1.

INTRODUCTION

Imanadvocateoflearningtobeaninsurgent.1 Gen.RussellHoward

OneofcapacitiestheSpecialOperationForces(SOF)mustalwaysdevelopmoreis thecapacitytolookbeyondformulaicresponsesandcomeupwithcreative solutionsinhighlycomplexsituations.Educatingandtrainingforthatcapacityhas becomemoreimportantasUSSOCOMhastakentheleadontheGlobalWaron Terror.Theobjectiveofthisstudyistoexaminewhethertheframeworkofweak sideorunderdogstrategyappliestoterrorismasithasto,say,counterinsurgency, andwhatitcancontributeanythingtothesolutiontothisproblem. Weaksideorunderdogstrategyistheancientwayofthinkingofwomenandthe vanquished,theformofstrategywhichwasexcludedbyAristotlefrom philosophicaldiscourse,butdidnotdisappearfrompractice.2Thewordstrategy hasbecomesomethingofarubberband,stretchedtofitwhatevermeaningis necessary.Forthepurposesofthispaper,however,strategyisanideathat orchestratesactionstoachieveagoal,anditisusuallyappliedbybusinessand military.Underdogorweakside3strategyisamoreflexible,holisticformofstrategy thatcanbeemployedoutsideofthemilitaryorbusinesstoanyinteractionbetween individuals,groupsorgovernments.Weaksideorunderdogstrategyanswersthe questionWhatisthebestthingyoucando,whentheoddsareagainstyou?That answeroftenincludesametaphorbecauseunderdogsmustmakedecisionsin conditionsofhighuncertaintyanddisadvantage,andmetaphorsareahelptothat kindofdecisionmaking.4Ithasprovenpossibletouseweaksideorunderdog strategyinpracticalsituations,usingthecognitiveheuristicdeviceofstructurally analogousthinking.Aheuristiccognitivedeviceisamentalshortcutformaking decisions,largeandsmall,andweallusethemineverydaylife.Forexample,ifwe findthatthesamegasstationrepeatedlyhasthelowestgasprices,wemayassume thatthisisalwaysthecase.Usinganalogiesfordecisionmakingorproblemsolving simplymeansthatweaskifwehaveeverencounteredthissituationbefore,andtry thesolutionthatworkedbefore.Structurallyanalogousthinkingbuildsonthis commonsense.

Gen Russell Howard, Director, Center for Counterterrorism, Fletcher School of Diplomacy, 22 February 2008 by personal communication.
2 3 4

Marcel Detienne, Les Ruses de lintelligence (Paris: Grasset, 1956). Jeffrey Record, Why Insurgencies Win (Washington: Potomac, 2007). Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Boston: MIT Press 1998).

Thedifferencesbetweenweaksideorunderdogstrategyandstrongsidestrategy aspracticedbymilitaryforcesarefew,buttheyareverysignificant.First,thereisa differenceinscope.TheUSarmedforcesapplystrategytotheatre,butnottoany smallerunits.Weaksidestrategyhasamuchsmallerscope:theirdefinitionof theatreismuchmorelimitedinscope,assmallastherangeofanimprovised explosivedevice(IED),asuicidebombing,anambushandassassinationofaleader, ortheextortionofanimpoverishedgroup.Strongsidestrategywouldcallthat tactical.Second,thereisadifferenceinrangeoftactics.TheUSarmedforces considerwhattheirtrainedspecializedpersonnelandequipmentcando.Weakside orunderdogstrategywilluseabroaderrangeofpolitical,economic,andsocial meanstoachievetheirend,includingwhatmightbeconsideredillegalorimmoral. Finally,thereisadifferencebetweenwhatisacceptableandwhatisnot.The militarybehaveinawaythatreflectstheirchainofcommand,discipline,and training,aswellasthelaws,treatiesandpoliciesofthenation.Weaksideor underdogstrategistswillalsohaverulesofbehavior,butthesearefewerandmuch lessrigid.Thesefewdifferencesaccountforthedifferencesincharacteristicsand mistakesweaksidestrategistsmake. Weaksideorunderdogstrategyasanideahasgivenrisetoaframeworkthatis composedofseveralparts:adescriptionofthemaincharacteristicsofweakside strategy,alistofthemistakesthosestrategistscommonlymake,adistinctgeneral theoryofstrategy,andananalyticalmethodthatcanmanageandcontrolwhat weaksidestrategistsdo.Weaksidestrategistsarehardtodefeat,becausethey tendtobemoresuccessfulthanotherunderdogs.Ofparticularinterestto USSOCOM,ofcourse,areterroristsusingweaksidestrategy,andhowthismightbe usedtodefeatthem. Thispaperfocusesonterroristsasweaksidestrategists.Forthepurposesofthis paper,terrorismisthedeliberatecreationandexploitationoffearthroughviolence ofthethreatofviolenceinthepursuitofpoliticalchange.5(Itisdistinctfrom insurgency,asitisfromconventionalwarfare.Ininsurgency,battlesarewaged amongandforthepeople,whoarethecentralprize,andthecommunityconducting insurgencycrossesnationalandinstitutionalboundaries.)6Theevidenceof terrorismconsideredherefallsbetweentheyears1985and2005.Theinformation isbiasedinfavorofthefailuresinterrorism,sincesuccessoftenmeanscontinuing freedomoftheterrorists.Theevidencealsoconsidersinformationonboththe leadersofgroupsandthegroupsthemselves.

Terrorism Defined, in R. D. Howard and R. L. Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorrism/ Understanding The New Security Environment, (New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 2006, 2nd edition), 23. M.C. Libicki, D.C. Gompert, D.R. Frelinger, R. Smith, Byting Back/Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st-Century Insurgents, (Washington: Rand, 2008).

ThisstudywillbeofinteresttoallranksandtradesoftheSOFwhichmightbecalled upontoplan,design,orimplementtacticsorstrategies(asdefinedhere,somewhat morebroadly)againstterrorists.Bythinkingmorelikeaterrorist,itbecomeseasier forSOFtoidentifyterroristssotheycanbeneutralized;theSOFcanalsoimprove theirperformanceduringredteamexercisesintraining;anditwillhelpthem understandtheattitudesanddecisionsofhostnations,whoarealmostbydefinition underdogscomparedtotheUS.Thekeyresearchquestionsofthisstudyareas follows: o Isthereevidencethatterroristsarebehavinglikeunderdogs? o Ifso,aretheyusingunderdogstrategy,oraretheybehavinginsomeother manner? o Iftheyareusingunderdogstrategy,isitpossibletotrainpeopletothinklike terrorists,tobettercounterthem? o Ifso,howdowetrainSOFtodoso? Thisstudyhasthreeaims.First,itexamineswhetherthemistakesunderdogsmake arealsothemistakesthatterroristsmake.Second,itexamineswaysinwhichthese mistakescanbeexploitedbytheSOF.Third,itlooksathowtheSOFcanexploitthis giventhecomplexityoftheenvironment.Giventheseaims,thisstudyhasseveral parts:inthefirst,itreviewswhatisknownofcounterterrorismtoseewhetherit matchesupwiththeknownmistakesofweaksidestrategists.Thesecondpartalso drawsontheliterature,andmoreparticularlycasestudies,tolookforexamplesof howthesemistakeshavebeenexploitedalready,andalsosomesuggestionsonthe basisofotherspheresexploitingthesemistakes.Next,itwillproposeamethodof analysisillustratedwithasimple,fictionaltask,tomanageandcontrolterrorists. Then,itwillapplythatmethodofanalysisandforecastingtoacasestudy,thatofa fictionalterroristattackontheU.S. Thereismuchinthesepagesthatisnovelandwillchallengeestablishedwaysof thinking.Iaskonlythis,thatthestudybejudgedonthebasisofthecriteria proposedforassessingcounterinsurgencydoctrine.(1)Cantheintendedaudience acceptit?(2)Isitteachable?(3)Isitrelevantandcurrent?And(4),isitmanageable andaccessible?7Inthealternative,onemayconsiderthefollowing: Cananalystsdemonstratetheskillstheyhaveacquiredthroughthisbook? Howmuchknowledgeisretainedbytheanalystwhohasworkedthroughthe casestudies? Doanalystshavetheabilitytoapply,inpracticalsituations,theknowledge andskillsthathavebeenacquired?

Alexander Alderson, US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Allys Perspective, Parameters (Winter 2007-08), 33-45, 37ss

 2. Thereisnotmuchtheacademicliteraturecantellusabouthowterroriststhink, althoughthereisabitmoreinthemilitaryliterature.Asfarastheacademic literatureonterrorismisconcerned,theresearchfitsintofourbroadcategories: gametheory;empiricalanalyses,likehistoricalorpolicycasestudies;thestudyof particularissue,likemartyrcontractsorwomensuicidebombers;andthe applicationofframeworkswhichweredevelopedforotherapplications,butare nowbeingtriedoutonterrorismandcounterterrorism.8Theseincludesocial networkanalysis,collectiveactionanalysis,andsomecounterinsurgency techniques. OnTerrorism Gametheory Thistheoryisoflittleinterestforourpurposes,sincethenumberofuserswith enough(andfreshenough)mathematicalbackgroundtotransposeitscontributions totheirownproblemsislikelytobeverysmall.ItisnotverylikelythatSOFwill havethetimetolearncalculusfromscratch. EmpiricalAnalyses Thereisarangeofstudiesinthiscategory.Someprovidepolicyadvice,liketelling liberaldemocraticgovernmentswhattodoandwhatnottodoaboutinternment withouttrial,coerciveinterrogativetechniques,andtheuseofliveammunition duringprotests.9Ingeneral,governmentsareadvisedtostaythecourse,longterm, butwithoutbeingadvisedonhowtomaintainpublicsupportforthatpolicy.Some studieswonderaboutorconcludethatUSalliesinthewaronterrorbehavelike WHATWEKNOWABOUTTHINKINGLIKEATERRORIST

Some of the categories come from B. Peter Rosendorff and Todd Sandlers Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49:2 (April 2005), 171-182. Tom Parker, Fighting an Antaean Enemy: How Democratic States Unintentionally Sustain the Terrorist Movements They Oppose, Terrorism and Political Violence (19:2, June 2007), 155-179.
9

whatwecallhereweaksidestrategists.10Lesssupportiveofourthesisarerational choicetheorists.11Othersobservethatdemocraciesareresistanttocoercion.12 SpecialIssueStudies Thereisadetaileddiscussionofthelevelofuncertaintyincounterterrorism,given thesmall,secretivenatureofterroristplotsandtheindeterminatenatureofthe target,asituationtowhichaweaksidestrategywouldmakeasignificant contribution.13 ExistingFrameworks Thesestudiesincludecollectiveactionandsocialnetworkanalysis.Thesocial actionperspectiveisaprecedentforapplyinganewapproachtoterrorism.14I concurwithTillyandsomeofthemilitaryliteraturethatanepistemological expansionisnecessary.15Itisnogreatleaptomovefromsocialnetworkanalysis, havingprevioususesinthestudyofcrime,intelligence,andcriminalnetworks,to counterterrorismandintelligence.16 HowTerroristsThink Thegeneralterroristleaderprofileincludesanumberofcharacteristics: o ofteneducatedtouniversitylevel,ofteninsubjectthathaveterrorist applications(science,business); o oftenorganizedplanners,withsomemilitarytraining/experience;

10

Daniel Byman, Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism, in Journal of Strategic Studies 29:5 (October 2006), 767-811; Gregory Miller,Confronting Terrorisms: Group Motivation and Successful State Policies,, in Terrorism and Political Violence 19:3 (September 2007), 331-350 Martha Crenshaw, Logic Of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior As A Product Of Strategic Choice, in Howard and Sawyer, ibid., 54.

11

12

Max Abrahms, Why Democracies Make Superior Counterterrorists, Security Studies 16:2 (April 2007), 223-253. Paul R. Pillar, Counterterrorism After Al Qaeda, Washington Quarterly 27 (Summer 2004): 3, 101113, 102. Eitan Y. Alimi, Contextualizing Political Terrorism: A Collective Action Perspective for Understanding the Tanzim, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006), 263-283. Charles Tilly, Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2003.

13

14

15 16

Stuart Koschade, Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29 (2006), 559-575.

o usuallythebrainsbehindoperationsortargetingandhavingthemost detailedknowledgeoftheworkingsandintentions; o oftenappearingtobelawabiding,inordertoremainundertheradar; o oftencharismatic,beingabletoconvinceandmanipulatepeople,andbeing abletoconceptualizeandarticulateanideaintoamission; o trulyconvincedofthecause;and o maybeinvolvedinpersonalrisktakingbutusuallykeepsacertaindistance toavoidcaptureandprosecutionandmaintainplausibledeniability.17 TaylorandHorgansresearchexaminestheprocessofterroristthinking.18They identifysomeproblems,likethebridgingwithassumptionintheabsenceofsound empiricalknowledge.Terroristssharesomeofthecharacteristicsofordinary people.Thereisusuallyacontextwhichfacilitatesthetransitiontoterrorism,and theactofterrorismbringstheterroristsomebenefit,ifonlyinhisownmind,and terrorismcanoperateatanindividualand/orpoliticallevel. Finally,thereareoddsandendsthatdonotfitinanyoftheabovecategories.One articlelooksatterrorisminapositivelightnowforgotten,withitbeingabulwark againsttyranny.19Itnonethelessmakesaninterestingdistinctionbetween terrorismandinsurgency,thefundamentaldifferencebeingthatterrorism emanatesfromtheunderground,whereinsurgency,withactivitieslikelootingor protesting,happenspublicly.Kilcullenappliesapproachestocounterinsurgencyto theglobalwaronterror.20Alsoprecedingthepresentworkarearticlesthat generalizefromexperimentswithcollegestudentstomilitaryapplications.21 Althoughtherearesignificantdifferencesinthechoice,theamountofinformation used,thedecisionstrategyemployedandtheeffectofexogenousconditionson decisionstrategyandchoiceininternationalrelations,thosedifferencesare quantitativeratherthanqualitative.

17 18

Graeme Steven and Rohan Guanaratna, Counterterrorism (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004).

Max Taylor and John Horgan, A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist, Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (2006), 585-601. James De Nardo, Power in Numbers/The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 229. David J. Kilcullen, Countering Global Insurgency, Journal of Strategic Studies 28:4 (August 2005), 597-617.

19

20

Alex Mintz, Steven B. Redd, and Arnold Vedlitz, Can We Generalize from Student Experiments to the Real World in Political Science, Military Affairs, and International Relations? Journal of Conflict Resolution 50:5 (October 2006), 757-776.

21

Havingreviewedtheliteratureinpoliticalscience,wecannowturntothe professionalmilitaryliterature. MilitaryLiterature Thereviewofmilitaryliteratureisstrikingforthecompatibilitywiththeprocesses andideasoutlinedbelow,aswellasthecontributiontheformalizationoftheseideas canmake.Therehavebeenseveralnewconceptualframeworksthattrytohelp solveproblemsinoperationalart.22Mostsharesomeoftheobjectivesand techniquesoutlinedbelow.Theyalsoconsidertheissuesofcomplexity, unpredictablility,andlackofinformation.Forexample,Yargarreviewsstrategic theory,includingitspremises.23Heseekstoimprovetheconceptofstrategyby proposingsomecharacteristicsofweaksidestrategy.Yargaralsoidentifies commontrapsintowhichstrategistsfall.Themilitaryliteraturealsoincludesawide rangeoffictionalandactualcasestudies,suchasE.D.SwintonsDefenseofDuffers Drift.24Therearealsoproposalsforapplyingoperationaldesignmoresystemically, buttheseproposalsexplorespecificquestionsratherthanidentifyingthestepsina process.Dugansmonographonstrategicintuitionexploresthenonrationalbut nonethelesssignificantcontributionmadetoplanningandcarryingoutstrategythat ismadebywhathecallsstrategicintuition,whatClausewitzcalledcoupdoeil,what Kleincalledanalogicalthinking,andwhatIcallthecoreidea.Pattonwasastriking exampleofstrategicintuitionbyapplyingexamplesfromhistorythroughcoup doeil.25Moreover,withoutcoreidea,itisboundtofail.Finally,theUSArmyhas proposedasevenstepmilitarydecisionmakingmodel.26Theprocessproposed here,outlinedinChapter7,ismoredetailed.Itmovesbeyondtherationaldecision makingasabasisforcampaigndesign,whichisotherwiseboundtofail.27Despiteit beingmoredetailed,theprocessproposedinChapter7fosters,ratherthanlimits, creativityandtakesintoaccountabroaderrangeofpossibilities.Theprocess proposedherealsohastheadvantageofhavingbeenbrokendownintoformsand

22

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-50-500, Commanders Appreciation and Campaign Design (Washington: Department of Defense, 2008), 59 p.; A Concept for Countering Irregular Threats / A Comprehensive Approach (US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory: Quantico: 2006). Harry R. Yargar, Strategic theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy, Letort Papers (February 2006). E.D. Swinton, Defense of Duffers Drift,Infantry Journal (1905).

23

24 25

William Dugan, Coup dOeil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning, (Washington: US Government, November 2005), 59 pages, p. 5. FM 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations (Department of the Army: Washington, 1997).

26 27

W.T. Sorrells, G.R. Downing, P.J. Blakesley, D.W. Pendall, J.K. Walk, and R.D. Wallwork, Systemic Operational Design: An Introduction, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2004-5, 104 pages.

checkliststhatcanbeusedquicklyandeasily.Theuseofchecklistsiscommonina numberoffields,includingmedicine.28

28

Atul Gawande, The Checklist, New Yorker December 10, 2007, 86-95, 92.

3.

