Golden Apple vs.

Sierra Grande Realty Corporation July 28, 2010 626 SCRA 1 Civil Procedure; Appeals; Questions of Law; The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court. However, this rule is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court. Findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals may also be set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or where the lower courts' conclusions are based on a misapprehension of facts. People vs. Magayon July 28, 2010 626 SCRA 58 Evidence; Conflicting Testimonial Evidence; The focal point of almost all rape cases is the issue of credibility of the witnesses, to be addressed primarily by the trial court, which is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. The manner of assigning values to declarations of witnesses on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who has the unique and unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility. In essence, when the question arises as to which of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense is worthy of belief, the assessment of the trial court is generally given the highest degree of respect, if not finality. Accordingly, its findings are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which would otherwise affect the result of the case. The assessment made by the trial court is even more enhanced when the Court of Appeals affirms the same, as in this case. Varela vs. Revalez July 29, 2010 626 SCRA 159 Civil Procedure; Complaint; The complaint merely identified Varela as the mayor of Cadiz City. It did not categorically state that Varela was being sued in his official capacity. The identification and mention of Varela as the mayor of Cadiz City did not automatically transform the action into one against Varela in his official capacity. The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of the cause of action.

Same; Same; In the case at bar, petitioner is actually sued in his personal capacity inasmuch as his principal, the State, can never be the author of any wrongful act. The Complaint filed by the private respondent with the RTC merely identified petitioner as Director of the Telecommunications Office, but did not categorically state that he was being sued in his official capacity. The mere mention in the Complaint of the petitioners position as Regional Director of the Telecommunications Office does not transform the action into one against petitioner in his official capacity. What is determinative of the nature of the cause of action are the allegations in the complaint. It is settled that the nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filling [sic] the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. Cariaga vs. People July 30, 2010 626 SCRA 231 Criminal Procedure; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that any rigid and strict application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must always be avoided. People vs. Court of Appeals August 3, 2010 626 SCRA 353 Criminal Procedure; Equipoise Rule; Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise, or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not suffice to produce a conviction. To this Courts mind, the reliance of the RTC in the equipoise rule is misplaced as a review of previous Court decisions would show that the position of petitioner is in fact correct. The equipoise rule has been generally applied when the parties have already concluded the presentation of their respective evidence as shown in a plethora of cases such as Abarquez v. People, Tin v. People and People v. Leano. Same; Based on Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the RTC judge, upon the filing of an Information, has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause,

order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the information. The judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. To this Courts mind, the RTC had complied with its duty of personally evaluating the supporting evidence of the prosecution before arriving at its decision of dismissing the case against respondents. Calipay vs. NLRC August 3, 2010 626 SCRA 409 Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is true that procedural rules may be waived or dispensed with in the interest of substantial justice. This Court may deign to veer away from the general rule if, on its face, the appeal appears to be absolutely meritorious. Indeed, in a number of instances, procedural rules are relaxed in order to serve substantial justice. However, the Court sees no reason to do so in this case as there is no reason to reverse the findings of the CA.

People vs. Rellota August 3, 2010 626 SCRA 422 Criminal Procedure; Information; Variance Doctrine; Under Section 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. As explained by this Court in People v. Abulon: However, following the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant can be found guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. Torres vs. Alamag August 3, 2010 626 SCRA 450 Remedial Law; Appeals; Fresh Period Rule; In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that a party-litigant should be allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, so as to standardize the

appeal periods provided in the Rules of Court and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Furthermore, in Sumiran v. Damaso, the Court again emphasized that the ruling in Neypes, being a matter of procedure, must be given retroactive effect and applied even to actions pending in this Court. Thus, in this case, since respondents received a copy of the Order denying their motion for reconsideration on August 29, 2001, then the last day for filing their notice of appeal was on September 13, 2001. The respondents having filed their notice of appeal on September 11, 2001 is well within the prescribed period. De Leon vs. Public Estates Authority August 3, 2010 626 SCRA 547 Judgments; Writs of Execution; Ownership; As a general rule, a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated partys claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership. Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected. This is precisely what happened in the present case. This Court had already declared the disputed property as owned by the State and that De Leon does not have any right to possess the land independent of his claim of ownership. Same; Same; Same; A judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party in possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer should oust him. No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the decision; nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of time. The removal of the improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed read into the decision, subject only to the issuance of a special order by the court for the removal of the improvements. Same; Same; Same; It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. In the present case, it would be redundant for PEA to go back to court and file an ejectment case simply to establish its right to possess the subject property.

