Table of Contents: Introduction. Overview Geography... Population and People................. Acholi-land. History. Governance. Economy.

Conflict Actors Lords Resistance Army.. Government of Uganda... Government of Sudan. Government of Democratic Republic of Congo.. International Criminal Court... 11 13 15 15 15 1 3 4 5 6 9 10

Analysis Realism 15 Liberalism... 16 Conclusions. 16 Intervention Humanitarian Situation... 19 Case For Intervention.. 19 Conclusion.. 20

Bibliography 21 Annex 1. Selected Chronology... 2: Map of Uganda... 24 27

Introduction:

For the last 19 years, the east-African country of Uganda has had its development marred by an ongoing internal conflict1. Though Uganda is no stranger to political violence and instability, the current fighting in the Northern region of Acholi-land has become one of Africa's longestrunning conflicts2 and is astonishing for its persistent brutality.

The Lords Resistance Army (LRA) has been active in various incarnations since 19863 and is widely held responsible for copious human rights abuses and war crimes4. Under the leadership of the self-proclaimed prophet Joseph Kony5, the precise objectives of the cult-like6 LRA remain unclear. On the surface, its purpose appears to be the removal of the current Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, with the aim of instituting the Ten Commandments as the basis for law in Uganda7.

To these ends, the LRA has committed atrocities that are broad in scope and brutal in nature; at one point, between 1.3 and 2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) had fled the LRAs campaign of violence and been forced to live in IDP camps8. In addition to looting and burning villages and raping and mutilating civilian populations9, the LRA is particularly notorious for

1 2

United Nations Population Fund, Overview: Uganda, British Broadcasting Corporation, Country Profile: Uganda 3 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 406. 4 Amnesty International: Amnesty International calls for an effective alternative to impunity 5 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 407. 6 British Broadcasting Corporation, Country Profile: Uganda 7 United Nations, Committee On Elimination Of Racial Discrimination 8 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uganda 9 Human Rights Watch, The Scars of Death

3 having abducted over 30,000 children since the conflict began10. Children as young as six years old11 are routinely taken from villages attacked by the LRA. Girls are typically used as sex slaves while boys are trained as soldiers to replenish the LRAs ranks12. Under captivity, these children are often forced to commit violent crimes such as mutilations and murder13.

In 2003, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was formally asked by President Museveni to intervene by investigating and prosecuting the crimes against humanity purportedly committed by the LRA14. This was the first state referral of a case to the ICC under its new mandate and, in 2004, the court determined that an investigation into the LRAs alleged crimes was justified15. In 2005, the ICC concluded there was enough evidence of the suspected crimes against humanity to indict four high-ranking commanders of the LRA, as well as Joseph Kony16. Although still in the pre-trial phase with the arrest warrants not carried out, the case is a landmark accomplishment for the ICC and an important development in the evolution of the domain of international law and human rights.

However, other attempts to resolve the conflict have been more controversial; blanket offers of impunity for LRA combatants put forward by the Ugandan government have been decried by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International as counter-productive and contradictory to the work of the ICC17. Further complicating the peace process are the current negotiations between the LRA and the Government of Uganda. The talks are being mediated by
10 11

United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2005 p. 161. United Nations, UNICEF highlights forgotten tragedy of child soldiers in Uganda 12 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2005 p. 161. 13 United Nations Childrens Fund, Chance to Return to Normal Life 14 International Criminal Court, Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo p. 2. 15 International Criminal Court, Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo p. 3. 16 International Criminal Court, Uganda 17 Amnesty International: Amnesty International calls for an effective alternative to impunity

4 the autonomous region of Southern Sudan, and though they appear promising and have resulted in the return of civilians to their villages from IDP camps18, this has been at the expense of the ICC. Museveni has promised to interfere with the courts warrants in an effort to coax the LRA into negotiating19. While the situation is far from resolved, there has been a cease-fire since August of 2006 and growing optimism internationally for a peaceful solution20.

What is perhaps most striking about the conflict is the lack of international attention it has received. Jan Egeland, head of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), has repeatedly expressed his concern that an emergency on the scale of Uganda [] is getting such little international attention"21. He cites some kind of an unwitting conspiracy of silence 22 as the cause of inaction: It includes the media. It includes us in the UN. It includes the donor countries, it includes everybody 23.

