Administrative Law

c. Form of and Promulgation of Judgment INDIAS v PHILIPPINE IRON MINES, INC. 107 PHIL 297 BAUTISTA ANGELO; Apr 29, 1957
NATURE Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations FACTS - A complaint was filed by petitioner alleging that respondent has engaged in unfair labor practice - Hearings were conducted by the hearing examiner, Atty. Emiliano Tabigne, at which both parties, represented by counsel, appeared. - After the presentation of the evidence, the hearing examiner rendered his report stating that the charge of unfair labor practice has not been substantiated by the evidence and recommending its dismissal. He also found that the dismissal of petitioner was for sufficient cause. - The court approved the hearing examiner's recommendation and rendered the following order: Hearing Examiner Mr. Tabigne recommends the dismissal of this case on the ground that the evidence by the complainant did not support the charges of unfair labor practice. The facts are stated in the Hearing Examiner's dated May 16, 1955. After a perusal of the record of the case, the Court finds no sufficient justification for modifying said recommendation, findings and conclusions, and consequently, this case is hereby dismissed. SO ORDERED. - Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the court en banc. - Hence this petition for review. - It is contended that the aforequoted order runs counter to the Constitution which provides that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based" (Article VIII, section 12); and to Rule 35, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, which provides that a court decision shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." And the claim is made in view of the fact that the order does not contain either a discussion of the evidence or any finding of fact based on said evidence, which counsel claims does not meet the requirements of the law and the Constitution. ISSUE WON the Court of Industrial Relations can issue an order dismissing a case without stating the facts and the law support thereof. HELD YES - The order, it is true, does not make its own discussion of the evidence or its own findings of fact, but such is not necessary if the court is satisfied with the report of its examiner or referee which already contains a full discussion of the evidence and the findings of

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fact based thereon. The situation differs if the court disagrees with the report in which case it should state the reasons for its disagreement. If it is in full accord with the report, it is purposeless to repeat what the referee or examiner has already found in it. - Such is the present situation. The court approved the report of the hearing examiner "after a perusal of the record of the case." This presupposes that it has examined the evidence and found no justification for modifying his findings and conclusions. This is a substantial compliance with the law. - When the Court of Industrial Relations refers a case to a commissioner for investigation, report, and recommendation, and at such investigation the parties were duly represented by counsel, heard or at least given an opportunity to be heard, the requirement of due process has been satisfied, even if the court failed to set the report for hearing, and a decision on the basis of such report, with the other evidence of the case, is a decision which meets the requirement of a fair and open hearing. Disposition The order appealed from was affirmed.

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ISSUE WON the denial of the PSC of Serranos petition was correct HELD NO Ratio Quasi-judicial tribunals, including the Public Service Commission, should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. Reasoning - The obligation to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the decision is based is incumbent on a court of record. The Public Service Commission is not a court of record within the meaning of the above constitutional provision. - The PSC is not a judicial tribunal and its functions are limited and administrative in nature. The PSC is not a court (citing Dagdag vs. PSC and Filipino Bus Co. vs Philippine Railway). - It does not mean, however, that the non-inclusion of the administrative tribunal within the scope of the above constitutional provision justifies the summary disposition of petitioner's application in the manner followed by respondent Public Service Commission. - In Ang Tibay v. Court, speaking of the Court of Industrial Relations, which is likewise an administrative tribunal possessed of quasi-judicial powers like the PSC, the Court made clear that while it (the CIR) is "free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements," it does not mean "that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirement of due process. - The failure to respect such cardinal primary right of petitioner to have his application decided in such a manner as to inform him not only of the issues involved but the reasons for the decision, which necessarily would likewise require a finding of facts, cannot receive judicial approval. - The denial of Serranos petition was plain and palpable error. There is a need then to remand the matter to the Public Service Commission so that it could consider the evidence and discharge the function committed to it by law. Only after it has rendered its decision setting forth the facts on which it is based does the power of review on the part of this Court come into play. Disposition Decision set aside, case remanded to PSC.

SERRANO v PSC 24 SCRA 867 FERNANDO; Aug 30, 1968

NATURE Petition for review of a decision of the Public Service Commission. FACTS - Serrano filed an application with the Public Service Commission requesting authority to operate a taxicab automobile service within the City of Manila and from said city to any place in Luzon open to motor vehicle traffic and vice versa. Fifty units of taxicabs were to be used. - Serrano was a public service bus operator in the City of Manila and was the holder of several certificates of public convenience. - His application was heard by Associate Commissioner Panganiban. Serrano completed the presentation of his evidence, but the oppositors and no evidence was presented to rebut his claims as to his qualification and financial capacity. The Public Service Commission denied application - A motion for reconsideration was filed and denied by the PSC. - Serrano alleged that the Public Service Commission erred in failing to make a statement of facts as to each case regarding the qualification and financial ability of the applicant and the other factors constituting the criterion used as basis in granting the application, in whole or in part, on the one hand, and dismissing or denying the application on the other. He relies on the constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH v CAMPOSANO, et al. G.R. No. 157684 PANGANIBAN; Apr 27, 2005
NATURE Petition for Review FACTS -Camposano was the Finance and Mgt Officer, Agustin was an Accountant , and Perez was the Acting Supply Officer of Dept of Health NCR (DOH-NCR) - a complaint was filed before the DOH Resident Ombudsman against

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Dir. Majarais, Acting Admin Officer Cabrera, and respondents, for an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vit B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth P330,000.00 -the Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Sec of Health recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge. Sec of Health filed a formal charge against the respondents and their co-respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019. -Exec Sec Ruben Torres issued AO 298 creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) -the PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH. After the investigation, it issued a resolution finding Majarais, Camposano, Cabrera, Agustin, and Perez guilty as charged and recommended to Pres Ramos that they be dismissed from government service. -Pres Ramos issued AO 390 finding Majarais guilty and dismissed from service and remanded records of case to Sec of Health for appropriate action. -Sec of Health issued an Order disposing of the case against respondents and Cabrera. The dispositive portion said: pursuant to the Resolution rendered by the PCAGC, respondents Camposano, Cabrera, Agustin, Perez are hereby dismissed from the service. -Respondents filed MFR of the said Order. Sec of Health denied. They filed appeal w/ the CSC. CSC denied. Respondents went to the CA. -CA held that the PCAGCs jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only to presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had no power to investigate the charges against respondents. Moreover, in simply and completely relying on the PCAGCs findings, the secretary of health failed to comply with administrative due process. ISSUE WON the decision of Sec of Health was valid HELD NO - Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions,the disciplining authority must make an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its face, a decision imposing administrative sanctions must show the bases for its conclusions. While the investigation of a case may be delegated to and conducted by another body or group of officials, the disciplining authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence gathered and indicate the applicable law. In this manner, the respondents would be informed of the bases for the sanctions and thus be able to prepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedure is part of the sporting idea of fair play in a democracy. -Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least

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contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved. -The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the present factual milieu. Noncompliance with the sixth requisite is equally evident from the health secretarys Order dismissing the respondents. The decision of Secretary Reodica should have contained a factual finding and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desired. -To support its position, petitioner cites American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents. However, this case merely authorized the delegation of the power to investigate, but not the authority to impose sanctions. Verily, in requiring the disciplining authority to exercise its own judgment and discretion in deciding a case, American Tobacco supports the present respondents cause. In that case, the petitioners objected to the appointment of hearing officers and sought the personal hearing of their case by the disciplining authority. The Court, however, sustained the right to delegate the power to investigate, as long as the adjudication would be made by the deciding authority. - (Solicitor General insists that respondents are guilty of the charges and deserve dismissal from the service. Suffice it to stress that the issue in this case is not the guilt of respondents, but solely due process. Guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is first observed. ) Disposition Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