TERRORISTSTRATEGY

TheCoreIdea Thispaperscontentionisthatsometerroriststhinklikeweaksidestrategists,and thattheterroristswhoarethehardesttodefeatusetheirownformofstrategy.The authorofthispaperhasbeenusingthisformofstrategyforthirtyyearsand studyingitfortwenty.Ithasbeenappliedtothestudyofrelationsamongstates,to thedomesticpoliticsofnations,tomilitaryaffairsandnationalandinternational security,butalsotoindividualsandgroupstryingtoachievepoliticalgoals,aswell astocounterinsurgency.Asmentionedinthefirstchapter,underdogstrategyasan ideahasgivenrisetoaframeworkthatiscomposedofadescriptionofthemain characteristicsofunderdogstrategy,alistofthemistakestheymostcommonly make,adistinctgeneraltheoryofstrategy,andananalyticalmethodthatcan analyzeandpredictwhatunderdogsusingstrategydo.Inaddition,itispossibleto useunderdogstrategyinpracticalsituations,usingthecognitiveheuristicdeviceof structurallyanalogousthinking.Acognitivedeviceisamentalshortcutformaking decisions,largeandsmall,andweallusethemineverydaylife.Usinganalogiesfor decisionmakingorproblemsolvingsimplymeansthis.First,weaskourselves whetherwehaveeverencounteredthissituationbefore.Second,wetrythe solutionthatworkedbefore.Structurallyanalogousthinkingbuildsonthiscommon sense. Therehasbeenanincreaseintheuseofanalogousthinkinginrecentyears,among scientistswithsomesurprisingcollaborators.Inoneofthemoreunlikely collaborationsofmodernmedicine,Britainslargestchildrenshospitalhas revampeditspatienthandofftechniquesbycopyingthechoreographedpitstopsof ItalysFormulaOneFerrariracingteam.Thehospitalprojecthasbeeninplacefor twoyearsandhasalreadyhelpedreducethenumberofmishaps.29Physiciansin theUShavealsosoughtoutunusualcollaborators:Agrowingnumberofhealth careprovidersaretryingtolearnformaviationaccidentsand,morespecifically, fromwhattheairlineshavedonetopreventthem.Inthelastfiveyears,several majorhospitalshavehiredprofessionalpilotstotraintheircriticalcarestaff membersonhowtoapplyaviationsafetyprinciplestotheirworkitiswell establishedthat,likeairplanecrashes,themajorityofadverseeventsinhealthcare aretheresultofhumanerror,particularlyfailuresincommunication,leadership anddecisionmaking.30Thereisalsostructurallyanalogousthinkinginotherareas ofscience.Forexample,Inatrialforacompanywithahighspeedroboticassembly

29

Gautam Naik Hospital Races to Learn Lessons of Ferrari Pit Stop, Wall Street Journal November 14 2006 p.1. Kate Murphy, What Pilots Can Teach Hospitals About Patient Safety, New York Times, October 31, 2006, 1.

30

10

line,ittookthealgorithmforthewaggledanceofbeesidentifyingnectarlocation (developedbyCardiffUniversitysManufacturingEngineeringCentre)justafew daystoidentifythemostefficientwaytorunthemachines,muchfasterthanamore conventionalprogram.31 Buttherehavebeenstructurallyanalogousthinkinginthemilitarysphere,going backtotheDukeofWellingtonsAmosquitoattack,notacannonattack, ChurchillsWeshallattacktheunderbellyofEurope,andPattonsflashesof insight.32Thestudyofemergencyrespondersusingintuitivemethodsofdecision making,includingmilitarypeople,isalsoestablished.33Thisauthorhasalsoused thecapacityforanalogousthinkingasadiagnostictestinassessingpotentialfor effectivecounterinsurgencytrainingintheCanadianForcesreserves. Next,welookatcharacteristicsofterroristthinkingandthetypicalmistakesthey make.Fortheexplorationofcharacteristicsterroristsmayhaveincommon,Iuseda singleindepthcasestudy,oftheTalibaninAfghanistanafteritsmilitarydefeatin late2001.Fortheexplorationofmistakes,Ihaverangedacrossvariousterrorist groupsandmovements,inanattempttocompensatefortheproblemsof documentation. CharacteristicsofTerroristWeakSideThinking 1.Underdogstrategistsarealwaysawareofwhatthestrongergroupsor governmentsmaydo.TheTalibanwereclearlyobservingwhattheAfghanand foreignpoliceweredoingatonepoint,theymovedsomeoftheHelmandopium tradetoNimrozwhentheyrealizedthatprovincewasmoreweaklypoliced,inthe springof2005.34 2.Underdogstrategistsarealwaysadapting.TheTalibanchangeditsmethods repeatedlyaftertheinitialU.S.ledinvasion,thenafteritsdefeat,andfinallyafterthe arrivaloftheNATOtroops.Thesemethodsincludedassassinations,kidnappings, insurgencytactics,suicidebombings,andimprovisedexplosivedevices.35Among theoccurrencesforeachofthereare:

31 32
33 34

The Waggle Dance New Scientist, 25 November 2006, 56.

John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Viking, 1987). Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Boston: MIT Press 1998). Andrew North, Losing The War On Afghan Drugs, BBC News, 12 April 2005.

35

Scott Baldauf and Faye Bowers, Afghan Riddled with Drug Ties, Christian Science Monitor, May 13, 2005.

11

o Forassassinations:thedeathofVicePresidentHajiAbdulQadirinJuly2002; attemptsonPresidentHamidKarzaiinSeptember2002,onavice presidentialcandidatein2004,andontheformergovernorofBadakhshanin October2007; o Forkidnappings:ofgroupsofforeignersinbothJuly2007andOctober2007; o Forinsurgencytactics:therecruitmentandtrainingonthePakistanborder, andtherepeatedambushofsoldiers; o Forsuicidebombings:thereweresixtyfourbetweenJanuary2005and August2006;and o Forimprovisedexplosivedevices:againstU.S.andNATOtroops,andagainst Afghanmilitaryandcivilianvehicles,withthenumbersteadilyincreasing.36 o TheTalibanalsoquicklydevelopedasymbioticrelationshipwiththeopium traders,inordertofinancetheseandotheroperations.37 3.Underdogstrategistsalmostalwaysplayawaitinggame.Afteritsdefeatby theU.S.in2001,theTalibantookafewmonthstoregroupandstartrecruiting.The violencefelltonothingduringthatperiod,beforeincreasingagainlater. 4.Underdogsarecreative,becausetheirmeansaresolimited.TheTaliban usedimprovisedexplosivedevicesbeforetheIraqinsurgents,buttheydidimport theIraqisdifferentIEDtechnology.TheTalibanshowedcreativityintheadoption oftheopiumtradetofinanceitself.38TheTalibanbasedopiumtradealsoshowed creativityineffectivelyexploitingAfghanistansharshterrain,theeasycorruptionof someofitsofficials,andtheinsecurityofthepopulation.39 5.Underdogstrategistsaremoreholistic.Afteritsdefeatin2001,itwasclear thattheTalibanwerenolongerseekingamilitaryvictoryoverNATOortheU.S.led forces.Instead,theyaretargetedtheunwillingnessofNATOsdomesticpopulations totakecasualties.TheTalibanalsoexploitedcertaintacticstowhichtheU.S.or NATOtroopscannotrespondinkind,forlegalorethicalreasons.Thosetactics includethreateningrelativesofdangerousTaliban,blackmailingthecivilian

36

IED, A Weapons Profile, Defense Update/An International Online Defense Magazine (2004) 3, updated 23 August 2006. Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend, Afghanistans Drug Trade and How It Funds Taliban Operations, Terrorism Monitor 5:9 (May 10, 2007). Anthony Cordesman, Testimony to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, January 2007.

37

38 39

Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend, Afghanistans Drug Trade and How It Funds Taliban Operations, Terrorism Monitor 5:9 (May 10, 2007).

12

populationintoprovidinginformation,orexploitingthewidespreadpoverty. Exploitingsuchopportunitieswouldbeimpossiblewithoutaholisticperspective. 6.Underdogstrategistsconstantlyscantheenvironmentforpossiblethreats andopportunities.TheTalibanarequicktospottheiropportunities,something thatismademoreobviousbytheirruthlessness.Theyquicklyidentifiedthe povertyoffarmersasapossiblywaytoexertpoweroverthem,forexample,by offeringthemmoney,bygettingintoanextortionracket,orbypromotingtheopium trade.Sincefarmpricesforpoppyhavedeclinedasproductionhasincreased,many farmersarefallingintodebt,makingthemvulnerabletoTalibanblackmail.40 Povertyalsomakesexploitationeasy:theTalibanhaverecruitedforaslittleas$US 20aday.41UnemployedmenmaybeinferiortoNATOtroops,buttheycaneasilybe usedtoconductreconnaissanceonNATOorCoalitionforces,arrangeroadside bombs,orharvestopium.42 7.Underdogsspecificallydesigneachactiontosuittheirstrategy.Thereisno evidenceinopensourcesabouttheTalibansplanninginthismanner. 8.Underdogsforecastforeachtacticandeachscenario,howeverunlikely. ThereisnoevidencefromopensourcesabouttheTalibansforecastingcapability. 9.Underdogstrategistsassumetheywillloseanydirectconfrontation.The TalibanasagovernmentmayhavebeenattackeddirectlybytheU.S.,butonce defeatedandreducedtothestatusofaninsurgentpoliticalgroupwithnoplacein thepoliticalsystem,itavoidedanydirectmilitaryorpoliticalconfrontation.The TalibandidnotparticipateintheAfghanistanelections. 10.Ifthesituationgetsbadenough,underdogstrategistswillbreaktheirown rulesofbehavior.WhiletheTalibanwereinpower,theybannedopium production.Asinsurgents,however,theyhavequicklycometorelyontheopium tradeinordertofinancetheiroperations.43

Gregg Zoroya and Donna Leinwand, Rise of drug trade threat to Afghanistan's security, USA Today, May 13, 2005. Senlis Group, Afghanistan, Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making Enemies (London: MF Publishing, 2007).
42

40

41

Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend, Afghanistans Drug Trade and How It Funds Taliban Operations, Terrorism Monitor 5:9 (May 10, 2007).

43

Unofficial comments by international staff working in the region, April 2007, cited in Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend, Afghanistans Drug Trade and How It Funds Taliban Operations, Terrorism Monitor 5:9 (May 10, 2007).

13

11.Underdogstrategistsarepassionatelycommitted.Despitelongstanding adversecircumstances,Talibansupportersarewillingtofighton,eventhoughthey faceamuchmorepowerfulmilitaryenemy. Overall,thereisagoodlevelofevidencethattheTalibanuseweaksidestrategy. Table1,EvidenceofCharacteristicsofWeakSideStrategy,summarizesthefindings. Inthenextsection,theTalibaninsurgentsaremakingsomeofthemistakes underdogstrategistshaveincommon.

Table1:EvidenceofCharacteristicsofWeakSideStrategy Characteristic Theyarealwaysthinking aboutwhatthestrongare abouttodo Theyarealwaysadapting. Talibaninsurgents OpiumtradersmovedtoNimrozfromHelmandbecauseit wasmoreweaklypoliced Changedfromregularwarfaretoassassinationsand kidnappings,insurgency,suicidebombingsandimprovised explosivedevices,financingbyopiumtrade. Tooktimetoregroupafterlosingcontrolofcountry Adoptingthemethodofroadsidebombs,importedfromthe Iraqinsurgency;opiumtradersexploitharshterrain,easy corruptionofofficials,povertyofthepopulation AbandonedgoalofmilitaryvictoryoverISAF;nowtargeting unwillingnessofdomesticNATOpopulations,using unanswerablemethods Quicklyidentifiedthepovertyoffarmersasapossiblyway toexertpoweroverthem Gaveupregularwarfare;didnotcompeteinelections Bannedopiumwheninpower,reliedonopiumtradeas insurgents willingtofightondespitefacingamuchmorepowerful enemy

Theyplayawaitinggame. Theyarecreative.

Theyareholistic.

Theyarealwaysscanning theirenvironment. Theyspecificallydesigneach actiontosuittheirstrategy. Theyarealwaysforecasting forallevents. Theyareconvincedtheywill loseadirectconfrontation. Theywillbreaktheirown rules. Theircommitmentis complete.

14

 CommonMistakesofTerrorists Mistakesterroristsmakeareintheirreasoningand/orplanning,whichisdifficultto documentwhentheyaresuccessful,anddifficulttodocumentaftertheirfailure, sincethatusuallymeansdeathorcapture.Moreover,whatcanbediscoveredafter theirdefeat,theinformationisnotalwayscompletelyavailableinatimelywayin opensources.Itisthereforenosurprisethatsomemistakescannotbeillustrated. 1.WorkingontheWrongProblem.TheMujaehdineKhalqOrganization(known astheMEKortheMKO),wasexpelledfromIranaftertheIslamicrevolutionin1979, forbeingMarxist.Atthatpointtheproblemwasanyoneoranythingthatwasnot Marxist.Afteritsexpulsion,however,itsprimarysupportcamefromSaddam Hussein,anditperpetratedantiWesternattacksandterroristattacksonthe interestsoftheclericalIranianregime.Atthatpoint,theproblemwastheIranian regime.Similarly,theSalafistGroupforCallandCombat,isasplinterfactionwhich gainedpopularsupportinAlgeriathroughitspledgetoavoidcivilianattacksinside Algeriaasopposedtotherestofthegroupwhowaswillingtosacrificecivilians. Later,however,theydidattackcivilians.44 2.NotSpecifyingTheirObjectivesEnough.ThefactthattheIslamicGroup(Al FamaaalIslamiyya),Egyptslargestmilitantgrouphasbeenactivesincethe1970s, buthasnotconductedattackswithinEgyptsinceAugust1998.Thisledtoasplitin thegroup,withonesupportingtheceasefire,ledbyMustafaHamza,andtheother callingforareturntoarmedoperations,includingattacksonUSandIsraeli interests.Thesplitcouldhavebeenavoidediftheobjectiveshadbeenclearall along.Thesameistrueof,ontheonehand,theGeneralCommandofthePopular FrontfortheLiberationofPalestineand,ontheother,thePopularFrontforthe LiberationofPalestineitself.TheGeneralCommandsplitfromtherestoftheFront in1968,wantingtofocusmoreonfightingandlessonpolitics.FARCperiodically hidesitsactualaimsunderanideologicalstrugglethatisnolongercredible.45And finally,thereisalsoindirectevidencethiswasaproblemforAlQaeda,i.e.thefact thatKhalidShaikhMohommadintroducedtheprincipleofbeinggoalorientedand notruleoriented.Thiswasrevealedwhenitcametoplanstoattackgovernmentor otherhardtargetsweredisruptedinSoutheastAsia.ThenKhalidapprovedattacks onsofttargets,includingnightclubs,cafes,andmostfamously,theBalinightclubon October12,2002.46

44

Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorism/Understanding the New Security Environment, 2nd edition, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006). Graeme Steven and Rohan Gunaratna, Counterterrorism (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004), p. 189. Graeme Steven and Rohan Gunaratna, Counterterrorism (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004), p. 163.

45 46

15

3.NotDevelopingEnoughAlternatives.Onegroupthatdoesdevelopenough alternativesistheLiberationTigersofTamilEelam(LTTE),themostpowerful TamilgroupinSirLanka.Itusesovertanillegalmethodstoraisefunds,acquire weapons,andpublicizeitscause,whichistoestablishanindependentTamilstate. Itusesaguerillastrategythatincludestheuseofterroristtactics.KhalidShaik Mohommadalsodevelopsalternativesmostclearlyregardingfinancing.Whenever heneededmoney,hediscreetlyapproachedbusinessmen,politicians,andeven charityworkershehascultivatedovertheyears.47Butthoseareexceptions. Todaysinternationalterroristgroupsfunctionnotastightlystructured hierarchies,butratherasshadowynetworksthat,whennecessary,strikeadhoc tacticalalliances,bridgingreligiousandideologicalschisms.48Thelackof alternativesleadstocontradictoryactions,aswhenOsamaBinLadenscallto MuslimstocometoIraqsdefensecameashederidedtheregimeinBaghdad.The factthatceasefiresareusedasstallingtacticsby,amongothers,Hizbollahandthe IRAreflectthislackofalternatives.Partlythelackofalternativescomesasa protectionagainstthegroupsplintering.ForexampletheRealIrishRepublicArmy wasformedinearly1998asaclandestinearmedwingopposingSinFeinsadoption inSeptember1997oftheMitchellprinciplesofdemocracyandnonviolence.Itis composedofperhaps200activistsandsomeIRAhardlinersdissatisfiedwiththe ceasefire. 4.GivingInadequateThoughtToTradeoffs.Some,ofcourse,dogiveadequate thoughttotradeoffs,likethetheKurdistanWorkersParty(PKK)startedwitha Marxistideology,butbythe1990sadvocatednationalismovercommunism,then startedincludingIslam.Itadoptedviolenttacticsin1984,withanenlarged campaignofviolencein1993and1994thatledto1600deaths.49Butthereverseis moreoftentrue.JamalAlFadlwasaSudanesenationalwhowalkedintoauthorities in1996andprovidedinformationonAlQaedasactivitiesinvariouscountries.50He hadembezzledmoneybecauseofhislowpay,asituationthatwouldhavebeeneasy toavoid.PerhapsAlQaedathoughtthesocialrewardswouldbeenough:arecurring themeinAlQaedasrecruitingistheformationofanetworkoffriendshipsthat

47 48

Graeme Steven and Rohan Gunaratna, Counterterrorism (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004), p. 163.

BBC Transcript (www.newsbbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/2751019.htm) of Al-Jazeeras broadcast of Bin Ladens audio message, 11 February 2003. Alison Jamieson, Transnational Organized Crime: A European Perspective, in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24 (2001), 383. Peter Bergen, The Bin Laden Trial: What Did We Learn? Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24:6 (November-December 2001), 430, in Robert Sheperd, Human Intelligence and Counterterrorism, graduate paper, University of Calgary, 2007.

49

50

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solidifiedandprecededformalinductionintotheterroristorganization51Similarly, ETA(EuzkadiTaAskatasuna),theBasqueseparatistgroupfoundedin1959, financesitsactivitiesthroughkidnappings,robberies,andextortion.Itspolitical tactics,sotospeak,arelimitedtobombingsandassassinationsofSpanish Governmentofficials.Astimegoeson,however,thepracticesarelikelytospread fromonegoaltotheother.TheFARC,theRevolutionaryArmedForcesofColombia, wentfrombeingaMarxistrevolutionarypoliticalorganizationtoaterrorist organizationasaresponsetopoliticalfailure.Theytriedtoentermainstream Colombianpoliticsinthemid1980s,throughthePatrioticUnionparty.Large landownersandthearmyrespondedwithacampaignofmurderagainsttheir officials.52FARCthenincreaseditsmilitarycapacity,butneededmoney,whichitgot fromnarcoticssmuggling.Thebusinesseventuallytookoverthepoliticalaspect, whichcouldhavebeenavoidediftheyhadsoughtpoliticalsuccessinadifferent way.TheAbuSayafGrouphasasimilarstory.TheAbuSayafGroupisoneofthe mostviolentoftheIslamicseparatistgroupsintheSouthPhilippines.Itengagesin kidnappingsforransom,bombings,assassinations,andextortion.Itshowsthe willingnesstobreaktherules,inthiscasethelaw,ifnecessary.In2000,afaction kidnappedtwentyonepersons,includingtenforeigntourists,fromaresortin Malaysia.Italsoabductedseveralforeignjournalists.Ithasafewhundredcore fighters,butnowitalsocountsinitsranksover1000individualsmotivatedbythe prospectofransompaymentsjoinedin20002001.Theyhavemovedfroman extremistpoliticalgrouptoonedominatedbycriminals. 5.DisregardingUncertainty.Theessenceofstrategyishowtodealflexiblyand creativelywithnewdevelopments,notinnailingdowntheperfectplanonpaper. Thismeans,forexample,thatinaterroristgroupthemembership,butnotthe leadership,isexpendable.Whensomememberoftheleadershipiscaptured,it becomesobviousthattheterroristgroupreliesontheleadership,andsuffers accordingly.Thiswasseenwiththecaptureofthreeleadersinthreedifferent terroristgroups:AbimaelGuzman,whofoundedtheShiningPath;Rohan Wijeweera,wholedtheJanathaVimukthiPeamuna(JVP);andAbdullahOcalan,who ledtheKurdishWorkersParty(PKK).AfterShokoAsharawascapturedbypolice, AumShinrikyosnewleaderrejectedthefoundersviolentandapocalyptic teachings. 6.FailingtoAccountForYourRiskTolerance.Risktoleranceisatoolusedand misusedbyterrorists.Forexample,KalidShaikhMohommad,thirdincommandof

51

Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Pressk 2004), 108 in Robert Sheperd, Human Intelligence and Counterterrorism, graduate paper, University of Calgary, 2007.