Overview: Geography: Uganda is a tropical land-locked east-African country. It borders Sudan in the North, Kenya in the East, Rwanda and Tanzania in the South and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the West. The Eastern border is dominated by Lake Victoria. The capital city, Kampala, is in the Southeast, on the shores of Lake Victoria. See Annex 1.

18 19

United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda Economist, Coming in from the Jungle, Maybe 20 Economist, Will Kony come out of the Bush? 21 British Broadcasting Corporation, Country Profile: Uganda 22 Cable News Network, Transcript: Inside Africa 23 Cable News Network, Transcript: Inside Africa

5 Population and People: The effects of Britains colonisation are still widely felt on Ugandas 28 million people: 66% still adhere to Christian faiths and English remains the countrys official language24. Muslim and traditional religions comprise the remaining 16% and 18% of the population, respectively.

When Britain drew colonial borders, diverging ethnic populations were grouped together, effectively making political stability an impossibility prior to independence25. The diverse ethnic populations were artificially divided according to European classification, based primarily upon language, into non-Bantu, Bantu and Nilotic26. The non-Bantu and Bantu division corresponds roughly to a North-South partition, while the Nilotic group is native to the West Nile region in the Northwest corner of the country27. Uganda has always been a polyethnic28 society, and even after independence there are still major ethnic divisions within the country; there are 15 main ethnic groups speaking approximately 63 different dialects and languages29. The Baganda people are the largest ethnic group, comprising 17% of the population and occupying the territory around the capital30. The three next largest groups are the Ankole, Basoga and Iteso, each comprising 8% of the population.

The effects of colonialism are not limited to the artificial grouping of ethnic populations; under the British protectorate there were also major socio-economic consequences. As colonial administrators worked to exploit Ugandas resources, development efforts all focused on the
24 25

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uganda Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uganda 26 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 13. 27 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 18. 28 Mazrui, Soldiers and Kinsmen in Africa p. 40. 29 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 13. 30 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uganda

6 south 31. This systemic preferential interference lead to an internal polarization between the North and South and contributed to the creation of a potentially explosive mix32. The division was pointedly defined by the roles assigned to the different regions by the British; the South benefited economically from cash crops while the North was used as a reservoir of cheap labour 33 to be used primarily in the agricultural sector of South.

Ugandas high levels of poverty intensifies population growth. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) measures this growth at 3.5% a year, making it the worlds third fastest. At this rate, Ugandas population will have doubled by the year 202534.

Acholi-land The native territory of the Acholi ethnic group in the north of the country is made up of three administrative districts: Gulu, Pader and Kitgum. Although considerable in size, it is sparsely populated, comprising just 4% of Ugandas population - 700,000 people35. The area has little natural resources and relies heavily upon cattle-raising36. For the past 19 years, it has been the primary setting of the LRAs operations and war crimes37.

The colonial legacy perhaps most relevant to the conflict in question was the role of the British in creating and defining the Acholi people. Prior to colonialism, the Acholi did not even exist; before the 1930s they did not have a defined territory and were referred to as Gangi or
31 32

Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 19. Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 19. 33 Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 8. 34 United Nations Population Fund, Overview: Uganda 35 Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 10. 36 Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 12. 37 Economist, An end in sight?

7 Shuli38. The British, continuing with their exploitation of the North of the country, recruited what would later become the Acholi into the armed forces, effecting the eventual creation of a military ethnocracy39. Although far from having a military tradition, the Acholi gradually came to define themselves in terms of military service, and would, in more recent years, comprise significant portions of the Ugandan military40.

History: Since achieving independence in 196241, the former British colony has seen devastating civil wars, military coups, unstable interim governments and brutal dictatorships. The initial years after independence, though marked by political instability, were relatively peaceful. In 1966, the countrys first Prime Minister, Milton Obote, suspended the constitution and assumed control of the government42. The next year he instituted a new constitution, granting himself increased authority. The new constitution also made Uganda a Republic by eliminating the traditional kingdoms that had composed the countrys government after independence43. This proved divisive, particularly among the armed forces. After Obote seized power, the army divided into two factions, split between Acholi loyal to Obote and West Nilers loyal to the newly promoted commander of the armed forces Idi Amin Dada44. Amin continued to promote officers loyal to him45 as tensions between him and the president escalated46.

