the borrower's financial situation and discussion of options
may occur during the first contact, or at the subsequent meeting scheduled
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for that purpose. In either case, the borrower shall be provided the toll-free
telephone number made available by the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing
counseling agency. Any meeting may occur telephonically.

22. Chase did not contact Plaintiff or Mr. Banayan, either in person or by
telephone, to discuss Plaintiff's financial condition and the impending foreclosure.
Chase did not call, it did not write, and it did not provide a toll-free HUD number
to Plaintiff or his lawyer. Chase did not offer to meet with Plaintiff or his lawyer
and did not advise them that Plaintiff had a right to request a subsequent meeting
within 14 days.
23. California Civil Code 2923.5(g) states that a notice of default may be
filed pursuant to 2924 when a mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has
not contacted a borrower provided that the failure to contact the borrower occurred
despite the due diligence of the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent. Due
diligence is defined in (g) as:
(1) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall first attempt to
contact a borrower by sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free
telephone number made available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing
counseling agency.
(2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgagee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent shall attempt to contact the borrower by telephone at least
three times at different hours and on different days. Telephone calls shall be
made to the primary telephone number on file.
(B) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent may attempt to
contact a borrower using an automated system to dial borrowers, provided
that, if the telephone call is answered, the call is connected to a live
representative of the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent.
(C) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent satisfies the
telephone contact requirements of this paragraph if it determines, after
attempting contact pursuant to this paragraph, that the borrower's primary
telephone number and secondary telephone number or numbers on file, if
any, have been disconnected.
(3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the
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telephone call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the
mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall then send a certified letter,
with return receipt requested.
(4) The mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall provide a
means for the borrower to contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free
telephone number that will provide access to a live representative during
business hours.
(5) The mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has posted a
prominent link on the homepage of its Internet Web site, if any, to the
following information:
(A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to
afford their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and
instructions to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore those
options.
(B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be
prepared to present to the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent when
discussing options for avoiding foreclosure.
(C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss
options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgagee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent.
(D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

24. Chase did none of the above. Chase Fulfillment Center sent Plaintiff a
"Request Disqualification" on September 1, 2010, attached as Exhibit 7. It said,
"Unfortunately, because your initial request was less than seven (7) business days
from the date of the scheduled foreclosure sale on your home, you are no longer
eligible under Making Home Affordable ("MHA") Program guidelines." A second
copy was sent on September 7.
25. Chase and CRC recorded a Notice of Default against the Wellworth
Property in the Los Angeles County Recorder's Office on May 14, 2010 (Exhibit
9). Attached to the NOD was a Declaration of Compliance with Cal. Civil Code
2923.5 certified under penalty of perjury by Renee Daniels on behalf of Chase.
She checked off a box that read, "The mortgagee, beneficiary or authorized agent
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tried with due diligence but was unable to contact the borrower to discuss the
borrower's financial situation and to explore options for the borrower to avoid
foreclosure as required by Cal. Civ. Code Section 2923.5. Thirty days or more
have elapsed since these due diligence efforts were completed."
26. Renee Daniels either misrepresented the facts, if and when she signed
the declaration, or she did not have personal knowledge of the matters described in
her declaration when she asserted that Chase attempted to contact Plaintiff as
required by 2923.5. Since the contacts required by 2923.5 did not occur, the
foreclosure is illegal.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE
28. Soon after WaMu originated the loan, Plaintiff is informed and believes
that WaMu transferred all beneficial interest in the loan to a private investor.
29. Neither WaMu, Chicago Title, CRC, nor Chase has recorded a transfer
of beneficial interest in the Note to Chase.
30. Chase does not have standing to enforce the Note because Chase is not
the owner of the Note, Chase is not a holder of the Note, and Chase is not a
beneficiary under the Note. Chase does not claim to be a holder of the Note or a
beneficiary. Chase describes itself as a loan servicer in the Notice of Trustee's Sale.
If Chase can prove that it is a servicer, Chase cannot foreclose on Plaintiff's
property without authorization from the Lender under the terms of the Deed of
Trust.
31. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Chase cannot produce an original
Note. Chase does not own the loan and cannot identify the owner of the loan.
Chase did not purchase the loan when it took over WaMu in September 2008
because WaMu had sold its beneficial interest in the loan two years earlier.
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32. A power of sale is conferred by the mortgage under Cal. Civ. Code
2924. The Adjustable Rate Note attached as Exhibit 3 states, "Lender or anyone
who takes this Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under this
Note is called the "Note Holder." The Note states in paragraph 7(C): "Notice of
Default. If I am in default, the Note Holder may send me a written notice telling
me that if I do not pay the overdue amount by a certain date, the Note Holder may
require me to pay immediately the full amount." The Note gives the right to
collect, if timely payments are not made, to the Lender and anyone who takes the
Note by transfer. This does not include a servicer who is not the Note Holder.
33. According to Plaintiff's Deed of Trust, the "Lender" is WASHINGTON
MUTUAL BANK, FA, and the "Trustee" is Chicago Title Company.
Consistent with the language of the Note, only the Lender is authorized
under paragraph 22 of the DOT to accelerate the loan:
"Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration
following Borrower's breach of any covenant of agreement in this
Security Instrument
"If Lender invokes the power of sale, Lender shall execute or
cause Trustee to execute a written notice of the occurrence of an event
of default and of Lender's election to cause the Property to be sold.
Trustee shall cause this notice to be recorded in each county in which
any part of the Property is located." (DOT page 13, paragraph 22).
34. Washington Mutual Bank remained the Lender for no more than a few
days until it sold the loan. Thereafter, it was a servicer of the loan. The Note
Holder or Lender was the Investment Trust or that funded the loan.
35. Paragraph 24 of the DOT (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) states:
24. Substitute Trustee. Lender, at its option, may from time to time
appoint a successor trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder by an
instrument executed and acknowledged by Lender and recorded in the
office of the Recorder of the county in which the property is located.
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The instrument shall contain the name of the original Lender, Trustee
and Borrower, the book and page where this Security Instrument is
recorded and the name and address of the successor trustee. Without
reconveyance of the property, the successor trustee shall succeed to all
the title, powers and duties conferred upon the Trustee herein and by
Applicable Law. This procedure for substitution of trustee shall govern
to the exclusion of all other provisions for substitution.
Chase seeks to proceed with foreclosure of Plaintiff's property even though
it cannot identify the Lender and therefore is incapable of substituting the Trustee.
36. On May 3, 2010, eRC recorded a Substitution of Trustee (Exhibit 8)
signed by Deborah Brignac, Vice President of JPMorgan Chase Bank. The
signature of Deborah Brignac on the Substitution of Trustee does not resemble the
signature of Deborah Brignac, Vice President of California Reconveyance
Company on the Notice of Trustee's Sale (Exhibit 10). It is a forgery.
37. The Substitution of Trustee purports to substitute CRC as Trustee in
14 place of Chicago Title. Brignac's forged signature is acknowledged by Loren
15 Lopez, a California Notary Public. It is not remotely similar to the Deborah
16 Brignac signatures appearing on the recorded documents attached hereto as
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Exhibits 11, 12, 13, and 14.
Association successor in interest to Wasbington Mutual Bank, FA
Deborah Brignac, Vice Pt t
I I
/
STATE OF CAUFORNtA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Substitution of Trustee,
08-16-2010

Exhibit 8 - recorded on May 3, 2010)
. .. .
SEE EXHIBIT
CALIFORNIA RECONVEYANCE COMPANY
- 12 -
-------
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Courts are putting a stop to the epidemic of forgery and robo-signing that
infected the banking industry during the past ten years. Deborah Brignac's diverse
signatures and Loren Lopez's acknowledgment of them are fraudulent and illegal.
38. On May 14, 2010, CRC recorded a Notice of Default ("NOD"), attached
hereto as Exhibit 9, describing the Wellworth Property with instructions that
Plaintiff contact JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION to
stop the foreclosure. The NOD was signed by Silvia Freeberg, Assistant Secretary.
The "Declaration of Compliance (Cal Civil Code Section 2923.5(b)" attached to
the NOD was signed under penalty of perjury by Renee Daniels on behalf of
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association. Chase is described in the
Declaration of Compliance as "The undersigned mortgagee, beneficiary or
authorized agent." Washington Mutual is described in the body of the NOD as
beneficiary. However, Chase's interest, if any, was acquired from WaMu in
September 2008, and WaMu's beneficial interest had terminated when WaMu sold
the Note to investors in 2006.
39. Chase was not the beneficiary and Brignac had no authority to act on
behalf of the beneficiary when someone forged her signature to the Substitution of
Trustee. The Substitution of Trustee was unauthorized and fraudulent, so CRC was
not authorized to initiate foreclosure against Plaintiff on May 14, 2010, when it
recorded the Notice of Default, and it was not acting for the Lender when it filed
the Notice of Trustee's Sale on August 16, 2010.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION QUASI CONTRACT
41. Chase demanded monthly mortgage payments from Plaintiff starting in
October 2008, and continued to collect payments from Plaintiff for twelve months.
Plaintiff reasonably relied upon Chase's assertion that it was entitled to payments
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for the reason that it had acquired certain assets from WaMu under an agreement
with the FDIC.
42. Chase knowingly accepted the payments and retained them for its own
use knowing that WaMu was not a beneficiary under Plaintiff's Note on the date
that its assets were transferred to Chase and therefore Chase did not acquire any
right from WaMu to accept or keep Plaintiff's payments. It would be inequitable
for Chase to retain the payments it received from Plaintiff. The equitable remedy
of restitution when unjust enrichment has occurred is an obligation created by the
law without regard to the intention of the parties, and is designed to restore the
aggrieved party to his or her former position by return of the thing or its equivalent
in money.
43. The DOT states in Paragraph 23: "Upon payment of all sums secured
by this Security Instrument, Lender shall request Trustee to reconvey the Property
and shall surrender this Security Instrument and all notes evidencing debt secured
by this Security Instrument to Trustee." The obligations to WaMu under the DOT
were fulfilled when WaMu received the balance on the Note as proceeds of sale
through securitization to private investors. Chase has been unjustly enriched by
collecting monthly payments from Plaintiff.
44. Plaintiff seeks restitution for any payments he made to Chase that were
not paid to the lender or beneficiary, if any.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - NO CONTRACT
46. Plaintiff is informed and believes that WaMu routinely approved
predatory real estate loans to unqualified buyers in 2006 and 2007 and
implemented unlawful lending practices by encouraging brokers and loan officers
to falsify borrowers' income and assets to meet underwriting guidelines when
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borrowers were not qualified.
47. Plaintiff followed WaMu's instructions when he submitted a Uniform
Residential Loan Application to WaMu that contained only his basic identifying
information, such as name, address, phone number, social security number, and
bank account number. WaMu employees filled out the application.
48. Plaintiff is informed and believes that WaMu pre-sold Plaintiff's
mortgage. Immediately after he signed the Note, WaMu transferred all of its
interest in the Note to an investment bank that bundled Plaintiff's Note with
numerous other residential mortgages into residential mortgage-backed securities
("RMBS") which were structured into synthetic collateralized debt obligations
("CDOs") and sold to investors in Pool Number 432551 identified in Standard &
Poor's registry as CUSIP # 31379XQC2.
49. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the investment bank intended to
short the portfolio it helped to select by entering into credit default swaps to buy
protection against the certain event that the promissory notes would default. WaMu
expected that Plaintiff would not have the ability to repay the loan. It was not a
matter of being unconcerned with the possible outcome that Plaintiff would
default; WaMu expected he would default.
50. Washington Mutual Bank, the sponsor of the securitization transaction,
was a wholly owned subsidiary of Washington Mutual Inc. Securitization of
mortgage loans was an integral part of Washington Mutual Inc.'s management of
its capital. It engaged in securitizations of first lien single-family residential
mortgage loans through Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation, as
depositor, beginning in 2001. WaMu acted only as a servicer of Plaintiff's loan.
51. WaMu failed to disclose to Plaintiff that its economic interests were
adverse to Plaintiff and that WaMu expected to profit when Plaintiff found it
impossible to perform and defaulted on his mortgage.
52. A necessary element in the formation of an enforceable contract under
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the common law is a meeting of the minds. Two or more parties must share some
expectation that a future event will occur. Plaintiff expected that he would borrow
money from WaMu, he would pay it back, and then he would own the Property.
WaMu expected that Plaintiff would borrow money, he would not be able to pay it
back, and then WaMu or the investors would own the Property. Since there was no
shared expectationno meeting of the mindsno contract was formed between
Plaintiff and WaMu.
53. In addition to WaMu's expectation that Plaintiff would lose title to the
Wellworth Property through foreclosure, WaMu anticipated transferring the Note
to investors immediately after Plaintiff signed the Note. Plaintiff is informed and
believes that WaMu purchased credit default insurance so that WaMu would
receive the balance on the Note when Plaintiff defaulted, in addition to any money
WaMu received when it securitized the Note.
54. Not only did WaMu dispense with conventional underwriting practices
in 2006, it also paid premium fees and other incentives to mortgage brokers who
signed up the riskiest borrowers. Fueled by spiraling profits to Chase, WaMu, and
other bankers, common law principles of contract formation, customary
underwriting practices, and statutory procedures for transferring interests in real
property, including the recordation of transfers of interests in real property,
disintegrated and the system collapsed.
55. WaMu expected that Plaintiff would not perform as merely one victim
in a scheme in which:
(1) WaMu's fees as servicer would be greater as the number of loans increased;
(2) WaMu's fees as servicer would be greater as the balances of loans increased;
(3) WaMu would recover the unpaid balance of Plaintiff's loan through credit
default insurance when Plaintiff inevitably defaulted; and
(4) All risk of loss in the event of Plaintiff's default would be borne by investors,
not WaMu as the servicer.
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56. Plaintiffs participation in the mortgage contract was procured by overt
and covert misrepresentations and nondisclosures. The parties did not share a
single expectation with respect to any of the terms of the mortgage contract and
therefore the contract was void ab initio.
57. No enforceable contract was formed between Plaintiff and WaMu, so his
DOT and Promissory Note were not assets of WaMu that could be acquired or
assumed by Chase from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as
receiver after WaMu was closed by the Office of Thrift Supervision on September
25, 2008.
58. Chase Bank has no right to receive payment under Plaintiffs mortgage
loan and has no right to foreclose on his Wellworth Property. Plaintiff does not
seek rescission of the contract. He alleges that the contract was void ab initio.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION - QUIET TITLE
60. Plaintiff seeks to quiet title against the claims of Defendants and all
persons claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or adverse interest
in the Wellworth Property as of the date the Complaint was filed (Cal Code Civil
Procedure 760.020)
61. Plaintiff is the titleholder of the Wellworth Property according to the
terms of the Grant Deed recorded on December 11, 2006.
62. WaMu securitized Plaintiff's single-family residential mortgage loan
through Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. Plaintiff is informed and
believes that the lawful beneficiary has been paid in full.
The DOT states in paragraph 23:
23. Reconveyance. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security
Instrument, lender shall request Trustee to reconvey the Property and
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shall surrender this Security Instrument and all notes evidencing debt
secured by this Security Instrument to trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the
Property without warranty to the person or persons legally entitled to it
///
63. The DOT does not state that Plaintiff must pay all sums, only that all
secured sums must be paid. Plaintiff alleges that the obligations owed to WaMu
under the DOT were fulfilled and the loan was fully paid when WaMu received
funds in excess of the balance on the Note as proceeds of sale through
securitization(s) of the loan and insurance proceeds from Credit Default Swaps.
64. Defendants claims are adverse to Plaintiff because Plaintiff is informed
and believes that none of the defendants is a holder of the Note, none of them can
prove any interest in the Note, and none of them can prove that the Note is secured
by the DOT, as well as for the reasons set forth in the preceding causes of action.
As such, Defendants have no right, title, lien, or interest in the Wellworth Property.
65. Plaintiff therefore seeks a judicial declaration that the title to the
Wellworth Property is vested solely in Plaintiff and that Defendants have no right,
title, estate, lien, or interest in the Property and that Defendants and each of them
be forever enjoined from asserting any right, title, lien or interest in the Property
adverse to Plaintiff.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION - DECLARATORY & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
67. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and
Defendants concerning their respective rights and duties. Plaintiff contends:
(a) that Chase is not the present holder in due course or beneficiary of a
Promissory Note executed by Plaintiff. However, Defendants contend that Chase is
the present owner and beneficiary of a Promissory Note executed by Plaintiff.
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(b) that Defendants are not real parties in interest, do not have standing, and
are not entitled to accelerate the maturity of any secured obligation and sell the
Wellworth Property because they are not a beneficiary or authorized agent of
beneficiaries under the purported Note. However, Defendants assert that they are
entitled to sell the Property.
(c) that the Substitution of Trustee recorded in Los Angeles County on May
3, 2010, which purports to substitute CRC in place of Chicago Title Co. as Trustee
under the Deed of Trust dated 11-14-2007, was subscribed with a forged signature
of Deborah Brignac and fraudulently acknowledged, and therefore CRC is not a
trustee authorized to file a Notice of Default or a Notice of Trustee's Sale on the
Wellworth Property. However, Defendants contend that CRC is a trustee duly
authorized to file said Notices.
68. Plaintiff desires a judicial determination of his rights and duties as to the
validity of the Note and DOT, and Defendants' rights to proceed with nonjudicial
foreclosure on the Wellworth Property. Unless restrained, Defendants will sell
Plaintiffs residence, or cause it to be sold, to Plaintiffs great and irreparable
injury, for which pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief.
69. Defendants wrongful conduct, unless and until restrained by order of
this court, will cause great irreparable injury to Plaintiff as the value of the
residence declines under threat of foreclosure and Plaintiff faces the prospect of
eviction from his residence. Plaintiff designed and built this home himself. It is
unique and cannot be replicated.
70. If the foreclosure sale is allowed to proceed, the burden on Plaintiff
significantly outweighs the benefit to Defendants, and each of them. By contrast,
if the foreclosure sale is enjoined, the burden to defendants is minimal and is not
outweighed by the benefit to Plaintiff.
71. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law for the injuries currently being
suffered and that are threatened. It will be impossible for Plaintiff to determine the
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precise amount of damage that he will suffer if Defendants conduct is not
restrained and Plaintiff must file a multiplicity of suits to obtain compensation for
his injuries.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION - INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
73. Between October 2008 and November 2009 Chase cashed Plaintiff's
monthly checks and kept the money when a cursory review of WaMu's records,
under Chase's control, would have revealed that Chase had no right to keep the
money. When Plaintiff stopped paying, Chase notified Plaintiff in 2010 that it
would take his family homea house that he had built himself. There was no
signature or name on Chase's correspondence, so Plaintiff cannot identify the
authors prior to commencement of discovery.
74. In March 2010, Plaintiff hired a lawyer to negotiate with Chase and
explore options to foreclosure. Chase ignored his lawyer's letters, which were
faxed to Chase's offices in three states.
75. Knowing that it was a servicer, not a beneficiary or lender of Plaintiff's
loan, Chase pretended to transfer the deed of trust to its subsidiary, CRC, on April
30, 2010, so CRC could record a fraudulent Notice of Default on May 14, 2010.
76. Plaintiff contends that the acts and omissions of the Defendants, and
each of them, constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.
77. Plaintiff further contends that Defendants, and each of them, engaged in
such conduct either intentionally or with reckless disregard as to the effect on
Plaintiff.
78. As a result of said extreme and outrageous conduct by Defendants, and
each of them, Plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress in the amount of
#:580


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$5,000,000.00.
///
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests judgment as follows:
1. That this court issue an Order to Show Cause and, after a hearing, issue a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction restraining Defendants,
and each of them, during the pendency of this action, from continuing with their
efforts to conduct a Trustee's Sale of the Wellworth Property.
2. That the attempted foreclosure of the Wellworth Property be declared illegal
and that Defendants be forever enjoined and restrained from selling the Property or
attempting to sell it or causing it to be sold, either under power of sale pursuant to
trust deed or by foreclosure action, and from posting, publishing, or recording any
notice of default or notice of trustee's sale contrary to state or federal law.
3. That the underlying loan transaction be declared void as a result of
Defendants' and WaMu's misrepresentations, fraud, concealment, and predatory
loan practices.
4. That Defendants make restitution to Plaintiff according to proof.
5. For a judgment determining that Plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of the
Wellworth Property against the adverse claims of Defendants and that Defendants
have no interest in the subject property adverse to Plaintiff.
6. For damages in an amount of $5,000,000.00.
6. For costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees.
7. For any and all other and further relief that may be just in this matter.

Date: April 11, 2011 ______________________________
Douglas Gillies, Attorney for Plaintiff

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#:582
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4 Daryoush lavaheri declares:
VERIFICATION
5 I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the foregoing Second
6 Amended Complaint and know its contents. The same is true of my own
7 knowledge, except as to those matters that are alleged on information and belief,
8 and as to those matters, I believe them to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury
9 that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed in Los
10 Angeles, California, on Apri112, 2011.
11 /// /:1'" t /.
12 ~ ~ n / ~ ~ .....
13 D a r y ~ ~
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PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS

Exhibit Description

1 Grant Deed recorded 12/11/2006

2 Uniform Residential Loan Application 9/8/2006

3 Adjustable Rate Note 11/14/2007

4 Deed of Trust 11/14/2007

5 Notice of Collection Activity 3/22/2010

6 Attorney Fariba Banayan's fax to Chase 4/19/2010

7 Request Disqualification (Chase) 9/1/2010 and 9/7/2010

8 Substitution of Trustee 4/30/2010

9 Notice of Default 5/14/2010

10 Notice of Trustee's Sale 8/16/2010

11-14 Deborah Brignac's signatures 10/2/2009 9/29/2010

#:583
#:660

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THEODORE E. BACON (CA Bar No. 115395)
SCOTT J. STILMAN (CA Bar No. 120239)
sstilman@AlvaradoSmith.com
FRANCES Q. JETT (CA Bar No. 175612)
fjett@AlvaradoSmith.com
ALVARADOSMITH
A Professional Corporation
633 W. 5
th
Street, Suite 1100
Los Angeles, California 90071
Tel: (213) 229-2400
Fax: (213) 229-2499

Attorneys for Defendant
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,


CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION

DARYOUSH JAVAHERI,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA RECONVEYANCE
COMPANY and DOES 1-150, inclusive,

Defendant.

CASE NO.: CV-10-8185 ODW (FFMx)

JUDGE: Hon. Otis D. Wright II

NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION BY DEFENDANT
JPMORGAN BANK, N.A.,
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT

{Request for Judicial Notice Efiled and
Proposed Order Submitted Concurrently
Herewith}

Courtroom: 11
DATE: June 6, 2011
TIME: 1:30 P.M.

Trial Date: None Set
Action Filed: October 29, 2010

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
NOTICE IS GIVEN that on June 6, 2011, at 1:30 P.M., in Courtroom 11, of
the above-entitled court located at 312 N. Spring Street, Los Angeles, California
90012, Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., (JPMorgan) will move the Court to
dismiss the action without leave to amend, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Case 2:10-cv-08185-ODW -FFM Document 30 Filed 04/28/11 Page 1 of 17 Page ID #:661

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Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the Second Amended Complaint of
plaintiff Daryoush Javaheri (Plaintiff) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. This motion is based on the following grounds:
1. The first cause of action for Violation of California Civil Code 2923.5
fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a claim for relief pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6).
2. The second cause of action for Wrongful Foreclosure fails to state
facts sufficient to constitute a claim for relief pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6).
3. The third cause of action for Quasi Contract fails to state facts sufficient
to constitute a claim for relief pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6).
4. The fourth cause of action for No Contract fails to state facts sufficient
to constitute a claim for relief pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6).
5. The fifth cause of action for Quiet Title fails to state facts sufficient to
constitute a claim for relief pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6).
6. The sixth cause of action for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief fails to
state facts sufficient to constitute a claim for relief pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6).
7. The seventh cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a claim for relief pursuant to FRCP
12(b)(6).
The motion will be based on this Notice of Motion, the Memorandum of Points
and Authorities, the Request for Judicial Notice, and the pleadings and papers filed.
///
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Counsel for JPMorgan met and conferred with Plaintiffs counsel on April
21, 2011, via letter. Therefore, Defendant has met the requirements of Local Rule 7-
3. See, Local Rule 7-3.

DATED: April 28, 2011
Respectfully submitted,

ALVARADOSMITH

By: /s/ Frances Q. Jett
THEODORE E. BACON
SCOTT J. STILMAN
FRANCES Q. JETT
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ............................................ 1
I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 1
II. SUMMARY OF FACTS ................................................................................. 2
III. STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS .............................................. 3
IV. PLAINTIFFS FIRST, SECOND, AND FIFTH CLAIMS FAIL SINCE
JPMORGAN HAD THE RIGHT TO FORECLOSE AND COMPLIED
WITH STATE LAW ....................................................................................... 4
A. JPMorgan Acquired the Loan from the FDIC ...................................... 4
B. JPMorgan Complied with State Law .................................................... 5
V. THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE THIRD CLAIM OF QUASI
CONTRACT .................................................................................................. 7
VI. THERE IS NO CLAIM ALLEGED FOR NO CONTRACT ...................... 8
VII. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF...................................... 9
VIII. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PLEAD OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT .................. 10
IX. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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Federal Cases
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007) ................................................................................................. 3
Bustamante v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn,
619 F.2d 360, 365 (5th Cir. 1980)............................................................................... 8
In re Wepsic,
231 B.R. 768 (S.D. Cal. 1998) .................................................................................... 8
Lee v. City of Los Angeles,
250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001) ....................................................................................... 3
MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman,
803 F. 2d 500 (9th Cir. 1986) ...................................................................................... 3
Molina v. Wash. Mut. Bank,
2010 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 8056 (W.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010) ............................................. 3
Wietschner v. Monterey Pasta Co.,
294 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ...................................................................... 3
Yamamoto v. Bank of New York,
329 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................................................. 8, 9
Federal Rules
Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ................................................................... 1, 2, 3
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) .............................................................................. 8
Federal Rule of Evidence 201(d) .................................................................................... 3
State Cases
Adler v. Sargent
109 Cal. 42 (1895) ....................................................................................................... 6
Alturas v. Gloster,
16 Cal.2d 46 (1940)..................................................................................................... 9
Bachis v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,
265 Cal.App.2d 722 (1968) ........................................................................................ 9
Cardellini v. Casey,
181 Cal.App.3d 389 (1986) ......................................................................................... 9
Christensen v. Superior Court,
54 Cal.3d 868 (1991) ................................................................................................ 10
Davidson v. City of Westminster,
32 Cal.3d 197 (1982) ................................................................................................ 10

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Jogani v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
165 Cal. App. 4
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901 (2008) ....................................................................................... 7
KORV-TV, Inc. v. Sup. Ct.,
31 Cal.App.4th 1023 (1995) ..................................................................................... 10
Kruse v. Bank of America,
202 Cal.App.3d 38 (1988) ......................................................................................... 11
Mabry v. Superior Court,
185 Cal.App.4th 208 (2010) ....................................................................................... 5
Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc.,
206 Cal. App. 4th, 779 (2003) .................................................................................... 8
Ricard v. Pacific Indemnity Co.,
132 Cal.App.3d 886 (1982) ....................................................................................... 10
Santens v. Los Angeles Finance Co.
91 Cal.App.2d 197 (1949) ........................................................................................... 6
Tiburon v. Northwestern Pacific Railroad Co.,
4 Cal.App.3d 160 (1970) ............................................................................................. 9
Trerice v. Blue Cross of California,
209 Cal.App.3d 878 (1989) ....................................................................................... 11
State Statutes
Civil Code 1216 ........................................................................................................... 7
Civil Code 2924(a)(1) .................................................................................................. 5
Civil Code 2924b(b)(4) ................................................................................................ 5
Civil Code 2934 ........................................................................................................... 6
Civil Code 2923.5 .......................................................................................................... 5

