EUSL2010 POLITICAL THEORIES AND REGIMES OF THE EU

Tom Delreux

INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORIES

1. What is European integration theories?
Theories: allow to make sense, give meaning and order to observations. They give a framework; pure factual data are not enough to make sense. The aim of a theory is to understand, analyze and then critically assess what you observe in the reality. Of course they are many ways to look at the same phenomenon In the case of the EU, there is not only one framework: not 1 theory, right or wrong, but different perspectives each emphasizing different points. European integration: classical definition from Haas, 1958: a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions process or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.

a process: dynamic not static distinct national settings: member states

loyalties, expectations and political activities: European integration is not only a shifting of competences, but also of broader aspects (=loyalties). a new center: EU (and its predecessors)

institutions: European Commission, Parliament, Council all EU institutions can regulate in the member states, they take bounding decisions. The development of the European integration theories is closely connected to the development of the political and historical situation.

2. Why study European integration theories?

It helps to:

- Understand how the EU works, whats happening. Understanding current situations reflecting on the
future. Analyze: facts are not sufficient. Pose normative questions: assess European integration in a critical way.

3. Development of European integration theories and development of the EU

The development of theories is very closely connected with the development of the EU itself. Throughout the development of the EU, it is possible to determine 3 stages, but they have fuzzy frontiers, not very delimited. All these theories try to assess the EU. It is also possible to study 3 broad components: Polity: umbrella word to define the political nature of the system. Policy: measures created by the EU, the outcome of the EU. Politics: decision-making process, before the policies.

Evolution in theories: Dominant question in thories is Why do sovereign states create the EU? European integration as a dependant variable

1950-1982 Understanding the EU Evolution in the European integration: - 1950s-1960s: ECSC / Treaty of Rome

Theories initiated:

- Federalism: established during

WWII to avoid WWII again, necessity to get rid of nationalism and fascism build a European federation. Federalism is not really a theory in term of mechanism, it is more an idealism.

- 1970s: empty chair crisis no new

question triggered

- Neofunctionalism: thinks EU has

been established by the member states because of the benefits for them : spill-over effect of one area to the others (opposed to intergovernmentalism)

- Intergovernmentalism: the member

states drive the EU integration. EU is not a supranational organization : integration process seen as the result of hard bargaining. Aim of those theories : understanding

1982-mid 90s Analyzing the EU Evolution in the European integration: Change: 1992: Single European ActSEA + idea to create the Common market with freedom of goods, capital and men.

Evolution in theories: Exploring the nature of the beast: what is the EU?

Theories initiated: - Liberal intergovernmentalism: member states drive the EU integration + they act on the bases of national interest, each member state acts according to its own values, interests, preferences

- New institutionalism: a collection of

3 theories: rational choice, sociological and historical theories to understand the EU, necessity to look at the institutions.

- Social constructivism: ideas matter.

The EU is what you make of it.

- Multi-level governance:
Vertical level: EU = supranational / national / regional Horizontal level: not only public actors, also private (NGO, firms) multi-level refers to the vertical (supranational, and regional) dimension, governance to the horizontal dimension : the political institutions but also the private actors taking part in the integration

process Policy networks

- Policy networks: networks built

mid 90s-today Normative questions Evolution in the European integration: Question of enlargement and constitutionalization Lisbon Treaty within the EU. Aim of those theories : analyzing

Evolution in theories: How to evaluate the EU and the European integration? European integration as an independent variable.

Theories initiated:

- Europeanization: all the theories

before analyze the EU integration as a bottom-up process. This theory looks at the top-down perspective: how the EU can influence member states.

- Critical political economy: criticizing

capitalism in the common market, : criticizes the capitalist fundaments of the EU clear normative element: emphasize the need of a more social construct.

A CRASH COURSE ON HISTORICAL AND EU INSTITUTIONS

1. Deepening and widening: 1950s-now
2 dimensions in EU: Deepening The Assumption that national states decide to establish a supranational policy level and not only a cooperation between states. The EU becomes stronger. The process: - Always goes together with the transfer of competence - Unanimity requirement - Parliament gets stronger It is based on treaties and treaty amendments to amend treaties: - IGCs = Intergovernmental conferences - Unanimity requirement - National ratification requirement

- 2002: Convention on the future of Europe: broadening the participation and the agenda lower influence of
national interest. Widening The EU enlarges, increases the number of member states. The process: - Candidate addresses membership request - EU decides to launch accession negotiations - Negotiations on the basis of chapters (exceptions, etc.) - Since 1993: the Copenhagen criteria for membership: o Political set: democracy, rule of law, Human rights, minority rights o Economical set: liberalized market economy o Implementation of the acquis communautaire Approval in the EU + ratification by each member state separately Development of these 2 dimensions

- 1952: ECSC Treaty basis of the 1950 Schuman Declaration:Le gouvernement franais propose de
placer l'ensemble de la production franco- allemande de charbon et d'acier sous une Haute Autorit commune, dans une organisation ouverte la participation des autres pays d'Europe. o high authority = deepening o organization open to the participation = widening Motives of Schuman: o Peace idealism by a Franco-German reconciliation. o Economic: France wants to assure the accession to German coal. o Diplomatic: France wants to take the initiative in Europe. Significance: o Avoidance of a new Franco-German war o Supranational principles o Institutional framework as the basis for further integration

- 1952: 6 countries - 1952: European Defense Community = EDC Treaty: the idea, from France, is to bring defense of European
countries under a supranational authority. It failed in the French Assemble Nationale, because at the time, there are less threat outside Europe (end of the Korean war) what is the use of EDC? EDC never really existed.

- 1957: Treaty of Rome: 3 entities are established: ECSC, Euratom, EEC, with a communitarian institutional
structure: o Supranational Commission/High Authority o Council of Ministers o Common Parliament and Assembly

- 1965-1967: Merger Treaty: Mergence of the institutions of EEC, Euratom and ECSC. - 1973: 9 member states (+ UK, Ireland, Denmark economical logic mainly). - 1986: SEA (= biggest deepening step since Rome in 1957): o Internal market by the end of 1992 hence the need of a lot of piece of legislation necessity of
o o majority voting Beginning of qualified majority voting = QMV, instead of unanimity More power to the Parliament (directly elected since 1979)

- 1981-1986: from 9 to 10 (+ Greece, 1981) and from 10 to 12 (+ Spain and Portugal, 1986): in the 1970s,
those countries shift from right-authoritarian regimes to democracy integration = stabilizing those countries into democracy.

- 1992: Maastricht Treaty:

- 1992 : Treaty of Maastricht : most important step in the deepening of the European Union: the negotiations leading to this treaty, negociations on a political union and a monetary union results : Strengthening of the supranational structure (European parliament gets more influence, qualified majority voting, competences transferred from the MS to the EU) EU Treaty and the EC Treaty Three pillar structure : EC, Euratom, and ECSC characterized by the so-called communitarian method ; CFSP (common foreign and security policy) and PJCC (police, judicial and criminal cooperation) which are driven by the MS. above those three pillars, the EU - 1995 : from 12 to 15 : Sweden, Finland and Austria. Before, they had adopted a neutral position after the fall of the Berlin wall, not useful to remain neutral. Were in the European economic area, but nothing to say in the negotiations decided to join. - 1995 : Treaty of Amsterdam = a failure for the EU. - 2001 : Treaty of Nice : purpose was to prepare the EU institutionally for the foreseen 2004 enlargement to the central & east Europe countries but = failure. - 2002-2004 convention and constitutional Treaty Laeken Declaration : many questions asked % structure of the EU & its future.

Convention established but not in the framework of an intergovernmental conference succeeded to get a result : a draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Followed the formal intergovernmental conference agreed on the major part of the text. Constitutional Treaty (October 2004). Had to be approved by all parliaments in the MS : referenda in France & the Netherlands led to a no

 blocage. 2004 : from 15 to 25 2007 + Bulgaria and Romania 2009 : Treaty of Lisbon : not so many differences % dead constitutional Treaty : main dynamics kept : o o o New double majority in the council Permanent president of the European council High representative for foreign affairs and security policy who is also vice-president of the Commission Number of MEPs limited to 751 Larger role for national parliaments (yellow card on subsidiarity : if they are benefits of scale to act at European level EU can adopt legislations ; but sometimes better to act at local, national level) Legal personality for the EU exit clause ordinary legislative procedure (codecision) in more policy areas equal powers given to the EP and the council

o o

Changes : o o o o Terminology : Constitution References to some symbols Charter of fundamental rights : no full text, but reference No reference to free competition as EU objective

European institutions
European Council
Heads of State and government Permanent president Intergovernmental conferences Since Lisbon = formal institution Determines the general strategies of the EU, that have to be implemented

Economic and Social Committee 6

Advisory body : cant take binding decisions Consulting the interests of the socio-economic sectors in the decision-making Little verve : many people that belong to that committee are at the end of their career not very dynamic lobbying

Committee of the Regions

Advisory body Consulting the interests of the regions in the decision-making process Very distinct composition : MS can decide the people they send to that committee Diverging interests impact not very relevant

European Court of Justice

Has to solve the disputes between EU institutions mutually or between EU institutions and MS guardian of the Treaties Treaty interpretations Has only powers in the first communitarian pillar

European Court of auditors

Tests the accounts against the budget

Division of powers

Supranational institutions = Commissions & Parliament Legislative power = Council & Parliament Executive power = Commission & Council

Commission
Composed of 27 members but they are not supposed to represent the State they come from representatives of the common European interests. Each of the Commissioners is responsible for a certain policy area. Who decides on the composition of the European Commission? After the European elections in the MS, the European council proposes a president for the Commission, who is nominated by the EP the president of the Commission starts to compose the Commission by going to each MS and asking who they propose as Commissioner for their country his role is to make a puzzle, build a team the Commissioners are heard by the EP has to agree the whole team. Tension : Commissioners shouldnt defend their State interests but if he wants to be designated again has to serve those interests a bit. Functions Exclusive agenda-setting on former first pillar issues right on initiative

Implementation EU legislation, on the field Guardian of the Treaties defend common European interests examines the respect by the MS of the obligations < Treaties External representation on EU competences voice of the EU

Political role Collegial decision-making

Important role of the Commission president Each Commissioner has his own cabinet

Administrative role of the Commission Line services : directorate-general = ministries under the authority of one Commissioner

Council of Ministers
Composed of 27 members, one per member States but this time = representatives of the interests and preferences of their MS in the EU structure. De iure, there is only one Council of ministers; de facto, sectorial councils : for the moment, there are 10 : on general affairs, foreign affairs, competitiveness, justice and home affairs, agriculture & fisheries, economic and financial affairs, environment Treaty : the only condition is that the participants to the Council are ministers Federal states can be represented by ministers from federated entities system established in Belgium to assure Belgian representation at European level & rotation of the ministers of the federated entities :

system of agregation of preferences : federal, Flemish, Walloon and Brussels position have to be reconciliated Decision-making process : unanimity veto powers belong to each MS far more conservative, encourages statut-quo, or qualified majority voting reformist perspective. How is QMV defined at European level ? All MS are attributed a certain number of vote, which is the result of political negociations biggest countries get more votes, but system isnt really proportional favorites the small MS. Then qualified majority is reached if 255 of the 345 votes are got

But

+ a normal majority of the member States (14/27) + those member States must represent 62% of the European population Luxumbourg compromise : vital national interest veto possible even in the QMV system but rare. Loanina compromise : striving for more than 255 larger majority required, the MS try to get more

votes gentlemens agreement In reality striving for consensus

Lisbon Treaty has reformed the QMV : 55% of the member States (unweighted) 65% of the European population

Three complications / additional conditions : Qualified majority : minimally 15 member States Blocking minority : minimally 4 member States Loanina compromise

Presidency of the council of ministers :

Six-monthly and rotating among the MS (now till December : Belgium) mediating the council agenda-shaping (><setting: commission!) in the council External Representation in some areas (low-politics [air transport, environmental issues], >< high: high-Representative!)

Council = top of the iceberg. Level of the ministers. Meet every semester, month... -Below: ambassadors: COREPER (Comit des Reprsentants Permanents) I (administrative questions) & II (foreign policy etc) : also try to prepare the meetings of their ministers. After political debate: A points (ministers dont need political discussion/guidance anymore) and B points (still need political discussion). -Below: civil servants: 200-250 council working groups (meet on a weekly basis in Brussels): prepare decisions of the ministers, daily technical debates. 70% of the decisions.

Legitimacy: * = Spokesperson of the nation interests: mandated by the MS, formally! * dont decide alone formally: final formal decisions = ministers, but as A points! Table: Change places each time closer to the presidency seat + presence of the commission during the council

meetings (logical: commission presents propositions so can answer questions) + Council secretariat (assists the rotating presidency: institutional memory

European Parliament
Number of seats of this assembly is divided by MS. Only matters before the elections, because after, the laureates # Representatives of their country but of their political groups (i.e. of the interests of the European citizens). Belgium : 24 seats (4 times less than Germany even if 8 times less Belgians than Germans!) After European elections: the number of seats per political group depends on the election result:

Political groups in the EP # parties. (ex) EPP = a lot of nation parties!!