38 39

Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 10. Mazrui, Soldiers and Kinsmen in Africa p. 41. 40 Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 10. 41 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uganda 42 United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 43 United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 44 Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 8. 45 Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 8. 46 Listowel, Amin p. 67.

8 By 1971 the army was sufficiently under Amins personal control to facilitate a military coup dtat while Obote was out of the country47. Upon seizing power, Amin proceeded to accord himself absolute power and dissolve parliament48. The 1970s, dominated by his infamous dictatorial regime, saw the deaths of over 300,000 people in state-sponsored ethnic and tyrannical violence49. The Acholi were one of two ethnic groups predominantly targeted by Amin, largely due to their support for Obote as well as their considerable influence within the military50. After his ineffective attempt to invade Tanzania, Amin was overthrown by the Tanzanian army and the Acholi-dominated resistance movement the Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF), and its military wing, the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA), in 197951.

However, overthrowing Amin led to greater instability; in less that two years of subsequent interim governments, three different administrations came into power52. Immediately after Amins defeat, the UNLF took control of the country, appointing the UNLA as the countrys military and Yusuf Lule as the countrys interim president53. Infighting resulted in a change of leadership after just two months, when one of Obotes closest deputies, Godfrey Binaisa, replaced Lule as president54. However, the UNLF, with the aim of installing Obote as president through elections, ended Binaisas corrupt administration after just eleven months55. The

47 48

Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 23. United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 49 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 23. 50 United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 51 Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 9. 52 Conflict and growth in Africa p. 24. 53 United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 54 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 24. 55 United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda

9 government was turned over to a military commission led by Paulo Muwanga while elections were organized56.

Prior to taking office, the UNLF had been held together almost exclusively by an opposition to Amin. After he was disposed, there was substantial division as UNLF members began to support other parties. Elections were eventually held and, despite the division, Obote was elected to a second presidency in 1980, albeit under questionable 57 circumstances. His second term would prove bloody; in the first half of the 1980s it is estimated that between 300,000 and 500,000 people, mainly civilians, died58.

In 1981, Yoweri Museveni formed the National Resistance Army (NRA) to fight the government of Obote59. The NRA rejected the old political circles60 that Obote and Amin represented as tyrannical and power-hungry. As the NRA gained popularity and influence in the region to the north of the capital, known as the Luwero triangle, Obote launched Operation: Bonanza to end the NRA insurgency.61 The UNLA proved ineffectual against the NRA and began to commit massacres among the supporting population while at the same time suffering extensive losses at the hands of the NRA62. Furthermore, acting out of frustration, the UNLA undertook massive revenge massacres in the home territory of Idi Amin63.

56 57

United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 9. 58 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 25. 59 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 24. 60 Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 9. 61 Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 9. 62 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 25. 63 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 24.

10 Obotes support crumbled even among the Acholi, who were dying in large numbers in combat with NRA, while Obote refused to negotiate, in addition to no longer receiving preferential treatment in the military64.

In 1985, General Tito Okello, an Acholi, stormed the capital along with Acholi troops, ousting Obote and establishing a military council65. Okello became president and initiated peace negotiations with the NRA and Museveni.66 Though the negotiations appeared promising, the conflict raged. Under Okello, massive human rights violations67 continued as he attempted to wipe out the NRA. Simultaneously, The NRA continued its campaign against the government. The UNLA was soon overwhelmed by the NRA and its remaining forces fled to Sudan68. The fighting continued into 1986, when the NRA captured Kampala and installed Museveni as President69. As president, Museveni integrated the military into a 100,000 strong force, encompassing fighters from the NRA, the UNLF and even Amin supporters70. He would later rebrand the army the Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF)71.

Governance: In Uganda, the president is elected to five year term as the head of state as well as the head of government72. The prime minister presides over the cabinet selected by the president from among the elected legislators to the unicameral National Assembly73.
64 65

Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 25. Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 10. 66 Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 10. 67 United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 68 Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 10. 69 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 25. 70 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 25. 71 United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 72 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uganda 73 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uganda

11

The stability brought by President Museveni has been praised by the likes of the World Bank and U.S. President Bill Clinton74. The World Health Organization cites Uganda as one of the rare success stories in a region that has been ravaged by the HIV/AIDS epidemic75. Museveni has been credited with improving human rights, notably by reducing abuses of the army and police76, in addition to instituting democratic reforms. Although in 2005 he lead the amendment of the constitution that removed term limits for the presidency, a referendum in the same year allowed multi-party elections77. In 2006, he was re-elected President in the first such elections held in the last quarter-century78. The conflict in the North has severely blemished these successes.

