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North Korea and United States Conflict Analysis Using Graph Model For Conflict Resolution

Sherlin, Intan School of Business and Management, Institut Teknologi Bandung Hermawan, Pri School of Business and Management, Institut Teknologi Bandung Putro, Utomo Sarjono School of Business and Management, Institut Teknologi Bandung Intan Sherlin, Institut Teknologi Bandung, SBM ITB Jl. Ganesha 10 Bandung, West Java, Indonesia, 40132, +628192520737 ABSTRACT This paper intends to illustrate nuclear power conflict between North Korea and United States. Our focus is to analyze second phase conflict from North Koreas point of view. Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) is applied to formulating and analyzing the static structure of real-world conflict since it gives a range of solution concept under some different strategies. There is also Sensitivity Analysis to see how stability moves to equilibrium and conclusion built to help us understand North Koreas strategies. occurred for the first time by the end of the Korean War (1950-1953), until before North Korea conducted second nuclear test (May 25, 2009). This phase also includes moment when North Korea conducted first nuclear test (9 October, 2006). Phase since North Koreas second nuclear test is the second phase. If the first phase modeled by Obeidi [5] is using U.S.s point of view, the second phase which we focus to analyze in this paper will use North Koreas point of view.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK INTRODUCTION Game theory has been widely used to model well formulated conflicts and predict possible equilibria. In game theory, players preference must be represented by real-valued utilities. Since it is very difficult to measure the utility of players in reality, this theory has difficulties due to its very strict assumption of reality. On the other hand, Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) provides a flexible approach to modeling strategic conflict. Basically, this model is based on game theory that has been further extended by Fraser and Hipel [3]. But instead of cardinal utility, decision makers ordinal preference can be ranked from most preferred to least preferred by assuming all preferences are transitive. It gives analytical insight into problems within which possible strategic interaction among decision makers could be systematically analyzed to ascertain possible compromise resolutions. Modeling outcomes and feasible transitions as graph structure would help players understand the structure of modeled conflict. It could also interactively be operated by use of computer-based calculation software. In North Korea and United States (U.S.) conflict, there at least four countries which could directly feel the effect of North Koreas military capability: Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea. We divide the whole process of conflict into two phases. The first phase is similar with a model developed by Obeidi [5], while in the second phase we add the latest news of the conflict to determine decision makers states before analyzing its stability. The differences between the first phase and the second phase are based on two issues: time and point of view. The first phase starts when conflict Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (Fang, Hipel, and Kilgour, 1993) is a methodological approach to frame interactive decision situation or conflict, where formal analysis of stability could be applied [1]. Major advantage of the model is it could model the interplay structure among multiple players with their own effective strategies from particular outcome. GMCR orders possible outcomes in terms of preference, where state is defined as set of decision makers options. After the preferences of each decision maker (DM) determined, an equilibrium state is obtained as situation where DM cannot move to a better state. Mathematical character of GMCR is described as follows. Ri represents a collection of state reached DMi, and U represent the set of all state. Si+ (k) is possible moves that can improve player is payoff from state k. Payoff for player i denotes as Pi. Based on Kilgour and Hipel [4], the main stability definitions used in graph model analysis are Nash Stability (Nash), General Metarationality (GMR), Symmetric Metarationality (SMR), Sequential Stability (SEQ), Limited Move Stability (Lh), and Non-Myopic Stability (NM). In this paper, only Nash and SEQ solution concepts will be employed. 1. Nash Stability State k is Nash stable for player i iff i cannot improve its payoff by changing its strategies. In other words,

S i+ (k) = {}

(1)

2. Sequential Stability State k is sequentially stable for player i iff for every k1 Si+ (k) there exists k2 Si+ (k) with Pi (k)>Pi(k2).

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NORTH KOREA AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS

UNITED

STATES

Background of the Conflict North Koreas history formally begins with the establishment of Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948. In the aftermath of the Japanese occupation of Korea which ended in 1945, Korea was divided at the 38th parallel in accordance with a United Nations arrangement, to be administered by Soviet Union in the north and U.S. in the south since they were unable to agree on implementation of Joint Trusteeship over Korea. This led to the establishment of separate governments, each claiming to be the legitimate government of all of Korea. Trying to re-unify Korea under their respective governments, these two Korean powers led to a period military conflict called The Korean War (1950-1953). The end of this war reinforced the division of Korean peninsula both geographically and ideologically into totalitarian and quasi-democratic. Recently, the tension between U.S. and DPRK heightened sharply. North Korean nuclear-related activities began in 1955 when representatives of the Academy of Sciences participated in an East European conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. North Korea began expanding its nuclear infrastructure during mid 1970s. Based on data from Library of Congress Country Studies, there was growing international concern in early 1990s that North Korea was seeking to produce nuclear weapons. In July 1985, North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty but delayed signing the IAEA Full Scope Safeguards Agreement. In series of agreements with South Korea at the end of 1991, North Korea agreed to set up a Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC) to ensure that there are no nuclear weapons in either country. However, DPRK has twice tested nuclear explosive device and deployed short and medium-range ballistic missiles. As Obeidi [5] mentioned, after the 11th September 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. administration is very aggressive on national security issues. U.S. fears North Korea may sell nuclear technologies to other countries for hard currency, and may even supply nuclear weapons to terrorists. Therefore, officials in the U.S. government have routinely characterized North Korea as a threat to the USs national interests. After North Koreas second nuclear test in violation of existing United Nations (UN) resolutions, Japan took action by requesting a UN Security Council meeting to ask for DPRKs explanation behind its action. According to VOA News by Margaret Besheer, 10 June 2009, assuming North Korea not taking UNs previous sanction into account, UN Security Council is considering new sanctions against North Korea for its recent underground nuclear test including cargo inspections and total embargo on the export of arms. However, if we see from North Korea point of view, it had no immediate reaction to the UN draft resolution. Actually, North Korea routinely accuses U.S. of

plotting to invade. But the U.S., which in fact has 28,500 troops in South Korea, has said it has no such plan. North Korea stated that if the country was provoked, it would use nuclear capability to deal with those who harm country's dignity and sovereignty. Choosing Decision Makers, Options, and Preferences Our analysis emphasizes on actions and motives of each DM after North Koreas second missile test. Based on the framework of July 2009 where either North Korea or U.S. keeps on blaming each other, we will analyze the situation between four parties: North Korea, United States (U.S.), United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and China. However, not all the involved parties can become decision makers [6]. Putting UNSC as a third party, it can play a monitoring role as a world peace and economic stability keeper by banning North Korea from buying weapons from Russia and China; two superpower countries which have the same ideology with North Korea. China also has role as a third party since U.S. could not take in the first phase conflict into UNSC court since China has veto right in UN. Along history, China always backed up North Korea with ideas, goods and potential war efforts. U.S. was afraid if China would protect North Korea from UNs sanction. By changing the framework of the problems, we list the players and their options on Table 1. TABLE 1

Since all players only have two answers for each option, there are 24 = 16 possible states for this phase. However, the infeasible states which contain mutually exclusive options or highly unlikely strategies must be removed. From the actual condition, it is implied that North Korea only wants to say agree in negotiating if and only if UN stop sanctioning against it. Therefore, we left with 8 feasible states in Table 2; with state 7 as status quo at the time of modeling. While we order decision makers preferences on Table 3, Table 4 shows us how to find the stability.

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TABLE 2

We could see from the table that it would be a unilateral disimprovement for North Korea or U.S if only one party who change its preference (state 5 and state 1). On the other hand, moving from state 7 to state 3 could give joint improvement for both parties. A better joint improvement for both parties happens in the equilibrium position where China as a third party also moves to protect North Korea.

CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH This paper has been successfully described the interaction that occurs in North Korea and United States conflict using different perspective. From the analysis, we propose North Korea to stop bolstering its nuclear and U.S. to stay away from Korean peninsula. However, in fact, North Korea will never stop to bolster since issuing nuclear threat to U.S. is its way to obtain international recognition. This explained why North Korea is indifferent with UNs sanction and Chinas position. For further research, we will implement Coalition Analysis as China finally decided to form a coalition with U.S. and South Korea in March 2010. Japan might also join the coalition as its sanction has been disobeyed by North Korea and will be ended in April 2010.

TABLE 3

TABLE 4 REFERENCES [1] Fang, L., Hipel, K.W., & Kilgour, D. M. Interactive decision making, USA, New York: Wiley, 1993 [2] Feffer, John. US-North Korea Relations, Foreign Policy In Focus, 1999, 4(15) [3] Fraser, N.M, & Hipel, K.W. Dynamic Modelling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1982, 6(1) [4] Kilgour, D.M., & Hipel, K.W. The graph model for conflict resolution: Past, present, and future, Group Decision and Negotiation, 2005. 14(6), 441-460 [5] Obeidi, Amer. Emotion, Perception and Strategy in Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Canada, 2006 [6] Sensarma, S.R., & Okada, Norio. Conflict over Natural Resource Exploitation in a Mountainous Community: The Trade Off Between Economic Development and Disaster Risk Mitigation - A Case Study, Journal of Natural Disaster Science, 2005, 27(2), 95-100 [7] Sensarma, S.R., & and Okada, Norio. Modeling Multi-Actor Decision Process in Conflict Situation: A case of Community Disaster Risk Mitigation in Ichinose Community, Tottori Prefecture, Japan, Disaster Prevention Research Institute Annuals, 2005, 48B, 83-94

Sensitivity Analysis Table 5 below will show the movement from status quo of the conflict into stability and equilibrium. TABLE 5

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