2.1 : Commission isnt based on a majority in the EP 2.2 : MEPs # bound to stable majorities that would keep the commission alive (majorities vary from dossier to dossier)

Legislative process

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Ordinary legislative procedure, used for 90% of the Legislation (Treaty of Lisbon) Commission: exclusive power to initiate the procedure (1 exception: initiative of the citizens) Plmt (amendments possible) Council (amendments possible) Plmt: agrees over the text by the Council adoption

wants to change the text Commission (reconsider his text following opinions of Plmt)
Council:

agrees with changes: adoption doesnt agree: everything re-starts in the end: re-sent to council + Plmt (have to agree both: coLegislators) adoption This system didnt exist before 86 (SEA). Between 86-2009 (Treaty of Lisbon), this procedure was extended to more and more areas power of the Plmt didnt stop rising now, veto power! Conclusion % legislation making: -commission = initiation -Council + Plmt = co-Legislators The 3 institutions are interdependent. Institutional trianglethe 3 institutions = really intertwined!

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CHAPTER ONE: FEDERALISM

1. ORIGINS
Federalism as a peace project, not as real theory: no clear-cut academic school of European federalism.

Throughout the 20th century: concern to end war (political holy grail) WWI = decline of the European state system and demise of the balance of power: in the end 1860s-1870s,
o o the consolidation of the German nation challenged the 19th century European order, the Concert of Europe, by being a direct challenge to the balance of power mechanism 2 tendencies: Necessity of reordering the European states: state-centric Nation-state = ultimate dorm of human governance: liberal-idealist

Liberalists = founders of modern RI: conflict was not endemic to international politics, the systemic
o o o anarchy could be replaced alternative = collective security, achieved by: The progressive spread of liberal values (democracy, justice) The progressive spread of liberal processes (commerce) The establishment of international organizations and bodies of international laws

Inter-war period: shaping of a European idea: significant activism on the boundary of the intellectual and
the political: Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi Pan-Europa, 1923: vision of a united Europe underwritten by a federal constitution. This vision is motivated by 2 perceptions: o Positive side: the feeling that Europe was in many ways a natural entity that could become significant global force. Negative assertion: unless substantial changes occurred in the political organization of Europe, the continent would tear itself apart in nationalistic internecine conflict. The post-Versailles order might have eradicated empires aggrandizing tendencies, but the system that replaced empires was one with potentially problematic national units, often internally incoherent.

His suggestions was an economic integration will precede political integration (the second will follow quasi automatically) Aristide Briand, Memorandum on the Organization of a Regime of European Federal Union, 1930 = 1st 20th century proposal of a European government for European unity (but received with skepticism and quickly overwhelmed by events). But in the inter-war period, these kinds of books were written in the context of a more pamphleteering culture than ours.

What is interesting is that the theme of European unity had moved squarely onto the intellectual and political

agendas emergence of a sort of relationship between these intellectual schemes and the actions of certain politicians. Altiero Spinelli (1941) THE real founder of this theory : Altiero Spinelli: politician prisoner during WW2: document written in Mussolini prison the Ventotene manifesto (on cigarette paper!!). Very antifascist. His Idea: nationalism will tear apart (dchirer, dtruire) Europe on the international level! Only way to get rid of that in a stable and permanent way = new political structure: European federation.

One of the two big EP buildings = called after his name Pro-federalism group in the European Parliament = spinelli group.

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 After WWII: idea that the state system and the attendant problem of the relationship between nationalist
sentiments and international conflict gave rise to Nazism in Germany the German question and the need to attend to the historic tension between France and Germany possibility to secure an alliance? Cold War: necessity to ensure Germanys future with the Western alliance. Federalism: Big role for Europe in global politics Fear of nationalism Economical integration > political integration France-Germany axis

2. WHAT IS FEDERALISM
a) Definition Elements of definition:

Constitutional structure polity where authority is shared between 2 or more levels of

governments.

Division of authority between central and regional or state government: Taylor, 1993 The
Federalist integration process requires the establishing of 2 levels of government separate but coordinate being the government of the whole, the federal level, and the government of the parts, the state or local level. Necessity of compromises: permanent agreements between territorial units. Territorial units: o Yield a measure of authority to common, centralized institutions, o Remain intact as units, o Retain at least a measure of autonomy.

The magic formula = optimum mixture of unity and diversity, allowing the constituent units to perform common tasks with maximum efficiency while maximizing decentralization and autonomy ensure constitutional government in plural liberal democratic societies. Federalism = ideology Federation = the derivative organizational principle. 2 tendencies in federalism: Disunity centrifugal federalism: Belgium, UK de-centralist federalism Unity centripetal federalism: USA, EU centralist federalism The existence of those tendencies explain why this ideology has become such an elastic and controversial concept. For some, the doctrine of subsidiarity (article 3b of the TEU) = form of federalism. Problem: no core prescription about the division of powers. Federalists: statehood = either a desirable or inevitable mode b) The objectives of federalism o Murray Forsyth: 3 strands in federalist theory: Derived from the ideas associated with Kant: an expanding federation is the most appropriate

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constitutional safeguard against war. o o Ensuring efficient governance within the democratic framework so that authority is supplied as closely as possible to the people. The scholarly contemplation of federalizing tendencies and processes: analyzing background conditions and the social movements that induce federal outcomes. o o Charles Pentland: 2 key starting points: Sociological: progress and peace emerges from the interaction of peoples Constitutional: harmony and stability flow from enlightened constitutional design. Both have the same destination: a clearly defined supranational state. Federalism as a peace project, not a real theory o o 2 advantages of federalism: The prevention of the capture of a system by any one group; Strengthening of the federated state as a unit in the face of external threat. Shortcomings of nationalism People and nations are put against each other, which undermines chance of peace Objectives of federalism Shift from national to European level But not everything should be unified Unity in diversity
The symbols of the Union The flag of the Union shall be a circle of twelve golden stars on a blue background. The anthem of the Union shall be based on the Ode to Joy from the Ninth Symphony by Ludwig van Beethoven. The motto of the Union shall be: United in diversity. The currency of the Union shall be the euro. Europe day shall be celebrated on 9 May throughout the Union. (article I-8, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe)

Clearly defined division of power/competences: contract Shared rule and self rule

Higher democratic level Link between European citizen and federal level: formal and legal, Federalism has more democratic fundaments than nationalism Tendency to lead to totalitarian regime
Federalists insist that European union should be brought about by the European populations, and not by diplomats, by directly electing a European constituent assembly, and by the approval through a referendum, of the constitution that this assembly would prepare. (Spinelli, Ventotene Manifesto, 1941)

Critical junctures

c) The method of federalism Federalism involves achieving the appropriate balances between: Different levels of authority Democracy and efficiency To achieve the optimum mixture of unit autonomy and overarching harmony common objectives. The pursuit of these objectives must be constitutionalized rather than left to traditional diplomatic devices; it cannot be achieved through either individual unit action or the construction of international alliances. How:

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 Democratic radicalism: federation should be an act of constitutional immediacy.

o

Aim: European constitution with a broad public support But: failure of EDC & the Treaty establishing a Constitution for the EU in 2004 & 2005.

Gradual integration: Jean Monnet develops a step by step approach of European integration.
incremental, pragmatic approach : economic integration will lead to political integration // spill over effect

o
o

Federalism as a popular movement to create a impetus for a federal pact among political elites. In this sense, federalists = activists, consciousness-raisers. Incremental approach Economical integration will lead to political integration political economy of integration: economic forces and processes generate political transformation Predominance of popular will in this approach Exploitation of crisis situations as moments for the widespread propagation of federalist ideas (Hence a resemblance with neofunctionalism, because of the strategic dexterity used) Carl Friedrich, 1968: Federalism = an evolving pattern of changing relationships, rather than a static design regulated by firm and unalterable rules emphasis on the question of the function of a federal relationship over the question of its structure. In this approach, necessity to question: The nature of relations between states before the federalization; The powers allocated to the components once the process begins; If unification is an even process, and if certain actors are more implicated in the beginning; The functions of a system once the process is complete.

o o
o

Normative approach = neofunctionalism: spillover

In all those approaches: primacy of the political: sociological change is not sufficient; institutions matter, either as human creations or as advocates shaping mass ideational change in favor of federation.

3. CRITICISMS Conceptual vagueness/elasticity: Federalism can be useful to a variety of political projects, and therefore is
difficult to conceptualize: what would a federal Europe look like? o o o o Member states like US states/German Lnder? Differentiated integration? It might lead to an EU where the depth of integration varies considerably from one state to another. Europe of the regions? The rigidity of national territorial barriers would wither away; 2 primary levels of governance = regional an European. Clearly defined competences and autonomy, with constitutional principles delimitated, to protect the rights of member-states. o A federal Europe is not by definition a pacifist Europe Federalism as conflict management system Risk of superstate, making the same mistakes: since the normal outcome of federalism is a statelike entity, theres a risk of reproducing or even exacerbating nationalism, with the emergence of a global system of superstates.

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Risk of European nationalism Democratic level of a federal Europe?

o
o

Concentrating significant elements of governing capacities at the European level creates an increasing gap between citizens and supranational level 1940s-2000s: increasing degree of legitimacy in nation states Feasibility Wrong assessment of preparedness of European citizens Wrong assessment of willingness of European governments

o o

4. EUROPEAN FEDERALISM AND BELGIAN FEDERALISM

3 aspects of similarities between Belgium and the EU:

Belgium
Multi-national and multi-lingual federation Consociational federation majority-constraining No representatives from a state-wide party in Parliament

EU Pluri-national and multi-lingual polity Structural and procedural features that are majorityconstraining No representatives from a EU-wide party in Parliament

Belgium
Centrifugal Evolution

EU
Centripetal

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Political parties

No state-wide parties Parliamentary majority Divided party groups in Parliament Grand Coalition requirement Upper level decides No referenda Not transparent + package deals Policy symmetry Detailed list

No state-wide parties No parliamentary majority Unified party groups in Parliament No Grand Coalition requirement is possible Lower level decides Referenda Not transparent + package deals Policy asymmetry is possible Relatively open-ended

Majoritarianism

Constitutional framework

Policy symmetry Nature of the competences

1.

Belgium : 1932 : language frontier lead in 1970 to the creation of the cultural communities and in 1980 to the creation of the regions more autonomy given to federated entities, to lower levels of power >< EU: more competences, powers are given to the center. The parties linked to one of the Belgian communities are focusing and defending only this communitys interests, then when they are elected they must work and negotiate with the parties that represent the other community comparable to the European dynamic : national parties only care about nationals interests.

2.

But 2 differences appear after the elections % trust of the Parliament (required >< not required) and % party groups in Parliament (divided or unified). 3. Belgian Constitution is full of details defending the minorities on political field (under more, the socalled sonnette dalarme : alarm bell procedure, assuring the minority a veto it can oppose to a project which would threat its interests) grand coalition requirement >< QMV in the Council of ministers, and the majority, on European level, is constantly shifting, from a certain issue to another.

4. The nature of the Belgian federal system is decided at the upper level >< the EU MS within
intergovernmental conferences decide about the treaties and the basic rules governing EU constitutional framework. & no referenda organized at Belgian level : not possible constitutionally >< it is an option at European level. Finally, there are package deals both at European & Belgian level : each of the political parties see some of its interests fulfilled but has also to make some concessions consensus after long negotiations (which are not transparent).

5. Symmetric distribution of competences : all the regions, & communities have the same competences //
same in the EU : if one MS gives a competence to the EU level, all the other MS must agree this delegation and lose this competence but there are exceptions at European level (a negative and a positive) : some member States have decided to remain out of certain EU decisions : for example, Denmark has an opting out for one policy area : citizens policy ; UK and Ireland have an opting in on the same field, UK and Poland % treaty of Lisbon those options are often offered during the ratification process of a new treaty. Sometimes some of the MS also decide to do sthg together, to go further than EU rules require, and not all of the MS are joining the project.

6. Detailed list of competences in Belgium >< competences of the EU are relatively open-ended (article

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191 TFEU). In Belgium, the lower levels can conduct regulatory policies (regulating the society) whereas the federal level has distributive policies (tax policies, collecting money and spending it) >< EU : lower level the MS - still have the power to raise taxes distributive policies, but they have delegated regulatory policies to the EU.

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CHAPTER 2: NEOFUNCTIONALISM
Origins and emergence of the theory

Emergence of the theory: late 1950s and early 1960s, prime until the mid-1960s: 1958 The Uniting of
Europe, by Haas.

Main authors: Haas and Lindberg response to the creation of the ECSC and its spill over effect, the
creation of EEC and Euratom.

Mid-1980s: resurgence of the European integration process comeback of the theory. Since the 1990s: revising the original approach. Start the integration in an area which is low politics but economically essential : in the EU case, it was coal
and steel : vital sector after WW2.