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168. Original jurisdiction over inter partes proceeding. - The Director of Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. In the event that the Patent Office should be provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall have the original jurisdiction over these cases, instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final decision subject to appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of notice of decisions. Such appeals shall be governed by sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be P25.00. - The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases were drafted and promulgated by the Director of Patents and approved by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. - Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, amended the afore-quoted Rule 168 to read as follows: 168. Original Jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. - The Director of Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, [In the event that the Patent Office is provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall then have the original jurisdiction over these cases, instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final decisions shall be subject to appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of notice decision. Such appeals shall be governed by Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be [P25.00.] Such inter partes proceedings in the Philippine Patent Office under this Title shall be heard before the Director of Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking official designated by the Director, but all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him. (Emphasis supplied.) - In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners' cases to hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo Velasco, Rustico Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the other respondents herein. - Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law the Director must personally hear and decide inter partes cases. Said objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to compel The Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers. ISSUE: WON the amendment of the rule is illegal and void as it should be the Director who must personally hear and decide inter partes cases. HELD: NO.

AMERICAN TOBACCO CO v THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS 67 SCRA 287 ANTONIO; Oct. 14, 1975
FACTS: - petitioners are challenging the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or servicemark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office. - Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166 ), the Director of Patents is vested with jurisdiction over opposition, interference and cancellation cases filed by petitioners. Likewise, the Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases contains a similar provision, thus:

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- The power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions may be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. - The nature of the power and authority entrusted to The Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act No. 165) should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws. As such officer, he is required, among others, to determine the question of priority in patent interference proceedings, decide applications for reinstatement of a lapsed patent, cancellations of patents under Republic Act No. 165, inter partes proceedings such as oppositions, claims of interference, cancellation cases under the Trade-mark Law and other matters in connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. It could hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and every case pending in his Office. This would leave him little time to attend to his other duties. The remedy is a far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. - Thus, while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. - The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. 15 In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. 16 It is, however, required that to "give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them." - In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of Patents. Apart from the circumstance that the point involved is procedural and not jurisdictional, petitioners have not shown in what manner they have been prejudiced by the proceedings. Disposition Petition is dismissed

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ALBERT v GANGAN 353 SCRA 673 BUENA; March 06, 2001
NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - Petitioner Ramon Albert, president of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corp (NHMFC) approved loans taken out to finance several projects in pursuance of its Community Mortgage Program (CMP), a low-cost home financing scheme. One of the projects under this program was the AMAKO project for which P36,796,711.55 was released and approved by petitioner. - Upon petitioners instruction, an inspection of the said project was conducted and it was found that the project was 3 months in arrears in their amortization. Because of this finding, petitioner ordered other investigations be conducted. After investigation, the CoA Resident Auditor of NHMFC disallowed the loan granted to the AMAKO proj. for the following reasons: (a) non-submission of documentary requirements/non-complying or defective documents as required under NHMFC Corporate Circular No. CMP-001; and (b) irregular/excessive expenditures per COA Circular No. 85-55A - Months later, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman a letter-complaint against his subordinate employees who appeared to be responsible for the fraud with respect to the AMAKO loan transaction. Petitioner also filed a civil case for sum of money, annulment, damages and attorneys fees with preliminary attachment, against SHGCCI, AMAKO, Sapang Palay & Development Foundation, Inc., and other persons responsible for the misrepresentation, tortious and fraudulent acts in connection with the loan granted to AMAKO project. - The Commission on Audit (COA), after investigation, later found petitioner as among the persons liable for the amount representing payment of loan proceeds obtained by AMAKO. The COA disallowed the plan payment because it found the payment irregular and an excessive expenditure, and held petitioner primarily liable pursuant to sec. 103 of PD 1445, which states, expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor. - In his MFR, which was later denied, Alberts defense was that he cannot and should not be held personally liable for the amount of the loan as he acted only in the performance of his official duties and that there was no clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence on his part. - The COA in dismissing said MFR stated thus: Albert himself was the final approving authority of the transaction in question and that the officers/employees who processed the same were directly under his supervision. He could have conclusively determined the validity of a transaction involving such a large amount. Alberts claim of good faith and exercise of due diligence are disputable presumptions, and these presumptions are overcome by evidence of specific acts constituting an offense, as where there exists the fact that loss of government funds resulted from official action. Lastly, it stated that Sec3. (9) of RA

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3019 (Anti-Graft Law) declares to be unlawful the act of entering, in behalf of the government, into a contract or transaction manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. - Aggrieved, petitioner filed this case contending that he cant be held personally liable for the amount of P36, 796,711.55 representing the loan proceeds to AMAKO, because the questioned COA decisions dont have any findings that he has knowingly participated in the alleged fraudulent transaction. He claims that there is no clear showing that he acted in bad faith, with malice, or gross negligence when he approved the loan transaction. ISSUE WON COA committed grave abuse of discretion when it held petitioner personally liable for the subject disallowance. HELD YES. Ratio The decision of a government agency must state the facts and the law on which the decision is based. Reasoning The assailed decision failed to mention petitioners direct participation in the fraudulent scheme. It merely held that petitioner be immediately and primarily held responsible for the disallowance, for the simple reason that, as the approving officer, any transaction presented to him for approval is subject to his discretion. The COA decision merely stated conclusions of law. Facts and circumstances (the whys, whats and hows of the disallowance), were patently missing, inaccurate or incomplete. The COA cannot just perform its constitutional function of disallowing expenditures of govt funds at sheer discretion. There has to be factual basis why the expenditure is alleged to be fraudulent or why there was a misrepresentation. Liability depends upon the wrong committed and not solely by reason of being the head of govt agency. The COA even mentioned the anti-graft law which imputes liability for a grossly disadvantageous contract entered into by a govt functionary but as to why and how the disbursement of funds in this case was considered disadvantageous must be duly supported by findings of facts. Disposition Decision of COA REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

AROCHA VS VIVO GR No.24844 REYES, J.B.L; Oct 26, 1967

FACTS - Pedro Gatchalian, a minor, arrived at the Manila International Airport together with four other persons supposedly his father (Jose Gatchalian), an aunt and two brothers, and sought entry as Filipino citizen. Not satisfied with his papers, the immigration officer referred the case of Pedro to the Special Board of Inquiry. This body, after due hearing, rendered decision admitting Pedro and seven others, as Filipino citizens.

