Battle For The Schools: Taliban and State Education

AntonioGiustozziandClaudioFranco
TheBattlefortheSchools
TheTalebanandStateEducation
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
Stateeducationhasbeenamajorboneof contentionbetweentheKabulgovernmentandthe Talebansince2001.By201011,however,a changedattitudetowardsstateeducationseemed tobecomethefirstconfidencebuildingmeasurein movingtowardspoliticalnegotiations.Moreover, overtheyearstheTalebansstrategyofaggression againststateschoolsproducedverymodest dividends,asonlysmallportionsofthepopulation weresoradicallyopposedtostateschools;this promptedarethinkingoftheissuewithinthe Taleban. Stateeducationhasbeencontroversialin Afghanistansinceitsfirstrolloutinthe1950s:rural communitiesand,inparticular,mullahshaveoften opposedit,sometimesviolently.Until1978,the Kabulgovernment(carefulnottoantagonisethe villagersmorethenstrictlynecessaryinlightofits aimofgradual,slowchange)keptsuchopposition undercontrol.Thatchangedin1978,whenaradical leftistregimetookpowerandsetouttointensify theuseofeducationasavehicleofmodernisation andideologicalindoctrination.Thevillagersandthe mullahs,alwayssuspicious,werepushedtoopenly rebelagainststateeducation.Educationalreforms wereoneofthemaincausesofrebellionin1978 79.In197892,theconservativeandIslamist oppositioncametoseestateschoolsasaprimary target,withthousandsbeingtorched;thousandsof teachersalsodiedintheviolence. In19922001,stateeducationwasstill controversial,thistimemainlybecauseofits absence.Schoolswerebarelyfunctioninginthose yearsandthenewIslamicregimes(themujahidins andtheTalebans)toyedwiththeideaofIslamising stateeducation,increasingdramaticallytheshare ofreligioussubjectsinthecurricula,butachieved littleinthewayofafunctioningsystembecauseof lackofresources. After2001,thenewregimeinstalledby internationalinterventiondidnotparticularlyfocus oneducationasatoolofpoliticalindoctrination,but someaspectsofthetextbooksadoptedturnedtobe controversial,aswasthemodestroleassignedto religioussubjects.Clericaloppositionwasstrong fromthebeginning,andsomeruralcommunities tooseemtohaveresentedstateeducation,evenif attendingschoolwasnotcompulsory. Violenceagainstschoolsstartedwithavarietyof conservativeactors,buttheTalebansoonadoptedit asoneofthemainmanifestationsoftheircampaign againstthenewregime;attacksagainstschools peakedin2006,withdozensofstudentsand teacherskilledandhundredsofschoolsaffected. However,ruralcommunitiesshowedlittlesupport fortheviolentcampaignandtheTalebanfaceda backlashfromvillagerswhowantedtheirchildrento begiventheopportunitytoattendschool. Havingopenlycommittedtothecampaignof violence,theTalebancouldonlybacktrackslowly.In
GiustozziandFranco:TheBattlefortheSchools
2007,however,contactswiththeMinistryof Education(MoE)tookplace,andthenwerecutoff, allegedlybecauseofAmericanhostilitytothem. NeithertheTalebannortheMoEtriedhoweverto preventlocaldeals:afewschoolsstartedreopening. ThesubstanceofTalebandemandsforthe reopeningofschoolsremainedconstantfrom2007 onwards:adoptingtheTalebancurriculum, returningtotheoldtextbooksandhiringteachersof religioussubjectslinkedtotheTaleban.Atrickleof localdealscontinueduntil2010,whenthepaceof localnegotiationsacceleratedconsiderably,perhaps becausetheTalebanremovedtheauthorisationto attackschoolsfromtheircodeofconductin2009. However,betweenlate2010andearly2011,the MoEapparentlydecidedtorestartnegotiationsat thetopleveltoallowformoreradicalchange. PerhapstheAfghangovernmentdecidedthatitdid notneedanymoreWashingtonsauthorisationto negotiate,orWashingtondidnotopposesuch willingnesstonegotiate.Inanycase,theTaleban decidedtosuspendattacksonschoolsaltogether; thedecisiondidnotleadtoacompletecessationof attacks,becauseofcommandandcontrolproblems, becausenonTalebanelementswereinvolvedor becauseofalternativereasonsforcarryingout attacksagainstspecifictargets(asopposedtoanall outcampaignagainststateschools). Thefactremainsthatthelevelofviolencedropped verysubstantiallystartinginthesecondhalfof2010 andevenmoresoin2011.Talebancommandersin thefieldoftenopenlytalkedaboutanagreement betweentheTalebanleadershipandtheMoE (mediatedaccordingtosomebyformerTaleban ForeignMinisterMutawakil)toreopenallschoolsin exchangefortheMoEsgeneralisedadoptionofa newcurriculum.Dealmakingatthelocallevelinthe meanwhilecontinued,withgirlschoolsalso beginningtoreopeninsomeprovinces. Perceptionsofdealmakingonstateschoolsvary amongthepopulationandamongtheTaleban.In thefirsthalfof2011,whenresearchwas conducted,villagerssawthecessationofattacks mostlyaspositive.AmongtheTaleban,several intervieweesseemedunenthusiasticaboutthe change,butwereencouragedbythepromiseof furtherconcessionsbytheMoE,whichwouldbring thenationalcurriculamuchclosertotheTalebans. Voicesstronglysupportiveofthenew developmentsandofseculareducationgenerally existedevenamongtheTaleban,perhapsasa resultofgrowingrecruitmentofmembersfrom statehighschoolsorevenformermembersof moremodernistpartiessuchasHezbeIslami.
Atthetimeofwriting,theMoEleadershipseemed keentoturndealmakingonschoolsintoa confidencebuildingmeasureforfuturepolitical negotiationsthantheTalebanthemselveswere; theTalebanseemedmoremotivatedbytheneed tobridgethegapwiththeruralcommunities, increasinglywaryofaconflictwhichneverseems toend.Communitieshaveevidentlyputpressure ontheTalebansince200607,althoughsaying whatweightsuchpressurehadinmakingthe Talebanchangetheirmindisdifficult.Insome cases,clericsseemtohavebeeninvolvedin lobbyingtheTalebanfornegotiatinglocaldeals. TheTalebansstrategyforeducationseemsaimed attryingtoprovideasmuchaspossiblearangeof servicestothepopulation:Quranicschools,private schools(sometimessubsidisedbyTaleban), madrassasandTalebancontrolledstateschools. Thelatterareofparticularimportancebecause theyaretheonlyfreesource(atleastinprinciple) ofseculareducation,andtheTalebanhave investedhumanresourcesinsupervisingstate schoolsintheareaswheretheyaremost influential.TheTalebansupervisorsnotonlyensure thatthedealswiththeMoEarerespected,butalso theattendanceofteachersandstudents.This seemstoresultfromtherealisationthatonekey weaknessoftheTalebanistheirlimitedabilityto provideservicestothepopulation,whichdemands theminsistently.
CONTENTS
1. Introduction 2. Thebeginningofthecampaignofviolence 2.1Thedimensionsoftheproblem 2.2ReasonsforTalebanopposition 2.3ThefirstsignsofTalebanreconsidering 3. Negotiationsorconcessions? 3.1Thefirstnegotiatinground 3.2Thesecondnegotiatinground 3.3ContinuityintheTalebanspolicy 3.4Discontinuity 4.1TheTalebanandprivateschools 4.2DifferencesamongTalebanabout stateschools 4.3Talebansschoolmonitoring 4.4TheTalebanandtheclergy 5. Conclusion Annex 3 4 4 5 8 8 8 10 13 16 21 22 24 25 25 28
4. Talebanviewsaboutthefutureofeducation21
AANThematicReport08/2011
1.INTRODUCTION
Inearly2011,theattitudeoftheTalebantowards nonreligiouseducationcametotheattentionof themediabecauseofastatementconcerninga changeinthisattitudebyMinisterofEducation FaruqWardak.Inreality,somethinghadbeen fomentinglongbeforethat.Thisreportwas conceivedinOctober2010andtheprojectstarted inDecember,beforeWardaksforay.Betweenthe endof2009andearly2010,whileresearching anotherpaperoneducationinAfghanistan,1oneof theauthorsnoticednegotiationsgoingonatthe locallevelinvariouspartsofAfghanistan.Then during2010,whileresearchinganotherpaper, InsurgentsoftheAfghanNorth,2theauthorsheard oftheTalebanassertingtheircontroloverstate schoolsinKunduz.Thesehintsthatsomethingwas happeningonthegroundwereenoughto stimulatetheauthorsattention,notleastbecause oftheview,alreadyexpressedinNationBuildingIs NotforAll 3thatcontrolovereducationisacrucial aspectofanycompetitionforpoliticalinfluence. ThispaperthereforesetsouttoexploreTaleban attitudestowards(nonreligious)educationin generalandstateeducationinparticular,ingreater depththanwaspossibleinthefirstpaper.The paperisbasedprimarilyonaseriesofinterviews carriedoutbytheauthorsbetweenDecember 2010andMarch2011withamixof82Taleban, elders,teachersandinformedpeoplein10 differentprovincesofAfghanistan.Theinformed peopleincludetailors,shopkeepersanddrivers, chosenbythefieldresearchersbecauseoftheir knowledgeoflocaldevelopments.Thirtytwoof the82intervieweeswereTalebancommanders. Faryab,Helmand,Kandahar,Ghazni,Paktika, Nangarhar,Kunar,Laghman,KunduzandTakhar provinceswerechosenfromareashavinga significantTalebanpresenceasasample representingthedifferentregionsofAfghanistan. AgroupofAfghaninterviewers,commissionedby theauthorsofthispaper,carriedoutinterviewsin ruralareasintheirownprovinces.Theyuseda questionnaire,whichwasadaptedinthecourseof theresearchtoimprovethecollectionofrelevant information.Theoriginalversionofitisattachedto
1
thisreportasanannex.Allinterviewershad previousexperienceofthistypeofresearch.The interviewerstooknotesduringtheinterviews.The teamdecidedthatrecordingtheinterviewswas notfeasibleandwouldcompromisethegathering ofinformation.Transcriptsoftheinterviewswere producedoutofthenotesanddelivered electronicallyormanuallyfortranslation.Asmall groupoftrustedtranslatorstranslatedthe interviewsandquoteshavebeenextractedfor perusalinthisreport.Inevitably,thequalityofthe responsesandthedegreeofcooperationofthe intervieweesvariedwidely,butonthewhole,the interviewersfoundafairdegreeofopenness amongtheinterviewees.Althoughthe intervieweestendedtomakeinflatedclaims,the authorsbelievethatthematerialwasusefulasa representationoftheirviews;interviewswith Talebanwerebalancedbyinterviewswithteachers andeldersinordertoverifytheclaimsbeingmade. Inaddition,theauthorsalsocarriedoutinterviews inKabulamongdiplomatsandofficialsof internationalorganisations.Thematerialthus collectedwasassessedbasedoninformation availablefromothersources,includingtheexisting literatureandpressreports. Thisreportstartswithsomebriefconsiderationsof theTalebanscampaignofviolenceagainstschools, teachersandstudentsafter2001.Thetopichas alreadybeendebatedelsewhere4andwediscussit hereonlytofacilitateunderstandingofthe subsequentchanges.Importantly,stateeducation hasbeencontroversialinAfghanistansinceitwas firstrolledoutonalargescaleinthe1950s. Conservativefamiliesfeltthatthestatewas stealingtheirchildren,inculcatinginthemasetof valuesdifferentfromthosetheyhelddear.Mullahs feltthreatenedoneofthemainreasonsvillagers paidushr(religioustax)tothemwasbecausethey taughtintheQuranicschools(wheresmallkidsget toknowthebasicsofreligion)andmadrassas (wherefuturemullahsareformed).Educationof girlswasthemostcontroversialaspectofstate education.Resistanceandincidentsoccurredinthe 1950sand1960s,particularlyinthesouth.Then, thepoliticisationofstateeducationbytheleftist regimein1978turnedschoolsintooneofthemain targetsofthearmedopposition(themujahidin). Until1992,thousandsofteachersandstudents diedinattacksonschools,effectivelywipingout stateeducationinmostofthecountryside.
4
A.Giustozzi,NationBuildingIsNotforAll:ThePolitics ofEducationinAfghanistan,AANThematicReport 2/2010,Berlin,Kabul:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,May 2010. 2 A.GiustozziandChristophReuter,TheInsurgentsofthe AfghanNorth,AANThematicReport04/2011Kabul, Berlin:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,May2011. 3 Giustozzi,NationBuilding(seeFN1).
SeeGiustozzi,NationBuilding(FN1)forasummary. ThemainpiecesofworkareLessonsinTerror:Attackson EducationinAfghanistan,HumanRightsWatch,July 2006;andKnowledgeonFire:AttacksonEducationin Afghanistan,CareInternational,January2009.
December2011
Educationwasalsocontroversialintheyearsofthe TalebansIslamicEmirate,althoughforreasons oppositetothosediscussedabove.TheTaleban tookoverwhatwasleftofstateeducationand triedtoreshapeitaccordingtotheirmodel,mixing secularandreligioussubjectsinapproximately equalparts.Theyalsogreatlycurtailedgirls education,allowingonlyafewNGOrunschoolsto keepteachinggirls. Itwasnotuntil2002thattheAfghanstatewasin positiontorolloutagainstateeducationinthe Afghancountryside.Pastexperiences,however, contributedtomakeeducationasensitiveissue. ItemslikethepicturesofCommanderMassud (believedtoconveytheimageofahero)orof MullahOmar(believedtoconveyinsteadthe imageofavillain)becamehighlycontroversial. Violenceagainstschoolstartedagainandpeaked in2006,inwhatseemedanorchestratedcampaign againststateschools. Thecentralpartofthereportisdedicatedto discussingevidenceofnegotiationsaround schools;thefirstsectionfocuseson200709when thefirstindicationsemergedthatsomethingwas goingon.Thesecondsectiontakesthediscussion to201011.Inaseparatesubsection,wediscuss whatmotivatedtheTalebanschangeofstrategy; wealsodiscussseparatelytheTalebandemands foracompromise.Thelastsectionlooksathintsof thedebatewithintheTalebanofwhatthefutureof educationinAfghanistancouldbe.
allegedlycontaminatedbyforeigners;mixedboys andgirlsclasses(inthelowergrades)were reportedlyafurtherreasonforopposition. Conservativeelementshadbeen,inmanycases, campaigningforsometimeagainststateschoolsin variouspartsofthecountry,includingthenorth: MawlawiIslam(amemberofJamiatIIslamiwho joinedtheTalebanandthenreturnedtoJamiatat theendof2001)closedstateschoolsinKamad, Samangan,inlatespring2001andkidnapped teachers.Alreadyin2002,nightletterswere poppingupinfrontofschoolsandhomesofstaff members,mainlyinthesouthbuteveninthe north.7Thecontentwassimilarthroughoutthe countryandwasmainlyaprotestagainst internationalinvolvementineducation.8Clearly, thisoppositioncouldnotbestrictlycharacterised asTaleban,becauseofitsgeographicalspread. Conservativemullahsandmembersofarmed militiaswerethechiefsuspects.9After2002,a rangeofattacksandintimidationbecamemore andmorecommoninvariouspartsofthe country.10ByOctober2009,theMinistryof Educationacknowledgedthat800schoolshadto beclosedintheareasmostaffectedbythe insurgency,andeventhatmighthavebeenan underestimateoftheextentoftheproblem. Clearly,theTalebanjoinedthewaveofattacks againstschoolsearlyon.Whatordersandwhen exactlytheywereissuedisnotclear;thefirstsign ofcodificationofthecampaignagainstschools datesbacktoDecember2006.Atthattimethe Talebanleadershipincludedinitslayeha,thecode ofconductissuedtofieldcommanders, instructionstoattackschoolsthatdidnotabideby therulesestablishedbytheleadershipitself; concerningthebanonthepost2001curriculum, onthenewtextbooksgraduallyadopted;andon girlseducation.Allegedly,theTalebanleadership tookthedecisionafteramajordiscussiononthe topicinthepreviousmonths.11