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On March 24, 2011, this Court granted defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A.s (JPMorgan or Defendant) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Daryoush Javaheris
First Amended Complaint (FAC) as to all claims with leave to amend. In so doing,
the Court specifically addressed the deficiencies in each and every of Plaintiffs
claims.
Plaintiff has now filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) which not only
fails to cure any of the deficiencies in the FAC, but also succeeds in creating a whole
new set of deficiencies.
Plaintiffs SAC against defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., fails primarily
because JPMorgan is not the same entity as Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu) and
did not assume its liabilities when it acquired WaMus assets from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
The crux of Plaintiffs entire SAC remains that he believes he is entitled to
rescind a $2.6 million loan he received from WaMu on or about November 14, 2007,
to refinance a house located at 10809 Wellworth, Los Angeles California, (Subject
Property) without having to tender anything back to the lender because of the alleged
bad acts of the WaMu at the loan origination, because of alleged discrepancies in the
acquisition of the loan by JPMorgan from the FDIC, and due to alleged improprieties
in the non-judicial foreclosure process. Plaintiffs SAC fails simply because it does
not establish any facts to support his claims and is not supported by the law.
In particular, Plaintiffs first and second claim for wrongful foreclosure, as well
as the fifth claim for quiet title, allege that Defendants have no right to foreclose,
because they do not own the note, but as the SAC itself alleges and the documents
attached to Defendants Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) confirm, JPMorgan
acquired the Loan from the FDIC when the FDIC was appointed receiver for WaMu.
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Exhibit 2 to the FAC also shows full compliance by Defendants with California Civil
Code 2923.5.
The third claim for quasi contract is not a legal claim. The fourth claim of
No Contract claim is essentially a rescission claim which fails, because there is no
mistake or fraud alleged and no offer to restore the consideration Plaintiff obtained.
The sixth claim for declaratory and injunctive relief mirrors the prior claims and fails
for the reasons set forth above. The seventh claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress fails to allege virtually all the elements of that claim.
Accordingly, as none of Plaintiffs claims against JPMorgan are properly pled
and cannot be amended, the SAC must be dismissed.
II. SUMMARY OF FACTS
Plaintiff obtained a mortgage loan in the amount of $2,660.000.00 (Loan)
secured by a Deed of Trust (DOT) encumbering the Subject Property. SAC, 12,
13, Exhibits 3, 4. The DOT was recorded on or about November 30, 2007, with the
Los Angeles County Recorders Office as instrument number 20072634177. The
DOT identifies Washington Mutual Bank, FA (WaMu) as the lender beneficiary,
and the FAC confirms California Reconveyance Company (CRC) is the current
trustee of the DOT. SAC, 13, Exhibit 4.
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) assumed control of WaMu on
September 25, 2008. RJN, Exhibit A. On that same day, JPMorgan acquired
WaMus banking operations from the FDIC, including the interest in the Loan on the
Subject Property, under the Purchase and Assumption Agreement (P&A
Agreement) between the FDIC and JPMorgan dated September 25, 2008. See RJN,
Exhibit B.
Plaintiff failed to comply with the Loan obligations and Notice of Default was
recorded May 14, 2010, and confirms that $141,558.18 is in arrears. Exhibit 9. The
SAC does not deny this amount is due and owing as of May 13, 2010. On August 16,
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2010, a Notice of Trustees sale was recorded with the Los Angeles County
Recorders Office. SAC, 17, Exhibit 10.
III. STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS
A motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) may be brought when a plaintiff fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. While a complaint attacked by a
FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of actions elements
will not do. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1959 (2007). Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all of the complaints allegations are true. Id.
On a motion to dismiss, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public
record in accordance with Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 201 without converting
the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. Lee v. City of Los Angeles,
250 F.3d 668, 688-689 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors,
Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)). Courts may take judicial notice of
documents outside of the complaint that are capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
FRE 201(d); Wietschner v. Monterey Pasta Co., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1109 (N.D.
Cal. 2003). Courts can take judicial notice of such matters when considering a motion
to dismiss. Id.; MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F. 2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986).
The Court may take judicial notice of a matter that is data stored on-line at a federal
agencys website. See Molina v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 2010 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 8056
(W.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010) (taking judicial notice of data on web sites of federal
agencies).
///
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IV. PLAINTIFFS FIRST, SECOND, AND FIFTH CLAIMS FAIL SINCE
WITH STATE LAW
A. JPMorgan Acquired the Loan from the FDIC
JPMorgan obtained its rights under the Loan from the FDIC. See RJN, Exhibit
B, Complaint 2. In his SAC Plaintiff continues to assert that JPMorgan has not
recorded its claim of ownership of the purported mortgage and does not have
standing to enforce the Note because Chase is not the owner of the Note, Chase is not
the holder of the Note, and Chase is not a beneficiary under the Note. SAC, 15,
30. However, this is contrary to the Courts specific ruling on the Motion to the
Dismiss the FAC whereby the Court specifically noted that the transfer of interest to
JPMorgan, however, is evidenced in documents of which the Court has already taken
judicial notice namely, the OTS Order and P&A Agreement. RJN, Exhibit C, p. 3.
Further this Court has already found that Plaintiffs claims based on the allegation
that JPMorgan does not own he note are without merit. RJN, Exhibit C, p. 4. This
confirms that JPMorgan had the right to foreclose on default and had the right to
appoint CRC as the trustee in commencing foreclosure.
The facts alleged in this case and those subject to judicial notice establish that
the Loan was an asset of WaMu when the P&A Agreement went into effect on
September 25, 2008. See, e.g., RJN, Exhibit B. Consequently, the Loan was one of
the deeds and mortgages that was assigned, transferred, conveyed and delivered
to JPMorgan pursuant to the P&A Agreement. JPMorgans rights under the DOT
derives from the terms and conditions of the P&A Agreement with the FDIC, which
transferred to JPMorgan the ownership of the beneficial and servicing rights, and all
other interests that WaMu owned and possessed on September 25, 2008. Id. Thus,
JPMorgans power to exercise the power of sale under the DOT derives from the P&A
Agreement with the FDIC acting as receiver and pursuant to its federal powers.
///
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Accordingly, JPMorgan properly acquired the rights to the DOT from the FDIC
when WaMu was placed into receivership, so the claim that Defendant does not have
the right to foreclose is without merit.
B. JPMorgan Complied with State Law
As to the alleged violations of California Civil Code 2923.5, the law is clear
that foreclosure can be commenced by the trustee, mortgagee or beneficiary or any of
their authorized agents and a person authorized to record the notice of default or the
notice of sale. (See California Civil Code 2924(a)(1) and 2924b(b)(4).)
Plaintiff continues to claim that JPMorgan violated 2923.5, because the person
who signed the declaration attesting to compliance with 2923.5 did not have personal
knowledge of the facts. SAC, 26. However, again, the Court has already addressed
this allegation and found that nothing in this statute requires that a declaration be
signed by a person with personal knowledge. RJN, Exhibit C, pp.4-5. Moreover,
Mabry v. Superior Court, 185 Cal.App.4th 208 (2010) makes it clear that 2923.5 does
not require one individual having personal knowledge of all facts in the declaration:
And, finally-back to our point about the inherent individual operation
of the statute-the very structure of subdivision (b) belies any insertion
of a penalty of perjury requirement. The way section 2923.5 is set up;
too many people are necessarily involved in the process for any one
person to likely be in the position where he or she could swear that all
three requirements of the declaration required by subdivision (b) were
met. We note, for example, that subdivision (a)(2) requires any one of
three entities (a mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent) to
contact the borrower, and such entities may employ different people
for that purpose. And the option under the statute of no contact being
required (per subdivision (h)
FN18
) further involves individuals who
would, in any commercial operation, probably be different from the
people employed to do the contacting. For example, the person who
would know that the borrower had surrendered the keys would in all
likelihood be a different person than the legal officer who would
know that the borrower had filed for bankruptcy. Id, 234, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 201, 220.

In an obvious last ditch effort to salvage his claims of wrongful foreclosure,
Plaintiff tries something new in his SAC by asserting that the Substitution of Trustee
was forged and therefore cannot be used to facilitate the subject foreclosure. SAC,
36-39.
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First and foremost, the so-called exhibits Plaintiff has attached to his SAC as
evidence that Ms. Brignacs signature is forged have nothing whatsoever to do with
Plaintiff or the subject Loan. See, Exhibits 11, 12, 13 to SAC. These exhibits clearly
concern entirely different properties and loans and have no relevance whatsoever to
the claims at issue. Moreover, the signatures which Plaintiff has cited examples of the
so-called forgery each clearly have initials of someone other than Ms. Brignac after
the signature indicating that there was no actual forgery involved, but rather as
clearly indicated, that these (irrelevant) documents were signed with Ms. Brignacs
authority.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs effort to salvage his claim clearly fails.
Finally, Plaintiffs insistence that JPMorgan does not have standing to enforce
the DOT, because there is no recorded assignment, is without any legal support. Any
assignment of a deed of trust may be recorded, but it is not required to be recorded in
order to provide constructive notice of the contents of the deed of trust. See California
Civil Code 2934 and Santens v. Los Angeles Finance Co., 91 Cal.App.2d 197, 201-
202 (1949) :
Defendant argues that since the assignment of the note and trust deed to
Graham was not recorded that defendant was a bona fide purchaser at the
execution sale and is not bound by the assignment. He relies on the
provision of section 2934 of the Civil Code that any assignment of the
beneficial interest under a deed of trust may be recorded, and from the
time the same is filed for record operates as constructive notice of the
contents thereof to all persons. We see nothing in the wording of the
section which would operate to defeat the title to Graham of the note
and trust deed as the transfer of the note carried with it the security
and the trust deed is a mere incident of the debt and could only be
foreclosed by the owner of the note. Santens, supra 91 Cal.App.2d at
201-202.

(Emphasis added.) See also Adler v. Sargent, 109 Cal. 42 (1895) .
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(In a case where neither the note nor deed of trust had been recorded by the true
assignee, California Supreme Court held that a mortgage, being a mere incident to the
debt, belongs to the holder of the collateral note, and can be foreclosed only by him.)
1

Accordingly, even in the absence of a recorded assignment and/or substitution
of trustee, Plaintiffs wrongful foreclosure claims fail.
In short, the first, second and fifth claims have no merit and should be
dismissed.
V. THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE THIRD CLAIM OF QUASI
CONTRACT
Plaintiff has amended his FAC in part by replacing his previously dismissed
claim for restitution with a claim for quasi contract. However, the end result
sought by Plaintiff in this new claim remains the same restitution. SAC, 44.
In fact, Plaintiff asserts that the equitable remedy of restitution when unjust
enrichment has occurred in an obligation created by the law without regard to the
intention of the parties. SAC, 42. Plaintiffs third claim for quasi contract is
essentially a claim for unjust enrichment and as such it fails because unjust
enrichment is not a cause of action. Jogani v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
165 Cal. App. 4
th
901, 911(2008), citing Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc., 106
Cal. App. 4
th
779, 793 (2003) ([T]here is no cause of action in California for unjust
enrichment.). Unjust enrichment is a general principle, underlying various legal
doctrines and remedies, rather than a remedy itself. Melchior v. New Line

1
Generally, only certain documents have no legal effect until recorded. See, for
example, California Civil Code 1216, which requires that revocation of a power of
attorney to convey or execute instruments must be recorded to be effective: No
power contained in an instrument to convey or execute instruments affecting real
property which has been recorded is revoked by any act of the party by whom it was
executed, unless the instrument containing such revocation is also acknowledged or
proved, certified and recorded, in the same office in which the instrument containing
the power was recorded.

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Productions, Inc., 206 Cal. App. 4
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779, 793 (2003) , citing Dinosaur Development,
Inc. v. White, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1310, 1315 (1989) (internal citations omitted). Even if
it were a claim, Plaintiff pleads no facts indicating how JPMorgans mere receipt of
payments from Plaintiff on the Subject Loan a debt he voluntarily incurred is
somehow unjust. Additionally, Plaintiff does not and cannot plead that CRC as
trustee under the DOT, respectively, were unjustly enriched in any way.
VI. THERE IS NO CLAIM ALLEGED FOR NO CONTRACT
In support of his claim for No Contract, which is essentially a claim for fraud,
Plaintiff continues to assert conclusory allegations with regard to WaMus alleged
fraudulent scheme. SAC, 47, 51, 56. In fact, Plaintiff specifically alleges that his
participation is the mortgage contract was procured by overt and covert
misrepresentations and nondisclosures. SAC, 56. This Court has already ruled
that Plaintiff must meet the standards for pleading fraud found in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 9(b). See, RJN Exhibit C, p. 6. Plaintiff has not cured this
deficiency in his SAC. Accordingly, this claim is subject to dismissal.
Plaintiff also continues to allege that he is not seeking rescission (SAC, 58),
but he cannot escape the fact that he received $2.6 million dollars and, in order to void
the agreement, must still offer tender in the FAC. A borrower is required to make a
tender offer to pay the lender what he or she received in the original mortgage
transaction (minus interest, finance charges, etc). See, Yamamoto v. Bank of New
York, 329 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003); see, e.g., Bustamante v. First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Assn, 619 F.2d 360, 365 (5th Cir. 1980) (creditors TILA obligations were not
triggered until obligor tendered repayment); In re Wepsic, 231 B.R. 768, 776 (S.D.
Cal. 1998) (conditioning rescission on borrowers tender of her duty of repayment
under the statute.). Moreover, as was held by the Yamamoto court, rescission may
not be enforced unless there is a determination that a borrower can also comply with
his rescission obligations. See, Yamamoto, 329 F.3d at 1173. That is, the borrower
///
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must show that he or she has the capacity to pay back what he received from the
lender, because rescission is a remedy that restores the status quo ante. Id.
The obligation to rescind has not been triggered, because Plaintiff has failed to
make a tender offer in the FAC. Plaintiff has made no claim that he can pay the
amount borrowed pursuant to the mortgage transactions. See generally, FAC. The
statutory obligation to rescind will only be triggered when, and only when, this Court
renders a decision that Plaintiff is entitled to rescission, and Plaintiff proves that he
has the capacity to pay back what he received under the Loan. For the foregoing
reasons, the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs no contract claim must be granted.
VII. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF
In pleading the sixth cause of action for declaratory relief, the Plaintiff must
specifically allege (1) whatever rights or duties the parties have with respect to the
property and (2) the existence of an actual and present controversy. General statements
about a controversy are unavailing. Alturas v. Gloster, 16 Cal.2d 46, 48 (1940). An
actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations
of a party must exist. See Tiburon v. Northwestern Pacific Railroad Co., 4
Cal.App.3d 160, 170 (1970). Thus, it is axiomatic that a cause of action for declaratory
relief serves the purpose of adjudicating future rights and liabilities between parties
who have some sort of relationship, either contractual or otherwise. See Cardellini v.
Casey, 181 Cal.App.3d 389 (1986); Bachis v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 265
Cal.App.2d 722 (1968). The sixth claim also seeks injunctive relief based on the
allegations of improper foreclosure.
The sixth claim simply incorporates the prior causes of action and seeks equitable
relief on the same flawed claims. Consequently, for the same reasons set forth in regard
to the prior causes of action, Defendants request that the sixth claim be dismissed
without leave to amend.
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VIII. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PLEAD OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT
Plaintiff fails to state a claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
against JPMorgan. The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention
of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2)
the Plaintiffs suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and
proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendants outrageous conduct.
Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 (1991).
A claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress requires a showing of
outrageous conduct which is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually
tolerated in a civilized community. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197,
209 (1982). A plaintiff must plead and prove with great specificity acts that are
outrageous. Outrageous conduct has been defined as conduct so extreme as to
exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. Ricard v.
Pacific Indemnity Co., 132 Cal.App.3d 886, 894 (1982) (emphasis added). Conduct
will be found to be actionable only where the recitation of the facts to an average
member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and leave
him to exclaim, Outrageous! KORV-TV, Inc. v. Sup. Ct., 31 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1028
(1995).
In the SAC, Plaintiff seeks recovery for emotional distress; however, he fails to
plead any of the elements of the emotional distress claim. Instead, Plaintiff pleads
conclusions of law and damages. Indeed, there are absolutely no allegations of
outrageous conduct anywhere in the FAC with respect to JPMorgan.
Moreover, the only conduct that can be asserted against JPMorgan is the
enforcement of the payment of the Loan and foreclosure for Plaintiffs failure to comply
with his payment obligation under the Loan, and his failure to make all required
payments. See generally, SAC. An assertion of legal rights in pursuit of ones own
economic interests does not qualify as outrageous under this standard. Trerice v. Blue
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Cross of California, 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883 (1989); Kruse v. Bank of America, 202
Cal.App.3d 38, 67 (1988). Assuming that the outrageous conduct Plaintiff refers to
against JPMorgan is the foreclosure of the Subject Property, such activities were simply
done in the pursuit of the economic interests of the lender in enforcing the security
instrument encumbering the Subject Property. See Kruse, 202 Cal.App.3d at 67 (no
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress where lender simply attempted to
collect debt due under security interest). Thus, a foreclosure sale cannot be considered
outrageous and cannot support an action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
Because Plaintiff fails to plead any of the elements of the claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and activities in the pursuit of ones own economic
interest do not qualify as outrageous, the seventh claim must be dismissed without
leave to amend.
IX. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, JPMorgan respectfully requests that the Court
grant this motion to dismiss in its entirety.

DATED: April 28, 2011

ALVARADOSMITH

THEODORE E. BACON
SCOTT J. STILMAN
FRANCES Q. JETT
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A

#:677

Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint
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DOUGLAS GILLIES, ESQ. (CA Bar No. 53602)
3756 Torino Drive
(805) 682-7033

Attorney for Plaintiff
DARYOUSH JAVAHERI


DARYOUSH JAVAHERI,
Plaintiff,
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.,
and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
Defendants.
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Case No. CV 10-8185-ODW (FFMx)
JUDGE: HON. OTIS D. WRIGHT II

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT

DATE: June 6, 2011
TIME: 1:30 PM
COURTROOM: 11

Plaintiff DARYOUSH JAVAHERI opposes Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint on the grounds that the SAC contains sufficient facts to
state plausible claims for relief.

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Table of Contents

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii
THE FACTS 1
1. CAL CIVIL CODE 2923.5 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 9
2. WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 14
3. QUASI CONTRACT THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 18
4. NO CONTRACT FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 21
5. QUIET TITLE FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 24
6. DECLARATORY/INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 28
7. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SEVENTH
CAUSE OF ACTION 28
8. CONCLUSION 29

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Cases
Barker v. Riverside County Office of Education, 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9
th
Cir. 2009)..............................9
Burgess v. Rodom, 121 Cal. App. 2d 71 (1953) ...................................................................................23
Caravantes v. California Reconveyance Co., 2010 WL 4055560, 9 (S.D.Cal. 2010)..........................16
Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872) ....................................................................................18
Cook v. Mielke, 3 Cal. App. 2d 736 (1935) ..........................................................................................23
Das v. WMC Mortgage Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122042, 10-25 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2010) ..9, 13
Dillingham v. Dahlgren, 52 Cal.App. 322, 326-327 (1921).................................................................24
Dunkin v. Boskey, 82 Cal. App. 4th 171, 195 (2000) ...........................................................................19
Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003)....................................29
Estes v. Hardesty, 66 Cal. App. 2d 747 (1944).....................................................................................23
German Sav. & Loan Soc. v. McLellan, 154 Cal. 710 (1908) ..............................................................23
Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002) ....................................................................9
Halperin v. Raville, 176 Cal. App. 3d 765, 774, 222 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1986) ........................................19
Hirsch v. Bank of America, 107 Cal.App.4th 708 (2003).....................................................................20
Holland v. McCarthy, 173 Cal. 597 (1916) ..........................................................................................23
Iusi v. Chase, 169 Cal. App. 2d 83, 87, 337 P.2d 79 (1959) ................................................................19
Kruse v. Bank of America, 202 Cal.App.3d 38, 67 (1988) ...................................................................29
Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726 (2000) ................................................................20
Lonergan v. Scolnick, 129 Cal. App. 2d 179 (1954).............................................................................23
Mabry v. Aurora Loan Services, 185 Cal.App.4
th
208 (2010)..........................................................9, 25
Martin Deli v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247, 417 N.E.2d 541 (1981) ...........24
Melchior v. New Line Productions, 106 Cal.App.4th 779 (2003) ........................................................20
MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E. 2d 81 (N.Y. 2006) ................................................................16
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990)...............................29
Morton v. Foss, 48 Cal. App. 2d 117 (1941) ........................................................................................23
North Star Int'l v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983) ......................................9

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Patterson v. Clifford F. Reid, Inc., 132 Cal. App. 454 (1933)..............................................................23
Salomon v. Cooper, 98 Cal.App.2d 521, 522-523 (1950) ....................................................................24
Santa Clara County v. Robbiano, 180 Cal. App. 2d 845, 848, 5 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1960) ........................19
Santens v. Los Angeles Finance Co., 91 Cal.Ap.2d 197, 201 (1949) ...................................................27
Saxon Mortgage v. Hillery, Case No. C-08-4357 (N.D. Cal. 2008).....................................................17
Scott v. Los Angeles Mountain Park Co., 92 Cal. App. 258 (1928) .....................................................23
Trerice v. Blue Cross, 209 Cal.App3d 878 (1989) ...............................................................................28
Ussery v. Jackson, 78 Cal. App. 2d 355 (1947)....................................................................................23
Walleri v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Seattle, 83 F.3d 1575, 1580 (9th Cir. 1996) .................................9
Wells Fargo v. Jordan, 914 N.E.2d 204 (Ohio 2009)...........................................................................16

Statutes
Cal. Civ. Code 1428............................................................................................................................25
Cal. Civ. Code 2920..............................................................................................................................1
Cal. Civ. Code 2920(a) .......................................................................................................................25
Cal. Civ. Code 2923.5.........................................................................................................................13
Cal. Civ. Code 2923.5(g) ....................................................................................................................12
Cal. Civ. Code 2924............................................................................................................................25
Cal. Civ. Code 2934............................................................................................................................26
Cal. Civ. Code 2934a..........................................................................................................................27

Other Authorities
CEB Mortgages, Deeds of Trust, and Foreclosure Litigation, (4th ed. 2011) .....................................11
Congressional Oversight Panel November Oversight Report, Examining the Consequences of
Mortgage Irregularities for Financial Stability and Foreclosure Mitigation (November 16, 2010) 7
David Horton, "The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments," 57 UCLA
Law Review 605 (February, 2010) ..................................................................................................24

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Wall Street and the Financial Crisis - Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, the U.S. Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations (April 13, 2011) .....................................................................14, 23
William Hubbard, "Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Rights: the Importance of Ex
Post, Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal (January, 2009)...........................24


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THE FACTS
The facts recited in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") show that
Chase is not the Lender. Only the Lender can invoke the power of sale under
paragraph 22 of the Deed of Trust (Exhibit 4).
If Chase is not the Lender, Chase has no right to initiate foreclosure under
paragraph 22 of the Deed of Trust unless it can show that it is acting as an
authorized agent of the Lender, and this they must prove. According to Cal. Civ.
Code 2920, a mortgage is a contract. The contract is the controlling authority. The
Civil Code does not invalidate the Deed of Trust so that anybody can take a home.
Chase asserts on the first page of its Memorandum of Points & Authorities that
the SAC "fails primarily because JPMorgan Chase is not the same entity as
Washington Mutual Bank." Plaintiff does not make such an allegation, but that is
actually a primary reason that the SAC succeeds. Chase is not WaMu. Chase does
not have privity with Plaintiff. Chase is a third party purchaser of certain assets.
Plaintiff alleges that WaMu was not the Lender in September 2008, so Chase did not
become the Lender when it assumed certain assets and liabilities of WaMu.
Contrary to defendants' assertion, the SAC does not allege that Chase acquired
Plaintiff's loan from the FDIC. The SAC states that Chase asserted that it acquired
certain assets, and Plaintiff relied on Chase's assertion when he made payments to
Chase. Paragraph 41 of the SAC states: "Chase demanded monthly mortgage
payments from Plaintiff starting in October 2008, and continued to collect payments
from Plaintiff for twelve months. Plaintiff reasonably relied upon Chase's assertion
that it was entitled to payments for the reason that it had acquired certain assets from
WaMu under an agreement with the FDIC." Now Plaintiff wants his money back,
since Chase is not the Lender and apparently was keeping his payments.
Plaintiff does not seek to rescind his loan. He seeks to ascertain the identity of

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the Lender, if indeed the court rules or a jury finds that he entered into a contract
with WaMu.
Defendants argue that the SAC does not deny that Plaintiff is in arrears in a
certain amount. Denials are customary in Answers rather than Complaints. Plaintiff
cannot know if the amount generated by Defendant in its memorandum has any
basis in fact until discovery commences. It is a figure posed by Defendant as it seeks
to take Plaintiff's property with no substantiation.
Plaintiff alleges plainly and unequivocally that Chase is not the Lender, and
therefore Chase cannot foreclose according to the express terms of the Deed of Trust
and the Promissory Note. This is not a legal conclusion. Taking something that isn't
yours is stealing. Chase is not the Lender, a fact that is alleged in the SAC. When a
plaintiff alleges that defendant is attempting to take plaintiff's property, the courts
provide a forum for the plaintiff to challenge the thief and get the property back, or
otherwise be compensated. In recent years, banks got into the business of taking
property without offering valid documentary evidence to support their claims. If
documents can prove that Chase is the Lender and that WaMu was the Lender on
September 25, 2008, those documents are in Chase's possession and can be
disclosed. Chase holds its cards tight, but that won't gain it clear title.
Plaintiff alleges in 14 of the SAC specifically that between November 15 and
November 30, 2007, WaMu transferred Plaintiff's Note to Washington Mutual
Mortgage Securities Corporation. The Note was then sold to an investment trust and
became a part of, or was subject to a Loan Pool, a Pooling and Servicing Agreement,
a Collateralized Debt Obligation, a Mortgage-Backed Security, a Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificate, a Credit Default Swap, an Investment Trust, and/or a Special
Purpose Vehicle. The security that started as Plaintiff's Note is listed in Standard &
Poor's registry as CUSIP # 31379XQC2, Pool Number 432551. Thereafter, WaMu
acted solely as a servicer of the loan, and was neither a Lender nor Beneficiary after
November 2007. These are facts, not legal conclusions.

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The acronym CUSIP refers to the Committee on Uniform Security Identification
Procedures, which was founded in 1964. The 9-character alphanumeric code
identifies any North American security for the purposes of facilitating clearing and
settlement of trades. The CUSIP distribution system is owned by the American
Bankers Association and is operated by Standard & Poor's. The CUSIP Service
Bureau acts as the National Numbering Association (NNA) for North America, and
the CUSIP number serves as the National Securities Identification Number for
products issued from both the United States and Canada. Plaintiff's Note could not
have been assigned a CUSIP number unless and until it was converted into a
security. Of course, these are matters readily ascertainable at trial.
Chase's counsel appears before this Court as a handwriting expert to testify to
the authenticity of the diverse signatures of "Deborah Brignac." Chase's P&A offers
testimony describing office practices of California Reconveyance Company. The
many varied signatures attached to the SAC "clearly have initials of someone other
than Ms. Brignac after the signature indicating that there was no actual forgery
involved, but rather as clearly indicated" (Defendant's P&A 6:6-8). Mr. Jett may
make a fine witness at a later stage in the proceedings, but Plaintiff objects to the
testimony and expert opinions offered in Defendants' Motion to Dismisslacks
foundation, and isn't all that clear. There was a time when banks expressed concern
about forged documents. Now, when Plaintiff calls attention to a series of fake
signatures, Chase calls it "an obvious last ditch effort to salvage his claims" (P&A
5:25). Times have changed.
Plaintiff's factual allegations are not far-fetched. Last month, U.S. regulators
slapped the nation's largest banks with unprecedented penalties for improper home-
foreclosure practices, issuing detailed orders to revamp the way they deal with
troubled borrowers. The orders were issued on April 13, 2011, to Chase and thirteen
other financial institutions by the Federal Reserve, the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS), and the Comptroller of the Currency.