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- Pedro Gatchalian was issued an identification certificate by the immigration authorities, attesting to his admission as citizen of the Philippines - the Secretary of Justice, as department head, issued a memorandum order directing the Immigration Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a citizen of the Philippines. - the Board of Commissioners reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and ordered the exclusion of Pedro Gatchalian for being improperly documented. Pedro was accordingly. But, although the warrant for his exclusion was issued in July, 1962, Pedro Gatchalian was taken into custody by the immigration authorities only June 6, 1965. - Macario Arocha, on behalf of Pedro, petitioned the CFI for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the detention of Pedro, a Filipino by the Immigration Commissioner is violative of said petitioner's constitutional rights. Respondents immigration officials countered that the exclusion order was issued pursuant to the decision of the Board of Commissioner, finding Pedro to have failed in proving the allegation that he is a Filipino citizen. - In its decision, the court sustained petitioner's theory that the decision of reversal of the Board of Commissioners was antedated and issued beyond the prescribed one-year period. Holding that the decision of the Special Board of Inquiry, admitting the Philippine citizenship of Pedro Gatchalian had already become final, the Court ordered his immediate release from detention and enjoined respondents, permanently, from arresting, deporting and otherwise depriving of his liberty. On the strength of a writ of habeas corpus issued by the Court, Pedro Gatchalian was released from custody of the immigration authorities at 9 o'clock in the evening of August 3, 1965. - The cause of petitioner and appellant Commissioner of Immigration in this Court hinges on the issue of the correct date of promulgation of the decision of the Board of Commissioners reversing that of the Special Board of Inquiry. For if, indeed, the reversal was made on July 20, 1962, as asserted by Pedro, instead of July 6, 1962, as maintained by Vivo (the Commissioner of Immigration), then the admission on July 6, 1961 by the Special Board of Inquiry of the fact of Pedro's Philippine citizenship would have become final and, therefore his detention by the immigration authorities would be unlawful. - pursuant to Section 27 (b) of Commonwealth Act 613, as amended by RA 503, the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry shall become final unless reversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners, or in the absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu proprio, of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of the said decision. ISSUES 1.WON the decision of the Board of Commissioners reversing that of the Special Board of Inquiry was made within the one-year prescriptive period. 2. WON the decision of the Inquiry Board had become non-reviewable since 1961 because of its confirmation by the majority of the preceding Board of Commissioners.

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HELD 1. YES. Ratio The mere fact of a retyping of dates on the face of the documents, without further evidence of record, does not suffice to convict the three members of the Board of Immigration Commissioners of maliciously antedating their decision, considering the presumption of regularity in official actuations, and the serious implications of the charge, which amounts to no less than a falsification of official documents. Such an offense cannot be lightly inferred, but must be clearly proved beyond reasonable doubt. The operative date of the Commissioners' action is that when the resolution of exclusion was voted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date when the decision in extenso was prepared, written and signed. Reasoning - the decision of the Board of Commissioners, the notification to appellee's counsel that such decision was rendered, and the warrant of exclusion, bear the date July 6, 1962, or within one year from the reviewed decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. It is contended, however, that in all of these documents, the date of promulgation of the decision appeared to have been originally written as July 20, 1962, but the number "20" was erased and superimposed by "6". - Vivo insists that these erasures and substitutions were corrections made only to rectify clerical mistakes. - the accusation of Pedro is negatived by the official minutes of the Board's proceedings, which clearly show that the resolution to exclude was adopted on July 6, 1962. No alteration in dates appears in these. In fact, the alterations observed are susceptible of the explanation that the date July 20 was originally placed by the stenographer or typist because it was then that the reasoned and extended decision was typewritten in final form, but that it was corrected to July 6, the date it was voted, because the decision in extenso must relate back to the day the resolution to exclude was actually adopted. - the Court below erred in finding and declaring that the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry in the case of petitioner-appellee had become final and unreviewable, and that its review and revocation by the Commissioners of Immigration was null and void. 2. NO. Ratio Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a Board. The Legislature organized the Board of Commissioners precisely in order that they should deliberate collectively and in order that their views and ideas should be exchanged and examined before reaching a conclusion. The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be exercised by the individual members separately. Their acts are official only when done by the members convened in session, upon a concurrence of at least a majority and with at least a quorum present. Where the action needed is not of the individuals composing a board but of the official body, the members must be together and act in their official capacity, and the action should appear on the records of the board. Reasoning It is pointed out by Pedro that two members of the board in reference to said decision had marked "Noted" over their own signatures, while only the third Commissioner made of record his adverse opinion. The former Immigration Commissioners appeared to have acted individually in this particular instance and not as a Board. It is shown by the different dates affixed to their signatures that they did

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not actually meet to discuss and vote on the case. This was officially made to record by the Secretary of Justice in his Memorandum Order No. 9, on January 24, 1962, wherein he stated that for the past several years, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration has not met collectively to discuss and deliberate in the cases coming before it. - Secondly, the aforementioned Memorandum Order, issued in the exercise of his powers of control and supervision as Department Head, expressly declares that the public interest so requiring, it is ordered that all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal from or on review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry, are set aside and this nullification included the alleged 1961 decision. Dispostion decision and order of CFI reversed, nullified and set aside.

NERIA v THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION G.R. NO. 24800 CASTRO; May 27 1968
FACTS - On July 9, 1961 the petitioner, with three other persons, supposedly his widowed mother (Dolores Neria) and two younger brothers (Felix and Manuel Neria), arrived at the Manila International Airport from Hongkong on board a Cathay Pacific Airways plane. The immigration inspector at the airport, not satisfied with the petitioner's travel documents and those of his companions upon primary inspection thereof, referred the matter of their admission to the Board of Special Inquiry for investigation "to determine filiation and paternity to a Filipino citizen". Accordingly, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 conducted a hearing on July 14, 1961, at which time the petitioner offered oral and documentary evidence to support his claim for admission as a Filipino citizen After the conclusion of the investigation, the said board on August 2, 1961 deliberated on the case and unanimously voted for petitioner's admission. The board on the same date rendered its decision, declaring Dolores Neria a Filipino citizen, and the petitioner a Filipino citizen as he is an illegitimate son of Dolores, and allowing his admission into the Philippines. This written decision was subsequently submitted to the members of the Board of Immigration Commissioners. The Immigration authorities issued Identification Certificate 16306 to the petitioner, attesting that he "was admitted as a citizen of the Philippines" per decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 dated August 2, 1961. - On January 24, 1962, the Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum Order 9 (exh. 7), directing that [i]t appearing that for the past several years, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration has not met collectively to discuss and deliberate on the cases coming before it, it is hereby ordered that all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on Appeal from, or on review motu proprio of, decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry are set aside. The Board of Commissioners is directed to review, in accordance with Section 27 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, all decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry admitting entry of aliens into the country and give preference to all cases where entry has been permitted on the

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ground that the entrant is a citizen of the Philippines, following the principle laid down in Section 30 of Commonwealth Act 613, as amended, that 'the burden of proof shall be upon such alien to establish that he is not subject to exclusion' and the ruling of this Department that "Citizenship is a status of privilege, power and honor of inestimable value. When doubts exist concerning a grant of it, they should be resolved in favor of the Government against the claimant" - In compliance with the above directive, the Board of Immigration Commissioners, proceeded to review motu proprio the entire proceedings had before the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 relative to the petitioner's case and that of his supposed relatives. A hearing officer of the Bureau of Immigration was directed to conduct an investigation of the entire proceedings of and the evidence presented before the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1. On the basis of a memorandum of the hearing officer, the new Board of Immigration Commissioners found that the petitioner had not satisfactorily established his claim for admission as a Filipino citizen and, consequently, reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, and ordered that the petitioner be excluded from the Philippines as an alien not properly documented for admission and be returned to the port from whence he came or to the country of which he is a national. The petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said decision. This motion was denied by the new Board. - The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain the Commissioner of Immigration and the Board of Immigration Commissioners from arresting and expelling him, and prohibit them from taking any further steps or actions contrary to the decision rendered by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1. This petition was given due course, and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued as prayed for. But this petition was dismissed. - On April 30, 1965 the present petition for habeas corpus was filed, the petitioner claiming that the respondent's agents picked him up at Rosario St., Manila, in the evening of the previous April 23 on the supposed claim that he was not properly documented for admission as a Filipino citizen when he entered the Philippines; and that since then he "has been unlawfully and illegally confined, restrained and deprived of his liberty in the Bureau of Immigration Detention Station in the Engineering Island, Manila." On the same date, the lower court required the respondent to bring the petitioner before the court on May 3, 1965 at 8:30 O'clock in the morning. The clerk of court issued the corresponding writ of habeas corpus directing the respondent to submit his return. The latter's written return of May 6, 1965 states, among other things, that the petitioner was under lawful custody on a valid process commanding his exclusion from the Philippines and ordering his return to the port where he came from or to the country of which he is a national. - On June 18, 1965 the lower court dismissed the petition stating that the petitioner is legally detained on a warrant issued by the respondent Commissioner of Immigration." On July 20, 1965 the lower court set aside its decision of June 17, 1965, and, on the same date, rendered an amended decision completely reversing its decision of June 17, granted the writ of habeas corpus and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner. The lower court held that "the decision rendered by the new Board of Commissioners is null and void for lack of