Contrary to De Leons claims, the issuance of the writ of execution by the trial court did not constitute an unwarranted modification of this Courts decision in PEA v. CA, but rather, was a necessary complement thereto. Such writ was but an essential consequence of this Courts ruling affirming the nature of the subject parcel of land as public and at the same time dismissing De Leons claims of ownership and possession. To further require PEA to file an ejectment suit to oust de Leon and his siblings from the disputed property would, in effect, amount to encouraging multiplicity of suits. Certiorari; Principle of Judicial Courtesy; As to whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the resolution of PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition, Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides the general rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of origin does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. It is true that there are instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy. The principle of judicial courtesy, however, remains to be the exception rather than the rule. As held by this Court in Go v. Abrogar, the precept of judicial courtesy should not be applied indiscriminately and haphazardly if we are to maintain the relevance of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Temporary Restraining Order; the Order of the RTC holding in abeyance the resolution of PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition also appears to be a circumvention of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which limit the period of effectivity of restraining orders issued by the courts. In fact, the assailed Orders of the RTC have even become more potent than a TRO issued by the CA because, under the Rules of Court, a TRO issued by the CA is effective only for sixty days. In the present case, even in the absence of a TRO issued by a higher court, the RTC, in effect, directed the maintenance of the status quo by issuing its assailed Orders. Worse, the effectivity of the said Orders was made to last for an indefinite period because the resolution of PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition was made to depend upon the finality of the judgment in G.R. No. 181970. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders dated December 28, 2007 and March 4, 2008. Judgments; The Court reminds the De Leon that it does not allow the piecemeal interpretation of its Decisions as a means to advance his case. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and read in this context, but the same must be considered in its entirety. Read in this manner, PEAs right to possession of the subject property, as well as the removal of the improvements or structures existing thereon, fully follows after considering the entirety of the Courts decision in PEA v. CA. This is consistent with the provisions of Section 10, paragraphs (c) and (d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which provide for the procedure for execution of judgments for specific acts.

Same; As a final note, it bears to point out that this case has been dragging for more than 15 years and the execution of this Courts judgment in PEA v. CA has been delayed for almost ten years now simply because De Leon filed a frivolous appeal against the RTCs order of execution based on arguments that cannot hold water. As a consequence, PEA is prevented from enjoying the fruits of the final judgment in its favor. The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its contention that every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the life of the law. To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that this Court should write finis to this litigation. Leviste vs. Almeda August 3, 2010 626 SCRA 575 Judgments; Moot and Academic Issues; Waiver; The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) later argued that the present petition had been rendered moot since the presentation of evidence, wherein petitioner actively participated, had been concluded. Waiver on the part of the accused must be distinguished from mootness of the petition, for in the present case, petitioner did not, by his active participation in the trial, waive his stated objections. Criminal Procedure; Arraignment; Bail; Waiver; By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to challenge the regularity of the reinvestigation of the charge against him, the validity of the admission of the Amended Information, and the legality of his arrest under the Amended Information, as he vigorously raised them prior to his arraignment. During the arraignment on March 21, 2007, petitioner refused to enter his plea since the issues he raised were still pending resolution by the appellate court, thus prompting the trial court to enter a plea of not guilty for him. The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment from questioning the illegal arrest or the lack of or irregular preliminary investigation applies only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto. There must be clear and convincing proof that petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish his right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. Same; Same; Same; Same; Injunction; Whatever delay arising from petitioners availment of remedies against the trial courts Orders cannot be imputed to petitioner to operate as a valid waiver on his part. Neither can the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction be deemed as a voluntary relinquishment of petitioners principal