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Under the Consent Order, Chase has sixty days to establish plans to clean up its
mortgage-servicing processes to prevent documentation errors. The Order directs
Chase to take steps to ensure it has enough staff to handle the flood of foreclosures,
that foreclosures don't happen when a borrower is receiving a loan modification, and
that borrowers have a single point of contact throughout the loan-modification and
foreclosure process.
Chase must hire an independent consultant to conduct a "look back" of all
foreclosure proceedings from 2009 and 2010, including Plaintiff's foreclosure, to
evaluate whether Chase improperly foreclosed on any homeowners. Chase must
establish a process to consider whether to compensate borrowers who have been
harmed. The Federal Reserve has ordered Chase and other big banks to clean up
their illegal foreclosure practices. This is the context in which Plaintiff filed suit.
The New York Times reported on April 14, 2011:
Regulators said the enforcement actions were tough measures that would
make the banks accountable. "The banks are going to have to do substantial
work, bear substantial expense, to fix the problem," the Acting Comptroller of
the Currency, John Walsh, told reporters in a conference call.
JPMorgan Chase, one of the servicers signing the agreement, said that it
was adding as many as 3,000 employees to meet the new regulatory demands.
Jamie Dimon, its chief executive, called it "a lot of intensive manpower and
talent to fix the problems of the past."
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business/14foreclose.html

Chase signed the Consent Order with the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System on April 13, 2011. Plaintiff requests that the court take judicial
notice of the Federal Reserve Consent Order, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Docket No. 11-023-B-HC, attached as Exhibit 15,
which is summarized below and is available for download on the Fed's website at:
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/enf20110413a5.pdf

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The Consent Order, signed by Frank Bisignano, Chief Administrative Officer of
Chase, includes the following allegations against Chase, which, according to the
Order, initiated more than a quarter of a million foreclosure actions in 2009-2010.
The Consent Order has been abbreviated (but not changed) in the following:
WHEREAS, in connection with the process leading to certain foreclosures
involving the Servicing Portfolio, the Mortgage Servicing Companies (Chase)
allegedly:
(a) Filed or caused to be filed in state courts and in connection with
bankruptcy proceedings in federal courts numerous affidavits executed by
employees making various assertions, such as the ownership of the mortgage
note and mortgage, the amount of principal and interest due, and the fees and
expenses chargeable to the borrower, in which the affiant represented that the
assertions in the affidavit were made based on personal knowledge or based on
a review by the affiant of the relevant books and records, when, in many cases,
they were not based on such knowledge or review;
(b) Filed or caused to be filed in state courts, in federal courts or in the local
land record offices, numerous affidavits and other mortgage-related documents
that were not properly notarized, including those not signed or affirmed in the
presence of a notary;
(c) Litigated foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings and initiated non-
judicial foreclosures without always confirming that documentation of
ownership was in order at the appropriate time, including confirming that the
promissory note and mortgage document were properly endorsed or assigned
and, if necessary, in the possession of the appropriate party;

WHEREAS, the practices set forth above allegedly constitute unsafe or
unsound banking practices;

NOW, THEREFORE, Chase shall cease and desist and take affirmative
action, as follows

The forged signatures of Deborah Brignac, attached to the SAC as Exhibits 8
and 10-14 and included in 37 of the SAC, fit into a national pattern that prompted
the Federal Reserve to impose a Consent Order on our nation's biggest banks,
including Chase. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss protests that the forgeries have
nothing to do with Plaintiff's loan. Only the trier of fact can determine whether the
#:746

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very different signatures of Deborah Brignac on the Substitution of Trustee (Exhibit
8), the Notice of Trustee's Sale (Exhibit 10), and countless other recorded documents
were truly signed by Ms. Brignac based on her personal knowledge. If the signature
on the Substitution of Trustee is a forgery, the foreclosure is illegal. CRC cannot
become the Trustee based on the forged signature of its own employee.
Defendants assert that calling attention to a forged Substitution of Trustee is a
"last ditch effort" by Plaintiff. The banks dug plenty of ditches, and the Fed is not
taking them lightly. Defendants may seek to place a cloud on Plaintiff's title by
gaining a dismissal on the pleadings and then conducting an illegal foreclosure sale,
but the cloud will not go away so easily.
The presumption of infallibility where big banks are concerned no longer
applies. Chase and other banks have adopted a nationwide strategy of defeating
homeowners in foreclosure on the basis of challenging the language of the
complaints. While possessing all the evidence, the banks stonewall plaintiffs in court
and then presume they can take whatever property they fancy. This is a shortsighted
and self-destructive legal strategy that will lead to endless litigation and result in a
cascading plunge in real property values for decades in the United States.
A judgment resulting from dismissal based on alleged defects in the complaint
does not resolve the underlying issue as to who owns the property. A demurrer or
dismissal is no more that an editorial rebuke of the draftsman when it concerns title
to real property. If the bank gets a judgment, sells the property, takes the money, and
pays another billion-dollar round of bonuses to its executives, the unlucky buyer of
REO or Deed Upon Trustee's Sale will not get clear title. New facts and new theories
will support an endless succession of lawsuits as holders of grant deeds, such as
Plaintiff Daryoush Javaheri, their successors and assigns, hammer away at the
mountain of securitization documents that will continue to percolate to the surface in
lawsuits for years to come. Better to get it out in the open now, rather than plow
these controversies under a rising pile of toxic title defects that will be passed back
#:747

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and forth between banks, title companies, and the holders of grant deeds. It's a big
mess now, but it will only get bigger the longer it is perpetuated.
This may seem like the bold pronouncement of some lawyer fighting to save
his client's family home, but it is a finding of the Congressional Oversight Panel, a
body convened by Congress to keep an eye on the initial $700-billion bailout.
1

Plaintiff renews his Request for Judicial Notice of the Congressional Oversight
Panel (COP) Report, Examining the Consequences of Mortgage Irregularities for
Financial Stability and Foreclosure Mitigation (November 16, 2010). The COP
report is attached to Plaintiff's current Request for Judicial Notice as Exhibit "15." It
states on pages 4-8:
In the fall of 2010, reports began to surface alleging that companies
servicing $6.4 trillion in American mortgages may have bypassed legally
required steps to foreclose on a home. Employees or contractors of Bank of
America, GMAC Mortgage, and other major loan servicers testified that they
signed, and in some cases backdated, thousands of documents claiming
personal knowledge of facts about mortgages that they did not actually know
to be true.
Allegations of robo-signing are deeply disturbing and have given rise to
ongoing federal and state investigations. At this point the ultimate
implications remain unclear. It is possible, however, that robo-signing may
have concealed much deeper problems in the mortgage market that could
potentially threaten financial stability and undermine the government's efforts

1
In response to the escalating financial crisis, on October 3, 2008, Congress provided Treasury
with the authority to spend $700 billion to stabilize the U.S. economy, preserve home ownership,
and promote economic growth. Congress created the Office of Financial Stability (OFS) within
Treasury to implement the TARP. At the same time, Congress created the Congressional Oversight
Panel to review the current state of financial markets and the regulatory system. The Panel is
empowered to hold hearings, review official data, and write reports on actions taken by Treasury
and financial institutions and their effect on the economy (COP Report, Nov. 16, 2010, p. 124)
#:748

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to mitigate the foreclosure crisis.
If documentation problems prove to be pervasive and, more importantly,
throw into doubt the ownership of not only foreclosed properties but also
pooled mortgages, the consequences could be severe. Clear and uncontested
property rights are the foundation of the housing market. If these rights fall
into question, that foundation could collapse. Borrowers may be unable to
determine whether they are sending their monthly payments to the right
people (COP Report, Nov. 16, 2010, pp. 4-5).
If irregularities in the foreclosure process reflect deeper failures to
document properly changes of ownership as mortgage loans were securitized,
then it is possible that Treasury is dealing with the wrong parties in the course
of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). This could mean
that borrowers either received or were denied modifications improperly. Some
servicers dealing with Treasury may have no legal right to initiate
foreclosures, which may call into question their ability to grant modifications
or to demand payments from homeowners, whether they are part of a
foreclosure mitigation program or otherwise. The servicers' tendency to cut
corners may also have affected the determination to modify or foreclose upon
individual loans.
Many of the entities implicated in the recent document irregularities,
including Ally Financial, Bank of America, and JPMorgan Chase, are
current or former TARP recipients (p. 8) (emphasis added).
Chase wants to take real property without offering any real proof that will tend
to show who is the Lender or who holds a beneficial interest in the promissory note.
It stands on the hollow stump of a belated Purchase and Assumption Agreement.
Plaintiff did not contract with Chase. WaMu assigned its rights as Lender to a
third party two years before the OTS stepped in and FDIC took over. If Chase did
not forward Plaintiff's payments to the Lender, Chase has been unjustly enriched.
#:749

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The material allegations in the SAC present triable issues. A motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the complaint's sufficiency.
North Star Int'l v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). All
material allegations in the complaint, "even if doubtful in fact," are assumed to be
true. The court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must "construe
them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298
F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); Walleri v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Seattle, 83 F.3d
1575, 1580 (9th Cir. 1996). The court must accept as true all reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the material allegations in the complaint. Barker v. Riverside
County Office of Education, 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9
th
Cir. 2009).

1. CAL CIVIL CODE 2923.5 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Defendant cites Mabry v. Aurora Loan Services, 185 Cal.App.4
th
208 (2010) in
support of the proposition that the NOD satisfies the requirements of Cal. Civil Code
2923.5 since it recites the form language of the statute. However, this misses the
point of the statute. Section 2923.5 requires contact with the borrower, not form
language stapled to a form. If the party sending the Notice attaches a declaration
signed by a robo-signer who has no personal knowledge whether contacts were
made, the NOD does not prove compliance with the notice requirements.
Mabry has been followed by various federal district courts in California. In Das v.
WMC Mortgage Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122042, 10-25 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28,
2010), the magistrate found that tender was not required, in contrast to Defendant's
assertion that a borrower is required to make a tender offer (P&A 18-20).
The whole purpose of this section (Cal. Civ. Code 2923.5) is to allow a
homeowner an opportunity to at least discuss with the lender the possibility of
loan modification. Where such communication does result in loan modification,
the homeowner can avoid foreclosure even if he or she would not otherwise be
in a position to fully redeem the property at a foreclosure sale. In situations
like this, a requirement that the homeowner tender the entire amount of the
secured indebtedness would actually defeat the purpose of the statute (p. 5-6).
#:750

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In Argueta v. Chase, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41300 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011), the
District Court refused to grant a motion to dismiss where borrower alleged in the
Complaint that defendants did not contact him. The order states in part:
A notice of default may be filed only thirty days after the initial contact
with the borrower or satisfying the due diligence requirements. Civ. Code
2923.5(a)(1). A notice of default must be accompanied by a declaration stating
that the buyer has been contacted or could not be reached despite due
diligence. Id. 2923.5(b). The only remedy for violation of this statute is
postponement of a foreclosure sale until there has been compliance with the
statute. Paik v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 10-04016, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3979, 2011 WL 109482, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2011); Mabry v.
Super. Ct., 185 Cal. App. 4th 208, 223, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201 (4th Dist. 2010)
("If section 2923.5 is not complied with, then there is no valid notice of
default, and without a valid notice of default, a foreclosure sale cannot
proceed. The available, existing remedy is . . . to postpone the sale until there
has been compliance with section 2923.5.").
Plaintiff alleges that all defendants failed "to assess the financial situation
and explore options for plaintiff to avoid foreclosure, thirty (30) days prior to
filing the Default." (Compl. 96.) Plaintiff allegedly received "no phone calls,
phone messages, or letters via first class or certified mail either before or after
the Notice of Default was recorded." (Id. 100.)
While the moving defendants' provided the Notice of Default in which
Quality Loan declares that it complied with the statute, the Complaint's
allegations to the contrary are sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. See
Caravantes v. Cal. Reconveyance Co., No. 10-CV-1407, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 109842, 2010 WL 4055560, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010).
Accordingly, the court will deny the motion to dismiss this claim.

Civ. Code 2923.5 has been narrowly construed, but where the defendants failed
to access the financial situation and explore options, didn't call and didn't write, the
Complaint will defeat a motion to dismiss.
As an example of a 2923.5 declaration that makes sense in light of the language of
the statute, California Continuing Education for the Bar (CEB) recommends the
following form for a Notice of Default in its practice guide, CEB Mortgages, Deeds of
#:751

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Trust, and Foreclosure Litigation, (4th ed. 2011):
DECLARATION UNDER CC 2923.5

I declare that:

I am _ _[the beneficiary/an authorized agent of the beneficiary]_ _ of the foregoing
deed of trust. I initially attempted to contact the borrower (trustor under the deed of
trust) by sending a first-class letter that included the toll-free telephone number made
available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

I contacted the borrower _ _[in person/by telephone]_ _ on _ _[date]_ _ to assess the
borrowers financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure.
During the initial contact, I advised the borrower that he or she had the right to request
a subsequent meeting and, if requested, that it would be scheduled within fourteen (14)
days. The borrower _ _[did/did not]_ _ request the subsequent meeting. I also gave the
borrower the toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a HUD-
certified housing counseling agency.

I attempted to contact the borrower _ _[in person/by telephone]_ _ on the following
dates _ _[list all dates of attempted contact and results of each attempt]_ _. This was
done to assess the borrowers financial situation and explore options for the borrower to
avoid foreclosure. I exercised due diligence to further contact the borrower as follows:
_ _[list all actions taken to contact borrower and results as required by CC
2923.5(g)]_ _.

No contact with the borrower was required because the borrower surrendered the
property on _ _[date]_ _ to the _ _[trustee/beneficiary/authorized agent]_ _, the
borrower contracted with an organization, person, or entity whose primary business is
advising how to extend the foreclosure process, or the borrower filed a bankruptcy
petition and the bankruptcy court has not entered an order closing or dismissing the
bankruptcy case or granting stay relief.
___[Signature of declarant]___
[Declarants typed name]

Compare the above CEB form to CRC's cryptic, ambiguous, form-language
2923.5 declaration on the Notice of Default attached to the SAC as Exhibit 9:
The mortgagee, beneficiary or authorized agent tried with due diligence but was
unable to contact the borrower to discuss the borrower's financial situation and to
explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure as required by Cal. Civ. Code
Section 2923.5. Thirty days or more have elapsed since these due diligence efforts
were completed.
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Cal. Civ. Code 2923.5(g) defines due diligence:
(g) A notice of default may be filed pursuant to Section 2924 when a mortgagee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent has not contacted a borrower as required by
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) provided that the failure to contact the borrower
occurred despite the due diligence of the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent. For purposes of this section, "due diligence" shall require and mean all of the
following:
(1) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall first attempt to contact
a borrower by sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free telephone number
made available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
(2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent shall attempt to contact the borrower by telephone at least three times at
different hours and on different days. Telephone calls shall be made to the primary
telephone number on file.
(B) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent may attempt to contact a
borrower using an automated system to dial borrowers, provided that, if the
telephone call is answered, the call is connected to a live representative of the
mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent.
(C) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent satisfies the telephone
contact requirements of this paragraph if it determines, after attempting contact
pursuant to this paragraph, that the borrower's primary telephone number and
secondary telephone number or numbers on file, if any, have been disconnected.
(3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the telephone call
requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the mortgagee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent shall then send a certified letter, with return receipt requested.
(4) The mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall provide a means for
the borrower to contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free telephone number
that will provide access to a live representative during business hours.
(5) The mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has posted a prominent
link on the homepage of its Internet Web site, if any, to the following information:
(A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to afford their
mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and instructions to
borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore those options.
(B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be prepared to
present to the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent when discussing options
for avoiding foreclosure.
(C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss options
for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent.
(D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a HUD-
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certified housing counseling agency.
No evidence has been introduced to show that Chase or CRC used due diligence
to contact Plaintiff. On the contrary, Chase ignored the request of Plaintiff's lawyer
to explore options (Exhibit 6). The SAC alleges:
22. Chase did not contact Plaintiff or Mr. Banayan, either in person or by
telephone, to discuss Plaintiff's financial condition and the impending
foreclosure. Chase did not call, it did not write, and it did not provide a toll-free
HUD number to Plaintiff or his lawyer. Chase did not offer to meet with
Plaintiff or his lawyer and did not advise them that Plaintiff had a right to
request a subsequent meeting within 14 days.
Attached to the NOD was a "Declaration of Compliance with Cal. Civ. Code
2923.5" signed under penalty of perjury by Renee Daniels for Chase. Ms. Daniels
could not have had personal knowledge of the matters described in her declaration,
which stated that the mortgagee, beneficiary or authorized agent was unable to
contact the borrower to explore options to avoid foreclosure (SAC 26).
Das v. WMC Mortgage Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122042, 10-25 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 28, 2010) resolved a similar issue and refused to dismiss: The court may
take judicial notice of the fact that the declaration signed by Natalie McClendon on
April 18, 2009 was recorded. However, the court may not take notice of the content
of the declaration because Defendants have not shown that Ms. McClendon is a
source "whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." See e.g., Reusser v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 858 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2008); and Turnacliff v.
Westly, 546 F.3d 1113, 1120 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2008). The fact that the declaration was
recorded is not indisputable proof that Defendants actually contacted Plaintiffs to
discuss their financial situation and the impending foreclosure. Further, courts may
not take notice of any matter that is in dispute. U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908
(9th Cir. 2003); Walker v. Woodford, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1022 (S.D.Cal. 2006).
California Attorney General Edmund G. Brown was so annoyed with Chase's
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cavalier attitude towards 2923.5 that he wrote to Chase on September 30, 2010:
"JP Morgan Chase has now admitted that employees assigned to
handling foreclosures signed affidavits without first personally reviewing the
contents of borrowers' loan files. Thus, borrowers suffered the foreclosure of
their homes based on affidavits that JP Morgan Chase had not confirmed to be
accurate. This admission strongly suggests that any purported verification by
JP Morgan Chase that it complied with section 2923.5 before commencing a
foreclosure in California is similarly suspect." (SAC Exhibit 3.)
- Attorney General Brown's letter to Chase, September 30, 2010
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1996_jp_morgan_chase_letter.pdf
2. WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Chase offers no proof that it acquired an interest in Plaintiff's residence. In this
Motion to Dismiss, once again the only document offered to support its claim is the
P&A Agreement. Chase asks the court to leap to the conclusion that WaMu was the
Lender on September 25, 2008, when the P&A Agreement was signed, even though
the likelihood of that, given WaMu's history of securitization, is less than 50%. The
challenge facing homeowners is to prove facts to trial courts at the pleading stage.
Wall Street and the Financial Crisis - Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, the U.S.
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (April 13, 2011) 650-page report,
was released following an 18-month investigation into the causes of the financial
crisis. WaMu was the leading case study in the report183 pages (28%) of the
report were devoted to WaMuthe worst of the worst. The report is readily
available for download at the Senate Subcommittee's website.
2

Over a four-year period, high-risk loans grew from 19% of WaMus loan
originations in 2003, to 55% in 2006, while its lower risk, fixed rate loans fell
from 64% to 25% of its originations. At the same time, WaMu increased its

2
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2011/PSI_WallStreetCrisis_041311.pdf
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securitization of subprime loans six fold, primarily through its subprime
lender, Long Beach Mortgage Corporation, increasing such loans from nearly
$4.5 billion in 2003, to $29 billion in 2006. From 2000 to 2007, WaMu and
Long Beach together securitized at least $77 billion in subprime loans. WaMu
originated an increasing number of its flagship product, Option Adjustable
Rate Mortgages (Option ARMs), which created high risk, negatively
amortizing mortgages and, from 2003 to 2007, represented as much as half of
all of WaMus loan originations. In 2006 alone, Washington Mutual originated
more than $42.6 billion in Option ARM loans and sold or securitized at least
$115 billion to investors.
Wall Street and the Financial Crisis, page 2.

Chase knows whether Plaintiff's loan was on the books of WaMu on September
25, 2008, when Chase "acquired certain assets." If the property was not listed as an
asset, then Chase did not acquire a beneficial interest in Plaintiff's loan and must
show that it is acting as an authorized agent of the Lender, whomever that may be, in
initiating foreclosure. If they don't know, they misappropriated Plaintiff's payments
for an entire year and must make restitution.
Defendant alleges in its P&A, "JPMorgan obtained its rights under the loan from
the FDIC" (P&A 4:5). Whether or not the Loan was an asset of WaMu on September
25, a key issue in this case, is not mentioned. Chase asks the court to find, without
evidence, a fact that it must prove in order to take the property. Nothing in the P&A
Agreement shows whether WaMu had any beneficial interest in Plaintiff's loan on
September 25, 2008. The court is asked to guess the answer and dismiss the case.
Then Plaintiff will lose his house.
Where factual findings or the contents of the documents are in dispute, those
matters of dispute are not appropriate for judicial notice. Caravantes v. California
Reconveyance Co., 2010 WL 4055560, 9 (S.D.Cal. 2010) citing Darensburg v.
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Metropolitan Transp. Comm'n, 2006 WL 167657, at *2 (N.D.Cal. 2006).
WaMu sold its beneficial interest in Plaintiff's property to fund the loan,
receiving the balance on Plaintiff's note from the investors, and retained, if anything,
merely a duty to service the loan. Even if Chase acquired WaMu' servicing interests
on September 25, Chase acquired no beneficial interest in Plaintiff's loan.
There was a time, about ten ago, when servicers were trusted bankers. Times
have changed. Stated in the Congressional Oversight Panel's report at page 14:
Effective transfers of real estate depend on parties being able to answer
seemingly straightforward questions: who owns the property? How did they
come to own it? Can anyone make a competing claim to it? The irregularities
have the potential to make these seemingly simple questions complex. As a
threshold matter, a party seeking to enforce the rights associated with the
mortgage must have standing in court, meaning that a party must have an
interest in the property sufficient that a court will hear their claim and can
provide them with relief. See Stephen R. Buchenroth and Gretchen D. Jeffries,
Recent Foreclosure Cases: Lenders Beware (June 2007); Wells Fargo v.
Jordan, 914 N.E.2d 204 (Ohio 2009) (If plaintiff has offered no evidence
that it owned the note and mortgage when the complaint was filed, it would
not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.); Christopher Lewis Peterson,
Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic
Registration System, University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, at
1368-1371 (Summer 2010); MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E. 2d 81
(N.Y. 2006) (URL's redacted per local rule). Accordingly, a second set of
problems relates to the chain of title on mortgages and the ability of the
foreclosing party to prove that it has legal standing to foreclose. While these
problems are not limited to the securitization market, they are especially acute
for securitized loans because there are more complex chain of title issues
involved.

The investors who purchased the security identified as CUSIP # 31379XQC2 in
Pool Number 432551 can make a competing claim to Plaintiff's property and the
payments he made to Chase. Chase has offered no evidence that it owned the Note
and Deed of Trust when the NOD and NOTS were filed, so it lacks standing.
Chase argues that it obtained the right to sell Plaintiff's property when it acquired
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WaMu's assets through the P&A Agreement for $1.9 billion. Chase could only
acquire what WaMu owned. WaMu no longer owned Plaintiff' mortgage. Perhaps
the identity of the Lender can be tracked down, but it remains unknown.
Defendant argues that Chase assumed no liability for actions taken by WaMu
prior to September 25, 2008 in regard to the subject loan. This obscures the issue.
Plaintiff alleges that WaMu did not have any interest in Plaintiff's residence on
September 25, 2008. His property was not an asset of WaMu, and therefore Chase
could not acquire any interest in Plaintiff's residence. This is not a liability issue.
Chase seems to assert that it can foreclose on any property under the P&A
Agreement on the grounds that WaMu might have had a beneficial interest in the
property at some time, even though WaMu sold most of its mortgages to investors.
Plaintiff alleges in 62 of the SAC that WaMu securitized Plaintiff's single-
family residential mortgage loan through Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities
Corp. If WaMu retained no beneficial interest in the promissory note when it
brokered the deal, Chase cannot acquire what WaMu never had.
If WaMu transferred all of its beneficial interest in the note at the inception of
the loan and never entered it in its books as an asset, and entered no corresponding
reserve on its ledger as a liability in the event of Plaintiff's default, then Chase did
not acquire ownership of the note by purchasing WaMu's assets because WaMu had
nothing to sell. This is a question of fact. Plaintiff alleges in 30 of the SAC that
Chase does not have standing to enforce the Note because Chase is not the owner of
the Note, not a holder of the Note, and not a beneficiary under the Note.
If Chase has no beneficial interest in the note, Chase can only proceed if it
proves that it is the servicer and joins the owner of the note in this action. To dismiss
this lawsuit before ascertaining the truth of these allegations is unwarranted. Chase
could produce evidence in its files, but it prefers to rob Plaintiff of his day in court.
In Saxon Mortgage v. Hillery, Case No. C-08-4357 (N.D. Cal. 2008), the court
ruled that the foreclosing party must demonstrate that it is the holder of the deed of
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trust and the promissory note. The Saxon court cited In re Foreclosure Cases, 521
F.Supp.2d 650, 653 (S.D. Ohio, 2007), which held that to show standing in a
foreclosure action, the plaintiff must show that it is the holder of the note and the
mortgage at the time the complaint was filed.
For a valid assignment, there must be more than just an assignment of the deed
alone; the note must also be assigned. "The note and mortgage are inseparable; the
former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the
mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity." Carpenter v.
Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872).
In re Foreclosure Cases involved 27 foreclosure actions filed in the Southern
District of Ohio, in which the court questioned whether the plaintiff lenders had
standing and whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the cases at the
time the foreclosure complaint was filed. Judge Thomas M. Rose wrote, "It is the
creditor's responsibility to keep a borrower and the Court informed as to who owns
the note and mortgage and is servicing the loan, not the borrower's or the Court's
responsibility to ferret out the truth." In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F.Supp.2d 650,
652 (S.D. Ohio, 2007).

3. QUASI CONTRACT THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Defendant argues that Plaintiff pleads no facts indicating that JPMorgan's receipt
of payments from Plaintiff on the Subject Loan is unjust. The SAC alleges that when
WaMu originated the loan, it transferred all beneficial interest in the note to an
investment bank (SAC 28). Neither WaMu, Chicago Title, CRC, Chase, nor
anyone else has recorded a transfer of a beneficial interest in the Note (or any other
interest in the) Property to Chase. (SAC 29). Chase does not have standing to
enforce the Note because Chase is not the owner of the Note, Chase is not a holder
of the Note, and Chase is not a beneficiary under the Note. Chase does not have
capacity to exercise a power of sale. Chase does not claim to be a holder of the note
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or a beneficiary. Chase merely describes itself as a loan servicer in the Notice of
Trustee's Sale (SAC 30).
Implied contracts under Cal. Civ. Code 1619 - 1621 refer to implied-in-fact
contracts that arise from the mutual agreement of the parties. Iusi v. Chase, 169 Cal.
App. 2d 83, 87, 337 P.2d 79 (1959). Courts recognize contracts called implied-by-
law contracts or quasi-contracts to prevent the unjust enrichment of one party, who
has no intent, either express or implied, to pay or to make reimbursement for
something of value received by that party. The law imposes an obligation to pay or
reimburse because good conscience dictates that the party benefited should make the
payment reimbursement. Santa Clara County v. Robbiano, 180 Cal. App. 2d 845,
848, 5 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1960); see Halperin v. Raville, 176 Cal. App. 3d 765, 774, 222
Cal. Rptr. 350 (1986) (imposing liability to repay loan to family business on
equitable ground when no express promise was made).
The equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment applies where the plaintiff, while
having no enforceable contract, nonetheless has conferred a benefit on the defendant,
which the defendant has knowingly accepted in circumstances in which it would be
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for its value. The
phrase unjust enrichment does not describe a theory of recovery but describes the
effect that would result from a failure to make restitution in circumstances where it
is equitable to do so. Therefore, no particular form of pleading is necessary to invoke
the doctrine of restitution, and a well-pleaded claim for breach of contract can be
sufficient. While the measure of damages for unjust enrichment is essentially
restitution, that concept that has been expanded in modern jurisprudence to include,
not only the restoration of something, but also compensation, reimbursement,
indemnification, or reparation for benefits derived from, or for loss or injury caused
to, another. Dunkin v. Boskey, 82 Cal. App. 4th 171, 195 (2000).
It is not the receipt of payments that makes them unjust, but rather the unjust
retention of the payments coupled with repeated threats of foreclosure and eviction.
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The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are the receipt of a benefit and
[the] unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another. Lectrodryer v. Seoul
Bank, 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726 (2000). Hirsch v. Bank of America, 107 Cal.App.4th
708 (2003) held that the plaintiffs there stated a valid cause of action for unjust
enrichment based on [the defendants] unjustified charging and retention of
excessive fees which were passed on to the plaintiffs. (Id. at p. 722.) Hirsch
involved plaintiffs who alleged they paid overcharges in the form of excessive
fees that were unjustly retained by the defendant at the plaintiffs expense.
If Chase can show that it obtained "servicing interests" in Plaintiff's loan, then
perhaps Chase can also prove that it actually forwarded payments from Plaintiff to
the beneficial owner of the loan. If Chase kept the money, it was unjustly enriched at
Plaintiff's expense.
Defendant cites Melchior v. New Line Productions, 106 Cal.App.4th 779 (2003)
for the proposition that unjust enrichment is not a cause of action. Unjust enrichment
would be the result if Chase is not the Lender and it were to retain the payments, but
the Third Cause of Action is brought under a theory of Quasi Contract. Melchior
was a screenwriter who alleged that defendants converted his script to produce an
episode of the Columbo television series. The court wrote, The phrase Unjust
Enrichment does not describe a theory of recovery, but an effect: the result of a
failure to make restitution under circumstances where it is equitable to do so
(citation). Unjust enrichment is a general principle, underlying various legal
doctrines and remedies, rather than a remedy itself. (citing Dinosaur Development,
Inc. v. White (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1310, 1315, 265 Cal.Rptr. 525.) It is
synonymous with restitution. The court continues, "Melchior suggests he is entitled
to restitution under a quasi-contract theory. He did not plead this theory of recovery,
and he points to nothing in the record that suggests it was before the trial court in
ruling on the summary judgment motion. It consequently cannot serve as a basis for
reversing the summary judgment." 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793. So the Melchior court
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recognized quasi contract as a valid theory of recovery which had not been pled.

4. NO CONTRACT FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Contracts are not formed every time two people shake hands, or exchange things
of value, or talk about how they expect things to turn out. If a trader sells a diseased
camel to an unsuspecting buyer on a promise to pay over time and the camel dies the
following day, there is no contract. They buyer doesn't have to pay.
No contract was formed between WaMu and Plaintiff because there was no
meeting of the minds and no shared expectation. A contract is not simply words on
paper. WaMu did not disclose to Plaintiff that it committed underwriting fraud by
altering Plaintiff's loan application to satisfy underwriting requirements for the
loans. WaMu's intent was evidenced by WaMu's failure to provide Plaintiff with
copies of documents as required by Section 17 of the Deed of Trust and provisions
of TILA. WaMu did not inform Plaintiff that his loan had already been sold to
investors and that WaMu would not have any beneficial interest in the loan.
Chase asserts that the one-year Statute of Limitations has expired, but the failure
of WaMu to provide documents at closing, a clear violation of federal law, serves a
different evidentiary purpose. It shows motive. WaMu didnt fund the mortgage
from its own assets, but rather brokered the loan with funds provided by institutional
investors. WaMu did not provide the borrower with a copy of the loan application
because it didnt want to alert the borrower to the fact that it was pooling toxic waste
for unsuspecting investors. This is not a question of whether Chase assumed a
liability in the P&A Agreement with FDIC. It shows that Plaintiff and WaMu never
came to a mutual understanding.
Some decisions have suggested that lenders do not have a duty to ascertain the
ability of borrowers to repay home loans. If lenders have no duty to weigh the
likelihood that borrowers can demonstrate even a remote ability to repay bank loans,
then our time-tested system governing transfers of interest in real estate is
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collapsing. Title companies are beginning to refuse to guarantee title.
Evaporation of the duty of the lender to follow commonly accepted underwriting
practices resulted in the current economic crisis. It was not just that banks didn't care
if the homeowners could pay back their loans that crippled our economy. They made
loans knowing that the borrowers could never possibly pay them back. If one party
enters into an agreement knowing full well that the other party will default, there is
no contract. It is not a question of duty or liability. There is no contract because there
is no shared expectation. It is void ab initio.
At the same time that WaMu was implementing its high risk lending
strategy, WaMu and Long Beach engaged in a host of shoddy lending
practices that produced billions of dollars in high risk, poor quality mortgages
and mortgage backed securities. Those practices included qualifying high risk
borrowers for larger loans than they could afford; steering borrowers from
conventional mortgages to higher risk loan products; accepting loan
applications without verifying the borrowers income; using loans with low,
short term teaser rates that could lead to payment shock when higher
interest rates took effect later on; promoting negatively amortizing loans in
which many borrowers increased rather than paid down their debt; and
authorizing loans with multiple layers of risk. In addition, WaMu and Long
Beach failed to enforce compliance with their own lending standards; allowed
excessive loan error and exception rates; exercised weak oversight over the
third party mortgage brokers who supplied half or more of their loans; and
tolerated the issuance of loans with fraudulent or erroneous borrower
information. They also designed compensation incentives that rewarded loan
personnel for issuing a large volume of higher risk loans, valuing speed and
volume over loan quality.
As a result, WaMu, and particularly its Long Beach subsidiary, became
known by industry insiders for its failed mortgages and poorly performing
residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS). Among sophisticated
investors, its securitizations were understood to be some of the worst
performing in the marketplace.
Documents obtained by the Subcommittee reveal that WaMu launched its
high risk lending strategy primarily because higher risk loans and mortgage-
backed securities could be sold for higher prices on Wall Street. They
garnered higher prices because higher risk meant the securities paid a higher
coupon rate than other comparably rated securities, and investors paid a higher
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price to buy them. Selling or securitizing the loans also removed them from
WaMus books and appeared to insulate the bank from risk.
Wall Street and the Financial Crisis - Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, the
U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (April 13, 2011)p. 2-4

Meeting of the minds is a necessary element in the formation of a contract, a
notion that dates back to the origins of contract law. Consent of the parties is one of
the requisites of a valid contract for the sale of realty. Ussery v. Jackson, 78 Cal.
App. 2d 355 (1947). It is essential to the creation of such a contract that there be a
meeting of the minds of the parties and a mutual agreement on the terms of the
contract. Holland v. McCarthy, 173 Cal. 597 (1916); German Sav. & Loan Soc. v.
McLellan, 154 Cal. 710 (1908); Lonergan v. Scolnick, 129 Cal. App. 2d 179 (1954);
Cook v. Mielke, 3 Cal. App. 2d 736 (1935).
The writing must evince a free and mutual understanding of the parties and show
that they both agreed on the same thing in the same sense, Estes v. Hardesty, 66 Cal.
App. 2d 747 (1944), or the writing has no binding effect on either. Patterson v.
Clifford F. Reid, Inc., 132 Cal. App. 454 (1933); Scott v. Los Angeles Mountain
Park Co., 92 Cal. App. 258 (1928). When the writing shows that there was no
meeting of the minds on the material terms of the proposed agreement, no contract
exists, no obligation to convey rests on the vendor, and the purchaser is under no
duty to accept the property or pay for it. Burgess v. Rodom, 121 Cal. App. 2d 71
(1953); Salomon v. Cooper, 98 Cal. App. 2d 521 (1950). In such a case it is
immaterial that the signature of the party charged, or of both parties, is affixed.
Patterson v. Clifford F. Reid, Inc., 132 Cal. App. 454 (1933); Morton v. Foss, 48
Cal. App. 2d 117 (1941).
It is indispensable to a valid memorandum of an agreement to sell and convey
land that it be complete evidence of the terms to which the parties have assented. If
it establishes that there was in fact no contract, if it discloses that upon essential and
material terms the minds of the parties did not meet and that such terms were left
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open for future settlement, then there is no binding obligation upon the seller to
convey or the buyer to accept and pay for the land. It will be regarded as merely an
inchoate effort. Implications will not be indulged. Salomon v. Cooper, 98
Cal.App.2d 521, 522-523 (1950).
An action for damages for breach of contract for the purchase or sale of real
property will not lie unless the writing contains the essential terms and material
elements of such an agreement without recourse to parole evidence of the intention
of the contracting parties. Dillingham v. Dahlgren, 52 Cal.App. 322, 326-327
(1921). "Plaintiff's evidence does not establish the indispensable 'meeting of the
minds' regarding the material terms of this transaction and, therefore, the existence
of an enforceable contract." Martin Deli v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 436
N.Y.S.2d 247, 417 N.E.2d 541 (1981).
David Horton wrote in the UCLA Law Review, "The perception that adherents
(to standard form contracts) did not read and could not understand fine-print terms
made it difficult to identify the requisite 'meeting of the minds' or 'mutual assent' of
contract formation." David Horton, "The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and
Unilateral Amendments," 57 UCLA Law Review 605 (February, 2010).
William R. Hubbard wrote, "(T)he core of a contract is the parties' meeting of the
minds, which both parties will want to memorialize clearly. If a dispute arises
regarding the meaning of a contract term, both parties can provide evidence
regarding the meeting of the minds. William Hubbard, "Efficient Definition and
Communication of Patent Rights: the Importance of Ex Post, Santa Clara Computer
and High Technology Law Journal (January, 2009).