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jurisdiction, and no administrative action being possible because the question involved in this case is purely a legal question, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no application in this case." On July 22 the clerk of court issued the corresponding writ of habeas corpus. ISSUE WON the decision of the new Board of Immigration Commissioner is null and void for having been rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in violation of section 27 (b), Comm. Act 613 HELD YES RATIO Comm. Act 613, as amended, provides in part that :[t]he decision of any two members of the Board [of Special Inquiry] shall prevail and shall be final unless reversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners as hereafter stated, or, in the absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu propio of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision.... - The resolution of this issue, in turn, depends upon the determination of the date when the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 was promulgated, August 2, 1961 when it was actually rendered, or September 4, 1961 when the petitioner was actually notified thereof and a copy received by his counsel. The date of promulgation is important. It is from that date that the one-year period commenced within which the Board of Immigration Commissioners could review motu proprio the entire proceedings of Board of Special Inquiry No. 1. - According to the Solicitor General, the correct date of promulgation is September 4, 1961, because under the Immigration Rules and Regulations, the decision of a Board of Special Inquiry "shall be rendered in writing",5 and under section 27 (b), supra, the written decision "shall be promulgated"; that the words "rendition" (from "rendered") and "promulgation" (from "promulgated") connote two separate and distinct acts required to be accomplished by the Board of Special Inquiry, for rendition is the date when a judge signs his decision and files it with the clerk of court, whereas promulgation is the date when such decision is published, officially announced, is made known to the public, or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties or to their counsel; and that in this case, rendition was accomplished on August 2, 1961 when the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 concluded its hearing on the petitioner's case, deliberated thereon, voted for his admission into the Philippines and rendered its written decision, and promulgation was accomplished on September 4, 1961 when the petitioner was actually notified of the decision, copy of which was received by his counsel. - No amount of hair-splitting in regard to the words "rendition" and "promulgation" would convey different meanings. This Court defined promulgation as "the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing and publication". The word "promulgate" was viewed by the majority in People vs. Dinglasan (77 Phil. 764) as the entry made by the clerk of a judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments made by said clerk.

Dean Carlota
- The petitioner's argument, at all events, is without merit. Section 27 (b), supra, provides that proceedings of the Board of Special Inquiry its appraisal of a case on the merits, the result of its deliberation, its decision and notice thereof to an alien, and the time when an appeal may be brought therefrom "shall be conducted under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration." - In this case, August 2, 1961 was the date when the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 concluded its hearing of petitioner's case (I.C. 61-2312C), deliberated on it, and voted for his admission as a citizen of the Philippines. August 2, 1961 was also the date when the decision in extenso was rendered. That date and not September 4, 1961, therefore, is the date of promulgation of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, which decision should "prevail and shall be final ... unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu proprio of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision."10 Computing the one-year period from August 2, 1961, the Board of Immigration Commissioners had until August 2, 1962 within which to review the proceedings motu proprio. - The case of the petitioner was included in the agenda of the Board of Immigration Commissioners for review motu propio for July 24, 1962. The case was referred to the Immigration hearing officer, who, on July 30, 1962, submitted his memorandum to the said board. The case was again included in the agenda of the said board for August 2, 1962, the date it was considered submitted for decision. The minutes of the meeting of the Board of Immigration Commissioners presented by its Secretary Pio Noche and read into the records of this case, however, reveal that the petitioner's case was actually acted upon and decided, not on August 2, 1962, as the decision and the warrant of exclusion would tend to show, but on August 8, 1962 - The minutes of the meeting of the new Board of Commissioners and, the testimony of its Secretary show that as late on August 8, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners was, only deliberating on the case of the petitioner. The admission of the Secretary of the new Board of Commissioners that the case of the petitioner was not acted upon on August 2, 1962, shows that the alteration of the date of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners from August 8, 1962 to August 2, 1962 was deliberate. The fact that the case of the petitioner was submitted to the new Board of Commissioners for its resolution on August 2, 1962, is no excuse for ante-dating its decision which was actually rendered after that date. On August 2, 1962, it did not reverse the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, because having actually deliberated on the case of the petitioner on August 8, 1962, it could not have on August 2 resolved to reverse the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. - The alteration of the true date of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners, made upon instruction of the respondent Commissioner of Immigration, is revealing: it shows that the respondent Commissioner knew that the one-year period was to be computed from August 2, 1961; it shows also that he knew that if the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 had to be reversed, the new Board of Commissioners had to act not later than August 2, 1962. As it was on August 8, 1962 when the Board of Immigration Commissioners as a body deliberated on and voted for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, the review motu proprio was effected 6 days beyond the one-year period fixed by

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section 27 (b), supra. The said decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioners, and the warrant of exclusion issued on the strength of such decision, are therefore, as correctly found by the lower court, null and void, for "lack of jurisdiction," since the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 by that time had already become "final." - The respondent also contends that the petitioner's petition for habeas corpus was prematurely filed, because he did not first appeal the decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioners to the Secretary of Justice, who, by law, is vested with power of control and supervision over the said Board. We have already held that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable "where the question in dispute is purely a legal one", or where the controverted act is "patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and "nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done" thereon. DISPOSITION Decision affirmed from affirmed

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SEC. 27. xxx (b) A board of special inquiry shall have authority (1) to determine whether an alien seeking to enter or land in the Philippines shall be allowed to enter or land or shall be excluded The decision of the [BSI] shall be final unless reversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners or, in the absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu proprio of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision The decision [of the BSI] shall be promulgated not later than two days from the date of the deliberation [T]he Commissioner of Immigration may grant an extension of time if he considers it necessary. (c) An alien excluded by [BSI] or a dissenting member thereof may appeal to the [BOC], whose decision in the case shall be final. The decision on appeal shall be put in writing and promulgated not less than seven days from the time the case is submitted for decision. xxx - This Court had already held that the operative date of the Commissioners' action is that when the resolution of exclusion was voted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date when the decision in extenso was prepared, written and signed" because "the decision in extenso must relate back to the day when the resolution to exclude was adopted (citing, inter alia, Arocha vs. Vivo and Neria vs. Commissioner of Immigration). Consequently, the Commissioners were justified in using March 11, 1963 as the date of their written decision although it was actually drafted on August 13th and mailed to Mrs. GO on August 27th. The decision related back to the date when the Commissioners deliberated on the decision of BSI and resolved to reverse it. - Section 27(b) specifies that the decision of BSI "shall be promulgated not later than two days from the date of the deliberation". The absence of such a requirement with respect to the decision of BOC supports the view that such decision need not be promulgated within the one-year period. It suffices that BOC should review the decision of BSI and deliberate upon it within one year from promulgation of BSI's decision and that the minutes of their deliberation should reflect the action which they took within the said statutory period. - Moreover, section 27(c) expressly requires that the decision of BOC in case of an appeal from the decision of BSI should "be put in writing and promulgated not less than seven days from the time the case is submitted for decision". In contrast, no such requirement is provided for in section 27(b) with respect to the Commissioners' decision in case they motu proprio review the decision of BSI. Disposition for lack of necessary votes to reverse the trial court's decision, the same is considered affirmed. [only 6 Justices (Fernando, Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Concepcion Jr., Martin, JJ. and the writer) voted for reversal. J. Teehankee filed a dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice (Castro) and J. Antonio concurred. J. Barredo also dissented.]