Economy: The 2006 Human Development Index ranks Uganda 145th out of 177 countries, a relative success for a country situated in the poorest region of the world79. And while the World Bank describes Ugandas recent economic progress as impressive80, poverty still grips the country: 82% of the population is living on less than $1 U.S. per day81. Nearly half of the governments budget comes from foreign aid82.

74 75

Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 8. World Health Organisation, Uganda Reverses the tide of HIV/AIDS 76 British Broadcasting Corporation, Country Profile: Uganda 77 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uganda 78 British Broadcasting Corporation, Country Profile: Uganda 79 United Nations Development Programme, Country Fact Sheets: Uganda 80 World Bank, Country Brief: Uganda 81 United Nations Population Fund, Overview: Uganda 82 Economist, Coming in from the Jungle, Maybe

12 Agriculture is overwhelmingly the largest sector of the Ugandan economy, employing over 80% of the work force and comprising 31% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)83. Although the main agricultural export of coffee makes the Ugandan economy vulnerable to fluctuating commodity prices on the world market84, the World Bank records a consistently growing GDP and an increasing percentage of the GDP based in exports85. Fertile lands, access to lakes and rivers and significant mineral deposits account for Ugandas other main exports of tea, cotton, tobacco, fish products, copper, cobalt and gold86. Abundant resources and significant reforms to the agricultural and financial sectors have helped to stabilize the Ugandan economy and qualify it for debt relief87.

Conflict: Actors: Lords Resistance Army The LRAs first incarnation, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), was formed under the leadership of Alice Auma in 198688. After suffering heavy losses in an insurgency against the NRA in 1987, Auma fled Uganda to Kenya89. Kony took command in 1988 and consolidated the remaining HSM forces, re-branding them the LRA90. It was not until 1991 that the LRA began using violence against civilians in its insurgent campaign against the government91.

83 84

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uganda British Broadcasting Corporation, Country Profile: Uganda 85 World Bank, Country Brief: Uganda 86 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uganda 87 World Bank, Country Brief: Uganda 88 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 406. 89 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 406. 90 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 407. 91 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 406.

13 But while Konys LRA is typically characterized as a rebellion based on the use of terror tactics92 which has never put forward any coherent political agenda93, there are significant underlying motivating factors for its activities. Apart from religious fanaticism, the LRA was formed and continues to act in part due to the effects of colonialism and past dictatorships. Claiming to represent the Acholi people native to the north of the country, the LRA ostensibly seeks to avoid recurrences of oppressive inequality and ethnic cleansing suffered by the Acholi under previous regimes94. Despite these galvanizing factors, the LRAs efforts to rally the Acholi people against the Ugandan government have thus-far been unsuccessful. This failure is largely due to the reality that the Acholi are the same population [that] has been the primary victim of LRA atrocities95.

Because of violent tactics, The LRA is considered a terrorist organisation by many governments, including Uganda96 and the United States97. However, the characteristics of the LRA make it difficult to classify more precisely. With the upper ranks adhering to the commands of Joseph Kony, who claims to have supernatural powers, certain aspects of the LRA resemble a personality cult98. From an organisational perspective, the LRA more closely resembles a traditional military force99.

92 93

Human Rights Watch The Scars of Death United Nations, Committee On Elimination Of Racial Discrimination 94 Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 13. 95 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 407. 96 United Nations, Committee On Elimination Of Racial Discrimination 97 United States Department of State, State Department Identifies 37 Foreign Terrorist Organizations 98 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 406. 99 International Criminal Court, Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo p. 5.

14 Although it is known to have abducted approximately 30,000 children in its history, the reclusive nature of the LRA makes estimating its current size almost impossible100. The difficulties associated with defeating the LRA militarily are numerous; apart from employing guerrilla tactics and a complete disregard for international borders, the LRA is partly financed and equipped from abroad.101

It is important to note that, although disruptive, the LRA has never threatened the sovereignty of the Ugandan government or directly menaced the leadership of President Museveni.