prayer. The non-issuance of such injunctive relief only means that the appellate court did not preliminarily find any exception to the long-standing doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution. Consequently, the trial of the case took its course. Same; Preliminary Investigation; Inquest; Words and Phrases; A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard to fine. As an exception, the rules provide that there is no need for a preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful arrest without a warrant involving such type of offense, so long as an inquest, where available, has been conducted. Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of determining whether said persons should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. Same; Same; Same; It is imperative to first take a closer look at the predicament of both the arrested person and the private complainant during the brief period of inquest, to grasp the respective remedies available to them before and after the filing of a complaint or information in court. BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN COURT, the private complainant may proceed in coordinating with the arresting officer and the inquest officer during the latters conduct of inquest. Meanwhile, the arrested person has the option to avail of a 15-day preliminary investigation, provided he duly signs a waiver of any objection against delay in his delivery to the proper judicial authorities under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. For obvious reasons, this remedy is not available to the private complainant since he cannot waive what he does not have. The benefit of the provisions of Article 125, which requires the filing of a complaint or information with the proper judicial authorities within the applicable period, belongs to the arrested person. The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its summary nature and the attendant risk of running against Article 125, ends with either the prompt filing of an information in court or the immediate release of the arrested person. Notably, the rules on inquest do not provide for a motion for reconsideration. Same; Same; Same; Amendment of Information; Before the accused enters a plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused. It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to entry of plea. An information which is voidab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal. An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise impermissible. Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering the general rule that an information may be amended even in substance and even without leave of court at any time before entry of plea, does it mean that the conduct of a reinvestigation at that stage is a mere superfluity?

It is not. Any remedial measure springing from the reinvestigation be it a complete disposition or an intermediate modification of the charge is eventually addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which must make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. Since the trial court would ultimately make the determination on the proposed course of action, it is for the prosecution to consider whether a reinvestigation is necessary to adduce and review the evidence for purposes of buttressing the appropriate motion to be filed in court. Same; Same; Same; Same; Reinvestigation is required in cases involving a substantial amendment of the information. Due process of law demands that no substantial amendment of an information may be admitted without conducting another or a new preliminary investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that a substantial amendment in an information entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended information contains a charge related to or is included in the original Information. Same; Same; Same; Same; The question to be resolved is whether the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation. The Court answers in the affirmative. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. Same; Same; Same; Same; Matalam adds that the mere fact that the two charges are related does not necessarily or automatically deprive the accused of his right to another preliminary investigation. Notatu dignum is the fact that both the original Information and the amended Information in Matalam were similarly charging the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation. Mercado v. Court of Appeals states that the rules do not even require, as a condition sine qua non to the validity of a preliminary investigation, the presence of the respondent as long as efforts to reach him were made and an opportunity to controvert the complainants evidence was accorded him. People vs. Sambahon August 3, 2010 626 SCRA 613 Criminal Procedure; Witnesses; Impeachment of Witness; Respecting AAAs inconsistent statements, harped upon by appellant, during the preliminary examination and at the witness stand relative to thelocation of the room where she was ravished, the defense oddly did not call attention thereto to afford her the opportunity to explain or clarify it as called for under Rule 132, Section 13 of the Rules of Court which provides: SEC. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them. Apropos is this Courts ruling in People v. Relucio: . . . every witness is presumed to be truthful and perjury is not to be readily inferred just because apparent inconsistencies are evinced in parts of his testimony. Every effort to reconcile the conflicting points should first be exerted before any adverse conclusion can be made therefrom. These considerations lie at the base of the familiar rule requiring the laying of a predicate, which in essence means simply that it is the duty of a party trying to impugn the testimony of a witness by means of prior or, for that matter, subsequent inconsistent statements, whether oral or in writing, to give the witness a chance to reconcile his conflicting declarations, such that it is only when no reasonable explanation is given by him that he should be deemed impeached. MetroBank vs. Reynado August 9, 2010 627 SCRA 89 Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Preliminary Investigation; Definition of Probable Cause; Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. By way of exception, however, judicial review is

