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DUE PROCESS CASES: ANG TIBAY vs.

Court of Industrial Relations The Solicitor- General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations filed a motion for reconsideration. The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of the SC and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial. Facts: Ang Tibay is a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army which is owned by Toribio Teodoro. There was said to be an agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union. However, NLU alleged in its complaint that Toribio Teodoros claim (sept. 26, 1938), that there was shortage of leather soles in Ang Tibay, which caused him to temporarily lay off the members of the NLU, is entirely false and unsupported by records. NLU averred that it was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. (note: there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Workers Brotherhood). Also, they believed that the National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. NLU claimed that Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc. and unjustly favoring the National Workers Brotherhood. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion. (there was no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers was due to their labor affiliation or activity) Issue: Whether or not there has been a due process of law? Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103. As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) The decision must have something to support itself; (4) The evidence must be substantial; (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. (mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence) (the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.) The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.

March 20, 1987 Restituto Ynot v Intermediate Appellate Court FACTS: On January 13, 1984 the police station commander of Iloilo confiscated the 6 carabaos of the petitioner when he had transported these animals in a pump boat to Iloilo from Masbate, in violation of Executive Order No. 626-A. The said order

prohibits the interprovincial movementand slaughter of carabaos. Section 1 of the said EO contains: xxx the carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit*, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit*, in the case of carabaos. The petitioner sued for their recovery in the RTC of Iloilo to which the said court sustained the confiscation of his carabaos. The lower court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the EO for lack of authority and presumed validity. IAC upheld the trial courts decision. ISSUE: WON EO 626-A is a violation of the constitutional guarantee of due process. HELD: It is unconstitutional. Primary Considerations 1. Due process was violated by the said EO in a way that it confiscates the property of the accused without giving him, his right to be heard in his defense and is immediately punished. EO 626-A is penal in nature and the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police authority but by a court of justice, which alone has the authority to impose the prescribed penalty only after the trial and conviction of the accused. It is a clear encroachment of judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.

2. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing, but
these are not imperative in every case. There are instances when the need for an expeditious action will justify the omission of these requisites. An example would be a summary abatement of a nuisance, as when a mad dog can be killed on sight when it poses danger to lives of the people, pornographic materials and narcotic drugs which are inherently harmful and may be summarily destroyed. But in the present case, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioners preemptory treatment. Other Considerations 3. The phrase may see fit is an extremely dangerous condition as to the distribution of the confiscated carabeefs. The option was apparently boundless. The officers named above can choose as they see fit the fortunate beneficiaries which give an avenue for corruption, partiality and abuse. 4. The prohibition of the interprovincial transport of the carabaos does not prevent the indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere with no less difficulty in one province or the other the prohibition was useless.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. - Cruz, J.

EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION(DYRE) vs Hon. DANS Prelude: This petition was filed in order to allow the reopening of the Radio Station DYRE which had been closed on grounds of national security. Petitioner averred that it was denied the constitutional right to due process when its radio station was closed down on the mere allegation that the same was used to incite people to sedition. It advanced that no hearing was held and no proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. Additionally, the petitioner was not informed beforehand why an administrative sanction was put before it. No action was taken by the respondents to ENTERTAIN A MOTION SEEKING THE RECONSIDERATION OF THE CLOSURE. The petitioner also readied the issue of freedom of speech. It appears the respondent based its claim upon the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs. FACTS: On March 25, 1985, before the Court could promulgate a decision squarely passing upon all the issues raised, the petitioner through its president, Mr. Rene G. Espina suddenly filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition. The petitioner alleged: 1. Petitioner Eastern Broadcasting Corporation has already sold its radio broadcasting station in favor of Manuel B. Pastrana as well as its rights and interest in the radio station DYRE in Cebu including its right to operate and its equipment; 2. Respondent National Telecommunications Commission has expressed its willingness to grant to the said new owner Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite license and franchise to operate the said radio station and to approve the sale of the radio transmitter of said station DYRE; 3. In view of the foregoing, petitioner has no longer any interest in said case, and the new owner, Manuel B. Pastrana is likewise not interested in pursuing the case any further. The case, therefore, has become moot and academic. ISSUE:Whether or not the closure was without due process.(read ang tibay v. CIR for the requirements) Whether or not the closure was violative of the freedom of the press.