52

Michaelf Shifter, Colombia on the Brink: There Goes the Neighborhood, Foreign Affairs 78:4 (JulyAugust 1999), 14ss, 16.

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AlQaeda,wasonlycapturedinMarch2003,afterputtinglayersofoperatives betweenhimandfrontendorganizersforyears.53Ontheotherhand,theleaderof theTamilTiger(orLTTE),VelupillaiPrabhakaran,becameobsessedbysecurity overtime.Herarelygaveinterviewsandkepthismovementsbetweenjungle hideoutsunderthestrictestsecrecy,afterhenarrowlyavoidedbeingassassinated orcapturedseveraltimes.Thenearmissesmadehimparanoid,andheeventually murderedseveralofhistrustedcommandersforsuspectedtreason.Hereportedly wearsacyanidecapsulearoundhisnecktobeswallowedintheeventofcapture, andexpectshisTigersoldierstodothesame.Seldomseeninpublicexceptbefore battles,hehasareputationforbeingfearlessandruthless. 54Leadersthemselves haverelativelylowtoleranceforriskwhenshornoftheirsupporters,andtendto behavepoorlywhencaptured:thePKKleaderOcalanandtheJVPleaderWijeweera bothplednottobetorturedwhentheywerecaptured,afacttheirsupportershave troublebelieving. 7.FailingtoPlanAheadWhenDecisionsAreLinkedOverTime.Hizbollahfailed todothisin2006.Foundedin1982inresponsetotheIsraeliinvasionofLebanon thatyear,Hizbollah(PartyofGod)isunwillingtoworkwithintheestablished politicalsystem.HavingpreviouslycapturedthreeIsraelisoldiersintheShabaa Farms,andthenhavingkidnappedanIsraelinoncombatant,in2006,itkidnapped twoIsraelisoldiers.Thattime,Israelrespondedwitharmsaresponsewhose effectivenessmaybedebated,butwhoseintensitycannotbedoubted. 8.Nottrustingyourintuition.Instrategy,itisimportanttoworkeasilywiththe nonrationalaspectsindecisionmaking,aswellasthetacitornonexplicit processes. 9.Notkeepingthingssimpleanddiscreet.Herethereareseveralexamplesof brazenbehavior.Forexample,theJaisheMohammed(JEMorArmyof Mohammed)ofPakistanisanIslamicextremistgroupformedinearly2000.It collectedfundsthroughdonationrequestsinmagazinesandpamphlets.This understandablydrewtheattentionofthegovernment,andforcedwithdrawalof fundsfrombankaccountinanticipationofassetseizures.(Theyinvestedthemin legalbusinessessuchascommoditytrading,realestateandproductionofconsumer goods!)55TheKahaneChai(KahaneLives),wasfoundedtorestorethebiblicalstate ofIsrael.OneofseveralfundamentalistorganizationsinIsrael,KahaneChaiwas onlydeclaredaterroristorganizationbytheIsraelicabinetinMarch1994afterit supportedaJewishattackontheAlIbrahimimosque.Alongstandingorganization,

53 54 55

Graeme Steven and Rohan Gunaratna, Counterterrorism (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004), p. 163. Graeme Steven and Rohan Gunaratna, Counterterrorism (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004), p. 180.

Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorism/Understanding the New Security Environment, 2nd edition, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006).

18

todaytheFARCsvulnerabilityinvolvesthepoliticsoftheorganization,complete withstatutesdefiningitsstructure(squad,guerrilla,company,column,fronts,block offronts,andcentralhighcommand).56TheTamilTigerstodayhavetheirown newspaper,pressandpropagandasection,inadditiontoapoliticalwing,aresearch anddevelopmentwing,andanintelligencewing.Isitanywondertheyattract attention? 10.Goingagainsttheflowofevents.Thisisunadvisableexceptattheverystartof operations,beforeanypositionsaretakenordecisionsmade.Itisonlywith experienceandsomedevelopmentsthatitispossibletojudgemomentum,andit onlythenbecomespossibletodivertittobestadvantage.However,inexperienced orirrationalterroristsmaynotbehaveinthisway. 11.Ignoringtheneedtowait,rushingheadlongintoaction.Inpositionsof disadvantage,thisisacostlymistaketomake.Thereisindirectevidencethiswasa problemforAlQaeda,andthefactthatKalidShaikhMohommadintroducedthe principleoflosingandlearningdoctrine.Inotherwords,ifanalQaedaoperation failsorsufferslosses,itisnotconsideredastrategiclossifthegrouplearns, improves,andvowsnottorepeatitsmistake.57Suchapolicywouldnotbe necessaryiftherewerenoserious,repeatedproblems.
12. Ignoring the unintended consequences of your actions. Any strategist should beware of the unintended consequences that flow from actions. Situations are unpredictable, and consequences arising from terrorist action affect not just achieving a goal, but also affect a range of other situations. These unintended consequences have to be managed or they can interfere with success. Table2:EvidenceofStrategicMistakes TypeofMistake NotKeepingThings Simple,Honest, ModeratelyDiscreet TerroristGroupandAction JEMcollectedfundsthroughdonationrequestsinmagazinesand pamphlets(assetsseizedbyPakistanigovernment);KahaneChai declaredterrororganizationbyIsraelafteritsupportedaFeb.1994 attackonthealIbrahimiMosque;FARCsinternalpolitics,statutes definingthestructure(squad,guerrilla,company,column,fronts, blockoffronts,centralhighcommand);TamilTigerssnewspapers, pressandpropagandasection,politicalwing,researchand developmentwing,andintelligencewing. Noevidencefound

GoingAgainst, InsteadOfWith,The FlowOfEvents.

56 57

Economist, April 19, 2001. Graeme Steven and Rohan Gunaratna, Counterterrorism (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004), p. 163.

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IgnoringTheNeedTo AlQaeda,KalidShaikhMohommadhadtointroducelosingand Wait,Rushing learningdoctrine,i.e.onlyadefeatifnothingislearnedand HeadlongIntoAction. mistakesrepeated IgnoringThe Unintended ConsequencesOf YourActions. Workingonthe WrongProblem. Noevidencefound

MEKexpelledfromIranin1979forbeingMarxist,thenperpetrated antiWesternattacks;SalafistGroupforCallandCombatgained popularitythroughpledgetoavoidAlgeriancivilians,thenattacked themanyway HizbollahrepeatedlykidnappedIsraelisoldiersorcivilians;In 2006,kidnappingoftwoIsraelisoldiersbroughtIsraeliarmed response IslamicGroupofEgyptsplitintoafactionsupportingaceasefire andafactionwantingtocarryoutattacksonUSandIsraeli interests;GeneralCommandofthePopularFrontfortheLiberation ofPalestinesplitfromtherestofthePopularFrontin1968, wantingtofightmoreandpolitickless;AlQaedasKalidShaikh Mohommadhastomovefromgovernment,hardtargetsin SoutheastAsiaforsofttargetsliketheBalinightclubonOctober12, 2002;FARCactualaimsversusofficial,ideologicalstruggle CeasefiresusedasstallingtacticsbyHizbollah,IRA

FailingtoPlanAhead WhenDecisionsAre LinkedOverTime. NotSpecifyingTheir ObjectivesEnough.

NotDeveloping EnoughAlternatives

GivingInadequate MovefromMarxismtonationalismtoIslamismofPKK;moveto ThoughtToTradeoffs enlargedcampaignofviolencein1993;SudanesewalkinfromAl Qaedaoverembezzlement,lowpay;useofkidnapping,robberyand extortionbyETAformoney,insteadofbombingsand assassinationsofofficialsforpoliticalreasons;FARCturnedto terrorismafterpoliticalfailure;gotintonarcoticssmugglingfor money;AbuSayafGroup,IslamicseparatistsinsouthPhilippines, useskidnapping,bombings,assassinations,andextortionfor money;itsnumbers,over1000in20022001,nowmotivatedby moneyratherthanextremism Disregarding Uncertainty DiscomfitureofShiningPath,JVP,AumShinrkyo,andPKKafter captureofleaders

FailingToAccountFor KalidShaikhMohommad,thirdincommandofAlQaeda,usedlayersof YourRiskTolerance. operativesbetweenhimselfandorganizerstoprotecthimself;Leader oftheLTTEmurderedseveralofhisowncommandersforsuspected treason,woreacyanidecapsulearoundhisneckincaseofcapture; capturedleadersofPKKandJVPbeggednottobetortured

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4.EDUCATINGYOURSELFTOTHINKLIKEATERRORIST Howdoesoneeducatehighlytrained,highlyintelligent,highlycompetentpeopleto thinkliketerrorists?Theanswerforveryhighperformingindividualsisdifferent thanfortheaverageperson,andinrecentyearsseemstoliewithanalogicalor metaphoricalthinking.Theuseofanalogicalthinkingisrecommendedfor emergencyresponders,amongothers,inhighlycomplexsituationswithuncertainty byKlein.58Butithasspreadbeyondthatsphere.Inoneofthemoreunlikely collaborationsofmodernmedicine,Britainslargestchildrenshospitalhas revampeditspatienthandofftechniquesbycopyingthechoreographedpitstopsof ItalysFormulaOneFerrariracingteam.Thehospitalprojecthasbeeninplacefor twoyearsandhasalreadyhelpedreducethenumberofmishaps.59Thishasalso beentrueforUShospitals.Agrowingnumberofhealthcareprovidersaretryingto learnformaviationaccidentsand,morespecifically,fromwhattheairlineshave donetopreventthem.Inthelastfiveyears,severalmajorhospitalshavehired professionalpilotstotraintheircriticalcarestaffmembersonhowtoapplyaviation safetyprinciplestotheirworkitiswellestablishedthat,likeairplanecrashes,the majorityofadverseeventsinhealthcarearetheresultofhumanerror,particularly failuresincommunication,leadershipanddecisionmaking.60Outsidethedelivery ofhealthcare,therehavebeeninterestingresults.Inatrialforacompanywitha highspeedroboticassemblyline,ittookthealgorithmforthewaggledanceofbees identifyingnectarlocation(developedbyCardiffUniversitysManufacturing EngineeringCentre)justafewdaystoidentifythemostefficientwaytorunthe machines,muchfasterthanamoreconventionalprogram.61 Analogicalthinkinghastheadditionalbenefitofcrystallizinginacognitiveheuristic devicesomeofthecharacteristicsofweaksidestrategyinpracticalsituations.A cognitivedeviceisamentalshortcutformakingdecisions,largeandsmall,andwe allusethemineverydaylife.Usinganalogiesfordecisionmakingorproblem solvingsimplymeansthis:weaskourselvesifwehaveeverencounteredthis situationbefore,andtrythesolutionthatworkedbefore.Structurallyanalogous thinkingbuildsonthisformofcommonsense.Therehavebeenstructurally analogousthinkinginthemilitarysphere,goingbacktotheDukeofWellington.62

58 59 60 61 62

Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Boston: MIT Press, 1998), 213ss. Gautam Naik Hospital Races to Learn Lessons of Ferrari Pit Stop, Wall Street Journal November 14 2006 p.1 Kate Murphy, What Pilots Can Teach Hospitals About Patient Safety, New York Times, October 31, 2006, 1. The Waggle Dance New Scientist, 25 November 2006, 56. John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Viking, 1987).

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Andthestudyofemergencyrespondersusingintuitivemethodsofdecisionmaking, includingmilitarypeople,isalsoestablished.63Thisauthorhasalsousedthe capacityforanalogousthinkingasadiagnostictestinassessingpotentialfor effectivecounterinsurgencytrainingintheCanadianForcesreserves.Overall,the trainingavailableconsistsofexercises,forms,andchecklists.Theuseofchecklists iscommoninanumberoffields,includingmedicine.64 Whatmaywellberequiredtolearntothinkliketerroristsmayamounttoachange ofmindsetformilitarypersonnelissomethingamountingtochangingthemindset. Forregulararmedforces,defensivepositionsandwaysofthinking:clearlylikethe enemyislikeyourself,tryingtomaneuvertheenemysothatyouradvantageswill bedecisive.Butincomplexenvironmentssuchasarenowfaced,theenemydonot caretomeetwithadecisiveengagement,whichtheyarenowconvincedtheywill lose.Theywillattacktheweakpoints,notthestrongpoints,andarewillingtowait becauseitisnotbeingdecimated.65 Kleindevelopedtherecognitionprimedmodel.66Heclaimsthatwithexperienced decisionmakers,thefocusisonthewaytheyassessthesituationandjudgeit familiar,notoncomparingoptions.Coursesofactioncanbequicklyevaluatedby imagininghowtheywillbecarriedout,notbyformalanalysisandcomparison. Decisionmakersusuallylookforthefirstworkableoptiontheycanfind,notthebest option.Sincethefirstoptiontheyconsiderisusuallyworkable,theydonothaveto generatealargesetofoptionstobesuretheygetagoodone.Theygenerateand evaluateoptionsoneatatimeanddonotbothercomparingtheadvantagesand disadvantagesofalternatives.Byimaginingtheoptionbeingcarriedout,theycan spotweaknessesandfindwaystoavoidthese,therebymakingtheoptionstronger. Conventionalmodelsjustselectthebest,withoutseeinghowitcanbeimproved. Theemphasisisonbeingposedtoactratherthanbeingparalyzeduntilallthe evaluationshavebeencompleted.Metaphorsandanaloguesdirectthinkingby framingsituationawareness,identifyingappropriategoals,andflaggingrelevant piecesofinformation.Analogiesprovideastructureformakingpredictionswhen therearemanyunknownfactors.Analogiesfunctionlikeexperiments,linking interactivesetsofcausestooutcomes.Andbytakingintoaccountthedifference betweentheanalogueandthecurrentcase,wecanadjusttheanaloguedatato deriveaprediction.Analogicalpredictionsaremosthelpfulwhenthereisagood databasebutnotenoughinformationtoapplymorerigorousanalyses.Analogues areusefulforgeneratingexpectanciesandsolvingproblems.

63 64 65 66

Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Boston: MIT Press 1998).

Atul Gawande, The Checklist, New Yorker December 10, 2007, 86-95, 92. John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Viking, 1987). Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Boston: MIT Press, 1998), 213ss.

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Theuseofformsandchecklistsisfamiliartomilitarypersonnel.However, checklistsalsoestablishahigherstandardofbaselineperformanceinICUstaff. Pronovostisroutinelydescribedbycolleaguesasbrilliant,inspiring,agenius. HehasanM.D.andaPh.D.inpublichealthfromJohnsHopkins,andistrainedin emergencymedicine,anesthesiology,andcriticalcaremedicine.But,really,doesit takeallthattofigureoutwhathousemovers,weddingplanners,andtax accountantsfiguredoutagesago?Pronovostishardlythefirstpersoninmedicine touseachecklist.Butheisamongthefirsttorecognizeitspowertosavelivesand takeadvantageofthebreadthofitspossibilities.67 Itisonthebasisofanalogiesandcheckliststhatthelearningofterroriststrategy rests.Thefirststepindefeatingunderdogthinkingisinunderstandingwhat underdogthinkingentails.Thischapteranalyseshowunderdogsusebothstrategy andtactics.Thistypeofanalysisreliesonthecharacteristicsoftheirstrategic thinkingoutlinedinthepreviouschapter.Italsoreliesontherepeated differentiationofsignificantevents,actions,actors,orresourcesusedbyanyof them,frominsignificantones.Someonetryingtodefeatunderdogthinkingforthe firsttimecanlearnthestepsofanalysisbyusingtheworksheetsystemdiscussed below. Theprocessdescribedbelowendswithanapplicationofstructurallyanalogous thinkingcombinedwithastructuredsetofopenendedquestions.Theworksheets presentedherearebasicallyformsyouusetoanswerspecificquestionsthatwill walkyouthroughyourstrategicandtacticalanalysisinastepbystep,structured way.Eachworksheetrepresentsonestepintheprocessofanalyzingunderdog strategyandtactics,witheachboxrepresentingafurtherbreakingdowninthe analysis.(Asyougetmoreexperiencedusingtheworksheets,itispossibletouse thesameworksheetstodesignstrategiesortacticsthatwilldefeatunderdogs). Althoughthestructureandwordingofmostworksheetsissimple,thinking,or sometimesthoughtexperiments,mayberequiredtoanswereachquestion. Ifagroupisanalyzingaproblem,thenconsiderablediscussionmaybenecessaryto fillouteachworksheettheaimistoreachconsensusintheresponses,whichleads totheteamreachingconsensusontheoverallapproach.Thereisnorightorwrong answerinanysituation,oronanyworksheet:theprocessiswhatisimportant. Takentogether,theworksheetsformasystemthatbreaksdowntheanalysisof underdogstrategy,andhelpsdesignactionstodefeatit. Whatfollowaredescriptions,instructionsandexamplesoftencoreworksheetsthat canbeusedtodeveloporanalyzestrategyinallitsapplications.Tokeepthe numberofworksheetsmanageable,theseparticularexampleswerechosento addressthemostcommondifficultiesencountered,whilestillofferinga

67

Atul Gawande, The Checklist, New Yorker December 10, 2007, 86-95, 92.