allowed where respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion that is, when he has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Tested against these guidelines, we find that this case falls under the exception rather than the general rule. Same; Same; Same; Same; The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint are matters of defense best left to the trial courts deliberation and contemplation after conducting the trial of the criminal case. To emphasize, a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is not a part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Same; Same; Same; Same; In the case at bar, as analyzed by the prosecutor, a prima facie case of estafa exists against respondents. As perused by her, the facts as presented in the Complaint-Affidavit of the auditor are reasonable enough to excite her belief that respondents are guilty of the crime complained of. In Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas we had occasion to rule that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Same; Same; Prosecution of Offenses; Suffice it to say that it is indubitably within the discretion of the prosecutor to determine who must be charged with what crime or for what offense. Public prosecutors, not the private complainant, are the ones obliged to bring forth before the law those who have transgressed it. Same; Same; Same; Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court mandates that all criminal actions must be commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor. Thus the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for the offense. The proper remedy under the circumstances where persons who ought to be charged were not included in the complaint of the private complainant is definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in the information. Heirs of Francisca Medrano vs. De Vera August 9, 2010 627 SCRA 108

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Joinder of Parties; The trial courts approach is seriously flawed because De Veras interest is not independent of or severable from the interest of the named defendants. De Vera is a transferee pendente lite of the named defendants (by virtue of the Deed of Renunciation of Rights that was executed in his favor during the pendency of Civil Case No. U-7316). His rights were derived from the named defendants and, as transferee pendente lite, he would be bound by any judgment against his transferors under the rules of res judicata. Thus, De Veras interest cannot be considered and tried separately from the interest of the named defendants. Same; Same; Same; The above provision gives the trial court discretion to allow or disallow the substitution or joinder by the transferee. Discretion is permitted because, in general, the transferees interest is deemed by law as adequately represented and protected by the participation of his transferors in the case. There may be no need for the transferee pendente lite to be substituted or joined in the case because, in legal contemplation, he is not really denied protection as his interest is one and the same as his transferors, who are already parties to the case. Same; Same; Same; While the rule allows for discretion, the paramount consideration for the exercise thereof should be the protection of the parties interests and their rights to due process. In the instant case, the circumstances demanded that the trial court exercise its discretion in favor of allowing De Vera to join in the action and participate in the trial. It will be remembered that the trial court had already admitted De Veras answer when it declared the original defendants in default. As there was a transferee pendente lite whose answer had already been admitted, the trial court should have tried the case on the basis of that answer, based on Rule 9, Section 3(c). Same; Same; Same; In this case, De Vera is not a stranger to the action but a transferee pendente lite. As mentioned, a transferee pendente lite is deemed joined in the pending action from the moment when the transfer of interest is perfected. His participation in the case should have been allowed by due process considerations. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc vs. DNG Realty and Development Corporation August 9, 2010 627 SCRA 125 Remedial Law; Foreclosure of Mortgage; Writs of Possession; Section 7 of Act 3135, as amended, refers to a situation wherein the purchaser seeks possession of the foreclosed property during the redemption period. Upon the purchaser's filing of the ex parte petition and posting of the appropriate bond, the RTC shall, as a matter of course, order the issuance of the writ of possession in the purchaser's favor. But equally well settled is the rule that a writ of possession will issue as a matter of course, even without the filing and approval of a bond, after consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new TCT in the name of the purchaser. Thus, if under Section 7 of Act 3135 as amended, the RTC has the power during the period of redemption to issue a writ of possession on the ex parte application of the purchaser, there is no reason why it should not also have the same power after the expiration of the redemption period, especially where a new title