Held: It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be valid.(read ang tibay v. CIR for the requirements) All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. Yet the freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.

ABAKADA Guro Party List v Ermita (July 5, 2005) FACTS: Motions for reconsideration for the Courts Decision dated Sep 1, 2005 were filed by the petitioners, upholding the constitutionality of RA 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. 1. In GR No.168463,Escudero, et al. (petitioner) challenged the courts ruling basedon the following grounds: A. The deletion of the "no pass on provisions" for the sale of petroleum products and power generation services constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the bicameral conference committee. B. Republic act no. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24, Article VI of 1987 Philippine constitution. C. Republic act no. 9337s stand-by authority to the executive to increase the vat rate, especially on account of the effective recommendatory power granted to the secretary of finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority. 2. In G.R. No. 168730, Bataan Governor Garcia, Jr., challenge RA 9337 with the argument that burdening the consumers with significantly higher prices under a VAT regime renders the law unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive and inequitable. 3. In G.R. No. 168461, petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., challenge the constitutionality of RA 9337 on the grounds that: A. The Court erred in upholding the constitutionality of Section 110(A)(2) and Section 110(B) of the NIRC, as amended by the EVAT Law, imposing limitations on the amount of input VAT that may be claimed as a credit against output VAT, as well as Section 114(C) of the NIRC, as amended by the EVAT Law, requiring the government

or any of its instrumentalities to withhold a 5% final withholding VAT on their gross payments on purchases of goods and services, B. And finding that the questioned provisions are not arbitrary, oppressive and confiscatory as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution; ISSUES: WON RA 9337 is unconstitutional and that WON the court erred in its ruling on the issues abovementioned. COURTS RULING: The court denied the motions for reconsideration and upholds the constitutionality of RA 9937. 1. A. The Bicameral Committees act of deleting the "no pass on provisions" is justifiable. The petitioners insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 and Senate Bill No. 1950. However, the court find this contention untenable. There are indeed two opposing forces: the HOR wants petroleum dealers to be saddled with the burden of paying VAT and the Senate which does not see it proper to make that particular industry bear said burden. Clearly, such conflicts and differences between the no pass-on provisions in the Senate and House bills had to be acted upon by the bicameral conference committee as mandated by the rules of both houses of Congress. Moreover, The Court stands by its ruling that the issue of whether or not the House panel in the bicameral conference committee complied with said internal rule cannot be inquired into by the Court. 1.B. On the issue that Republic act no. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills. The court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides: Sec. 24 All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. In the Tolentino case, it was held that it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. The Senate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House. The intent of the House of Representatives in initiating House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 was to solve the countrys serious financial problems. The Senate introduced amendments on income taxes, would yield about P10.5 billion a year. There were also sections that the Senate amended to soften the impact of VAT on consumers. The Court finds no reason to reverse the earlier ruling that the Senate introduced amendments that are germane to the subject matter and purposes of the house bills. 1.C. Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337s stand- by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. There is no merit in this contention. The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.

2. With regard to petitioner Garcias arguments, the Court also finds the same to be without merit. The Court recognizes the burden that the consumers will be bearing with the passage of R.A. No. 9337. But it cannot strike down the law as unconstitutional simply because of its yokes. The role that the Court plays in the picture is to determine whether the law was passed in accordance with the Constitution. 3. A.Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc. reiterated their arguments in the petition. The glitch in petitioners arguments is that it presents figures based on an event that is yet to happen. Their illustration of the possible effects of the 70% limitation is theoretical. Theories have no place in this case as the Court must only deal with an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. 3.B. Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right. The Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right, and a VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove. As the Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of law. Prior to the enactment of multi-stage sales taxation, the sales taxes paid at every level of distribution are not recoverable from the taxes payable. The right to credit input tax as against the output tax is clearly a privilege created by law, a privilege that also the law can limit. It should be stressed that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges.

The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. When Rep. Act No. 9337 has not yet even been implemented, is that petroleum dealers right to use their input VAT as credit against their output VAT unlimitedly has not vested, being a mere expectancy of a future benefit and being contingent on the continuance of Section 110 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, prior to its amendment by Rep. Act No. 9337. WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court is LIFTED.