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comprehensiveanalysisofastrategy.Worksheetsalsovaryincomplexity.Foreach, thereisanexplanationofitspurpose,ablankworksheet,asetofinstructionson howtofillitout,andanexampleofacompletedworksheet.Sampleworksheets presentedhereallcoverthesamehypotheticalsituation:soldiersonpatrolin hostileterritorycapturedaprisonerandnowreturningtobasecampoveratwo dayperiod. Thegoaloftheworksheetsisnottoprovideanexhaustivesetofminutelydescribed stepstoreachasinglecorrectconclusiontheintentissupporttheartofanalyzing ordesigningunderdogstrategy.Inmostcases,youwillbecomemorecomfortable usingtheseworksheetsafterusingthemsixorseventimes.Onceyouareproficient, however,worksheetscanstillbeusedanytimeaproblemneedstobesolved,oras longasisnecessaryforthestrategyorstrategicanalysistobecompleted. Theworksheetsusesareillustratedusingasimplecasestudy,thatofaninfantry squadhavingtoholdandthenreturnacapturedenemytotheirbase.Theten worksheetsare:
1. Strategy 2. KeyActors 3. AnActorsActionsorTactics 4. ResourcesAStrategyCanDrawOn 5. RulesoftheGame 6. AllOtherFactors 7. StepsandNodes 8. TacticsandCounterTactics 9. CoreIdea 10. IntegrationDiary

Youneednotusealltheworksheets,butyoucanpickandchooseanysubsetofsix andthechancesarestillgoodthattheprocesswillwork.

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Worksheet1:Strategy Inthisworksheet,youareexpectedtoidentifythecomponentsofastrategytodeal withaparticularchallenge.Youshouldusepointformtofillthisout,andrestrict yourselftonomorethanasinglepagetocompletetheworksheet.Thiswillforce youtobevery,veryspecificandfocused,andtochooseamongcompetingpriorities. Thisway,itispossibletoassessyourjudgment,aswellasyourcapacitytothink usingstrategy.

Worksheet1:Strategy 1.Issue 2.Goal 3.CoreIdea 4.Tactics 1 2 3 4

Youdonotneedtodevelopastrategyonlyinanadversarialsituationyoucanuse thissystemtodealwithachallengeofanytype.Becauseitisdemandingtodevelop andimplement,itisusuallyonlyusedindirecircumstanceswherethereareatleast oneandusuallymanyenemyplayers.Asusual,youmustbedetailed,specific,and succinct.Youshouldalsobecarefultoworkalwaysatthesamelevel:most strategiesarelikenestingbowls,andyoucancovermoreorlessbroadlythe situation.Fortheprocesstoworkproperly,youneedtodecidehowmuchofthe situationyouwanttocover,andsticktoit. Yourproblemisdescribedsuccinctlyinthetopbox,1.Issue.Thebestsolutionto thatproblemisdescribedsuccinctlyinthemiddlebox,2.Goal.Themetaphoror analogyyouwanttouseisinthenextbox,3.CoreIdea.Thestepsthatwillhave theanalystreachthegoal,orthemethodtobeused,inthebottombox,4.Tactics.

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SampleWorksheet1:Strategy 1.Issue 2.Goal 3.CoreIdea 4.Tactics Tiredtroopsinahostileenvironment Providesecure,safeandrestfulenvironmentfortroopsforonenight Letscirclearoundthequeenbee(principlebehindallrounddefense) 1 Identifymostdefensiblelocationwithinaccessiblerange 2 Assignguardduty 3 Assigntasksre:settingupcamp 4 Other

Worksheet2:KeyActors Inanystrategy,thereareanumberofpossibleactors.Thoseactorscanbe individuals,groups,governmentsorevengroupsofgovernments.Theactorscanbe involvedintheplanningofastrategy,orbeontheoutside.Theymaybehelpful, neutral,orhostile.Theymaybeawareofthestrategyoractions,ornot.Butmost importantly,theymayhaveanimpacteitheronthetacticsorthestrategyitselfyou areanalyzingordesigningorcarryingout.Thegoalofthisworksheetistoidentify whichonesmayhaveanimpact,sothatyoucansettheothersasideand concentrateyourenergiesontheactorswhomatter.

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Worksheet2:KeyActors 1.YourGoal 2.YourLatestTactic 3.LatestActionorEvent, ifdifferentfromabove 4.aYourPossibleTacticA 4.bYourPossibleTacticB 4.cYourPossibleTacticC 4.dYourPossibleTacticD 6.Canthis actoraffect your achieving thegoal? (YesorNo) 7.Canthis actor preventyour achieving thegoal? (YesorNo) Tactic A Tactic B Tactic C Tactic D

5.All Actors

8.Canthisactoraffectanyofyour possibletactics?

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 Box1:Statethegoalofthestrategyis. Box2:Statewhatwasyourlastactionrelevanttoyourstrategy. Box3:Statewhatwasthelastactionorevent,relevanttothestrategy.Thisaction oreventcancomefromanywhere,butithastohavehappenedafterthelasttactics. Box4:Listtheactionsunderconsiderationwithrespecttothestrategy.Uptofour maybeconsidered. Box5:Here,makeacomprehensivelistofactors.Variousheadings,suchascivilian, military,domestic,foreign,army,navy,airforce,etc.mightbeuseful.Donotbe concernedaboutputtingpeopleorgroupsintherightcategories:theheadingsjust helptoensureeveryindividualand/orgrouppossibleislisted.Askwhetherthe groupslistedoughttobebrokendownfurtherintosmallergroupsforexample, shouldaforeignnationalgovernmentbelistedassuch,orshoulditbebrokendown intoministryoftheinterior,ministryofdefense,legislators,executivecouncilor cabinet,localgovernment,etc. Oncethelistofactorsiscomplete,thenextcolumnhelpsdifferentiatebetween significantandinsignificantactors. Boxes6,7,8:Asignificantactorisonewithoutwhomitisimpossibleforthetactic cannotsucceed.Tobemorespecific,asignificantactorcanaffectwhetherornot thetacticrequiredcanmovethestrategytowardtheachievementofthegoal. Withoutwhoisaparticulartacticisguaranteedtofail?Whosecooperationand supportisessentialtothesuccessofthetactic?Whichactororactorshavethe powertoaffecttheoutcome?Who,ontheotherhand,isirrelevant?Arethere actorswhomyouknowstandnochanceofaffectingtheoutcome?Cantheybe spoilers?Arethereotherindividualsorgroupsforwhichthesamecanbesaid?On theotherhand,arethereanygroupsorindividualswhocanaffecttheoutcome?Are thereanyactorsthatpresentapictureofdisproportionateinfluenceorpoweron theoutcome?Placethecheckmarksasyougoalong,andthenselectforfurther analysisactorswhoaresignificant.

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SampleWorksheet2:KeyActors 1.YourGoal 2.YourLatestTactic 3.LatestActionorEvent, ifdifferentfromabove 4a.YourPossibleTacticA 4b.YourPossibleTacticB 4c.YourPossibleTacticC 4d.YourPossibleTacticD 6.Canthis actoraffect your achieving thegoal? (YesorNo) 7.Canthis actor prevent your achieving thegoal? (YesorNo) 8a. Tactic A Squad Leader Soldier1 Soldier2 Soldier3 Soldier4 Soldier5 Prisoner1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No 8b. Tactic B Yes No No No No No No 8c. Tactic C Yes No No No No No No 8d. Tactic D Orderblackout Allowlightstobeused Allowminimallightstobeused Gettingprisonerbacktocamp Settingupcampforthenight Nightisfalling

5.All Actors

8.Canthisactoraffectanyofyour possibletactics?

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Nearby civilian1 Nearby civilian2 Nearby civilian3 Nearby civilian4 Nearby civilian5 Possible enemy fighter1 Possible enemy fighter2 Possible enemy fighter3 Possible enemy fighter4 Possible enemy fighter5 Local authorities

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

No No No No No Yes

No No No No No Yes

No No No No No Yes

No No No No No Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Worksheet3:AnActorsActionsandTactics Thenextstepinthetacticalanalysisofasituationfocusesonthetactics,andalso differentiatesbetweensignificantandinsignificantactions.Thereareanumberof actionsonthepartofeachsignificantactor.Thoseactionsmaybetactics,i.e. relevanttothestrategy,ornot.Inordertobetactics,theymustdirectlyor indirectlymovethesituationtowardsthegoalbeingachieved.Tacticsthemselves maypreventthegoalfrombeingachievedorthestrategyfrombeingsuccessful,i.e.

30

theycanbekeytactics.Whichoftheseactionsarerelevanttotheachievementof thegoal?Inwhatsituationsisthatunclear?Ifitispossiblethatthetacticis relevanttothegoal,includeit.Bettertoincludetoomanythantomisssomecritical aspectofthestrategy,whichwillcomebacklatertohauntyou.Ifyouarepressed fortime,listthetacticsofwhichyouareunsure,butjustanalyzethetacticsthatyou arecertainarerelevant.Ifyouranalysislaterturnsouttobeincomplete,youwillbe abletostartagainfromthispoint. Box1:givethedateandtimeoftheactionyouareanalyzing.Duringthefirstdraft, youcanlistactionsasyourememberthem,butinlaterdraftitishelpfultolistthem chronologically.Onlyifmorethanoneactiontakesplaceonaparticulardaydoyou needtolistthetime. Box2:giveatimeanddatefortheactionyouareanalyzing. Box3:giveatitletotheactionyouareanalyzing.
Worksheet3:AnActorsActionsandTactics 1.Actor:__Individual__Group 4.Detailed 5.Isthis Description atactic? 6.Isa response necessary?

2.Time/Date

3.Action

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Box3:giveadetaileddescriptionoftheactionyouaredescribing.Usepointform ratherthanfullsentences:thiswillhelpfocusonthemostimportantfeaturesofthe action. Box4:anactionisatacticifitisrelevanttotheachievementofthegoalidentifiedin thestrategy.Iftheanswertothequestion:Doesthisaffectreachingmygoalinany way?isyes,thantheactionisatactic.Onlyiftheanswerisyesdoyouproceedto Box5.

SampleWorksheet3:AnActorsActionsandTactics 1.Actor:Prisoner__Individual__Group 5.Is thisa tactic? no 6.Isa response necessary?

2.Time/Date 1stdayof capture,6pm

3.Action Smokes

4.DetailedDescription Asksforacigarette,isgivena cigarettebyasoldier,has cigarettelit,squatsdown, smokescigarette Triestodrinkwaterfroma stream,isstoppedbysoldier, asksforwater,isgivenabottle ofwater,unscrewsthecap, drinksentirecontents,screws capbackon,returnsbottleto soldier Isgivenvegetarianrationsand plasticfork,unwrapsrations, opensplasticbox,usesforkto tastefood,grimacesand complains,eatsremainder, givesbackforkandfoodwraps tosoldier Squatsdownandwatches soldiersgoaboutthetaskof settingupcampandother duties Squatsdownandwatchesthe soldierspecificallyguarding him

1stdayof capture,3pm

Drinkswater

No

1stdayof capture,6:30 pm

Eatsdinner

No

1stdayof capture,on andoff 1stdayof capture,6pm

Observeshis captors

Yes

No

Observesthe soldiers assigned specificallyto guardhim

Yes

No

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1stdayof capture,8pm

Yes Triestocuthis Whilesoldierguardinghim handrestraints turnsawayforamoment,tries tocuttheplasticrestraintson hishandsonasharprock;stops whensoldierturnsback towardshim

Yes

Box5:iftheactionisatactic,i.e.ifitisrelevanttothestrategy,thenitmayormay notrequirearesponse.Inotherwords,didthetactichaveaneffectthatwasbadfor yourchancesofachievingyourstrategy?Ifso,aresponseisnecessaryandthe answerisyes.ForBox6,ifthetacticmayhavehadaneffectthatwasbadforyour chancesofachievingyourstrategy,thenaresponseisnecessaryandtheansweris yes. Worksheet4:ResourcesaStrategyCanDrawOn Thenextstepistheidentificationofresources,usingWorksheet4:Resourcesa StrategyCanDrawOn.Putatitsbroadest,resourceswhichmaketacticspossible aregeneratedbythesymbolicexperiences,mythiclore,andritualpracticesofa grouporsociety[that]createmoodsandmotivations,waysoforganizing experienceandevaluatingreality,modesofregulatingconduct,andwayofforming socialbonds.68Conventionalwisdomusuallyfindsthatmoneyisthemost importantresource,anditcancertainlybeaseverelylimitingfactor.Muchmore scarce,andmucheasiertowaste,istheattentionandgoodwillofpeoplewith power.Thefourgeneraltypesofresourcesdiscussedbeloware:theright equipment,therightpeople,time,andinformation. Therearetwocategoriesofequipmentandmateriel:equipmentyouhave,inwhich casetheissueisdecidinghowtouseit;andequipmentyoudonothave,inwhich casetheissueisfindingitandjustifyingit.First,youneedtodecidehowmuchand whatkindofequipmentyouactuallyneed.Therearethreetypesofequipmentor materielthatyoumayneed:thosethatareessentialtosuccess,thosethatwould makeasignificantdifferencetosuccess,andthosethatwouldbenice,butarenot suretomakeasignificantdifferencetosuccess.Therearealsothingsthataffect politicians,whocontrolthepursestringsoftheoveralloperations,whichyoumay includehere.Youhavetobepragmatic:someequipmentmaynotbeasimportant asyouthink.

68

. Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, American Sociological Review 51:2 (April 1986), 273286.

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Althoughmoreinkisspilledandmeetingsheldonmoneyandmoneyrelatedissues thananythingelse,themostimportantresourceishuman:skills,energy,and numbers.Thefirststepistoestablishwhatskillsareuseful,andthenscanforthem amongthesignificantactors.Amongthenontechnicalskillsthatmaybeneeded are:command,writing,speaking,planning,research,tacticalanalysis,strategic analysis,forecasting,calmunderpressure,goodjudgment,integrity,courage. Resourcescanbefiniteorlimitless;helpfulorneutral;andessentialornot. Worksheet4:ResourcesaStrategyCanDrawOnshouldbefilledoutlistingasmany oftheresourcesaspossible.

Worksheet4:ResourcesaStrategyCanDrawOn

1.Resource

2.Effect 3.Limited? 4.Helpful? 5.Essential? ontactic

34

Box1:Listhereallthematerials,services,people(beyondthepeoplewhoare carryingoutthestrategywithyour),information,andfundsthatyouneedto achieveyourgoal.Thelistshouldbecomprehensive,i.e.itshouldincludeabsolutely everythingyouwillneed.Inordertoincreasethechancesofwritinga comprehensivelist,itishelpfultolookatcategoriesofresources,sothatyouare lesslikelytoforgetanything.Youmayuseascategoriesmaterials,services,people, informationandfunds.Youmayalsodevelopcategoriesthatarespecifictoyour situation,ashasbeendoneinSampleWorksheet4. Box2:here,describetheeffectthataparticularresourcehasonthetacticyouare consideringapplyingnext.Forexample,ifthesquadleaderintheexamplegiven alreadyisconsideringwhethertouselightsornot,heneedstothinkaboutthe powersourceforthoselightsandwhetheritisrenewableorifthereisenoughnon renewablepowersourceforhislight. Thenextthreecolumnsareansweredyesorno. Box3:istheresourcebeinganalyzedinthislinelimitedornot?Isthereaspecific amountofitavailable,oristhereplentyofitaround?Forexample,ifthesquad leaderneedswaterforsoldierstowashsomeequipment,andthecampisneara river,thenthatwaterresourceisnotlimited.If,ontheotherhand,thesquadleader isconsideringwhethertoallowlights,andthelampsareallkerosene,theamountof kerosenehehaswithhimislimited.Hemayhaveenoughforhisforeseeableneeds, orevenmorethanhisforeseeableneeds,butitisstillaspecificamountavailable. Whethertheresourceislimitedornotisanimportantpointforcarryingoutthe strategy.Thestrategistneedstotakeintoaccountthelimitedresourcesasthe strategyunfolds. Box4:Istheresourcebeinganalyzedhelpfultothegoalbeingreached?Isit somethingthatwillmovethestrategyforward?Ifso,theanswerisyes.For example,havingfuelforvehicleswilldefinitelymovethesquadleadersstrategyof bringinghisprisonerbacktothemilitarybaseforward.Thesamecanbetrueofa numberofresources.Whethersoldiershaverecreationalreadingwiththemdoes notdirectlymovethestrategyabouttheprisonerforward.Theanswerthenwould beno.Onlytheresourcesforwhomyouhaveansweredyesinthiscolumnneedto beanalyzedfurther,toBox6.
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SampleWorksheet4:ResourcesaStrategyCanDrawOn 1.Resource Waterforequipment Fuelforlamps Food Drinkingwater Ammunition Fuelforvehicles Sparepartsforvehicles Changeofclothes Medicationforcuts Medicationforillness Bandages Sparepartsforweapons 2.Effect ontactic N Y N N N N N N N N N N 3.Limited? 4.Helpful? 5.Essential? N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N N N N N N Y

Box5:Iftheanswerinthepreviouscolumnisyes,thenitisnecessarytoanalyze theresourcefurther.Here,askyourselfwhethertheresourcebeinganalyzedis absolutelynecessaryforreachingthegoal,whetherifthereisnoneofthisparticular resourceleftyoucouldstillachievethegoal.Ifso,thenyoumaywriteyesinthis column.Ifthesquadleaderrunsoutoffuelforhisvehicles,hecanstillwalktobase andreachhismission.Therewouldbeconsiderablymoredangerinvolved,butit wouldstillbepossible.Sotheanswerherewouldbeno.However,ifthesquad leaderweretorunoutofammunitionandcontinuedtoencounterenemyfighters, thenitwouldbecomeimpossibletocarryoutthestrategybecausetheenemy fighterswouldkilleveryoneinthesquad.Whethertheresourceislimitedornotis animportantpointforcarryingoutthestrategy,butifitisanessentialresource, thenthestrategisthastoputitatthehighestpriority.Thelistbelowisan illustrationofthetypeofanalysisthatneedstobedone;itisnotacompletelistof resourcesnecessary.
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Worksheet5:RulesoftheGame Thefifthstepinthetacticalanalysisrequiresanexaminationoftherulesinvolved. Takentogether,rulesmayformasystem.Asystemisacoherentwholeofprocesses orpracticesthatareorganizedorinstitutionalized;itsometimestakestheformofa combinationofrulesthatproduceapredictableeffectontheoutcome.Theroleofa systemistoensureadefinedfunctionorrole,orguaranteetheproductionofa particularresult.Suchsystemscanbehelpfuloressential(ornot),totheoutcome ofthestrategy.Theyareparticularlycriticalwhenitcomestoirregularwarfare.In thistypeofwarfare,soldiersareoperatinginaheavilyconstrainedenvironment, andnotalltherulesareknown.Systemscanbeeitherformalorinformal,andthey maybeincomplete;ifyouaredealingwithhostileactors,theserulesmaynotbe obviousalthoughyourswillbetothem.Systemsareenforcedthroughsanctions,so onewaytospotinformalsystemsistowatchforbehaviorchangesamongthe hostileactors,andthenlookforthefactorsthatledtothemodification.Iftherewere sanctions,thenyouareontherighttrack.Sanctionstendtobeobvious,evenifthe systemleadingtothemisnot. Systemscanaffectactions,betheytactics,themanagementofresources,or strategies.Systemscanalsoaffectthesignificanceofactions.Inadditiontothe considerableformalrules,whichareeasytoidentify,atleast,therecanbeinformal rulestoconsider,governingethicsorchoicesofallocationofscarceresources. Therecouldbelocalculturalpracticeswhichmayhavetobetakeninto consideration.
Worksheet5:RulesoftheGame 1.Rule 1a.Actions 1b.People 1c.Resources 2.Description 3.Formal (yes/no)? 4.Helpful 5.Essential (yes/no)? (yes/no)?