5. QUIET TITLE FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Defendant argues that tender of the full amount of the debt is necessary, citing
Nool, Pagtalunan, Miller, and Caravantes. However, if Chase has no enforceable
claim to the Property, and cannot produce any evidence that it acquired or possesses
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any rights to the property, then full tender would be an onerous requirement to stop
their frivolous claim. Any crook could file a Notice of Trustee's Sale and evict a
homeowner. If lack of resources prevented the homeowner from having his day in
court, how would he prove that the thief had an illegitimate claim? Mabry states that
a requirement of tender would defeat the purpose of Civ. Code 2923.5. Mabry v.
Aurora Loan Services, 185 Cal.App.4
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208 (2010). The same principle applies
where the foreclosing party can offer no evidence that it is authorized to foreclose.
The core issue in this case is to ascertain who is the Lender. Plaintiff did not
borrow money from Chase. Plaintiff's pre-discovery inquiries indicate that WaMu
did not own the loan on September 25, 2008, and therefore Chase is not the Lender.
This issue cannot be brushed aside because California is a non-judicial state.
In California, an obligation arises either from the contract of the parties or by
operation of law. Cal. Civ. Code 1428; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 26. A mortgage is a
contract. Cal. Civ. Code 2920(a). A power of sale is conferred on the mortgagee,
trustee, or other person by the mortgage. Cal. Civ. Code 2924.
The Adjustable Rate Note attached to the SAC as Exhibit 3 identifies
Washington Mutual Bank as the Lender in 1, which then says, "Lender or anyone
who takes this Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under this
Note is called the "Note Holder."
The Note states in 7(C): "Notice of Default. If I am in default, the Note Holder
may send me a written notice telling me that if I do not pay the overdue amount by a
certain date, the Note Holder may require me to pay immediately the full amount"
So the Note gives the right to collect, if timely payments are not made, to the
Lender and anyone who takes the Note by transfer. This does not include a servicer
who is not the holder of the Note.
In Plaintiff's Deed of Trust (SAC Exhibit 4) the "Lender" is WASHINGTON
MUTUAL BANK, FA (page 1, C). The "Trustee" is CHICAGO TITLE
COMPANY (page 2, D).
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Consistent with the Note, only the Lender is authorized under 22 of the DOT
to accelerate the loan:
"Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following
Borrower's breach of any covenant of agreement in this Security
Instrument
"If Lender invokes the power of sale, Lender shall execute or cause
Trustee to execute a written notice of the occurrence of an event of
default and of Lender's election to cause the Property to be sold. Trustee
shall cause this notice to be recorded in each county in which any part of
the Property is located." (DOT page 13, 22).
Washington Mutual Bank remained the Lender for no more than a few days until
it sold the loan. Thereafter, it was, at best, a servicer of the loan. The Lender was the
investment trust that put up the money.
Foreclosure of the Wellworth Property was commenced by CRC, having been
appointed trustee on April 30, 2010, by Chase. Chase was not the Lender. The DOT
(SAC Exhibit 4) states on page 13, paragraph 24:
"Lender, at its option, may from time to time appoint a successor Trustee
to any Trustee appointed hereunder by an instrument executed and
acknowledged by Lender and recorded in the office of the Recorder of the
county in which the Property is located." (SAC Exhibit 8, 24).
Defendant asks the Court's approval to proceed with foreclosure of Plaintiff's
property on the basis of a NOD and NOTS filed by CRC, a wholly owned subsidiary
of Chase (SAC 16) that was appointed as successor Trustee by Chase even though
Chase is not the Lender and has not revealed who the Lender might possibly be.
Defendant cites Cal. Civ. Code 2934 for the proposition that an assignment of a
deed of trust is not required to be recorded in order to provide constructive notice of
the contents of the deed of trust. (P&A 6:11-14). That section actually says: "Any
assignment of a mortgage and any assignment of the beneficial interest under a deed
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of trust may be recorded, and from the time the same is filed for record operates as
constructive notice of the contents thereof to all persons;" The case cited by
Defendant, Santens v. Los Angeles Finance Co., 91 Cal.Ap.2d 197, 201 (1949) was
concerned with whether a bona fide purchaser at an execution sale was bound by an
assignment of the note if the deed of trust was not recorded.
Cal. Civ. Code 2934a provides:
(a) (1) The trustee under a trust deed upon real property or an estate for years
therein given to secure an obligation to pay money and conferring no other duties
upon the trustee than those which are incidental to the exercise of the power of sale
therein conferred, may be substituted by the recording in the county in which the
property is located of a substitution executed and acknowledged by:
(A) all of the beneficiaries under the trust deed, or their successors in interest
Nowhere does the Civil Code allow for assignment of a Deed of Trust by the
assignee acting on its own behalf.
Since Chase is not the Lender, it would violate the terms of the Note and the
Deed of Trust to dismiss the SAC and allow Chase to foreclose as a result of a
forged Assignment of Deed of Trust signed by someone working for the Assignee.
Plaintiff holds a grant deed. Chase has a contested Purchase and Assumption
Agreement that has generated millions of dollars in lawyers' fees every month.
Plaintiff is ready, willing and able to resume monthly payments to the owner of
the note, but is Chase legally entitled to receive these funds from Plaintiff? Chase
must show that it is the beneficiary of the note, or that it is acting on behalf of the
beneficiary with the beneficiary's blessing. Plaintiff is informed and believes that
Chase cannot produce the necessary instruments. Plaintiff will show at trial that the
promissory note was bundled into a presold Trust which was then pooled and sold
to investors many times over. The note was separated from the deed of trust and
atomized. It no longer exists as an enforceable mortgage document.

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Multiple banks may attempt to foreclose upon the same property. Borrowers
who have already suffered foreclosure may seek to regain title to their homes
and force any new owners to move out. Would-be buyers and sellers could
find themselves in limbo, unable to know with any certainty whether they can
safely buy or sell a home. If such problems were to arise on a large scale, the
housing market could experience even greater disruptions than have already
occurred, resulting in significant harm to major financial institutions. For
example, if a Wall Street bank were to discover that, due to shoddily executed
paperwork, it still owns millions of defaulted mortgages that it thought it sold
off years ago, it could face billions of dollars in unexpected losses. (COP
Report, p. 4-5)

6. DECLARATORY/INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiff's home was scheduled by CRC to be sold on the Courthouse steps on
November 8, 2010. A Trustee's Sale of Plaintiff's home is currently scheduled for
June 10, 2011. There is a significant and grueling controversy brewing between the
parties and a pressing need for a judicial determination of the parties' rights and
duties concerning the validity of the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust.
Plaintiff requests a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
restraining defendant from conducting a Trustee's Sale of the Property during the
pendency of this action.

7. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SEVENTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
"An assertion of legal rights based on one's own economic interests does not
qualify as 'outrageous' under this standard" argues defendant, citing Trerice v. Blue
Cross, 209 Cal.App3d 878, 883 (1989).
Times have changed since 1989. The mortgage meltdown in the past decade was
outrageous, devastating, and extremely distressful for the millions of families who
lost their homes. To Chase it may seem to be business-as-usual, but Defendant's
conduct as alleged in the SAC was so outrageous that it exceeded all bounds
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tolerated in a civilized societyforged documents, systemic perjury, underwriting
fraud, selling worthless junk to unsuspecting retirement funds, and attempting to
take a family's home without any legal claim to the property.
Defendant concludes by citing Kruse v. Bank of America, 202 Cal.App.3d 38, 67
(1988), which states there is no claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
where the lender simply attempted to collect a debt due under a security interest.
That depends on whether the interloper is the Lender, and that is why Defendant's
motion to dismiss must be denied.
Public Faith in Due Process Could Suffer. If the public gains the
impression that the government is providing concessions to large banks in
order to ensure the smooth processing of foreclosures, the people's
fundamental faith in due process could suffer (COP Report, p. 84).

8. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Daryoush Javaheri respectfully requests that
the Court deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. If any claims are insufficiently plead,
Plaintiff requests leave to amend. Where a motion to dismiss is granted, a district
court should provide leave to amend unless it is clear that the Complaint could not
be saved by any amendment. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048,
1052 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit requires that this policy favoring amendment
be applied with extreme liberality. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893
F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990).

Date: May 16, 2011 /s/___________________________
DOUGLAS GILLIES
DARYOUSH JAVAHERI

#:770

Request for Judicial Notice
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DOUGLAS GILLIES, ESQ. (CA Bar No. 53602)
3756 Torino Drive
(805) 682-7033

DARYOUSH JAVAHERI


DARYOUSH JAVAHERI,
Plaintiff,
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.,
Defendants.
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Case No. CV 10-8185-ODW (FFMx)

JUDGE: HON. OTIS D. WRIGHT II

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
DISMISS SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT

DATE: June 6, 2011
TIME: 1:30 PM
COURTROOM: 11

TO DEFENDANT JP MORGAN CHASE BANK N.A., AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF
RECORD:
Plaintiff DARYOUSH JAVAHERI hereby requests that the Court take judicial
notice pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence section 201(b), 201(c), and 201(d) of the
following documents:
1. Congressional Oversight Panel November Oversight Report released on
#:771

Request for Judicial Notice
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November 16, 2010, stored and available to the public for retrieval and review at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-111610-report.pdf. A true and correct copy is
attached hereto as Exhibit 15.
2. Federal Reserve System Consent Order in the Matter of JPMORGAN CHASE
& CO. and EMC MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Docket No. 11-023-B-HC and 11-
023-B-DEO, dated April 13, 2011, stored and available to the public for retrieval and
review at www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/enf20110413a5.pdf.
A true and correct copy is attached hereto as Exhibit 16.

Date: May 16, 2011 /s/_______________________
Douglas Gillies
DARYOUSH JAVAHERI

#:772
Plaintiff's Exhibits

Exhibit Description

15 Congressional Oversight Panel Report 11/16/2010

16 Fed Reserve Consent Order re JPMorgan Chase 4/13/2011

#:773

EXHIBIT 15
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c. TimeUne
After the housing market started to collapse in 2006, the effects rippled through the
financial sector and led to disruptions in the credit markets in 2008 and 2009. In an economy
that had been hit hard by the financial crisis and soon settled into a deep recession, the housing
market declined, dragging down housing prices and increasing the likelihood of default. This put
pressure on a variety of parties involved in the mortgage market. During the boom, there were
many players involved in the process of lending, securitizing, and servicing mortgages, and
many of these players took on multiple roles.
4
The initial role of servicers was largely administrative.
5
They were hired by the MBS
investors to handle all back-office functions for existing loans, and generally acted as
intermediaries between borrowers and MBS investors.
6
However, when the housing bubble
burst, and the number of delinquencies began to rise, the role of servicers evolved
correspondingly.
7
Servicer focus shifted from performing purely administrative tasks to
engaging in active loss mitigation efforts.
8
Servicers found themselves responsible for
processing all defaults, modifications, short sales, and foreclosures.
9
The servicers themselves
have admitted that they were simply not prepared for the volume of work that the crisis
generated. IO Thus, many servicers began subcontracting out much of their duties to so-called
"foreclosure mills," contractors that had significant incentives to move foreclosures along
quickly.
4 For example, it was not uncommon for a commercial bank to perfonn both lending and servicing
functions, and to have established separate lending and servicing anns of its organization. As discussed later in this
report, the securitization process begins with a lender/originator, often but not always a commercial bank. Next, the
mortgage is securitized by an investment bank. Finally, the mortgage is serviced. often also by a commercial bank
or its subsidiary. Even where the same banks are listed as doing both lending and servicing, they did not necessarily
service only the mortgages they originated. Source: Inside Mortgage Finance.
S See Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset ReliefPrognrm, Quarterly Report to
Congress, at 157 (Oct. 26, 2010) (online at
www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congressl2010/0ctober2010_Quarterly_Report_to _ Congress.pdf) (hereinafter "October
2010 SIGTARP Report").
6 Servicer duties included fielding borrower inquiries, collecting mortgage payments from the borrowers,
and remitting mortgage payments to the trust. See !d. at 157, 164. See also Congressional Oversight Panel, March
Oversight Report: Foreclosure Crisis: Working Toward a Solution, at 4042 (Mar. 6, 2009) (online at
cop.senate.gov/documentslcop-030609-report.pdi) (hereinafter "March 2009 Oversight Report").
7 See March 2009 Oversight Report, supra note 6, at 40.
8 See March 2009 Oversight Report, supra note 6, at 40-42. See also October 2010 SIGT ARP Report,
supra note 5, at 158.
9 See October 2010 SIGTARP Report, supra note 5, at 157-158. In the spring of 2009, when Treasury
announced its Making Home Affordable program, the centerpiece of which was HAMP, servicers took on the
additional responsibility of processing all RAMP modifications.
10 See March 2009 Oversight Report, supra note 6, at 39.
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81

determine if such payments are being made.
299
Treasury may well be paying incentives to
servicers that have no right to receive them.
Treasury has justified its relative inaction by noting that if ownership of the mortgage has
not been properly transferred, the legal owner will eventually appear, and at that time, Treasury
can claw back any incentive payments made to the wrong party.
300
Such a solution, however,
may not be feasible. It optimistically assumes that legal owners will be able to identify clearly
the mortgages they own, despite all of the potential litigation and complex transactions many
mortgages have been part of, and then navigate the bureaucracy to bring the matter before
Treasury. Inevitably, not all legal owners will manage this, in which case Treasury will be
giving money to parties that are not entitled to it. Moreover, if this is occurring, even in cases
where the legal owners do come forward, Treasury is essentially providing interest-free loans to
the wrong parties in the meantime. In addition, Treasurys inactivity may give rise to a double
standard in which borrowers must provide extensive documentation before benefiting from
HAMP, while servicers are allowed public money without having to prove their right to
foreclose.
In addition, although Treasury maintains that HAMP is unaffected by transfer of
mortgage ownership issues because modifications are private contracts between servicers and
borrowers,
301
a servicer cannot modify a loan unless it is authorized to do so by the mortgages
actual owner.
302
If legal owners then begin to come forward, as Treasury is relying on them to
do in order to clarify incentive payments, the legal owners will not be bound by the
modifications.
303
Abruptly, borrowers would no longer benefit from the reduced interest rates of
a HAMP modification. As a result, the length of time that a modification provides a borrower to
recover and become current on payment, which Treasury cites as one of HAMPs principal
successes,
304
would be cut short. Indeed, borrowers may even suffer penalties for not having
been paying the monthly payments required prior to the modification.
Another concern involves how HAMP servicers have been calculating the costs of
foreclosure under the programs NPV test. Foreclosures carry significant costs leading up to the
acquisition of a propertys title. If, by cutting corners in the foreclosure process, servicers were
able to lower the cost of foreclosure artificially, their own internal cost comparison analysis

299
Testimony of Phyllis Caldwell, supra note 143.
300
Treasury conversations with Panel staff (Oct. 21, 2010).
301
Treasury conversations with Panel staff (Oct. 21, 2010).
302
Written Testimony of Katherine Porter, supra note 14, at 8.
303
It is unclear what would happen if the true owner were also in HAMP. Under the HAMP standards, the
individual servicer should not matter, and a loan that qualified for a modification with one servicer should qualify
with another. The borrower, however, might have to reapply for a modification and enter a new trial modification.
It is also possible that Treasury could facilitate the transfer and not require a borrower to reapply.
304
Testimony of Phyllis Caldwell, supra note 143.
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slightly, while the FHF A Housing Price Index increased very slightly in August 2010. The
Case-Shiller and FHF A indices are 6 percent and 5 percent, respectively, below their levels of
October 2008.
332
Additionally, Case-Shiller futures prices indicate a market expectation that home-price
values for the major Metropolitan Statistical Areas
333
(MSAs) will hold constant through
2011.
334
These futures are cash-settled to a weighted composite index of U.S. housing prices in
the top ten MSAs, as well as to those specific markets. They are used to hedge by businesses
whose profits and losses are related to any area of the housing industry, and to balance portfolios
by businesses seeking exposure to an uncorrelated asset class. As such, futures prices are a
composite indicator of market information known to date and can be used to indicate market
expectations for home prices.
to boost home sales. U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, New
Residential Sales in June 2010 (July 26, 2010) (online at www.census.gov/constinewressales.pdf); U.s. Census
Bureau, New Residential Sales - New One-Family Houses Sold (online at
www.census.gov/ftp/pub/constisold_cust.xls)(accessedNov. 3,2010).
332 The most recent data available is for July 2010. See Standard and Poor's, S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price
Indices (Instrument: Case-ShilJer 20-City Composite Seasonally Adjusted, Frequency: Monthly) (online at
www.standardandpoors.comlindiceslsp-case-shiller-home-price-indicesleniusnindexId=,pusa-cashpidff-p-us---)
(hereinafter "S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices") (accessed Nov. 3, 2010); Federa\ Housing Finance Agency,
u.s. and Census Division Monthly Purchase Only Index (Instrument: USA, Seasonally Adjusted) (online at
www.fhfa.govlDefault.aspx?Pageo:87)(hereinafter'U.S. and Census Division Monthly Purchase Only Index")
(accessed Nov. 3,2010). S&P has cautioned that the ,easonal adjustment is probably being distorted by irregular
factors. These factors could include distressed sales and the various government programs. See Standard and
Poor's, S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices and Seasonal Adjustment, S&P Indices: Index Analysis (Apr. 2010).
For a discussion of the differences between the Case-Shiller Index and the FHF A Index, see April 2010 Ovesright
Report, supra note 282, at 98.
333 A Metropolitan Statistical Area is defined as a core area containing a substantial population nucleus,
together with adjacent communities having a high degree of economic and social integration with the core. U.S.
Census Bureau, About Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas (online at
www.census.gov/populationiwww/metroareaslaboutmetro.html)(accessed Nov. 3, 2010).
3" Data accessed through Bloomberg data service on November 3, 2010. The Case-Shiller Futures contract
is traded on the CME and is settled to the Case-Shiller Index two months after the previous calendar quarter. For
example, the February contract will be settled against the spot value of the S&P Case-Shiller Home Price Index
values representing the fourth calendar quarter of the previous year, which is released in February one day after the
settlement of the contract. Note that most close observers believe that the accuracy of these futures contracts as
forecasts diminishes the farther out one looks.
97
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EXHIBIT 16
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON, D.C.

In the Matter of

New York, New York

and

Lewisville, Texas

Docket No. 11-023-B-HC
11-023-B-DEO

CONSENT ORDER

WHEREAS, JPMorgan Chase & Co., New York, New York (JPMC), a registered bank
holding company, owns and controls JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, Columbus,
Ohio (the Bank), a national bank, and numerous direct and indirect nonbank subsidiaries,
including EMC Mortgage Corporation, Lewisville, Texas (EMC) and its direct and indirect
subsidiaries;
WHEREAS, JPMC has engaged in the business of servicing residential mortgage loans
through non-bank subsidiaries, including EMC and its subsidiaries (collectively, the Mortgage
Servicing Companies), as well as through the Bank. The Mortgage Servicing Companies have
serviced residential mortgage loans that are held in the portfolios of: (a) EMC and its
subsidiaries; (b) the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, and the Government National Mortgage Association (collectively, the GSEs); and
(c) various investors, including securitization trusts pursuant to Pooling and Servicing
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Agreements and similar agreements (collectively, the Servicing Portfolio). The Mortgage
Servicing Companies have had substantial responsibilities with respect to the Servicing Portfolio
for the initiation and handling of foreclosure proceedings, and loss mitigation activities (Loss
Mitigation or Loss Mitigation Activities include activities related to special forbearances,
repayment plans, modifications, short refinances, short sales, cash-for-keys, and deeds-in-lieu of
foreclosure);
WHEREAS, on or about April 1, 2011, JPMC transferred all of the residential mortgage
loan servicing rights and certain related assets and liabilities of the Mortgage Servicing
Companies to the Bank (the EMC Servicing Rights Transfer). Following consummation of
that transfer, the Mortgage Servicing Companies are no longer in the business of residential
mortgage loan servicing, and only the Bank is conducting residential mortgage loan servicing
within the JPMC organization;
WHEREAS, JPMC, through the Bank and the Mortgage Servicing Companies,
collectively, is the third largest servicer of residential mortgages in the United States and services
a portfolio of 8.5 million residential mortgage loans. During the recent financial crisis, a
substantially larger number of residential mortgage loans became past due than in earlier years.
Many of the past due mortgages have resulted in foreclosure actions. From January 1, 2009, to
December 31, 2010, the Mortgage Servicing Companies initiated 256,179 foreclosure actions;
WHEREAS, in connection with the process leading to certain foreclosures involving the
Servicing Portfolio, the Mortgage Servicing Companies allegedly:
(a) Filed or caused to be filed in state courts and in connection with bankruptcy
proceedings in federal courts numerous affidavits executed by employees of the
Mortgage Servicing Companies or employees of third-party providers making various
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assertions, such as the ownership of the mortgage note and mortgage, the amount of
principal and interest due, and the fees and expenses chargeable to the borrower, in which
the affiant represented that the assertions in the affidavit were made based on personal
knowledge or based on a review by the affiant of the relevant books and records, when, in
many cases, they were not based on such knowledge or review;
(b) Filed or caused to be filed in state courts and in connection with bankruptcy
proceedings in federal courts or in the local land record offices, numerous affidavits and
other mortgage-related documents that were not properly notarized, including those not
signed or affirmed in the presence of a notary;
(c) Litigated foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings and initiated non-judicial
foreclosures without always confirming that documentation of ownership was in order at
the appropriate time, including confirming that the promissory note and mortgage
document were properly endorsed or assigned and, if necessary, in the possession of the
appropriate party;
(d) Failed to respond in a sufficient and timely manner to the increased level of
foreclosures by increasing financial, staffing, and managerial resources to ensure that the
Mortgage Servicing Companies adequately handled the foreclosure process;
failed to respond in a sufficient and timely manner to the increased level of Loss
Mitigation Activities to ensure timely, effective and efficient communication with
borrowers with respect to Loss Mitigation Activities and foreclosure activities; and full
exploration of Loss Mitigation options or programs prior to completion of foreclosure
activities; and
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(e) Failed to have adequate internal controls, policies and procedures, compliance
risk management, internal audit, training, and oversight of the foreclosure process,
including sufficient oversight of outside counsel and other third-party providers handling
foreclosure-related services with respect to the Servicing Portfolio.
WHEREAS, the practices set forth above allegedly constitute unsafe or unsound banking
practices;
WHEREAS, as part of a horizontal review of various major residential mortgage
servicers conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board of
Governors), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the FDIC), the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (the OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision, examiners from
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the Reserve Bank) have reviewed certain residential
mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure-related processes at the Mortgage Servicing Companies,
and examiners from the OCC have reviewed certain residential mortgage loan servicing and
foreclosure-related practices at the Bank;
WHEREAS, the Bank and the OCC have entered into a consent order to address areas of
weakness identified by the OCC in residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation,
foreclosure activities, and related functions (the OCC Consent Order). Following the EMC
Servicing Rights Transfer, the Servicing Portfolio will be subject to the terms of the OCC
Consent Order;
WHEREAS, in the OCC Consent Order, the OCC has made findings, which the Bank
neither admitted nor denied, that there were unsafe or unsound practices with respect to the
manner in which the Bank handled various foreclosure and related activities;