Create a supranational institution which has no national interests to defend, which can oversee the integration
process and which can drive the integration process further : it was the High Authority, which then would become the Commission. Integration in a particular economic sector will create functional pressures for integration in related economic sectors. Social interests will redirect their activities because they look for the most effective way to realize their objectives. More integration will create the need for more European institutionalization. As a result, political integration will be the inevitable consequence of the economic integration, which will lead to long-term peace. Intellectual roots

Neofunctionalism = juncture between functionalism, federalism and communications theories Haas and
Lindberg combined functionalist mechanisms with federalist goals.

Similarities with functionalism: emphasizing the mechanisms of

o o o Technocratic decision-making, Incremental change, Learning process.

But: differences with Mitranys functionalism: Functionalism The form, scope and purpose of an organization is determined by the task that it was designed to fulfill. Integration not limited to a territorial area. Importance of changes in popular support. Neofunctionalism Importance given to the autonomous influence of supranational institutions and the emerging role of organized interests. Integration has a specifically regional focus. Importance of changes in elite attitudes.

1. NEOFUNCTIONALISM AND THE MONNET METHOD

Haas and Lindberg integration: A process not an outcome or (end-)state ( federalism) Creation and role expansion of regional institutions Change in expectations and activities on the part of participating actors Haas: The process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions posses or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones. Lindberg: (1)The process whereby nations forego the desire and ability to conduct foreign and domestic

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policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs: and (2) the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new centre. Lindberg: Breadth and depth of integration can be in constant flux Political actors merely shift their expectations and not their loyalties to a new centre A more cautious conception Importance of Jean Monnet in neofunctionalism:

He recognized the importance of functional spillover (before it was given an explicit academic label). Neofunctionalism was no only an analytical framework, but also a normative guide for action.
Underlying assumptions of neofunctionalism:

Rational and self-interested actors:

o o o o With a capacity to learn and change their preferences Who recognize the limitations of national solutions Who shift their expectations and loyalties toward a new centre motivated by their self-interests intergovernmentalists, who assume an exclusively national-interest aggregation

Institutions, once established, can take a life on their own; employees, driven by their self-interests, become
agents of further integration by influencing the perceptions of participating elites.

Primacy of incremental decision-making over grand designs: political actors stumble from one decision to
the next, and decisions, under the pressures of deadlines, are taken without knowing or understanding their consequences.

Exchanges between actors:

o o win-win situations = positive-sum games Supranational style of decision-making

Emerging functional interdependencies between whole economies and their productive sectors tends
inexorably to foster further integration. Federalism : peace project, not a real theory Neofunctionalism: o A grand theory, applicable regardless of when and where it occurs o A framework for policy-makers: step-by-step process Jean Monnet: Start integration project in an area that is low politics but nevertheless of key economic importance Create a supranational institution which: Has no national interests to defend

+
Can oversee the integration process

+
Can drive the integration process further Integration in a particular economic sector will create functional pressures for integration in related economic sectors the different national economies will progressively be entangled Social interests will redirect their activities because they look for the most effective way to realize their objectives

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More integration will create the need for more European institutionalisation Political integration will be the inevitable consequence of economic integration

In conclusion: Economic integration Political integration

+
Supranational institutions Long-term peace

2. THE NEOFUNCTIONALIST LOGIC OF INTEGRATION

The Neo-functionalist logic of integration can be found in the book by Ernst HAAS : intellectual father of Neo-functionalism : talks about the snow ball effect : integration in political domains, political elites (not only the politicians, but all the people involved in decisions-making processes) think more and more European. An apparent paradox : pluralism on the one hand : politics as group-based activity (state + not state actors), those groups adopt rational behaviour : try to maximize their interests >< Evolution toward more Europe on the other hand : more European integration in the long run no more conflicting interests, but they converge ! Neo-functionalism try to answer this question : how is this transition (each group defending its own interests all the groups trying to reach more integration, because it serves their interests no conflicting preferences anymore) possible ? Two mechanisms explain this transition according to NF : Spill-overs and redefinition of the interests and loyalties at the European level = a snowball effect: integration in political domains political elites think more and more European. Analytical puzzle: an apparent paradox: Pluralism Politics as group-based activity (state + non-state actors) Rational behaviour: short term CBA

More Europe More European integration in the long run Not more conflicting interests

In fact, neofunctionalism explains this transition From pluralism to more Europe

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With 3 kinds of spillover and the redefinition of interests and loyalties. a) Functional and cultivated spillovers Spillover: process by which an integration in one area generates demands in another area, which can only be solved by more integration in that other area importance of :

Political elites who, by supporting the integration process, promote further integration, adding a political
stimulus to the process.

Non-state elites (= interest groups, e.g. political parties, trade unions, business associations), who add a
pressure: integration in a particular sector higher level of aggregation interest groups shift their focus and expectations to European institutions. Socialisation + political spillover (= integrative pressures exerted by national elites) Lindberg: a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth. Functional spillover Functional spillover: integration helps to overcome the problem of intergovernmental cooperation political spillover more integration more common/European policies strengthening of supranational institutional structures for ex, the decision to integrate coal and steel generated questions % transport of those products between the MS need for integration in another domain ; abolition of the trade barriers within the EU (no internal borders, but one external border) need for a definition of that common trade barrier % third states ; creation a one common market to assure economic competition need for regulation of the state aids.

Political spillover: integrative pressures exerted by state and non-state elites, who realise that the issue cannot be solved at the national level integration needs to be triggered and driven by political actors How:

Central position + technical expertise:

o o Momentum of crisis situations More European solutions

Exploiting the division among member states:

o Intergovernmental division supranational solution

o o Policy entrepreneurs Political conflicts among member states as engines of integration

Emphasis on the role of socialisation and learning in political spillover development of an esprit de corps. For ex, common agricultural policy = consequence of the will of France so important field for France, that the only way to get its agreement was to establish this common policy. (often < threat by one MS of using its veto power against a European decision). Two effects of political spill over : more common/European policies & strengthening of supranational institutional structure : if the MS cant resolve a problem by themselves, they let a third party find a solution : it is the EU that will integrate a

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new policy. Cultivated spillover Cultivated spillover = integrative role attributed to the Commission: a central position and authority enables the EC to: Direct the dynamics of relations among member states Direct the relations of interest groups within each state Integration needs to be triggered/ driven by political actors but who and how ? European Commission : central position in the decision-making process : only actor that can initiate legislation and initiate a judicial procedure if one of the MS does not respect its obligations < EU legislation & technical expertise. Makes use of momentum of crisis situations to propose its agenda and European solutions. Also exploiting the divisions among the MS intergovernmental division supranational solution Commission = real policy entrepreneur. Thus, political conflict among the MS as engines of integration !! The divisions among the MS help the Commission play this role ! Supranational institutions are characterized by a bargaining process of upgrading common interests: actors feel that by conceding something, they gain something else. b) Redefinition of interests and loyalties at the European level

Interests
Pluralism: politics as group-based activity state + non-state actors: a win-win relation: Supranational/European non-state actors

Policy entrepreneurs These non-state actors, consequences : Interests = European interests Suggestions = European suggestions Domestic lobbying = pro-European integration Loyalty to initial principal and to the European integration project socialisation European decision-making process emphasizes the role of the supranational non State actors (thus pluralism : politics as group-based activity) give information to the Commission because they want to influence the final decisions win access/impact on the policy entrepreneurs win-win contract between the Commission and interest groups. Loyalties Loyalty to initial principal and to European integration project (socialisation : the representatives feel they belong to a new, supranational community they feel they are part of the group new loyalty ; they are not only representing the interests of their State anymore). And this process does not happen first at the top level, but is starts primarily at the base : the Council working groups & the Coreper loyalties redefined. Beyers: Socialisation refers to how individuals develop a sense of belonging with a group and adapt their behaviour accordingly. It refers to individuals who are in a process of becoming members of collectivities. c) Under which conditions does the magic trick work? Conditions of functional spillover Functional spillover: process in which the original integrative goal can be assured only by taking further integrative action, which in turn creates circumstances that require further action.

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Functional pressure needs to be perceived as compelling: the original issue area and the objectives are considered salient. in area B, which would be the result of functional spillover from A

o The benefits of integration in area A outweigh the concerns about the disadvantages of integration
o The higher the number of integrated areas, the higher the likelihood of functional spillover

e.g. the spillover from internal market to the area of justice and home affairs: with the completion of the single market necessity of compensatory measures, such as visa, immigration, police cooperation. Conditions of cultivated spillover Cultivated spillover: effect under which the Commission, +/- a policy entrepreneur, drives European integration (= agenda-setting power). o o o o o o o o o Internal unity in the Commission Smart tabling of proposals: the EC can propose in new areas in a smart way (take into account the timing, the presiding member state) Exploitation of relations with member states and non-state actors Compromise-finding (between member states) Persuasion of the compellingness of the spillover: persuade that spillover is needed Assessing limits of policy entrepreneurship (not overplay its role as an agenda-setting power) Non-state actors as allies are necessary (NGOs, lobbies) At least 1 big member state as an ally Crisis and political momentum makes it easier, its a window of opportunity for new propositions

e.g. of the negotiations on the treaty of Amsterdam, during which it was proposed that the EC would be the representation of the EU for trade and services. Conditions of redefinition of interests at the EU level o o o o Integration has to lead to benefits Benefits for interest groups Interest groups need time (redefining interests cant be done immediately) High degree of perceived functional spillover: to redefine interests, groups need to be convinced by its necessity

Conditions of redefinition of loyalties at the EU level

o The contact thesis: time needed before socialization: the more contact the more socialization
o o o o No distrust ( from a presence of complete trust) Low degree of politicization: ideas discussed must not be too politically sensitive Participants consider themselves as experts No domestic pressure: be quite independent from ministers and/or member states its not wanted, it wont happen). Cross-border transactions demands for EU rules, supplied by EU institutions development of EU legislation actors realize that 1 set of EU rules is better than 27 sets of national rules emergence of a supranational society

o Psychologically: no a priori idea not to go along with socialization (+/- self-fulfilling prophecy: if

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3. CRITICISMS
Compared to federalism, neofunctionalism took a big step forward on the theory level: less normative, not an ideal type. 6 criticisms were developed on neofunctionalism:

Its deterministic nature: a fix idea on where the EU is going (deepening); it doesnt take into account other
possibilities one-sided perspective on the outcome of EU integration. Underestimation of the role of member states: neofunctionalism emphasizes the role at the supranational level; however, member states, being the masters of the treaties, can refuse spillover. Spillover is therefore not inevitable. This critic comes from both scholars (Intergovernmentalists) and politicians (practitioners, e.g. De Gaulle, who was very skeptic on supranational institutions). different loyalties a time dimension.

Socialization is not either/or: it is not polarized between national or EU level; it is about multiple and No distinction is made between depth (= autonomy and power on certain political domains) and width (=
number of political domains in which EU has competencies on) of EU integration. Power in a lot of areas versus autonomy in those areas competences can be very limited in some areas.

Not sufficient attention for external context and exogenous factors, e.g. the role of the USA after WWII or
the role of globalization, not sufficient attention for what happens outside the EU.

n = 1 problem: neofunctionalism is a theory that can only be used to analyze EU integration, it cant be
used on other facts. For neofunctionalists, EU has a sui generis character, it is unique, so it needs unique theories built only for its analysis.