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BARREDO, J., dissenting: The operative date of the decision of BOC is the date of promulgation, if not the date of notice to the party aggrieved. TEEHANKEE, J, dissenting: - The Act's provisions as well as public policy support a construction that requires that a resolution or decision of BOC on a review motu proprio must be in writing and promulgated with due notice on the party affected within the one-year period. - Section 27 (b) provides that "the decision [of BSI] shall be promulgated not later than two days from the date of deliberation." Section 27 (c) likewise provides for a summary period of seven days from submittal for decision within which BOC shall put in writing and promulgate its decision on appeal. Read in context, it seems obvious that the decision on a review motu proprio by BOC must be no less than a decision on appeal by either party; it must be duly put in writing and promulgated within the more than adequate one-year period fixed by the Act. - Where the alien has appealed from an adverse decision or a dissenting BSI member has appealed a favorable decision, the applicant for admission knows as mandated by the law that a final decision must be handed down within seven days from submittal of the appeal for decision. Where there has been no appeal and BOC conducts a review motu proprio of which the applicant is likely unaware, both public policy and due process demand that where no adverse decision is promulgated within the one-year period, the decision of BSI shall have become final. (Otherwise, such one-year period would be an elastic period and would have no meaning, as in this case where the appellee would have been ordered excluded by a decision of reversal promulgated 5 months after the lapse of the one-year period.) - Such a view is in consonance with law's policy of a definite date of fixed finality of the BSI's decision and to reduce occasion for anomalies and irregularities in the admission or exclusion of aliens and applicants for admission, under the procedures for appeal or review motu proprio established by the Act.

GO YU TAK WAI v VIVO G.R. No. L-22257 AQUINO; May 25, 1977
NATURE Appeal from the decision of CFI/RTC. FACTS - The controversy arose when Go Yu Tak Wai (Mrs. GO) applied with the Bureau of Immigration for admission as a returning resident. It appears that Mrs. GO arrived in the Philippines after 20 years of absence from the country. The Bureaus Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) concluded that Mrs. GO satisfactorily proved her right to admission as a returning resident. The decision of BSI was promulgated on March 27, 1962. It was reviewed motu proprio on March 11, 1963 by the Board of Commissioners (BOC). On said March 11th, BOC resolved to reverse the BSIs decision (and, thus, to exclude Mrs. GO). - However, BOC's decision in extenso (extended opinion) was not immediately rendered and promulgated. It appears that the draft of the BOC decision was signed by the Commissioners during the period August 13-26. The decision was mailed on August 27th to Mrs. GO, who received the same the following day. Upon Mrs. GOs complaint, CFI held that BOCs decision was void because it was promulgated after the statutory one-year period. ISSUE Whether or not a resolution of BOC which reversed the decision of BSI and adopted within one year from the promulgation of BSIs decision is sufficient HELD YES. REASONING BOC is empowered to reverse motu proprio the decision of BSI within one year from promulgation of said decision. The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended provides:

SICHANGCO v BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION G.R. No. L-23545 MAKASIAR; Nov 7, 1979
FACTS - Sy Te, whose name was changed to Benito Sichangco was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino citizen by birth in an order dated February 19, 1960 .Sychangco is married to Cheng Yok Ha. Three sons were born in China allegedly out of their marriage, namely, Si Beng, Si Son and Si Luna. - On August 28, 1961 arrived in the Philippines and sought admission claiming to be the children of Benito Sichangco. An investigation was conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration. After hearing, the said Board rendered a decision on September 11, 1961 (Exh. C) admitting these minors into the

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Philippines as citizens thereof, being the children of the petitioner . said decision was submitted to the then members of the Board of Commissioners who "noted" the decision on different dates. - On January 24, 1962, then Secretary of Justice Jose W. Diokno issued Memorandum Order No. 9, wherein he found "that for the past several years, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration has not met collectively to discuss and deliberate on the cases coming before it," for which reason he set aside "all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal from, or on review motu propio of, decisions of the Boards of Special Inquiry," and directed the Board of Commissioners "to review in accordance with Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, all decisions of the Boards of Special Inquiry admitting entry of aliens into this country and give preference to all cases where entry has been permitted on the ground that the entrant is a citizen of the Philippines, following the principle laid down in Section 30 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, that 'the burden of proof shall be upon such alien to establish that he is not subject to exclusion ..." - Pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 9, a committee examined the pretended right of the said minors as alleged children of petitioner to admission, and thereafter forwarded its findings to the Commissioner of Immigration recommending the exclusion of said minors, the revocation of the order declaring Sy Te or Benito Sichangco a Filipino citizen, and the filing of deportation proceedings against him.A copy of this decision was received by the minors on October 26,1962. - Benito Sichangco, in behalf of the minors Si Beng, Si Son and Si Luna, filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction on November 20, 1962 before the Court of First Instance of Manila, to annul the decision of the Board of Commissioners of Immigration excluding the abovenamed minors from the Philippines. - CFI declared that the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 4, 1962, reversing the decision of the previous Board of Commissioners dated September 11, 1961, to have been rendered on October 26, 1962, more than a year from the first decision, and therefore illegal and null and void, and the injunction earlier issued was made permanent, with costs against respondent Board. ISSUE: WON the notice of the BOC decision must be received within the 1 year period HELD NO - The Board of Commissioners rendered on September 4, 1962 its decision reversing that of the Board of Special Inquiry No, 1 dated September 11, 1961, well within the one-year period required by law. - It is true that the copy of the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 4, 1962 was sent by mail to the petitioner's minor children herein only on October 26, 1962, and received by the said minors on the same date. This fact, however, does not work to vitiate said decision. All that the Immigration Law requires is that the decision of reversal of the Board of Commissioners be promulgated within one year from the rendition of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. Notice of said decision of reversal may be sent even after the one-year period has elapsed. In the case of Neria vs. Commissioner of

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Immigration (L-24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 807, citing Arocha vs. Vivo, supra), the Supreme Court ruled that "the operative date of the Commissioners' action is that when the resolution (of exclusion) was noted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date when the decision in extenso was prepared, written and signed," and with more reason, as in this case, regardless of the date when such decision is mailed, "because the decision in extenso must relate back to the day the resolution to exclude was actually adopted. Necessarily the extended opinion had to be posterior to the day when the Commissioners voted and resolved to reverse the findings of the Board of Special Inquiry. The Secretary's certificate shows that the Board of Immigration Commissioners acted upon not less than eight Immigration cases (including that of the Gatchalians) on July 6, 1962; and it was of course impracticable to prepare and sign fully reasoned decisions in all these cases."