37

 1d.Time management 1e.Culturaletc. factors 1f.Intelligence 1g.Attitudetowards casualties 1h.Otherrules

Box1:Listherealltheformalandinformalrulesaboutmaterials,services,people (beyondthepeoplewhoarecarryingoutthestrategywithyour),information,and fundsthatyouneedtoachieveyourgoal.Thelistshouldbecomprehensive,i.e.it shouldincludeabsolutelyeverythingyouwillneed.Inordertoincreasethechances ofwritingacomprehensivelist,itishelpfultolookatcategoriesofrules,listed above,sothatyouarelesslikelytoforgetanything.Youmayuseascategories materials,services,people,informationandfunds.Youmayalsodevelopcategories thatarespecifictoyoursituation,ashasbeendoneinsampleworksheet5.

38

Box2:here,describetheeffectthataparticularrulehasonthetacticyouare consideringapplyingnext.Rulesconstrainbehavior,butitisimportanttobeaware ofhowandwhyeachruleconstrainswhichbehaviororaction.Forexample,ifthe squadleaderintheexampleisthinkingaboutwithholdingmedicalcarefroma prisoner,heneedstothinkabouttherulesgoverningprisonersofwarandenemy fighters.Thesquadleaderalsoneedstoconsiderwhetherhisconscienceorculture provideshimwithrulesinthissituation. Thenextthreecolumnsareansweredyesorno. Box3,4,5:Istherulebeinganalyzedinthislineformalornot?Wouldinfringing thisrulehaveconsequencesinthenearorlongterm?Forexample,ifthesquad leaderhasmoreneedofmedicalcarethanhehasresourcestomeetthatneed,ishe withinhisrightstowithholdmedicalcarefromtheprisoner?Ordoesthatprisoner comefirst?Orshouldhemakehisdecision,asbesthecan,onthebasisofmedical need?Whatarehisordersinthisregard?Whatarethegeneralordersonthis matter?DotheGenevaconventionsontreatmentofprisonersofwarapply?Doany otherinternationalconventionsapply?Tomakethisdecisionandsomanyothers, thesquadleaderneedstounderstandtherulesapplyingtohissituation.The strategistneedstotakeintoaccounttherulesasthestrategyunfolds.
SampleWorksheet5:RulesoftheGame 1.Rule Genevaconventions 2.Description Internationaltreaty regardingthetreatment ofciviliansinwarand prisonersofwar Howtoconductapatrol inunknownand possiblyhostile territory Objectivesforthat specificpatrol,suchas travelinginaparticular area,watchingfor particularactivities,etc. Proceduresregarding howtorestrain,guard, interrogate,and generallytreat prisoners 3.Formal (yes/no)? Y 4.Helpful 5.Essential (yes/no)? (yes/no)? Y

Procedures regardingpatrol

Specificorders regardingpatrol

Standingorders regardingprisoners

39

Standingorders regardingfuelspills contaminatingwater

Proceduresand regulationsabouthow todealwiththespillof varioustypesoffuelin tovarioustypesof bodiesofwater Expectations,values, andprinciplesabout humanityinstilledby cultureandassociation

Moralimperatives regardingtreatment ofanotherhuman being

Proceduresregarding Guidanceforbehaviorin Y allocationofmedical makingdecisionsabout care whogetswhatkindof medicalcarewhen, includingvarioustypes ofindividualswhomay beinthechargeofa squadleader

Box4:Istherulebeinganalyzedhelpfultothegoalbeingreached?Isitsomething thatwillmovethestrategyforward?Ifso,theanswerisyes.Forexample,there maybestandingordersnottoexecuteprisonersonthespot,buttoreturnthemto camp.Ifthesquadleadersstrategyistobringtheprisonerbackforinterrogation, thentheorderorruleishelpful.Somerulesmaysimplybeirrelevant:forexample, theremayberulesregardingenvironmentalprotectionandtherivernearby,butif therearenofuelspillsduringtheencampment,thentherulesabouthowtodeal withthatdonotapply.Thesamecanbetrueofanumberofrules.Forexample, theremaybestandingordersregardingtheuseofpersonallaptops.Butifno soldiersarecarryingthemduringthepatrol,thoserulesaresimplyirrelevant.The answerthenwouldbeno.Onlythoseresourceswiththeansweryesneedtobe analyzedfurther. Box5:Iftheanswerinthepreviouscolumnisyes,thenitisnecessarytoanalyze therulefurther.Here,askyourselfwhethertherulebeinganalyzedisabsolutely necessaryforreachingthegoal,whetherifthisruleisbrokenorignored,whether youcouldstillachievethegoal.Ifso,thenyoumaywriteyesinthiscolumn.For example,ifthesquadleaderignoresafuelspillbecausehispatrolcomesunder enemyfire,hecanstillgethispatrolandhisprisonerbacktothebase.Therecould beconsequencesforthatsquadleader,butreachingthegoalisstillpossible.Sothe answerwouldbeno.However,ifthesquadleaderwastodenymedicalcaretothe prisoner,andtheprisonerweretodiefromit,thegoalwouldnotbeachievedand theconsequencesforthesquadleaderwouldstilloccur.Forthoserules,thenthe

40

strategisthastoputitatthehighestpriority.Thelistbelowisanillustrationofthe typeofanalysisthatneedstobedone;itisnotacompletelistofrulesnecessary. Worksheet6:AllOtherFactors Atthisstageintheanalysis,itbecomesnecessarytoanalyzewhatfactorsfavoror workagainstyourtacticalorstrategicgoal.Amongthesefactorsareforces,trends, oreventsthataffecttheoutcome,whichyoucanlistinWorksheet6:AllOther Factors.Factorsmaynotbeinanyonescontrolornecessarilypredictable:there couldbeasuddenstorm,astockmarketcouldcrashanddestabilizetheeconomy,a newviruscouldemerge,someoneimportantmightsuddenlydieorbecome disabled,afanaticmightcallonthepopulationtorise.Theonlywaytoidentify thesefactorsistoscantheenvironmentinwhichyourtacticwilltakeplace.To avoidmissinganyfactors,itisbettertodividetherelevantenvironmentspatially, temporallyorfunctionallyintodifferentsectorsandthenscaneachsector.The environmentcouldbedividedupspatially,temporally,orfunctionally.Itisalso possibletodivideuptheenvironmentaccordingthemajorplayersinvolvedinthe strategyortactic.
Worksheet6:AllOtherFactors 1.DesiredStrategicOutcome: 2.DrivingFactors 3.RestrainingFactors

Box1:thedesiredstrategicoutcomeisthegoallistedinthestrategy.Thesemay includegoalsdrawnfromavarietyofcategories,orcanbeverysimple.Amongthe
41

categoriesfromwhichgoalsmaybedrawnare:completeeliminationofhostile actors,completeeliminationoffatalitiesofcivilians,completeeliminationof fatalitiesofmilitary,completeeliminationoffatalitiesofciviliansandmilitary, completeeliminationofcasualtiesofcivilians,completeeliminationofcasualtiesof civilians,eliminationofbothcivilianandmilitarycasualties,instaurationofruleof laweverywhere,instaurationofruleoflawinruralareas,instaurationofruleoflaw incities,instaurationruleoflawinsomesectors,instaurationofruledemocratic institutionseverywhere,instaurationofdemocraticinstitutionsinruralareas, instaurationofdemocraticinstitutionsincities,instaurationofdemocratic institutionsinsomesectors,andothers.Inthecaseofourongoingexample,the squadleadersgoalissimplytoreturntobaseorbasecampwiththeprisoner. Box2:drivingfactorsmayincludepublicanxiety,politicalpressure,orthreatsin otherlocations.Inthecaseofourongoingexample,thesquadleaderwouldhaveno controlovertheweather.Certaintypesofweathercouldbefavorable,suchas preventingattacksfromtheair,orothertypesofweathermightmakethepatrols workmoredifficult,suchasrainsointenseitwashesoutroadsandturnscreeks thatcouldbecrossedintotorrentsthatcouldnotbecrossed. Box3:restrainingfactorsinabroadermilitarysituationmayincludebudget constraints,lackofinformation,feweffectivemeasures,lackofguides,lackof guidelines,andlackofexperience.
SampleWorksheet6:AllOtherFactors 1.DesiredStrategicOutcome:returningtocampwithprisoneralive 2.DrivingFactors Favorableweather Popularexpectations Threatsinotherlocations 3.RestrainingFactors Lackofexperience Lackofinformation Lackofapplicableprocedures,orders

Worksheet7:StrategicPathway Thestrategicpathwayisthesuccessionofstepswhicharelikeliesttoleadtothe achievementofthegoal,foraparticulartactic.Itcanbeidentifiedusingathreepart process:first,allpossiblestepstothegoalareidentified;second,thesignificant stepsoutofallthepossibleonesareidentified;third,thecriticalstepsareidentified. Thestrategicpathwayismadeupofthecriticalsteps,i.e.strategicnodes.

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Worksheet7asksthequestionsrelevanttothefirstpart.Whatarethestepsto achievingthegoal?Foreachstep,whatarethealternativestepsthatcanalsoleadto goal?Whatarethescenariosyoucanthinkofthatwillachievethegoal?Who decides?Whohasthepowertomakethechanges?Whataretheotherpossibilities? Areanyofthealternativesmoreeffective?Areanyofthealternativesmore economical,notjustintermsofmoney,butalsointermsofotherresources?Are anyofthealternativesmorelikelytosucceed?Whatargumentsareconvincingto thosewhodecide?Whatfactorsaffectthedecisionsofthosewhodecide?Ifyou weretoworkbackwards,howwouldyousetthesteps? Worksheet7alsoassistsinidentifyingthestrategicnodes.Amongthequestions are:Whatarethecriticalactors,actions,resources,rules?Wherearetheysituated oninrelationshiptoanother?Drawapictureoftherelationshipsandlocations.For everycriticallocation,drawabigredcircle.Thatisastrategicnode.Thencompare toyourtacticalplan.Areyoufocusedonthosenodes?Areyouconcentratingyour effortsthere?Howdoesthischangeyourownplanningtoreachyourgoals?
Worksheet7:StepsandNodes 1.StrategicGoal: 2.Pathway1 3.Alternative1 4.Alternative2

Circlenodesoneachpathway. Box1:thestrategicgoalisthegoalthatisgiveninthestrategyfromWorksheet1.

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InBox2,writeouteachofthestepsnecessarytoreachthegoal,insequence.This firstcolumnisforreachingthegoalwithnosurprisesorproblems.Youmustfillin thestepsuntilyoureachyourgoal.Eachstepshouldrepresentasingletacticor actioncontributingtoyourgoal.Youneedtolistallthestepsnecessarytoreach yourgoal.Next,youneedtoidentifywhichstepsareabsolutelyessentialtoyour reachingyourgoal.Considereachstepinturn,andaskyourselfwhetheritwould stillbepossibletoreachthegoalifyoufailedatthisstep.Iftheanswerisyes,then youcancirclethatstep.Thatisastrategicnode,andyouneedtodevelop alternativestomakesurethatyougetbeyondthatstep. InBox3,writealternativestepstoreachthegoalforeachoftheproblemsyoucan anticipateatastrategicnode.Ifatanypointyourpathwaystartstobethesameas incolumn1,thenjustdrawanarrowreturningtothatstep.Next,youneedto identifywhichstepsareabsolutelyessentialtoyourreachingyourgoal.Consider eachstepinturn,andaskyourselfwhetheritwouldstillbepossibletoreachthe goalifyoufailedatthisstep.Iftheanswerisyes,thenyoucancirclethatstep. Thatisagainastrategicnode,andyouneedtodevelopanalternativetomakesure yougetpastit. InBox4,fillinthestepstoreachyourgoalifanothersetofproblemsoccursafter whatyouhavepredictedinthemiddlecolumn.Again,fillinthestepsuntilyou reachthegoal,andifatanypointyourpathwaystartstobethesameasinthe middleorlefthandcolumn,thenjustdrawanarrowreturningtothatstep.You mayusemorethanonecopyoftheworksheetifnecessary.Remembertonumber theworksheetssequentiallyifyoudothat. Intheexamplegiven,thepatrolstruggletogettheprisonerbacktobasecamp.On thewayback,oneofthevehiclesgetsaflattire,andthenthepatrolcomesunder enemyfire.Thesquadleaderdealswitheachsituation,andadaptsthepathwayto returntobasecampwithhisprisoner.
SampleWorksheet7:StepsandNodes 1.StrategicGoal:gettingprisonerbacktocamp 2.Pathway1 Assignguardstoprisoner Travel20kmonfirstday Setupcampfornight Travel12kmonfirstday Vehiclegetsflattire 2.Alternative1 3.Alternative2

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 Travel20kmonsecondday Setupcampforsecondnight Travel10kmtobasecamp

Setupcampforday/night Repairflat Travel20kmonsecondday Travel5kmonsecondday

Setupcampforsecondnight Comeunderenemyfire Travel18kmtobasecamp Radioforairsupport Returnfire

Travel10kmmore Setupcampforsecondnight Travel20kmonthirdday Setupcampforthirdnight Travel15kmtobasecamp

Circlenodesoneachpathway.
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Worksheet8:TacticsandCounterTactics Indesigningaresponsetoatactic,retracethestepsoftacticalanalysis,using thesamesequenceofworksheetsandinstructionsasabove.Countervailingtactics designedwithintheframeworkofabroaderstrategyarecalledstrategic intervention,andsomegeneralrulesapply. Choosethetacticstowhichyoumustrespond. Choosetheearliestpossiblemomentinthedecisionmakingprocess. Chooseonlykeyactors. Brainstormthepossibleactionswithoutprejudgingyourownorothersideas,but thenassessthemascarefullyasiftheywereotheractors. Initiallychooseonlyfourpossibleactions,andassessthecostandbenefitsofeach. Oncetheanalysisiscomplete,choosetacticsfortheireconomyandmaximum benefit.Ifthatisnotapparent,itispossibletodevelopmultiplescenariosfor outcomes,dependingonhowfavorablevariousfactorsaretothetactic,using Worksheet10:CountervailingTactics.Questionstoaskintermsofthislatest worksheetinclude:Whodecides?Whohasthepowertomakethechanges?What aretheotherpossibilities?Areanyofthealternativesmoreeffective?Arethey economicalintermsofpersonnel,equipment,casualties?Whoislikelytosucceed? Whatargumentsareconvincingtothosewhodecide?Whatfactorsaffectthe decisionsofthosewhodecide?Ifyouweretoworkbackwards,howwouldyouset thesteps?Forthenextphase,startwithsteps,thenactors,thenfactors,then resources,thenactions/tactics,thenatlastrulesforsystemanalysis?
Worksheet8:TacticsandCounterTactics 1.Issue: 2.Goal: 4.Tactics 3.Goal: 5.CountervailingTactics

46

InBox1,theissuelistedatthetopoftheworksheetistheissueidentifiedinthefirst worksheet,theproblemonwhichyouareworking.Thetwocolumnsrepresentthe tacticsoftwoactors.Ontheleftisoneactor,whichcanbeyou,andontherightis anotheractorwhodoesnotsharethesamestrategicgoal. InBoxes2and3,foreachactor,thestrategicgoalisidentifiedinthefirstworksheet. Thegoalsneednotbecontradictory:theyneedonlynotbeidentical. InBox4,Tactics,listalltheactionsthatmovethatactortowardsthestrategicgoal chosen. InBox5,CountervailingTactics,listalltheactionsthatmovethatactortowardsthe otherstrategicgoalchosen.Thetacticsandcountertacticsdonothavetomatchup, althoughmanyofthemwill.Thelistoneachsideneedstobecomplete,sothatit maybeusefultousecategoriesoftacticstomakesureyouarenotmissingany.

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SampleWorksheet8:TacticsandCounterTactics 1.Issue:returningprisonertobasecamp 2.Goal:returningtobasecamp 4.Tactics Assignsguard Tiesupprisonershands Givesprisonermedicalcare Givesprisonerfoodandwater 3.Goal:prisonerseekstoescape 5.CountervailingTactics Observesguard Triestofreehands Observesallsoldiers Eats,drinkstokeepupstrength

Worksheet9:CoreIdea Becausecomingupwithacoreideaisoftenthemostdifficultpartoftheexercise, thereisashortworksheetthatcanbecompletedquicklythatwillstimulatethe thinkingoftheparticipants.Thisworksheetisdesignedtoforcetheparticipantto startthinkingbeyondtherational,linearmodelthathasservedhim/hersofarso well.Thegoaloftheworksheetistogettheprocessofthinkingmetaphorically established,andthentogivetheparticipantsomepractice.Itisdeliberatelysimple tofosterandfocusthinkingwithstrategy.Thesampleworksheetisbeing completedwiththesametaskassetoutabove,settingupcampforthenight.Notall themetaphorsareactuallypracticalorhelpful.Thepointistoproduceanumberof themsothattheparticipantcanthendevelopthecapacitytojudgewhicharebetter ormorepractical. InBox3,listthemetaphors,images,rolemodelsorimagesthatcometoyourmind thatfitthesamecategory. InBox4,chooseoneimageormetaphorandworkitintoasloganthatcaptureshow youwanttoachieveyourgoal.Repeatthesestepsfortheothercategories.Atthe bottomofthepageisablankspaceforyoutowriteinacategoryofimagesand metaphorsthatcometomindduringthisphaseofyourthinking.Thenlistthe imagesormetaphorsthatcometomind,andthendevelopasloganusingthat metaphororimage.