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CHAPTER 3: INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Intergovernmentalism: the 1st answer to neofunctionalism, which until the 1960s was the only theory, and developed in the 1950s, at the age of a strengthening integration, on a level of deepening very high. First answer to neo functionalism, which developed in the fifties : age of strengthening the EU : treaties of Rome, creation of Euratom, very high level deepening of the EU >< in the sixties, when intergovernmentalism was developed : European integration slowed down, many doubts, skeptical reflects, no new treaties more national feelings. Furthermore, UK joined the EU and it was thought this would slow down European integration In the 1960s: a very different atmosphere: EU integration slowed down + a lot of skepticism; no new treaty (until 1985-1986 with the SEA). De Gaulle is the illustration of this skepticism: Veto to the accession of UK (reasoning: will to have a strong France in the EU)

The empty chair crisis in the 2nd half of 1965:boycott of the EU by France. The reason: the Commission, with
president Hallstein, wanted to introduce QMV on some policies, but he knew De Gaulle would refuse, so he had the idea to couple its voting in the Commission with a proposition on financing of the CAP, very much wanted by France. But it didnt work, and France boycotted the EU. This crisis was solved by the Luxembourg compromise: if a vital interest is at stake, the member state has de facto a veto power on the question. Two important names to know Stanley Hoffman = intellectual father of intergovernmentalism (USA) Andrew Moravcsik = his intellectual son, he added the liberal to intergovernmentalism. (USA)

2. INTERGOVERNMENTALISM (= HOFFMANN)
It is more or less a derivate of realism, a theory of RI, which states that international politics is about interactions of self-interested actors in an essentially anarchic environment: actors: states are primary actors and they act rationally, on the basis of a cost-benefit assessment (CBA). self-interested: those actors want to survive military and security power = hard power. Intergovernmentalism is based on 2 assumptions derived from realism: Actors (states) act rationally. They are self-interested and want to survive, hence the importance of military and security power. In intergovernmentalism: sovereignty of states in Europe is transforming, but states are obstinate, rigid, they remain the central actors; it is difficult to change them. Therefore, cooperation is possible : If it serves the national interest CBA Only if it is in low politics areas (e.g. never in military issues) Neofunctionalism explains the transition: From pluralism politics as group-based activity

To more Europe

Intergovernmentalists: transition: From pluralism

To more diversity

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Rational behavior: Short term CBA It is an obstacle to integration

High politics: centrifugal instead of integrational (away from each other)

In intergovernmentalism, pluralist politics lead to a low degree of integration because of the uncertainty of the EU integration. States want an international environment certain to them because they are driven by the idea to survive. But EU integration is full of uncertainties: Finalit politique of the EU integration? To what aim is the EU being constructed? What is the political method of the EU? Why do pluralist politics lead to diverging interests and thus to low extend of European integration because EU is a factor of uncertainty, full of uncertainties % finalits politiques : unknown outcome of the European integration (we dont know where it is going) & % political method (means to get there) dangerous for the survival of those self-interested actors that are the States Member states go along but they dont know where theyre going Hoffman (1966: 882):

3. LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM (= MORAVCSIK)

Theory in the beginning of the 1990s. Moravcsik added to Hoffman the need to take into account domestic interests of the member states liberal intergovernmentalism: liberal in the way of looking at what happens inside the main actors, mostly economically. This theory was established because of the question of why internal market was established in the 1990s. Moravcsik built his theory on the basis of the answer: to understand, we need to look at the big member states, France, Germany and UK. The QMV rule implies that those 3 states were willing to accept internal market, which is not surprising for Germany and France, but more for the UK. Therefore, to understand why the internal market was established, we need to understand why the UK accepted it: End of the 1980s, Thatcher negotiated with the EU a rebate: if the UK contributed financially like other member states, this financing would immediately come back to the UK. QMV was limited: UK accepted QMV because a lot of decisions were still voted by unanimity. UK didnt want to be sidelined (the market being created without them). Hence the importance of looking at whats happening inside. a) Liberal intergovernmentalism: EU integration, a 3-step model: For each step, Moravcsik relies on existing theories of spol: Step 1 liberalism Step 2 realism Step 3 delegation theory 1. Preferences, interests formation at domestic, national level ; Andrew Moravcsik relies on liberalism to analyze this first step.

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2. Negotiations at EU level (the MS having defined their own interests at domestic level step 1) ; Andrew Moravcsik relies on realism 3. Institutional design of EU institutions ; Andrew Moravcsik relies on delegation theories to explain this third step.

Liberalism Predominance to Interests of states

Realism Predominance to Military capabilities/power

Pluralism = politics is a group-based activity: 3 assumptions: Rational behavior = self-interest and risk-aversion = Cost/Benefits Assessment-CBA Internal interests = external interests Internal configuration (inside member states) determines external pattern of conflict/cooperation Its all about domestic interest Liberal intergovernmentalism tries to link those 2 antagonistic theories of RI (bridge-building).

Step 1 national level: it all starts with the preference formation at domestic level o It looks at states as not being unitary actors, or black box, at what is inside the interests of
societal groups determine the positions in politics.

o Moravcsik: Understanding the domestic politics (= Moravcsik) is a precondition for, and not a
supplement to, the analysis of strategic interactions among states (= Hoffmann). o Economical interests are the starting point. They can be: o Clear and outspoken: it will therefore be defined at the EU level, and will determine the government positions. Unclear and insignificant: it gives some room for other elements in the government positions (e.g. ideology).

It means that for each issue, the position of one actor can change.

Step 2 intergovernmental level: once interests are defined, intergovernmental negotiations at EU level o The Council of ministers is there to defend member states interests. Therefore, it is where the
intergovernmental negotiations happens a key institution.

o Moravcsik works on certain moments where member states have decided to delegate power in the
history of EU integration. Those dates are big moments that shaped the EU as it is today deepening process.

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Member states are driven by asymmetrical interdependence:

Asymmetrical: benefits of cooperation are not equally distributed among the participants of that cooperation. Interdependence: member states depend on each other because the world is globalized hence need of cooperation asymmetrical

This concept means that the actors are dependent on each other, because the world is globalizing problems need to be solved by cooperation, BUT the benefits are not evenly, equally distributed : some have more advantages than others % benefits of cooperation : some MS have a lot to win with the EI (export oriented MS ; smaller MS, like Belgium they are in a weaker negotiation position, as they also have a lot to lose without the EI) >< Some dont have so much to win with the EI (less economically dependent MS ; bigger MS, like Germany they have a stronger negotiation position, as they dont really need the EI to be economically competitive).

o Benefits are not equally distribute 2 ideal-types:

Member states that have a lot to win with EU integration member states with an export-oriented economy; usually the smaller member states weaker negotiation position: they have a lot to win from integration, therefore a lot to lose if no integration. Member states that dont have so much to win with EU integration less economically dependant member states, e.g. Germany. Those can economically manage well on their own; usually the bigger member states stronger negotiation position.

Because benefits of integration are unequally divided, intergovernmental negotiations are a fight. o The degree to which a member state is dependant on EU integration and on other member states depends on 2 factors = costs:

Cost of no-agreement: the value a member state attaches to reaching an agreement at

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EU level how costly is it that negotiation fails the higher the cost is, the more dependant the member state is, the weaker his negotiation position, so prepared to big concessions (e.g. Germany, at the beginning of the 1990s, who didnt want monetary union because of their strong money low cost of no-agreement strong position and power during negotiation).

Cost of exclusion: political cost connected to a situation in which all other member states reach an agreement, and 1 member state is excluded value attached to the nonanticipation (e.g. creation of the internal market from UK point of view, they didnt want to be side-lined). This logic is often used by people who plead for a bipolar Europe a core and a periphery increasing the cost of exclusion persuade peripheral countries to more integration. But this cost only holds for market-related policy areas, because in other domains (social, environmental), it may not be a disadvantage to be excluded (it might increase competitiveness).

o Those 2 costs determine the power of member states on the negotiation table usually, big
member states are more powerful, because the costs are not too high, they dominate the EU consequences:

To reach an agreement the lowest common denominator (also in unanimity) In this 2nd step, the Council and the European Council are the most powerful institutions, where intergovernmental negotiations happen.

Step 3 creation of institutions: institutional design of EU institutions = outcome o Deepening process 2 characteristics:
Transfer of competences: EU competent for more and more political areas Stronger EU institutions: an EU framework which is stronger and stronger

delegation of power Why do member states delegate? Three reason:

o The Minimization of transaction costs: all the costs (not only financing) that have to be made
before the negotiations and the policies start. All 27 members have to make those costs; the idea is that by making it together, those costs will decrease benefits of scale. (not to have to take these measures separately).

o Maximizing credibility: 2 components:

Among member states mutually; credibility that member states will apply the decisions taken in Brussels collective action problem make sure that all member states will take action the prisoners dilemma :

Not doing what youre supposed to do

In the short term, non-compliance is rational (hoping that the other MS will comply, what will constitute a competitive advantage ex. establishing a trade barrier later than the other MS) >< in the long term, compliance is rational. How to avoid this collective action problem ? Answer of liberal intergovernmentalism : they try to avoid this problem by creating institutions : overseeing institutions (The Commission, controlling the implementation of European policies at national level) and sanctioning institutions (The Court of Justice)

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increase the credibility of the MS commitments vis--vis each other. How to avoid the collective action problem creation of institutions:

Institutions overseeing/monitoring whats happening: the EC (= guardian of treaties) Institutions sanctioning in case of non-compliance: the ECJ (brought to court by EC)

Those 2 types of institutions increase the credibility of commitments of member states vis--vis each other. Between governments of member states and their constituents, at the domestic level blame-shifting = shifting the blame of an action to the EU (e.g. in the 1990s, in order to implement : necessity for the MS to cut off their public dispenses for the establishment of the EMU its because of the EU increasing credibility national governments BUT decreasing credibility of the EU.

o Increasing power of national government vis--vis interest groups:

At the national level close control on governments At the EU level less control on governments: what governments do is not so visible (not so mediatised, lower control of EP, interest groups dont have so much access, Council behind closed doors) a lot of freedom, possibility of high maneuvers for governments Question of the democratic deficit of the EU: to what extent is the EU democratic? For liberal intergovernmentalists, the fact the there is a democratic deficit is a good thing: ironically, the European Communitys democratic deficit may be a fundamental source of its success democratic deficit increased efficiency (in 2002, Moravcsik writes an article in the JCMS In Defence of the Democratic Deficit).

At national and EU level, negotiations happen simultaneously Robert Putnam, the

2-level-games: negotiations happening simultaneously are closely connected to each other, because a central actor, the governments of the member states, link the levels governments allow negotiations to be connected to each other. Therefore, the 1st 2 steps of liberal intergovernmentalism are a 2-level-game. In this theory, all actors have certain interests about policies decided at the EU level (from o policy, or very few, to extreme reformist policy). In the national contest, actors matter because they have to accept the decision taken afterward. Collection of policy options = the domestic win-set it is transferred at the EU level in the negotiations. But those domestic win-sets are multiplied by 27 Moravcsik: the EU win-set = junction of every domestic win-sets where they overlap (that way member states accept the policy because it is part of their domestic win-set, so no problem at the national level). The problem: in reality, domestic win-sets dont always overlap. The central point of the 2-level-game is that governments can play with those 2 levels strategically:

From EU to national level: compellingness by other member states, feasibility, They can tell their national parliaments, their electors that they had to make concessions, to shift their domestic win set in order to reach an agreement, that it was a necessary condition for the EI going further and deeper argument of compellingness From national to EU level: use the national political dynamics to have more power in EU negotiations the schelling conjecture = negotiation strategy: the weaker your internal position is, the stronger you will be at the external level (my hands are tied) [...] the power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to make concessions and to meet demandsargument of the tied hands : MS can say they cannot change their domestic win set the weaker

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you are at domestic level (divisions), the stronger you are at international level, the stronger your negotiation position at EU level will be, as your hands are tied you can argue youre not able to make any concession power of the negotiator // his inability to make any concessions. The basic question behind each step:

Step 1: what are the motivations behind the national preference national preference Step 2: how to explain the outcome of EU negotiations EU agreement Step 3: when is sovereignty delegated to the EU and how to explain the institutional design delegation /
pooling of sovereignty

4. EXAMPLE: THE CREATION OF CAP (=PAC)

CAP: easy case to apply liberal intergovernmentalism because interests of interest groups are easily defined and determined. 3 steps to explain the creation of CAP: Inside the big member states, who dominate the bargaining, Germany and France at the time: o Neofunctionalism explains it with political spillover o Liberal intergovernmentalism: CAP is not so much a liberalized market. It reflects the interests of interest groups, farmers: In Germany, farmers want higher support prices In France, farmers want preferential access to German market + higher support prices.

CAP was decided as wanted by those 2 countries Unanimity applied because: o Germany: guarantee for a high level of protection for German farmers o France: Guarantee for a high level of protection for French farmers, even when UK would join.

5. CRITICISMS

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All of the criticisms are usually based on the work of the 5 case studies of Moravcsik, the 5 big moments in EU history, 3 of them about liberalization, 2 of them about monetary market. No attention paid to political integration, and only to economic integration. Liberal intergovernmentalism argue that political integration is possible only if no economical interests are at stake. But in EU, in the facts, there is an increasing level of political integration (e.g. military actions of the EU outside since Lisbon); this is ignored by liberal intergovernmentalism. Moravcsik pays no attention for day-to-day decision-making processes, only to big historical steps. Liberal intergovernmentalism is easily applied to theses big steps, but difficult to apply to day-to-day processes; it is suited to analyze negotiations of treaties, but not negotiations inside the boundaries of treaties.

Moravcsik answer: European Council: increasing power + increasing initiation (formal role of the EC). In the European Council: culture of consensus = +/- intergovernmental bargaining; rarely QMV. Main determinant of policy-making = interests and preferences. In the EU, there are still many intergovernmental areas that remain.