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- On January 7, 1993, the public respondent rendered its decision dismissing the petitioners' appeal. Motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the public respondent on January 26, 1993. Consequently petitioners come before this Court, in this petition. ISSUE WON the HLURB can act validly as a division composed of only 3 commissioners HELD Yes. - Under section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines the powers and duties of the commission, the board is specifically mandated to adopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its business and to perform such functions necessary for the accomplishment of its above mentioned functions. Since nothing in the provisions of either E.O. 90 or E.O. 648 denies or withholds the power or authority to delegate adjudicatory functions to a division, we cannot see how the Board, for the purpose of effectively carrying out its administrative responsibilities and quasijudicial powers as a regulatory body should be denied the power, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, to constitute its adjudicatory boards into various divisions. - After all, the power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions has been held "to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provision of the Act or by implication it has been withheld." The practical necessity of establishing a procedure whereby cases are decided by three (3) Commissioners furthermore assumes greater significance when one notes that the HLURB, as constituted, only has four (4) full time commissioners and five (5) part time commissioners to deal with all the functions, administrative, adjudicatory, or otherwise, entrusted to it. - As the Office of the President noted in its February 26, 1993 Resolution denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, "it is impossible and very impractical to gather the four (4) full time and five (5) part time commissioners (together) just to decide a case." Considering that its part time commissioners act merely in an ex-officio capacity, requiring a majority of the Board to sit en banc on each and every case brought before it would result in an administrative nightmare.

REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP v SENDINO 233 SCRA 665 KAPUNAN, J.: July 5, 1994
FACTS: - Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120square meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat, Paranaque for P307,800.00 as its purchase price. She paid P1,000.00 as partial reservation fee on January 15, 1989 and completed payment of this fee on January 20, 1989 by paying P4,000.00. - On July 18, 1989, private respondent paid REVI P16,600.00 as full downpayment on the purchase price. However, she was advised by REVI to change her co-maker, which she agreed, asking for an extension of one month to do so. - For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of the appropriate documents under the terms of the original agreement, REVI, through its Vice-President for Marketing, informed respondent of the cancellation of the contract on the 31st of July 1989. - On April 20, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance against REVI with the office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) asking that respondent be ordered: To comply and continue with the sale of the house and lot, Block 4, Lot 17 at the Raymondville Subdivision, Sucat Road, Paranaque, Metro Manila; - This petition was amended on August 17, 1990 by impleading petitioners Magdiwang Realty Corporation (MRC) which appeared to be the registered owner of the subject lot as per TCT No. 76023. - On April 3, 1991 the HLURB, whose authority to hear and decide the complaint was challenged by REVI in its answer, rendered its judgment in favor of private respondent and ordered petitioners to continue with the sale of the house and lot and to pay private respondent P5,000 as moral damages, P5,000 as exemplary damages and P6,000 as attorney's fees and costs of the suit. An appeal from this decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the President, herein public respondent.

3. Jurisdiction FELICIANO, et al. v DIRECTOR OF PATENTS 93 Phil 113 PADILLA; May 22, 1953
NATURE Petition for review order of director of patents FACTS - An application for patent was filed with the Patent Office. Pending examination of the application, Albaa filed a motion to intervene

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claiming that the Feliciano and Tapinio had sold and/or bartered and assigned to him their right to contract or deal the sale of their invention called Fel-Tap Meter Guard and Detector to or through the Corp that they were then organizing under his direction and to fix and decide on the purchase price of it to at least P200,000 in installments cash and P300,000 in shares of stock of said Corporation * * * and praying that applicant-inventor Tapinio be compelled to sign a contract and, together with the other applicant-inventor Feliciano who had already signed it, to acknowledge it in another contract before a notary public, to have both contracts recorded in the Patent Office and in the office of the Register of Deeds, and that the patent for the invention be issued in his name and in the name of the inventors. - motion: denied on ground that under the Patent Law (RA165) the Director of Patents has no jurisdiction or power to decide the question submitted to him. He then filed an amended motion, denied (it contended that Albaa is the assignee of inventors Feliciano and Tapinio of the undivided part interests in the invention for whose patent is applied for.) - Dir. Of Patents denied the amended motion, on the ground that assignment made to Albaa is not one of exclusive right to make, use and sell the electrical contrivance for which patent is applied for; that it is just an authority to act as the selling agent for the inventors of the patent, if granted, and the invention covered thereby and to receive compensation therefor; and that not being entitled to have his name included as one of the patentees, if patent for the invention be granted, the movant has no right to intervene in the proceedings for the grant of the patent. ISSUE WON the Director of Patents erred in denying the motion HELD NO Ratio Under the provisions of the Patent Law (RA165), the Director of Patents has no power and authority to compel the applicant-inventors to do what the appellant is asking them to perform. What the appellant asked the Director of Patents to do for him is essentially a judicial function which would require the determination or finding by a court of competent jurisdiction as to whether there was a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties before it could compel the applicant-inventors to perform what the appellant prays the court to order them to do. Aside from want of authority and power, the Director of Patents lacks the means to make such determination and finding which would be necessary before he could act on the appellant's motion. Reasoning - Despite the amendment to the 1st motion to intervene by which he claims assignment of the invention, still it remains that the alleged assignment is not of the invention but it is an agreement whereby he is to act as selling agent for the inventors of the patent (if granted) and of the invention covered thereby and to receive compensation therefor. - the contract clearly shows that it wasnt an assignment of the invention and the patent applied for.: We (the inventors) *** hereby declare and ratify that both of us are the co-inventors and joint 50-50 owners of the 'Fel-Tap Electric Meter Guard & Detector' ***. We are now organizing a Corporation under the direction of Mr. Albaa to

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exploit and industrialize the invention *** which we promise hereby to sell to said Corporation with its letter-patent *** except the Royalty Right of the same, ***. For and in consideration of the monetary and other help that said Mr. Albaa *** has rendered and is rendering us *** we hereby promise and actually pay to Mr. Albaa in installments P50,000 of P200,000 purchase price ***. - Assignments of patents and inventions covered thereby may be recorded in books and records kept for the purpose in the Patent Office if presented in due form; but the appellant does not ask for the registration of the alleged agreement between him and the inventors, but prays that the Director of Patents compel Tapinio to sign the contract executed and signed by Feliciano and both applicantinventors to acknowledge it, and then to have both documents recorded in the Patent Office and in the office of the Registrar of Deeds. Disposition Petition is dismissed. Order is affirmed

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- August 28, 1975 > Syquia further manifested her willingness to abide by such computations as the board may determine to be the correct electric billing that should be charged against Ruiz et al for their respective electric consumption and submitted pertinent records of the electrical consumption and Meralco billings. The board in said order however came up with its computation which would allow Syquia to charge Ruiz et al only the cost of electricity registered in their individual apartment meters and disallow the actual cost of additional electricity charged them pro rata by Syquia for the cost of electricity consumed by all tenants in the common areas. - Syquia pointed out in her MFR that the board's computation would not reimburse her for the cost of the electric consumption in the common areas and elevators with a resultant loss to her at the least of P1,250.00 a month or P15,000.00 a year and reiterated that this was a contractual obligation of the tenants over which the regulatory board had no jurisdiction, the board, acting through its Acting Chairman de Guzman denied reconsideration and ruled that since the tenants are already paying rentals for the use of their rooms and for the cost of their electricity within their rooms, they should no longer be required to pay for the extra cost of electricity in common areas such as the elevator and the servants' quarters, for it is only fair and equitable that the cost of electricity for common areas such as the elevator and servants' quarters be shouldered alone by the owner of the building as part of the cost for the rentals being paid by the tenants ISSUE WON the Board of Power and Waterworks has jurisdiction over the said case HELD NO Ratio The board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by Ruiz et al against Syquia. The board acquired no jurisdiction over Syquias contractual relations with Ruiz et al as her tenants, since Syquia is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise. Ruiz et als complaints against being charged the additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction. Reasoning - Comment of Acting Solicitor: the regulatory board acted without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the complaints, since Syquia does not operate, manage or control the power plant and furthermore, since electricity is directly and uninterruptedly supplied to the end-user, it cannot be correctly claimed that Syquia is selling electricity nor can she be considered a middleman in the electric power business. - The dispute between Syquia the landlord and her tenants as to how much each tenant should be correspondingly billed, for the actual electricity consumed and as to the proportionate amount each tenant should bear for the common facilities used in the apartments, if such amounts should be borne by the tenants at all, is an issue affecting