Government of Uganda: Under the leadership of Museveni, the response to the LRA has varied between complacency, negotiations and military operations.

While it was the case that in the early stages of the conflict, the Ugandan government could not have defeated the LRA militarily because of support from Sudan102, this support has since eroded. In 1994, the government launched Operation North; a brutal anti-insurgent campaign that largely backfired because of the terror it caused among the Acholi people103. Peace negotiations attempted during this time were unsuccessful104.

100 101

United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2005 p. 161. United Nations, Committee On Elimination Of Racial Discrimination 102 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 406. 103 Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 23. 104 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 407.

15 Under the pretext of fighting the LRA, Uganda also launched a military campaign in the DR Congo which was broadly criticized for enabling the exploitation of the DR Congos resources105.

In 2002, the Ugandan government launched Operation Iron Fist against the LRA, during which Ugandan security forces were allowed to enter Southern Sudan to engage LRA bases militarily106.

Uganda is a state-party to the ICC and is under obligation to carry out its warrants. This has been a contentious issue in recent months as Museveni has extended amnesty to those with outstanding warrants in an effort to advance negotiations107.

Government of Sudan: While the government of Sudan is now co-operating with Uganda, this was not always the case108. In the late 1980s, when the NRA formed the government of Uganda, Sudan was under the control of the principally Arab National Islamic Front (NIF). The NIF felt that their control over the Southern, non-Arab area of Sudan was in jeopardy. At that time, in Sudan, there was an uprising lead by the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) that the Sudanese government associated with the government of Uganda. The overlapping desires of the Sudanese Government and the LRA lead to an unstable alliance109.

105 106

United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 107 Economist, Coming in from the Jungle, Maybe 108 Economist, Coming in from the Jungle, Maybe 109 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 406.

16 The ICCs involvement has helped pressure Sudan to stop harbouring rebel camps, and although it is a non-state party, it has formally pledged to execute the ICCs arrest warrants.

Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo: The current implication of the D.R. Congo is minimal, although it is believed that in recent months Kony has been hiding within its borders110. The D.R. Congo is a state-party to the ICC and therefore has an obligation to carry out the arrest warrants for Kony and his deputies111.

The International Criminal Court: The ICCs statute was outlined in the Rome Statute in 2002, the date after which any war crimes committed would fall under its jurisdiction112. The LRA was heavily active in the years between the courts inception and the formal request of Museveni for an intervention. The ICCs investigation found that the LRA had committed numerous acts of murder and enslavement, both constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity113

Analysis: Realism: Realism underscores the states tendency to act in its self-interest. To this end, the state will often bolster its military capacity and seek to acquire both territory and resources. The security of the state and key political issues form the basis of the states foreign policy, and it will accordingly

110 111 112 113

Economist, An end in sight? Economist, An end in sight?

International Criminal Court, Facts and Procedures Regarding the Situation in Uganda p. 1.
International Criminal Court, Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo p. 2.

17 act strategically to meet these ends. States are the basis of the international system which is largely anarchic in nature.

Liberalism: Liberalism or Idealism stresses the individual and groups of individuals as the basis for international relations. The quest for life, liberty, security and prosperity in the rational and secular individual leads to democracies and societies based upon laws. These laws are granted to all individuals equally. Considered to be natural laws, they dictate the behaviour of humans in addition to the motivation of ones self-interest. There sphere of international relations has an abundance of non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations and sub-state entities such as ethnic groups.

Conclusions: The LRAs campaign in Uganda can be partially analyzed by employing both the Realist and the Liberal schools of thought, though each theory has limitations that do not fully account for all pertinent aspects of the conflict. However, when used in conjunction, it is possible to depict the conflict more completely. Realism allows the most thorough description of the motivations and activities of the LRA within Uganda and bordering countries, while Liberalism offers the most accurate account of the real-world circumstances concerning the international response to the conflict on a humanitarian and legal plane.