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WHEREAS, it is the common goal of the Board of Governors, the Reserve Bank, JPMC,
and the Mortgage Servicing Companies (to the extent that the Mortgage Loan Servicing
Companies engage in residential mortgage loan servicing in the future) ensure that the
consolidated organization operates in a safe and sound manner and in compliance with the terms
of mortgage loan documentation and related agreements with borrowers, all applicable state and
federal laws (including the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act),
rules, regulations, and court orders, as well as the Membership Rules of MERSCORP, Inc. and
MERS, Inc. (collectively, MERS), servicing guides with GSEs or investors, and other
contractual obligations including those with the Federal Housing Administration and those
required by the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), and loss share agreements
with the FDIC (collectively, Legal Requirements);
WHEREAS, after the conduct set forth above became known, JPMC and the Mortgage
Servicing Companies have been taking steps to remediate the filing of and reliance on inaccurate
affidavits in foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings;
WHEREAS, the boards of directors of JPMC and EMC, at duly constituted meetings,
adopted resolutions authorizing and directing Frank J. Bisignano, and Anthony J. Horan to enter
into this Consent Order to Cease and Desist (the Order) on behalf of JPMC and EMC,
respectively, and consenting to compliance with each and every applicable provision of this
Order by JPMC and EMC, and their institution-affiliated parties, as defined in sections 3(u) and
8(b)(3) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended (the FDI Act) (12 U.S.C. 1813(u)
and 1818(b)(3)), and waiving any and all rights that JPMC and EMC may have pursuant to
section 8 of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1818), including, but not limited to: (i) the issuance of a
notice of charges; (ii) a hearing for the purpose of taking evidence on any matters set forth in this
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Order; (iii) judicial review of this Order; (iv) contest the issuance of this Order by the Board of
Governors; and (v) challenge or contest, in any manner, the basis, issuance, validity, terms,
effectiveness or enforceability of this Order or any provision hereof.
NOW, THEREFORE, before the filing of any notices, or taking of any testimony or
adjudication of or finding on any issues of fact or law herein, and without this Order constituting
an admission by JPMC, EMC or its subsidiaries, of any allegation made or implied by the Board
of Governors in connection with this matter, and solely for the purpose of settling this matter
without a formal proceeding being filed and without the necessity for protracted or extended
hearings or testimony, it is hereby ordered by the Board of Governors that, pursuant to
sections 8(b)(1) and (3) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1818(b)(1) and 1818(b)(3)), JPMC and
EMC, and their institution-affiliated parties shall cease and desist and take affirmative action, as
follows:
Source of Strength
1. The board of directors of JPMC shall take appropriate steps to fully utilize
JPMCs financial and managerial resources, pursuant to section 225.4(a) of Regulation Y of the
Board of Governors (12 C.F.R. 225.4(a)), to serve as a source of strength to the Bank,
including, but not limited to, taking steps to ensure that the Bank complies with the Consent
Order issued by the OCC regarding the Banks residential mortgage loan servicing activities.
Board Oversight
2. Within 60 days of this Order, the board of directors of JPMC shall submit to the
Reserve Bank an acceptable written plan to strengthen the boards oversight of JPMCs
enterprise-wide risk management (ERM), internal audit, and compliance programs concerning
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the residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities conducted
through the Bank. The plan shall, at a minimum, address, consider, and include:
(a) Policies to be adopted by the board of directors of JPMC that are designed
to ensure that the ERM program provides proper risk management oversight with respect to the
Banks residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities,
particularly with respect to compliance with the Legal Requirements, and supervisory standards
and guidance of the Board of Governors as they develop;
(b) policies and procedures adopted by JPMC to ensure that the ERM
program provides proper risk management of independent contractors, consulting firms, law
firms, or other third parties who are engaged to support residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss
Mitigation, or foreclosure activities or operations, including their compliance with the Legal
Requirements and JPMCs internal policies and procedures, consistent with supervisory
guidance of the Board of Governors;
(c) steps to ensure that JPMCs ERM, audit, and compliance programs have
adequate levels and types of officers and staff dedicated to overseeing the Banks residential
mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities, and that these programs
have officers and staff with the requisite qualifications, skills, and abilities to comply with the
requirements of this Order; and
(d) steps to improve the information and reports that will be regularly
reviewed by the board of directors of JPMC or authorized committee of the board of directors
regarding residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities and
operations, including compliance risk assessments and the status and results of measures taken,
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or to be taken, to remediate deficiencies in residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation,
and foreclosure activities, and to comply with this Order.
Foreclosure Review
3. (a) Within 45 days of this Order, JPMC and EMC shall retain one or more
independent consultant(s) acceptable to the Reserve Bank to conduct an independent review of
certain residential mortgage loan foreclosure actions (including judicial and non-judicial
foreclosures and related bankruptcy proceedings, and other related litigation) regarding
individual borrowers with respect to the Servicing Portfolio that was serviced by EMC. The
review shall include actions or proceedings (including foreclosures that were in process or
completed) for residential mortgage loans serviced by the Mortgage Servicing Companies
whether brought in the name of the JPMC, the Mortgage Servicing Companies, the investor, or
any agent for the mortgage note holder (including MERS) that have been pending at any time
from January 1, 2009, to December 31, 2010, as well as residential foreclosure sales that
occurred during this time period (Foreclosure Review). The purpose of the Foreclosure
Review shall be to determine, at a minimum:
(i) whether, at the time the foreclosure action was initiated or the
pleading or affidavit filed (including in bankruptcy proceedings and in defending suits brought
by borrowers), the foreclosing party or agent of the party had properly documented ownership of
the promissory note and mortgage (or deed of trust) under relevant state law, or was otherwise a
proper party to the action as a result of agency or other similar status;
(ii) whether the foreclosure was in accordance with applicable federal
and state laws, including but not limited to, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act and the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code;
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(iii) whether, with respect to non-judicial foreclosures, the procedures
followed with respect to the foreclosure sale (including the calculation of the default period, the
amounts due, and compliance with notice periods) and post-sale confirmation were in
accordance with the terms of the mortgage loan and state law requirements;
(iv) whether a foreclosure sale occurred when the borrower had
requested a loan modification or other loss mitigation and the request was under consideration,
when the loan was performing in accordance with a trial or permanent loan modification, or
when the loan had not been in default for a sufficient period to authorize foreclosure pursuant to
terms of the mortgage loan documentation and related agreements;
(v) whether any delinquent borrowers account was charged fees or
penalties that were not permissible under the terms of the borrowers loan documents, state or
federal law, or were otherwise unreasonable. For purposes of this Order, a fee or penalty is
otherwise unreasonable if it was assessed: (i) for the purpose of protecting the secured partys
interest in the mortgaged property, and the fee or penalty was assessed at a frequency or rate,
was of a type or amount, or was for a purpose that was in fact not needed to protect the secured
partys interest; (ii) for services performed and the fee charged was substantially in excess of the
fair market value of the service; (iii) for services performed, and the services were not actually
performed; or (iv) at an amount or rate that exceeds what was customarily charged in the market
for such a fee or penalty, and the mortgage instruments or other documents executed by the
borrower did not disclose the amount or rate that the lender or servicer would charge for such a
fee or penalty;
(vi) whether Loss Mitigation Activities with respect to foreclosed loans
were handled in accordance with the requirements of HAMP, if applicable, and consistent with
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the policies and procedures applicable to the Mortgage Servicing Companies proprietary loan
modifications or other Loss Mitigation programs, such that each borrower had an adequate
opportunity to apply for a Loss Mitigation option or program, any such application was handled
appropriately, and a final decision was made on a reasoned basis and was communicated to the
borrower before the foreclosure sale; and
(vii) whether any errors, misrepresentations, or other deficiencies
identified in the Foreclosure Review resulted in financial injury to the borrower or the owner of
the mortgage loan.
(b) The independent consultant(s) shall prepare a written report detailing the
findings of the Foreclosure Review (the Foreclosure Report). JPMC and EMC shall provide to
the Reserve Bank a copy of the Foreclosure Report at the same time that the report is provided to
them.
(c) Within 30 days of receipt of the Foreclosure Report, JPMC and EMC shall
submit to the Reserve Bank an acceptable plan to:
(i) remediate, as appropriate, errors, misrepresentations, or other
deficiencies in any foreclosure filing or other proceeding;
(ii) reimburse or otherwise provide appropriate remediation to the
borrower for any impermissible or otherwise unreasonable penalties, fees or expenses, or for
other financial injury identified in paragraph 3 of this Order;
(iii) make appropriate adjustments for the account of JPMC, the GSEs,
or any investor; and
(iv) take appropriate steps to remediate any foreclosure sale where the
foreclosure was not authorized as described in paragraph 3.
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(d) Within 60 days after the Reserve Bank accepts the plan described in
paragraph 3(c), the JPMC and EMC shall make all reimbursement and remediation payments and
provide all credits required by such plan, and provide the Reserve Bank with a report detailing
such payments and credits;
(e) JPMC shall take all steps necessary to ensure that the Bank provides any
cooperation needed by the independent consultant(s) to complete the independent review.
4. Within 5 days of the engagement of the independent consultant(s) described in
paragraph 3 of this Order, but prior to the commencement of the Foreclosure Review, JPMC and
EMC shall submit to the Reserve Bank for approval an engagement letter that sets forth:
(a) The methodology for conducting the Foreclosure Review, including:
(i) a description of the information systems and documents to be reviewed, including the
selection criteria for cases to be reviewed; (ii) the criteria for evaluating the reasonableness of
fees and penalties under paragraph 3(a)(v); (iii) other procedures necessary to make the required
determinations (such as through interviews of employees and third parties and a process for the
receipt and review of borrower claims and complaints); and (iv) any proposed sampling
techniques. In setting the scope and review methodology, the independent consultant may
consider any work already done by JPMC, EMC, or other third-parties on behalf of JPMC or
EMC. With respect to sampling techniques, the engagement letter shall contain a full description
of the statistical basis for the sampling methods chosen, as well as procedures to increase the size
of the sample depending on the results of initial sampling;
(b) the expertise and resources to be dedicated to the Foreclosure Review;
(c) completion of the Foreclosure Review and the Foreclosure Report within
120 days of the start of the engagement; and
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(d) a written commitment that any workpapers associated with the
Foreclosure Review will be made available to the Reserve Bank upon request.
Compliance Program
acceptable written plan to enhance its enterprise-wide compliance program (ECP) with respect
to its oversight of residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities
and operations. The enhanced plan shall be based on an evaluation of the effectiveness of
JPMCs current ECP in the areas of residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and
foreclosure activities and operations, and recommendations to strengthen the ECP in these areas.
The plan shall, at a minimum, be designed to:
(a) Ensure that the fundamental elements of the ECP and any enhancements
or revisions thereto, including a comprehensive annual risk assessment, encompass residential
mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities;
(b) ensure compliance with the Legal Requirements and supervisory guidance
of the Board of Governors; and
(c) ensure that policies, procedures, and processes are updated on an ongoing
basis as necessary to incorporate new or changes to the Legal Requirements and supervisory
guidance of the Board of Governors.
Audit
acceptable written plan to enhance the internal audit program with respect to residential
mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities and operations. The plan
shall be based on an evaluation of the effectiveness of JPMCs current internal audit program in
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the areas of residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities and
operations, and shall include recommendations to strengthen the internal audit program in these
areas. The plan shall, at a minimum, be designed to:
(a) Ensure that the internal audit program encompasses residential mortgage
(b) periodically review the effectiveness of the ECP and ERM with respect to
residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities, and compliance
with the Legal Requirements and supervisory guidance of the Board of Governors;
(c) ensure that adequate qualified staffing of the audit function is provided for
(d) ensure timely resolution of audit findings and follow-up reviews to ensure
completion and effectiveness of corrective measures;
(e) ensure that comprehensive documentation, tracking, and reporting of the
status and resolution of audit findings are submitted to the audit committee; and
(f) establish escalation procedures for resolving any differences of opinion
between audit staff and management concerning audit exceptions and recommendations, with
any disputes to be resolved by the audit committee.
Risk Management
acceptable written plan to enhance its ERM program with respect to its oversight of residential
mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities and operations. The
enhanced plan shall be based on an evaluation of the effectiveness of JPMCs current ERM
program in the areas of residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure
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activities and operations, and recommendations to strengthen the risk management program in
these areas. The plan shall, at a minimum, be designed to:
(a) Ensure that the fundamental elements of the risk management program
and any enhancements or revisions thereto, including a comprehensive annual risk assessment,
encompass residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclosure activities;
(b) ensure that the risk management program complies with supervisory
guidance of the Board of Governors, including, but not limited to, the guidance entitled,
Compliance Risk Management Programs and Oversight at Large Banking Organizations with
Complex Compliance Profiles, dated October 16, 2008 (SR 08-08/CA 08-11); and
(c) establish limits for compliance, legal, and reputational risks and provide
for regular review of risk limits by appropriate senior management and the board of directors or
authorized committee of the board of directors.
Approval, Implementation, and Progress Reports
8. (a) JPMC and EMC, as applicable, shall submit written plans and an
engagement letter that are acceptable to the Reserve Bank within the applicable time periods set
forth in paragraphs 2, 3(c), 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this Order. Independent consultant(s) acceptable to
the Reserve Bank shall be retained by JPMC and EMC within the applicable period set forth in
paragraph 3(a) of this Order.
(b) Within 10 days of approval by the Reserve Bank, JPMC and EMC, as
applicable, shall adopt the approved plans. Upon adoption, JPMC and EMC, as applicable, shall
implement the approved plans, and thereafter fully comply with them.
(c) During the term of this Order, the approved plans and engagement letter
shall not be amended or rescinded without the prior written approval of the Reserve Bank.
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(d) During the term of this Order, JPMC and EMC, as applicable, shall revise
the approved plans as necessary to incorporate new or changes to the Legal Requirements and
supervisory guidance of the Board of Governors. The revised plans shall be submitted to the
Reserve Bank for approval at the same time as the progress reports described in paragraph 9 of
this Order.
9. Within 30 days after the end of each calendar quarter following the date of this
Order, JPMCs and EMCs boards of directors shall jointly submit to the Reserve Bank written
progress reports detailing the form and manner of all actions taken to secure compliance with the
provisions of this Order and the results thereof. The Reserve Bank may, in writing, discontinue
the requirement for progress reports or modify the reporting schedule.
Notices
10. All communications regarding this Order shall be sent to:
(a) Ms. Barbara Yelcich
Assistant Vice President
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
33 Liberty Street

(b) Mr. David Lowman
Chief Executive Office
Chase Home Lending
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
194 Wood Avenue South
Iselin, New Jersey 08830

(c) Mr. Anthony J. Horan
Senior Vice President and Assistant Secretary
EMC Mortgage Corporation
270 Park Avenue, 38
th
Floor

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Miscellaneous

11. The provisions of this Order shall be binding on JPMC, EMC and each of their
institution-affiliated parties in their capacities as such, and their successors and assigns.
12. Each provision of this Order shall remain effective and enforceable until stayed,
modified, terminated, or suspended in writing by the Reserve Bank.
13. Notwithstanding any provision of this Order, the Reserve Bank may, in its sole
discretion, grant written extensions of time to JPMC and EMC to comply with any provision of
this Order.
14. The provisions of this Order shall not bar, estop, or otherwise prevent the Board
of Governors, the Reserve Bank, or any other federal or state agency or department from taking
any further or other action affecting JPMC, EMC, or any of their current or former institution-
affiliated parties or their successors or assigns, or any other of JPMCs subsidiaries.

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15. Nothing in this Order, express or implied, shall give to any person or entity, other
than the parties hereto, and their successors hereunder, any benefit or any legal or equitable right,
remedy, or claim under this Order.
By Order of the Board of Governors effective this 13
th
day of April, 2011.

JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

By: /s/ Frank J. Bisignano By: /s/ Jennifer J. Johnson
Frank J. Bisignano Jennifer J. Johnson
Chief Administrative Officer Secretary of the Board


By: /s/ Anthony J. Horan
Anthony J. Horan
Senior Vice President

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FRANCES Q. JETT (CA Bar No. 175612)
fjett@AlvaradoSmith.com
ALVARADOSMITH
633 W. 5
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Street, Suite 1100
Tel: (213) 229-2400
Fax: (213) 229-2499



CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION

DARYOUSH JAVAHERI,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA RECONVEYANCE CO.,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: CV-10 8185 ODW (FFMx)


DEFENDANT JPMORGAN BANK,
N.A.S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
DISMISS SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT

Courtroom: 11
DATE: June 6, 2011
TIME: 1:30 P.M.


Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., (JPMorgan) hereby replies to the
Opposition (Opposition) of plaintiff Daryoush Javaheri (Plaintiff) to Defendants
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (SAC).
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I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs Opposition fails to resolve any of the deficiencies identified in the
Motion to Dismiss (Motion). In fact, Plaintiffs Opposition does nothing more than
demonstrate that he has not pled sufficient facts to support his claims and that his claims
are not supported by the law. Plaintiff has now had three attempts to plead his claims.
It is obvious that no matter how many attempts Plaintiff is given, he simply cannot
sufficiently plead any of his claims.
The gravamen of Plaintiffs SAC, as well as his Opposition, continues to be
based on Plaintiffs argument that Defendant has not proved that JPMorgan acquired
Washington Mutual Banks interest in the subject loan. Such argument is disingenuous
at best.
While ignoring the fact, as admitted to by Plaintiff himself, that he is in default
on his $2.6 million loan, Plaintiff unsuccessfully hinges his Opposition on his claim that
JPMorgan is not the original lender, has not produced an original promissory note,
and therefore not entitled to foreclose. Rather than addressing the actual shortcomings
of his claims, Plaintiff spends a great deal of time in his Opposition discussing entirely
irrelevant acronyms and reports. (See, Opposition generally.)
Plaintiffs lengthy recitation of what CUSIP stands for and reference to consent
orders that have no bearing on the Subject Loan, is again of no consequence to
Plaintiffs actual claims. Nor can Plaintiff escape the fact that he has defaulted on a
$2.6 million loan.
Rather than curing the defects in Plaintiffs SAC, Plaintiffs Opposition only
serves to demonstrate the weaknesses of Plaintiffs claims. As set forth below,
Plaintiffs arguments fail, and JPMorgans Motion to Dismiss should be granted in its
entirety without leave to amend.
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II. PLAINTIFFS FIRST, SECOND, AND FIFTH CLAIMS FAIL SINCE
WITH STATE LAW
A. JPMorgan Acquired the Loan from the FDIC
This Court has already clearly opined that the transfer of interest to JPMorgan,
however, is evidenced in documents of which the Court has already taken judicial
notice namely, the OTS Order and P&A Agreement. JPMorgans Request for
Judicial Notice (RJN), Exhibit C, p. 3. Despite this unequivocal ruling from the
Court, Plaintiff continues to desperately cling to his argument that JPMorgan is not the
Lender and has no right to foreclose. (Opposition, pp. 1, 2.) Nothing has changed
since the last time the Court considered and rejected this argument.
Further, this Court has already found that Plaintiffs claims based on the
allegation that JPMorgan does not own the note are without merit. RJN, Exhibit C,
p. 4. This confirms that JPMorgan had the right to foreclose on default and had the
right to appoint CRC as the trustee in commencing foreclosure.
Accordingly, the Court should disregard Plaintiffs attempts to paint JPMorgan as
a party out to steal from Plaintiff. Plaintiff borrowed $2.6 million from Washington
Mutual Bank and now seeks to avoid having to pay these monies back to the current
beneficiary under the Deed of Trust.
Plaintiff can expend pages and pages of his Opposition citing to irrelevant
acronyms and reports this will not change the basic fact that JPMorgan acquired
Washington Mutual Banks interest in the subject Loan, that Plaintiff defaulted and now
seeks to avoid the effects of that default by continuing to insist that JPMorgan is not the
holder of the Note. JPMorgan properly acquired the rights to the DOT from the FDIC
when WaMu was placed into receivership, so the claim that Defendant does not have
the right to foreclose is without merit.
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B. JPMorgan Complied with State Law
Plaintiffs attempts to salvage his claim for alleged violations of California Civil
Code 2923.5 by allegations of forgery and citations to documents which have no
relation whatsoever to the Subject Loan are entirely unpersuasive. As set forth in the
Motion to Dismiss, the Court has already addressed and dismissed Plaintiffs allegation
that JPMorgan violated 2923.5, because the person who signed the declaration
attesting to compliance with 2923.5 did not have personal knowledge of the facts.
SAC, 26. Specifically, the Court previously found that nothing in this statute
requires that a declaration be signed by a person with personal knowledge. RJN,
Exhibit C, pp.4-5.
Despite the Courts previous ruling, Plaintiff yet again spends a significant
portion of his Opposition opining on how CRCs declaration, when compared with a
form declaration from a Continuing Education of the Bar publication, is cryptic,
ambiguous, form-language. (Opposition, pp. 10-11.) Plaintiffs recitation of what
Continuing Education for the Bar recommends for a form declaration under Civil
Code 2923.5 is of no matter.
As to the alleged violations of California Civil Code 2923.5, the law is clear
that foreclosure can be commenced by the trustee, mortgagee or beneficiary or any of
their authorized agents and a person authorized to record the notice of default or the
notice of sale. (See California Civil Code 2924(a)(1) and 2924b(b)(4).)
Accordingly, Plaintiffs effort to salvage his claims clearly fails. Plaintiffs
first, second and fifth claims have no merit and should be dismissed.
III. THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE THIRD CLAIM OF QUASI
CONTRACT
In his Opposition, p. 18, Plaintiff erroneously claims that Chase does not have
standing to enforce the Note because Chase is not the owner of the Note, Chase is not a
holder of the Note, and Chase is not a beneficiary under the Note. This claim is
without merit because, as set forth above, JPMorgan is entitled to enforce the terms of

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the Note pursuant to Section 3.1 of Article III of the P & A Agreement. See also
Caravantes v. CRC, 2010 WL 4055560, 9 (S.D.Cal., 2010).
IV. THERE IS NO CLAIM ALLEGED FOR NO CONTRACT
In defending his claim for no contract, Plaintiff entirely ignores the arguments
raised by JPMorgan in its Motion. In fact, Plaintiffs arguments in defense of his claim
such as his argument that Chase asserts that the one-year Statute of Limitations has
expired (Opposition p. 21) are entirely nonsensical given that JPMorgan does not
make this argument in its Motion to Dismiss the SAC. Plaintiff does not even attempt
to address JPMorgans arguments regarding Plaintiffs failure to offer tender in the
FAC. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim for no contract is insufficiently pled and subject
to dismissal.
V. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF
Plaintiffs claims for equitable belief are based on nothing more than Plaintiffs
allegations that JPMorgan is not the holder of the Note and therefore has no standing to
enforce the DOT. However, whether or not the Defendants are a holder of the original
note is irrelevant as [t]here is no requirement that the party initiating foreclosure be in
possession of the original note. Nool v. HomeEquity Servicing, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
80640, *12 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009); Pagtalunan, supra, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
80640, *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2009) and Caravantes, supra.
Plaintiff is unable to state any basis for contending that declaratory relief would
be necessary or useful. See Sanchez United States Bancorp, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
87952 at *20 (S.D. Cal. Aug, 4, 2009); Ricon v. Reconstruction Trust, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 67807 at *16 (S.D. Cal. Aug, 4, 2009); Mohammad, supra, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61796 at *14; Pagtalunan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34811 at *6 -*7.
Accordingly, this cause of action should be dismissed.
VI. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PLEAD OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT
The weakness of Plaintiffs defense of his emotional distress claim can be found
in one line in Plaintiffs Opposition [t]imes have changed since 1989. This is not a

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legal defense. This is merely Plaintiffs opinion and not a legitimate reason for the
denial of JPMorgans motion to dismiss which is based on actual law.
Because Plaintiff fails to plead any of the elements of the claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and activities in the pursuit of ones own economic
interest do not qualify as outrageous, the seventh claim must be dismissed without
leave to amend.
VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, JPMorgan respectfully requests that the Court
grant this motion to dismiss in its entirety.

DATED: May 23, 2011

ALVARADOSMITH

THEODORE E. BACON
FRANCES Q. JETT
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A

O
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV10-08185 ODW (FFMx) Date June 2, 2011
Title Javaheri v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al.
Present: The Honorable Otis D. Wright II, United States District Judge
Sheila English Not Present n/a
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s):
Not Present
Attorneys Present for Defendant(s):
Not Present
Proceedings (In
Chambers):
Order GRANTING in Part and DENYING in Part
Defendants Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second
Amended Complaint [30] (Filed 04/28/11)
I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.s (JPMorgan)
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Daryoush Javaheris (Plaintiff) Second Amended Complaint
(SAC). (Dkt. No. 30.) Plaintiff filed an Opposition on May 16, 2011, to which JPMorgan
filed a Reply on May 23, 2011. (Dkt. Nos. 32, 34.) Having considered the papers filed in
support of and in opposition to the instant Motion, the Court deems the matter appropriate
for decision without oral argument. FED. R. CIV. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. For the following
reasons, JPMorgans Motion is GRANTED in Part and DENIED in Part.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 14, 2007, Plaintiff obtained a mortgage loan in the amount of
$2,660,000 from Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu) to finance his property located at
10809 Wellworth Los Angeles, California (the Subject Property). (SAC 4, 11-13.) In
conjunction therewith, Plaintiff executed a promissory note (the Note) and a deed of trust
(the DOT), which encumbered the Subject Property. The DOT identifies WaMu as the
lender and beneficiary under the Note. (SAC 13.)
CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 1 of 11
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Plaintiff alleges that between November 15 and November 30, 2007, WaMu
transferred Plaintiffs Note to Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation and that
the Note was subsequently sold to an investment trust and became part of, or was subject
to, a Loan Pool, a Pooling and Servicing Agreement, a Collateralized Debt Obligation, a
Mortgage-Backed Security, a Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate, a Credit Default Swap,
an Investment Trust, and/or a Special Purpose Vehicle. (SAC 14.) Plaintiff identifies this
security as Standard & Poor CUSIP # 31379XQC2, Pool Number 432551. (SAC 14.)
Because of this alleged transaction in which Plaintiffs Note was sold as an investment
security, Plaintiff claims that JPMorgan is not the owner, holder, or beneficiary of the Note,
and therefore cannot legally foreclose on the Subject Property. Plaintiff also alleges that
JPMorgan failed to properly record its claim of ownership in the Subject Property, further
evidencing its lack of ownership. (SAC 15.)
JPMorgan, however, contends that it is the rightful owner, holder, and beneficiary of
Plaintiffs Note. In support, JPMorgan points to its September 25, 2008 acquisition of
WaMus assets by virtue of a Purchase and Assumption Agreement (P & A Agreement)
executed by JPMorgan and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), who at the
time was acting as Receiver for WaMu. (Dkt. No. 10, Exhs. 1-2.) JPMorgan, therefore,
maintains that it succeeded to all of WaMus assets, including Plaintiffs Note.
On or about March 22, 2010, Plaintiff received a letter stating that he had not made
his monthly payments since November of 2009. (SAC 19.) Plaintiff alleges that, within
thirty days of receiving this letter, his attorney faxed a letter in response, but that JPMorgan
did not contact Plaintiff or [his attorney], either in person or by telephone, to
discuss Plaintiffs financial condition and the impending foreclosure.
[JPMorgan] did not call, it did not write, and it did not provide a toll-free HUD
number to Plaintiff or his lawyer. [JPMorgan] did not offer to meet with
(SAC 22.) Nevertheless, on May 14, 2010, JPMorgan and CRC recorded a Notice of
Default (NOD) and a Declaration of Compliance, which identified JPMorgan as the
undersigned mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent. (SAC 25.) Subsequently, on
August 16, 2010, California Reconveyance Company (CRC) recorded a Notice of
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Trustees Sale. (SAC 17.)
As a result of the foregoing events, on October 29, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Complaint
in this Court against JPMorgan and CRC. Subsequently, on January 11, 2011, the Court
granted JPMorgan and CRCs joint Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. (Dkt. No. 20.)
Plaintiff then filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against JPMorgan on January 3,
2011. (Dkt. No. 22.) The Court granted JPMorgans Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs FAC on
March 24, 2011. (Dkt. No. 28.) On April 12, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended
Complaint against JPMorgan, asserting claims for: (1) violation of California Civil Code
section 2923.5; (2) wrongful foreclosure; (3) quasi contract; (4) no contract; (5) quiet title;
(6) declaratory and injunctive relief; and (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
(SAC at 1.) JPMorgan now brings the instant Motion to Dismiss the SAC in its entirety.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint generally must satisfy only the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule
8(a)(2). Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. FED. R. CIV.
P. 8(a)(2). For a complaint to sufficiently state a claim, its [f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Mere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. Id. Rather, to overcome a 12(b)(6) motion, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability
requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendants
liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement of
relief. Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
When considering a 12(b)(6) motion, a court is generally limited to considering
materials within the pleadings and must construe [a]ll factual allegations set forth in the
complaint . . . as true and . . . in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff]. See Lee v. City
of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Epstein v. Washington Energy Co., 83 F.3d
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1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996)). A court is not, however, required to accept as true allegations
that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
IV. DISCUSSION
The Court will discuss Plaintiffs seven claims in the following order. First, the Court
will analyze Plaintiffs fourth claim for no contract, which is predicated on events
allegedly occurring during the loan origination process. Second, the Court will address
Plaintiffs first claim for violation of California Civil Code section 2923.5, which is
predicated on JPMorgans alleged failure to contact Plaintiff before filing a notice of default.
Third, the Court will examine Plaintiffs second claim for wrongful foreclosure, fifth claim
for quiet title, third claim for quasi contract, and sixth claim for declaratory and injunctive
relief, all of which can be resolved by examining the parties dispute as to who properly
owns the Note. Finally, the Court will discuss Plaintiffs seventh claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

A. Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for No Contract
Plaintiff alleges that no enforceable contract was formed between WaMu and Plaintiff
because there was no meeting of the minds. (SAC 52.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends
that he expected that he would borrow money from WaMu, . . . pay it back, and then . . .
own the Property, while WaMu expected that Plaintiff . . . would not be able to pay it back,
and then WaMu or the investors would own the Property. (SAC 52.)
When ruling on Defendants previous Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs FAC, the Court
found that [w]hile Plaintiff frames his claim as one based on the absence of a contract, his
allegations indicate that he is, in fact, alleging fraud. (Dkt. No. 28 at 5.) In this respect,
Plaintiffs SAC is virtually identical to his FAC and indeed his no contract claim sounds
in fraud. Consequently, Plaintiff must meet the heightened pleading standards under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which require him to state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). Plaintiffs allegations must enable the
defendant to prepare an adequate answer[.] Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture
Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986); see Bosse v. Crowell Collier & MacMillan, 565
O
F.2d 602, 611 (9th Cir. 1977); Walling v. Beverly Enter., 476 F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1973).
In that regard, proper identification of the circumstances entails specif[ication of] such facts
as the times, dates, places, and benefits received, and other details of the alleged fraudulent
activity. Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993). Additionally, [i]n a fraud
action against a corporation, a plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the
allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they
said or wrote, and when it was said or written. Saldate v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 686 F.
Supp. 2d 1051, 1065 (2010) (citing Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2 Cal. App.
4th 153, 157 (1991)).
Here, Plaintiffs allegations with regard to WAMUs alleged fraudulent scheme fall
exceedingly short of the Rule 9(b) requirements. Plaintiff fails to identify any particular
facts regarding WaMus supposed expectations or misrepresentations as they relate to
Plaintiffs loan. Instead, Plaintiff generally asserts that WaMu engaged in a predatory
lending scheme with respect to unqualified borrowers in 2006 and 2007. (SAC 46, 55.)
As to Plaintiffs specific loan, Plaintiff only alleges, in a conclusory fashion, that WaMu
expected he would default, that WaMu pre-sold Plaintiffs mortgage[,] and that WaMus
economic interests were adverse to Plaintiffs interests. (See SAC 48, 49, 51.) These
allegations do not meet the requisite heightened pleading standard under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b) because they do not set forth the times, dates, places, benefits received,
and other details of the alleged fraudulent activity nor do they allege the names of the
persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom
they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. See Neubronner, 6
F.3d at 672; Saldate, 686 F. Supp. at 1065. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allegation that the
investment bank intended to short the portfolio is irrelevant as the investment bank, which
Plaintiff fails to identify, is not a party to this action. (SAC 49.) Without specific
information regarding WaMus alleged fraudulent activity, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b), Plaintiffs claim must fail. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs fourth claim for No Contract. Because Plaintiff has
previously been granted leave to amend this claim, has again failed to sufficiently plead his
allegations, and it appears that further leave to amend will likely prove futile, Plaintiffs
fourth claim for No Contract is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B. Plaintiffs First Claim for Violation of California Civil Code 2923.5
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California Civil Code section 2923.5 requires a declaration that the mortgagee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent has contacted the borrower, has tried with due diligence to
contact the borrower as required by this section, or that no contact was required pursuant to
subdivision (h). CAL. CIV. CODE 2923.5(b). Courts agree that nothing in this statute
requires that a declaration of compliance with section 2923.5 be signed by a person with
personal knowledge. See Pantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1177,
1186 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2009). Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiffs claim under section
2923.5 is predicated on the fact that the person who signed the Declaration of Compliance
did not have personal knowledge of the facts contained therein, it is insufficient. Indeed, the
Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs claim in his FAC on this very ground. (See Dkt. No.
28 at 4-5.) However, Plaintiffs SAC cures the remaining deficiencies with respect to this
claim. Rather than solely attacking the personal knowledge of the signer of the Declaration
of Compliance, Plaintiff alleges that JPMorgan
did not contact Plaintiff or [his attorney], either in person or by telephone, to
discuss Plaintiffs financial condition and the impending foreclosure.
[JPMorgan] did not call, it did not write, and it did not provide a toll-free HUD
number to Plaintiff or his lawyer. [JPMorgan] did not offer to meet with
(SAC 22.) JPMorgan attempts to controvert Plaintiffs assertion with the Declaration of
Compliance itself. However, Plaintiff claims that the person who signed the Declaration of
Compliance either had no personal knowledge or misrepresented the facts. Taking the facts
as alleged in Plaintiffs SAC as true, which the Court must do when deciding a motion to
dismiss, Plaintiffs first claim for violation of California Civil Code section 2923.5 is
sufficient. Accordingly, Defendants Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs first claim.
C. Plaintiffs Second Claim for Wrongful Foreclosure and Fifth Claim to
Quiet Title
Plaintiffs second claim for wrongful foreclosure and fifth claim to quiet title are based
on his allegations that JPMorgan does not own the note and that JPMorgan cannot produce
an original promissory note. (SAC 17, 18.) In his FAC, Plaintiff simply concluded that
WaMu transferred all beneficial interest in the loan to a private investor. (FAC 15.)
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Standing alone, the Court found that this allegation was merely a legal conclusion and did
not raise a right to relief above the speculative level. (See Dkt. No. 28 at 3 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).) Plaintiff, however, has cured this deficiency by alleging facts
in his SAC to support these claims. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that between November
15 and November 30, 2007, WaMu transferred Plaintiffs Note to Washington Mutual
Mortgage Securities Corporation. (SAC 14.) Plaintiff claims that the Note was then sold
to an investment trust and became part of, or was subject to, a Loan Pool, a Pooling and
Servicing Agreement, a Collateralized Debt Obligation, a Mortgage-Backed Security, a
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate, a Credit Default Swap, an Investment Trust, and/or a
Special Purpose Vehicle. (SAC 14.) Plaintiff identifies the security as Standard & Poor
CUSIP # 31379XQC2, Pool Number 432551. (SAC 14.) The Court must accept these
facts as true when deciding a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Coupled with
Plaintiffs allegation that JPMorgan never properly recorded its claim of ownership in the
Subject Property, (SAC 16), the abovementioned facts regarding the transfer of Plaintiffs
Note prior to JPMorgans acquisition of WaMus assets raise Plaintiffs right to relief above
a speculative level. Furthermore, in the face of these specific factual allegations, JPMorgans
assertion that the P&A Agreement suffices to establish their ownership of the Note is no
longer viable. Indeed, the P&A Agreement does not specifically identify Plaintiffs Note.
(See Dkt. No. 10, Exh. 2.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff has now sufficiently alleged that JPMorgan did not
own his Note and therefore did not have the right to foreclose. Accordingly, the Court
DENIES Defendants Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs second claim for
wrongful foreclosure and fifth claim to quiet title.
D. Plaintiffs Third Claim for Quasi Contract
Plaintiff seeks restitution by alleging that JPMorgan was unjustly enriched by any
payments he made to [JPMorgan] that were not paid to the lender or beneficiary, if any.
(SAC 44.) The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs claim for restitution because
Plaintiffs argument [was] based on his assertion that JPMorgan is not the owner, a holder,
or a beneficiary under the note. (See Dkt. No. 28 at 5.) As the Court noted above, however,
Plaintiff has cured any deficiencies with respect to this assertion. While JPMorgan correctly
contends that unjust enrichment, restitution, or quasi contract are not independent causes of
action, (Mot. at 7), as previously discussed, Plaintiffs allegations that JPMorgan did not own
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his Note have been sufficiently alleged. Consequently, if indeed JPMorgan did not own the
Note yet received payments therefrom, those payments may have been received unjustly.
Accordingly, Defendants Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs third claim for quasi contract.
E. Plaintiffs Sixth Claim for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Plaintiffs sixth claim for declaratory and injunctive relief seeks a judicial
determination of his rights and duties as to the Note and DOT, and JPMorgans rights to
proceed with a non-judicial foreclosure on the Subject Property. (SAC 68.) Additionally,
Plaintiff seeks a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction restraining
JPMorgan from conducting a Trustees Sale of the Subject Property during the pendency of
this action. (SAC, Prayer 1.)
As to Plaintiffs claim for declaratory relief, the Declaratory Judgment Act states that
[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States .
. . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration. 28 U.S.C. 2201(a). Jurisdiction to award declaratory relief exists only in
a case of actual controversy. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kearns, 15 F.3d 142, 143 (9th Cir.
1994). Consequently, the Ninth Circuit instructs district courts to first determine whether
there is an actual controversy within its jurisdiction. Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 394
F.3d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 2005). If the court finds that an actual controversy exists, it must
next decide whether to exercise its jurisdiction by analyzing the factors enumerated in
Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942). The Brillhart factors require the Court to
(1) avoid needless determination of state law issues; (2) discourage litigants from filing
declaratory actions as a means of forum shopping; and (3) avoid duplicative litigation.
Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495.
Here, Plaintiff contends an actual controversy has arisen in whether: (1) JPMorgan is
the present owner and beneficiary of the note; (2) JPMorgan is entitled to sell the Property;
and (3) CRC is a trustee duly authorized to file a Notice of Default or a Notice of Trustees
Sale. (SAC 67.) As the Court noted above, Plaintiff has cured the deficiencies with
respect to these allegations. Consequently, the Court finds that an actual controversy exists.
Furthermore, none of the Brillhart factors suggest that the Court should refrain from
entertaining Plaintiffs claim for declaratory relief. Accordingly, Defendants Motion to
Dismiss is DENIED as to Plaintiffs sixth claim for declaratory relief.
O
As to Plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief, the Court was already presented with this
issue on October 29, 2010 and denied Plaintiffs ex parte application for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. (Dkt. No. 6.) Plaintiff, however, has now
pleaded additional facts that may support such a request. Therefore, Plaintiff is not
precluded from bringing another ex parte application if he so chooses. Additionally,
Plaintiff seeks that JPMorgan be forever enjoined and restrained from selling the Subject
Property. (SAC, Prayer 2.) As a general rule, a permanent injunction will be granted
when liability has been established and there is a threat of continuing violations. MAI Sys.
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, Plaintiff has
properly pleaded his underlying claims and Defendant may therefore be found liable at a
later stage of the litigation. Consequently, Defendants Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs
sixth claim for injunctive relief.
F. Plaintiffs Seventh Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To successfully plead a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under
California law, Plaintiff must allege (1) [JPMorgan]s extreme and outrageous conduct; (2)
that [JPMorgan] intended to cause, or recklessly disregarded the probability of causing,
emotional distress; (3) that [P]laintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4)
actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by [JPMorgan]s outrageous
conduct. Davenport v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 725 F. Supp. 2d 862, 883-84 (N.D. Cal.
2010); see also Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 571 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth the same
elements). Outrageous conduct is that which is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that
usually tolerated in a civilized community. Id. at 884. Moreover, [f]or emotional distress
to be severe, it must be of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable
man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it. Grant v. WMC Mortg. Corp.,
No. CIV 2:10-1117 WBS KJN, 2010 WL 2509415 at *2 (E.D. Cal., June 17, 2010).
In support of his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, Plaintiff alleges that
JPMorgan cashed Plaintiffs monthly checks and kept the money when it had no right to
do so. (SAC 73.) Plaintiff further alleges that JPMorgan ignored Plaintiffs letters
requesting alternative options to foreclosure and that JPMorgan fraudulently transferred the
DOT. (SAC 74, 75.) While Plaintiff concludes that these acts and omissions . . .
O
constitute extreme and outrageous conduct, and that JPMorgan engaged in such conduct
either intentionally or with reckless disregard as to the effect on Plaintiff[,](SAC 76, 77),
Plaintiff fails to point the Court to any case law to support his contention that such acts
associated with foreclosure, even if wrongful, are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that
usually tolerated in a civilized community. See Davenport, LP, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 884.
Moreover, [f]or emotional distress to be severe, it must be of such substantial quantity or
enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure
it. Grant v. WMC Mortg. Corp., No. CIV 2:10-1117 WBS KJN, 2010 WL 2509415 at *2
(E.D. Cal., June 17, 2010). Plaintiff makes absolutely no factual allegations with respect to
the severity of his emotional distress in terms of either quantity or quality. Rather, Plaintiff
merely states that he has suffered emotional distress in the amount of $5,000,000. (SAC
78.) Such labels and conclusions are insufficient. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Ultimately, Plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is nothing more
than a formulaic recitation of the elements[,] which simply will not do. See id.
Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs seventh claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because Plaintiff has previously been granted
leave to amend this claim, has again failed to sufficiently plead his allegations, and it appears
that further leave to amend will likely prove futile, Plaintiffs seventh claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in Part and
DENIED in Part. Plaintiffs second claim for wrongful foreclosure, fifth claim for quiet
title, first claim for violation of California Civil Code section 2923.5, third claim for quasi
contract, and sixth claim for declaratory and injunctive relief survive Defendants Motion
to Dismiss. Conversely, Plaintiffs fourth claim for no contract and seventh claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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tbacon@,AlvaradoSmith.com
FRANCES Q. JETT (CA BarNo. 175612)
fjett@,AlvaraaoSmith.com
DA VlD J. MASUT ANI (CA Bar No. 172305)
dmasutani@AlvaradoSmlth.com
AL VARADOSMITH
A Corporation
633 W. 5 J Street, Suite 1100
Tel: (213) 229-2400
Fax: (213) 229-2499
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. ,
UNITED STATES DISTRlCT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRlCT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION
DARYOUSHJAVAHERl,
Plaintiff,
v.
CALIFORNIA RECONVEYANCE
COMPANY and DOES 1-150, inclusive,
Defendant.
CASE NO.: CV-1O-8185 ODW (FFMx)
ANSWER BY DEFENDANT
JPMORGAN BANK, N.A, TO
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Trial Date:
Action Filed:
None Set
October 29,2010
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., ("JPMorgan") answers the Second
Amended Complaint ("SAC") of plaintiff Daryoush Javaheri ("Plaintiff') as follows:
lntrodllction
1. In response to paragraph 1 of the SAC, as to the allegations concerning
Washington Mutual Bank, FA, JPMorgan lacks sufficient information to fOlm a belief
as to the truth of the allegations and therefore denies. As to all other allegations,
JPMorgan denies the allegations contained therein.
2. In response to paragraph 2 of the SAC, JPMorgan lacks knowledge and
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information sufficient to fOlm a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in
said paragraph and therefore denies each and every allegation therein.
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in
Parties and Jurisdiction
4. In response to paragraph 4 of the SAC, based upon information and
belief, JPMorgan admits the allegations set forth therein.
5. In response to paragraph 5 of the SAC, JPMorgan states that it is a
national banking association authori zed to do business in the State of Califomia.
JPMorgan denies that it is a corporation. As to the remaining allegations, JPMorgan
admits it is the current servicer and owner of the Subject Loan.
6. In response to paragraph 6 of the SAC, JPMorgan denies that the loan has
been securitized. Except as expressly alleged, JPMorgan lacks knowledge and
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth ofthe allegations contained in
7. In response to paragraph 7 of the SAC, the allegations in this paragraph
contain legal conclusions as to which no answer is necessary.
Jury Trial Demand
contain legal conclusions as to which no answer is necessary. To the extent that the
paragraph contains allegations of fact directed against JPMorgan, JPMorgan lacks
knowledge and infomlation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations
contained in said paragraph and therefore deny each and every allegation therein.
Claims for Relief
9. In response to paragraph 9 of the SAC, JPMorgan denies the allegations
contained therein.
III
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Background Facts
10. In response to paragraph JO of the SAC, JPMorgan, based upon
information and belief, admits the allegations therein.
information sufficient to form a beliefas to the truth ofthe allegations contained in
12. In response to paragraph 12 of the SAC, JPMorgan admits that Plaintiff
executed a Fixed I Adjustable Rate Note ("Subject Note") in the amount of
$2,660,000.00 payable to Washington Mutual Bank, FA. JPMorgan further admits
Plaintiff executed the DOT. As to the remaining allegations, Defendant lacks
knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth ofthe allegations
contained in said paragraph and therefore denies each and every remaining allegation
therein.
13. In response to paragraph 13 of the SAC, JPMorgan admits the allegations
contained therein.
therein.
15. In response to paragraph 15 of the SAC, JPMorgan admits that it is the
owner and servicer of the Loan.
contained therein.
17. In response to paragraph 17 of the SAC, JPMorgan admits that on August
16, 2010, California Reconveyance Company ("CRC") caused to be recorded a Notice
of Sale ("NOS") which set the date of the trustees' sale of the Subject Property as
September 7, 20 I 0, and that the document is the best evidence of its contents and
speaks for itself.
III
III
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Civil Code Section 2923.5
18. In response to paragraph 18 of the SAC, JPMorgan re-alleges and
incorporates by reference paragraphs I through 17 as if set forth herein.
contained therein.
20. In response to paragraph 20 of the SAC, JPMorgan admits that it
received the subject letter, but denies that it was not working to assist the Plaintiff.
21. In response to paragraph 21 of the SAC, the allegations in thi s paragraph
therein.
24. In response to paragraph 24 of the SAC, JPMorgan admits that it sent
Exhibit 7 to the Complaint, but denies the remaining allegations.
25. In response to paragraph 25 of the SAC, JPMorgan admits on or about
May 14,2010, CRC caused a Notice of Default concerning the Subject Property to be
recorded with the Los Angeles County Recorder's Office. Defendant admits the
remaining allegations contained in paragraph 25.
contained therein.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Wrongful Foreclosure
incorporates by reference paragraphs I through 26 as if set forth herein.
28. In response to paragraph 28 ofthe SAC, JPMorgan denies the allegations
therein.
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29. In response to paragraph 29 of the SAC, JPMorgan alleges no recorded
transfer was necessary as it acquired the Loan from the FDIC pursuant to a Purchase
and Assumption Agreement dated September 25, 2008 .
30. In response to paragraph 30 of the SAC, JPMorgan denies the
allegations therein.
therein.
32. In response to paragraph 32 of the SAC, JPMorgan admits that the
Subject Note speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its contents.
33. In response to paragraph 33 of the SAC, JPMorgan admits that the DOT
speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its contents.
therein.
35. In response to paragraph 35 of the SAC, JPMorgan admits that paragraph
24 of the DOT speaks for itself. As to the remaining allegations, JPMorgan denies
each and every allegation therein.
36. In response to paragraph 36 of the SAC, JPMorgan admits that on about
May 3, 2010 CRC caused to be recorded a substitution of trustee. Defendant denies
Deborah Brignac's signature is a forgery.
37. In response to paragraph 37 of the SAC, JPMorgan denies the subject
signature is a forgery.
38. In response to paragraph 38 of the SAC, JPMorgan admits that on or
about May 14,2010, CRC caused to be recorded a Notice of Default ("NOD")
regarding the Subject Propeliy which was signed by Silvia Freeberg. As to the
remaining allegations, JPMorgan admits it is described as beneficiary in the
Declaration of Compliance. JPMorgan admits that Washington Mutual is described in
the NOD as the original beneficiary. JPMorgan denies the loan was sold in 2006.
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contained therein.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Quasi Contract
40. In response to paragraph 40 of the SAC, IPMorgan re-alleges and
incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 39 as if set fOlth herein.
contained therein.
contained therein.
43. In response to paragraph 43 of the SAC, JPMorgan admits that paragraph
23 of the DOT speaks for itself. As to the remaining allegations, JPMorgan denies the
allegations therein.
paragraph contains allegations of fact directed against JPMorgan, IPMorgan denies
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
No Contract
45. In response to paragraph 45 of the SAC, as this claim has been dismissed
with prejudice, no response to this paragraph is required.
47. In response to paragraph 47 of the SAC, as thi s claim has been dismissed
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with prej udice, no response to this paragraph is required.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Quiet Title
incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 44 as if set forth herein.
paragraph contains allegations of fact directed against JPMorgan, JPMorgan lacks
knowledge and infonnation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations
contained in said paragraph and therefore deny each and every allegation therein.
61. In response to paragraph 61 of the SAC, based upon information and
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belief, JPMorgan admits the allegations therein.
contained therein.
contained therein.
contained therein.
paragraph contains allegations of fact directed against JPMorgan, JPMorgan denies
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 44, and 69 through 65 as if set forth
herein.
contained therein.
contained therein.
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paragraph contains allegations of fact directed against lPMorgan, JPMorgan denies
each and every allegation therein, that it acted improperly or that it caused any
damage to Plaintiff.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
As separate and distinct affirmative defenses to the SAC on file in this action,
JPMorgan alleges as follows:
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to State a Claim for Relief)
I . The SAC, and each claim asserted in the SAC, fails to set fOlth facts
sufficient to constitute a claim for relief against JPMorgan.
III
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#:947
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SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Waiver)
2. Plaintiff is balTed by the equitable doctrine of waiver from obtaining any
relief as against JPMorgan.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Estoppel)
3. Plaintiff is estopped from asserting and/or recovering on any claims
against JPMorgan by reason of Plaintiff's own acts, omissions, and conduct.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Unclean Hands)
4. Plaintiff is balTed by the equitable doctrine of unclean hands from
asserting any claim against JPMorgan.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Privilege)
5. The SAC, and each claim asserted in the SAC, is baiTed by virtue ofthe
fact that all of the acts alleged to have been performed by JPMorgan were privileged
or justified, if performed at all.
SIXTH AFFIRM A TIVE DEFENSE
(Unjust Enrichment)
6. The SAC, and each claim asselied in the SAC, is balTed by virtue of the
fact that Plaintiff would be unjustly enriched to the detriment of JPMorgan.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Offset)
7. The SAC, and each claim asselied in the SAC, is balTed, in whole or part,
by virtue of offsets to which JPMorgan is entitled by way of Plaintiff's wrongful
conduct.
III
III
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EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Ratification)
8. The SAC, and each claim asserted in the SAC, is ban'ed by Plaintiff's
ratification of the actions allegedly undertaken.
NINTH AFFIRMA TlVE DEFENSE
(Consent)
9. The SAC, and each claim asserted in the SAC, is barred by Plaintiff's
consent.
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Comparative Fault)
10. Plaintiff's recovery, if any, must be reduced proportionately to the extent
that any damages alleged by Plaintiff are caused and contributed to by Plaintiff's own
action or actions by third parties.
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to Mitigate)
11. Plaintiff is barred from recovering monetary damages from JPMorgan or
any other relief against JPMorgan to the extent Plaintiff failed to mitigate or
reasonably attempt to mitigate the damages as required by law.
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Right to Add Additional Affirmative Defenses)
12. JPMorgan allege that they cannot fully anticipate all affirmative defenses
that may be applicable to the within action. Accordingly, the right to assert additional
affirmative defenses, if and to the extent that such affirmative defenses are applicable,
is hereby reserved.
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Equitable Lien)
13. Defendant alleges that it is entitled to an equitable lien in the amount that
its loan paid off existing loans secured by the subject property.
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FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Good Faith Encumbrancer)
14. Defendant alleges that its security interests in the subject property should
stand, as Defendant is a good-faith encumbrancer for value which took its interests
without actual or record notice of any adverse claims.
WHEREFORE, IPMorgan prays:
1. That Plaintiff takes nothing by his SAC;
2. For dismissal of the SAC against JPMorgan with prejudice;
3. For attorneys' fees as permitted by law or contract and costs of suit; and
4. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
DATED: June 28, 2011
ALVARADOSMITH
209 1987. 1
THEODORE E. BACON
FRANCES Q. JEIT
DAVID J. MASUTANI
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
12
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Dar yoush Javaher i v. JP Mor gan Chase Bank NA
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Pl ai nt i f f : Daryoush Javaheri
Def endant s: Does and JP Morgan Chase Bank NA

Case Number : 2: 2011cv10072
Fi l ed: December 5, 2011

Cour t : California Cent ral Dist rict Court
Pr esi di ng Judge: John F. Walt er
Ref er r i ng Judge: Fernando M. Olguin

Nat ur e of Sui t : Ot her - Ot her

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Sear ch f or t hi s case: Dar yoush Javaher i v. JP Mor gan Chase Bank NA et al
Pl ai nt i f f : Dar yoush Javaher i
Represent ed By: Douglas Crawford Gillies
Def endant : Does
Def endant : JP Mor gan Chase Bank NA
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(FFMx), DISCOVERY, MANADR, RELATED-G

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA (Western Division - Los Angeles)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:11-cv-10072-ODW-FFM

Daryoush Javaheri v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA et
al
Assigned to: Judge Otis D Wright, II
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm
Demand: $145,000
Related Case: 2:10-cv-08185-ODW -FFM
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive & Declaratory
Relief

Date Filed: 12/05/2011
Jury Demand: Plaintiff
Nature of Suit: 220 Real Property:
Foreclosure
Jurisdiction: Diversity
Plaintiff
Daryoush Javaheri represented by Douglas Crawford Gillies
Douglas Gillies
Attorney at Law
3756 Torino Drive
805-682-7033
Email: douglasgillies@gmail.com

V.

Defendant
JP Morgan Chase Bank NA represented by David J Masutani
Anglin Flewelling Rasmussen
Campbell & Trytten LLP
199 South Los Robles Avenue
Suite 600
Pasadena, CA 91101-2459
626-535-1900
Fax: 626-577-7764
Email:
dmasutani@alvaradosmith.com

Defendant
Does
1-10 inclusive

Date Filed # Docket Text
12/05/2011 1 COMPLAINT against Defendants Does, JP Morgan Chase Bank NA.
Case assigned to Judge John F. Walter for all further proceedings.
Discovery referred to Magistrate Judge Fernando M. Olguin. (Filing
fee $ 350 Paid.) Jury Demanded., filed by Plaintiff Daryoush
Javaheri. (et) (mg). (Entered: 12/06/2011)
12/05/2011 21 DAY Summons Issued re Complaint - (Discovery) 1 as to
Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank NA. (et) (Entered: 12/06/2011)
12/05/2011 2 CERTIFICATION AND NOTICE of Interested Parties filed by
Plaintiff Daryoush Javaheri. (et) (mg). (Entered: 12/06/2011)
12/05/2011 3 NOTICE TO PARTIES OF ADR PROGRAM filed. (et) (Entered:
12/06/2011)
12/07/2011 4 NOTICE Lis Pendens filed by Plaintiff Daryoush Javaheri. (Gillies,
Douglas) (Entered: 12/07/2011)
12/07/2011 5 STANDING ORDER by Judge John F. Walter: READ THIS ORDER
CAREFULLY. IT CONTROLS THE CASE AND DIFFERS IN
SOME RESPECTS FROM THE LOCAL RULES. Counsel are
ORDERED to deliver 2 copies of all documents filed electronically in
this action to Chambers. For each document filed electronically, one
copy shall be marked CHAMBERS COPY and the other copy shall
be marked COURTESY COPY. (kbr) (Entered: 12/07/2011)
12/14/2011 6 ORDER RE TRANSFER PURSUANT TO GENERAL ORDER 08-
05 -Related Case- filed. Related Case No: CV 10-08185
ODW(FFMx). Case transferred from Magistrate Judge Fernando M.
Olguin and Judge John F. Walter to Judge Otis D Wright, II and
Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm for all further proceedings. The
case number will now reflect the initials of the transferee Judge CV
11-10072 ODW(FFMx).Signed by Judge Otis D Wright, II (rn)
(Entered: 12/14/2011)
12/14/2011 7 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Judge Otis D Wright, II:This
action has been assigned to the calendar of Judge Otis D. Wright II.
Counsel are encouraged to review the Central Districts website for
additional information.It is not necessary to clear a motion date with
the Court Clerk prior to filling the motion. The Court hears motions
on Mondays, Criminal at 10:00 a.m. and Civil at 1:30 p.m. The Court
requires delivery of one non-blue backed Mandatory Chambers
Copies of only the following manual and electronically filed
documents to Judge Wrights document box outside the entrance to
chambers near courtrooms 10 and 12: (1) All noticed motion and
related documents; (2) All ex parte applications and related
documents; and (3) All exhibits and attachments must be separately
tabbed. [ Refer to the Courts General Order No. 10-07 regarding ECF
Courtesy paper Copies.] Attention ECF Attorneys- Chambers Email
Addresses are available under your Utilities menu. (lc) (Entered:
12/15/2011)
12/28/2011 8 Joint STIPULATION Extending Time to Answer the complaint as to
JP Morgan Chase Bank NA answer now due 1/27/2012, re Complaint
- (Discovery), Complaint - (Discovery) 1 filed by Defendant JP
Morgan Chase Bank NA.(Masutani, David) (Entered: 12/28/2011)

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Case 2:11-cv-10072-ODW-FFM Document 1 Filed 12/05/11 Page 1 of 74 Page ID #:25

Complaint - Javaheri v. Chase - 2 -

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INDEX
IN1kCDUC1ICN 3
Ak1ILS AND IUkISDIC1ICN 4
IUk 1kIAL DLMAND S
CLAIM ICk kLLILI S
8ACkGkCUND IAC1S 6
IIkS1 CAUSL CI AC1ICN - WkCNGIUL ICkLCLCSUkL 7
SLCCND CAUSL CI AC1ICN - UASI CCN1kAC1 10
1nIkD CAUSL CI AC1ICN - UIL1 1I1LL 11
ICUk1n CAUSL CI AC1ICN - DLCLAkA1Ck & INIUNC1IVL kLLILI 12
III1n CAUSL CI AC1ICN - NC CCN1kAC1 (IkAUD) 13
kALk 16
VLkIIICA1ICN 17
LAIN1III'S LxnI8I1S 18


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INTRODUCTION
1. During the first decade of the 21
st
Century, Washington Mutual Bank, FA
(WaMu) and JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA (Chase), and other banks abandoned
traditional underwriting practices and contributed to a frenzy of real estate
speculation by issuing predatory loans that ultimately lowered property values in
the United States by 30-60%. Kerry Killinger, CEO of WaMu, took home more
than $100 million during the seven years he steered WaMu into bankruptcy. In
March 2011, the FDIC filed a sixty-page complaint against Killinger and Stephen
Rotella, WaMu COO, alleging gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and
fraudulent transfers. FDIC v. Kerry Killinger, Stephen Rotella, et. al., Case No.
2:11-cv-00459 (WD WA). Defendants have not yet filed answers to the complaint
(Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion Protective Order, filed 9/21/11, Document 80).
2. WaMu issued an unprecedented number of predatory loans between 2001
and 2008 knowing that borrowers, including Plaintiff, would default and lose their
property. WaMu filled in fictitious inflated figures on Plaintiff's loan application so
that it would meet underwriting guidelines and WaMu would collect inflated fees
when it sold the loan to investors and then acted as servicer without taking any risk
of loss when the borrower defaulted. Such blatant, systematic, and unregulated acts
of fraud constituted a criminal enterprise. As a direct, proximate result of WaMu's
behavior, countless families have lost their homes while courts deny borrowers the
opportunity to conduct discovery in order to determine who owns their loans.
3. Plaintiff DARYOUSH JAVAHERI is facing foreclosure of his
condominium at a Trustee's Sale scheduled for December 12, 2011. The loan
application Plaintiff submitted to Washington Mutual consisted only of his name
and address and three account numbers. Plaintiff's Universal Residential Loan
Application was filled in by employees of WaMu to meet underwriting standards
so that WaMu would collect fees when it sold the loan to unsuspecting investors in
mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations.


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PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
4. Plaintiff DARYOUSH JAVAHERI is the owner of the single-family
condominium located at 10660 Wilshire Blvd #1401, Los Angeles, California
90024, APN 4326-001-153 (the Wilshire Property). He acquired it by a Grant
Deed recorded on December 19, 1995 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1).
The legal description is:
A condominium composed of:
Parcel 1:
(A) An undivided 1/132
nd
interest in and to Lot 1 of Tract No. 39372, in the
City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, State of California, as per map
recorded in Book 987, Pages 32 and 33 of maps, in the Office of the County
Recorder of said County.
Except therefrom all of the 132 units of Tract 39372 as shown and defined
on the Condominium Plan, recorded September 23, 1981 as Instrument No.
81-946528, Official Records, of said County.
(B) Unit 1401, as shown and defined on the condominium plan referred to
above.
Parcel 2:
An exclusive easement, appurtenant to Parcel 1 above, for parking purposes,
over that portion of Lot 1 of said Tract 39372, shown as parking spaces 235
and 236 on the parking plan attached to the declaration of restrictions,
recorded September 23, 1981 as Instrument No. 81-946527, Official
Records.
Parcel 3:
An exclusive easement appurtenant to Parcel 1 above, for maids rooms over
that portion of Lot 1 of said Tract No. 39372, as shown as Areas 138-MR as
shown and defined on Condominium Plan referred to above.
5. Defendant JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,


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(Chase), a New York corporation licensed to do business in California, claims to
be a note holder, beneficiary, or servicer of a Note secured by the Wilshire
Property.
6. Defendants Does 1-50, inclusive, are sued under fictitious names. When
their true names and capacities are known, Plaintiff will amend this Complaint and
insert their names and capacities. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon
alleges that each of these fictitiously named defendants is legally responsible,
negligently or in some other actionable manner, for the events and happenings
hereinafter referred to and proximately caused the injuries and damages to plaintiff
as hereinafter alleged, or claims some right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the
property adverse to Plaintiffs title. Their claims constitute a cloud on Plaintiffs
title to the property, or they participated in unlawful or fraudulent acts that resulted
in injury to Plaintiff's person or property. Upon information and belief, Does 1-30
claim to be successors in interest to the Subject Mortgage by virtue of Plaintiff's
loan having been made a part of a securitization process wherein certain residential
mortgages and promissory notes were securitized by aggregating a large number of
promissory notes into a mortgage loan pool, then selling security interests in that
pool of mortgages to investors by way of Secondary Vehicles.
7. There is diversity of citizenship between Plaintiff and Defendant Chase,
and the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of
$75,000. This court has jurisdiction of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332(a).
Declaratory relief is authorized under 28 U.S.C. 2210.

JURY TRIAL DEMAND
8. Plaintiff demands a jury trial on all issues.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF
9. Plaintiff brings this action against Chase and Does 1 through 50 for


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attempting to sell Plaintiff's Wilshire Property at a trustee's sale and deprive
Plaintiff of his property without a lawful claim. Plaintiff seeks to clear his title.