SYQUIA V BOARD OF POWER AND WATER WORKS (RUIZ, ENRIQUEZ, MOSES) 74 SCRA 212 TEEHANKEE; Nov 29, 1976
NATURE Petition for special civil action for certiorari FACTS - December 1974 > Ruiz, Enriquez, Moses (respondents) filed 3 complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia (petitioner) as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments at Malate, Manila, for selling electricity without permit or franchise issued by the board, in that Syquia billed Ruiz et al various specified amounts for their electricity consumption at their respective apartments for the months of May to September 1974 in excess of the Meralco rates authorized by the board. - Syquias motion to dismiss the complaints asserting that they involved contractual obligations of Ruiz et al as apartment tenants and were beyond the board's jurisdiction was denied by the latter. - Syquia filed her answer, wherein she questioned the complaints as beyond the jurisdiction of the board as a regulatory body, since she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their lease contracts, and their relationship is contractual in nature. She added that the tenants including Ruiz et al had no complaint under the contractual set-up of billings for water and electric service consumption, whereby while individual electric meters are installed in each apartment, Meralco billings include all consumption in the entire compound, including the common areas, servants' quarters and elevators, the payment for which was advanced by Syquia and later collected by way of reimbursement from the tenants pro rata; but that Ruiz et al alone complained later when on account of the energy crisis, additional fuel adjustment costs were added by Meralco to their billings which were likewise passed on by Syquia to all the tenants pro rata.

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mathematical computations and conditions of lease between landlord and tenant. - Under the reorganization plan effected by PD No. 1 as amended by PD No. 458 issued on May 16, 1974, jurisdiction, supervision and control over public service related to electric light, power and waterworks utilities formerly vested in the Public Service Act were transferred to the Board of Power and Waterworks. Disposition The orders of the board are annulled and the complaints of Ruiz et al are ordered dismissed

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subject to deportation are provided for in the following provisions of the Revised Administrative Code: - SEC. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippine Islands shall not be deported expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the Governor-General except upon prior investigator, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall he informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses. - On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law Provides that certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the Commissioner's warrant - "after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien." - So, under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the immigration Law (Qua Chee Gan vs- Deportation Board, supra). - The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercise by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation. Disposition CFI decision is reversed and set aside

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such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words." - The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from requiring plaintiffs-private respondents to print on the labels of their filled milk products the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age or words of similar import," as directed by the abovequoted provision of law, and from taking any action to enforce the above legal provision against the plaintiffs-private respondents in connection with their filled milk products, pending the final determination of the case, Civil Case No. 52276, on the merits. - OSG brought an appeal from the said order by way of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Respondent court in the meantime suspended disposition of these cases but in view of the absence of any injunction or restraining order from the Supreme Court, it resumed action on them until their final disposition therein. - Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand, is an action for prohibition and injunction with a petition for preliminary injunction. Petitioners therein pray that the respondent Fair Trade Board desist from further proceeding with FTB I.S. No. 1, entitled "Antonio R. de Joya vs. Institute of Evaporated Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, etc." pending final determination of Civil Case No. 52276. - Antonio R. de Joya and Sufronio Carrasco, both in their individual capacities and in their capacities as Public Relations Counsel and President of the Philippine Association of Nutrition, respectively, filed FTB I.S. No. 1 with Fair Trade Board for misleading advertisement, mislabeling and/or misbranding. - Among other things, the complaint filed include the charge of omitting to state in their labels any statement sufficient to identify their filled milk products as "imitation milk" or as an imitation of genuine cows milk, and omitting to mark the immediate containers of their filled milk products with the words: "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age or with other equivalent words," as required under Section 169 of the Tax Code. ISSUES 1. WON the lower court erred in ruling that Sec. 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by implication. 2. WON the lower court erred in ruling that Sec. 169 of the Tax Code has lost its purpose. 3. WON the lower court erred in ruling that the fair trade board is without jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute alleged misbranding, mislabeling, and/or misleading advertisement of filled milk products. HELD 1. NO. - Section 169 was enacted in 1939, together with Section 141 (which imposed a specific tax on skimmed milk) and Section 177 (which penalized the sale of skimmed milk without payment of the specific tax and without the legend required by Section 169). However, Section 141 was expressly repealed by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 344, and Section 177, by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 463. By the express repeal of Sections 141 and 177, Section 169 became a merely declaratory provision, without a tax purpose, or a penal sanction.

GO TEK v DEPORTATION BOARD 79 SCRA 17 AQUINO; Sept 9, 1977

NATURE Appeal from a decision of the Manila Court of First Instance FACTS Go Tek was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation after a search of an office in Sta Cruz, Manila. He was alleged to have with him at the time of the arrest fake dollar checks in violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Court which rendered him an undesirable alien. - The Chief Prosecutor of the Deportation filed a complaint against Go Tek with a prayer that after the trial the Deportation Board recommend to the President of the Philippines Go Teks immediate deportation as his presence in this country having been, and will always be a menace to the peace. welfare, and security of the community. - Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was premature because there was a pending case against him and that the Board had no jurisdiction to try the case in view of the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 118 Phil. 868 that aliens may be deported only on the grounds specified in the law. - The Board denied the motion. They reasoned that it was not necessary for an alien to be convicted before the State can exercise its right to deport said alien. Besides the Board is only a fact finding body whose function is to report and recommend to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien. - The CFI ruled in favor of Go Tek and issued a writ of prohibition against the Board. - Hence this appeal to the SC. ISSUE/S WON the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground not specified in Section 37 of the Immigration Law and although the alien has not yet been convicted of the offense imputed to him. HELD Yes. - A thorough comprehension of the President's power to deport aliens may show the baselessness of the instant prohibition action of Go Tek. The President's power to deport aliens and the investigation of aliens

VERA v. CUEVAS 90 SCRA 379 DE CASTRO; May 31, 1979

NATURE Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction FACTS - Private respondents are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products throughout the Philippines. - Commissioner of Internal Revenue required plaintiffs-private respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen days from receipt of the order with the explicit warning that failure of plaintiffs-private respondents to comply with said order will result in the institution of the necessary action against any violation of the aforesaid order. "Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. All condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in which

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- Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. The use of the specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute. - There would seem, therefore, to be no dispute that filled milk is suitable for feeding infants of all ages. Being so, the declaration required by Section 169 of the Tax Code that filled milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age would, in effect, constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law. 2. YES. - With the repeal of Sections 141 and 177 of the Tax Code, Section 169 has lost its tax purpose. Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax purpose, petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost his authority to enforce the same. This was so held by his predecessor immediately after Sections 141 and 177 were repealed in General Circular No. V-85 as stated in paragraph IX of the Partial Stipulation of facts entered into by the parties, to wit: ". . . As the act of selling skimmed milk without first paying the specific tax thereon is no longer unlawful and the enforcement of the requirement in regard to the placing of the proper legend on its immediate containers is a subject which does not come within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the penal provisions of Section 177 of the said Code having been repealed by Republic Act No. 463." - The Bureau of Internal Revenue may claim police power only when necessary in the enforcement of its principal powers and duties consisting of the "collection of all national internal revenue taxes, fees and charges, and the enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties and fines connected therewith." The enforcement of Section 169 entails the promotion of the health of the nation and is thus unconnected with any tax purpose. This is the exclusive function of the Food and Drug Administration of the Department of Health as provided for in Republic Act No. 3720. 3. NO. - The Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board, are without jurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute alleged misbranding, mislabeling and/or misleading advertisements of filled milk. The jurisdiction on the matters cited is vested upon the Board of Food and Drug Inspection and the Food and Drug Administrator, with the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of Justice, also intervening in case criminal prosecution has to be instituted. To hold that the petitioners have also jurisdiction as would be the result were their instant petition granted, would only cause overlapping of powers and functions likely to produce confusion and conflict of official action which is neither practical nor desirable. Disposition decision appealed from is affirmed en toto.