The most obvious aspect of the LRAs conduct is arguably its rampant self-interest. With total disregard for laws or basic human rights, the LRA is ruthless: more than half its numbers are

18 forcibly conscripted child soldiers114. And although the crimes committed by the LRA are often characterized as arbitrarily brutal, this is not always necessarily the case. Many of the mutilations the LRA carry out, such as the amputation of legs and ears, have important symbolic value that directly, albeit ruthlessly, work to further the anti-government activities115. Those who are suspected of informing authorities of the LRAs activities might have their lips cut off, for example.

Its objective of mobilizing the Acholi people to overthrow the government is being shrewdly carried out by a campaign of terror and domination. Although this invariably creates resentment towards the LRA, there is also growing dissatisfaction with Musevenis impotence in the region among the Acholi.

Consistent with the Realist school of thought is the LRAs outward projection of its national interest; much of its activity is directly based on its internally-held ideology. The LRA seeks the advancement of its religious beliefs, particularly working to institute the Ten Commandments as the basis of law in Uganda. It works to accomplish this through armed struggle and the amassment of weaponry and resources116.

Although the conflict occurs largely within Uganda, the LRAs complete disregard for international borders must be taken into consideration. Kony has avoided capture by fleeing to Sudan and the DR Congo, and frequently operates across borders with the support or

114 115

International Criminal Court, Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo p. 5. Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 27. 116 Human Rights Watch, The Scars of Death

19 complacency of foreign governments117. This is best represented by the Realist conception of anarchic international relations.

Idealism clearly depicts reaction to the conflict in the international sphere. While the ICC is becoming an important actor, humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGO) had been actively responding to the situation long before the ICCs mandate. Given that IDP camps are notorious for fostering disease and having minimal medical facilities, NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders (MSF) have been attempting to provide basic medical care for the hundreds of thousands of IDPs affected by the conflict. While making important efforts to provide assistance, MSFs resources, for example, are overwhelmingly insufficient for the size of the disaster118.

The influence of international agreements, not limited to the Rome Statute, are also relevant. Of particular pertinence to this conflict is the internationally maintained Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Uganda signed and ratified119. The most glaring abuse of the Convention is the LRAs use of child soldiers, which has prompted the most pronounced international criticism. The Ugandan governments failure to bring an end to such glaring abuses has lead to the intervention of international organisations and the UN.

117 118 119

Economist, An end in sight? Mdecins Sans Frontires, Security Improves But Fears Remain.

United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, Status of Ratification of Human Rights Treaties p. 11.

20 Intervention:

As mentioned above, the ICCs intervention in Uganda is a ground-breaking advance in international law. As such, the case will be a litmus test for the ICC 120. The court, which found that between July 2002 and July 2004 [] the killings and abductions numbered in the thousands, often reaching into the hundreds within single months121 will be judged on its efficacy in bringing those charged with crimes against humanity to justice. The past failures or underachievement of other international tribunals represent additional pressure upon the ICC to realize its goals.

Humanitarian Situation: The severity of the humanitarian situation is difficult to understate. As Jan Egeland has said, 90 percent of the population, of the civilian population, has now been displaced in large parts of northern Uganda 122. The LRA has committed atrocities of indescribable horror, not limited to rape, murder, enslavement, sexual enslavement and forced enlisting of children 123.

The Case For Intervention The need for an international intervention is pressing and clear. The Acholi are a marginalized minority suffering massive human rights abuses at the hands of a brutal insurgency. The Ugandan government has been ineffectual at protecting the Acholi people and the international community has been largely silent on the matter. The ICC is an important international institution that, despite important setbacks in the case of Uganda, represents a new chapter in the
120 121

Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 415. International Criminal Court, Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo p. 2. 122 Cable News Network, Transcript: Inside Africa 123 International Criminal Court, Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo p. 4.

21 proactive protection of human rights. Rather than seeking merely to correct the mistakes of already-committed crimes, the ICC is and must continue to actively intervene and work to stop ongoing and future crimes by charging and prosecuting the perpetrators of human rights abuses and crimes against humanity.

Conclusion:

The Acholi people of Uganda have had a violent history. Their current humanitarian plight has reached massive proportions that requires urgent resolution. Although the government of Uganda has made recent progress towards such a resolution, it is unacceptable to allow the perpetrators of such large-scale atrocities to go unpunished. The legal requirement for the governments of the world to support the ICC and bring Kony and his deputies to trial is present and justified.