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CHAPTER 4: NEW-INSTITUTIONALISM
1. ORIGINS OF NEW-INSTITUTIONALISM
New institutionalism: applied to the study of the EU as a polity and to European integration as a process. Finds its origin in comparative politics hasnt been developed only to analyze the European integration NI can also be used in order to understand other political systems no sui generis approach. Why New Institutionalism ? Because the institutions were defined in a new way : not only formal but also informal institutions (norms). Development of this school = reflection of a gradual and diverse reintroduction of institutions into a large body of theories in which institutions had been either absent or epiphenomenal, i.e. reflections of deeper factors or processes, theories that are institution-free accounts of politics. The 1st : RCI

2. WHAT ARE INSTITUTIONS? Policy choices are inherently unstable: no single policy is able to command a lasting majority among
legislators; yet empirically, legislators have been able to agree on stable policies how and why such stability is achieved how actors choose or design institutions to secure mutual gains, and how those institutions change or persist over time

Institutions are the ex ante agreements about the structure of cooperation Shepsle: o equilibrium institutions: institutions as independent variables explaining how they shape policy
outcomes.

o structured-induced equilibria: institutions as dependent variables created and maintained by

rational actors to perform certain functions for the actors that created them.

Institutions are relatively stable collections of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific
groups of actors in specific situations March and Olsen

3. 3 SCHOOLS IN NEW-INSTITUTIONALISM
The common point: they all agree on the fact institutions matter. But no agreement % how the institutions matter, thus affect policy making. Rational Choice Institutionalism Sociological Institutionalism Historical Institutionalism

Question: how do institutions matter? a) Basic features of rational choice institutionalism Functionalist explanation: political institutions are designed by actors for the efficient performance of specific functions.
EU Collective action problem = making sure that all MS will take action the prisoners dilemma

Actors have exogenous preferences and aim to maximize them Politics is a series of collective action problems prisoners dilemma :

Behavior that is rational in the short term is suboptimal in the long term.

Actors follow a logic of consequences:

o o Cost-Benefits Assessment CBA Rational expectations

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Institutions are developed because their function is beneficial for the actors Therefore feedbacks from institutions can either strengthen and reinforce existing institutions, or undermine them: o Self-reinforcing institutions = institutions that change the political environment in ways that make the institution more stable in the face of exogenous shocks o Self-undermining institutions = institutions that change the environment such that a previously stable institutional equilibrium is undermined b) Basic features of sociological institutionalism

A broad definition of institutionalism, blending institution and culture: o Informal norms and conventions o Normative power and formal rules the notion includes informal norms & normative power (the norms constitute the actors, has an enormous impact on the way the actors behave & even on their preferences) definitions by Shepsie and March & Olsen: Institutions are relatively stable collections of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations March and Olsen Actors have endogenous preferences culturally-specific practices explain institutional forms. they are not only and purely determined outside the institutional framework, as the institutions have an important impact on them also inside deep normative impact of institutions.

Institutions are the ex ante agreements about the structure of cooperation Shepsle

Actors follow a logic of appropriateness: not based on rational calculation of costs and benefits but
assessment of the appropriateness, of what is considered as being legitimate, as being the correct way to behave in a certain situation) : kind of unwritten norm.what is [appropriate/legitimate/correct] in a given situation? role with attached prescriptive norms of behavior: institutional forms constitute the identity of social actor

Constructivist approach: institutions constitute actors, i.e. they shape the way in which actors view the
world. LOA: The institutional environment shapes the preferences of the actors in the EU: process by which the EU and other institutional norms are diffused and shape the preferences and behavior of actors in domestic and international politics. Ex. two cars on a desolate road both drivers have the same preference : being home asap : they suddenly meet a red traffic light one of them act rationnaly : calculations of costs and benefits : not likely to be a police patrol on this road, and he wants to be home asap he doesnt stop (RCI LOC), the other knows hes expected to act according to the norm he stops (SI LOA)

Logic of consequence Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 What are the alternatives? What are my interests? What are the consequences of the alternatives for my interests? Choose the alternative with the best consequences c) Intermezzo (1): comparing RCI and SI RCI Characteristics of institutions Strategic forum, reducing collective action Status problem

Logic of appropriateness What is the situation? What is my role in the situation? How appropriate are the possible actions for me in my role in the situation? Do what is most appropriate

SI Forum for communicative action, entailing norms

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Effect Density Preferences Rationality Action logic Negotiation style Consensus

Determine strategies Low institutional density Exogenous Instrumental rationality LOC Hard bargaining Leads to lowest common denominator

Determine preferences High institutional density Endogenous Collective rationality LOA Problem-solving Promotes integrative bargaining

Characteristics of actors

Characteristics of interactions

RCI: actors = strategic utility-maximizers whose preferences are taken as given SI: people act according to a LOA construction of their preferences and selection of the appropriate behavior for a given institutional environment d) Intermezzo (2): empirical non-exclusivity of RCI and SI Rational Choice Institutionalism Empirically: No either/or But both/and Analytically useful The two schools look thus incompatible, BUT important to see them as the two ends of a continuum : on empirical field, the actors will try to conciliate them, their behaviour will thus be somewhere between those two ends (they try to maximize their interests, but not at every cost, every price : there are norms they must obey) rather both/ and than either/ or analytically useful : we need those two perspectives to understand the policy making process. e) Basic features of historical institutionalism Sociological Institutionalism

Position +/- in between SI and RCI focus on the effects of institutions over time: institutional choices
taken in the past can persist, or become locked in shaping and constraining actors later in time rejection of functionalist explanations (i.e. RCI) Both LOC and LOA are applicable Institutions provide asymmetrical power far more dependent on the choices made in the past very costly to quit that path because you lose everything you made before) and unintended consequences (that may be reached because of that path dependency : it is a logical consequence of this concept : you may finally end somewhere you didnt, at first, imagine you would finish). Existing institutions may produce:

A key role for path-dependency and (the choices are not only determined by preferences and/ or norms but

o Positive feedbacks: support of existing institutions = institutions generate incentives for actors to
stick with and not abandon existing institutions, but incremental adaptation interrelated phenomena characterizes politics:

Inertia = lock-ins: existing institutions remain in equilibrium for extended periods despite political change Critical role for timing and sequencing: relatively small and contingent events occur at

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critical junctures early in a sequence, and shape events that occur later

Path-dependence: early decisions provide incentives for actors to perpetuate institutional and policy choices inherited from the past; Levi once a country or region has started down a path, the costs of reversal are very high. () entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct easy reversal of the initial choice.

o Negative feedbacks: creation of pressures for institutional and policy changes. Emphasis on the importance of time, feedbacks, sequencing, and path-dependence, but no rejection of
equilibrium analysis history matters, and explain how and under what conditions historical events shape contemporary and future political choices and outcomes.

4. NEW-INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE EU RCI: e.g. Garrett cf. principal-agent and delegation theory (comitology as a control mechanism of Com) SI: e.g. Lewis cf. social constructivism
HI: e.g. Pierson a) RCI and European integration by Geoffrey Garett(Cf. tableau de comparaison RCI-SI) RCI the effect determines the strategies: e.g.: Preference: opposing Commission proposal Strategy to maximize: using voting rules in institutions Question of the voting power under different decision rules: relative weights, hence bargaining power, of MS under various voting formulas. Preference = opposing Commission proposal. Strategy to maximize = institutions voting rule (if QMV, youll have to convince a minority of States which will be able to stop the proposal; if unanimity, strategy very simple : oppose the proposal as long as you have interest to act this way) Geoffrey Garrett combines 2 axis : substantive preference & procedural preference (unanimity, QMV, simple majority). Then he uses a mathematic model to determine whether and why a certain proposal will be adopted/ fail very positivist approach, hardcore RCI : goes too far Example 1: Garrett, 1992: positivist approach, often formalism substantive preferences determine procedural preferences; e.g. bargaining over the SEA:

COREPER Comit de reprsentants permanents des Etats Fait partie du rseau administratif de lUE, qui travaille en parallle du rseau politique, et assiste celui-ci, le Conseil des ministres, dans sa tache lgislative, au niveau de la prparation des dcisions. A la fois une instance de dialogue et de contrle politique Charg de lexamen pralable des dossiers lordre du jour du Conseil, pour en prparer les travaux, et s'efforce de trouver un accord sur chaque dossier Groupes dexpert compos des ambassadeurs des EM auprs de lUE fonctionnaires nationaux, de reprsentants des intrts socioprofessionnels et de consultants indpendants Le Coreper agit au moyen de deux formations : le Coreper I, compos des reprsentants permanents adjoints, couvre les dossiers caractre technique ; le Coreper II, compos des ambassadeurs traite des sujets caractre politique, commercial, conomique ou institutionnel. Les comptences du Coreper s'appliquent tous les domaines d'activit du Conseil sauf pour les questions agricoles

cf. principal-agent theory b) SI and European integration

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Example Lewis, 2002, on COREPER I and II:

Both the processes and the outcomes of the decision: making process are influenced by the normative environment of the Council: Diffuse reciprocity: o Influence of the future / expected decision-making o Shadow of the future o Reciprocity is diffuse Thick trust: o Respect, confidence, interpersonal relations o Discrete setting o Informal Council meeting Mutual responsiveness: o Knowing and understanding each other o Arguments, explain considerations Consensus reflex: o Voting very rare o LOA effect

Culture of compromise: basic intuition to accommodate diverging interests Geoffrey Lewis examines the working of the Coreper (prepares the meetings of the Council on basis of the work of the civil servants) insists on the impact of the norms on the functioning of this organ. Both the processes and the outcomes of the decision-making process are influenced by the normative environment of the Council. Lewis points 5 community norms that make that policy makers at European level dont follow their own, national interest : Diffuse reciprocity : influence of future/ expected decision-making ; shadow of the future ; reciprocity is diffuse (no deal between two States but concessions that are made in order to benefit from another concession on another field).

Thick trust : establishment of interpersonal relations of respect, confidence, trust : two factors contributing to this respect : discrete setting : behind close doors, very untransparent process enables building of confidence (>< when cameras are there) ; & informal council meetings : group-based activities, with as goal the growing of personal relations between the ministers. Mutual responsiveness : knowing and understanding each other (conscience of the difficulties of the other MS at national level). Not only express ones position, also explain it.

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Consensus reflex : voting very rare and LOA effect (try to achieve a compromise). Culture of compromise : basic intuition to accommodate diverging interests. Interest can be defined broadly : material, process, relationship and principled interests.

c) HI and European integration Example Pierson, 1998 Policies Council Paul Pierson starts from the observation that there are some policies that are contradictory with the preferences of the MS and sometimes even with those of the Commission ! How can that be explained ? Member states: short-term time horizon but (societal) situation and preferences evolve: gaps in the ability of MS governments to control institutions and policies, for 4 reasons:

Electoral considerations at the national level agreement on EU policies leading to a long-term loss of
national control in return for a short-term electoral return

Unintended consequences of institutional choices Change and evolution of MS preferences, most obviously because of electoral turn-over: a new national
government inherits an acquis communautaire negotiated by the previous government

Lock-ins due to the incremental growth of political support for existing institutions from below, as
societal actors adapt and develop a vested interest in the continuation of specific EU policies. Why dont member states use their powers to change the policies?

o Institutions are sticky = resistant to change uncertainty of institutional design + possible

o transaction costs setting high institutional thresholds to later reforms Exit-option is costly unintended consequences of early integration decisions that become difficult for the EUs constitutive MS to control of overturn explanation of temporal aspects of EU integration Link of positive feedback with functional spillover (Haas) and socialization of elites (Checkel).

o Path-dependency: European integration is a process unfolding over time, often as a result of the

5. THE JOINT DECISION-TRAP Developed by Fritz Scharpf in the 80s : EU would be caught in a trap Concept applicable to all kinds of multi-level political systems. The EU is stuck in a trap, at the time it was in a joint-decision system: to take a decision, everyone had to be
on board (federalism also highlights this point) joint decision-making systems decisions in the EU could only be reached if all actors agreed upon those decisions everyone, every MS needed on board grand coalition required, QMV = exception to that rule. joint decision-trap: a given institution or policy, once instituted, tends to remain in place, rigid and inflexible, even in the face of a changing policy environment.

Joint decision-trap characterized by 3 interrelated rules: o Intergovernmentalism ( federalism or supranational decision-making) o Voting rule of unanimity ( majority) o A default condition in which the institution/policy would persist if no agreement is found (no
change, stuck in a status quo NO renationalization) = suboptimal result of the joint decisiontrap

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 For the joint decision-trap: no achievement/crisis status quo falling apart

it therefore disagrees with the bicycle theory which states that in case of a crisis, the EU will fall apart. Consequence of this joint-decision system : suboptimal results : default condition going back to the domestic level : it means if we dont agree on how to realize a certain policy, if we dont achieve to reach a consensus, the competence is not renationalized we dont make any progress the trap is exactly there : the EU because of the joint-decision system is kept in a status quo. Some say then the EU is going to fall apart if it is unable to resolve crisis that stop its development, its progress = bicycle theory : the wheels of the bike have to continue turning, otherwise it will fall, and fall apart >< joint decision-trap doesnt agree : according to this perspective, EU is just kept in status quo.