had already been issued in the name of the purchaser. Thus, after the consolidation of title in the buyers name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and the issuance of such writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function. The basis of this right to possession is the purchasers ownership of the property. Same; Same; Same; A writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus will only be issued if there is neither appeal nor any plain, speedy or adequate relief in the ordinary course of law. However, Section 8 of Act 3135 provides the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in opposing the issuance of a writ of possession. Same; Same; Same; A party may file a petition to set aside the foreclosure sale and to cancel the writ of possession in the same proceedings where the writ of possession was requested. The aggrieved party may thereafter appeal from any disposition by the court on the matter. Same; Same; Same; Respondent's recourse to the CA via Rule 65 was inappropriate even though the Sheriff had demanded that they vacate the property. Section 8 of Act No. 3135 mandates that even if an appeal is interposed from an order granting a petition for a writ of possession, such order shall continue to be in effect during the pendency of an appeal. Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Keihin (NLMK-OLALIA-KMU) vs. Keihin Philippines Corporation August 9, 2010 627 SCRA 179 Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Parties; Joinder of Indispensible Parties; Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants." If there is a failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness. It is "precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present." The purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face cannot attain real finality where there is want of indispensable parties.

Century Canning Corporation vs. Ramil August 9, 2010 627 SCRA 192

Remedial Law; Appeals; Anent the first issue raised, petitioner faults the CA in disregarding the unanimous findings of the LA and the NLRC sustaining the legality of respondent's termination from his employment. The rule is that high respect is accorded to the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, more so in the case at bar where both the LA and the NLRC share the same findings. The rule is not, however, without exceptions one of which is when the findings of fact of the labor officials on which the conclusion was based are not supported by substantial evidence. The same holds true when it is perceived that far too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from bare facts adduced in evidence. Same; Same; Accordingly, for want of substantial basis, in fact or in law, factual findings of an administrative agency, such as the NLRC, cannot be given thestamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to it, as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. Contrary to petitioners assertion, therefore, this Court sees no error on the part of the CA when it made a new determination of the case and, upon this, reversed the ruling of the NLRC. Same; Same; Respondent alleged in his position paper that after preparing the CAPEX form on March 3, 1999, he endorsed it to Marivic Villanueva for the signature of the Executive Vice-President Ricardo T. Po. The next day, March 4, 1999, respondent received the CAPEX form containing the signature of Po. Petitioner never controverted these allegations in the proceedings before the NLRC and the CA despite its opportunity to do so. Petitioner's belated allegations in its reply filed before this Court that Marivic Villanueva denied having seen the CAPEX form cannot be given credit. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party. Reyes vs. Ortiz August 11, 2010 628 SCRA 1 Actions; Declaratory Relief; Petitioners insist that this is mainly a petition for declaratory relief. Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides: SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property

or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. The foregoing section can be dissected into two parts. The first paragraph concerns declaratory relief, which has been defined as a special civil action by any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or whose rights are affected by a statute, ordinance, executive order or regulation to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The second paragraph pertains to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument; (2) an action to quiet title; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase. Same; Same; The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63 enumerates the subject matter to be inquired upon in a declaratory relief namely, deed, will, contract or other written instrument, a statute, executive order or regulation, or any government regulation. This Court, in Lerum v. Cruz, declared that the subject matters to be tested in a petition for declaratory relief are exclusive, viz: Under this rule, only a person who is interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder. This means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of expressio unius est exclussio alterius. (Emphasis supplied.) Same; Same; Heirarchy of Courts; Despite this procedural remedy available to them, petitioners, under the pretext that they were in a quandary as to their rights under the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC, directly filed the instant case here. Petitioners did not bother to proffer a compelling reason for their direct resort to this Court. This procedural faux pas proves fatal. The Courts exhortation against taking a procedural shortcut cannot be overemphasized. In Ortega v. The Quezon City Government, the Court accentuated: At all events, even if this petition delves on questions of law, there is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for according to this Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief which advances only questions of law. Finally, while a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition if it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved, there is no allegation of facts by petitioner tending to show that she is entitled to such a writ. The judicial policy must thus remain that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it, except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.) Same; Same; Courts; Injunction; The foregoing order is not addressed to the Caloocan City RTC. Neither can it be inferred from the language thereof that the Quezon City RTC intended to enjoin the Caloocan City RTC from further proceeding with the Recovery case. The order merely mentions the Caloocan City MeTCs. Nothing more. But more importantly, the Quezon City RTC could not have validly enjoined the