BACKGROUND FACTS
10. Plaintiff is the owner of the Wilshire Property under the terms of a Grant
Deed executed by Julie Gilbert in favor of Daryoush Javaheri on November 20,
1995 (Exhibit 1).
11. Plaintiff's Residential Loan Application (Exhibit 2), Adjustable Rate
Note (Exhibit 3) and Deed of Trust (Exhibit 4) are dated December 6, 2006.
12. Plaintiff is named as Borrower on the Note and on the Deed of Trust
dated December 6, 2006 ("DOT"). Washington Mutual Bank, FA is identified on
the Note and Deed of Trust as "Lender."
13. Between December 14 and 31, 2006, WaMu transferred Plaintiff's Note
to Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation. An Assignment of Deed
of Trust dated May 18, 2010 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5), indicates that the Note was
sold to Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007-HY1
Trust and became a part of, or was subject to, a Loan Pool, a Pooling and Servicing
Agreement, a Collateralized Debt Obligation, a Mortgage-Backed Security, a
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate, an Investment Trust, and/or a Special Purpose
Vehicle. Thereafter, WaMu acted solely as a servicer of the loan, and was neither a
Lender nor a Beneficiary after December 2006. The closing date for Series 2007-
HY1 REMIC Trust was January 24, 2007, which was the cut-off date for adding
loans or securities to the pool under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement and New
York State trust and securities law. The Assignment of DOT (Exhibit 5) is invalid.
14. CHASE claims to be a note holder, lender, beneficiary, or servicer of the
Subject Mortgage, but Chase did not record a claim of ownership of the mortgage.
15. California Reconveyance Company (CRC), a wholly owned subsidiary
of Chase, filed a Notice of Default (Exhibit 6) against the Property on 5/20/2010.


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16. On or about November 18, 2011, CRC recorded a Notice of Trustee's
Sale ("NOTS") stating that the Wilshire Property would be sold at public auction
on December 12, 2011 (Exhibit 7). The NOTS bears the purported signature of
Marco Rivera, Assistant Secretary of California Reconveyance Company. Chase is
not named on the NOTS.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE
18. Days after WaMu originated the loan, WaMu transferred all beneficial
interest in the loan to an investment pool: the Series 2007-HY1 REMIC Trust.
19. Neither WaMu, CRC, nor Chase has recorded a transfer of beneficial
interest in Plaintiff's note to Chase.
20. Chase does not have standing to enforce the Note because Chase is not
the owner of the Note, Chase is not a holder of the Note, and Chase is not a
beneficiary under the Note. Chase does not claim to be a holder of the Note or a
beneficiary. Chase is merely named as a contact in the Notice of Default. If Chase
could prove that it is a servicer, Chase could not foreclose on Plaintiff's property
without authorization from the Lender under Paragraph 22 of the Deed of Trust.
21. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Chase cannot produce an original
Note because Chase does not own the loan and cannot identify the owner of the
loan. Chase did not purchase the loan when it took assumed certain assets of
WaMu in September 2008 because WaMu had sold its beneficial interest in the
loan two years earlier. Plaintiff's loan was not identified as an asset in the Purchase
and Assumption Agreement under which Chase purchased certain assets of WaMu.
22. A power of sale is conferred by the mortgage under Cal. Civ. Code
2924. The Adjustable Rate Note states, "Lender or anyone who takes this Note by
transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under this Note is called the "Note


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Holder." The Note states in paragraph 7(C): "Notice of Default. If I am in default,
the Note Holder may send me a written notice telling me that if I do not pay the
overdue amount by a certain date, the Note Holder may require me to pay
immediately the full amount." The Note gives the right to collect, if timely
payments are not made, to the Lender and anyone who takes the Note by transfer.
This does not include a servicer who is not the Note Holder.
23. According to Plaintiff's Deed of Trust, the "Lender" is WASHINGTON
MUTUAL BANK, FA.
Consistent with the language of the Note, only the Lender is authorized
under paragraph 22 of the DOT to accelerate the loan:
"Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration
following Borrower's breach of any covenant of agreement in this
Security Instrument
"If Lender invokes the power of sale, Lender shall execute or
cause Trustee to execute a written notice of the occurrence of an event
of default and of Lender's election to cause the Property to be sold.
Trustee shall cause this notice to be recorded in each county in which
any part of the Property is located." (DOT page 13, paragraph 22).
24. Washington Mutual Bank remained the Lender for no more than a few
days until it sold the loan. Thereafter, it was, at most, a servicer of the loan. The
Note Holder or Lender was the Investment Trust or that funded the loan.
25. Paragraph 24 of the DOT (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) states:
24. Substitute Trustee. Lender, at its option, may from time to time
appoint a successor trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder by an
instrument executed and acknowledged by Lender and recorded in the
office of the Recorder of the county in which the property is located.
The instrument shall contain the name of the original Lender, Trustee
and Borrower, the book and page where this Security Instrument is


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recorded and the name and address of the successor trustee. Without
reconveyance of the property, the successor trustee shall succeed to all
the title, powers and duties conferred upon the Trustee herein and by
Applicable Law. This procedure for substitution of trustee shall govern
to the exclusion of all other provisions for substitution.

Chase seeks to proceed with foreclosure of Plaintiff's property even though
it cannot identify the Lender.
26. On May 18, 2010, CRC recorded an Assignment of Deed of Trust
(Exhibit 5) signed by robosigner Colleen Irby, "Officer of JPMorgan Chase Bank".
No authority is cited for Chase to assign a beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust.
27. On May 20, 2010, CRC recorded a Notice of Default ("NOD"), attached
hereto as Exhibit 6, describing the Wilshire Property with instructions that Plaintiff
contact JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, in
Jacksonville, FL to stop the foreclosure. The NOD was signed by Luis Alvarado,
"Assistant Secretary". The "Declaration of Compliance (Cal Civil Code Section
2923.5(b)" attached to the NOD was signed under penalty of perjury by robosigner
Clement J. Durkin on behalf of JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association.
Chase is described in the Declaration of Compliance as "The undersigned
mortgagee, beneficiary or authorized agent." Washington Mutual is described in
the NOD as the beneficiary. However, Chase's interest in WaMu's assets was
acquired in September 2008, and WaMu's beneficial interest had terminated when
WaMu sold the Note to investors in 2006.
28. Chase was not the beneficiary and so Colleen Irby had no authority to act
on behalf of the beneficiary if and when she signed the Assignment of Deed of
Trust recorded on May 20, 2010. The Assignment of Deed of Trust was fraudulent,
so CRC was not authorized to initiate foreclosure against Plaintiff when it recorded
the Notice of Default, and it was not acting for the Lender when it filed the Notice
of Trustee's Sale. Therefore, the foreclosure pursuant to Trustee's Sale is illegal.


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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION QUASI CONTRACT
30. Chase demanded monthly mortgage payments from Plaintiff starting in
October 2008, and continued to collect payments from Plaintiff for approximately
six months. Plaintiff reasonably relied upon Chase's assertion that it was entitled to
payments.
31. Chase knowingly accepted the payments and retained them for its own
use knowing that WaMu was not a beneficiary under Plaintiff's Note on the date
that its assets were transferred to Chase and therefore Chase did not acquire any
right from WaMu to accept or keep Plaintiff's payments. It would be inequitable
for Chase to retain the payments it received from Plaintiff. The equitable remedy
of restitution when unjust enrichment has occurred is an obligation created by the
law without regard to the intention of the parties, and is designed to restore the
aggrieved party to his or her former position by return of the thing or its equivalent
in money.
32. The DOT states in Paragraph 23: "Upon payment of all sums secured
by this Security Instrument, Lender shall request Trustee to reconvey the Property
and shall surrender this Security Instrument and all notes evidencing debt secured
by this Security Instrument to Trustee." The obligations to WaMu under the DOT
were fulfilled when WaMu received the balance on the Note as proceeds of sale
through securitization to private investors. Chase has been unjustly enriched by
demanding and collecting monthly payments from Plaintiff in the amount of
$45,000.00.
33. Plaintiff seeks restitution for any payments he made to Chase that were
not paid to the lender or beneficiary, if any, and were unjustly retained by Chase.
Plaintiff also seeks damages in excess of $100,000 for depreciation to his Wilshire
Property as a result of the wrongful foreclosure proceedings initiated by Chase.


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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - QUIET TITLE
35. Plaintiff seeks to quiet title against the claims of Defendants and all
persons claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or adverse interest
in the Wilshire Property as of the date the Complaint was filed pursuant to Cal.
Code Civil Procedure 760.020.
36. Plaintiff is the titleholder of the Wilshire Property according to the
terms of his Grant Deed (Exhibit 1). WaMu securitized Plaintiff's single-family
residential mortgage loan through Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp.
Plaintiff is informed and believes that the lawful beneficiary has been paid in full.
The DOT states in paragraph 23:
23. Reconveyance. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security
Instrument, lender shall request Trustee to reconvey the Property and
shall surrender this Security Instrument and all notes evidencing debt
secured by this Security Instrument to trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the
Property without warranty to the person or persons legally entitled to it.
37. The DOT does not state that Plaintiff must pay all sums. It states that all
secured sums must be paid. The obligations owed to WaMu under the DOT were
fulfilled and the loan was fully paid when WaMu received the balance on the Note
as proceeds of sale through securitization of the loan and insurance proceeds from
Credit Default Swaps. Chase did not purchase the loan from the FDIC on 9/25/08.
38. Defendants claims are adverse to Plaintiff because defendants are not
Lenders or a holders of the Note, none of the defendants can prove any interest in
the Note or show that the Note is secured by the DOT, as well as for the reasons set
forth in the preceding causes of action. As such, Defendants have no right, title,
lien, or interest in the Wilshire Property.
39. Plaintiff therefore seeks a judicial declaration that the title to the


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Wilshire Property is vested solely in Plaintiff and that Defendants have no right,
title, estate, lien, or interest in the Property and that Defendants and each of them
are forever enjoined from asserting any right, title, lien or interest in the Property
adverse to Plaintiff.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - DECLARATORY & INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF
41. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and
Defendants concerning their respective rights and duties. Plaintiff contends that:
(a) Chase is not Lender, the present holder in due course, or beneficiary of a
Promissory Note executed by Plaintiff. However, Defendants contend that Chase is
the present owner and beneficiary of a Promissory Note executed by Plaintiff; and,
(b) Defendants are not real parties in interest, do not have standing, and are
not entitled to accelerate the maturity of any secured obligation and sell the
Wilshire Property because they are not a Lender, beneficiary or authorized agent of
a beneficiary under the purported Note. However, Defendants assert that they are
entitled to sell the Property.
42. Plaintiff desires a judicial determination of his rights and duties as to the
validity of the Note and DOT, and Defendants' rights to proceed with nonjudicial
foreclosure on the Wilshire Property. Unless restrained, Defendants will sell
Plaintiffs property, or cause it to be sold, to Plaintiffs great and irreparable injury,
for which pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief.
43. Defendants wrongful conduct, unless and until restrained by order of
this court, will cause great irreparable injury to Plaintiff as the value of the
property declines under threat of foreclosure and Plaintiff faces the prospect of
eviction.


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44. If the foreclosure sale is allowed to proceed, the burden on Plaintiff
significantly outweighs the benefit to Defendants, and each of them. By contrast,
if the foreclosure sale is enjoined, the burden to defendants is minimal and is not
outweighed by the benefit to Plaintiff.
45. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law for the injuries currently being
suffered and that are threatened. It will be impossible for Plaintiff to determine the
precise amount of damage that he will suffer if Defendants conduct is not
restrained and Plaintiff must file a multiplicity of suits to obtain compensation for
his injuries.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION - NO CONTRACT (FRAUD)
47. Plaintiff is informed and believes that WaMu routinely approved
predatory real estate loans to unqualified buyers in 2006 and implemented
unlawful lending practices by encouraging brokers and loan officers to falsify
borrowers' income and assets to meet underwriting guidelines when borrowers
were not qualified. WaMu employees falsified Plaintiff's Assets and Liabilities.
48. Plaintiff followed the instructions of WaMu Chief Loan Officer Jack
Skidmore when he submitted a Loan Application to WaMu that contained only his
name, address, phone number, social security number, and bank account number.
Mr. Skidmore employee filled out the application and presented it for Plaintiff's
signature on 12/6 showing the condominium's inflated market value as $17 million.
49. Plaintiff is informed and believes that WaMu pre-sold Plaintiff's
mortgage to investors based on inflated valuation. Immediately after he signed the
Note, WaMu transferred all of its interest in the Note to an investment bank that
bundled Plaintiff's Note with numerous other residential mortgages into residential
mortgage-backed securities ("RMBS") which were structured into synthetic


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collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs") and sold to investors in Washington
Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007-HY1 Trust.
50. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the investment bank intended to
short the portfolio it helped to select by entering into credit default swaps to buy
protection against the certain event that the promissory notes would default. WaMu
expected that Plaintiff would not have the ability to repay the loan. It was not just
that WaMu was unconcerned with a possible outcome that Plaintiff would default;
WaMu knew that he could not perform and expected him to default on the loan.
51. Washington Mutual Bank, the sponsor of the securitization transaction,
was a wholly owned subsidiary of Washington Mutual Inc. Securitization of
mortgage loans was an integral part of Washington Mutual Inc.'s management of
its capital. It engaged in securitizations of first lien single-family residential
mortgage loans through Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation, as
depositor, beginning in 2001. WaMu acted only as a servicer of Plaintiff's loan.
52. WaMu failed to disclose to Plaintiff that its economic interests were
adverse to Plaintiff and that WaMu expected to profit when Plaintiff found it
impossible to perform his obligation and defaulted on his mortgage.
53. A necessary element in the formation of an enforceable contract under
the common law is a meeting of the minds. Two or more parties must share some
expectation that a future event will occur. Plaintiff expected that he would borrow
money from WaMu, he would pay it back, and then he would own the Property.
WaMu expected that Plaintiff would borrow money, he would not be able to pay it
back, and then WaMu or the investors would own the Property. Since there was no
shared expectationno meeting of the mindsno contract was formed between
Plaintiff and WaMu when WaMu falsified his application to qualify for the loan.
54. In addition to WaMu's expectation that Plaintiff would lose title to the
Wilshire Property through foreclosure, WaMu anticipated transferring the Note to
investors immediately after Plaintiff signed the Note. Plaintiff is informed and


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believes that WaMu purchased credit default insurance so that WaMu would
receive the balance on the Note when Plaintiff defaulted, in addition to any money
WaMu received when it securitized the Note and sold it to investors.
55. Not only did WaMu dispense with conventional underwriting practices
in 2006, it also paid premium fees and other incentives to mortgage brokers who
signed up the riskiest borrowers. Fueled by spiraling profits to Chase, WaMu, and
other banks, common law principles of contract formation, customary underwriting
practices, and statutory procedures for transferring interests in real property,
including the recordation of transfers of interests in real property, disintegrated and
the system ceased to function as a reliable means to transfer clear title to property.
56. WaMu expected that Plaintiff would not perform as merely one victim
in a scheme in which:
(1) WaMu's fees as servicer would be greater as the number of loans increased;
(2) WaMu's fees as servicer would be greater as the balances of loans increased;
(3) WaMu would recover the unpaid balance of Plaintiff's loan through credit
default insurance when Plaintiff inevitably defaulted; and
(4) All risk of loss in the event of Plaintiff's default would be borne by investors
or U.S. taxpayers, not WaMu as the servicer.
57. Plaintiffs participation in the mortgage contract was procured by overt
and covert misrepresentations and nondisclosures. The parties did not share a
single expectation with respect to any of the terms of the mortgage contract and
therefore the contract was void ab initio.
58. No enforceable contract was formed between Plaintiff and WaMu, so his
Note and DOT were never assets of WaMu that could be acquired or assumed by
Chase from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver after
WaMu was seized by the Office of Thrift Supervision on September 25, 2008.
59. Chase Bank has no right to receive payment under Plaintiffs mortgage
loan and has no right to foreclose on his Wilshire Property. Plaintiff does not seek
1 rescission of the contract. He alleges that the contract was void ab initio as a result
2 offraud in the inducement and fraud in the execution of the so-called agreement.
3
4 PRAYER
5 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests judgment as follows:
6 1. That this court issue a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
7 Injunction restraining Defendants, and each of them, during the pendency of this
8 action, from continuing with their efforts to conduct a Trustee's Sale of the
9 Wilshire Property.
10 2. That the attempted foreclosure of the Wilshire Property be declared illegal
11 and that Defendants be enjoined and restrained from selling the Wilshire Property
12 or attempting to sell it or causing it to be sold, either under power of sale pursuant
13 to trust deed or by foreclosure action, and from posting, publishing, or recording
14 any notice of default or notice of trustee's sale contrary to state or federal law.
15 3. That the underlying loan transaction be declared void as a result of
16 Defendants' and WaMu's misrepresentations, fraud, concealment, and predatory
17 loan practices.
18 4. That Defendants make restitution to Plaintiff according to proof for
19 payments made to Chase that were not deposited in the account of the Lender.
20 5. Actual damages for depreciation to the Property in excess of$100,000.00.
21 6. For a judgment determining that Plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of the
22 Wilshire Property against the adverse claims of Defendants and that Defendants
23 have no interest in the subject property adverse to Plaintiff.
24 7. For costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees.
25 8. For any and all other and further relief that may be just in this matter.
26
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Date: December 2, 2011
Complaint - Javaheri v. Chase
1---------- -.. ------ . .
Douglas Gillies, Attorney for Plaintiff
- 16 -


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PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS

Exhibit Description

1 Grant Deed 11/20/1995

2 Universal Residential Loan Application 12/6/2006

3 Adjustable Rate Note 12/6/2006

4 Deed of Trust 12/6/2006

5 Assignment of Deed of Trust 5/18/2010

6 Notice of Default 5/18/2010

7 Notice of Trustee's Sale 11/18/2011


EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 3

EXHIBIT 4
TITLE(S) :
CODE
20
CODE
19
CODE
9 __
This page Is part of your document DO NOT DISCARD
i ..
IIII1
LEA 0
062765538
RECORDED/FILED IN OFFICIAL RECORDS
RECORDER'S OFFICE
S H
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
CALIFORNIA
12/13/06 AT 08:00am
D.T.T.
Assessor's Identification Number (AIN)
To be completed by Examiner OR Title Company In black Ink. Number of AIN's Shown
THIS FORM IS NOT TO BE DUPLICATED
a
"
TITLE CO.
ReCording Requested By:
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK
Return To:
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK
2210 ENTERPRISE DRIVE
FLORENCE, SC 29501
DOC OPS MIS FSCE 440
Prepared By:
KRLA DIAZ PANIAGUA
(p () ()J 37'13-H--'11'
--------- (Space Above This Line Por Recording Datal
ZCA1
M28
DEED OF TRUST
12113108
I il 1111 1111
20062765538
3010901449-101
DEFINITIONS
Words used in multiple sections of this document are defined below and other words are defined
in Sections 3. 11, 13. 18. 20 and 21. Certain rules regarding the usage of words used in this
document are also provided in Section 16,
(A) "Security Instrument" means this document, which is dated DECEMBER 06. 2006
together with aU Riders to this document,
(B) "Borrower" is DARVOUSH JAVAHER I I A SINGLE MAN
Borrower's address is 10650 WILSHIRE BLVD, # 1401, LOS ANGelES, CA 90024
. Borrower is the trustor under this Security Instrument.
(C) "Lender" is WASH I NGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA
Lender is 8 fEDERAL SAVINGS BANK
organized Bnd existing under the laws of THE UN I TEO STATES OF AMER leA
CAliFORNIA - 51n910 Family - Fannie M.e/Freddle Mac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT
Form 3006 1101
_-SICA.) 102071
PI" I .f l'
VMP MORTGAGE FORMS - 1800'521-7281
"
Lender's address is 2273 N. GREEN VALLEY PARKWAY, SU I TE 14, HENDERSON, NV
89014
Lender is the beneficiary under this Security Instrument.
(D) NTrustee"is CALIFORNIA RECONVEYANCE COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORP
(E) "Note" means the promissory note signed by Borrower and dated DECEMBER 06. 2006
The Note states that Borrower owes Lender NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND
AND 00/100 Dollars
(U.S. $ 875 ,000.00 ) plus interest. Borrower has promised to pay this debt in regular
Periodic Payments and to pay the debt in full not tater than JANUARY 01. 2037 .
(F) "Property" means the property that is described below under the heading "Transfer of Rights
in the Property. W
(0) "Loan" means the debt evidenced by the Note, plus interest, any prepayment charges and late
charges due under the Note, and all sums due under this Security Instrument, plus interest.
(H) "Riders" means all Riders to this Security Instrument that are executed by Borrower. The
following Riders are to be executed by Borrower (check box as applicable):
B
Adjustable Rate Rider
Balloon Rider
1-4 Family Rider
W Condominium Rider B Second Home Rider
D Planned Unit Development Rider Other(s} [specify]
D Biweekly Payment Rider
(I) "Applicable Law" means all controlling applicable federal, state and local statutes.
regulations, ordinances and administrative rules and orders (that have the effect of law) as well as
all applicable rinal, judicial opinions.
(J) "Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments" means all dues, fees,
assessments and other charges that are imposed on Borrower or the Property by a condominium
association, homeowners association or similar organization.
(K) "Electronic Funds Transfer" means any transfer of funds, other than a transaction
originated by check, draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated through an electronic
terminal. telephonic instrument, computer, or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize
a financial institution to debit or credit an account. Such term includes, but is not limited to,
point-or-sale transfers, automated teller machine transactions, transfers initiated by telephone, wire
transfers. and automated clearinghouse transfers.
(L) "Escrow Items" means those items that are described in Section 3.
(M) "Miscellaneous Proceeds" means any compensation, settlement, award of damages, or
proceeds paid by any third party (other than insurance proceeds paid under the coverages
described in Section 5) for: (i) damage to, or destruction of. the Property; Hi) condemnation or
other taking of all or any part of the Property; (iii) conveyance in lieu or condemnation; or (jv)
misrepresentations of, or omissions as to, the value andlor condition of the Property.
(N) "Mortgage Insunmce" means insurance protecting Lender against the nonpayment of, or
default on, the Loan.
(0) "Periodic Payment" means the regularly scheduled amount due for (j) principal and
interest under the Note, plus Oi) any amounts under Section 3 of this Security ]nstrument.
(P) "RESPA" means the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (12 U.S.C. Section 260J et seq.)
and its implementing regulation, Re,uJation X (24 C.P.R. Part 3500), as they might be amended
trom time to time. or any additional or successor legislation or regulation that governs the same
subject matter. As used in this Security Instrument, "RESPA" refers to all requirements and
IRlllelS:&
Form 3006 1/01
'8'
o
0'1
knowledge, (b) any Environmental Condition, including but not limited to, any spilling. leaking,
discharge, release or threat of release of any Hazardous Substance, and (c) any condition caused by
the presence, use or release of a Hazardous Substance which adversely affects the value of the
Property. If Borrower learns. or is notified by any governmental or regulatory authority. or any
private party. that any removal or other remediation of any Hazardous Substance affecting the
Property is necessary, Borrower shall promptly take all necessary remedial actions in accordance
with Environmental Law. Nothing herein shall create any obligation on Lender for an
Environmental Cleanup.
NON-UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows:
22. Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration
followiog Borrower's breach or any covenant or agreement in this Security lostrument
{but not prior to acceleration under Section 18 unless Applicable Law provides otberwise}.
The ootice shan specify: (a) the default; (b) the action required to cure the default; (c) a
date, not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given to Borrower, by whicb the
default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default on or before the date
specified in the notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured by this Security
Instrument and sale of the Property. The notice shan further inform Borrower of the right
to reinstate after acceleration and the right to bring a court action to assert the
non-existeoce of a default or any other defense of Borrower to acceleration and sale. If the
defeult is not cured on or before the date speciFied in the notice, Lender at its option may
require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument
without further demand and may invoke the power of sale and any other remedies
permitted by Applicable Law. Lender shan be entitled to collect all expenses incurred in
pursuing the remedies provided in this Section 22. including, but not limited to,
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of title evidence.
If Lender invokes the power of sale, Lender shall elecute or cause Trustee to cxecute a
written notice of the occurrence of an event of default and of Lender's election to cause
the Property to be sold. Trustee shall cause this notice to be recorded in each county in
wbicb any part of the Property is located. Lender or Trustee shall mail copies of the notice
as prescribed by Applicable Law to Borrower and to tbe other persons prescribed by
Applicable Law. Trustee shall give public notice of sale to the persons and in tbe man ncr
prescribed by Applicable Law. After the time required by Applicable Law, Trustee.
without demand on Borrower. shaH sell the Property at public auction to the higbest
bidder at the time and place aod under the terms designated in the notice of sale in one or
more parcels and in any order Trustee determines. Trustee may postpone sale of all or any
parcel of the Property by public announcement at the time and place of any previously
scheduled sale. Lender or its designee may purchase the Property at any sale.
Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser Trustee's deed conveying the Property without
any covenant or warranty, expressed or implied. The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be
prima facie evidence of tbe truth of tbe statements made therein. Trustee shall apply the
proceeds of tbe sale in the follOWing order: (a) to all expenses of the sale, includinc. but not
limited to, reasonable Trustee's and attorneys' fees; (b) to all sums secured by this
Security Instrument; and (c) any excess to tbe person or persons legally entitled to it.
23. Reconveyance. Upon payment or all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender
shall request Trustee 10 reconvey the Property and shall surrender this Security Instrument and all
notes evidencing debt secured by this Security Instrument to Trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the
Property without warranty to the person or persons le.sally entitled to it. Lender may charge such
person or persons a reasonable fee for reconveying the Property, but only jf the fee is paid to a third
party (such as the Trustee) for services rendered and the charging of the fee is under
Applicable Law. If the fee charged does not exceed the fee set by Applicable Law. the fee is
conclusively presumed to be reasonable.
24. Substitute Trustee. Lender, at its option, may from time to time appoint a successor
trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder by an instrument executed and acknowledged by Lender
and recorded in the office of the Recorder or the county in which the Property is located. The
instrument shall contain the name of the original Lender. Trustee and Borrower, the book and page
where this Security Instrument is recorded and the name and address of the successor trustee.

-BICAt
Pte' II ., II Form 3005 1/01
5
ZCA2
Without conveyance of the Property, the successor trustee shall succeed to all the title. powers and
dutiea conrerred upon the Trustee herein and by Applicable Law. This procedure for substitution
of trustee shaH govern to the exclusion of all other provisions for substitution.
25. Statement of Obligation Pee. Lender may collect a fee not 10 exceed the m8llimum
amount permitted by Applicable Law for furnishing the statement of obligation as provided by
Section 2943 of the Civil Code of California.
BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained
in this Security Instrument and in any Rider executed by Borrower and recorded with it.
Witnesses:

DARVOUSH JA -&mower
___________ {Seal)
-Borrowor
___________ (Seal) ___________ (Seal)
-Borrowor -Borrowor
___________ (SeaJ) ___________ (Seal)
-Borrower
____________ (Seal) ___________ (Seat)
-Borrowor -Borrowor
(0207)
Pa,. U .1 II! Form 3005 1/01
----------..,.....-.. 'B'IJ!!!!!!, ... ----r---....
.
F. Remedies. If Borrower does not pay condominium dues and assessments when due, then
Lender may pay them. Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this paragraph F shall become
additional debt of Borrower secured by the Security Instrument. Unless Borrower and Lender agree
to other terms of payment, these amounts shall bear interest from the date of disbursement at the
Note rate and shall be payable, with interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting
payment.
BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and provisions contained in this
Condominium Rider. (Seal) o . ~ i . . (S I)
-Borrowor -Borrowor
DARVOUSH AVAHEAI
(Seal)
--------------------------------------------------
___________ (Seal)
-Borrower -Borrower
____________ (Seal) ____ ~ ______ (Seal)
-Borrow.,r -Borrowor
___________ {Seal} ___________ (Seal)
-Borrowor -Borrow or
G\-8R (0008) PlIgo 3 of 3 FOf'" 3140 1/01

EXHIBIT 5
' .l
RECORDING REQUESTED BY
AND WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO
9200 Oakdale Avenue
Mail Stop: CA2-4379
Chatsworth, CA 91311
Space above !his Iihe for l'9CCInIer's use only
Trustee Sale No, 243380CA Loan No, 3010901449 Title Order No. 464288
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOTE: After having been recorded, this Assignment should be kept with the
Note and (tie Deed of Trust hefeby assigmld.
ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby grants, assigns and transfers to Bank of America,
National Association successor by malller to LaSalle Bank National AssociatJon as trustee for
Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007-HY1Trust all beneficial interest
under that oertain Deed of Trust dated 12-06-2006, executed by DARYOUSH JAVAHERI, A SINGLE
MAN, as Trustor; to CAliFORNIA RECONVEYANCE COMPANY as Trustee; and Recorded 12-13-
2006, Book, Page. Instrument 06 2765538 of official records in the Qfflce of the County Recorder of
LOS ANGELES County. Callfomia. APN: 4326-001-153 Situs: 10660 WILSHIRE BLVD #1401, LOS
ANGELES, CA 90024
TOGETHER with the note or notes therein described and secured thereby. the money due and to
become due thereon, with interest. and all rights accrued or to aCcrue under said Deed of Trust
Including the right to have reconveyed. in whole or in part, the real property described therein.
DATE: May 18. 2010
nat Association, successor in interest to WASHINGTON MUTUAL
1
( ( ,
010
r r u s t e ~ Sale No. 243380CA loan No. 3010901449 Title Order No. 464288
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF lOS ANGELES
On May 18, 2010 before me, JESSICA ERIN SNEDDEN, "Notary Public", personally appeared
Colleen Irby, who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) whose
name(s) is/are subscribed to the within Instrument and acknowledged to me that he/shelthey
executed the same in hislher/thelr authorized capaclty(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on
the Instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the
instrument.
I oertIfy under PENAL TV OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing
paragraph is true and correct.
WiTNESS my hand and offiCial seal.
:::-=:----.-.. (Seal)
'-.
2
- ---- --
20100687282

ThIs page 1& part of your document - DO NOT DISCARD

Rec:otdedIFIled In OftIclal Records
Recorder's OfT1ce, Los Angeles County.
California
06120/10 AT 08:00AM
FEES: 21.00
TAXES: 0.00
OTHER: 0 00
P1UD: 21 . 00

LEADSHEET
1I1111I11
201005200230002
00002392098
111011111111
SEQ:
06
DAR - 'fi tle Company (Ba.rd Copy)

. THIS FORM IS NOT TO BE DUPLICATED

EXHIBIT 6
This page Is part of your document DO NOT DISCARD
20100687283
I mllllil 11111111 PB8g:=
Recorded/Flied In omclal Records
Recordefs OffIce. Los Angeles County,
california
06120/10 AT 08:00AM
PEEs: 24.QO
TAXES: 0.00
OTHER: 0.00
PAID: 24 . OQ
11111111111111111 1
LEACSH&&T
1111111111111111111 1111111 111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
201005200230002
00002392099
II111III
002692265
SEQ:
07
DAR - Title Company (Hard Copy)

THIS fORM IS NOT TO BE DUPLICATED
T79 ...