Change in any of the interrelated rules alleviation of the joint decision-trap allowing adaptation of
existing institutions to changing circumstances. e.g. of the CAP, policy locked-in as long as a single MS remained able to block policy or institutional reforms, even in the face of ever-growing agricultural surpluses or other pressures. In 2006: the joint decision-trap revisited: o More and more QMV o Maybe too pessimistic o Intergovernmentally organized areas

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CHAPTER 5: DELEGATION AND THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY

This theory is an application of rational choice institutionalism, therefore the assumption of RCI are all applicable:

Preferences formed outside the EU institutional framework LOC = minimum cost for maximum benefits Actors have an instrumental rationality
The relationship between the 2 actors: the principal delegates a certain task to the agent, who executes that task on his behalf.

The principals: most often the member states in the European Council. The agents: e.g. The Commission (to represented EU in WTO), the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA),
the ECJ An actor / Actors (MS in the European Council in the EU case) delegate(s) a certain task / tasks to another (Commission, European Court of Justice), who executes that/ those task(s) on his/ their behalf = principal agent relationship. What are the reasons for delegation ? and what will be the resulting autonomy in which measure ?

1. THE BENEFITS OF DELEGATION

Why member states delegate to actors at EU level? They expect functions that are beneficial to them functionalist answer. The functions:

Monitoring compliance: control whether member states do at the national level what they have promised at
the EU level solving the collective action problem: institution oversee and sanction allows credibility of commitments of the agents vis--vis each others.

Solving problems of incomplete contracting: contract = agreements among principals (= member states);
those contracts can never be complete (impossibility to predict all possibilities). The point is: who will fill the gap of these possibilities not predicted? The agents (e.g. need of the ECJ to interpret treaties).

Issuing complex or credible regulations:

o High degree of complexity some agents are specialized, they can deal with it, o Agents as independent actors for credibility (acting as neutral arbiter). the MS dont want a
certain policy to be biased among them dealing with complexity & neutrality / independence

Agenda-setting: question of who takes the initiative: the agent, the Commission, initiates legislation.
Those are applicable to all kind of political systems.

2. THE COSTS OF DELEGATION

Costs = risks of delegation; mainly 2:

The agents will have their own preferences, maybe diverging from the principals preferences : will the agent
do what the principals want? risk 1: the opportunistic behavior cost 1: heterogeneous preferences

The agents can gain new information that principals dont have: risk to use this information against
principals.

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 risk 2: own information cost 2: asymmetrical information Those risks are called the agency losses/slack Therefore the principals must weight the benefits against the costs:

The need to delegate authority may give powers to the agents that can be used against the principals. The same features that make agents attractive can also make them dangerous.

3. MITIGATING THE COSTS OF DELEGATION: CONTROL

The relation between the actors is characterized not only by delegation, but also by control: delegation and control go together. A balancing act from the principals:

Too much control risk of undoing the benefits of delegation

vs.

Not enough control risk of being confronted with the costs of delegation
How do member states control their agents? 3 steps: 1. Decision to delegates ex ante control mechanism 2. Execution of delegated task by the agent ex post control mechanism 3. Once the task is executed ex post control mechanism

Ex ante control mechanisms: before the execution of the task Ex post control mechanism: during or after the execution of the task
a) Ex ante control mechanisms Definition of the scope of delegation = contract between principal and agent (I want exactly this to be done, and done that way) in the case of the EU, ex. of the principle of Subsidiarity what and how an agent has to do establish a contract, give instructions to the agent. The contract = definition of tasks (what) and procedures (how) The principle of subsidiarity is a clear example of this control mechanism: art. 5 3 TEU: Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. b) Ex post control mechanism Much more elaborate: 4 mechanisms:

Police patrol: monitoring the agents all the way by member states themselves. But it is very costly (time,
capacity). E.g. Comitology = member states, in a lot of legislative acts, delegate implementation powers to the Commission, but in a committee composed with member states representatives.

Fire alarm: principals dont monitor the agents themselves, but assume that other actors will monitor the
agents and raise the alarms if the agents dont perform the delegated tasks: e.g. NGOs, industrial lobbies, trade unions, interest groups less costly assumption by principals: others will raise the alarm; but it is less effective than the police patrol, because:

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o o

risk that the alarm is raised too late less likely to work in less politicized areas.

Institutional checks to keep an eye on what agents are doing on behalf of the principals:
o o An agent controls the agent executing the task More or less the system of checks and balances

Sanctioning: indispensable for control, necessary for credibility.

Ways of sanctioning:

Cut/reduce the budget of the agent, since the budget is composed of annual contributions by member states =
the power of the purse; but collateral damages, because it punishes other actors.

Refuse to reappoint the agent, e.g. the president of the Commission, or national commissioners. But member
states cannot dismiss the Commission and commissioners.

Refuse to cooperate with the agent, e.g. not accepting with a proposal of the Commission, but difficult
because to deviate from a proposition need unanimity.

Change the treaties: the nuclear option limited credibility and last resort. Moreover, changing treaties =
a default condition, e.g. the status quo, therefore it is pointless to change the treaty. In practice, those sanctioning mechanisms are seldom applied, but they are not unuseful, they contribute to reducing the possibility of agency slack rational anticipation by the agent: the agent wants to avoid the activation of sanctions, so he will execute the task according to the principals demand. The mere existence of control mechanisms can be sufficient to reduce the likelihood of agency loss ( they exist to NOT be used).

4. DISCRETION AS THE RESULT OF DELEGATION AND CONTROL

The agents have some room of maneuver how big is it after establishing the control mechanisms? It is the discretion = room of maneuver after establishing the control mechanisms. How can variation be explained degree of autonomy / flexibility / discretion. MS delegate powers to agents, simultaneously exert control on those agents, BUT yet those last do have a room for manoeuvre after establishment of the control mechanisms = discretion. Some agents are more autonomous than others; and if we look at the European Commission, we can make another statement : a certain agent can be more or less autonomous, depending on the field, the area in which he intervenes two extreme ends : the puppet on strings and the wild horse, autonomy of the agents has to be replaced between those two ends. 5 factors explain the degree of discretion (they are hypothesis):

In reality, there are 27 principals, for which the preferences dont go in the same direction preference
homogeneity among principals. Effects on agents:

o Homogenous preferences clearly defined scope low degree of discretion o Heterogeneous preferences broad mandate + divide & rule by the agent high degree of
discretion If homogeneous preferences clearly defined scope of delegation low degree of discretion >< if heterogeneous preferences broad mandate + the agent can use the divide between the principals on behalf of his own interests (EU, on behalf of EI) high degree of discretion.

Preference homogeneity between agents and principals:

o Homogenous no need to control high degree of discretion the ally principle o Heterogeneous tight control mechanism low degree of discretion

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 Mostly: its the Council that delegates to the agents: the voting rule applied in the Council will have an
effect:

o Unanimity all member states have to agree low degree of discretion o QMV high degree of discretion
Degree of politicization of the delegated tasks: are the tasks needing to be executed politically sensitive for
the member states?

o High degree of politicization the principal is concerned with what the agent is doing low
degree of discretion

o Low degree of politicization member states care less high degree of discretion
The question of private information for the agent, that principals dont have:

o Private information asymmetrical information high degree of discretion o No private information low degree of discretion

5. APPLICATION: COMMISSION AS EXTERNAL NEGOTIATOR ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBER STATES AT THE WTO
In the WTO, the EU is represented as 1 by the Commission. The Council f ministers is the principal, it delegates the task of representation to the agent, the Commission. a) Why delegate? 3 functions:

Benefits for the Council: it creates a bargaining power: the sum is stronger than its parts. The Commission has a better know-how, expertise, capabilities. (Cynically), by delegating, member states can play the blame game: governments of member states can shift
the blame to the Commission if the decisions are not according to the plans; it allows national governments to sell it at home, at the national level. b) Control mechanisms Risk of heterogeneous preferences and private info necessity of control mechanisms:

Authorization: although the Commission being their delegate is written in the treaties, it needs an additional
authorization from the member states: The Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise it to open the necessary negotiations., art. 207 3 TFEU primary law. Activating this mechanism means a high political cost for the member states, because they have the possibility not to activate it, but they wouldnt be represented. The Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise it to open the necessary negotiations. the 1st step comes from the Commission, as a policy-setting institution.

The mandate: the typical ex ante control mechanism, established together with the decision to delegate
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations [] within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it., art. 207 3 TFEU directives = mandate. The Council may activate this mechanism, giving instructions on what the Commission has to obtain.

Committee 133: the police patrol control mechanism: control the Commission in its negotiation: The
Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task, art. 207 3 TFEU special committee: composed of member states = principals, gathering with the Commission during negotiations constant control of the agent by the principals.

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 Attending the international negotiations: police patrol control mechanism: member states can attend
meetings of WTO, which allows them to constantly observe the actions of the Commission (those member states are called mothers-in-law). Even if only the European Commission is competent to speak on behalf of the MS, often those MS are also able to attend the meetings of the WTO, as they are members of this organization

Ratification requirements: sanctioning mechanism: The Council shall authorise the opening of
negotiations, adopt negotiating directives, authorise the signing of agreements and conclude them. art. 218 2 TFEU possibility for member states to sanction the Commission by not ratifying what the Commission has done = rejecting the delegated task of the Commission. Take it or leave it logic: it is not possible to amend it, because the agreement was concluded at an external level; therefore, not ratifying is a nuclear option, because rejecting the agreement = blowing up the whole process. But agents are rational, so they try to anticipate on the actions of the member states afterwards: the Commission anticipates the action of the member states. c) Agent strategies to increase his discretion Vision from the agent perspective: is the agent able, and if so how, to increase/maximize his discretion? Rational choice institutionalism. The concept of preferences: Detour by the concept of preferences as being win set, thus the collection of all the policy options that are acceptable, with preference intensity > 0. ideal point = concrete solution a MS supports, it represents for this MS the best alternative that could emerge from international negotiations.

Preferences as win-sets: all policy options acceptable for a member state win-sets of all agents can overlap
agreement:

Preferences as single points: not a collection of policy options, but 1 ideal point advantage: possibility to
locate the real position of the actor. Those 2 ways at looking at the preferences of actors are the most studied in literature.

But a 3rd one adding another criteria: the preference intensity

When they have to ratify the decisions taken by the European Commission within the WTO, the MS, as rational actors, weigh and compare the benefits of international agreement, including the substantive benefits of the agreement, but taking also into account the procedural cost (cost of blocking the whole negotiation process, of being the one responsible for that blockage) & the substantive costs of the international agreement.

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Acceptable possibilities

All options above 0 = the more member states want something. How can the Commission maximize its discretion? Each principal is assumed to have both an ideal point and a win-set. At the ratification requirement, member states have to weight the benefits vs. the costs of the international agreement = weight the substantive benefits vs. the substantive costs.

There is also procedural costs to take into account: costs of procedures if no ratification, the agent is responsible for blowing up the whole agreement. This cost has to be added on the benefits side, since the higher it is, the more it weighs in the balance of accepting the agreement (not wanting to be responsible). Therefore, the balancing to measure is: costs vs. procedural costs + benefits.

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The Commission can influence the procedural costs, increasing it, so that member states will ratify the agreement: It increases its discretion It is the main strategy that the Commission has to influence the political behavior of the principal. The Commission can influence the procedural cost by transferring the pressure from international negotiations to the member states the more the Commission can influence the procedural cost, the more the preference intensity will lower (more compellingness by member states), so finding a point of agreement between member states will be easier (The main strategy the Commission has to influence the political behavior of the principals (so they dont use their veto power) is thus acting on the procedural cost ! How ? By transferring pressure from international negotiations to the MS !! If the Commission succeeds to do so, the range of policy options is broadened makes more chance that an overlap between national preferences exists an agreement can be made, that is acceptable for all MS) :

This allows some agreements to be ratified, that would not have been ratified if no procedural costs. But the discretion is increased in a certain limit.

6. CHAIN OF DELEGATION
Commission as an agent and member states as principals are only part of a chain of delegation: the ministers in the Council are in fact agents vis--vis their government, the principal every principal is an agent of another principal:

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Every process in the political system can be analyzed through the principal-agent theory interconnection of all these actors, through all the processes of the political system:

The longer the chain: - The higher the likelihood of suboptimal information : the information has indeed to pass through all the links of this chain results in a lack of accuracy, every step back // amount of information decrease. - The higher the likelihood that the agreement made by the ultimate agent is not accepted by the ultimate principal; the procedural cost cant be transferred to every actors. - The more complex the negotiation process.

7. CRITICISMS
Simplification: unitary actors: the theory sees actors as black boxes, e.g. the Commission, which is in
fact not unitary, but composed of 27 actors commissioners; the same for the Council.

A lot is ignored:
o o Role of the EP Not all principals are the same

Assumption of this theory: too much flexibility by the agent is not wanted. But is opportunistic behavior by
the agent by definition problematic? perspective of efficiency.

No attention for the question of legitimacy: the accountability of the agent vis--vis the principal is not taken
into account.

General criticisms on rational choice institutionalism.

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CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

It adds a metatheoretical dimension.