Caloocan City RTC without violating the doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals[56] justifies this rule in this manner: Beginning with the case of Orais v. Escao, down to the subsequent cases of Nuez v. Low, Cabigao v. del Rosario, Hubahib v. Insular Drug Co., Inc., National Power Corp. v. De Veyra, Luciano v. Provincial Governor, De Leon v. Hon. Judge Salvador, Cojuangco v. Villegas, Darwin v. Tokonaga, we laid down the long standing doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various trial courts of a province or city, having the same or equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice. (Emphasis supplied.) Same; Ejectment; Bereft of merit too is petitioners argument that the Caloocan City MeTC cannot disregard the injunction order of the Quezon City RTC hearing the Annulment/Reversion case. The established rule is that a pending civil action for ownership such as annulment of title shall not ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding. The Court explained that the rationale for this is that in an ejectment case, the issue is possession, while in an annulment case the issue is ownership. In fact, an ejectment case can be tried apart from an annulment case. Although there is an exception to this rule, petitioners failed to justify that this case falls within said exception. Limos vs. Odones August 11, 2010 628 SCRA 288 Remedial Law; Evidence; Modes of Discovery; Under these rules, a party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be deemed to have impliedly admitted all the matters contained therein. It must be emphasized, however, that the application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court. As such, it is the duty of the courts to examine thoroughly the circumstances of each case and to determine the applicability of the modes of discovery, bearing always in mind the aim to attain an expeditious administration of justice. Same; Same; Same; The determination of the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to comply with the modes of discovery also rests on sound judicial discretion. Corollarily, this discretion carries with it the determination of whether or not to impose the sanctions attributable to such fault. Same; Same; Same; A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting partys pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request, whose purpose is to establish said partys cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence has always been firm and constant in declaring that when the affirmative defense raised is failure to state a cause of action, a preliminary hearing thereon is unnecessary, erroneous, and improvident. Same; Actions; Annulment of Title; In an action for annulment of title, the complaint must contain the following allegations: (1) that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and (2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff. Same; Same; Laches; Equally settled is the fact that laches is evidentiary in nature and it may not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to dismiss. Same; Same; Declaration of Heirship; In both cases, this Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding and not in a civil action. It must be noted that in Yaptinchay and Enriquez, plaintiffs action for annulment of title was anchored on their alleged status as heirs of the original owner whereas in this case, the respondents claim is rooted on a sale transaction. Respondents herein are enforcing their rights as buyers in good faith and for value of the subject land and not as heirs of the original owner. Unlike in Yaptinchay and Enriquez, the filiation of herein respondents to the original owner is not determinative of their right to claim title to and ownership of the property. Lazaro vs. Brewmaster International, Inc August 23, 2010 628 SCRA 574 Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Cause of Action; Sales Invoices; As correctly held by the CA, the sales invoices are not actionable documents. They were not the bases of respondents action for sum of money but were attached to the Complaint only to provide details on the alleged transactions. They were evidentiary in nature and not even necessary to be stated or cited in the Complaint. At any rate, consideration of the attached sales invoices would not change our conclusion. The sales invoices, naming Total as the purchaser of the goods, do not absolutely foreclose the probability of petitioner being liable for the amounts reflected thereon. An invoice is nothing more than a detailed statement of the nature, quantity, and cost of the thing sold and has been considered not a bill of sale. Had the case proceeded further, respondent could have presented evidence linking these sales invoices to petitioner.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division) August 25, 2010 629 SCRA 54 Certiorari; As a rule, the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, lies only when the lower court has been given the opportunity to correct the error imputed to it through a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in cases of urgency. As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non,when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. Aside from the public interest involved in the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth by the Government, it was shown that the issue herein raised by petitioner had already been squarely argued by it and amply discussed by public respondent in its assailed resolution. Hence, the requirement of prior filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with. Same; Interlocutory Orders; Words and Phrases; Contrary to public respondents posture, its order denying admission to petitioners documentary exhibits, as well as the denial of the motion to reopen for presentation of additional evidence for plaintiff, was merely interlocutory. An order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory. Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order (1) when the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. Recourse to a petition for certiorari to assail an interlocutory order is now expressly recognized in the ultimate paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court on the subject of appeal. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Order of Trial; Public respondent seriously erred in denying the motion to reopen for presentation of additional evidence on the basis of the supposed final and executory ruling which denied admission of Exhibits B to E in the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by the petitioner. Admission of additional evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Indeed, in the furtherance of justice, the court may grant the parties the opportunity to adduce additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question. The remedy of reopening a case for presenting further proofs was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice. While it is true that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, prescribed an order of trial (Section 5, Rule 30), relaxation of the rule is permitted in sound discretion of the court.