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Whentheworksheetiscompleted,youwillthenhaveseveralpossiblecoreideasto choosefromforyourstrategy.
Worksheet9:CoreIdea 3.Your Metaphors, Images,Role Models, Analogies

1.Category

2.SuggestedMetaphors, Images,Analogies,Role Models Machinegun,rifle,tank River,waterfall,creek Tree,fern,Venusflytrap

4.CoreIdea

Military Geographical Plant

Transportation Bus,golfcart,car Sports Mechanical Insects Animals Rolemodels Yourown Category: Caddy,gymnastics,football Wrench,Allenkey,ratchet Mosquito,ant,butterfly Cougar,pumarhinoceros PrincessDiana,Donald Trump,Gandhi Yourownmetaphors:

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SampleWorksheet9:CoreIdea 3.Your Metaphors, Images,Role Models, Analogies Battalion, submarine, armoured personnelcarrier Mountain, plateau,desert Flower,tomato, potato

1.Category

2.SuggestedMetaphors, Images,Analogies,Role Models Machinegun,rifle,tank

4.CoreIdea

Military

Worktogetherlike ac3gunanda shell A24houroasis Letscloseup camplikeoneof thoseevening prayerplants Letsmakeour breaklikeacruise shipforthenight Letscirclearound thequeenbee

Geographical Plant

River,waterfall,creek Tree,fern,Venusflytrap

Transportation Bus,golfcart,car

Truck,walking, running,bicycle Soccer,tennis, pingpong Siliconegun, screwdriver Bee,wasp,slug Tiger,lion, gazelle,turtle MotherTheresa, Montgomeryof Alamein

Sports Mechanical Insects Animals Rolemodels

Caddy,gymnastics,football Wrench,Allenkey,ratchet Mosquito,ant,butterfly Cougar,pumarhinoceros PrincessDiana,Donald Trump,Gandhi Yourownmetaphors:

Yourown Category:

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5.

ANEXERCISEINUSINGTHEMETHODOFANALYSIS

ThegoalofthefollowingsemifictionalcasestudyofabiologicalattackontheU.S.is toprovidethereaderwithanopportunitytousetheworksheetsinseveralways. Oneistoanalyzeanongoingterroristattack,oneistoanalyzethebehaviorofa possibleterrorist,andoneistoshowhowSOFcouldusetheworksheetstoplana counterterrorismoperation. TheFictionalCasestudy Afterintenselobbyingbylegislators,theleaderofCubareleasedaknownterrorist inJuly2000.Thisterrorist,RossWilliams,hadmastermindedanattackwhich destroyedaUScivilianaircraftinmidflightbackin1996.InOctober2000,there wasanarmedinfiltrationorganizedviaMiamioftwoterroristswithordersto commitactsofviolence.Theirweaponsandforgeddocumentswereconfiscated, alongwithflyersinvitingpeopletojointheCubanrevolution,promisingmoney. TheyalsoreferredtoamoletheyhadintheWashington,D.C.area. In1999,aUnitedNationsreportfoundthattheattemptstostrangletheterrorists moneysupplyhadfailing,andthattheterroristsareintentonusingchemicaland biologicalweapons.Theonlythingstoppingsuchanattackfromtakingplacewas thelackofexpertisetoconducttheoperation.ThewarsinAfrica,whileasourcefor trainingintheseattacksforterrorists,hadnothaveprovidedauniqueopportunity forterroriststoobtainweaponsofmassdestruction(WMDs).Therewasdebateas towhetherformerSovietRepublicsmightbeasourceforWMDs.OnOctober1st, 2002,theKuwaitiAlSiyassahreportedthatKuwaithadfoiledanattempttosmuggle $60millionworthofchemicalweaponsandbiologicalwarheadsthroughtheir territory,althoughKuwaitiofficialsquicklydeniedit.Startingin2003,therewere indicationsthatterroristswereplanningnewtypesofattacks,includingthe possibilityofusingwomenorchildren.Aselfproclaimedleaderofthefemale terroristnetworkclaimedshehadbeenassignedtosupervisethetrainingof females,statingthatfemalesuicidebombersweretoarriveattheirtargetsin Americashortly,forastrikethatwillknocktheSeptember11attacksinto oblivion.Uponarrest,anotherterroristleaderclaimedthattheterroristshadupto twodozenpendingattacksagainstAmericaninterests.AmericawenttoOrange AlertinJune2003duetoahighlevelofchatterbyterrorists.Internetforumsused bytheterroriststalkedaboutbigsurprisescoming.TherewasacallonallCubans toleaveNewYorkCity,Boston,andothercitiesontheEastCoastwithinfortyeight hours.DetaineestalkedofattackingthemainlandbyinfiltratingthroughCanada, andpossibleplotsagainstsubwaysystems.ANicaraguanpaperpublishedaletter fromtheterroristschiefoftrainingwhichreferredtoanimpendingattackagainst Americainvolvingafatalblowtotheheadoftheinternationalmediaserpentthat servestheAmericanwhimsandinterests.Thenextwavewouldcutoffthewings oftheWesterneagle,sliceitsarteries,andfinallybutcherit.InOctober2003, anotheraudiotapewasreleased.Init,theUK,theUS,Poland,Japan,Spain,Italy,and Australiawerethreatened.
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Theterroristswerebythispointthoughttobefocusingonattackingmaritime targets.Westernintelligencehasinformationthattheterroristorganizationhasan operationalbranchspecificallyformaritimeoperationsthatcouldtargetmilitary ships,merchantships,ports,oilterminalsandoiltankers.Accordingtoforeign intelligence,theterroristsaimedtocreateaseriesofmorelowlevel,sporadic attacks,withoccasionalmajorattacks.Mostattackswouldfocusoninsecuretargets. Thenewstrategycalledfornewmethodsofattackincludingsurfacetoairmissile use,poisons,etc.Thetargetsoftheoccasionalspectacularattackswouldbedecided bythetargetsprominence,abilitytocausemaximumpanic,maximumcasualties, maximumeconomicdisruption,andthetargetsprominence.Atthesametime, therewasanewfocusontargetsintheUnitedStates,andnewfocusonchemical andbiologicalweapons.Furtherintelligenceindicatedthatatleasttwomajor attackswerebeingprepared,lowleveloperativesinchargeoflogisticsforthe operationshadbeendispatched,andworldwidemovementofoperativeshadbeen detected. Indicationsofpreparationforanuclearattackorefforttoacquirenukesbeganin thefirsthalfof2004.Intelligenceconfirmedterroristsweretryingtoacquirethem, andsaidfurtherthattheyhadasophisticatedbiologicalweaponsprogram,andare seekingchemicalweapons.Theycautionedthatdozensofterroristgroupsand countriesareseekingsuchweapons.RussianandChinesecompanieswerecalled thekeysuppliesoftechnicalknowhowandequipmentforcountriesmakingWMD. AsleeperoperativeposingasanasylumseekerwasarrestedinTorontoinJuly2004 andwaslinkedtoaplannedterroristattackonPresidentBush.Hehadbeentrained asaphysicianinCuba,aspartofCubasexternalrelationsexercise.Thecityhas beendesignatedbyintelligencechiefsashavingthesamethreatlevelasBaghdad duringhisvisit.The36yearoldChileanoperativehaddocumentsaboutvialsof anthraxandbotulismwhichdisappearedfromaformerSovietUnionsecretlab outsidePraguetwoyearsago.Sixmonthsago,hehadbeendetainedasanillegal immigrant.Intelligenceagentsbegantocheckhisbackground,anddiscovered contactswithagroupofterrorists.Theyfoundhehadmadecontactwith supportersinFranceandSpain,anddiscoveredbiologicalwarfaredocuments.A EuropeanUniondiplomattoldtheRussianpressthatadvancedweaponslikeguided missilesandremotecontrolleddevicesandchemicalweaponshadbeenobtained fromfriendlynations.Theyear2005sawthefirstattemptsatmajorchemicaland biologicalattacksinWesternEuropeandelsewhere.Amongthefoiledattackswasa plottopoisonthefoodsupplyofaBritishmilitarybaseinEnglandinJanuary.Some ofthepreparationsfortheseattacksseemedtohaveoccurredinGeorgiaand Chechnya.InOctober,authoritiesinthePhilippinesfoundabioterrormanualand tracesofatetanusgermcarryingchemicalfoundinthehomeofaraidtoarrest membersoftheJeemahIslamiya.Therewerealsodocumentsrelatingtotheimpact onpublichealthofachiefdoctorofsomekind. OnApril9,2008,atabout8:30inthemorning,asingleengineFokkerbushplane flewlazilyoverthehilliestsectionofMaryland,headingsouthwestat3,400feet.
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Then,andforabouttenminutes,itflewoverthesuburbsofBaltimoreandthen Washington.ItstayedinitstransitcorridorthroughoutitspathintheD.C.flight rulesarea.Itsquawkedtherightcodeonthetransponder.Asaresult,airtraffic controlignorestheplane,andthepilotdidnotfileaflightplan,nordidsheidentify herselfinanyway. Althoughthepilotdoesnotknowit,sheflewoverthesprawlinghomesofBeltway bigshotsdrinkingEspressoandeatingFloridagrapefruit(theZonediet).It occurredtoaparticularWashingtonhostessandDemocraticpowerhousethatthe sunnydayathercountryestatewasperfectlychosentotakedeliveryofhernew Saabconvertible,at1oclock.Laterthatevening,shewasplanningtocelebratethe acquisitionofherlatesttoy,butasshelookedpastthehorsepaddock,shenoticeda fleetingwhitecloudoverhead,likeaverysmallrainsquall,behindaplane.Shemade amentalnotetoputtheSaabinthegaragebeforechoosingwhichArmanitowearto dinner. Twodayslater,acrosstown,aveterinarianfromBethesdawascatchinguponhis latestcasenotes.Thatmorning,hehadeuthanizedadog,Bobo.Herdistraught ownerhadheldthedoginherarms,feedinghercheeseandsayingshelovedherfor thedurationoftheentireprocedure,despitethebluesoresonBobosback,despite thedrippingbloodfromthecornerofBobosmouth.Hecouldstillhearthe shrillnessofBobosbreathing.Drivingtohisaccountantsduringthelunchhour,he triedtoremember.Bluesores?Itwasonlyintheearlyhoursofthefollowing Sundaythathesatupboltuprightinhisbed,awakeninghispartner,Mick.Itwasin hisfinal,prelicensingcourseaquestionaboutbluepigsoresinanimal epidemiology.Heimmediatelyleftamessageonthecountyhealthdepartments communicablediseasesansweringmachine. ThatverysameSunday,anexecutivesecretaryfromChevyChasewasflyingher Cessna172tojoinherhusbandinVirginiafortherestoftheday.Shespottedthe abandonedFokkerinthemiddleofavineyard.Wantingtohelpsomeoneindistress, shebankedleftandsetdown.Strange,shethoughttoherself,thatblackducttape hangingofftheinsideofthecockpitdoor.Insidewasastainlesssteelbox,boltedto thefloorbehindthepassenger'sseatandconnectedtotheaircraft'ssidemounted ventbyablackhoseaboutthreeinchesacross.Thatwasabiologicalagentdelivery system:thepilothasdeliveredhighgrade,finelymilled,lightanthraxsporesall overthearea,helpedbythewindandbytheinversionofairthatoccursevery morningandevening.Thesporescametosettleinfields,onrooftops,inyards,on parkinglots,floatedintoairandheatventsallovertheWashingtonarea:schools, hospitals,andfreewaysareallcontaminated.Withinthreedays,atleast500000 peopleandanequallylargenumberofanimalshadinhaledthemandthisattack wasabouttomaketheSeptember2001anthraxoutbreakinNewJerseylooklike childsplay.Yettherestillwasnotasinglehumanwithsymptoms.Symptoms,as everyonewasabouttobetold,tookaboutthirtysixhourstoshow.That Washingtonhostesscamedownwithacough,afever,andagenerallyrottenfeeling. Soon,sheignoredevenhercellphone,theonewhosenumberwasbothclosely
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guardedandhighlyprizedbythoseintheknow,tooweakandexhaustedtogetout ofbed.Herstaffwasstillhesitatingaboutcallingadoctor.Whenthehousekeeper sawheremployerlookingstrangelybluishandfeverish,andheardthewhistling intakeofbreath,shecalled911. Thedoctoroncallatthecountyhealthdepartmentwasinstantlyalertedwhenshe heardtheanxietyintheveterinariansvoicewhenhetalkedaboutanthrax.Lethim digupthedog,shethoughttoherself,andlethimgatherthespecimens.Shewas moreworriedabouttheresidentatWashingtonHospitalCenter.Hehadsplattered bloodonhisfaceandhandswhenhewasputtingadeliriouspatientonaventilator. Hehadalreadygottenhisprophylaxiswhenhecalledinapanic.Agrosslyextended mediastinuminthepatientsXrayssheknewwhatthatcouldmean. Thentheveterinariancalledbackhehadbeenareservistinwhileinveterinary school.HewasfullofColdWarRussianbioweaponsstories,enoughtoturn anyonesstomach.Uselessnow,ofcourse,butthen,thosememoriesarewhathad remindedhimofthebluesoressignificance.DuringthefamousSverdloskoutbreak ofanthraxafterabiologicalweaponfacilitybreachinthe1960s,theSovietshad orderedadusktodawncurfew.Lowflyingaircraftsprayedchemicalsoverthe fieldsandtrees,whileworkerscoveredgrassyareaswithasphaltandlinedditches withconcrete.Allthelocaldogswerekilled.Authoritiescametovictims'houses, dousedtheirdeadbodiesinbleach,wrappedtheminplasticandhauledthemaway forburial.Itwasworsethanahorrormovie.Theytookallthebedsheetsand sprayedthedishes,too.Anightmareseriesofevents,itwasnowthesubjectof countlessSiberianfolktales. WhenthecountyhealthdoctorarrivedatWashingtonHospitalCenter,shewas presentedwithadeathcertificateandabloodculturepositiveforanthrax.She calledheroffice,butitwasoneoftheVirginiafiredepartmentsthatdispatchedits hazardousmaterialsunittotheabandonedFokker.Thevacuumgeneratorwas coveredwith,apparently,anthraxspores.Phoneslitupoverthreestates.The DistrictofColumbia,theCentersforDiseaseControl,theFBI,theTerrorismEarly Warninggroup,theDepartmentofDefense,theDepartmentofHomelandSecurity, theWhiteHouse,theFederalEmergencyManagementAgency,theEnvironmental ProtectionAgency,threegovernors,themayorofWashington,theCoastGuard,and theFederalAviationAuthoritygotinvolved.Nothinglikeanthraxforastory, thoughtthedoctor,theonlycalmpersontobefoundinseveralsquaremiles. Atthewellfundedregionalemergencyoperationscenter,staffrushedtotheirseats andcomputerscreens.Meanwhile,atReaganNational,aNationalWeatherService Doppleroperatorporedoverweathertapesforthepreviousfortyeighthours.He foundtherightblip,asmallaircraftflyingnorthtosouth.Likeaneedleina haystack,hethought,giventheairtrafficonanygivenday.Thatblipwasfollowed byafaint,rapidlyvanishingtrace.Thenhetracedthecloudofanthrax.Itwasbig, muchbiggerthantheyexpectedorhoped.Hissupervisorimmediatelyreachedfor

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hisopenlinetoNORAD.HolyJesusChristwasallhesaidandheapracticing ChristianwhohadneverbeforebeenheardtoinvokethenameoftheLordinvain. AtanearbyAirNationalGuardBase,F16pilotsranforthecockpitoftheduty aircraft,andstartedrollingontothetarmac.Airbornewithinseconds,thelocal hotshotclimbedalmostvertically,passingthrough7500feetofaltitudebefore crossingthebarrierattheendofthefield.Bynowitwas2oclockinthemorning. ResidentsaroundthePotomacwhowerestillup(andquiteafewwhowerealready asleep)heardthesonicbooms.TheNationalGuardwasinterceptinganyslightly underperformingairlinepilots,whohadnotyetheardabouttheattackandmightbe slightlyoffcourse,forinstance,orwhowereflyingatthewrongaltitude,orwho weregivingoutthewrongtranspondercode. TheMondaymorningnewsshowsproved,onceagain,theirworth:televisioncanbe dramatic,anditiswonderfulatcommunicatingtheyouaretherefeeling.Butitis uselessattransmittingdetailed,specificinformation.Reporterswerewearinggas masksfortheirlivereportsfromthePentagon,theStateDepartment,andtheWhite House,whichviewerssomehowdidnotfindreassuring.Theyalsodidawkward, unwelcome,maninthestreetinterviewswithalarmed,sometimesvisiblypanicked passersby.Forachangeofpace,theyscrummedfiercelywithmedicalandlaw enforcementspokespeople,reportingrumorsaswellasfacts. Theregionalcoordinationteam,onlyslightlycalmerthantheaverageviewer, decidedonusingthewordscontainmentzoneforthefortyfivebytenmile rectangledrawnthroughit,ratherthanthewordquarantine,althoughtheword wouldmeanmoretoastronautsthantheaverage,postsmallpox,postpoliocitizen. ItwouldtakemonthstoclearthegreaterWashingtonareaofcontamination,tosay nothingofpreventingthespreadinfectionintheWashingtonNewYorkcorridor. Instead,startingat6a.m.Monday,aspokespersonfortheregionalemergency authoritiesstartaseriesofTV,radioandinternetannouncementscallingfor "shelterinplace"forresidents.Therewas,astoundingly,arunontapeandfoodas peopleignoredtheinstructionstostaycalm,stayindoors,tapethewindows,bring inthepets,closethechimneydampers,puttowelsinanydoorcracks,andawait furtherword. TheCentersforDiseaseControlheldapressconferencetoannouncethat researchersattheArmyinfectiousdiseasesresearchlabatFortDetrich,Maryland, hadjustconfirmedthatthesubstancefoundontheFokkerwasfinelymilled, weaponsgradeanthrax.Anestimated4.4poundsinweightwasdropped.On Wednesday,afterreferencingaDefenseIntelligenceAgencystudythatconcluded that50%ofthepeoplewhoinhaled25,000sporesapiecewoulddie,anassistant professorofbiologyatShouldKnowBetterUniversitysaidontheairthattherewas enoughanthraxonthatplanetokill200millionpeople.Theprofessorfailedto mentionthathewasassumingthateverysinglesporewouldbeinhaledby someone,ratherthanthemajoritysprinklingharmlesslyontrees,roadsandroofs.