7
2. THECAMPAIGNOFVIOLENCE
2.1 TheDimensionsoftheProblem
In2002,optimismwaswidespreadinAfghanistan abouttheprospectsofrelaunchingstate educationonagrandscaleandwithalargely secularsyllabus.Inreality,signsofresistanceby sectionsofthereligiousestablishmentandby conservativesectionsofsocietywereevidentfrom thebeginning,particularlyconcerningtextbooks andtheeducationofgirls.5Apreviousreport pointedoutthatoppositionwasstrongerinareas thathadbeenweaklyexposedtostateeducationin thepast,suchassouthernAfghanistan,statingthat upto2006,wecannoticethealmostperfect matchbetweenthepenetrationoftheTalebanand ruralilliteracyrates.6Theavailable(mostly anecdotal)evidencesuggeststhatsome communitiesopposedcertainaspectsofeducation, inparticularthecurriculumandthetextbooks,
5 6
SeeGiustozzi,NationBuilding(FN1). SeeGiustozzi,NationBuilding(FN1).
InterviewwithFaryabProvincialCouncilmember, Maimana,March2009;personalcommunicationwith KateClark,March2010andSeptember2011;Giustozzi, NationBuilding(seeFN1). 8 NGOsources. 9 SeeGiustozzi,NationBuilding(FN1). 10 MichaelDenTandt,InAfghanistan,toTeachIstoLive inFear,GlobeandMail(9March2006);SaeedZabuli, InsecurityHaltsLearninginZabul,PajhwokAfghan News(22December2006);SherAhmadHaidar, ThreatenedandSnubbed:50,000StudentsBannedfrom SchoolinGhazni,PajhwokAfghanNews(2January 2007). 11 KateClark,TheLayha:CallingtheTalebantoAccount, AANThematicReport6/2011,Kabul,Berlin:Afghanistan
Theincorporationofthatdecisioninthelayeha meantallgirlsschools,andboysschoolsthatused post2001textbooksandsyllabi,wereineffect liabletobeattacked.However,therealinnovation ofthelayehawastolayoutaclearprocedureon whichattacksonschoolscouldbeauthorised:first awarninghadtobeadministered,thenaphysical beatingandeventually(incaseofnoncompliance) thekillingofteachingstaffandtheburningofthe schoolwouldbeauthorised.12Theactualincrease inthepaceofattacksagainstschoolswasalready noticeableinthecourseof2006(seeGraphs1and 2).ISAF(InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce) sourcesestimatedthatattacksagainstschools increasedby65percentinthatyear.13
Graph1.Attacksoneducation, accordingtoUNICEF
2.2 ReasonsforTalebanOpposition
Externalobserversadvancedvariousexplanations aboutwhatmotivatedthewaveofviolenceagainst stateschoolsandteachers.Previousstudiesrarely discusswhytheTalebanhavebeentargeting schools;theCarestudyhoweverpointedoutthat girlsschoolsweremoreoftentargetedthanboys schools.14Thisisnotsurprisingasgirlseducation hadalwaysbeenaparticularlycontroversialissue inAfghanistan,moresointheyearstheTaleban wereinpower(19962001).15TheHumanRights Watchstudywastheonlyonetoaddresstheissues oftheTalebansreasonsandsummarisedthat itappearsthattheattacksaremotivatedby ideologicaloppositiontoeducationgenerally ortogirlseducationspecifically.Inother instancesschoolsandteachersmaybe attackedassymbolsofthegovernment(often theonlygovernmentpresenceinanarea)or, ifrunbyinternationalnongovernmental organizations,astheworkofforeigners.Ina fewcases,theattacksseemtoreflectlocal grievancesandrivalries.16
Graph2.Attacksoneducation,accordingtoMoE
AnalystsNetwork,2011;sourcesclosetotheTalebanin Pakistan,2009. 12 JasonStraziuso,SlayingofTeachersinAfghanistan FollowsNewRulesFromTaleban,TheWashingtonPost (10December2006). 13 TalebanAttacksKilledOver700AfghanCiviliansthis Year:NATO,AgenceFrancePresse(2November2006). 14 MaritGlad,KnowledgeonFire:AttacksonEducation inAfghanistanRisksandMeasuresforSuccessful Mitigation,Kabul,Care,September2009. 15 SeeGiustozzi,NationBuilding(FN1). 16 HumanRightsWatch,LessonsinTerror,p.8(seeFN4).
December2011
AfghananalystWahidMuzhda,whoworkedwith theTalebanduringtheIslamicEmirateperiod, expressedtheviewthattheTalebantargeted schoolsnotoutofideologicalconviction,butto denythegovernmentavenuetopropagateviews contrarytothoseoftheTaleban.17Oneexplanation ofthehostilityoftheTalebantowardsschoolswas thatISAFandtheAfghansecurityforceshadbeen usingthemascamps;thisis,forexample,the interpretationprovidedbyatailorinHelmand18 whohappenedtohearfromanindividual unsympathetictotheTalebanthatschools effectivelyworkedashatcheriesforthePoliceand Army.19Oneintervieweebelievedthatschoolsare providingaworkforcetotheNationalArmy, NationalPoliceandothereducatedgroupswhoat theendwouldstrengthenthegovernment.20The useofschoolsaspollingstationsalsoproved controversial,asexplainedbyoneinterviewee: Inourregion,Talebanclosedschoolsfortwo months.Governmentwantedtousethese schoolsaselectionstationsandTalebanwere againsttheseelectionssotheyclosedschools. Thelocaleldersconvincedthegovernment nottoconducttheelectioninschoolsand Talebantopermittheschoolstofunction. Lateron,theschoolsweregrantedpermission tofunction.21 Availabledataconfirmsthatwhentheelectoral commissionsusedschoolsaspollingstationsin 2010,theattacksaffectingschoolsincreasedby fourtofivetimes.22 Explanationsfortheattacksprovidedbyrankand fileTalebanweresubstantiallysimilarovertheyears. TheTalebanexplainedtheirruthlessattacks, includingthekillingofteachersandsometimes students,bysayingtheywereonlytargetingschools whereChristianityisbeingtaught.23Fromour interviewees,wecollectedvariationsonthistheme: TheTalebandonotlikeschoolsforthe governmentinstitutionsofferEnglishand othercurrentsubjects.Theyfearthatthese
subjectswouldweakentheirfaith.Islamonly permitsreligiouseducation.24 Talebanareoftheviewthat[theCommunists whoruledAfghanistanin19781992]were theproductofschoolsanduniversities; therefore,theyopposetheseinstitutionsand demandfortheestablishmentofreligious institutionslikemadrassas.25 TalebanwanttoimplementIslamiclaws.They arenotagainstacquiringeducation.Butbeing aMuslim,oneissupposedtoacquireIslamic educationonly.26 Talebanwantthepromotionofreligious education.Theydontlikeschoolswhereun Islamiceducationisimpartedandstudents aredivertedfromtheirreligion.27 Wedontacceptthesyllabusofinvaders.28 Weareenemiesofschoolsforthereasonthat theywanttoimparttheirversionof education.Butwesaythatreligiouseducation shouldbeimpartedtostudents.29 EveniftheTalebannolongeradmittedtoattacking stateschoolsin2011,theoppositionalrhetoricis stillthere: Whythenationrenderedsacrificesand offeredoneandahalfmillionmartyrsif peoplecanthaveasyllabusoftheirchoicein schoolsasthepresentlackscoursesof religiouseducation.30 SomeoftheTalebanintervieweesagreedwiththe viewthatschoolsbringsupportforthe government,andhencehavetobefought: Talebandonotlikethisgovernmentrun educationalinstitutionforitbrings acceptanceandsupportforgovernment whichTalebanfearswillharmtheir interests.31 Talebandonotopposetheschoolsassuch butsincetheyhavedifferenceswiththe governmenttheydoopposetheschoolsfor
17
Mursal,TheTalebanDontBurnSchools?UNIFEM, Afghanistan,14July2007;GolnazEsfandiari, Afghanistan:MilitantsAreTargetingSchools,RadioFree Europe,RadioLiberty(22February2006). 18 InterviewwithTailorA,Helmand. 19 InterviewwithShopkeeperHSH,Helmand. 20 InterviewwithTailorA,Helmand. 21 InterviewwithFarmerMA,Sarhauza(Paktika). 22 InterviewwithHossainNasrat,AIHRCofficial,13 March2011. 23 Mursal,TheTalebanDontBurnSchools?(seeFN16); Esfandiari,Afghanistan:Militants(seeFN16).
24 25
InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAAA,Garmser. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAK,DashtiArchi. 26 InterviewwithTalebanNAJ,Kunduz. 27 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderMawlawiR, Faryab. 28 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderMawlawiR, Faryab. 29 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAS,Faryab. 30 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAJ,Faryab. 31 InterviewwithTalebN,Nawa.
theybelievethatitleadstotheincreasing influenceofthegovernment.32 AttherootsofthehostilityoftheTalebantowards stateschoolsislikelybecauseTalebanfield commanders,inparticular,seemtobealmost exclusivelydrawnfrommadrassas.ATalebhimself explainedthat severalofTalebanleadershavegoteducation inschoolsanduniversities.ButsuchTaleban dontinterfereinaffairsofmilitary;onthe otherhand,Talebanofseminariesdont interfereincivilaffairs.33 Atthisstage,discerningwhetherthisdichotomy betweenthemilitaryandthepolitical administrativewingsoftheTalebanistheresultof aformaldecisionorhassimplygrownoutof circumstancesisdifficult.Suchdichotomy, however,mightexplainwhytheTalebanwereslow inchangingapolicyofviolenthostilitytowards stateschools,evenaftertheleadershiphad becomeawareofhowunpopularsuchapolicy was.Severalresponsestoourinterviews highlightedtheviewthatmadrassaeducationis thebackboneoftheTalebanfightingspirit(see Section4). TeachersinparticularsometimesaccuseTaleban cadresoflookingdownonstateeducatedpeople andofcallingtheminferiortofarmersand peasants,aswellofexpellingfighterseducatedin stateschools:34 TheTalebanofseminaryhavea contemptuousattitudetowardsschool students.Theytrytoexpelschoolgraduates fromtheirranks.ButTalebancantdowithout thehelpofschoolgraduates.Thepeoplewho attendedschoolsusedtowearturbansand runtheirgovernmentinthepast.35 Whilethehighschoolandstateeducateddismiss theTalebanasabunchofilliteratezealots,the Talebanareadamantthatalltheirleadersand commandersareeducated(inmadrassas)and proudlystatethatanilliteratepersonwillneverbe abletobecomeacommander,aseducationisa prerequisite.36 Talebancommandersandsomeexternalobservers seemtoagreeonthispointoffriction:
37
TheleaderofeverygroupofTalebanshould havecommandoverthefourschoolsofFiqh butTalebandontappointpeopleofschools asleaders.37 Talebanleadersareeducatedpeople.They graduatedfrommadrassasandhaventgot educationatschools.We(Taleban)consider Islamiceducationastherealeducationand nottheonethatwesternersaretryingto impart.38 TheTalebanofthemadrassasdontliketheir colleagues,whohavegoteducationin schools.TheTalebansaythattheyhave knowledgeofallfourschoolsofthought[of Islam]whilethosepeoplewhohavestudied inschoolknownothingaboutevenasingle schoolofthought.Sotheydontrespecttheir colleagues,whohavegoteducationin schools.39 Anotheroneoftheearlyreasonsforoppositionto stateschoolswasreportedlytheperceived discriminationagainstmadrassasbythe government,whichinvestedverylittleinavery smallnumberofgovernmentmadrassas.40Someof ourintervieweesechoedthissentimentaswell: Those[Taleban]whoareeducatedorhave someinformationabouttheschoolsare comparativelypositive,butthosewhoare ignorantoftheschoolsystemareagainstit andallegethatthestudentsorgraduateof theseschoolshavenegativeopinionabout theulema.Theyarecriticalabouttheschools anddonotlikemorepatronageandattention giventotheschoolsthanthemadrassas.41 ...thegovernmentisshowingpartiality.Why aretheyfavouringschoolsovermadrassas? ThisthingworriestheTalebanandtheydont likethisdiscrimination.42 Aparticulargroupisagainsttheschools,and theydothisinreactiontothefactthatthe governmentisnotpayinganyattentionto Madrassas.43
32 33
InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAQ,Zeri. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderGYZ,Takhar. 34 InterviewswithTeacherNU,Faryab;TeacherMZ, Laghman. 35 InterviewwithTeacherMZ,Laghman. 36 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAS,Faryab.
InterviewwithTalebanCommanderMawlawiR, Faryab. 38 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAS,Faryab. 39 InterviewwithTribalElderAH,Nangarhar.Notethat teachingschoolsofthoughtotherthanthepredominant oneinaparticularareaisonlysuperficiallyimpartedin theaveragemadrassa. 40 InterviewwithElder,Lashkargah. 41 InterviewwithElder,Lashkargah. 42 InterviewwithTalebAQ,Zeri. 43 InterviewwithTalebNM,SangiHisar.
December2011
Again,thesecommentsseemtohighlighthowthe clashisbetweenthesecularlyinclinedandthe Islamicfundamentalisttypes,withstatecontrol overschoolsonlyweaklyemergingasacauseof opposition,asfarastheviewsofindividualTaleb areconcerned.Obviously,however,giventhis substratumofhostilityagainstsecularschools amongtheTaleban,theleadershipmusthave founditeasytounleashviolenceagainststate schools.Thefactthatsecularprivateschoolswere largelyunaffected,evenbeforemanyofthem startedswitchingtotheTalebancurriculum, suggeststhattheleadershipwasabletochannel thefuryofitsrankandfilemembersrather precisely,withanantistatefunction. Unfortunately,intheabsenceofanythinglike reliablestatisticsonthepresenceofsecularprivate schoolsaroundAfghanistan,sayinghoweasythe taskoftheleadershipwasisdifficult.
Studentswillbetaughtsubjectsthatarein linewithIslamicteachingandjihad.45 Thephrasingseemstoimplicitlyreferto complaintsbythecommunitiesthattheopposition oftheTalebantostateschoolswasdeprivingthem ofaccesstoeducation.46ThattheTalebanfeltat timesembarrassedbytheviolenceofsomeoftheir owncommandersagainststateschoolsis confirmedbythefactthatTalebanspokesmen wouldsometimedenytheirinvolvementinattacks. Alternatively,alreadyin2006,therewasa widespreadbeliefinsouthernAfghanistanthat, ratherthantheTalebaninisolation,agentsofthe PakistaniInterServicesIntelligence(ISI)werein facttoblameformostattacks.47Suchbeliefswere encouragedbysomeTalebanbutinreality,field commanders,includingmostofthoseinterviewed forthisstudy,oftenacknowledgedtheattacks. AlthoughtheAfghangovernmentcontrols thousandsofschoolsandhundredsofmadrassas, attackshaveonlytakenplaceagainsttheformer,as pointedoutbytheMoEitself.48Thisdespitethe factthattheTaleban(andtheclergyingeneral) onlyaccepttheDeobandicurriculumandthatthe newcurriculaadoptedbystatemadrassasare rejected.49Thiswouldseemtoindicatethatthe Talebanoppositiontoseculareducationis ideologicallymotivatedandthattargeting governmentinstitutionsperseisnotamajorfactor intheviolence.
2.3 TheFirstSignsofTaleban Reconsidering