Ill-Gotten Wealth; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Executive Order No. 14, series of 1986, issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino, provided that technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to cases involving ill-gotten wealth. Apropos is our pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division): In all cases involving alleged ill-gotten wealth brought by or against the Presidential Commission on Good Government, it is the policy of this Court to set aside technicalities and formalities that serve merely to delay or impede their judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits before the Sandiganbayan. Substantial justice to all parties, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly pursued. Eleven years have passed since the government started its search for and reversion of such alleged ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is adequate proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the titles over these properties be finally determined and quieted down with all reasonable speed, free of delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks. It was incumbent upon the public respondent to adopt a liberal stance in the matter of procedural technicalities. More so in the instant case where the showing of a prima facie case of ill-gotten wealth was sustained by this Court in Silverio v. Presidential Commission on Good Governmentin No. L-77645 under the Resolution dated October 26, 1987. Dee Ping Wee vs. Lee Hiong Wee August 25, 2010 629 SCRA 145 Judgments; Doctrine of Immutability of Final Judgments; In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court had the occasion to discuss the nature of supervening events, thus: One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the existence of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality, including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time. A supervening event affects or changes the substance of the judgment and renders the execution thereof inequitable. Should such an event occur after a judgment becomes final and executory, which event may render the execution of the judgment impossible or unjust, Ramirez v. Court of Appeals dictates that a stay or preclusion of execution may properly be sought. Corporation Law; Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies; Appeals; Ispection of Corporate Books; Civil cases involving the inspection of corporate books are governed by the rules of procedure set forth in A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC, otherwise known as the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 (Interim Rules). Section 4, Rule 1of the Interim Rules defines the nature of the judgments rendered thereunder as follows: SEC.

4. Executory nature of decisions and orders. - All decisions and orders issued under these Rules shall immediately be executory, except the awards for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees, if any. No appeal or petition taken therefrom shall stay the enforcement or implementation of the decision or order, unless restrained by an appellate court. Interlocutory orders shall not be subject to appeal. Verily, the first part of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules is categorical. Save for the exceptions clearly stated therein, the provision enunciates that a decision and order issued under the Interim Rules shall be enforceable immediately after the rendition thereof. In order to assail the decision or order, however, the second part of the provision speaks of an appeal or petition that needs to be filed by the party concerned. In this appeal or petition, a restraining order must be sought from the appellate court to enjoin the enforcement or implementation of the decision or order. Unless a restraining order is so issued, the decision or order rendered under the Interim Rules shall remain to be immediately executory. Same; Same; Appeals; On September 14, 2004, the Court issued a Resolution in A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC to rectify the situation wherein lawyers and litigants are in a quandary on how to prevent under appropriate circumstances the execution of decisions and orders in cases involving corporate rehabilitation and intra-corporate controversies. To address the need to clarify the proper mode of appeal in [cases involving corporate rehabilitation and intra-corporate controversies] in order to prevent cluttering the dockets of the courts with appeals and/or petitions for certiorari, the Court thereby resolved that: 1. All decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. 2. The petition for review shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision or final order of the Regional Trial Court. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the legal fee prescribed in Rule 141 as amended before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reasons and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. Same; Inspection of Corporate Books; Burden of Proof; The Court of Appeals (Fourth Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85880 adjudged that the RTC patently erred in deciding in favor of respondents since the latter failed to show that they were impelled by proper motives in seeking to inspect the corporate records of Marine Resources Development Corporation. However, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals (First Division) in the assailed Resolution dated June 29, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 90024,Republic v. Sandiganbayan has already settled that the burden of proof lies with the corporation who refuses to grant to the stockholder the right to inspect corporate records.