EXHIBIT 7
I
RECORDING REQUESTED BY
AND WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO
9200 Oakdale Avenue
Mail Stop: CA2-4379
Chatsworth, CA 91311
800-892-6902
Trustee Sale No. 243380CA
Loan No. 3010901449
Title Order No. 464288
-
NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE
Space above this ~ n e for recorder's use only
YOU ARE IN DEFAULT UNDER A DEED OF TRUST DATED 12-06-2006. UNLESS YOU TAKE ACTION TO PROTECT
YOUR PROPERTY, IT MAY BE-SOL-D-AT-A PUBLIC SALE. If YOU NEED AN EXPLANATION Of THE NATURE Of
THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST YOU, YOU SHOULD CONTACT A LAWYER.
On 12-12-2011 at 9:00 AM, CALIFORNIA RECONVEYANCE COMPANY as the duly appointed Trustee under and
pursuant to Deed of Trust Recorded 12-13-2006, Book, Page, Instrument 06 2765538, of official records in the Office
of the Recorder of LOS ANGELES County, California, executed by: DARYOUSH JAVAHERI, A SINGLE MAN, as Trustor,
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA, as Beneficiary, will sell at public auction sale to the highest bidder for cash, cashier's
check drawn by a state or national bank, a cashier's check drawn by a state or federal credit union, or a cashier's check drawn
by a state or federal savings and loan association, savings association, or savings bank specified in section 5102 of the
Financial Code and authorized to do business in this state. Sale will be held by the duly appOinted trustee as shown below, of
all right. title, and interest conveyed to and now held by the trustee in the hereinafter described property under and pursuant to
the Deed of Trust. The sale will be made, but without covenant or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding title, possession,
or encumbrances, to pay the remaining principal sum of the note(s) secured by the Deed of Trust, interest thereon, estimated
fees, charges and expenses of the Trustee for the total amount (at the time of the initial publication of the Notice of Sale)
reasonably estimated to be set forth below. The amount may be greater on the day of sale.
Place of Sale: BEHIND THE FOUNTAIN LOCATED IN CIVIC CENTER PLAZA, 400 CIVIC CENTER PLAZA, POMONA, CA
Legal Description: A CONDOMINIUM COMPOSED OF:
PARCEL 1:
(A) AN UNDIVIDED 1/132ND INTEREST IN AND TO LOT 1 OF TRACT NO. 39372, IN THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AS PER MAP RECORDED IN BOOK 987, PAGES 32 AND 33 OF
MAPS, IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAID COUNTY.
EXCEPT THEREFROM ALL OF THE 132 UNITS OF TRACT 39372 AS SHOWN AND DEFINED ON THE CONDOMINIUM
PLAN, RECORDED SEPTEMBER 23, 1981 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 81-946528, OFFICIAL RECORDS. OF SAID COUNTY.
(B) UNIT 1401, AS SHOWN AND DEFINED ON THE CONDOMINIUM PLAN REFERRED TO ABOVE.
PARCEL 2:
AN EXCLUSIVE EASEMENT, APPURTENANT TO PARCEL 1 ABOVE, FOR PARKING PURPOSES, OVER THAT
PORTION OF LOT 1 OF SAID TRACT 39372, SHOWN AS PARKING SPACES 235 AND 236 ON THE PARKING PLAN
ATTACHED TO THE DECLARATION OF RESTRICTIONS, RECORDED SEPTEMBER 23, 1981 AS INSTRUMENT NO.
81-946527, OFFICIAL RECORDS.
PARCEL 3:
AN EXCLUSIVE EASEMENT APPURTENANT TO PARCEL 1 ABOVE, FOR MAIDS ROOMS OVER THAT PORTION OF
LOT 1 OF SAID TRACT NO. 39372, AS SHOWN AS AREAS 138-MR AS SHOWN AND DEFINED ON CONDOMINIUM
PLAN REFERRED TO ABOVE.
Amount of unpaid balance and other charges: $1,105,716.79 (estimated)
Street address and other common designation of the real property: 10660 WILSHIRE BLVD #1401
LOS ANGELES, CA 90024
------------ -----"
APN NI.rnber: 4326-001-153
The undersigned Trustee disclaims any liability for any incorrectness of the street address en! other common
designation, if any, shown herein. The property heretofore described is being sold Was is".
In compliancewlttl California Civil Code 2923.5(c) the mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent declares:
that it has contacted the borrower(s) to assess their financial situation and to explore options to avoid foreclosure; or
that it has made efforts to contact the bom7.Ner(s} to assess their financial situation and to explore options to avoid foreclosure
by one of the following methods: by telephone; by United States mail ; either 1
st
class or certified; by overnight delivery; by
personal delivery; bye-mail; by face to face meeting.
DATE: 11-18-2011
CAUFORNIA RECONVEYANCE COMPANY, as Trustee
MARCO RIVERA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
CALIFORNIA RECONVEYANCE"COMPANY IS A DEBT COLLECTOR
ATIEMPTING TO COLLECT A DEBT. ANY INFORMATION
OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE.
California Reconveyance Company
9200 Oakdale Avenue
Mail Stop: CA2-4379
Chatsv.OOh, CA 91311
800-m12-6902
For Sales Infonnation:
(714) 730-2727 orwww.lpsasap.com
(714) 573-1965 orwwwpriorttyposting.com
NOTICE OF SALE
PURSUANT TO SECTION 2924.8 OF THE CIVIL CODE
Foreclosure process has begun on this property, which may affect your right to continue to live in this property. Twenty days
or more after the date 01 this notice, this property may be sold at foreclosure. 11 you are renting this property, the new
property owner may either give you a new lease or rental agreement or provide you with a 60-day eviction notice. However,
other laws may prohibit an eviction in Ihis circumslance or provide you wi:h a longer notice before eviction. You may wish to
contacl a lawyer or your local legal aid or housing counseling agency to discuss any rights you may have.

. ili
2 *Ii"IJrilI'OIll IIR.

Xii 292A.B
01 r:m j'Ht AI<>tlV.Gj,.:::1.. '2..!0!! 'i'Ioflf 01 7'l14<'aHA, .Ie 9'
01 j}{CQj 'a':..}Ei .:::1. 01 xf'Ct 9' Tiot7t 01
VCf'2!, ':::::if'?fo i'lof.2f .'i.e 60',) 011../1 9' .IiirL-lcf .
et E .'i.e T\of01I711 tj7}fxl '2:;G'E) 7111,\ tf *50
2.!iL-lcf. Tlof2J flClOjI [jjt! t f71 .!flO!! Tlofe \l:l.:.Af 5':.e T\Of7t .Ie XI'l12J
71t!!'oJI 9'.s: .I@L-Icf.
ANUNCIO DE VENTA
SEGUN LA SECCION 2924.8 DEL CODIGO CIVIL
EI proceso de ejecucion de hipoteca ha comenzado en esta propiedad, 10 que puede alectar su derecho de vivir en asta
propiedad. La propiedad puede ser vendida en ejecucion de hipoteca veinte dias 0 mas despues de la facha de esla aviso.
Si usled esta rentando esta propiedad, 81 nuevo due no de la propiedad puede darle a usted un nuevo contrato de
arrendamiento 0 alquiler 0 darle un aviso de desalojo de 50dias. Sin embargo, olras leyes tal vel. puedan prohibir un
desalojo en esla circunstancia 0 proveerle a usted un aviso de desalojo de mas tiempo para que desaloje la propiedad. Tal
vel. usted desee comunicarse con un abogado 0 su ayuda legal de la localidad 0 agencia de consejeria de vivienda para
hablar de cualquier derecho que usted tal vez lenga.
PAUNAWA SA PAGBENTA
BATAY SA SEKSYON 2924.8 NG NILAGDAANG SIBIL
Ang proseso ng pagreremata ay nagsimula na sa pagaaring ito, na kung saan ay maaaring makaapakto sa inyong
karapatan na tuluyang manirahan sa pag-aaring nabanggit. Dalawampung araw 0 higil pa malapos ang pelsang naisagawa
ang paunawang ito, ang nasabing pag-aari ay maaari nang ibenta balay sa pagremata. Kung kayo ay nangungupahan sa
pag-aaring sa opagbenta 0 bigyan kayo ng
kasulatan na paunawa na makalipal sa loob ng 60 na araw. Gayunpaman, maaaring ipagbawalng ibang batas ang
pagpapaalis sa pagkakataong ito 0 maaaring blgyan kayo ng mas mahabang panahan bago ang pagpapaalis.
Minumungkahi kayong makipagblgay alam sa inyang abogado 0 lokal na katulong pang-legal 0 ahensiya ng payong
pabahay upang pag-usapan eng alinmang karapatan na kayo ay mayroon.
THONG BAo BAN
THEO ElIt:U 2924.8 BO LU,/>.T DAN SV'
Vi$c dau tich thu tili san nily co anh hU'ang den quyo'm we sinh s6ng cua ban t<;li day. d';'u tLY hai mU'D'i ngay
tra di sau thong bao, tili san nay co th& bi tich thu de Ira nQ'. Neu ('lang mi.J'on nhll tGli day, chu tal san mai sa gLri cho
ban cam kel meri vi$c thue hoi;ic mV'on hol;lc co the se gLri cho ban thOng bao rai khol nhit trong vbng 60 ngay. Tuy
nhien,mt 86 khac co the kh6ng cho phep yeu diu rai khoi nhi! trong trV'ang hoop nay rna glPi cho bGln thong bao
serm hcm trvac khi yeu diU ban rai ('Ii. B<;In n1ln lien vai SV' hoi;ic t5 chtic giup do dia phl1cmg ho(ic cO' sa tV' van
nhil de tham khao nhlmg quyen b,m c6.
2924.8(c) Sunsets Jan. 1, 2013
NOTICE 01<' ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR DISCOVEUY
This case has been assigned to District Judge John F. Walter and the assigned discovtlry
M,lgistratc Judge is Fernando M. Olguin.
The case number on all documents med with the Court should read as follows:
CV11- 10072 JPW (PMOx)
Pursuant to General Order 05-()7 of the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, the Magistrate Judge has been designated to hem' discovery related
moti(lns.
All discovery related motions should be noticed Oll the calendar oftha Magistrate Judge
= = = = = = = = = = = = . - ~ = ~ ~ = = = ~ = = = ~ ~ = = = = - - = = = = = = =
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
A copy of this notice muslll", served with the summons and complaint on ali defendants (if a removal aclion is
filed, '" copy of this no/ice must be served on ali plaintiffs).
Subsequent documents must be filed at the following location:
[Xl
Western Division
312 N, Spring St., Rm. G-8
l.os Angeles, CA 90012
Ll Southern Division
411 West Fourth St.. Rm. 1-053
Santa Ana, CA 92701-4516
Failure to file at the proper location wU! result in your documents baing retumad to you.
Ll Eastern Division
3470 Twelfth St., Rm. 134
Riverside, CA 92501
CV18 (03106) NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR DISCOVERY
Name & Address:
DOUGLAS GILLlES (CA SBN 53602)
douglasgillies(dlgmail.com
3756 Torino Drive, Santa Barbara, CA 93105
(805) 682-7033
Attomey for FlaintiffDARYOUSH .lAVAHERl

DARYOUSII JAVAHERI
v.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N
and DOES 1- '0. inclusive
CASE NUMBER
Pl.AINTIFf(S)
SUMMONS
DEFENDANT(S).
TO; DEFENDANI'(S): JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N .A.
A lawsuit has been filed against you.
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it), you
must serve on the pbintifl' an answer to the attached li complaint 0 amended complaint
[] counterclaim 0 cross-claim or a motion under Rule I2 oflhe Federal Rules of Civil Frocedure. The anSwer
or lJlotion lJlust be served on the phlintill" s ((ttorney, .. li!2L .. __ ._ .... _ .... _.. , whose address is
3756 Torino Drive, Santa Barbara, CA 93105 . If you fail to do so,
judgment by default will be entered against yO\] for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must me
your tmswer or motion with the court.
Clerk, U.S. District Court
DEC - 5 2011
Dated: ___________ _
By: - .----\,"'*-W'+--+---
(&01 oft C ( lU I)
[Use 60 days if the defendant is the United States or a United States agency, or is an qfficer ()r employee of the United Slates. Allowed
60 days by Rule 12(a)(3)!.
CV-01A (12/07) SlJMMONS
UNlTF.D STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL CO\'ER SIIEET
I (a) (Check if you are YOlll"$tlfO)
!lARYOVSIl JAVAHERI
DEFENDANTS
IPMOltOAN CHASE BANK
Attomoys (FKm and TdepbOflC Number. tfyOIJ art" {ePfCllCDtill3
your,elf, provide JiIJ\lC.)
Attorneys (JfK.nown)
IlOVOLAS GlLLmS, A'1'ORNEY
)1:56 Torino Drive, Santa Barburu, CA
(iOS) 68210n
JI. UASlS OF ,H.lRISDJCT10N (Place lin X in Qflt:: box Dilly,) III. CITlZENSH1P OF flUNClfAL PARTIES fo,. Div",,;,) Only
(Place aI) X in one: box for one for defendant.)
o I U.S. ftlnintitT (J 3 Federal QuIi:-lI(lon (U.S.
';It"
DEF PTF DEF
Government NQt a Party) Citizen of This. State 0 1 !ocorporaled or .PrinCipal Place 04 04
of:Busine&l ill this State
a 2 u.s. G()v&rTtmet'll Otfendant r$4 DiversIty Citizenship. Citizen of Another Stale 02 02 luoarporJcd and PrinciPJ' PJacr: 05
,,
of Patties in hem Ul) of in Anolher Stale
Citizen or Subject ora Foreign Country [] 3 r.:J) Foreign Nation;
IV. OltlG1N an X if) one bol(. Qoly.)
ril Origin.al (J:2 llcmovcd from. 0:3 Remanded fi'om 04 Rein$l.ated or CJ Tra.nsferred from (lipecify): 0 (, Multi
Proceeding State Coon App'!:!late Reopened District
Litia3tioo
C.1 7 Appcal to nit;trict
from
Judie
v. REQUI!STED IN COMPU1KT; JURY DEMAND: 'Yo.
CI.ASS " .C1'ION onder f.R.C,P, 23: 0 Yes GiNo
[] No (C'tt:=ck ' Yee:' onJy j(d.ernaMed in complaint.)
IiMON!Y D'Y.MANVt:V IN COMfl.AlNT: $ 145,000
'VI . OF ACTlON {Cito the U.S. SumllO Undct which yo\.l a:rc IUld wrll It bricfSlUIWK.'IIl o[CI.t.UlIC. Dc not citcjurilld"ictiollal lita.tutO!l unlcs$ di"\lc::mty.)
12 U.S,C. 1332(.)
VII. NA TORE OF sun (I'Iac< an X In 0 bu, only.)
o 400 StAte Reapportjonmmt
0410 Antitruat
o 430 Banks and [Jlnlcing
o 450 C.<> .".rIICC

o 460 DeportMion
0470 R.ac;k,t,"!lW" InHuen"ed
and Camlpt
Orgllniulions
Q 480 Coo&umc=r Credit
0490 Coblc&, TV
o atO Selcctivo
0850 S='rit!colComm<>di'i<:oIlo
8>!ch>nge
o Kl5 Cu.stomet" Cb.a.I1cn&e 12
USC34JO
() 890 Other StatutQry Acticna
089) Agricultural ACi
[J 892 E..cooomic Stabilization
,ole!
o 893 Environmenlilli Maners
CJ 894 P..ncJY AlIoc:alion Acl
CJ 895 Freedom offnfa. Act
a 900 Appea) of Fee Detl:rmj.
nation Bqual
Access 10 JII!iticCl
o 950 of
State: $laUites
Millet" Act
!40 NCIIDtisblc lnllfnlmcnt
150 of
.&
Enior!!cmcnt of
Judgment
McciCl)fC"
Reco\lery ofOefwltod
S!U<lettf Lo3n (lliel.
Vdcnms)
Reeo\ll:ryof
Ovcll'"aymc{)t Qf
VttentlJ)S: DencmtJ
Stoc/(hoMers' Suils
Other C.onlnet
Porecl.osure
Rent lAue & Ejectment
Land
TQrt. PRid\lct Liability
All 0111", Reol Properiy
Airplans
Airplane Product
LiabilHy
A:SGi'\.\Ilt. &.
Siandel"
Employers'
Llobllily
Marino
Marine Product
Linbility
MotorVchic:lc

Product Liability
Other Personal
lnjWy
PMionallnjury-
Mcd Malprllctice
J:.iersonalinjWy-
Prodnct .Liability
AsbeMos PClJ()/lfil

Corpus-

Other Immign.tion
Actions
Vacatco Scntcocc
Hl!:bcas COrpll:ol
S30 ('wneral
o., .. g"IO S3S Oco'" PenallY
$40 M .. dmnusl
Alllerican wittl
Disabilities .
Employm<nl
American with
Di$U.bilitics
OthO<'
Othet Ctvi I
Righlf!li
A.gricultme
Other Food &:
Drug
l'lrug Rcla.ted
Sc:i:tiAfC ('If
""'p,:ny 21 USC
881
6)0 Liquor Lcws
640 ILfL. A Tru<k
6Sll Alrline Re&o
660 Oe<u""tiOruil
Sofely 1ll",lth
690 Other
fOR omCE USE ONLY: C>;<Num!.,,, ________________________ _
IW
no
R:elalions
LOIhNlMgi"Tll".
&:
Oillc loSlirc Act
Ruilwny Labor Acl
0d:Ia: Ltlbor
litigatioo
EmpI.R ... Joc.
I . .
PJainliff
or D<:fc:tldB.ril:)
IRS Th;fd P"'y7.6
USC 7609
AFTER COMPUITING TIlE I"RON'C SIDE OF FORM CV-7l, COMl'LETK INFORMATION REQUESTED IIEI.OW.
Cy 71 (05/08) CIVIL COVER SHEET Page I fIof2
1----,.----,,--' --- ,.----- - -.--.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL COVER SHEET
VlII(a). IDENTICAL CASES: Has this action been previously filed in this court and dismissed, remanded or closed? MNo 0 Yes
[fyes,listcase number(s): __________________________________________________ _
VJII(b). RELATED CASES: Have any cases been previously filed in this court that are related to !he present case? !!INo "'Yes
[fyes,list case number(s): _____________________________________ _
Civil cases are deemed related if a previously filed case and the present rase:
(Check all boxes thai apply) A. Arise from the same or closely related transactions, happenings, or events; or
rtf B. Call tor determination of the same or substantially related or similar questions of law and fact ; or
o C. For other reasons would entail substantial duplication of labor if heard by different judges; or
DO. Involve the same patent, trademark or copyright, and one of the factors identified above in a, b or c also is present.
IX. VENUE: (When completing the following information, use an additional sheet if necessary.)
(a) List the County in this District; California County outside of this District; State if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH named plaintiff resides.
0 Check here if the government, its agenci es or employees is a named plaintiff. If this box is checked, go to item (b).
County in this District: California County outside oflhis District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country
Los Angeles County - PlaintiffDaryoush lavaheri
(b) List the County in this District; California County outside of Ibis District; State if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH named defendant resides.
0 Check here if the government, its agencies or employees is a named defendant. [fthis box is checked, go to item (c).
County in this District: California County outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country
New York State - Defendant JPMorgan Chase
(c) List the County in this District; California County outside of this District; State if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH claim arose.
Note' In land condemnation ca ... u.e the location of the tract of land involved ,
Count)' in this District:'" California County outside of this Di strict; State. if other than Califomia; or Foreign Country
Los Angeles County
'* Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, Rivenlde, Ventur&y Santa Barbara, or San Luis Obispo Counties
Note: In land condemnation cases use the location of the tract ofland involved
X. SIGNATURE OF AITORNEY (OR PRO PER): December 2, 2011
Notice to CounsellPartie" The CV-71 (JS-44) Civil Cover Sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings
or other papers as required by law. This fonn, approved by the Iudicial Conference ofthe United States in September 1974, is required pursuant to Local Rule 3-1 is not filed
but is used by the Clerk of the Court for the purpose of statistics, venue and initiating the civil docket sheet. (For more detailed instructions, see separate instructions sheet.)
Key to Statistical codes relating to Social Security Cases :
Natur. of Suit Code Abbreviation
861 HIA
862 BL
863 DlWC
863 DlWW
864 ssm
865 RSI
CV-71 (05/08)
Substantive Statement of Cau,e of Action
All claims for health insurance benefits (Medicare) under Title 18, Part A, of the Social Security Act, as amended.
Also, include claims by hospitals, skilled nursing faciliti es, etc., for certification as providers of services under the
program. (42 U.S.C. 1935FF(b))
All claims for "Black Lung" benefits under Title 4, Part B, of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.
(30 U.S.C. 923)
All claims filed by insured workers for disability insurance benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as
amended; plus all claims filed for child' s insurance benefits based on disability. (42 U.S.C. 405(g)}
All claims filed for widows or widowers insurance benefits based on disability under Title 2 of the Social Security
Act, as amended. (42 U.S.C. 405(g})
All claims for supplemental security income payments based upon di sability filed under Title 16 of the Social Security
Act, as amended.
All claims for retirement (old age) and survivors benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended. (42
U.S.c. (g})
CIVIL COVER SHEET Page 2 on
--_ ._._----
FDIC: Assignment of a Real Estate Lien
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/information/lien/Assignment.html[12/30/2011 9:21:47 PM]
Home > Industry Analysis > Failed Banks > Assignment of a Real Estate Lien
Assi gnment of a Real Est at e Li en
To obtain an assignment of lien on Homes, Buildings, Improved or Unimproved Land, Mechanic's Liens
please provide us with the following r equi r ed document(s):
A copy of the Mor t gage or Deed of Tr ust Document that you are requesting to be assigned.
The copy must be r eadabl e and clearly show the recording information. This document can be
obtained from the Public Records in the County where the property is located or from your title
company or title attorney.
Copies of any subsequent assignments that show the chain of title leading to an FDIC
receivership.
Proof that the party to whom the assignment is being made is the current holder of the
mortgage. Proof can be in the form of a Note Endorsement, Loan History, Sales Contract or
Indemnification Agreement.
If the lien holder of record is not a Bank or Savings and Loan that failed and has been placed in
FDIC receivership, please provide copies of any and all assi gnment s that show the chain of
title leading to an FDIC receivership.
It is hi ghl y suggested you also provide the following documents, if available:
A copy of a recent Ti t l e Sear c h or Ti t l e Commi t ment , or At t or ney' s Ti t l e Opi ni on on
the property for which you are requesting an assignment showing the breaks in the chain of title.
This is especially helpful in cases where the Mortgage documents are of poor quality and hard to
read. Your Title Company or Title Attorney can usually provide you with this.
A request for a Release of Lien must be made in writing.
Mail, email or fax your request with the required documentation to the appropriate DRR Customer
Service Center. Please do not do both. Hard to read documents should be mailed or sent overnight,
rather than faxed. Unreadable documents cannot be processed. To avoid any duplication, please
submit your request only once.
Be sur e t o i nc l ude your addr ess and phone number w i t h your w r i t t en r equest .
Please allow 14 business days for the completion of your request.
Processing fees for release of Real Estate Liens and Assignments:
Please be advised that a processing fee of $50 ($25.00 for each duplicate) will be billed for each
release of lien or assignment processed. This fee is for services provided by the Federal
Deposits Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to process and research the release document. An
invoice for this amount will be included with your release of lien or assignment document along
with a self-addressed return envelope. Upon receipt of your release of lien, please remit your
payment to the address shown on the invoice or on the self-addressed return envelope. Pl ease
do not send t he pr oc essi ng f ee pr i or t o r ec ei pt of your r el ease of l i en.
I f you have any quest i ons you may call the appropriate DRR Customer Service Center toll-free. A
Customer Service Representative will be happy to answer your questions, OR, refer to our Fr equent l y
Ask ed Quest i ons.
Bac k t o How To Obt ai n a Li en Rel ease
Last Updated 12/01/2011 cservicefdicdal@fdic.gov
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FDIC: Assignment of a Real Estate Lien
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/information/lien/Assignment.html[12/30/2011 9:21:47 PM]
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Service Center | FDIC Open Government Webpage | No FEAR Act Data
FDIC: Obtaining a Lien Release
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/information/lien/[12/30/2011 10:32:55 PM]
Home > Industry Analysis > Failed Banks > Obtaining a Lien Release
Obt ai ni ng a Li en Rel ease
En Espaol
You are ready to sell your home or trade in your vehicle but you've been told you have to obtain a "Release of
Lien" first. Normally, you would go back to the bank or Savings and Loan and ask them to prepare a release for
you. But, where do you go if the bank or Savings and Loan has failed?
The FDIC may be able to provide you with a Release of Lien on your home, vehicle, boat or other personal
property if:
The lien holder is a Bank or Savings and Loan Institution that failed and has been placed in FDIC
receivership. Also, in some cases, if the lien holder is a Subsidiary of a Failed Bank or Savings and Loan.
If you're not sure, please call the appropriate DRR Customer Service Center toll-free.
The loan was paid off before the Institution failed.
The loan was paid off to the FDIC after the Institution failed.
A request for a Release of Lien must be made in writing and must detail exactly what you want.
Mail, email or fax your request to the appropriate DRR Customer Service Center with the recorded document to
be released or to be assigned showing the closed institution as the lien holder. Also, a proof of payoff must be
provided to expedite the completion of your request and avoid researching the records of the closed institution
which will delay the completion of your request.
Please allow 14 business days for the completion of your request.
Please include your e-mail address and telephone number for us to communicate with you in case we need more
information to complete your request.
DRR Cust omer Ser vi c e Cent er
FOB
ECTSO
MWTSO
Dat e of Fai l ur e
(Refer to the Failed Bank List for the Closing Date)
Current Map (PDF Help) of State alignment by DRR Office
Bef or e
November 1,
2009
Af t er
November 1,
2009 J ul y 1,
2010
On or af t er
J ul y 1, 2010
FDIC - MWTSO
200 N. Martingale, Suite 200
Schaumburg, IL 60173
Attention: DRR Customer Service Center
Hour s: 8 AM - 5 PM Weekdays
Cal l : 1-877-680-4377 t ol l -f r ee
FAX: 1-847-273-0931
Emai l : customerserviceFDICsch@FDIC.gov
Not applicable Not applicable CT, DE, IA, IL, IN,
KY, MA, MD, ME,
MI, MN, ND, NE,
NH, NJ, NY, OH,
PA, RI, SD, VA,
VT, WI, WV
FDIC - ECTSO
7777 Baymeadows Way, West
Jacksonville, FL 32256
Cal l : 1-877-834-8562 t ol l -f r ee
FAX: 1-703-812-1099
Emai l : customerserviceFDICjax@FDIC.gov
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FDIC: Obtaining a Lien Release
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/information/lien/[12/30/2011 10:32:55 PM]
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Last Updated 12/18/2011 cservicefdicdal@fdic.gov
FDIC: Press Releases - PR-68-2009 5/8/2009
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09068.html[12/30/2011 10:37:34 PM]
Home > News & Events > Press Releases
Pr ess Rel eases
FDI C t o Open a Tempor ar y East Coast Sat el l i t e Of f i c e
The J ac k sonvi l l e Of f i c e w i l l Assi st w i t h Asset Sal es and Bank Cl osi ngs
FOR I MMEDI ATE RELEASE
May 8, 2009
Medi a Cont ac t :
Davi d Bar r (202) 898 -6992
dbar r @f di c .gov
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) today announced it will open a temporary satellite
office in Jacksonville, Florida, to manage receiverships and to liquidate assets from failed financial
institutions primarily located in the eastern states.
After conducting a competitive leasing acquisition process, the FDIC entered into a short-term
agreement to lease space at 7777 Baymeadows Way in Jacksonville. The decision was based on
mission needs and workload.
The new office will provide facilities for up to 500 nonpermanent staff and contractors. Staffing will be
based on the workload needs of this office, based on the number of closings in the eastern states, the
resulting number of receiverships, and the post-closing workload.
Throughout its history, the FDIC has used these offices to keep temporary asset resolution staff closer to
the concentration of failed bank assets they oversee. As the work diminishes, the temporary satellite
offices are closed.
The FDIC expects to gradually move into the space starting in mid-September 2009.
# # #
Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1933 to restore public confidence in the
nation's banking system. The FDIC insures deposits at the nation's 8,305 banks and savings
associations and it promotes the safety and soundness of these institutions by identifying, monitoring
and addressing risks to which they are exposed. The FDIC receives no federal tax dollars insured
financial institutions fund its operations.
FDIC press releases and other information are available on the Internet at www.fdic.gov, by subscription
electronically (go to www.fdic.gov/about/subscriptions/index.html ) and may also be obtained through the
FDIC's Public Information Center (877-275-3342 or 703-562-2200). PR-68-2009
Last Updated 5/8/2009 communications@fdic.gov
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FDIC
J.P. Morgan
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In Re Javaheri V JPMorgan Chase - UPDATE - Abbreviated Compendium

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"If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who

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