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AnexodusfromtheWashingtonareahadstartedthenightbefore.Withthe broadcastofthatinterview,residentsofthecontainmentzonestartedcrashing throughbarricades,ignoringbothtrafficcopesandsignallights,andotherwise battlinghardtojoinBeltwaygridlock.Theywouldrushupfreewayonramps,only todiscoveraparkinglot.Whenlanesoninterstatesjammed,driverstookto shoulders,medians,orevenoncominglanes.Sincenoonesoughttoenterthe capital,theseoncominglanesturnedintohighwaysout.Withinafewhours,there wasa400miletrafficjam.Gasstationsquicklyranshortoffuel.Infuriated motoriststhreatenedviolence.Alternateroutesquicklybecameimpassable,as localsblockedroadsintotheirtownswithtrailersandtrucks,tokeeptheTyphoid Mariesout. Meanwhile,atgovernmentoffices,officialsatalllevelspulledouttheirbioterrorism manuals,wonderedwhethertheyshouldhaveoptedforthedistributionofmoon suitsafterall,openedthepagestoanthraxandstartednervouslyissuingcommands. AllincomingflightsweredivertedfromReaganNational,andalloutgoingflights werestoppedontheramp.NationalGuardsmenranthroughthehallsofairports, whilebombsniffingdogsjumpedoverdesertedticketcountersandpawedthrough luggage.TheFederalAviationAgencygroundedallnonscheduledprivatelyowned smallplanesinthreestatesandtheDistrictofColumbia,whichsoirritatedone currencytraderwithhisownCessnathathetookoffwithoutpermission,flying quicklyeastwithoutnavigationlights.Heignoredrepeatedrequestsfromthetower toland,andwaspredictablyshotdownbytheAirNationalGuard.Indoingso,he producedwithpicturesofsmokingwreckageforthefrontpages.TheSecretaryof DefenseputmilitarybasesonthehighestalertlevelThreatConditionDelta,used onlywhenaterrorattackhasjusthappenedorwasinprogress.Thegovernors mobilizedtheNationalGuardtoprotectpotentialhighrisktargets.FBIagentsin bulletproofveststookupstationsaroundfederalbuildings.Meanwhile,aroundthe areapoliceforcesfoundithardtoadjusttoasituationwhereotheremergency personnelshowedupandtookcontrol.Therewasplentyofwhatdiplomatscall freeandfrankexchangeofviews.Attheregionalemergencyoperationscenter,a supplyofficersentoutarequestfortents,100,000beds,blankets,bottledwater, and20,000bodybags.Whentheyannounceahotlineforreportingdangerous substances,franticcitizensoverloadeditwithreportsofchalkdust,animallitter, sheetrockdust,lint,laundrydetergent,sugarsubstitute,dandruff,cornstarch, Parmesancheese,andnondairycreamer. DespitethethousandsofpeopledescendondistributioncentersforCipro(doctors' offices,hospitals,citycouncilmembers'offices,recreationofficesandschools), stocksheldout,thankstoadvancedpreparednessforthenationalcapitalregion. Peoplecomplained,however,thatthelineupsandwaitingweremassive,thisfrom citizensusedtoshowingupwiththeirsleepingbagsattheofficesoftheDepartment ofMotorVehicles.Hospitalbeds,ontheotherhand,wereinshortsupplyandfilled up,withpatientsspillingoverintohospitalcorridorsandwaitingrooms.Laboratory techniciansranoutofsupplies.Exhaustedstafftiredofthreatsandabuseand walkedpermanentlyofftheirjobs.Hospitalshadtoproducedangerpay,at20%to
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100%premiums.Snakeoilsalesmencomeoutinforce,sellingsunlampsthat purportedlydisinfectedobjectsfor$149andfakedosesofCiprofor$20apill. Healthfoodstoresjackeduppricesofoilofmint,saidtopreventanthrax.Menin whiteoverallsclaimingtobedecontaminationcrewsvandalizedhomesand businesses.Despiteassurancestothecontrary,manyresidentsinsistedondrinking onlybottledwaterstoresinthreestatesrunoutofwateralmostimmediately, includinginthecontainmentzone,andfreshstockswereimportedfromCanada. Thefourthdayoftheattackisthedaywherethefirstinfectedvictimsstartedtodie. Churchbellstolled.ThegreaterWashingtonareawasquiet,exceptforambulances andpolicecars.Peopleheededinstructionstohunkerdownalmosttoowell. Mournfulhymnsdominatedradiostationswhichafewdaysagofeaturedrapand hiphop.Cablechannelpunditscameunhinged,alternatingwithlonghoursof prayerservicesforthenationscapital,broadcastfromcathedralsandtemples aroundthecountry.Sincehospitalscouldnotcopewithalltheadmissions,anthrax victimswereredirectedtoconventioncenters,highschoolgyms,andeven monasteriesandchurches.Nursesandphysicianassistantstriaged,withholding antibioticsorventilatorsfrompeoplewhoweresoadvancedtheywerebeyond hope,distressingfamiliesintheprocess.Questionswereraisedaboutaccesstocare forthepoororthemerelyunknown.Althoughpublicofficialsrepeatedlycalledfor calm,thepanicwasmoredamagingthantheoutbreak. Onthefourthday,153peopledied,followedby370onthefifthday,1,007onthe sixthand4,650ontheseventh.Ondayeight,11,404died.Theclassicsignsof epidemicsoutofcontrolwerereportedroutinely.Makeshiftmorguesweresetup. Gravediggersworkedroundtheclockwithconstructionequipment.Theflameof crematoriumscouldbeseenbynight.Vehiclespiledhighwithsuitcases,jewelry, heirloomsandphotographs,pouredoutofthecity.Thepeoplebarricadedbehind closedoorsporedagonizedovernewspaperlistsofthedeadreporters, politicians,analysts,performersandartists,medicalpersonnel,famouschefs,anti waractivists,thehomeless,thepoor,thevulnerable.Publicservicesgroundtoa halt,althoughsomepoliceandfiremenstillshowedupforduty.Alsostoppedwere trainsinandoutofD.C.,andbusstationsweredeserted.TheNationalGuardwas senttowatertreatmentandhydroelectricplants.Afreaksnowstormjust compoundedthemisery,andwasreportedalmostasgoodnews. Politicians,ontheotherhand,madethemselvesseenandheardwithincreasing frequency,tryingtolookpresidential,gubernatorial,senatorial,orsimply representative.Thereeffortsweregiventheliebytabloidreportsofsomefortifying themselveswithdrink,othersdemandingcareaheadoftherestatareahospitals, andstillotherssobbingwithfearwhentheytestedpositiveforanthrax.Clichs abounded,aboutnationalunity,aboutrisingfromtheashes,aboutgoingtoafar,far betterplacethantheyhadeverknownbefore.Almostunnoticed,theWashington PostreportedthattheplanhadbeentracedtoaUghiurChinese.

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Meanwhile,theChiefOfficerofHealthoftheDistrictofColumbiadisappeared. Analysishadshownapatternofafewhoursdelayateverycriticaljuncture.The SOFwastaskedwithtrackinghimdown,establishingcontactandbringinghimback, afterhehadbeenidentifiedasakeyfigureintheepidemicbytheFBIandtheCIA. USSOCOMappointedaSOFveteranwithexperiencedirectingothersandwhowas thenwaitingforanewappointment,toheadtheeffort.TheSOFreceived informationindicatingthathewastobefoundinAustralia.Ateamwentto Australia,butwasunabletofindthephysician.Bystudyingpassengerlistsand bordercrossinginformation,SOFconcludedthathewasnowinLondon.Anumber ofconsultationswereheld:officialsdecidedthatifhewerefoundinLondon,andif therewereaneedtobringhimbacktotheUSagainsthiswill,thekidnappingwould notbedoneonBritishsoil,inordertoprotectrelationswithavaluableally.Soan SOFteam,includingafemaleagentnicknamedCheryl,combedthroughLondon. Withthehelpofinformationculledfromvarioussources,theSOFmanagedtotrack downthegooddoctor.Itidentifiedhishotelandkepttabsonhiscontactswith reporters. SOFcombedthestreetsofLondonwithapictureofthedoctorintheirpockets.Inan incrediblestrokeofluck,"Cheryl"foundthetargetashewasstaringatastore windowinLeicesterSquare.Shestoodalongsidehim,andestablishedeyecontact withhim.Thephysician,normallyshywithwomen,summonedthecouragetotalk withher."Areyoualsoatourist,"heasked"Cheryl."Sheidentifiedherselfasa cosmeticianbyprofession,andaHispanicAmericanwhowastouringLondon.The gooddoctorinvitedherforcoffee;sheplayedhardtoget;thedoctorwashooked. Threedayslater,aLondontabloidreleasedthedoctorspictureandridiculedhis actionsduringtheepidemic.Thedoctorwasupset,andCherylexploitedhishigh strungstate.SheproposedtheyleavethefollowingdayforRome,wherehersister hadanapartment.Thephysiciantookheruponheroffer,despitethefactthata reporterwarnedhimthatCherylmightbeasecretagentofsomesort.Afterthey flewtoRome,andenteredtheapartment,twoSOFagentspouncedonhim,tiedhis hands,andinjectedhimwithadrug.HewasthenbroughtbacktotheUSbyship. Meanwhile,backintheUSsuicidepreventioncentersweredelugedwithcallsfrom peoplewonderingiflifewasworthliving.DemandforZoloft,Paxil,Prozac,Xanax, andValiumskyrocketed,butViagrasalesslumped.TVpsychiatristsand psychologistswerenowatapremium,andanumberofthemwereaccusedof jackinguptheirappearancefeesinthecrisis.Fromsatellitehookups,theyadvised peopletotalkabouttheirfeelings,tolivetheirlivesnormally,andtoseek distractioninsitcomswhichwerenotevenbeingbroadcast.WhoopiGoldberg, RobinWilliams,andBillyCrystaltriedtolaunchFederalAid,andimmediatelyput anendtotheirowncareers.Othersfocusedtheiremotionsontheneedtostrike back,althoughagainstwhowasnotclear.TheInternetfilledwithfurioustirades andtherewereprolongedflamewarsinchatgroups. Thedeathratefolloweditsbellshapedcurve,peakingontheeighthdayand droppingafterthat.Infifteendays,thedeathratewaszero,butalmost25,000
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peoplehaddied.Thepostdisastercleanuphadauthoritiesbewilderedwasit necessary?Wasiteffective?Whileofficialsargued,cityworkersbreathingthrough highefficiencyparticulateairfilterssprayedthestreetswithtrucks,andwashed sporesintothestormdrains.Somecitizenssimplywashedofftheirroofswith gardenhoses,anapparentlycommonsensesolutionthatnonethelessre aerosolizedsomanysporesthatoverfortynewanthraxinfectionsoccur. Epidemiologistsandmeteorologiststookmonthstofigureoutwhattodoaboutthe contaminationproblem,whenthefirstoftwofiercespringstormssweptthrough theareaMotherNaturewassweepingWashingtonclean.Repeatedtestingshowed fewairbornespores,andsurfacesporeswererenderedharmlessbythenext summerssun. TheUSforceswereorderedMondaynighttoprepareplanstotargetterror organizationsinresponse.Theyalsoimmediatelyreinforcedtroopsalongthe AtlanticcoastfacingCuba,aswellastheborderwithMexico,whichsecurityofficials saidthebomberusedtoinfiltratetheUS."Wewillnotcutterrorgroupsanyslack, andtheceasefirewillnotpreventusfromtargetingthem,"theSecretaryofDefense said.Healsocalledforanendtothegovernmentspolicyofrestraint,claimingthat itwastimetostrikeback,butothergovernmentofficialssaiditwasfirstnecessary toestablishconvincinglywherethebombercamefrom,andwhichorganizationwas behindtheattack.ThePresidentwassettoholdtalkswithsecurityofficialsto discussthebombingandtheUSsresponse.Defenseofficialssaidthebomber infiltratedtheUSacrossthelongundefendedborderwithCanadathatismostly fencelessandpatrolledbyminimalforces.ThebomberenteredtheUSbycanoeing acrossariver,andthenwasdriventotheWashingtonarea.OfficialsbelievetheUS shouldaskCanadatodomoretopreventthistypeofinfiltration.However,the SecretaryofStatesaidtheD.C.attackwas"anexceptionalevent"andonethatthe defenseestablishmentplannedtokeepthatway.ThePresidentsaidthatinrecent monthstheUShadfoilednumerousterroristattacks.TheUSforcesaskedforthe erectionofanelectronicfencealongtheborder,butduetothecostthemoneyhad yettobetransferred.Atthemoment,somefivebattalionspatroltheborder.Funds thatweremeanttobetransferredtothefenceweredivertedtootherprojectsthis pastsummer. Overall,theUSsstrategyshouldbeasshownonWorksheet1(USstrategy).

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Worksheet1:USStrategy 1.Issue 2.Goal 3.CoreIdea 4.Tactics PreventdecreaseinUSscapacitytoprojectpower. ProtectUSpopulationstrustinitsgovernmentorforces,and thereforeitswilltofight Hangonuntilyoureoverthehump 1 QuarantineDCareabyairandgroundtransportation 2 Ordersupplies,antibiotics 3 Acttopreservestaffmoraleandprovidepublicinformation,as wellaslawandorder 4 Preparetodisposeofthedeadandplanforthecleanupafter theepidemicisover

ThefirststepisfortheSOFtoidentifytheterroristsstrategy,asshownin Worksheet1(TerroristStrategy)

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Worksheet1:(TerroristStrategy) 1.Issue 2.Goal 3.CoreIdea 4.Tactics DecreaseWestscapacitytoprojectpower Shakingpopulationstrustinitsgovernmentandforces,reducing itswilltofight CutoffthewingsoftheWesterneagle,sliceitsarteries,andfinally butcherit. 1 Increasebackgroundnoisetomakeactualattackharderto detect 2 Attackrepeatedlyuntilsuccessful 3 Flyundertheradarinabushplane,notbreakinganyflight rulesandregulations 4 Disperseanthraxsporesovertheheavilypopulatedcapital area

5 Activatemole

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LetusassumethattheSOFinthiscrisisareaskedtokeepwatchonpossiblemoles inthehealthsystem.Thereareonlyalimitednumberofphysiciansinthechainof commandforanepidemicthatcouldhaveanimpactontheentireprocess,and thereforewhoneedtobewatched.LetusassumethattheD.C.OfficerofHealthis onlyoneofseveralsuspects.Bycompletingaworksheet2foreachofthepossible actors,thepotentialmolesatcriticalpointsinthecrisiscanreadilybeidentifiedThe SOFtaskedwithwatchinghisactionswouldforecastwhatthesuspectedOfficerof Healthshoulddo,andhowhewouldbehaveifthesuspicionsarecorrect.

Worksheet2:KeyActorschiefofficerofhealth,DistrictofColumbia 1.YourGoal 2.YourLatestTactic Containepidemic OnMonday,askregionalemergency authoritiestostartpublic announcements Orderquarantine/stopairandcar traffic AskSecretaryofDefenseforhighest alert Askstategovernorstomobilize NationalGuard Requesttents,beds,blankets,bottled water,bodybags,etc. 7.Canthis actor prevent your achieving thegoal? (YesorNo) Tactic A Tactic B Tactic C Tactic D

3.LatestActionorEvent, ifdifferentfromabove 4.aYourPossibleTacticA 4.bYourPossibleTacticB 4.cYourPossibleTacticC 4.dYourPossibleTacticD

5.All Actors

6.Canthis actoraffect your achieving thegoal? (YesorNo)

8.Canthisactoraffectanyofyour possibletactics?

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Secretaryof Defence Governors

Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y

N Y Y N Y N

Y N N N N N

N Y N Y Y N

N N N N N Y

Law Y enforcement National Guard Armed forces Suppliers Y Y Y

IftheChiefOfficerofHealthisamole,hereiswhathemightdo
Worksheet2:KeyActorschiefofficerofhealth,DistrictofColumbia,mole 1.YourGoal 2.YourLatestTactic Allowepidemic OnTuesday,askregionalemergency authoritiestostartpublic announcements Delayorderingquarantine/stopair andcartrafficfor8hours DelayaskingSecretaryofDefensefor highestalertforaday Delayaskingstategovernorsto mobilizeNationalGuardforaday Delayrequestsfortents,beds, blankets,bottledwater,bodybags,etc. 7.Canthis actor prevent 8.Canthisactoraffectanyofyour possibletactics?

3.LatestActionorEvent, ifdifferentfromabove 4.aYourPossibleTacticA 4.bYourPossibleTacticB 4.cYourPossibleTacticC 4.dYourPossibleTacticD 5.All Actors

6.Canthis actoraffect your

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achieving thegoal? (YesorNo)

your achieving thegoal? (YesorNo) Tactic A Tactic B Y N N N N N N Y N Y Y N Tactic C N N N N N Y Tactic D

Secretaryof Defense Governors

Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y

N Y Y N Y N

Law Y enforcement National Guard Armed forces Suppliers Y Y Y

ReturningtotheChiefOfficerofHealthactingasheshould,wewouldsee:
Worksheet3:AnActorsActionsandTactics 1.Actor:ChiefofficerofHealth,DistrictofColumbiaXXIndividual 4.Detailed Description Callfrom county health officer regarding dog 5.Is thisa tactic? N 6.Isa response necessary? Y

2.Time/Date Sunday

3.Action First warning

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Sunday

Reviews emergency plans

First Y responseto possibilityof epidemic; sendsout warningof possible epidemic Getsnewsof positive anthraxtest Warn regional emergency operations N

LateSunday

Testresults

EarlyMondaymorning

advisory

Mondaymorning

liaison

Establish Y linkswith regional coordinating teamand relevant agencies Start Y preparations forepidemic Y

Monday

preparation

Monday

Mobilization Mobilize of Ciprostocks antibiotics forstaff Trouble shooting Lookinto lackof laboratory supplies

Tuesday

Tuesday

Trouble shooting burial

Adviseon Y staffmorale andshortage Adviseon Y safeburialof deceased

Wednesdays

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IftheChiefOfficerofHealthisamole,thentheworksheetwouldlooklikethis:
Worksheet3:AnActorsActionsandTactics 1.Actor:ChiefofficerofHealth,DistrictofColumbia(mole)XXIndividual 4.Detailed Description Callfrom county health officer regarding pig 5.Is thisa tactic? N 6.Isa response necessary? Y

2.Time/Date Sunday

3.Action First warning

Sunday

Reviews emergency plans;

Y First responseto possibilityof epidemic; sendsout warningof possible epidemic Y

Sunday

Considers effectsof evenshort delaysin taking action Testresults

LateSunday

Getsnewsof positive anthraxtest Warn regional emergency operations

LateMondaymorning

advisory

Tuesdaymorning

liaison

Establish Y linkswith regional coordinating

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teamand relevant agencies Tuesday preparation Start Y preparations forepidemic Y N

Tuesday

Mobilization Mobilize of Ciprostocks antibiotics forstaff Trouble shooting Lookinto lackof laboratory supplies

Wednesday

Wednesday

Trouble shooting burial

Adviseon Y staffmorale andshortage Adviseon Y safeburialof deceased

Thursday

ThenextthreeworksheetsarethesamewhethertheOfficerofHealthisamoleor not.
Worksheet4:ResourcesaStrategyCanDrawOn 1.Resource NationalGuard Hospitalpersonnel Governors SecretaryofDefense Suppliers 2.Effect ontactic Y Y Y Y Y 3.Limited? 4.Helpful? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 5.Essential? Y Y Y N Y

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Lawenforcement Media Generalpopulation Meteorologists

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

Y N Y N

Worksheet5:RulesoftheGame

1.Rule
1a.Actions 1b.People 1c.Resources 1d.Time management 1e.Culturaletc. factors 1f.Intelligence 1g.Attitudetowards casualties 1h.Otherrules

2.Description

3.Formal (yes/no)?