Thediscussionwithintheleadershipandthe inclusioninthelayehaofrulesbanningteachers arethereforemorelikelytohavebeena consequenceofthewaveofviolence,ratherthan thecause.Facedwithabacklashfromthemurders ofdozensofteachersandstudents,theTaleban triedtoplacelimitsontheviolence.Alreadyin 2007,theTalebanannouncedthattheywould opentheirownschoolsinareasundertheir control.InJanuarytheTalebanleadership announcedthatfromMarchonwards,Islamic educationwouldbeprovidedforboysandlater evenforgirlsinsixprovincesunderTaleban influence(Kandahar,Zabul,Uruzgan,Helmand, NimrozandFarah).TheTalebanannouncedthat theschoolswouldusethetextbooksusedunder theirEmirateinthe1990sandthatpreparations werealreadybeingmadetoprintthem;US$1 millionwasallocatedfortheseschools,ofwhich10 wereinitiallyplannedin10differentdistricts.44A Talebanspokesmanwasquotedassayingthat Theaimsaretoreopenschoolssochildren whoaredeprivedcanbenefitandsecondly,to counterthepropagandaoftheWestandits puppetsagainstIslam,jihadandtheTaleban.
44
3. NEGOTIATIONSOR CONCESSIONS?
3.1 TheFirstNegotiatingRound: LocalDeals,200710
AsmentionedinSection2.3,fromtheverytimeof theinitialescalationofattacksonschools(2005 06),thestrategyprovedcontroversialandnotonly amongwidesectorsoftheAfghanpopulation. Alreadyattheendof2006,theleaderofHezbe
45
NoorKhan,TalebantoOpenSchoolsinSouthern Afghanistan,SpokesmanSays,TheAssociatedPress(21 January2007);TalebanPlanEducationOffensivein AfghanFight,IndoAsianNewsService(25January 2007);TalibantoSpend1MlnDollarstoOpenJihad SchoolsinAfghanistan,HindustanTimes(21January 2007);ATurnfromBurningtoLearning,Pajhwok AfghanNews(21January2007).
HindustanTimes,TalibantoSpend1MlnDollars(see FN43). 46 Khan,TalebantoOpenSchools(seeFN43);Indo AsianNewsService,TalebanPlan(seeFN43);Pajhwok AfghanNews,ATurnfromBurning(seeFN43). 47 ScottBaldauf,Afghanistan:AfghanSchoolsFaceTorch, ChristianScienceMonitor(2February2006);Suzanna Koster,TalebanFightersTalkTacticsWhileSafein Pakistan,ChristianScienceMonitor(9November2006). 48 TenSchoolsTorchedinPastThreeWeeks,IRIN(10 April2008). 49 PersonalcommunicationwithThomasRuttig, September2011.
Islami,GulbuddinHekmatyar,condemnedattacks onschools.50InareaslikeWardak,Nangarharand Logar,whereeducationallevelshavelongbeen higherandresistancetostateeducationweaker, severalcommandersoftheTalebanandother insurgentgroupsappearnottohavetargeted schools,evenifcolleaguesoperatingwithinthe sameprovincesweredoingit.51Thesewereall areasofstrongHezbeIslamiinfluence,anIslamist organisationledbyuniversityeducatedandnon clericalfigures,promotingamodernist interpretationofIslamasopposedtotherevivalist orpuristtrendincarnatedbytheTaleban.There arenoconfirmedreportsofattacksonschoolby HezbeIslamiafter2001.52 AchangeofheartwithintheTalebanseemsto haveoccurredrelativelyearly,whateverthecause mighthavebeen.Alreadyduring2007,elementsof theTalebanwerenegotiatingwithMoEoversome compromiseonthecurriculaonthenationallevel, butneithersidewascomfortablewithgoingpublic aboutthetalks.OneoftheTalebancommanders interviewedinthisstudyhintedatrepeated negotiatingeffortsinthepast,whichdidnot succeedbecausetheMoEdidnotacceptour demands.Thenegotiationsquicklyendedwhen theAmericansallegedlyvetoedthemandeven reportedlyarrestedthemediatorbetweenMoE andtheTaleban.53However,therewasanimpactin theprovinces,wherelocalnegotiationssometimes resultedindeals.54TheTalebansinclinationto negotiateasettlementonschoolsseemstohave emergedwiththerapidterritorialexpansionofthe movementin200607,whichinturncreatedthe needforanewimageofamovementableto governasopposedtojustfight. Negotiationsonthereopeningofschoolsinthe southwerealreadymentionedinthepressin2006, althoughitwasnotalwaysmadeexplicitwith whom.55Thefirstconfirmationsofthefinalisation oflocaldealsinvolvingtheTalebanstarted emergingafter2007(seebelowinthisparagraph). AlthoughtheTalebanmighthavebeenundersome
50
kindofpressurefromthecommunitiestoleavethe schoolsopenorreopenthosetheyhadclosed, theyclearlywerenotreadytoentirelyrenounce theirstandonthecorruptionofschoolsbyforeign influenceandtheiruseascentresforthespreadof Christianity.56Agreementstoreopenschools involvedpurgingteacherswhowerenotacceptable toTalebanandlocalconservativeelementsand hiringconservativemullahswithleaningstowards theTalebantosuperviseonbehalfoftheTaleban, affectinginparticularthecurricula.57Whetherthe Talebancompromisedatallisunclear;perhaps communitiesandlocalofficialsofprovincial departmentsofeducationdecidedatonepointto simplyaccepttheconditionsimposedbythe Taleban.Theargumentcouldbemadethat somethingmorethannegotiationwashappening educationalauthoritiesweregivingwaytoTaleban demands,asthiswastheonlywaytoreopen schools. WhetherthechangeinTalebanattitudein2007 08wasaresponsetopressurecomingfrombelow isunclear.ThedeathsofkeyTalebanleaderssuch asDadullahandOsmaniandtheriseinimportance ofMullahBaradarmighthaveplayedarolehere. BaradarwaswiredintoPopolzaitribalchannels, whichmighthavefacilitatedcommunicationand negotiationswithnumerousPopolzaisatthetopof theAfghangovernment.Undoubtedly,resistance againsttheattacksonschoolswaswidespreadin thecommunities,particularlyasin200607,the Talebanhadbeenenteringvillageswhichwerenot asconservativeastheremotemountainones wheretheyhadbeendwellinguntil2005. Occasionalevidenceofcommunitiesprotesting againstattacksonschoolsexists,goingbacktothe earlyyearsoftheinsurgency.InPaktika,for example,thevillagerscondemnedthedestruction ofaschoolbuiltbytheSwedishCommitteefor Afghanistanandthencollectedmoneyamong themselvestorebuildit.58TheAfghangovernment madebigclaimsbetween2006and2008that manycommunitieswereorganisinggovernment sponsoredschoolsecurityshurastoinvolvelocal authoritiesandeldersinprotectingtheschools.By early2007,theMinistryofEducationwasalready claimingthatshurasexistedinhalfofthecountrys 9,000schools.Eventually8,000suchshuraswere
HekmatyarSaysinEidMessagethatUSFacing ImminentDefeatinAfghanistan,BBCMonitoringSouth Asia(30December2006). 51 PersonalcommunicationwithAsiaFoundationstaff member,April2009. 52 InterviewwithAmirMansoryoftheSCA,Kabul,10 April2011. 53 Meetingwithofficialofinternationalorganisation,3 April2011. 54 InterviewwithTalebancommanderSK,Kunar. 55 ForthecaseofArghandabdistrict(Kandahar)see Baldauf,Afghanistan:AfghanSchoolsFaceTorch(seeFN 46).
56
Onthis,seeZabuli,InsecurityHaltsLearning(FN10); HumanRightsWatch,LessonsinTerror,p.34(FN4). 57 InterviewwithAtaullahWahidyar,ChiefofStaff,MoE, Kabul,6October2009. 58 InterviewwithAmirMansoryoftheSCA,Kabul,10 April2011.
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created,accordingtotheMoE.59 Entrustingshuraswithmaintainingthesecurityof schoolsappearstohavebeenpopularwiththe public.Asurveycarriedoutin2008foundthatthe populationviewedsecurityshurasasthebestway todefendschools(34percentofrespondents),as opposedto21percentwhosupported negotiationswiththeopposition.Just0.4percent believedforeigntroopshadaroletoplayin defendingschools,although,likeallopinionpollsin acountryatwar,thereliabilitymightbe questionable.60 Inreality,thegovernmentwasoverstatingthecase. Theuseofweaponsbyschoolsecurityshuras seemstohavebeenveryrare.Intervieweesinthis studyconfirmedthatcasesofciviliansresisting attacksonschoolswereunheardof,atleastintheir areas.Insomecases,villagershiredarmedguards, whileinothers,communityselfdefencegroups weregiventhetaskofprotectingtheschools,but norecordexistsofarmedengagementsbetween theseschoolsecurityforcesandtheinsurgents.61 ClaimsbytheMinistryofEducationthattheshuras werereducingattacksonschoolsduringlate2006 andearly2007aredifficulttoverify,butstatistics showacontinuingincreaseintheoverallnumber ofattacks(seeGraphs1and2).Inmanycases,the shuras,whichincorporatedmullahs,eldersand police,wereactuallynegotiatingwiththe insurgentstopreventattacksonschools.Alreadyin 2006,administrativeandsecurityofficialsinthe southwerepointingouthowreopeningofschools withoutlocalcooperationwasimpossible, althoughvillageeldersweresometimesscepticalof thewillingnessofeithergovernmentorTalebanto allowthemtoplayarole.62Suchnegotiationseven ledtothereopeningofasignificantportionof schoolsthathadbeenclosed(reportedly220 reopenedbyOctober2009outofabout800closed atthatpoint).63Thesewerenotjustlocallevel negotiations:significantly,theclausesorderingthe Talebanfighterstoattackschoolsandteachers
59 60
weredroppedinthe2009versionofthelayeha andreplacedbytheordertoobeytheTaliban Emiratespolicyoneducation.64WithFaruq Wardakasminister,underpressurebecauseofthe waveofviolenceunleashedagainstschools,the MoEstartedallowinggreaterflexibilityinthe curriculaatthelocallevel,avoidingraisingissuesif certainpartsofthetextbookswereignoredor certainpagestornout:commanderMassudsand MullahOmarspicturesandsomecommentaryon Afghanistanhistory,forexample.65 Initiallythereopeningofsomeschoolswas attributedtotheinvolvementoftheelders.In March2009,11schoolswereannouncedtohave reopenedinthedistrictsofShahWaliKot,Maroof andKhakrez(Kandahar).Probablycontactswith theTalebancouldnotbementionedbecauseof theinvolvementofUSAID(USAgencyfor InternationalDevelopment)advisors.66 Insum,thefirstnegotiatingroundtookplaceat thelocallevel,althoughwiththeapprovalofboth theTalebanleadershipandtheleadershipofthe MoE,butwithoutthetwosidesbeingabletoagree onacomprehensivedeal,perhapsalsobecause externalpartners(atleastKabuls)werenotready totolerateit.
3.2 TheSecondNegotiatingRound: TowardsaNationalDealin201011?