Ichong v. Hernandez May 31, 1957

Facts: The legislature enacted R.A. No. 1180 An Act to Regulate the retail Business because there is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy as shown in the statistics on retail trade between the constitutional convention year 1935 up to 1954, the submission of RA 1180. Ichong brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, from enforcing its provisions. The main provisions are as follows: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation. Petition Denied. The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control. Issue: Denies aliens equal protection of the law and deprives them of their liberty and property w/o due process of law. Answer: The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because

sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege.

5. Equal protection- requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. He is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands. 6. Due process The test of the limitation is its Reasonability. Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges. If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority. [other issues:(2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution. In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.]

Kwong Sing v City of Manila Facts: A municipal ordinance, Ordinance No. 532, was passed by the City if Manila requiring all laundry establishments to issue their receipts in English and Spanish. The petitioner and other Chinese businessmen such as him challenged the said ordinance on the ground that it was oppressive. Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. Issue: ... W O N the enforcement of Ordinance No. 532 is a class legislation that infringes upon property rights? Held: No. The SC sustained the measure, noting that it was intended to protect the public from deceptions and misunderstandings that may arise from their accepting receipts in Chinese characters that they did not understand. It invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance.

EQUAL PROTECTION CASES: Quinto vs Comelec - Equal protection (December 1, 2009) FACTS: Department of Environment and Natural Resources Undersecretary Eleazar Quinto (running for Pangasinan congressman) and DENR Land Management Bureau Director Gerino Tolentino Jr. (running for Manila councilor) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify sec. 4(a) of Resolution 8678. According to them, imposing automatic resignation against appointive officials who file their certificates of candidacy is offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution of the Philippines because it gives an undue advantage to elective officials who are allowed to remain in office despite the filing of their certificates of candidacy. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369. ISSUE: Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was violative of the equal protection clause? HELD: Yes, the said COMELEC resolution was violative of the equal protection clause.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement that it must be germane to the purpose of the law. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause. The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad. First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office are those who occupy relatively high positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of ones highest aspirations to public office. Such is the essence of democracy. Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the

Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. After the retirement of Justice Minita Chico-Nazario and the appointment of Justices Jose Perez and Jose C. Mendoza, the Supreme Court resolved to reverse the original decision and adopt the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Reynato Puno. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION- February 10, 2010 CJ. Puno FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 provides that, Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Be it noted that petitioners of the above-entitled case are appointive officials who intend to be elected in the previously held 2010 elections and who felt aggrieved by the issuance of the questioned resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional.

RULING: The Supreme Court overruled its previous decision declaring the assailed resolution unconstitutional. Here, it strongly upholds the constitutionality of the resolution saying that it does not violate the equal protection clause. It is settled that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The test used is reasonableness which requires that: 1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions; 2. It is germane to the purposes of the law; 3. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4. It applies equally to all members of the same class. In the case under consideration, there is a substantial distinction between public and elective officials which has been rendered moot and academic by the ruling made in the case of Farinas, etl. al. vs. Executive Secretary. Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional.

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC. vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY

FACTS: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50. On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar. The Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES: a) W/N the Municipal Board has violated Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils the power to impose an export tax. b) W/N 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964 unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. HELD: a) Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void." Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees. Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas it held the former to have been repealed by the latter. And because of the transcendental effects that municipal export or import taxes or licenses will have on the national economy, due to Section

2 of Republic Act 2264, there was no other alternative until Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable results. b) In Felwa vs. Salas, it was ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. Decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to the payments made by plaintiff-appellant.

PASEI v. Drilon and Achacoso PASEI: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. Drilon: Sec. of Labor and Employment Achacoso: Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Facts: o The petitioner, a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."

Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's nonimpairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced. NOTE: Prohibition was removed in Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, HK, US, Italy, Norway, Austria and Switzerland.

Issue: o Whether Deparment Order No. 1, a police power measure, is valid under the Constitution.

Held: The petition is DISMISSED. Discrimination against males or females and inapplicability to all Filipino workers It is well-settled that "equality before the law" does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women under the Constitution. It admits of classifications, provided that: (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; o The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. There is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. It was largely a matter of evidence and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case.

(2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; o The avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers". In the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.

(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and o It is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted.

(4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. o Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly

circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. Violative of the right to travel The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. Invalid exercise of the lawmaking power It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. Worker participation The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" is not welltaken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation. The Constitution declares that: Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. "Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. Violative of the non-impairment clause The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.

Injury

The concern of the Govrnment is not necessarily to maintain profits and business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. NOTE: The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.