1. A NEW ONTOLOGY: STRUCTURATIONISM

Social constructivism:

Ideas matter: values, norms, identity Not about power or interests. The world is a social construction: it is constructed by the way we make it The world is what you make of
it. The difference with other theories: their ontology = the theory of being, the underlying concept of how the world is. In all the other theories, 2 concepts:

Agents and their interests and preferences determine the outcomes of politics The structure in which the actors behave determines the outcomes of politics

Agency = actors (the EU is actor-driven) or structure = institutions determine the outcome of politics .
In the 1990s, a new theory, social constructivism, with a new ontology : structurationism = neither agency nor structure determine the world (and the EU), but the continuous interplay between both agency and structure are mutually constitutive, they continuously constitute each other. 3 implications to this ontology:

Actors have a role Possibility for action of arguing New debate in EU studies
a) Roles Political actors see a particular role for themselves, actions are not only taken on the basis of interests and preferences. Actors feel the necessity to act according to, in line with that role perception even if this does not correspond to their material interest.

Actors feel the necessity to act in line with this role, even if this does not correspond to their material
interest (but this is subject to debate within the school).

e.g. of roles actors see for themselves:

o o o Commission: defender or European interests Scandinavian countries: defenders of the greenness of policy options (pro-environmentalist policies) Belgium: defender of the interests of small member states Third-world countries) Impact of those roles actors see for themselves expectations from other actors increasingly difficult not to act in accordance with those expectations = the role conception. b) The logic of arguing With other schools, 2 logics of arguing:

o The EU itself: promoter of multilateralism, e.g. through UN processes (cooperation with

Rational choice institutionalism: assessment of benefits and costs logic of consequences

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 Sociological institutionalism: action logic, based on what is appropriate, on institutional norms logic of
appropriateness. Social constructivism adds a 3rd action logic: if norms are contradictory/unclear debate = the power of arguing/persuasion actors are open to let themselves convince by other actors the logic of arguing:

Introduced by Habermas: [communicative action takes place] when the action orientations of the
participating actors are not coordinated via egocentric calculations of success, but through acts of understanding. Participants are not primarily oriented toward their own success in communicative action; they pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can co-ordinate their action plans on the basis of shared definitions of the situation.:

egocentric calculations of success + oriented toward their own success = logic of consequences

Idea of communicative action

In the EU: the likelihood of this logic depends on the institutionalization of the policy-making environment the more it is institutionalized, the more actors are open to debate. c) A new debate in the EU studies? When this school emerged: there was a big debate between neofunctionalists and liberal intergovernmentalists. With the introduction of social constructivism, these schools discovered that they had in common their basic underlying concept of looking at the EU integration: rationalism rational behavior by actors based on short-term CBA. They have the same ontology. The new theory of social constructivism challenges this ontology of having preferences and interests, and acting rationally to reach them. Constructivist questions are related to ideas, identities, and ideologies:

Neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism same ontology rationalism

Social constructivism structurationism : all things are mutually constitutive

new debate

2. MODERATE AND RADICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

Structurationism 2 implications: Subjective dimension of EU politics Epistemological consequences a) Subjective dimension of EU politics To what extent do norms and arguments have an impact on political behavior and processes? Moderate constructivists: open for interests and preferences, rationalist behavior. But rationalist theories dont pay enough attention to norms and debate, hence logic of appropriateness / logic of arguing. CHECKEL : conditions of logic of appropriateness / logic of arguing they do not choose a theory at the expense of the others ; but they want to bring a new theory into the scope of EU study while not denying that in some circumstances the Logic of preferences & interests could play a role under which conditions those two logics might be useful to explain the process of EU policy making ?

Checkel: 4 conditions to be able to speak about norms and arguing:

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o o o o

Actors must have the same professional background More arguing and appropriateness in crisis situations (because no time to build national interests) The contact thesis: the more actors see each other, the more likely eh logic of appropriateness/arguing Actors must be protected from political pressure (= committee governance)

Radical constructivists: reality is always a social construction: everything is what you make of it
importance of political discourse: examples:

Neofunctionalist discourse of the spillover: Effects on euro-optimists: strengthening the hope that strong political EU will indeed emerges Effects on euro-skeptics: deepening of EU integration goes by secret and beyond the will of member states and EU citizens.

Identity hegemony

Countries in European continent are defined/identified in terms of EU member/nonmember/candidate identity constructed in function of the EU Europe = EU : identity of EU redefines the identity of Europe Council of Europe and European Court of Human Rights are both totally independent from the EU, but they are more and more associated with the EU (when they have nothing to do with it).

The critic on radical constructivism: too much attention for discourses where is the power? b) Epistemology Epistemology = the theory of knowledge how do we know that a certain knowledge holds true?

Radical constructivists: criticism towards this school: reality is not existent, but it is constructed; therefore,
how can you measure, or make hypothesis or empirical checks? vagueness: the ontology of radical constructivism leads to questions with its epistemology.

Moderate constructivists: apply positive research methodologies, textbook scientific researches, e.g.
Checkel with the logic of appropriateness and arguing. The new debate that emerged from rationalist and constructivist ontological borderline changed: rationalism and moderate constructivism rationalists incorporate more and more the role of ideas vs. radical constructivists

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Ontological borderline

Epistemological borderline

Today the debate is this last one, not anymore on the ontological borderline, but on the epistemological borderline.

3. SOCIALIZATION
Both sociological institutionalism and social constructivism: norms political behavior. How do those norms determine political behavior? socialization: a process by which actors develop a loyalty towards the EU collectivity, they are not mere national representatives anymore but also members of the European group norm internalization. Empirical studies: socialization occurs, but under certain circumstances:

Beyers: the level of socialization depends on national factors (link with the same professional background by
Checkel)

Egeberg: actors have multiple roles that they combine, the new European role doesnt replace the national
one.

Lewis: scope conditions making socialization more likely: o High issue density o Isolation from national political pressure

4. CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE EU

a) European identity and the euro

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Why were EMU and an independent central bank created? Starting point of the theory: explaining why other schools are useless to explain the phenomenon need of another explanation:

Moderate constructivism explains the membership of states in the zone with collective identity what matters: the perception of European citizens. It also depends on: o The stability of the identity

The clarity and the preferences

Clarity of preferences Clear Stability of the identity Ambiguous UK No clear European identity Very clear national identity Germany Would the be a good thing? European identity very clear France Not sure about European identity

Stable

Contested

France: their position about is determined by their interests in zone. Germany and UK: a clear identity played the determinant role Germany in zone; UK out zone. b) Enlargement to ECO as a normative project Neorealism not useful here : no strengthening of EUs position in the world (limited economic and political power of CEE countries) Same for Liberal intergovernmentalism : economic benefits of enlargement for EU 15 are too small compared to its costs ! enlargement is costly. And even if there were benefits, there were less costly options to realize them : trade partnerships, treaties

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 concept of identity and rhetorical action importance of the discourse Even before the Berlin wall fell, the EU had already the rhetoric of sharing the same values, the same cultural background as the eastern Europe countries we are all European countries rhetoric of PAN-EUROPEAN VALUE COMMUNITY the candidate Member States made use of this rhetorical trap EU had to walk into the trap if it didnt want to lose its credibility and legitimacy candidate MS use the discourse of the EU to achieve their goals. % Turkey : no rhetorical engagement of the EU, to the contrary : Turkey described as not being a European country. Furthermore, this issue is more politicized which makes it less likely that decisions are taken on the basis of normative engagements. Finally, now already euroscepticism in Turkey complicating factor. How to explain the Eastern enlargement of EU? Starting point of the study:

Need of another factor identity: the concept of rhetorical action:

EU 15: we are all European countries sharing the same values and historical background Rhetoric of pan-European value community rhetorical trap EU had to walk into the trap if it didnt want to lose credibility and legitimacy The EU discourse creates a trap and is the basis for rhetorical action

This trap is also used by norm entrepreneurs in the EU discourses really impact on the outcome of policies. Can we learn from the enlargement of 2004 and 2007, when a rhetorical trap was used, for future enlargement? With Turkey, it is no likely, because the dominant rhetoric is that Turkey is not a European country = sociological construct. So constructivist insights on discourses may therefore work in all cases, but have different outcomes. In the Turkey case, moreover, it is more politicized, which makes it less likely that decisions are taken on the basis of normative engagement. In Turkey, there is already euro-skepticism, so it may change Turkeys mind about entering the EU. c) EU and globalization

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How is the phenomenon of globalization socially constructed in the EU? 3 types of discourses:

European economics are threatened by the globalizing economy EU is the most appropriate level to counter threat of globalization Neoliberal policy measures are the most appropriate solutions
Neoliberal EU solutions because of the dominating discourse the discourse construct the policy those dominating discourses = not a neutral process. The world is what you make of it becomes globalization is what you make of it in radical constructivism.

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CHAPTER 7: GOVERNANCE AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE

1. GOVERNANCE APPROACHES
Governance: UE = a sui generis system: a political system not comparable to any other political system in the world therefore EU = a new and emerging system of governance without government: a particular way of governance without government.

2. MODES OF GOVERNANCE
4 modes of governance 1. Hierarchy 2. Negotiation 3. Competition 4. Cooperation

Rarely the EU is characterized by only 1: those modes are ideal-types, and dont exist in the pure way. They can be divided in: old mode of governance: hierarchy new mode of governance: negotiation, competition, cooperation

Hierarchy:
o o The closest related to governing by a government, to traditional ways of governance System producing binding laws for its citizens coercive system o In the EU, it is found in the member states, but not in the EU as such (the institutional triangle)

o Enforcement procedures for these laws (police, military) to compel citizens to obey

Negotiation:
o o o o Based on the vertical and horizontal interactions between different groups: Horizontally: groups coming from different political sectors Vertically: groups coming from different level of government System producing binding decisions

o No sanctioning system laws are binding, but no hard sanctions

o At the EU level: legislative policy-making, negotiations between institutions

Competition:
o o o Usually not in decision-making or legislative policy-making It is a result of existing rules In the EU: e.g. the internal market, where actors are competing with each other, competition is inherent to internal market.

Cooperation:

o Voluntary coordination; no political rules compel actors to cooperate

o o Uncertainty as a consequence, e.g. in the compliance of applying what was decided (applying the decision of cooperation is also voluntary) Hence varying effectiveness

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In the EU: mostly in absence of EU competences; if the EU is competent, member states use the typical legislative process.

The institutional triangle: opportunities and constraints coming from this framework, and resulting mode of governance

Constraints on hierarchy in the EU:

o EU: not a sovereign state: decisions always with member states, because need of the Council
the EU cant take decisions without member states.

o Directives, the most commonly used EU legislative instruments, set goals, and are not directly
applicable (need of a domestic transposition) No possibility for a direct hierarchy in the EU.

Opportunities for new modes of governance

o EU = fragmented system of powers negotiation + cooperation o Many areas in politics are related to the internal market ( spillover effect, because need of
regulations in a lot of domain) competition

o EU has limited capacities: limited budget or administration staff; the EU works with attributed
competences given by member states negotiation: the EU looks for other power resources.

3. CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE

New governance approaches: origins declining role of the states in providing public goods and shaping public order:

Used for the 1st time in Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics: something
gives structure to the international system, even without a government; so there is order in the absence of government in the international system.

Nature of states are changing: states have a decreasing impact on societies delegation to non-state actors
to co-organized societies. In the EU:

No centralized authority (like in the international system), but order through dense web of rules and
procedures

Restricted capacity only attributed competences (by member states), and mostly market-making
competences EU is a fertile ground for new governance approaches. Consequences

Non hierarchic decision-making: in the EU, the political authority (member states), fragmented, is not there
on its own: o Vertical level of government: Below: subnational entities Above: supranational entities Horizontal dimension: private actors, and not only political authority in the system.

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 Decision-making is polycentric: 1 actor doesnt determine politics fragmented system of powers:

different centers of power depending on the policy area: o Environment: Council o o Issues related to the quality of food: EFSA Defense and foreign policy: member states

4. MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE
The vertical and horizontal dimensions added to political authority always the starting point of multi-level governance: need to identify them.

a) Vertical dimension Starts with level of political authority = member states, and the supranational entities (EU) + subnational entities.

Do subnational and supranational levels weaken the level of the member states? Does delegation lead to weakening the member states power?

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 No; in some cases, it strengthens the level of the state, e.g. in the case of Belgium, need of coordination between subnational levels before negotiations take place at the EU level, because the EU only take into account the federal/national level. Subnational entities: usually 2 manners to have an impact at the EU level

The indirect route: through state level states can organize mechanisms to coordinate subnational entities
among themselves to find a common position. If no common position is found, the member state cant be represented in the Council.