ThepaceoflocaldealmakingdescribedinSection 3.1,seemstohaveacceleratedin2010,atleastin someprovinces.InGhazni,schoolsstarted reopeninginspring2010;inGilan,thegovernment announcedinAprilthat18of22schoolswerenow openandopenlyacknowledgedthatnegotiations withtheTalebanhadtakenplace.67In2010,one schoolwasreportedtohavereopenedinAqcha (Jowzjan),allegedlyafterthelocalcommunitiesput pressureontheTaleban.68Thesameappliestothe reopeningofschoolsinGerodistrictofGhazni, whereadistricteducationofficeracknowledged thatitwastheresultofcooperationwiththelocal Talebanaswellaswiththelocaleldersalongwith
OnthispointseeGiustozzi,NationBuilding(FN1). Formoredetail,seeGiustozzi,NationBuilding(FN1). 61 InterviewwithheadofeducationdepartmentofHerat province,October2009;interviewwithAtaullah Wahidyar,ChiefofStaff,MoE,Kabul,October2009; LauraKing,AfghansTrytoStopAttacksonTheirSchools, LosAngelesTimes(11February2007). 62 Zabuli,InsecurityHaltsLearning(seeFN55). 63 InterviewwithAtaullahWahidyar,ChiefofStaff,MoE, KabulOctober2009;HundredsofSchoolsReopenin Afghanistan,RadioFreeEurope,RadioLiberty(1May 2009);AbaceenNasimi,HelmandParentsFace UnenviableDilemma,AfghanRecoveryReport(18March 2009);Haidar,ThreatenedandSnubbed(seeFN10).
64 65
Clark,TheLayha(seeFN11). InterviewwithAtaullahWahidyar,ChiefofStaff,MoE, Kabul,October2009. 66 BashirAhmadNadem,EducationalInstitutions ReopeninginKandahar,PajhwokAfghanNews(26 March2009). 67 MirwaisHimmat,SchoolsReopeninGhazniDistrict afterFourYears,PajhwokAfghanNews(22April2010). 68 PersonalcommunicationwithThomasRuttig, September2011.
11
thedemandsofthepopulation.69Laterthe governmentreportedallschoolswereopenin AndarandallexceptfivewereopeninAbiBand.70 Atthisstageattacksonschoolswerestilloccurring withnonoticeableslowdown,althoughthe Talebanweredenyinginvolvementwithunusual strengthandwereevenaskinglocalTaleban commanderstoinvestigatethereports.71 ThereopeningoftheschoolsinGhazni,tothe extentthatittookplace,wasbased,accordingto newspaperreports(unconvincinglydeniedbythe government),72onasettlementinwhichthe governmentpaidforthecosts,thecurriculum proposedbytheTalebanwasadopted,textbooks werechangedandteachersrecommendedbythe Talebanhired.Thecurriculumincorporatednew religioussubjectsasintheTalebantime:studyof theQuran,tafsir(exegesisorinterpretationofthe Quran),hadith(thewordsandactionsofthe ProphetMohammed)andaqaid(Islamicbeliefs). OntherequestoftheTaleban,asupervision committeewasestablishedtooverseethe teachersandthestudentsandtovisittheschools regularly.Reportedly,inonecasethegovernorof GhaznievensatisfiedaTalebanrequesttomovea schooltoadifferentplace,undertighterTaleban control.Accordingtothenewsagency,inAndarthe Talebanranall28schoolsinthesummerof2010; theTalebanhaddismissedtheteachersandhired theirownteachersofreligioussubjects. Complaintssurfacedthatthequalityofnon religiousteaching,particularlyscientificsubjects, waspoor.73 In2011anotherreport,thistimebytheWallStreet Journal,confirmedthatinAndartheschoolswere openbecausetheheadofthelocaleducation departmentwascoordinatinghiseffortswiththe Taleban.Heclaimedtobeenforcingthegovernment curricula,althoughnoothergovernmentofficialwas visitingtheseschoolsandhiswordhadtobetaken asfact.Thedistrictgovernor,SherKhan,wasnot sympathetictotheheadofeducationTazaGul, whomheaccusedofsympathisingfortheTaleban:
69
whilethelatteroperatedinAndarandcouldride aroundinamotorbike,thedistrictgovernor preferredtoresideintheprovincialcapitalof Ghazni.NeitherthegovernornortheAmerican troopsdeployedintheareaseemedhoweverwilling toreplaceTazaGul,probablyawareofthe consequencesifhelefthisjob.74 By2011,theTalebanclaimedthatthroughthese localagreementswholeprovinceswerenowunder theircontrolasfaraseducationwasconcerned: Talebanhavegainedcompletecontrolof severalprovinces,includingZabul,asthe officialsanddepartmentsofthepresent puppetgovernmentalsosupportthem.75 WhiletheMinistryofEducationwouldnotofficially confirmanydealwiththeTaleban,something seemedtobechangingasattheendof2010 ministryofficialsstatedthatnoadditionalschool hadbeenclosedin2010,evenastheTaleban continuedtoexpandtheirmilitaryactivitiestonew partsofthecountry.76 Inearly2011,evidenceemergedthatthetrend startedin2010wasmorethanthemere continuationofsomethingbegunin2007.In January,whileattendingtheEducationWorld Forum,MinisterofEducationFaruqWardaktoldan interviewerthattheTalebanwerenomore opposinggirlseducation.Healsoclaimedthatin manyareas,localmullahsaremorelikelyto opposegirlseducationthantheTaleban.77Laterin April,theministerstatedonToloNewsthatitisnot theTalebanwhowerestilloccasionallyburning schools,althoughhealsoadmittedhedidnot knowwhotheculpritswere.Heclaimedthatthe shurastheministryestablishedtoprotectschools andthatincorporatedclerics,eldersandteachers hadconvincedtheTalebannottoattackschools.78 TheTalebanhadnopubliccommentaryonanydeal withtheMoE,butacessationofattacksonschools wasopenlyannounced.InMarch,MullahOmar issuedastatementinwhichhedeniedthatthe Talebanweresettingschoolsonfire.79Afewdays later,newswasreleasedthatMullahOmarhad
74
MirwaisHimmatandStanikzai,15SchoolsReopened inSouthafterYears,PajhwokAfghanNews(8April 2010). 70 MirwaisHimmat,AllSchoolsOpeninGhazni:Official, PajhwokAfghanNews(7June2010). 71 ForanattackinQarabagh,seeMirwaisHimmat,Girls SchoolBlownUpinGhazni,PajhwokAfghanNews(23 May2010). 72 SeeFNs66,68and69. 73 SherAhmadHaidar,TalebanTakingControlofSchools inGhazni,PajhwokAfghanNews(11December2010); GhazniSchoolsNotunderTalebanControl,Pajhwok AfghanNews(16December2010).
MariaAbiHabib,SchoolinTalebanTerritoryShows PerilsofU.S.Pullout,WallStreetJournal(11May2011). 75 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderGYZ,Takhar. 76 60pcDeclineinSchoolDamageIncidentsthisYear: Official,PajhwokAfghanNews(30December2010). 77 TalebanNoLongerOpposedtoFemaleEducation, AsiaNews(14January2011). 78 TalebanDoNotBurnSchools:AfghanMinister, TOLOnews.com(11April2011). 79 TalebanLeaderDeniesSettingFiretoSchools, TOLOnews.com(28March2011).
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issuedadecreeinstructinginsurgentsnotto attackschoolsandintimidateschoolchildren, accordingtotheMoEitself.TheMoEreferredtoa messagetotheTalebanmilitarycouncilofKhost province,ofwhichtheMoEhadbecomeaware withoutspecifyinghow.TheMoEwelcomedthe development.80InApril,Talebanspokesperson ZabihullahMojahedstatedinaninterviewthatthe Talebanwerenotagainsteducationand,more remarkably,thattheywerekeentohavepublic support.81Inotherwords,betweentheendof 2010andthebeginningof2011,whathaduntil thenbeenlocaldealsseemedtobeturningagain intoanationwidepolicy,ashadbeendiscussedin 2007(seeSection3.1above). Evidencefromthegroundlargelyconfirmsthe existenceofasignificantchange.Byspring2011,the numberofattacksagainstschoolswasnearlyata standstill.Between21Marchand8June2011,the MoEonlyrecorded20attacksagainstschools,some ofwhichwerenotnecessarilyattributabletothe Taleban,ormightnothavebeenpremeditated.The monthlyattackratewaslessthanhalfthe2009and 2010ones;furthermore,thenumberofvictimsof theattacksappearstohavedeclinedevenfaster.82 TheAfghanIndependentHumanRightsCommission didnotrecordanyattackonschoolsinMarchand April2011andhadalreadyrecordedadecreasein attacksinthepreviousmonths.83 Onlysevenintervieweesinthisstudy,outof82, confirmedtobeawareofrecentincidentsinvolving teachers,studentsorschools.Ofthem,onlysix mentionedaconcreteepisodeandinfivecases theyreferredtothesameone,anexplosiveattack inNangarharwhereanadministratorwaskilled andtwoteachersandafewstudentsinjured.84The episodehadbeenreportedinthemassmediaand intervieweesasfarawayasKunduzandTakharhad heardofit,aswellasseveralinLaghman. Interestingly,nobodyinNangarharmentionedthe episode.Theotherepisodementioned,datingback to2010,wasamineblastkillingfourstudentsin Paktikaandwasprobablynotatargetedincident. AnotherincidentoccurredinMay2011,afterwe completedtheinterviewingtheheadteacherofa girlsschoolwasassassinatedafterhavingbeen
80
warnedtoleavehisjob.Significantly,theattack tookplaceinLogar,wheretheTalebanhadbeen reportedtobesofteronschools,includingongirls schools,asweshalldiscusslater.85Anotherattack occurredsometimeearlier,butwecouldnot confirmtheprecisedate:inHelmand,somelocals reportedthemurderofateacherbytheTaleban becausehewasoftheviewthatitisourparents whofeedusandnotGod(thatis,hewasa materialist).86 Authoritativesourcesreportedalargedecreaseon attacksonNGOsin2010,attributedtonegotiations betweenTalebanandcommunitiesinareaswhere theTalebanwereeffectivelyincontrol.87Perhaps schoolsbenefitedfromasimilarprocess. Theprocessofreopeningschoolswasofcoursestill goingon,althoughwhetherthepacehas acceleratedthroughout2010isunclear.Insome partsofthecountry,teacherswerereportedtobe flockingbacktotheirjobs,uponinvitationbythe Taleban.88Initiallytheprocesswasslow,butaftera fewmonthswithoutviolenceconfidencestarted buildingupandtheprocessaccelerated,for exampleinPaktika.89However,theordertostop targetingschoolsandnegotiationsoverthe reopeningofschoolsaretwoseparateprocesses, andareonlypartiallyrelated.Thenegotiations overthereopeningofschoolsstartedwellbefore theleadershipgavetheordertostopattacks;the ordermighthavefacilitatedthereopeningof schoolsandmightevenhavebeenaconcession madebytheTalebantoencouragetheMinistryof Educationtogivewaytotheirdemandsconcerning curriculaandotherissues. ThedecisionmakingprocesswithintheTalebanis stilllittleknownoutsidethemovement. Concerningeducation,diplomaticcirclesinKabul wereconvincedthatthedecisiontosuspend targetedattackshadprobablybeentakenin Peshawar,wherethePoliticalCommissionofthe Talebanisbelievedbymanytobebased.The decreeofMullahOmarconcerningeducation appearsindeedtohavebeenprintedinPeshawar, althoughthisisnotnecessarilyademonstrationof thepreviouspoint.Intheseconditions,thefew formerTalebanbasedinKabulandmaintaining linkstotheirformercolleaguesremainoneofthe fewaccessiblesources.FormerTalebanForeign
85
Afghanistan:GovernmentHailsTalebanDecreeon Schools,IRIN(29March2011). 81 KhanMohammadDanishju,TalebanTrySoftPower, IWPR,AfghanistanRecoveryReport(8April2011). 82 RayRiveraandTaimoorShah,FillingClasseswith Learning,NotFears,NewYorkTimes(9June2011). 83 InterviewwithAIHRCofficial,Kabul,April2011. 84 TheattacktookplaceinJalalabadcityon15March 2011,butnobodyclaimedit.SeeExplosionHitsSchool inJalalabad,TOLOnews.com(15March2011).
TalebanKillHeadofAfghanGirlsSchool,Reuters(25 May2011). 86 InterviewwithTailorA,Helmand. 87 Clark,TheLayha(seeFN11). 88 Danishju,TalebanTrySoftPower(seeFN80). 89 InterviewwithAmirMansoryoftheSCA,Kabul,10 April2011.
13
MinisterMullahMutawakkilreportedlyannounced toforeigndiplomatsin2011thataseconddecree byMullahOmarwouldbereleasedsoon,thistime concerninggirlseducation.90 DespiteEducationMinisterFaruqWardaks statementinJanuary,asoftheendJunethenew decreehadnotbeenissued.Inearly2011,reports wereemergingofgirlsschoolsreopeninginsome areas,namelyinLogarandtheninLoyaPaktia.In Ghazni,localsourcesconfirmedthattheTalebanno longeropposedgirlsgoingtoschool,butinsistedon certainconditions,suchasthegirlscoveringtheir faces.91Insomeareas,suchasKunduz,girlsschools werealreadyreopeninginsummer2010.92Only femaleteacherswerereportedlyallowedforthe oldergirls(overnineyearsofage).93InKunar,the Talebanwereallowinggirlstogotoschoolin2011, reportedlybecausethelocalcommunitiesasked themtodoso,althoughtheconditionsimposed variedacrossthedistricts:inChapadarra,girlswere alloweduntiltheeighthclass;inNarayand Watapur,untiltheeleventh;inotherplaces,until theycompletedthetwelfthclass.94 Inmostofthecountry,however,thefield commandershadnotreceivedanyinstructionin thisregard.AsthetypicalTalebcommanderputit inearly2011, Talebanopposegirlsschoolsstaunchly.They dontallowschoolsforgirlsevenifthe syllabusofTalebanistaughtthere.The presentcircumstancesarenotappropriatefor femaleeducation.95 MorespecificallyanotherTalebelaborated,inline withtheofficiallineoftheTalebansincethe1990s: Theyopposefemaleeducationbecausethere aresomeproblemsinitforthetimebeing.Itis notappropriatetosendgirlstoschoolsinthe presenceofWesternforcesinAfghanistan. Girlswillbeallowedtoattendschoolsafter peaceisrestoredandthesituationisnormal.96
Theprojectionoflocaldealsintonationalpoliticsis whatmakestheauthorsofthispapertalkofa secondnegotiatinground.Whateverthe communicationbetweentheTalebanandtheMoE was,theformermighthavebeenconstrainedin thespeedofimplementationbyinternalissues(on girlsschools).Consideringhowtheinitialcontacts athighlevelsin2007ended(see3.1above),the Talebanmightalsohaveharboureddoubtsabout theeventualsuccessofanynationaltalksand mightthereforehavewantedtoproceedcarefully andtestthegroundfirst.
3.3 ContinuityintheTalebansPolicy 3.3.1TalebanDemands