PJA v. Prado Facts: Congress enacted Republic Act 7354 "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith." and was implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. Under its Sec 35, the franking privelege of the Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn from them. Issue: W/O R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary. Held: (1) The title of the challenged act does not violate the Constitution. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. Although the repealing clause of said act states that All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly., the repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. (2) The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee

Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows: (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have be

International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing (June 1, 2000) Facts: Petitioners are employees (teachers) of respondent's school who are receiving less than their counterparts hired abroad and now cry discrimination. The school contends that a foreign-hire would necessarily uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take the risk of devaiting from a promising career path - all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land and such person does not enjoy security of tenure as well so the compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent pruofessionals in the field of international education. The school's classification between foreign-hires and localhires was in the point-of-hire so foreigners hired locally are being classified as localhires. Petitioner claims that such classification is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. On the other hand, the Acting Secretary of Labor upheld the point-of hire classification for the distinction in salary rates. He also stated that The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School. Hence the present petition. Issue: WON the Acting secretary erred in upholding the reasonableness of the classification made by respondent-school.

Held: Yes. That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution 8 in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code 19 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," 25 "to afford labor full protection." 26 The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.27 These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. 28 Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.

Mayor Antonio Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (November 10, 1978) FACTS: A petition to review the decision of the CFI of Manila, declaring the Ordinance No. 6537 of the City if Manila null and void. Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968. The ordinance prohibits the employment of aliens in any occupation or business unless they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Manila and paid a fee of P500. Hui Chiong Pao Ho, an alien and who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the CFI praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of the Ordinance No. 6537, and for a judgment declaring said Ordinance null and void.

Petitioners contention was 1.) the ordinance as a revenue measure imposed on aliens is discriminatory and violative of the rule on uniformity of taxation. 2.) the ordinance fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the actions of the Mayor. 3.) it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property, and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 6537 is unconstitutional.

HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a flat rate of P500, it failed to consider substantial differences in situations among aliens and for that reason violates the rule on uniformity of taxation. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. The ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. It does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance. Hence, the ordinance in question in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. The trial court did not commit any error in its judgment.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAYAT FACTS: Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the abovenamed accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. ISSUES: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law.

HELD: No. Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions. The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the nonChristian and the members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers to a geographical area and more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian tribes The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as thoseconditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

TELEBAP VS GMA NETWORK Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881. Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881which provides: Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign. Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer

even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year selections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such. Issues: (1) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws. (2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation. Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting theprivilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them. The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC Held: Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. 9 A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires." Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case was brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of

the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 11 Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast stations give free air time. Even in the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be required to give free air time to candidates in an election. In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.

Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro Facts: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established as Tigbao, Mindoro, against her will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation. According to the provincial officiats the alleged illegal acts are valid pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code that authorizes them to direct all Mangyans in the vicinity of the townships of Najuan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubis place in Calapan , to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbas Naujuan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917. It also states that any Mangyan who shall refused to comply will be imprisoned for not more than 60 days in accordance to section 2759. The provincial officials argue that such order were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyans of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. However, petitioner alleges the validity of this section of the Administrative Code as it is violates several provisions of the constitution. First, petitioner argues that there is an invalid delegation of legislative power. Petitioner contends that the legislature cannot delegate this power to provincial authorities. Second, petitioner claims that there is a religious discrimination which is manifested in Section 2145 and Section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code which are entitled Establishment of non-Christians upon site selected by provincial governor and Refusal of non-Christian to take up appointed habitation respectively. The religious discrimination is manifested by the segregation of non-Christians and none other as provided by section 2145 and 2759 which the petitioner alleges an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs and is consequently, unconstitutional. Third, petitioner argues that they have been deprived of due process of law and the equal protection of law which means their rights have taken without following the right process. Last, petitioner alleges that order made by the provincial officials constitutes involuntary servitude which is against the constitution.