22 Bibliography: AKHAVAN, Payam, The Lords Resistance Army Case: Ugandas Submission of the First State Referral to the International Criminal Court, The American Journal of International Law, Number 2, Volume 99, April 2005, p. 403-421 Amnesty International, Uganda: Amnesty International calls for an effective alternative to impunity, August, 2006, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR590042006? open&of=ENG-2AF, (consulted November 23, 2006) British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], Country Profile: Uganda, September, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1069166.stm (consulted November 23, 2006) Cable News Network [CNN], Transcript: Inside Africa: A Look at the Plight of Refugees, Illegal Immigrants in Africa, October, 2004, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0410/23/i_if.01.html (consulted November 23, 2006) Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], The World Factbook: Uganda, November, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ug.html, (consulted November 23, 2006) DOOM, Ruddy and VLASSENROOT, Koen, Konys Message: A New Koine? The Lords Resistance Army in Northern Uganda, African Affairs, Number 390, Volume 98, January 1999, p. 5-36 Economist, An end in sight?, August, 2006, http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_SRVVNGR, (consulted November 23, 2006) Economist, Coming in from the Jungle, Maybe, September, 2006, http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_SRRSSJN, (consulted November 23, 2006) Economist, Will Kony come out of the Bush?, October, 2006, http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_RDVRPPD (consulted November 23, 2006) Human Rights Watch [HRW], The Scars of Death: Children Abducted by the Lords Resistance Army, September, 1997, http://www.hrw.org/reports97/uganda/, (consulted November 23, 2006)

23 International Criminal Court [ICC], Facts and Procedures Regarding the Situation in Uganda, www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC_20051410-056-1_English.pdf, October 14, 2005, 4 p. (consulted November 23, 2006) International Criminal Court, Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/Uganda-_LMO_Speech_14102005.pdf, October 14, 2005, 8 p. (consulted November 23, 2006) International Criminal Court, Uganda, http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/UGD.html (consulted November 23, 2006) KLUGMAN, Jeni, NEYAPTI, Bilin and STEWART, Frances, Conflict and Growth in Africa: Vol. 2: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 1999, 113 p. LISTOWEL, Judith, Amin, Dublin: IUP Books, 1973, 188 p. MAZRUI, Ali, A., Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: the Making of a Military Ethnocracy, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975, 325 p. Mdecins Sans Frontires, Security Improves But Fears Remain: MSF maintains health care for displaced in Pader District, Uganda, June, 2006, http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=F04BDBB4-5056-8730D7CBA27B954DD801&component=toolkit.article&method=full_html, (consulted November 23, 2006) United Nations [UN], Committee On Elimination Of Racial Discrimination Concludes Review Of Uganda's Second To Tenth Periodic Reports, March, 2003, http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/A1F0DC9994BBEAE4C1256CE50058B538? opendocument, (consulted November 23, 2006) United Nations, UNICEF highlights forgotten tragedy of child soldiers in Uganda, July, 2004, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=11392, (consulted November 23, 2006) United Nations Childrens Fund [UNICEF], A Chance to Return to Normal Life: Former Child Soldiers Return Home in Northern Uganda, May, 2004, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/uganda_return_normal.html, (consulted November 23, 2006) United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], Human Development Report 2005, New York: UNDP, 2005, 371 p. United Nations Development Programme, Country Fact Sheets: Uganda, 2006, http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_UGA.html, (consulted November 23, 2006)

24

United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights [UNHCHR], Status of Ratification of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, June, 2004, http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf, p. 11, (consulted November 23, 2006) United Nations Population Fund [UNFPA], Overview: Uganda, http://www.unfpa.org/profile/uganda.cfm?Section=1, (consulted November 23, 2006) United States Department of State, State Department Identifies 37 Foreign Terrorist Organizations, April, 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2004/Apr/29-636067.html, (consulted November 23, 2006) United States Department of State [USDoS], Background Note: Uganda, November, 2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2963.htm (consulted November 23, 2006) World Bank, Country Brief: Uganda, September, 2006, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/UGANDAEXTN /0,,menuPK:374947~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:374864,00.html, (consulted November 23, 2006) World Health Organisation [WHO], Uganda Reverses the tide of HIV/AIDS, http://www.who.int/inf-new/aids2.htm, (consulted November 23, 2006)