SomeoftheTalebansdemandsforallowingthe reopeningofstateschoolshavebeenwellknown tomanyteachersforalongtime.Thisis particularlythecaseintheimplementationofthe oldcurriculum,theonesetbytheTalebans MinistryofEducationinthe1990s(featuring religioussubjectslikehadithandfiqhalongsidethe Quranandnonreligioussubjects).97Indeedthis seemstobethekeydemand,whichalltheTaleban commandersinterviewedmentionedfirstand foremost.TheTalebaninterviewedforthisstudy consistentlyclaimedthattheTalebansyllabusis alreadytaughtintheschoolsthatoperateinareas theycontrol.98 AlthoughsomeTalebanmentionedarequest deliveredtoalleducationdepartmentsof Afghanistantochangethesyllabus,99interviewed Talebancommandersindicatedthatthe understandingbetweentheMoEandtheTaleban occurredatthehighestlevel.Thisunderstanding wouldhavefeaturedanexchangeinwhichthe Talebanagreedtonolongerattackschoolsand teachersandtheMoEagreedtoprepareitselffor theintroductionofthenew(infactold1990s) curriculuminthefollowingacademicyear.100 Reportedly,Talebanwerevisitingmosquesin Nangarharinearly2011,announcingthatinthe nextacademicyeartheTalebansyllabuswouldbe taughtinstateschools:101 WehavebeendirectedbyAmirulMominin toshowpatienceandwaitforthe governmenttointroduceoursyllabus.Hehas orderedustoseeifthepuppetgovernment
97 98
90 91
InterviewswithWesterndiplomats,Kabul,April2011. Interviewswithvariouspeople,Ghazni. 92 TalebanReadytoLiftBanonGirls,TheGuardian(13 January2011). 93 Meetingwithofficialofinternationalorganisation,3 April2011.Inruralareas,femaleteachersoftencannot befoundandthereforemaleteachersmustteachgirls. Inthecities,wheremostfemaleteacherswork,thisis unusual. 94 PersonalcommunicationwithFabrizioFoschiniofAAN, September2011. 95 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderSTK,Kunduz. 96 InterviewswithTalebanCommanderAH,Mehterlam Baba;TalebanCommanderMaulawiR,Faryab.
InterviewwithTeacherNJ,Faryab. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderNM,SangiHissar. 99 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderT,Kunduz. 100 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAM,Kunar. 101 InterviewwithTribalElderSN,Nangarhar.
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honoursitspromiseornot.Allschoolswillbe openedifgovernmentfulfilsitscommitment, otherwisenotasingleschoolwillbe spared.102 ThisdemandoftheTalebanislikelytoarouse controversywhenitcomesintothepublicdomain. AlthoughmanyAfghans,eveneducatedones, wouldfavourmorereligioninthecurriculum, havinghalfofthecurriculumdedicatedtoreligious subjectswouldlikelyreducesignificantlythe effectivenessofteachingothersubjects.103Within oursmallsample,reactionstothedemandsofthe Talebanweremixed.Whilesometeachersand elderswerewillingtogivesomecredibilitytothe Talebansclaimofnotbeingagainsteducationper se,otherscounteredthatmassivelyincreasing religioussubjectsintheschoolsasdemandedby theTaleban,ineffect,wouldturntheminto seminars: ThemainobjectiveofTalebanisbringing governmentschoolsundertheircontrol.They wanttoturnschoolsintotheirtrainingcamps likeseminaries.104 Someelementsofthepopulationseemedtosee littledifferencebetweenstateschoolsand madrassasandwerereadytosupportany compromise.105Oneteacherconcurredandsaid, Thepeoplecanttellthemthattheircourse lacksknowledgeofpolitics,literatureand sciences;insteaditisrepletewithjihadand onlyjihad.106 SomeeldersconsideredtheTalebansoppositionto thegovernmentsyllabusjustified: Actually,Talebandontopposeschools.They opposethissyllabus,whichincludescourses ofChristianity.AllAfghansopposethis syllabus.107 Moreover,thecontroversyisonlylikelytointensify, asthisisnottheonlydemandputforwardbythe Taleban.Theyalsowantchangestothe textbooks.108TheTalebanthinkthat negativechangeshavebeenintroducedin
102 103
somebooks,likeinthebookofclassone; thenweopposethemandwantthat mujahidinerasubjectsandbooksshouldbe taughtintheschools.109 Somepeoplehavedevelopedtheimpressionthat theTalebanareopposedtopicturesinthe textbooksandwantthemremoved,evenifno Talebantoldusthesame.110 Yetanotherdemandwastheappointmentof teachersbytheTaleban: Nowafreshorderhasbeenreleasedfromthe Talebanhighcommandthatschoolswillget teachersnominatedorapprovedbythe Taleban,andifgovernmentappointed teacherscontinueteachingthentheTaleban willtakesternactionagainsttheschoolas wellasthestudentsandtheteachers.111 OneTalebfromKunarsaidthat wehavebeenorderedtoappointteachersfor alltheschoolsinourarea.Andiftheyarenot acceptedbythegovernment,neither teachersnorstudentswillbeallowedin schools.112 AformerTalebancommanderfromFaryab commentedthatintheTalebanhewasorderedto attackschoolsandnottoletanyschoolfunction. Accordingtohim,theTalebanhadbeenreceiving complaintsaboutclosedschoolsfromthepopulace foralongtime,butwouldtypicallytrytopacify thembypromisingtoreferthemattertothe relevantshura.Foryears,littlefollowupoccurred; bythetimethecommanderquittheTalebanand reconciledwiththegovernment,theleadership hadstillshownnosignofsofteningup.However, afterhisdeparturehedidnoticethattheTaleban werepromotingappointmentsofsympathisersas teachers.Heseemedtobelievethemotivationwas morepatronagethanthedesiretoindoctrinate children.113 ThemainpointworthmakingaboutTaleban demandsconcerningthereopeningofstate schoolsisthatsuchdemandsdidnotchangemuch between2007and2011:adopttheTaleban
109
InterviewwithTalebanCommanderMAL,Kunar. InterviewwithAmirMansoryoftheSCA,Kabul,10 April2011. 104 InterviewswithExteacherS,Laghman;TribalElder AH,Nangarhar. 105 InterviewwithShopkeeperAB,Kunduz. 106 InterviewwithTeacherZ,Kunduz. 107 InterviewwithTribalElderGMM,Laghman.No coursesofChristianityarebeingtaughtinAfghan schools,ofcourse. 108 InterviewwithTeacherMZ,Laghman.
InterviewwithTalebanCommanderU,Dila.See abovefordetailsonthecontroversialaspectsofthe textbooks. 110 InterviewwithCabDriverSU,KandaharCity. 111 InterviewswithTalebanCommanderWM,Takhar; TalebanCommander,Qarabagh. 112 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderMawlawiA, Kunar. 113 InterviewwithFormerTalebanCommanderAM, Faryab.
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curriculum,mujahidineratextbooksandTaleban approvedreligioustexts;hireteachersofreligious subjectsapprovedbytheTaleban.TheTalebanside didnotcompromiseonanyofthesepoints;if accommodationoccurred,theMoEsidedidit.The Talebansconcessionwastomaketheordertostop attackingschools,whichledtofewerincidents affectingschools.
oversuchschools.Wehavebeenstandingon ourstancesincestart.117 Talebanhavemadeitclearthattheyarenot againstschools;rathertheyareopposedto thenewsyllabus.They(thegovernment) shouldimplementtheoldsyllabussothatwe allowthemtoopenschoolsandteach students.118 PresentlyTalebandontopposeschools, whetherstaterunorprivate,becausethe governmenthasacceptedourdemandof introducingthesyllabusofIslamicEmirate.So presentlywedontopposeschools.Weare waitingtoseeifthegovernmentissincerein introducingoursyllabusornot.119 SomeTalebandeniedthattheproblemhadexisted inthefirstplace: Talebanarenotagainstschools.Whosays Talebanareagainstschools?Thisisthe poisonouspropagandaoftheWestagainst theTalebantomaligntheirimageintheeyes oftheinternationalcommunity.Yousawthat duringtheTalebansrule.Wesupported educationalactivitiesthroughoutthecountry duringtheTalebanera....Talebanreject WesternschoolsandWesternsyllabus.They dontwantAfghanchildrentobecome Western.120 Teacherandstudentshadneverbeenkilled. Thisisjustapropagandaofouropponents. ...TheagentsthesecretserviceofAfghan government,andISAFaredestroying schools.121 Thesecontradictoryperceptionswereinpart causedbytheconfusedcommunicationspolicyof theTaleban.In2006,Talebanspokesman MohammedHanifthreatenedtoattackschools becauseoftheircurriculum,whiletellinga journalistataboutthesametime, Wehavenotthreatenedanybodyexcept thosewhoworkforChristiansandfor foreignersinAfghanistan....Wehavenever killedanyteacheroranystudent.122
3.3.2PerceptionsofContinuity
Basedonwhatwasdiscussedabove,itwould appearthatbyearly2011anoticeablechangein theattitudeoftheTalebantowardsschoolswas takingplacetheschooldealsweregoingnational. Perceptionsofwhatwasgoingonhoweverwere notuniform,whetheramongthepopulationor amongtheTalebanthemselves.Inreality, intervieweesdidnotallagree.Tomostteachers andseveraleldersandlocalobservers,the predominantimageoftheTalebaninearly2011 hadnotchangedmuch.Inthewordsofone, Talebanhaveextremeviewsinthisregard. Theyaskpeopletosendtheirchildrento seminariesinsteadofschools.Fromthe beginningTalebanhavebeenopposingthe schools.Theirviewshavenotchangedsince then.114 Thefailuretoperceiveachangewasmostly because,infact,thestanceoftheTalebanhadnot changed;theceasefireagainstschoolswas motivatedbytheallegedpromiseoftheMoEto makeconcessions.TheTalebancommanders themselvesoftenstatedthisclearly.Inthewordsof someofthem, [Thepeople]havesomanytimesapproached usaboutthesafetyofschoolsbutwefollow ourpolicyandworkaccordingly.Thereare discussionsamongtheTalebanandthe governmentofficials.115 ThelocalTalebanagreewiththepeople.But dontagreewiththemregardingrunningof schools.Becausetheyfearthatsuchaction wouldstrengthenthegovernment.116 EssentiallytheseTalebanattributethechangetothe government,nottothemovementofMullahOmar: Therehasbeennochangeinthepolicyof Taleban.Theysaythatthereisnoneedfor schools.Ifsomeonewantstoopenaschool, hewillhavetoteachthecourseofIslamic EmirateandTalebanwillhavenoobjection
114 115
InterviewwithTeacherNJ,Faryab. InterviewwithTalebM,Sharana. 116 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAW,Lashkargah.
InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAS,Faryab. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAS,Faryab. 119 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAM,Kunar. 120 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderMAL,Kunar. 121 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderMNG,Laghman; interviewwithTalebanCommanderMawlawiN,Takhar. 122 HumanRightsWatch,LessonsinTerror,p.34(see FN4).
118
117
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3.4 Discontinuity 3.4.1PerceptionsofDiscontinuity