Issues: Whether or not there is invalid delegation of power. Whether or not religious discrimination is manifested in section 2145 and 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. Whether or not the Manguianes are deprived of liberty, due process of law and equal protection. Whether or not the order made by the provincial officials constitutes involuntary servitude. Held: The court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power of the state, thus is constitutional. The court also states that petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or detained. On the first issue, the court states that an exception to the general rule sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. In this case, the Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board. The delegation is made since provincial officials as official representatives of the province and charged with the administration of the province and the protection of the inhabitants are better qualified judge and better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people. On the second issue, the alleged religious discrimination is based on the term non-Christian. In resolving this problem, the court set down a skeletal history of former legislations which uses the term non-Christian enacted by the proper authorities before and after acquisition of the Philippines by the United States. It was found out that the term non-Christian refers to uncivilized member of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order rather than the difference in religious beliefs. In view of this, the court held that the non-Christian refers to the natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization and that section 2145 does not discriminate between individuals on account of religious differences. On the third issue, the court states that liberty do not necessary mean the freedom to do what one wants to do rather it exists in proportion to wholesome restraint. What the court is referring to is a liberty regulated by law. Implied in the term is restraint for good of the individual and of the society which the State is entitled to do in the exercise of its police power. On account of due process, the court also states that to constitute due process of law, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. Due process of law simply means, first that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general power of the legislature; second, that law should be reasonable; third, it should be enforced according to the regular method of procedure; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class. On account of the equal protection of law, it is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature. Given this, the court held that there is not violation of due process of law and equal protection since section 2145 is reasonable, enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed and is made applicable to all person of the same class. On the fourth issue, the court held that there is no involuntary servitude since the Manguianes are not being required to serve another but in fact are required to serve themselves. What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather

together the children for educational purposes and to improve the health and morals - was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. In fact, the segregration is also done as a protection of the Manguianes.

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City of Manila The question in this appeal from a CFI Manila decision is whether Ordinance 4760 Of Manila is violative of the due process clause, with the lower court judging it to be so. The facts are as follows. Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Minicipal Board of Manila enacted ordinance 4760, which aims to to curb the rising cases of prostitution and deteriorating morals by regulating hotels, motels, inns and other like establishments in the City of Manila. It was approved by Vice Mayor Astorga the next day, in his capacity as acting Manila mayor. Thereafter, the petitioners filed grievances, asserting that the ordinance is unconstitutional, void, oppressive oft the due process clause for the ff: 1. Imposing a P6,000 fee on first class motels and P4,500 fee on 2nd class hotels according to Section 1 of said ordinance 2. That according to the said section, the owner/manager is required to turn away any guest who fails to fill up a prescribed form in the lobby in view of the public, disclosing personal information. 3. That the establishments would always be open to inspection by the mayor or the chief of Police 4. That Section 2 of the ordinance prohibits any hotel, motel, inn or any like establishment to refuse entry to a guest below 18 y/o without being accompanied by parents or legal guardians. 5. That owners/managers of such establishment cannot lease a room more than twice every 24 hours. 6. That the penalty for a subsequent conviction would be the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party. The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition on July 5,1963, praying that there be a declaration nullity against the ordinance. Lower court granted a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the mayor to cease enforcing Ordinance 4760 from July 8, 1963 onwards. In their reply, the Mayor prayed for the dissolution of the case as there is a valid reason for the enactment of the ordinance: the curbing of immorality which is a valid exercise of police power. Despite the petitioners not submitting evidence of unconstitutionality (burden of proof rests with them), submitting only stipulations of facts, the lower court ruled in their favor stating that Ordinace 4760 is unconstitutional and void. Hence this appeal. Issue/s: WON the decision of the lower court is in line with the standards of constitutional adjudication in both procedural and substantive aspects

WON petitioner's submission of mere stipulations of fact sufficient to render the ordinance unconstitutional WON Ordinance 4760 is truly violative of the due process clause Held: The decision of the lower court cannot be allowed to stand as it is not consistent with the standards of constitutional adjudication, primarily because of the lack of evidence supplied by the petitioner for invoking unconstitutionality. The court ruled that the councilors are familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject t and are therefore informed about executing the necessary action. The local legislature has in effect given notice that regulations are essential for the moral well-being of the people. The judiciary should not set aside legislative action when there is no clear invasion of personal property rights under guise of police regulation. In the face of uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of legislative acts, the presumption of constitutionality prevails. Also, the ordinance is well meaning; its intention being to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests via the fill-up form, shattering the privacy that characterizes such registration of guests. Also, this ordinance has legal precedents, as the court has allowed multiple times the passing of others catering to the moral welfare of the people. The court finds this ordinance free from any of the defects mentioned by the petitioners as it has not outrun the bounds of reason and it does not result to sheer oppression.