The direct route: no role for the national level:

o Through offices: representations to defend their particular position, mostly through lobbying
processes (e.g. Scottish office in Brussels)

o Through their national permanent representation at the EU: permanent representations of

the states often have permanent representations of subnational entities.

o Through the Committee of the Regions, but it has no binding influential voice today:
question of the need of this Committee. b) Horizontal dimension Politics is not limited to state actors involvement of non-state actors; the border between public and private actors is blurred, it is difficult to distinguish between the 2. No limitation to the formal participation right in the policy-making process: the participation right depends on the contribution to finding a solution, the active participation in finding a solution. In multi-level governance, 4 kinds of non-state actors:

Socio-economic interest groups (COPA: European organization of farmers) NGOs with no definition of particular interests, but with broad interests (Human Rights, environment) Territorial actors (Scottish office) Professional lobbyists

Those non-state actors bring expertise to the EU, they deliver information; in exchange, they have access to the institutional triangle, that they can try to influence policy networks. Implementation/transposition of directives EU legislation: Regulations: directly and immediately applicable Directives: nationally transposable for application and legal binding Implementation and transposition is often made by subnational authorities, e.g. in Belgium: competences are delegated to supranational entities and regional entities have the authority. increased legitimacy of the EU, because the implementation and transposition is made at a closer level of the citizens.

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5. THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE

4 modes of governance evolution in time: transformation in style of governance and issues.

a) Changing governance styles For a long time, politics in the EU = regulatory approach rules, legislation structuring and organizing the internal market.

Evolution towards an interventionist approach: the EU intervenes more and more in very concrete cases,
e.g. by agencies

Evolution towards a soft law approach: rules, guidelines not enforceable by courts of justice
objectives, best practices (e.g. OMC). b) Changing policy issues At the beginning: clear EU competences. But more and more: new domains, e.g. in diplomacy, the European External Action Service, established by the Lisbon treaty. c) Meaning for EU image and legitimacy? Combination of the modes of governance + transformation of the EU governance transforming the image of the EU: More sympathetic image, because the EU is not becoming a superstate, it is not threatening. But also more sovereignty: threatening image.

6. EXAMPLE: OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION OMC

OMC : aim : coordination of social policies of member states; Europeanization of national member states policies. In 2000: the Lisbon strategy: aiming at making the EU the most competitive economy in the world by 2010. 3pillars: economic, social and ecological pillar. The OMC was created to coordinate the social pillar among member states, because it wasnt an EU policy.

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Functioning of the OMC: Council Sets objectives, policy goals Specific objectives per member states = benchmarking, but not compelling Member states National/subnational policies Council Evaluation: peer pressure political motivation (because it is not compelling) = naming & shaming Why did member states start the OMC?
Benchmarking comparison of the Member States' performance and exchange of best practices

Governance factors: member states tired of having to follow EU rules Political factors: in 2000, a lot of member states had left or central-left wing governments, hence the
inclusion of a social pillar, and therefore the OMC. OMC: Flexibility Decentralized: not a political authority in the EU Focus on procedures ( contents of policies) No coercion or sanctioning mechanism It is a typical example of combination of the new modes of governance.

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CHAPTER 8: POLICY NETWORKS

1. WHAT ARE POLICY NETWORKS?
Networks: Nodes: elements that are connected Connections: what connects the nodes EU: Nodes: human beings Connections: interactions This theory builds further at the multi-level governance theory: nodes = state + non-state actors governance perspective The networks combine 2 types of actors and dont distinguish them.

Networks in political sciences: clusters of different kinds of actors who are linked together in political,
social or economic life

Policy networks in political sciences: clusters of actors, each of which has an interest (or stake) in a
given policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure Cluster of actors with: o An interest/objective o Something to contribute to policy-making Policy networks challenges the view of:

Political space: the extent to which actors can be involved in political processes: not physical proximity,
but position in the network (all other theories assume physical proximity).

Static-centric perspective: relation between policy-makers matter informal modes of governance no

hierarchy.

2. EU AS A FERTILE GROUND FOR POLICY NETWORKS

EU often deals with the regulation of technical issues: o Need of technical information o Need to take into account cross-national differences. In EU, policies are made in a segmented way: isolated policy areas = filires (e.g. Director Generals of
the Commission, the Committees of the EP, the Council of ministers) de facto clusters ( ref. to the definition of policy networks).

Committee governance: comitology (principal-agent theory; expert groups, committees in the EP)
esprit de corps in those committees high likelihood of socialization towards the EU emphasis on the informal preparation for the formal institutions: it is the most important point that is added by this theory to the theories of EU integration.

3. ASSUMPTIONS OF NETWORKS IN THE EU

EU: non-hierarchical political system, characterized by and open to new modes of governance decisions
not imposed by political authorities.

Disaggregation of the political system: no statement about policy-making in EU as such. Recognition of the importance of preparatory work, by bureaucrats, experts and not by politicians
limit policy options, because preparatory works excludes de facto a series of options, hence their

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importance

4. CHARACTERISTICS OF NETWORKS IN THE EU

Requirements of 2 kinds of knowledge:

o Knowledge of topics = expertise epistemic communities: experts delivering objective

information + subjective influence (e.g. at international level, the IPCC for global warming).

o Knowledge of people: colleagues who know each other in other member states.
Go beyond traditional organizational boundaries:
o o o Cross institutional dimension Horizontal dimension Vertical dimension

Central position for the Commission (officials) in the networks, which very often triggers them:

o The Commission is supposedly neutral, so it limits national bias

o Process manager which are redefined).

o Attractive partner for non-state actors (neofunctionalism Europeanization of interests, 5. EFFECTS ON THE EU
Relations between policy networks and the EU: policy networks facilitate decision-making; it emphasizes the preparatory work, the informal preparation. How it facilitates decision-making:

Avoidance of clashes/deadlocks by limiting the policy options Changing the role of the state: member states become more and more mediators between non-state actors Creation of multiple loyalties and identities (social constructivism): the initial loyalties vis--vis the initial
principal is more and more replaced by loyalties vis--vis networks socialization, because networks are issue-based, so actors = colleague experts in social constructivism: the importance of having the same professional background creation of a collective identity

More and more trust (Lewis in Social constructivism), instead of specific reciprocity Networks are likely to produce effective outcomes, because of:

o Peer pressure (in relation with collective identity)

o Involving implementation actors

6. POLICY COMMUNITIES AND ISSUE NETWORKS

Policy communities issue networks: 2 big types of networks in the EU. Policy communities Size Contribution of resources Stability Outcome Small membership Actors contribute equally Long term cooperation stable Win-win outcomes, good for all participants Issues networks Large membership Differentiated contribution Fluid membership less stable Not necessarily equally divided benefits

Main added value of policy networks analysis = focus on the preparatory stages of policy-making informal

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preparation, ignored by all other theories. Therefore this theory can easily be combined with other theories (such as neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism), that focus on visible phenomena; its how policy networks theory is the most useful. This theory also points to the fact of overcoming deadlocks it is a result-driven theory.

7. CRITICISMS
Not a theory, more a toolbox with concepts, opening some doors of the integration process:
o o o More useful as a metaphor No answer on important questions of EU governance Only hinting at where answers can be found

Where is the power? not answered by this theory, no attention for dominance in EU politics and policies. Vagueness: more attention to concepts than to a better understanding.

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CHAPTER 9: EUROPEANIZATION
1. WHAT IS IT?

Meanings of Europeanization by Olsen

Used 1st in dynamics happening outside European borders More Europe: competences, institutions (e.g. foreign policy more and more Europeanized) but more
Europe more EU

Adaptation of domestic political systems under the influence of the EU Exportation of European forms of governance (norms) outside Europe National political systems becomes more and more similar
Increasingly: in literature, focus on the 3rd point, the adaptation of domestic political systems. How does it influence domestic politics? 2 levels: EU and member states:

Most theories are bottom-up perspectives, integration is seen as a bottom-up process = from member states
to EU (why integration, delegation)

Europeanization focuses on the top-down process of integration, from EU to member states impact of
EU processes and institutions on member states.

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Original question of Europeanization: does European integration affect the autonomy and authority of member states? it is exactly the opposite question that neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists ask. Autonomy/authority of member states:

If intergovernmentalism is correct: autonomy and authority of member states are not challenged, because
they determine whats happening at the EU level

If neofunctionalism is correct: autonomy and authority of member states are challenged/undermined.

Europeanization starts on the same question, but in a reverse way.

Bottom-up perspective: EU integration is the dependant variable, it is what theories want to explain. Top-down perspective: EU integration is the independent variable, used to explain the possible impact
of EU on member states.

2. HOW DOES THE EU EFFECTS MEMBER STATES?

Variations across member states and policy areas no clear answer. Consequences: there should be conditions under which we see (or not) an influence:

The goodness of fit: does the member state fit with eth EU? Is what happens at the national level compatible
with the EU?

Mediating factors
a) Misfit as the necessary condition for domestic change A certain degree of incompatibility is necessary to trigger change at the domestic level. The misfits can have 2 dimensions:

Misfits of policies: national regulation doesnt follow guidelines of EU regulations compliance problem Misfits of institutions: problem of internal coordination, e.g. coordination between subnational and national
level Misfit = opposite of the goodness of fit, which determines the degree of adaptational pressure from the EU to the member states it has the main explanatory power. Criticisms on the explanatory power of misfit:

Only applicable for market-correcting policies possible compliance problems; distinction with marketmaking policies, which are more flexible.

Implies static perspective: not taking into account a time dimension Low degree of resistance of domestic institutions, e.g. the accession process.
Misfit: necessary condition, but not sufficient for domestic change search of mechanisms. b) 3 mechanisms (each with mediating factors) New institutionalism theory has 3 schools, which help distinguish between the 3 mechanisms.

Rational choice institutionalism perspective: EU as an opportunity structure:

o Actors exchange resources in order to get what they want RCI: institutions offer
opportunities and constraints so the EU is a political opportunity structure

o The EU determines access points = opportunities for domestic actors; it allows more access
to certain actors than to others, therefore it makes some actors stronger than others.

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o The EU gives more access for national than for subnational governments: EUs
Mediating factors, which explain the differential empowerment : Number of veto points in member states Facilitating institutions in member states (e.g. easiness to adapt national constitution)

opportunity structure makes national government more powerful differential empowerment of national government. Opportunities constraints Redistribution of resources Differential empowerment More access for national than for subnational governments National governments are more powerful than regionals May lead to domestic changes

Sociological institutionalism socialization: domestic actors are socialized into EU norms and procedures
institutions make clear what is appropriate, informal norms expected from the actors.

Mediating factors, which explain the difference between member states: Norm entrepreneurs in member states promoting EU norms Supporting informal institutions

Norms, rules, beliefs Socialization Norm internalization Summary of those 2 perspectives:

Processes

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 Institutional adaptation = institutional isomorphism:

Dense interaction exists between national and EU levels National institutions adapt in the direction of EU institutions Increasingly similar characteristics Decreasing misfit Spread of characteristics of EU institutions towards member states. It can take 4 forms:

o Coercion: characteristic imposed to member states, e.g. when entering the zone. o Imitation: doing the same thing:
To reduce uncertainty of new policies Success proved in other political systems

o Competitive selection: member states are compelled to adapt if they want to remain
competitive, e.g. liberalization of markets

o Ideanational entrepreneurs: promoting of ideas on which member states base their

institutions

3. ON WHICH ELEMENTS OF MEMBER STATES DOES THE EU HAVE AN EFFECT?

Which aspects of member states can be Europeanized?

Domestic structure:
o o o o o o o o Political institutions + inter-institutional relations Structures for interests representation The target groups Instruments used by member states Resources for policies Policy styles Dominant values, discourses Impact on legitimacy

Policies of member states

o Problems at the source of policies

Cognitive and normative structures:

4. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF EU ON MEMBER STATES

a) The scope of domestic change How significant is EU influence? Conceptual answer 2 ideal types: no change high change, with different degrees in between.

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 Inertia:
o o o No change not necessarily a perfect goodness of fit, but resistance of the member state Often goes together with non-compliance

o this situation of not changing is not sustainable (possible sanctions for the member state)
Retrenchment:
o o Low change The member state changes, but in an opposite direction than the EU presses for

o Usually comes after an initial refusal o Counter-reaction against the EU

Absorption:
o o o o o o o o Medium change Changing just enough to comply, to avoid court and sanctions Peripheral change The core of policy is not touched upon Adapting existing policies and institutions, not creating new ones Replacing existing policies and institutions Not only the periphery is changed, but also the core e.g. Constitution, macro-economic policies

Accommodation:

Transformation:

Those changes are very difficult to distinguish empirically a big criticism on Europeanization is its difficulty to be empirically tested/applied. b) The direction of domestic change In which direction does the influence go? Does the EU change all member states in the same way, making them more similar? No, but neither is the opposite; EU doesnt make member states more different. The EU has an effect, but not the same on all member states. Cross-nation variation in direction of domestic change logic of consequence: change depends on the mediating factors that intervene at national level, therefore on the mechanisms (the 3 perspectives) allowing domestic change:

Rational choice institutionalism:

o o o o Number of veto points in the member states Supporting formal institutions in the member states Norm entrepreneurs Supporting informal institutions

Sociological institutionalism:

Institutional adaptation

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