Despitetheconfusedperceptionsdescribedabove, onthewholeamajorityofourintervieweeshad noticedacleardifferenceandexpressedthisview withstatementssuchas, Innearpast,mostoftheTalebanshowed toleranceorhaveadjustedthemselvestowards theschools.Theirdifferenceswiththe governmentofficialstoohavemelteddown.123 Inpast,Talebanwereverymuchagainstthe schoolsandhadpropagandaagainstthe teachersandstudentsbutnowthereisa positivechangeintheirapproach.Theyknow abouttheimportanceofeducationandso dontthreatenteachers.Theyhavepermitted teacherstoteachtheirstudentshere.124 Ateacherconfirmedthatevensomeofthemost radicalgroupshadshiftedtheirattitude: Someofthemsupportopeningofschools, eventhegroupofthebrotherofMullah Dadullah[lateTalebancommander]has announcedsupportforschools.125 WhilesomeTalebancontinuetodenyit,towards theendof2010,theevidenceofchangeinthe Talebansattitudebecameverystrong.The demandsoftheTalebanremainedthesame,but theirviolentattitudetowardsstateschoolsgreatly softened.However,thereasonsforthechange remainopentodebate,asdoeswhetherit representsatacticalorstrategicandlongterm decision.Evenoneoftheintervieweesmosthostile totheTalebanadmittedthatinrecenttimestheir attitudehaschanged,sayingthatthisisbecause theTalebannowliveamongthepopulationand aremoreexposedtotheirviews.Healsoexpressed thefear,however,thattheTalebanonlymightbe doingthistogetsympathiesofthepeopleasin realitytheyaretotallyagainstit.126Ultimately, whetherthedecisiontosuspendtheattacksonthe schoolsisonlyatemporaryceasefiretoallowthe MoEtochangethecurriculumoralongtermshift inpolicyshouldbecomecleariftheMoEdeclines tointroducethechangesexpectedbytheTaleban. Amongthoseweinterviewed,fewwereunderthe impressionthattheTalebanschangeinattitude wasduetoISAFsmilitarypressure;indeedthe mostcommonlystatedviewwasthatthe
123 124
insurgentswereradicalisingbecauseofthegreater ISAFactivity.ThefewwhobelievedthatISAFwas havingapositiveimpactwerevagueintheir statementsandreferredtotheneedforforeign troopstoestablishpermanentbasesin Afghanistan.Oneexceptionwasateacherin Kunduz,whobelievedthat Talebanhavechangedsomeoftheirviews, becomingmoderate.Theschoolsnearthe housesofTalebanleadersareopenand functionalbecausetheyfearthatdestruction oftheseschoolswillexposethem.Sothey dontharmsuchschoolsfortheirown safety.127 Quiteimplausibly,twointerviewees,bothtribal leaders,attributedthechangetothefactthatthe governmenthadstarteddeputisingpoliceofficers totheschools:apoliceofficerwouldhardly representasufficientprotectioninthefaceofa groupofTaleban.128 Someinterviewees,bycontrast,attributedthe declineinviolencetotheoppositecause:inmany areas,fewschoolswereleftfunctioning.Thisis particularlythecaseinHelmand.OneTaleb explainedthat theTalebandowarnthepeoplenottojoinor sendchildrentotheseinstitutions,which mostofthepeoplehasaccepted.Thisisthe majorreasonwhysuchcasesofmurderor harassmenthavenotoccurredinthenear past.129 AnelderfromHelmandconcurred: Mostofthepeoplewhoareenrolledinthe schools,theyhavelefttheterritoriesunder thecontrolofTalebanandhaveshiftedto cities.130 Themajorityofintervieweesattributedthechange toaconsciousdecisiontakenbytheTaleban, reportedlytheaudioandvisualcommission.131 Quiteafewviewedthechangeasmerelytactical: Sometimeshardlinersandsometimes softlinersbutnodrasticchangehasoccurred sofar.Theyaresoftintheareaswheretheir holdisnotsostrongbutintheareaswhere
127 128
InterviewwithTraderAW,Dand. InterviewwithFarmerMA,Saroza(Paktika). 125 InterviewwithTeacherZ,Kunduz. 126 InterviewwithFarmerTM,Faryab.
InterviewwithTeacherMK,Kunduz. InterviewswithElderSWK,Kunar;TribalElderMDQ, Laghman. 129 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderN,Nawah. 130 InterviewwithElderI,Lashkargah. 131 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderMaulawiWM, Faryab.
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theyhaveastronghold,theyare aggressive.132
3.4.2ReasonsfortheChange
Assumingthechangewasmerelyatacticalone, whatwasdrivingitwouldstillhavetobeassessed. Asmentionedabove,thismighthavetodowith thegradualtransformationoftheTalebanintoa militarypoliticalinsurgency,awareoftheneedto interactpositivelywithlocalcommunities.Several intervieweesstatedthattheTalebanhadcome underseriouspressurefromthecommunities.One elderfromKunarsaidthat Adelegationofcommonpeoplemetthe leadersofTalebanandaskedthemtoallow schoolstofunctionotherwisetheywould pinpointtheirhideoutstogovernment. Talebanleaderswereforcedtoacceptthe demandofpeoplebuttheyputthecondition aboutintroductionofsyllabus....Taleban werenotreadytoacceptthedemandof peoplebutreligiousscholarsconvincedthem toacceptthedemandofmasses,otherwise theywouldfaceproblems.133 Similarly,anotherelderfromNangarharstatedthat Thechangeoccurredbecauseofthe insistenceoftribalelders,whotoldTaleban thattheywouldteachthemalesson(ifthey againattackedschools).Talebanconveyedthe viewsoftribalelderstotheirleaders,who softenedtheirstanceonschools,fearing reactionfrompeople.134 Moreinterestingly,someTalebanadmittedcoming underpressure: First,theyweretotallyagainstschoolsbut nowcommonpeopleandreligiousscholars haveforcedthemtosoftentheirstance.135 Thecommonpeople,tribalelders,white beardedandreligiousscholarcompelled Talebantochangetheirstancebysendinga jointlettertosupremecouncilaboutopening ofschools.Thesupremecouncilforwarded thelettertoChiefMullahSahibandhe acceptedtheirrequest.136 PeopleforcedTalebantoinformsupreme councilabouttheirgrievances.Thesupreme councildecidedthatschoolswouldbe
137 132
allowedtofunctioniftheyintroducedthe syllabusofIslamicEmirateofTaleban.The privateschoolshavealreadybeenallowedto work....Thecommonreligiousscholars forcedustoinformsupremecouncilabout thegrievancesofmassesontheissueof schools.Thesupremecouncilissued directivesthatschoolswouldbeallowedto functioniftheyintroducedthesyllabusof Taleban.137 Onlyahandfulofintervieweesbelievedthe Talebanagreedtochangetheirattitudetowards schoolsunderduress.TheTalebanliketosaytheir attitudehassoftenedfortworeasons:theirdesire totaketheviewofthecommunitiesintoaccount andappeasecommonpeople(whereasthe Talebanhadearliertriedtoconvincethemtoleave childrenattheQuranicschool)andtheir negotiationswithgovernmentagencies. Concerningthedesiretoappeasethe communities,thesearesomefragmentsofwhat theTalebanandothershadtosay: Talebandontneedschools.Theydontneed openingofschools.Talebanhaveextreme viewsaboutschoolsbutnowtheyhave changedtheirpolicyforthesakeofcommon people.138 Abigchangecanbewitnessedinthe behaviourofTalebanascommonpeoplehave conveyedtheirgrievancestothemonthe issueofschools.139 Talebanwanttobepopularamongthe generalpeopleandthustheyarebecoming softandmoderatetowardsschools.140 Oneoftheimportantfactorsofthatchangeis thatTalebanhaverealizedthattheycanonly getthesupportandsympathiesofthepeople iftheyacceptandagreewiththewishesand needsofthelocalpeople.Talebanwere blamedforshoweringacidonagirlbut Talebanrefusedtohavedonethatact.So Talebanpermittheschoolstoavoidanysort ofblameorallegationsagainsttheminthis respect.141 TheTalebanhavenowrealizedthatthe foreigninvadersareabouttoleave
InterviewwithTailorA,Helmand. 133 InterviewwithElderSWK,Kunar. 134 InterviewwithTribalElderAH,Nangarhar. 135 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderMaM,Nangarhar. 136 InterviewswithTalebanCommanderMA, Nangarhar;ElderAA,Ghazni.
InterviewwithTalebanCommanderSK,Kunar. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderMawlawiR, Faryab. 139 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAH,Mehterlam Baba. 140 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAK,DashtiArchi. 141 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderWM,Takhar.
138
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Afghanistanandthustheyarenowtryingto wintheheartsofthepeopleof Afghanistan.142 HowdidsuchsynchronisationbetweenTaleban andcommunitiesoccur?Insomecasesatleast,it wastheresultofalocaldialoguebetweenTaleban, eldersandulema.AtraderinDandbelievedthat 12schoolsthathadreopenedinKandaharwere theresultofsuchadialogue.Thesamesource indicatedthatlocalnegotiationdidnotseem necessarilytostartfromthegovernmentas claimedbyMinisterFaruqWardakin2011: Fewdaysbackacouncilofthelocaleldersin thePanjwaidistrictdemandedthe governmenttofacilitateoropentheschools andtheythemselveswillprotecttheschools fromTaleban.143 ATalebancommanderfromFaryabproduceda similaraccount: Ofcourse,eldersandwhitebeardedpeople askTalebanrepeatedlynottoharmschools. ButTalebanconvincethemtointroducetheir syllabus.Peopleappreciatethepolicyof Talebanwhentheyunderstandit.144 Thesecondfactor,asalreadymentioned,isthe Talebansnegotiationswithgovernmentagencies. TheMinistryofEducationwasinvolvedsomehow, asithadtopayfortheschools.Onetypical exampleofdynamicsonthegroundisthisone: OnceTalebancametoourvillageandtoldus thattheywantedtoclosethelocalschoolbut wedidntagreewiththem.Thenthey informedthatgovernmentexcludedcourses ofreligiousbelief,fiqhandhadithfromthe syllabus.Wetooktheissuewiththe educationdepartmentandofficialsassuredus thatthosecourseswouldbeagainincludedin thesyllabus....Ithappenedinmanyareas thatTalebanplantedexplosivedevicesat schoolsbutthenremovedthesamewhenwe askedthemtodoso.Talebanpayheedto advicesofelders....Thepeopleforcedthem toacceptschoolsandstopattacking educationalinstitutions....Wetoldthem thatourchildrenwouldbecomeilliterateand deprivedofeducationiftheyclosedall schools.ThenTalebansoftenedtheirstance aboutschoolsandofferedsomerelaxationin thisregard.145
142 143
SomeTalebanconfirmedthatthistypeofdynamic playedarole.AccordingtooneoftheseTaleban commanders, Theissueofschoolswassettledbycommon religiousscholars.Thereligiousscholars talkedtothemembersofSupremeCouncil[of theTaleban]andconvincedthemtoallow openingofschoolswiththeconditionthat courseofTalebantimeswouldbetaughtto students.146 Commonreligiousleadershaverequestedus tobeginteachingingovernmentschools.We haveconveyedtheirrequesttoSupreme Council.147 CommonreligiousscholarsconvincedTaleban toallowschoolstofunction.Theyhave demandedtothegovernmentnowtoinclude Islamiccoursesinthesyllabus.148 Thereligiousleadershipgotfedupand contactedprovincialcouncil;then,the provincialcouncilcontactedthesupreme councilandfinallyitwasconveyedtoAmirul Mominin.ThenAmirulMomininconstituted acommissionandthecommissiondecided thatschoolsmustopenforAfghans. Afterwards,MullahSahibofficiallyissueda decreethattheTalebandonotobjecttothe openingofthegovernmentschools.149 AstheTalebanpresentit,suchnegotiations producedcompromisesheavilyfavourabletothem. Theygetthegovernmenttopayforsomethingthat ultimatelyreinforcestheirrecruitmentbasisor,at theveryleast,doesnotproduceanysupportfor thegovernment.Thisisparticularlythecaseifwe agreethatstateeducationisamajorfactorin detachingthepopulacefromthemore conservativeviews.150 However,itisunlikelythatlocalnegotiations accountedforalloftheschoolreopenings.Insome areas,attemptsnegotiatedbythecommunitiesto savetheschoolssucceeded.ButinKandahar,for example,theydidnot.151SomeTalebaneven dismissedtheroleoftheulema:
146
InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAK,DashtiArchi. InterviewwithTraderAW,Dand. 144 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAJ,Faryab. 145 InterviewwithTribalElderHSKM,Faryab.
InterviewswithTalebanCommanderMawlawiR, Faryab;TalebanCommanderMMA,Takhar. 147 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAML,Kunar. 148 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderT,Kunduz. 149 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderMawlawiMW, KhwajaBahauddin. 150 SeeGiustozzi,NationBuilding(FN1)onthispoint. 151 InterviewswithTalebanCommanderAK,Dashti Archi;TeacherMI,KandaharCity.
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TheTalebanhaverespectforeveryreligious scholar.Almostalltheoldreligiousscholars areourteachersandteachershaveanumber ofrightsoverstudents.Wedolistentothem butthemattersaredecidedbyourcouncilof scholars.152 Thereisnoroleofthelocalreligious leadership.Talebandontfollowothersin theirmatters.153 Thereisnosuchroleoftheulemaand religiousleaders.Talebanarenowremoving seniorulema;mostofthemhappenedtobe theteachersofTalebanfortheydonotwant theirinterferenceintheiraffairs,mostlyon importantandharddecisionsandpolicies.154 Commonreligiousscholarscandonothing. ThedirectivesofChiefMullahSahibare implementedatanycost.155 SeveralTalebanintervieweesexplicitlyhintedthat toplevelnegotiationswerethekeyfactorleading toachangeontheground: TheformerforeignministerofIslamic Emirate,WakilAhmedMutawakil,hastalked totheministerforeducationofthe incumbentgovernmentinthisregard,telling himthatTalebanwillnotharmschoolsifthe oldcoursesaretaughttostudents.The governmenthasacceptedhiscondition.Now weawaitfulfilmentofthepromise,madeby thepresentgovernment.156 Apparently,theroleofMutawakilandthe agreementwerereportedontheradiotoo.157Even someeldershadheardthesameabout Mutawakil.158 Oneindicationoftheimportanceofdecisions takenatthetopindeterminingtheshiftinTaleban attitudesisthespreadandsynchronicityof implementation.Fromourrelativelysmallsample, judgingtheeffectivenessoftheTalebanin implementingthenewrulesofengagement towardsschoolsisdifficult,althoughaswehave seensomeprovincesseemedtohavegone significantlyfartherthanothers.However,
152 153
eventuallytheorderwasimplemented countrywide,althoughwithvaryingdegreesof enthusiasm.PerhapstheTalebanroadtestedtheir newpolicybeforefullimplementation;thatwas whatperhapswashappeningin2011concerning girlsschools.Someindisciplinewithintheranks mighthaveoccurred.Weevencameacross allegationsthattheTalebanwereaskingformoney toallowtheschoolstostayopen.159ATaleb admittedthatsomebriberymayoccur: Peopledomakesucheffortstoprotectthe schoolsfromtheTaleban.Sometimethey evengivemoneytoTalebanandtheymake promisestojointheminjihad.Taleban usuallydonotinterfereintheprivateschools andthatfortworeasons.Firstlyprivate schoolsteachthesyllabusoftheTalebans timeandsecondlytheygivesomemonetary benefitsorcommission[bribe]toTaleban.160 Oneintervieweehintedthattheorderwas implementedmorestrictlyaroundthecommand structureoftheTaleban: Evennow,Talebanhavetheirowngovernors, administratorsandjudges.Theschools situatednearthehousesoftheir[shadow] officialsaresafeandfunctional,asTaleban leadershaveorderedthemnottoharmthese schools.161 Limitedlocalnegotiationsappeartohavedrivena changeofpolicythatinturnaffectedother communities.Negotiationsandtacticsaside,the questionremainswhetherTalebanviewsofnon religiouseducationhavebeenchangingornot.One elderexpressedtheviewthatthischange hasnotcomeduetothepressureoftheir elders,ratheritisduetotheincreasing consciousnessamongthemonindividualand collectivebasis.162 Certainly,amongsomeTalebanthehostilityto stateschoolshadnotdisappeared.Listeningto someoftheTalebancommanders,oneistempted toagreeonthetacticalcharacterofthemove: Talebanwanttosetupanddevelop seminariesinsteadofschoolstopromote religiousvalues,whichistheprimedutyofall theMuslimstocarryoutaccordingly....All Talebanareagainstschoolsbecauseschools arelikecancerforthenewgeneration.It
InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAS,Faryab. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAK,DashtiArchi. 154 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderWM,Takhar. 155 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAZ,Takhar. 156 InterviewswithTalebanCommanderAS,Faryab; TalebanCommanderAJ,Faryab8;TalebanCommander MawlawiA,Kunar1;TalebanCommanderMAL,Kunar; TalebanCommanderWM,Takhar. 157 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderWM,Takhar. 158 InterviewwithShopkeeperAB,Kunduz.
159 160
InterviewwithCabDriverSU,KandaharCity. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderWM,Takhar. 161 InterviewwithTeacherMK,Kunduz. 162 InterviewwithTraderAW,Dand.
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divertsthemfromthebasicIslamic teachings.163 EvenwithintheTaleban,however,differentviews areemerging.Perhapssomeatleasthavere examinedcriticallytheexperienceofthe1990sof runningthecountrywithoutthetechnicaland scientificknowhowtodoiteffectively.Animam clearlyclosetoHezbeIslamiprovidedaparticular interpretationofthispartialshiftinTalebanviews: TheleadersofHezbeIslami,whoarereal leaders,havecausedthischange....Hezbe Islamihasapositiveapproachtowards schoolssofar.MayAllahhelpthemtospread thisideologyamongallmujahidin.164 EducationMinisterFaruqWardakwasamemberof HezbeIslamiinhisyouth,duringtheantiSoviet jihad,andmanyofficialswhomhebroughtintohis ministrysharethesamebackground;someeven hadaTalebanbackgroundandmighthaveactedas abridgewiththeTaleban.165UsuallytheTaleban werefarfromappreciativeofthestandofHezbe Islamitowardseducation: Talebanareagainstschools.Theysaythat goingtoschoolisahabitofIkhwans[aterm associatedwithsomejihadigroupsin Afghanistaninspiredbythefoundersof MuslimBrotherhoodinEgypt].TheIkhwans cantseeseminariesflourishing,Taleban claim.166 WithinpoliticalIslam,167technicaleducationis consideredasanobligation,contrarytothe Talebanwhodonotconsideritobligatory;both convergeonthepointthatreligiouseducationis obligatory.Inthe1990s,someoftheTaleban supportedtheideathatuniversityeducationwas notnecessary.Thisdoesnotruleoutthepossibility thattheTalebanmighthaveengagedinadebate overeducationandintheprocessabsorbedsome Islamistideasaboutit,perhapswithouteven realisingit.168
Whetherduetotheinfluenceofformermembers ofHezbeIslamiornot,theTalebansattitude towardsstateeducatedindividualsseemstobe changing.AtleastoneelderinNangarharreported, NowtheTalebandontkillteachersand studentsbuttheycontactintelligentstudents andpersuadethemtoquitschoolandjoina seminaryandjihad.169 WehaveseenhowtheTalebanwerepreviously oftendeeplyhostiletostateschoolgraduates.Is this,togetherwiththeshiftdiscussedabove,asign ofachangeofattitude?Talebaneffortstorecruit inhighschoolsinKabulprovince,Wardakand Ghazniwereconfirmedtousbyothersources; theirrelativesuccessseemtohavederivedfrom thefrustrationofschoolleaverswhofailedtobe admittedtouniversity.170Whiletheexact motivationsareunknown,theTalebanreportedly hadyoungactivistsamongthehighschoolstudents workingtoconvincetheirfellowstudentstojoin theinsurgency.Thedesiretoexpandtheranksmay beoutstrippingthecapacityofmadrassasto providerecruits,butareevaluationofthe suitabilityofrecruitsfromstateschoolsseems implicit.171 Recruitmentfromstateschoolsmightthereforebe anotherfactordrivingtheshiftintheTalebans policytowardsschools.SomeTalebancommanders expressedcomparativelyopenviewstowardsnon religiouseducation,suggestingthatsuchviews haverecentlybecometolerablewithintheTaleban: Thereisnodifferencebetweentheeducation ofschoolandseminary.Everyonecanget educationeverywhereifiscommittedtothe cause(ofeducation).Thereareprivate schoolsandprivatelanguagecentres.Taleban arenotagainsteducationorEnglishlanguage. TheydontattackEnglishlanguagecentres. Butthemainissueisthatofsyllabus.Taleban willallowallschoolstofunctioniftheir syllabusisintroduced(inschools).172 ArmedTalebandontaskanyonewhyhe doesntgotoseminaryinsteadofschool.Itis amatterofchoiceofeverystudent.Manyof ourcolleagueshavegotadmissionsincourses
169 170
163
InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAZ,Takhar. 164 InterviewwithImamTH,LaghmanMarkaz. 165 PersonalcommunicationwithKateClark,September 2011. 166 InterviewwithElderAJ,Nangarhar. 167 ThatisIslamism,asopposedtoIslamic fundamentalism(thatistheTaleban),orinotherwords Islamasapoliticalideologyofthesecularlyeducated classasopposedtotheconservativeinterpretationof Islamofsectorsoftheclergy. 168 InterviewwithAmirMansoryoftheSCA,Kabul,April 2011.OnthedifficultytheTalebanhadrunningthe countryinthe1990s,seeAbdulSalamZaeef,MyLife withtheTaleban,London,Hurst,2010.
InterviewwithTribalElderAH,Nangarhar. PersonalcommunicationwithKateClark,who interviewedayoungTalebfighterandasympathizerin WardakinSeptember2011. 171 PersonalcommunicationwithAfghanjournalistfrom adistrictofKabulprovince,April2011;personal communicationwithAfghanresearcherfromWardak, April2011. 172 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAJ,Faryab.
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ofdifferentlanguagesinKabul,Nangarhar andotherprovinces.Everyoneshouldtryto learnnewthings.173 NowadaysbothIslamicandmodern educationisbeingimpartedinschoolsand madrassas.Wedounderstandtheimportance ofmoderneducationsothereisnosuch disagreementamongtheTaleban commanders.174 Insummary,theevolutionofTalebanthinkingon educationseemsdrivenbyacomplexsetoffactors andcannotbeexplainedsimplyintermsof negotiationsamongafewindividualsatthetop.
quitesometime,undertheir(mostlyinformal) supervision.Theseprivateschoolshadtoadoptthe Talebancurriculumtostayopen.176Infact,the Talebansaythattheyinvitefamiliestosendtheir childrentoprivateschools.177Theprocessofco optingprivateschoolscontinuesin2011;the Talebanclaimedtohaverecentlyreachedan agreementwithschoolsinFaryabfortheadoption ofTalebantexts.178Asidefromendorsingprivate schoolsthatadopttheTalebanscurriculum,the Talebanhavealsobeenclaimingthatprivate schoolsareofabetterstandardthanstate schools.179Sometimes,staterunschoolsseemto havereopenedasprivateschools: Inmanyareasstaterunschoolshavebeen turnedintoprivateeducationalinstitutions andstartedteachingcoursesofTaleban.180 EvenbeforetherecentnegotiationswiththeMoE, theTalebanseemtohavedecidedtofacilitatethe emergenceofmoreprivateschools,tosquarethe circlemakingthecommunitieshappyandatthe sametimerejectingtheroleofthestatein education.181Inrecenttimes,theTalebanstarted distributingpensandreligioustextbooksamong thepupilsofprivateschools,althoughtheextent towhichthisishappeningisunclear.182Theschools openedbytheTalebanin2007andmentioned above(seeSection2.1,Thedimensionsofthe problem)mightinfacthavealreadybeenprivate schoolssponsoredbytheTaleban. Arelatedaspectoftheneweducationaleffort linkedtotheTalebanistheappearanceinKabulof anewNGOledbyMullahZaeef,dedicatedto buildingschoolsforboysandgirls.AsofApril2011, onlytwoschoolshadbeensetup,buttheNGOhad startedoperationsonlyafewmonthsearlier.The schoolswereteachingboththegovernmentand theTalebancurriculaandwereregisteredas privateschoolswiththeMoE.183TheNGOplanned toopenmoreschoolsinLogar,Khost,Paktia, Badghis,KunarandNuristanprovinces.184The
176
4. TALEBANVIEWSABOUTTHE FUTUREOFEDUCATION
InSection3.3.1,Talebandemands,wehaveseen howtheTalebanwouldliketoreshapethestate educationalsectorinAfghanistanintheshortterm. WhatwouldhappeniftheTalebanwerebackin powerinKabulcanonlybeamatterofspeculation; the2011EidmessageofMullahOmarseemedto hintatamoreconciliatoryapproachthaninthe 1990s.175However,theTalebansviewsoftherole ofeducationinsocietyarewiderthanthat.They featurethelongtermstrengtheningoftheroleof madrassasandQuranicschools.Theyalsofeature anexpandedroleforprivateschools(thatisnot staterunandexcludingprivatemadrassas), althoughhowlongtermthisshouldbeinthe Talebansstrategyisunclear.Finally,thedebateon stateeducationdoesnotappeartobeoverwithin theTalebansranks.Ontheonehand,theTaleban areinvestingconsiderablehumanresourcesin bringingstateschoolsundertheircontrol;onthe other,withintheTalebanprejudiciallyhostileviews stillexist.TheTalebanmightpossiblyhaveseen somevalueandanopportunityinadealwiththe MinistryofEducationovertheschools,intermsof buildingconfidenceandtrustforfuturepolitical negotiations.
4.1 TheTalebanandPrivateSchools
Whileintheearlyyearsoftheinsurgencythey mighthavebannedallschools,virtuallyallthe peopleweinterviewedagreedthattheTaleban havebeenpermittingprivateschoolstooperatefor
173 174
InterviewwithTalebanCommanderSK,Kunar. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderU,Dila. 175 AbubakarSiddique,DecipheringMullahOmarsEid Message,RadioFreeEurope,RadioLiberty(2September 2011).
InterviewswithTeacherNU,Faryab;Taleban CommanderAS,Faryab6;TalebanCommanderSK, Kunar. 177 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderMawalwiR, Faryab. 178 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderMawlawiWM, Faryab. 179 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAM,Kunar. 180 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderGYZ,Takhar. 181 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAM,Kunar. 182 InterviewswithElderAJ,Nangarhar;Taleban CommanderMAM,Nangarhar. 183 LianneGutcher,TurnaroundbyTalebanGivesGirlsa Chance,TimesEducationalSupplement(10June2011). 184 ExTalebantoStartSchoolProgrammeinViolent
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femaleteachersworkingintheseschoolswere vettedbybothTalebanandMoE.185 Talebanarepositivefortheydovisitmosques inwintersandaskthepeopletoeducatetheir childreninwinterstoo.Wevisitedamosque theotherdayandtoldthepeoplethatthey shouldsendtheirchildrentomadrassasifthe schoolsareclosedinthewinterandwhenthe schoolsarereopenedthensendthechildren backtoschools.186 Talebanhavelaunchedaneweducational program.Theyvisitmosquesinthoseareas wherethereisnoschoolandaskpeopleto sendtheirchildrentomosqueforgetting education.Talebanteachthemtheirown syllabusinmosques.187
countries.ButwithhelpofAllahwewillnot accepttheideas,importedfromother countries.ThenonlocalTaleban,whowantto imposetheideasofothersonAfghans,willbe humiliatedandexpelledsoon.190 SeveraloftheTalebanmadeasimilarpoint: IfQuranandshariaistaughtintheseschools, localTalebandontopposetheirpresencebut theforeignTalebandontpermitanytypeof school,astheforeignTalebanarenot interestedinbringingpeaceintheregion. Theywantthepeopleofthiscountrytobe illiterateandbackward.Theyfearschoolswill spreadunIslamicnormsandvalues.191 Thegroupssupportedbytheforeignerswant toclosebothschoolsandmadrassas.192 AcommonpositionamongnonTalebanisthatnot allinsurgentshavebeeninvolvedinattackson schools;afrequentdistinctionisbetweenlocal TalebanandoutofareaTalebanorforeignfighters, withthelatterallegedtobetheonesattacking schools.193Ateacherhaddirectexperiencesof visitsbyforeignandoutofareaTaleban: Taleban,whenfrustrated,eithercome directlytoschoolsorgototheteachers houses.Theytellthemthatyouare preachingChristianity.ButAfghaniTaleban areeducated,theydontactso.Theycome andcheckthebooksandthenleave,butthe illiterateTalebanaretherealbastards.194 Someinterviewees,likethisshopkeeperfrom Paktika,rejectedtheideathattheelementshostile toschoolswereTaleban: Talebanhavenowadmittedtheimportanceof schoolsandthismightbethereasonthat theyarenotdestroyingschoolsespeciallyin thisarea.Althoughsomeforcesareagainst theschoolsanddestroyingschools,theyare notTaleban.195 TalebanfromPakistanoftenoperateinPaktika, WazirandMehsud,andtheyareknownfortheir particularlyhostileattitudetowardsschoolsand fortheirextremelyconservativeviews. ThedistinctionbetweenforeignandAfghan Talebanwasnottheonlyoneourinterviewees drew.Severalelders,afewteachersandaformer
190 191
4.2 DifferencesamongTalebanabout StateSchools