25 Selected Chronology: 1877: 1879: 1894: 1962: Protestant Missionaries enter the country124 Catholic Missionaries enter the country 125 British Protectorate is established over what would become Uganda126 Uganda achieves independence from Britain127

1966: Prime Minister Milton Obote suspends the constitution and takes control of the government, abolishing the offices of ceremonial president and vice-president.128 1967: Obote installs a new constitution, granting the president additional powers and making Uganda a republic. January 1971: Idi Amin leads a coup dtat and takes power129. He amends the constitution to accord himself absolute power, and proceeds to dissolve parliament130. Idi Amin is overthrown when Tanzanian military forces and the Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF)131, an opposition group, take Kampala132. Yusuf Lule becomes president133 June 1979: May 1980: Godfrey Binaisa becomes president134 Paulo Muwanga chairs the military commission leading the country135 Rigged elections are held and Obote is sworn into his second presidency136

April 1979:

December 1980:

1981: Yoweri Museveni establishes the National Resistance Army (NRA)137

124 125

United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 126 United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 127 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uganda 128 United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 129 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 23. 130 United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 131 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 24. 132 United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 133 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 24. 134 United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 135 United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 136 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 24. 137 Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 9.

26 January 1983: Operation: Bonanza launched by Obote to end the NRA insurgency.138

1984: UNLA has little success fighting NRA, commits atrocities among its supporters July 1985: January 1986: General Tito Okello Letwa (an Acholi) becomes President and initiates negotiations with NRA and Museveni.139 NRA takes the capital Museveni becomes president140

1986: The LRAs first incarnation, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), is formed under the leadership of Alice Auma141 1987: The HSM suffers major losses in combat with the NRM and Auma flees to Kenya142 1988: Joseph Kony assumes leadership of the remnants of the HSM and re-brands it the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). 143 1989: Museveni extends his term by 5 years144. It would actually be 7 years before elections are held. 1991: 1994: 1996: 1998: LRA begins targeting civilians145 Peace talks between and the LRA and Uganda fail146. LRA intensifies attacks on civilians147. Museveni wins the countrys first direct presidential election148 Uganda deploys military to the Democratic Republic of Congo149

1999: Uganda signs the Rome Statute150, creating the International Criminal Court 2001: Museveni is re-elected. 151

138 139

Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 9. Doom, Stewart, Konys Message p. 10. 140 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 25. 141 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 406. 142 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 406. 143 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 407. 144 Klugman, Neyapti, Stewart, Conflict and Growth in Africa p. 25. 145 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p..407. 146 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 407. 147 Akhavan, The Lords Resistance Army Case p. 407. 148 British Broadcasting Corporation, Country Profile: Uganda 149 United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 150 International Criminal Court, Facts and Procedures Regarding the Situation in Uganda p. 1. 151 British Broadcasting Corporation, Country Profile: Uganda

27 2002: Uganda launches Operation Iron Fist against the LRA in North Uganda and Southern Sudan152 June: 2002: July 2002: June 2003: December 2003: February 2004: July 2004: October 2005: February 2006: August 26th 2006: Uganda ratifies the Rome Statute153. Crimes committed after this date fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC154 Uganda recalls military force in the DRC. 155 Case against LRA referred to the ICC by Uganda156 Uganda affirms the jurisdiction of the ICC to prosecute crimes committed during the mandate of the court157. ICC opens investigation into crimes committed by LRA158 ICC unseals the warrants for the arrest of Joseph Kony and four of his deputies159 Museveni is re-elected. 160 The LRA and Uganda sign a truce in Juba, Sudan, giving LRA fighters until the 12th of September to surrender161.

152 153

United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda International Criminal Court, Facts and Procedures Regarding the Situation in Uganda p. 1. 154 International Criminal Court, Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo p. 2. 155 United States Department of State, Background Note: Uganda 156 International Criminal Court, Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo p. 2. 157 International Criminal Court, Facts and Procedures Regarding the Situation in Uganda p. 1. 158 International Criminal Court, Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo p. 2. 159 International Criminal Court, Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo p. 2. 160 British Broadcasting Corporation, Country Profile: Uganda 161 Economist, An end in sight?

28 Annex 2: Map of Uganda162

162

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Uganda