People vs. Asis August 25, 2010 629 SCRA 250 Criminal Procedure; Certiorari; Finality-of-Acquittal Doctrine; A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases, the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. Thus, in People v. Louel Uy, the Court has held: Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. Same; Same; Same; A review of the records, however, shows that the case need not be remanded to the CA for appropriate proceedings. The OSGs petition forcertiorari, which forms part of the records, would not merit a favorable review even if it would be given due course simply because it is bereft of merit. For said reason, We deem that a remand of the case would only prolong the disposition of the case. It is not without precedent. On many occasions, the Court, in the interest of public service and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits, instead of remanding them for further proceedings, as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case. The rule is that while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan, presents an instructive exception to the rule on double jeopardy, that is, when the prosecution has been denied due process of law. The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy. Same; Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without violating Abordos constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial courts evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion.

Crisostomo vs. People

September 1, 2010 629 SCRA 590 Criminal Procedure; Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges; Witnesses; It must be stressed that as a rule, "a motion to inhibit must be denied if filed after x x x the Court had already given its opinion on the merits of the case, the rationale being that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the court x x x (only to) raise an objection of this sort after a decision had been rendered." Here, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and Inhibition was filed on November 29, 2002after the trial court rendered its Decision on November 14, 2002. Accordingly, the trial judge did not commit any impropriety in denying the motion to inhibit as it came after the case had been decided on the merits. Same; Same; In a motion for inhibition, "[t]he movant must x x x prove the ground of bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial."14 "Bare allegations of partiality x x x [is not sufficient] in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor."15Petitioners bare allegations in his motion to inhibit are not adequate grounds for the disqualification or inhibition of the trial judge. Thus, credence should not be given to the issue of alleged prejudice and partiality of the trial judge. Lumanog vs. People September 6, 2010 630 SCRA 42 Remedial Law; Evidence; Affidavits; Appellants make much of a few inconsistencies in his statement and testimony, with respect to the number of assailants and his reaction when he was ordered to get down in his guard post. But such inconsistencies have already been explained by Alejo during cross-examination by correcting his earlier statement in using number four (4) to refer to those persons actually standing around the car and two (2) more persons as lookouts, and that he got nervous only when the second lookout shouted at him to get down, because the latter actually poked a gun at him. It is settled that affidavits, being ex-parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, but do not really detract from the credibility of witnesses. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused, as testimonial evidence carries more weight than an affidavit. Same; Same; Out-of-court Identification; In People v. Teehankee, Jr., we explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such identification, thus: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a

witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. . . In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Criminal Law; Evidence; Out-of-court Identification; In any case, the trial court did not rely solely on said out-of-court identification considering that Alejo also positively identified appellants during the trial. Thus, even assuming arguendo that Alejos out-of-court identification was tainted with irregularity, his subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have attended it. We have held that the inadmissibility of a police line-up identification should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification. Same; Same; Same; As this Court held in Velasco v. People. As regards the failure of the police to present a ballistic report on the seven spent shells recovered from the crime scene, the same does not constitute suppression of evidence. A ballistic report serves only as a guide for the courts in considering the ultimate facts of the case. It would be indispensable if there are no credible eyewitnesses to the crime inasmuch as it is corroborative in nature. The presentation of weapons or the slugs and bullets used and ballistic examination are not prerequisites for conviction. The corpus delicti and the positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime are more than enough to sustain his conviction. Even without a ballistic report, the positive identification by prosecution witnesses is more than sufficient to prove accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, since the identity of the assailant has been sufficiently established, a ballistic report on the slugs can be dispensed with in proving petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.