AfewTalebancommanders(andtheformerone interviewedinFaryab)admittedtodifferencesin attitudetowardsstateschoolsamongtheTaleban: Thereisdifferenceofopinionamongvarious groups.Therearesomewhosupportsthe schoolsbutotherswillopposeitandwillwant toreplaceitwithmadrassas....Educationis animportantfactor.Thosewhounderstandthe valueandimportanceofeducationarepositive irrespectiveoftheireducationbackground.It maybethereasonthattheilliterate commandersareagainstit.188 Theyhavedifferentopinionandapproachin thisregard.Atsomeplaces,schoolsare runningevenneartotopcommandersof Talebanbutinotherpartstheydontallow schoolsatall.189 AdividinglineseemstobebetweenAfghanand foreignTaleban,withtheformerbeingmore flexiblewithregardtoeducation.Asympathiser expressedhatredfortheforeignTaleban: StudentsofseminariesinAfghanistangeta differentkindofeducationwhileanothertype ofeducationisimpartedtostudentsinother
Areas,PajhwokAfghanNews(14December2010). 185 Meetingwithofficialofinternationalorganisation, Kabul,3April2011. 186 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAM,Barmal. 187 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAJ,Takhar. 188 InterviewswithTalebanCommanderAQ,Zeri; TalebanCommanderNM,SangiHisar. 189 InterviewswithTalebanCommanderAK,Dashti Archi;TalebanCommanderWM,Takhar.
InterviewwithTribalElderGMM,Laghman. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAW,Lashkargah. 192 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderMSN,Arghandab. 193 InterviewwithFarmerTM,Faryab. 194 InterviewwithTeacherFR,KhasKunar. 195 InterviewwithShopkeeperAM,MetaKhan.
23
TalebexpressedthebeliefthatTalebaneducatedin stateschoolstendedtobelesshostiletowards them,comparedtoilliterateormadrassaeducated ones.196AccordingtoateacherfromKunar, ThemajorityofTalebanleadershavegot religiouseducationandtheydontoppose schoolswithinAfghanistan.Theyevenallow theirsonsandnephewstoattendschoolsand neveropposetheschools.Buttheilliterate Talebanareinoppositiontoschools.197 AnotherdivisionpitsfreshTaleban,opposedto schools,againstolderones,whoaremore flexible:198 Thoseoldwerenotagainstschoolsbutthis newgenerationofTalebanisanewbreed. ThesenewTalebanneitherspareschoolsnor teachers.199 TheTaleban,whogoteducationin Afghanistanandworkedinthegovernmentof Taleban,aremoderate.Therootcauseofthe problemisemergenceoftheseTaleban,who havebecomemullahafterspendingonlysix monthsinseminaries.Inthepast,aman wouldspend20yearsawayfromhometo becomeamullahbutnowtheybecome mullahafterspendingfewmonthsina seminary.200 Viewsturnedouttobedividedabouttheroleof thePakistanieducationalestablishment.In southernAfghanistan,Pakistancanpassasa modern,progressiveplacetoreceiveaneducation: ThosewhohavestudiedinPakistan,theyare familiarwithschoolsanditbringspositive changeintheirattitudebutthosestudiedin Afghanistantheyarenotthatmuchfamiliar withtheschools;thatsthereasonthelatter stronglyopposetheschoolsandtheformer aremoderateontheissueofschools.201 Almostalltheintervieweeswhoexpressedan opiniononthematterheldacontraryviewpointto theonejustmentioned,sayingthatPakistanisdo notwanttoseeAfghanisadvanceineducation:
196
ThosewhohavestudiedinAfghanistanthey arethewellwishersofAfghanistan.Those whohavestudiedinPakistanorotherplaces, theydontwantAfghanistantomake advancement.Sotheyareagainsttheschools. Theymakemisinformationthatschools preachChristianity.202 ThosewhohavestudiedinPeshawaror Quettaaremoreextremists.Thosewhowere educatedinsideAfghanistanarebehaving normallytotheschoolsandlocalelders.203 However,theTalebanwhohavegoteducation inAfghanistanarenothardlinersascompared totheircolleagues,whohavegoteducationin othercountries.ThenonlocalTalebanhave learnedmanyotherthingsbesidesgetting educationbuttheywillsucceedintheir mission.TheywillleaveAfghanistanin humiliationandtheirowncountrywillsuffer fromthecancer,theyhavebroughtto Afghanistan.204 TheTalebancommanderswhohaveattended seminariesinAfghanistandontoppose schools.SuchTalebanhaverespectfor education.ButtheTaleban,whohave attendedseminariesinPeshawarandQuetta hateeducationandopposeschools.205 ThosewhohavestudiedinAfghanistan,they arenotthatmuchstrictintheirapproachand policiesascomparedtothosewhohave studiedinPakistan.Somemujahidinvisitthe schools,mosquesandmadrassasandcollect thestudentsandteachtheminlinewiththeir owninterpretations.206 Whatisoutofthequestionisthatdifferent positionsconcerningstateschoolsexistamongthe Taleban.AtraderfromDand(Kandahar)said, Thosewhoaremoderate,theydonotoppose theschools.Thereisaseparategroupwhich callstheschoolsashomeoforcentreof Satan[shaitan].Theysaythatifthereare religiousinstitutionsthereisnoneedof schools....Inourterritories,themoderate Talebandotrytoconvincethehardlinersnot toharassthestudentsandtheteachersand nottodestroytheschools.207 InKandahar,aneldermentionedanepisodein
202 203
InterviewswithFormerTalebanAMandTeacherNU, Faryab;ShopkeeperHSH,Helmand;TeacherMI, KandaharCity. 197 InterviewswithTeacherFR,KhasKunar;TribalElder MDQ,Laghman. 198 InterviewswithTeacherFR,KhasKunar;Shopkeeper AW,Takhar. 199 InterviewswithTeacherZ,Kunduz;TribalElderMDQ, Laghman. 200 InterviewwithTeacherMZ,Laghman. 201 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderA,Zeri.
InterviewwithCabDriverSU,KandaharCity. InterviewwithTeacherFR,KhasKunar. 204 InterviewwithExteacherS,Laghman. 205 InterviewwithTribalElderAH,Nangarhar. 206 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderWM,Takhar. 207 InterviewwithTraderAW,Dand.
December2011
24
Ghazni,whereaTalebancommanderwhohad permittedaschoolwaslaterbrutallykilledby otherTalebanandtheschoolclosed,asevidenceof bigdifferencesinviewpointamongtheTaleban.208
4.3 TalebansSchoolMonitoring
Perhapsthemostinterestingaspectofthe Talebanseducationalstrategyasitdevelopedfrom 2007onwardsconcernstheirefforttoestablisha degreeofcontroloverstateandprivateschools. Mostintervieweesbelievedorknewthatthe Talebanwerekeepinganeyeonstateschools,but thesystemimplementedseemedtovaryfrom placetoplace.InGhazni,209PaktikaandKunduz, theschoolswerebeingsupervisedinarather professionalway,withadedicatedcommission establishedforthetask.InPaktika, theyassignustaskstogoandcollect informationfromschoolsandthenaspecial committeelooksintothematterthatthe subjectstaughtintheschoolsareofanygood forthepeopleornot.210 WedokeepacheckontheschoolsandIhave personallyvisitedtheschoolssothattosee thatstudentsarenotinfluencedthroughthe Westerntypeofeducationorsubjects.But mostofthetimewedonotinterferewiththe schools.211 Yeswedokeepacheckonschoolsby deputingorsendingourmentoreportuson thesubjectsandactivitiessothatwelook thatthestudentsarenotmisledandguidedin thelineofinfidels.212 Talebanhavetheircouncilorgroupwhich looksintothemattersofschoolsandsyllabus sothatnoantiIslamicmaterialshouldbe addedinthesyllabus.213 InKunar,too,theTalebantookoverthe supervisionofschoolswithintheirareasofcontrol, asacknowledgedbytheeducationauthoritiesof theprovince.214AccordingtoThomasRuttig,At leastoneteacherateveryschoolisnamedbythe Taleban,or,ifalreadythere,ismadetheir representative.Hemustclearallotherteachers employedathisschool.Thisresemblesthedaysof
208 209
theEmiratewhenthevillagemullahsweremade theeyesandearsoftheTaleban.215Theprocess ofsettingupsupervisingcommissionswasstill goingoninautumn2011:accordingtotheAfghan authorities,suchacommissionwasestablishedin KapisaprovincebytheTalebaninOctober2011.216 Insomeareaswewerenotabletoestablishwhat washappening;ourinformersusedvague expressionssuchas, Theysendtheirmeninschoolsandobserve themintheTalebancontrolledareas.217 TheTalebanclaimedinKunduzto visiteachschooltocollectinformation.They closedownthoseschools,wherecoursesare notaccordingtothecultureandtraditionsof Afghans.Noonecanopensuchaschool again;ifsomeonetriesheisturnedintoa lessonforothers.218 InmanycaseswheretheTalebandidnotseemto strictlysupervisetheschools,theyseemedto recruitinformerswithintheschools,visitedthe housesofteacherstocheckthetextbooksandthe exercisebooks,orevensentelderstoschoolsto collecttextbooksfortheTaleban.219 Iftheyreceivereportsaboutanybook,they justcalltheschoolheadmasterandwarnhim abouttheteachingofthatbook.Butonce theystudythatbookalsobeforetakingany action.220 Insomeareas,wherenotraceofTaleban supervisionofschoolscouldbefound,likein Helmand,thismightbebecauseveryfewschools areactiveinsuchareaslikeBabaji.221TheTaleban claimto havealsocompleteinformationabout teachersastowhentheygooutandatwhat timetheyreturnhome.222 Aformerteacherweinterviewedexperiencedthis directly: Talebanreceivecompleteinformationabout theschoolastowhichbookisbeingtaught, atwhichtimeateachercomestoschooland
215
InterviewwithCabDriverSU,KandaharCity. InterviewwithEldersH,DM,AA,Ghazni. 210 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAM,Barmal. 211 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderU,Dila. 212 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderJ,Sharana. 213 InterviewwithTeacherMH,YousufKhail 214 KhanWaliSalarzai,KunarTalebanSupportEducation Process,PajhwokNewsAgency(31August2011).
T.Ruttig,TacticalorGenuine?TheTalebansNew EducationPolicy,AANBlog(posted15January2011). 216 BakhtarSafi,TalibanMonitoringSchoolsinKapisa, PahjwokAfghanNews(18October2011). 217 InterviewwithCabDriverSU,KandaharCity. 218 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderSTK,Kunduz. 219 InterviewwithTribalElderHSKM,Faryab. 220 InterviewwithTeacherY,Sharana. 221 InterviewwithElderKJ,Helmand. 222 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAM,Kunar.
25
whenhegoeshome.Talebanfirstwarnand thenattackateacher.Iwaswarnedseveral timesbyTalebanwhenIwasateacher.Atlast theykidnappedandIpromisedthemthatI wouldquitmyjob.223 Inthecontextofanongoingconflict,wherethe Talebanhavebeenundergrowingmilitarypressure bytheiradversaries,thisefforttosuperviseschools isamajorone.Whatdoesittellusaboutthe Talebansaims?Perhapsitrepresentsa compromisebetweenthoseinclinedtowardsa hardlineandthoseinfavourofasofterapproach therelativelygreatertolerancemighthavebeen hardertoselltotheradicalswithoutguaranteesof astrictrespectoftherules.Seenwithinthe contextofthewiderTalebanefforttoforma shadowgovernmentinsideAfghanistan,itmightbe anattempttoaddresstheirweaknessinproviding servicestothepopulation,hijackingstate educationandreshapingitinitsimage.The inspectionsintheschoolcontributetothisby ensuringthatthequalityoftheeducationprovided isbetterthaninschoolsunderstatecontrol.
schoolsamongtheTalebanleadershipbut nowthereispositivechangeintheirattitude andtheydoordernottointerfereinthe schoolsbutmostofthemdofocuson madrassasfortheywantreligiousknowledge tobepopularisedandgiventothepeople.227 Ingeneral,theTalebanclaimthattheclerics activelycollaboratewiththeminshapingan expandedreligioussectorineducation: Ofcourse,commonreligiousscholarsare playinganimportantrole.Theydeliver sermonsinmosquesandinformpeopleabout theeducationalprogramofTaleban.Theytell peoplethatTalebanwanttochalkouta strategyforimplementationoftheirsyllabus assoonaspossible.Theyimparteducationto childreninmosquesandTalebanprovide themwithpensandbookstodistribute amongthechildren.228 Althoughitseemslikelythattheclericsingeneral wouldsupporttheTalebanspolicyofislamicising education,AmirMansoryoftheSwedish Committeepointedoutthatthelevelandtypeof educationreceivedbymullahsvaryacrossthe country:certainlyNangarharsmullahsaremore likelytohavebeenexposedtononreligious subjectsthanthoseofthesouth.229
4.4 TheTalebanandtheClergy
Althoughtheclericsweinterviewedwerealmost alllinkedtotheTaleban,severalnonTaleban amongtheinterviewees,includingthesingle formerTalebancommander,wereoftheviewthat theclericssupportedtheTaleban:30outof61said thattheTalebanhelpmadrassas.Althoughmost Talebandeniedthatthemovementassuchhad anythingtodowiththemadrassas,12outof32 admittedtosomekindofrelationshipbetween madrassasandTaleban,andafewevenconceded thattheytransferfundstosomemadrassas:224 Talebanoffertheirbloodforseminaries,let alonefinancialassistance.Theydonatetheir zakatandalmstoseminaries.Talebanhave offeredtheirentirelifefortheserviceof seminariesinthepathofAllah.225 Talebanassistseminariesfromthegainsof warandalms,donatedbyrichtradersand businessmentothem.Thewelloffpeople buyessentialitemsforseminariesand providefinancialassistancetostudentsand teachersofseminarieshappily.226 Earliertherewerefewopponentsofthe
223 224
5. CONCLUSION
Stateeducationhaslongbeencontroversialin Afghanistanandhasfuelledviolentconflictsinceat least1978,ifnotearlier.Despitehopesofthe contrary,thiscontinuedtobethecaseafter2001. Therearemultiplereasons,rangingfroma lingeringresistanceamongtheclergyandsome sectionsofruralsociety,tostructuralfactorssuch asthefactthatschoolsoftenrepresenttheonly visiblepresenceofthestateinthevillages(hence presentingtheonlytargetagainstwhichtovent grievances). AmongtheTaleban,hostilityandsuspiciontowards stateschoolswereundoubtedlywidespreadafter 2001.Theshortageofgovernmenttargets convergedwiththishostilitytogenerateviolence againstschools,teachersandstudents.Atone point(2006),anorganisedcampaignagainst schoolsseemstohavebeenlaunchedbythe Talebanleadership.Theindicationsarethatsuch
227 228
InterviewwithExteacherS,Laghman. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAAA,Garmser. 225 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAS,Faryab. 226 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAH,Mehterlam Baba.
InterviewwithTalebanCommanderA,Zeri. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderNAJ,Kunduz. 229 InterviewwithAmirMansory,Kabul,SCA,10April 2011.
December2011
26
campaignwasnotwelcomedinmostvillages, becausetheportionoftheruralpopulation opposedtostateschoolswasaminority, particularlyinthemoredenselypopulateddistricts neighbouringthecities. Between2006and2011,theTalebanredefined theirattitudetowardsstateschools.Fromanall outcampaignofaggression,theygraduallyfound anapproachmoreacceptabletorural communities,whichinmanycaseswantedtheir kidstohaveaccesstostateeducation.Although thepaceofschoolreopeningsacceleratedin2010 andevenmoreso2011,itmightnothavebeen duetoachangeintheTalebansapproach:since 2007,stateschoolshadbeenreopeningbasedon agreementswiththeTaleban;theMoEsreadiness tosatisfyTalebandemandsisaslikelyasanything elsetoaccountforthesereopenings. Thegenuinedevelopmentof2011istheTalebans decisiontostopattackingschoolsacross Afghanistan.TheTalebanexplainedthisismeantto givetheMinistryofEducationthechancetoadopt theTalebancurriculumcountrywide.Attacks largelyceased,apartfromafewincidents,which mayhavebeenduetoflawsintheTalebans commandandcontrolsystem,tothepresenceon thegroundofgroupsofTalebanlinkedtoPakistani jihadistgroupsortospecificaccusationsagainst MinistryofEducationstaff(ofcooperationwiththe government).EvenifthedevelopmentofaTaleban educationalpolicydidnotstartin2011,bythenit wastakingshapeasarelativelycomplexeffortto offersomethingtothepopulation,asopposedto simplyrejectingstateeducation.Apartfromco optingstateschools,aneffortatwhichtheTaleban werebecomingquiteadeptasof2011,wehave alsoseenhowtheTalebanlearnedtolurethe privatesectortowardstheirpositions,atleastin theareastheydominated.Ofcourse,private educationisnotasurrogateofstateeducation becauseitisnotfree;theTalebanhavehowever triedtoaddressthisproblembyprintingtextbooks tobeusedinthoseschools.TheTalebanhavealso triedtoboostthemosqueschools,whichimpart civiceducationtolittlechildrenmorethen anythingelse,andthemadrassas.Afterinsistingon creatingalternativestostateschoolsforthreeto fouryears,theyendedupinvestingsignificant humanresourcesinestablishingcontroloverstate schools;thisshowsthattheywereawarethat private,madrassaandmosqueeducationwould neverbeseenbythevillagersasafullalternative tostateschools. EveniftheTalebanspolicytowardsstateschools wasnotreallynewinearly2011,itsrelationship
withtheTalebanswiderpoliticalstrategymight stillhavechanged.TheinvolvementofMutawakil inmediatingadealwiththeMoEseemstosuggest thatalinkagemighthaveemergedrelativelylatein 2010or2011andthatoriginallythepolicy emergedoutoftherelationshipwiththevillage communities.ItmatterswhethertheMinistryof Educationtooktheinitiativeorwhetheritwas someoftheTaleban,evenifatpresentwedonot knowtheanswer.Inanycase,thedemandsofthe communitiestowardstheTalebanseemtohave playedanimportantrole.Thismeansthatthenew policywhichwastakingshapein201011might lastlongerthanifithadbeendeterminedbya simpleopportunisticchangeofmindatthetopof theTalebanmovement. Thisisnottosaythatdecisionmakingatthetop hasnotbeenimportant.AsofendOctober2011, theexpectednewstandoftheTalebanongirls educationwasnotformallyannouncedyet;itwas apparentlybeingroadtestedinanumberof provinces.Aformalannouncementongirls educationwouldcertainlycreateasenseof momentumintheevolutionofTalebanviews,not leastbecauseitwouldweakenanysenseof continuitywiththepast.TheTalebanscautionon thispointshowsthattheissueremainsdivisive withintheirranks;however,italsoshowsthatthe leadershipappearstobeaheadofthebase. Therefore,theTalebanleadershipseemstobe ridingthetigerofreconciliationwiththe communities,tryingtopreventlocalcommanders frommakingseparatedeals.Butwhatistheaimof theleadership:politicalnegotiationsorexpansion ofitspoliticalbaseamongthepopulationand territorialcontrol?TheMinistryofEducation clearlyhopedthatengagingtheTalebanonthe schoolscouldbeawaytobuildconfidenceand thereforefacilitatepoliticalnegotiations.The Talebanmusthaveunderstoodwhattheministry wasaimingat;stilltheyseemtohavebeenmainly drivenbyotherconsiderations.Inthebodyofthe paper,wehavementionedthefirstsignsthatthe Talebanaresystematicallyrecruitinghighschool students.TheTalebanaccompaniedtheirpolicy changewitharelaunchofmosqueeducationand acontinuedefforttomakeprivateeducationmore viable.Theseeffortssuggestthattheyseethe villagecommunitiesastheirprimaryinterlocutor andtheMoEandtheAfghangovernmentas secondary.Theyhedgetheirbetsbyprivileging theirrelationshipwiththecommunities,which couldbringrewardsregardlessoftheultimate outcomeofpoliticalnegotiationsatthetop.Ina sense,theTalebansdevelopingapproachto educationisawinwinpropositionforthem,asit
27
strengthensthemovementintheirrelationship withthecommunitiesandcouldbeusedasa confidencebuildingmeasureinhypothetical forthcomingnegotiationswiththegovernment. TheoldTalebanleadershipgatheredintheQuetta Shuramusthaveknownthatpoliticalnegotiations wouldbedifficulttokickstartandthattheir outcomewouldbehighlyuncertain,sohedging theirbetswasanaturalapproachfromtheirpoint ofview.Moregenerally,itwouldbeunwiseforany insurgentleadershiptoinvesttoomuchinpossible politicalnegotiations,particularlyintheearly stagesoftheprocess.Militarily,theTalebanare strongenoughthattheynolongerneedsoft targetslikeschoolstoadvertisetheirpresence.The greaterpresenceintheprovincesofISAFand Afghansecurityforcesoffersplentyofwaysforthe Talebantodemonstratetheirdeterminationto fight.Atthesametime,theTalebanneedthe supportofthecommunitiesmorethanever. ThereductionintheTalebansattacksonschools andtheconcessionsmadebytheMinistryof EducationtotheTalebaninordertoreopen schoolsrepresentanimprovementfor
Afghanistansruralcommunities:childrenget accesstofree,seculareducation,evenifthe quality(neververyhighinthestatesector)is furtherdiluted,ashoursdedicatedtosecular subjectsarereducedtomakeroomforreligious subjects.FromtheperspectiveoftheAfghanstate, thisdevelopmentonlyseemsgoodifitreallycan contributetokickstartpoliticalnegotiationsand eventhisassumesthatsuchnegotiationswould endpositively.Otherwise,theAfghanstateendsup givingawaymorethanitgets:thebenefitsforthe TalebanaremoreobviousthanfortheAfghan state,themoresoastheTalebancanclaimtobe theoneswhomakestateschoolsworkasthey supervisethem.AsofOctober2011,optimism aboutthepossibilityofpoliticaltalkshadfaded considerablysincethebeginningoftheyear;the nextschoolyearinAfghanistanstartsinMarch 2012andbythenwhethertheMoEisdelivering thepromisedchangesinthecurriculatothe TalebanandhowtheTalebanaregoingtoreact shouldbeclear.
December2011
28
ANNEX
QuestionnaireforIntervieweesintheVillages
DotheTalebanopposestateschoolsinthisarea? Ifyes,howviolentistheiropposition?Havetheybeenkillingteachersorstudents? AreallTalebaninthisareaopposedtoschoolsortherearedifferences? Whydotheysaytheyopposeschools?Dotheyallofferthesamemotivations? Thedifferencesinattitudetowardstheschools:whatmotivatesthem? Previousaffiliation(forexampleHezbismoretoleranttowardsstateschools?) Previouseducationalbackground(thosehavingbeentostateschoolsbeingmoretolerant?) Locationofrecruitment:Pakistan,outofareaAfghan,orlocal? Requestsbylocalcommunities? Inthiscaseareallcommunities/villagestryingtoprotecttheirschoolsorsomearenot? Shadowgovernorsandcommanders:dotheyhavedifferentattitudes? Canweestimatehowmanycommandersinthisareaopposestateeducationandhowmanydonot? DifferentgroupsofTaleban:differentcommander,differentaffiliation(Quetta,Haqqani,Peshawar,AQ...)? Anythingelse? Whatarethedirectivesoftheleadershipcouncilandoftheshurasconcerningschoolsandstateeducation? Docommandersallrespectthesedirectives? Aretheytakenseriously? Dotheleaderstrytopunishthosedisobeying? Hastherebeenanevolutioninbehaviourtowardseducationovertime?DidtheTalebanbecomemoreorless aggressivetowardsstateeducation? Ifyes,whathasdeterminedit? Ordersfromthetop? ChangesonthegroundlikegrowingISAFpressure? DotheTalebantrytoinfluencethemadrassas? How?Supportthemfinancially? Imposeteachers? DotheTalebantrytoinfluencethestateschoolsleftopen? How? Imposeteachers? Changecurricula? IfHezbeIslamioperatesinthisarea,howdoestheirattitudetostateeducationdifferfromthatoftheTaleban?
ABOUTTHEAFGHANISTANANALYSTSNETWORK(AAN)
TheAfghanistanAnalystsNetwork(AAN)isanonprofit,independentpolicyresearchorganisation.Itaims tobringtogethertheknowledgeandexperienceofalargenumberofexpertstoinformpolicyand increasetheunderstandingofAfghanrealities. TheinstitutionalstructureofAANincludesacoreteamofanalystsandanetworkofregularcontributors withexpertiseinthefieldsofAfghanpolitics,governance,ruleoflawandsecurity.AANwillpublish regularindepththematicreports,policybriefingsandcomments. ThemainchannelfordisseminationofthereportsistheAANwebsite.Forfurtherinformation,please visitwww.aanafghanistan.org.
ABOUTTHEAUTHORS:ANTONIOGIUSTOZZIANDCLAUDIOFRANCO
Dr.AntonioGiustozziisanindependentresearcherassociatedwithIDEAS(LSE).Heistheauthorofseveral articlesandpapersonAfghanistan,aswellasofthreebooks,War,PoliticsandSocietyinAfghanistan, 19781992(GeorgetownUniversityPress),Koran,KalashnikovandLaptop:TheNeoTalibanInsurgency, 200207(ColumbiaUniversityPress)andEmpiresofMud:WarandWarlordsinAfghanistan(Columbia UniversityPress),aswellasavolumeontheroleofcoercionandviolenceinstatebuilding,TheArtof Coercion(ColumbiaUniversityPress,2011).HealsoeditedavolumeontheTaliban,DecodingtheNew Taliban(ColumbiaUniversityPress,2009),featuringcontributionsbyspecialistsfromdifferent backgrounds.HeiscurrentlyresearchingissuesofgovernanceinAfghanistan,fromawideranging perspectivewhichincludesunderstandingtheroleofarmy,police,subnationalgovernanceand intelligencesystem. ClaudioFrancohasabackgroundinPhilosophyofLanguageandjournalismandhas,inrecentyears,been workingasawriter,analystandconsultantspecializingonthePakAfghanregionandIslamistmovements. Since1999,travellingextensivelyacrossthegreaterMiddleEast,SouthAsiaandthePakAfghanregionhe developedaspecificfirsthandknowledgeandaneffectivenetworkofcontacts.Inthelastdecade,Mr Francocontributedexpertisetoseveralmediaoutlets,institutionalorganizations,academiaand independentresearchinstitutes.
AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork2011. Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationcanmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystemortransmittedinanyformorby anymeans,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,recordingorotherwisewithoutfullattribution.