4.Helpful 5.Essential (yes/no)? (yes/no)? Y Y Y Y

Scopeofpractice, healthprofessionals Criminalcode Civilliberties Possecomitatus

Y Y Y Y

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Worksheet6:AllOtherFactors 1.DesiredStrategicOutcome:containmentofepidemic 2.DrivingFactors Winddirection Morbidityofvirus Mortalityofvirus Rateofinfection 3.RestrainingFactors Precipitation

IftheD.C.OfficerofHealthactsasheshould,thenextstepintheanalysis wouldlooklikethis:

Worksheet7:StepsandNodes 1.StrategicGoal:containmentofepidemic 2.Pathway1 Testpatients Adviseofpossibility Reviewemergencyplans Adviseofpositivetest Orderquarantine 3.Alternative1 4.Alternative2

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 Establishlinkswith regionalauthorities Enforcequarantine OrderSupplies Provideantibioticstostaff Provideantibioticsto essentialpersonnel Preparefordisposalof deceased Quarantinebrokenby cartraffic Establishcontainmentat largerperimeter OrderSupplies Provideantibioticsto staff Provideantibioticsto essentialpersonnel Preparefordisposalof deceased Provideantibioticsto essentialpersonnel Preparefordisposalof deceased Provideantibioticstostaff

Suppliersrunoutof laboratorynecessities Ordersuppliesfrom outsidearea

Circlenodesoneachpathway. Ifthesuspectedmoleactswithslightdelays,thenWorksheet7wouldlooklike this:

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Worksheet7:StepsandNodes 1.StrategicGoal:delayedcontainmentofepidemicbyactionsofmole 2.Pathway1 Testpatients Delayby8hoursadvising ofpossibility Reviewemergencyplans Considerconsequencesof slightdelays Delayadvisingofpositive testby8hours Delayorderingof quarantinebyoneday Delayestablishinglinks withregionalauthorities byoneday Delayenforcing quarantinebyoneday Delayorderingsupplies byaday Establishcontainmentat perimetertwiceaslarge asotherwisewouldbe Quarantinebrokenby carandairtraffic 3.Alternative1 4.Alternative2

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 Provideantibioticslateto staff Provideantibioticsto essentialpersonnel Preparefordisposalof deceased

thecase OrderSupplies Provideantibioticsto staff Provideantibioticsto essentialpersonnel Preparefordisposalof twiceasmanydeceased Provideantibioticsto essentialpersonnel Warnofspreadofepidemic tothreeothermajorUS cities:NewYork,Los Angeles,Chicago Preparefordisposalof deceased Provideantibioticstostaff Suppliersrunoutof laboratorynecessities

Ordersuppliesfrom outsidearea

Turnoverresponsibility forepidemictonational authorities

Circlenodesoneachpathway.
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Worksheet8wouldbethesameineithercase.

Worksheet8:TacticsandCounterTactics 1.Issue:USscapacitytoprojectpower 2.Goal:preserveit 4.Tactics QuarantineDCareabyairand groundtransportation Ordersupplies,antibiotics Acttopreservestaffmoraleand providepublicinformation,aswell aslawandorder Preparetodisposeofthedeadand planforthecleanupafterthe epidemicisover 3.Goal:decreaseit 5.CountervailingTactics Increasebackgroundnoisetomake actualattackhardertodetect Attackrepeatedlyuntilsuccessful Flyundertheradarinabushplane, notbreakinganyflightrulesand regulations Disperseanthraxsporesoverthe heavilypopulatedcapitalarea Activatemoletodelaycontainment ofepidemic

IftheSOFchoosetoworkwithacoreidea,theywouldbeginbyfillingout Worksheet9.

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Worksheet9:CoreIdea 3.Your Metaphors, Images,Role Models, Analogies Artillery, submarine, warship Glen,forest, mountain

1.Category

2.SuggestedMetaphors, Images,Analogies,Role Models Machinegun,rifle,tank

4.CoreIdea

Military

Letsmowthe terroristsdown Letsdropthe terroristsinthe ocean,farfrom land Letssmotherthe terrorist organizationlike Virginiacreeper Letsrunthem overwithabus Letswrestlethe terroriststothe ground Letsbeheadthe terrorists Letskillthem withouteven f***ingthem Letsswarmthe terrorists Letsbelike Churchilland attackthe terrorists underbelly

Geographical

River,waterfall,creek

Plant

Tree,fern,Venusflytrap

Leaf,ivy,flower

Transportation Bus,golfcart,car Sports Caddy,gymnastics,football

Airplane,power boat Baseballbat, footballtackle, basketballscore Screwdriver, hammer,axe Blackwidow spider Tiger,elephant, monkeys Patton, Eisenhower, Montgomery, Wellington

Mechanical Insects

Wrench,Allenkey,ratchet Mosquito,ant,butterfly

Animals Rolemodels

Cougar,puma,rhinoceros PrincessDiana,Donald Trump,Gandhi

Yourown Category: Groupsof people

Yourownmetaphors: team,squad,mob

Letsgangupontheterrorists

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Worksheet9:CoreIdea

1.Category

2.SuggestedMetaphors, Images,Analogies,Role Models Machinegun,rifle,tank

3.Your Metaphors, Images,Role Models, Analogies Artillery, submarine, warship Glen,forest, mountain Leaf,ivy,flower Airplane,power boat Baseballbat, footballtackle, basketballscore Screwdriver, hammer,axe Blackwidow spider Tiger,elephant, monkeys Patton, Eisenhower, Montgomery, Wellington

4.CoreIdea

Military

letsshootdown thatmole Letsthrowthe moleover NiagaraFalls Letsrootoutthe mole Letsrunthe moleoverwitha bus Letswrestlethe moletothe ground Letsbeheadthe mole Letskillthat molewithout evenf***inghim Letsswarmthe mole Letsbelike Churchilland attackthemoles underbelly

Geographical

River,waterfall,creek

Plant

Tree,fern,Venusflytrap

Transportation Bus,golfcart,car

Sports

Caddy,gymnastics,football

Mechanical Insects

Wrench,Allenkey,ratchet Mosquito,ant,butterfly

Animals Rolemodels

Cougar,puma,rhinoceros PrincessDiana,Donald Trump,Gandhi

Yourown Category: Groupsof people

Yourownmetaphors: team,squad,mob

Letsganguponthemole

Worksheet9abovewouldlooklikethis,iftheyaretaskedspecificallywith identifyingamole.

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 Turningnowtothetaskoflocatingandcapturingthefugitivephysician,the SOFmightusetheworksheetsinthefollowingway:
Worksheet1:Strategy 1.Issue 2.Goal 3.CoreIdea 4.Tactics AssessingtheroleofthechiefofficerofhealthfortheDistrictof Columbiaintherecentepidemic GainingcustodyofthechiefofficerofhealthfortheDistrictof ColumbiaonUSsoil Letscagethismountaincat 1 Locatehim 2 Gainhistrust 3 Lurehimtoaneutrallocation 4 Physicallyandchemicallyrestrainhim 5 TransporthimbacktotheUS

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 Listedherearewhatactuallyhappenedandwhatmighthavebeen consideredastactics.
Worksheet2:KeyActors Gainingcustodyofthechiefofficerof healthfortheDistrictofColumbiaon USsoil Realizingthesuspectismissing Followupleadsre:Australia Scanpassengerlistsofairlines Contactforeigngovernmentsre:his whereabouts 7.Canthis actor prevent your achieving thegoal? (YesorNo) Tactic A Informants inAustralia Airline personnel Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N N N Y N N Tactic B N N Y Y Tactic C Tactic D

1.YourGoal 2.YourLatestTactic 3.LatestActionorEvent, ifdifferentfromabove 4.aYourPossibleTacticA 4.bYourPossibleTacticB 4.cYourPossibleTacticC 4.dYourPossibleTacticD 6.Canthis actoraffect your achieving thegoal? (YesorNo)

5.All Actors

8.Canthisactoraffectanyofyour possibletactics?

Government Y ofUK Government Y ofItaly

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Worksheet3:AnActorsActionsandTactics 1.Actor:CHERYLXXIndividual Group 4.Detailed 5.Isthis Description atactic? Y Carries photos, looksfor himaround hishotel Greets suspect, tellscover story,plays hardtoget Meets suspect, exploits emotional state, proposes getaway Meets suspect, fliesfrom Londonto Rome, brings suspectto apartment Y 6.Isa response necessary? Y

2.Time/Date Weeks1and2

3.Action Cruising through London

Week3,day1

contact

Week3,day6

proposal

Week4,day1

Travel

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Worksheet4:ResourcesaStrategyCanDrawOn 1.Resource Funds Backgroundinformationon target Otherpersonnelsubduingand druggingandtransporting target Informationforcoverstory Otherpersonnelbookingplane tickets Otherpersonnelplanningtrip toRome Personalappearanceand demeanor Skillasactress Skillasagent 2.Effect ontactic Y Y Y 3.Limited? 4.Helpful? Y Y Y Y Y Y 5.Essential? Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y N Y Y

Therearemanymorerulesinvolved,buttheseprovideyouwithasampleofwhat canbeincluded.

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Worksheet5:RulesoftheGame 1.Rule Assassination Kidnapping Safety Rulesonmoney spent Information security 2.Description Cannotkillwithout permission CannotkidnapinUK Avoidinjuryordeath ofagents Allowableand disallowedexpenses Preservesourcesof information;operate onneedtoknowbasis 3.Formal (yes/no)? N N N Y Y 4.Helpful 5.Essential (yes/no)? (yes/no)? N N N N N Y Y N N N

Worksheet6:AllOtherFactors 1.DesiredStrategicOutcome:bringtargettoUS 2.DrivingFactors 3.RestrainingFactors Weatherpermittingdepartureof ship Weatherpermittingdepartureof airplanes TrafficinRome

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Worksheet7:StepsandNodes 1.StrategicGoal:gettingtargetbacktous 2.Pathway1 Followupleadto Australia FindtargetinAustralia Subdueanddrugtarget Bringtargettoport Puttargetonship Haveshipleaveharbor HaveshipcrossPacific HaveshipdockinUSport Failtofindtargetin Australia Checkpassengerlists FollowupleadtoUK CombstreetsofLondon withpicture HaveCherylmake contact HaveCherylplayhardto get HaveCherylexploit emotionalvulnerability 3.Alternative1 4.Alternative2

HaveCherylbringtarget toapartment

HaveCherylproposeRome trip

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Subdueanddrugtarget

BringtargettoRome Subdueanddrugtarget Bringtargettoport Puttargetonship Haveshipleaveharbor HaveshipcrossAtlantic HaveshipdockinUSport

Bringtargettoport

Puttargetonship

Haveshipleaveharbor

HaveshipcrossAtlantic

HaveshipdockinUSport

Circlenodesoneachpathway.

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Worksheet8:TacticsandCounterTactics 1.Issue:custodyandlocationoftarget 2.Goal:targetremainsfreeinLondon 4.Tactics 3.Goal:captureandreturntargettoUS 5.CountervailingTactics FollowupleadtoAustralia FailtofindtargetinAustralia Checkpassengerlists FollowupleadtoUK CombstreetsofLondonwith picture HaveCherylmakecontact HaveCherylplayhardtoget HaveCherylexploitemotional vulnerability HaveCherylproposeRometrip BringtargettoRome Subdueanddrugtarget Bringtargettoport Puttargetonship Haveshipleaveharbor HaveshipcrossAtlantic HaveshipdockinUSport

Ifyoufindtherightcoreidea,youdontneedtokeepfillingouttheform.
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Worksheet9:CoreIdea 3.Your Metaphors, Images,Role Models, Analogies Airforce Fishing Screws Fly

1.Category

2.SuggestedMetaphors, Images,Analogies,Role Models Machinegun,rifle,tank Caddy,gymnastics,football Wrench,Allenkey,ratchet Mosquito,ant,butterfly

4.CoreIdea

Military Sports Mechanical Insects

Bombthistarget tobits Hookthistarget andreelhimin Screwthistarget over Trapthetarget likeaflyina spiderweb Havethetarget fallintoapittrap likeabear

Animals

Cougar,pumarhinoceros

Bear

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 6. CONCLUSION

Theapplicationsidentifiedfortheaboveprocessincludes: o theestablishmentofcriteriabywhichtodetectterrorists; o betterpreparationforredteamsinmilitaryexercises; o advisinghostnations; o othertypesofmilitaryoperations,suchascombatinginsurgency. Itisalsopossiblethatthereareothertypesofunderdogs,suchasnarcoterrorists and/orsmugglersofalltypesthatmightbeofinteresttotheSOFcommunity. Theknowledgetransfersystembasedonworksheets,whenjoinedtoan understandingofunderdogstrategicthinking,hasalargenumberofapplicationsin theGlobalWaronTerror.Thesystemisobviouslyincomplete,buttheforegoing chaptersonlypurporttobeanintroductiontounderdogstrategicthinking.Itcanbe usedtoanalyzeasingleterroristsactions.Itcanbeusedtodevelopaproposalto promotegreatersafetyforasinglecountry.Itcanbeusedtoanalyzeandimprove theeffectivenessofcooperationbetweentwostates,ifthatisoneofthestates' objectives,incombatingterrorism.Itcanbeusedtoexaminethepatternof terrorismanddesignaresponsetoit.Itcanbeusedtotrainanalysts,gatherersof intelligence,orofficersandpersonnelofcombatunits.Itcanbeusedbyanykindof individualorgroup,civilianormilitary.Itcanalsoanalyzethedomesticpoliticsofa state,ortotherelationsofnongovernmentalactors,ortherelationsofnon governmentgroupstotheirown(orother)governments.Itcanbeusedfor volitionalandnonvolitionalhostileactors. Underdogstrategycomeswithitsownrules,anditisimportanttojudgethe proposalmadewithinthesepagesbycriteriawhicharevalidforthistypeof enterprise.69 Howmuchknowledgeisretainedbytheanalystwhohasworkedthroughthe casestudies? Cananalystsdemonstratetheskillstheyhaveacquiredthroughthisbook? Doanalystshavetheabilitytoapply,inpracticalsituations,theknowledge andskillsthathavebeenacquired?

69

Christian Wolff, Philosophia prima sive Ontologia, part I, section 2, heading 3, article 169, pp. 72-73.

85

Anyassessmentshouldincludecategoriesthatrelatetothecoursecontent,should bereliable,shouldidentifyclearlythedegreeofdifficultyoftheskillsbeing acquired,shoulddiscriminatedifferentlevelsofskillshavingbeenacquired,should befreeofbiasandshouldprovidedirectioninthecaseofdifferentstandards betweenraters,shouldprovidefeedbacktoparticipants,andshouldbecredibleand functional. Iproposethefollowinglevelsofassessmentofindividualsorunitshavingacquired skills: Level1 Level2 demonstratesadequateknowledgeofthetasksathand;demonstrates abilitytoutilizenewknowledgeandexperience demonstratesbyactionsmasteryofknowledgeacquired;applies theorytospecificsituationsorproblems;doesnotmakethesame mistakesrepeatedly;reorganizesapproachorplanwhenneeded preparesrealisticplans;canbeusedbyateam,notjustbyindividuals; standsuptothereasoningofothers planswithflexibility,adjustingactionstothesituation;reflectson mosteffectiveuseofparticularskillsofgroupmembers,learnsfrom mistakesorchangesinthesituation. anticipateseventsandproblems,andneedresources;monitorsevents andanticipateschangestotacticsorstrategy.

Level3 Level4

Level5

Onecouldalsoconsider,asIhaveelsewhere,thatweaksidestrategyisthe justifiablefoundationforanewgeneraltheoryofstrategy.Thegeneraltheoryof strategyonwhichthisbookisbasedhastheoreticalandpracticalsignificance.Atits broadest,ithasthepotentialtochangethewayanyoneunderstandspower, analyzestheworld,andacts.Atitsnarrowest,itcanhelpthesingleindividualmake adifferenceinhisorherlife.Inadditiontoitsnumerouspracticalapplications,the newgeneraltheoryofstrategyalsospawnsacomplexresearchagenda:researchon phenomena,infranationalgroups,supranationalgroups,andsystemicapplications willrequireseveralsetsofcasestudies.Iftheyareallsuccessful,itwillbepossible toproposeanintegratedtheoryoftheuseofpowerinsociety.Themoreapplied strandofresearchrepresentsdetailedinstructionsfortheapplicationofthetheory inavarietyofsituations. Notallunderdogsusestrategy,butthosethatdoareunusuallysuccessfulinpolitical situations.Usingweaksidestrategyisnotnewtothestudyofeitherrelations

86

betweenstates,ordomesticpoliticsandpolicy.70Thedevelopmentofthe framework,andthestudyofitswiderangeofapplications,hasbeenpublished elsewhere.Traditionally,academicshavedeclinedtotakeresponsibilityforthe consequencesoftheirresearchbeingabused,andIfindmyselfunabletodo otherwise.ButIwishtoacknowledgeherethatstrategyisandalwayshasbeen ethicallyneutral.Itsapplicationandresultsdependentirelyonhow,andforwhat purpose,itisused. About the author: Laure Paquette, PhD, is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Lakehead University in Thunderbay, Ontario.

Laure Paquette, Security in the Pacific Century (New York: Nova, 2002), Strategy and Ethnic Conflict (New York: Praeger, 2002), Building and Analyzing National Policy (Lanham: Lexington, 2002).

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