Battle For The Schools: Taliban and State Education

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Battle For The Schools: Taliban and State Education

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AntonioGiustozziandClaudioFranco

SeeGiustozzi,NationBuilding(FN1)forasummary. ThemainpiecesofworkareLessonsinTerror:Attackson EducationinAfghanistan,HumanRightsWatch,July 2006;andKnowledgeonFire:AttacksonEducationin Afghanistan,CareInternational,January2009.

InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAQ,Zeri. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderGYZ,Takhar. 34 InterviewswithTeacherNU,Faryab;TeacherMZ, Laghman. 35 InterviewwithTeacherMZ,Laghman. 36 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAS,Faryab.

2.3 TheFirstSignsofTaleban Reconsidering

Onthis,seeZabuli,InsecurityHaltsLearning(FN10); HumanRightsWatch,LessonsinTerror,p.34(FN4). 57 InterviewwithAtaullahWahidyar,ChiefofStaff,MoE, Kabul,6October2009. 58 InterviewwithAmirMansoryoftheSCA,Kabul,10 April2011.

3.2 TheSecondNegotiatingRound: TowardsaNationalDealin201011?

TalebanKillHeadofAfghanGirlsSchool,Reuters(25 May2011). 86 InterviewwithTailorA,Helmand. 87 Clark,TheLayha(seeFN11). 88 Danishju,TalebanTrySoftPower(seeFN80). 89 InterviewwithAmirMansoryoftheSCA,Kabul,10 April2011.

3.3 ContinuityintheTalebansPolicy 3.3.1TalebanDemands

InterviewwithTeacherNJ,Faryab. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderNM,SangiHissar. 99 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderT,Kunduz. 100 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAM,Kunar. 101 InterviewwithTribalElderSN,Nangarhar.

InterviewwithTeacherNJ,Faryab. InterviewwithTalebM,Sharana. 116 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAW,Lashkargah.

3.4 Discontinuity 3.4.1PerceptionsofDiscontinuity

InterviewwithTraderAW,Dand. InterviewwithFarmerMA,Saroza(Paktika). 125 InterviewwithTeacherZ,Kunduz. 126 InterviewwithFarmerTM,Faryab.

InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAK,DashtiArchi. InterviewwithTraderAW,Dand. 144 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAJ,Faryab. 145 InterviewwithTribalElderHSKM,Faryab.

InterviewwithCabDriverSU,KandaharCity. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderWM,Takhar. 161 InterviewwithTeacherMK,Kunduz. 162 InterviewwithTraderAW,Dand.

InterviewwithTalebanCommanderSK,Kunar. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderU,Dila. 175 AbubakarSiddique,DecipheringMullahOmarsEid Message,RadioFreeEurope,RadioLiberty(2September 2011).

4.2 DifferencesamongTalebanabout StateSchools

Ghazni,whereaTalebancommanderwhohad permittedaschoolwaslaterbrutallykilledby otherTalebanandtheschoolclosed,asevidenceof bigdifferencesinviewpointamongtheTaleban.208

InterviewwithExteacherS,Laghman. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAAA,Garmser. 225 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAS,Faryab. 226 InterviewwithTalebanCommanderAH,Mehterlam Baba.

InterviewwithTalebanCommanderA,Zeri. InterviewwithTalebanCommanderNAJ,Kunduz. 229 InterviewwithAmirMansory,Kabul,SCA,10April 2011.

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