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DE LA FUENTE v DE VEYRA G.R. No. L-35385 GUTIERREZ; January 31, 1983
FACTS - At 6 o'clock in the afternoon, the crew of a Q-boat of the Philippine Coast Guard spotted a vessel, the M/V Lucky Star I, owned by the private respondent Lucky Star Shipping Co., unloading cargo to several small watercrafts alongside the vessel off the coast of Zambales. As the Q-boat was approaching the M/V Lucky Star I, it was met by gunfire from the smaller watercrafts which immediately fled from the scene. Only the M/V Lucky Star I was apprehended. - The Philippine Coast Guard officers discovered 3,400 cases of foreign made Champion cigarettes allegedly owned by Teng Bee Enterprises Co. (HK) Ltd. The coast guard officers, also saw on board a certain Deogracias Labrador, Filipino Captain of the domestic watercraft, M/L Sangbay, one of the boats seen alongside the M/V Lucky Star I. - The captain of the Lucky Star I, Li Tak Sin, was not able to present documents or papers for the cigarettes. He and the crew were arrested for smuggling. The boarding officers also seized the Lucky Star I and ordered its complement, including Labrador, to proceed to Manila on board said vessel. - A warrant of seizure and detention was issued by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Sual-Dagupan against the vessel and the articles. - The Acting Provincial Fiscal before the CFI of Zambales an information against Li Tak Sin, the crew of Lucky Star I, Deogracias Labrador, and other persons for violation of Section 101 of the Tariff and Customs Code and penalized under Section 3601 of Republic Act 1937, as amended by Republic Act 4712 - Meanwhile, the private respondents Lucky Star Shipping Company and Teng Bee Enterprises Company (HK) Ltd. filed before the CF of Manila presided over by respondent judge de Veyra a complaint for injunction and recovery of personal property against the petitioners praying for the return of the goods seized and the release of the M/V Lucky Star I. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 87435. - Judge de Veyra issued an order declaring that it has no jurisdiction as jurisdiction is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. With regard to the vessel, admittedly it is more than 30 tons dead weight thus ma not be forfeited. The remedy of the Bureau would only be the imposition of a fine. the Bureau of Customs is given until June 29, 1972 within which to inform this Court the maximum fine that may be imposed on the vessel, and this shall be the basis for a bond that would entitle Plaintiff to repossess the vessel. In the meantime, until the vessel is released the members of the crew of the vessel are in need of provisions and medicines and the Philippine Navy is ordered to permit Plaintiff, under proper escort of Philippine Navy Guards, to furnish provisions and medicines to the members of the crew. ISSUE: WON the CFI has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by the private respondents Lucky Star Shipping Company and Teng

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Bee Enterprises Company (HK) Ltd. for the release of the vessel M/V Lucky Star I, which is the subject of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of Customs of the port of SualDagupan. HELD: NO - It is well-settled that the exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a Court of First Instance from assuming cognizance over such cases. We, therefore, set aside the assailed orders of the respondent judge. - It has been held that the law affords the Collector of Customs sufficient latitude in determining whether or not a certain article is subject to seizure or forfeiture and his decision on the matter is appealable to the Commissioner of Customs and then to the Court of Tax Appeals, not to the Court of First Instance. The fundamental reason is that the Collector of Customs constitutes a tribunal when sitting in forfeiture proceedings beyond the interference of the Court of First Instance. As expressed in Pacis v. Averia, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. Moreover, on grounds of public policy, it is more reasonable to conclude that the legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the prerogative to replevin a property which is a subject of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, Otherwise, actions for forfeiture of property for violation of Customs laws could easily be undermined by the simple device of replevin.' The judicial recourse of the owner of a personal property which has been the subject of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of Customs is not in the Court of First Instance but in the Court of Tax Appeals, and only after exhausting administrative remedies in the Bureau of Customs. If the property owned believes that the Collector's conclusion was erroneous, the remedy is by appeal to the Commissioner of Customs, and then to the Court of Tax Appeals should the Commissioner uphold the Collector's decision. The Court of Tax Appeals exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review the ruling of the Commissioner in seizure and confiscation cases. and that power is to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance, which may not interfere with the Commissioner's decisions even in the form of proceedings for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, which are in reality, attempts to review the Commissioner's actuations.

CARINO v COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Giulia) SIMON, JR., v COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 229 SCRA 117 VITUG; January 5, 1994
FACTS - A "Demolition Notice," signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City

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Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a graceperiod within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. - The group, led by their President Fermo, filed a letter-complaint with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. - The CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. - Despite the Order, the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia. - Thus, the CHR ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." - A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioners questioning the CHR's jurisdiction. - The CHR cited the petitioners in contempt of court. ISSUES WON the public respondent has jurisdiction: a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City; b) to cite the petitioners in contempt and impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition. HELD a. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, the Commission does not have. b. On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its

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revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. c. The CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider. DISPOSITION Petition is GRANTED. Dissenting Opinion (Padilla) The CHR can issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate. The CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.

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as consolidated with a similar earlier case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for restraining order with the SC. The SC referred the case to the CA for proper disposition and issued a TRO ordering Serapio to desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case and for the mayor/city government of Caloocan from its operations in the dumpsite. -respondents filed an MFR; the Court directed the CA to set a hearing to determine WON the TRO should be lifted, but the parties failed to settle the dispute at the conference. CA promulgated a decision that the RTC had no jurisdiction on the appealed case since such appeal is w/in the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CA under Sec. 9 of BP129 and that petitioner had no authority to issue the cease and desist order. Said order was lifted, with the condition that any future dumping be in conformity with the procedure contained in the proposal attached to the record of the case. Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE WON petitioner can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the case HELD YES. Petitioners jurisdiction was validly invoked on the basis that the open dumpsite project was undertaken without its clearance, as required under RA 4850, which was also recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR. -RA 4850 authorizes petitioner to make, alter, or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution. Petitioner may not have been expressly conferred with the power to issue an ex parte cease and desist order, but there is enough jurisprudence to the effect that such authority need not be express (pollution adjudication board vs ca). Administrative agencies are conferred not only with such powers granted by law, but also those which are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. The immediate response to the demands of the necessities of protecting vital public interests gives life to the statement on a healthful ecology in Art. 2 Sec. 16 of the Constitution. -Petitioners charter, RA 4850, provides it with the power to institute necessary legal proceedings against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project w/in Laguna de Bay without previous clearance from it. Such a provision was designed to give petitioner sufficiently broad powers in regulation of such projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region. Disposition The petition is granted

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS CA (CALOOCAN) 320 SCRA 478 ROMERO; March 16, 1994
FACTS -Task Force Camarin Dumpsite in Caloocan filed a complaint with petitioner seeking to stop the operation of the Tala Estate open garbage dumpsite due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and possible pollution of the water in the surrounding area. After an on-site investigation affirming such contamination, and after a public hearing, petitioner issued a cease and desist order (under its enabling law, RA 4850) on the city government of Caloocan to desist from dumping waste matter in said dumpsite. -the city government filed with the RTC an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction and further sought to be declared as the sole authority on the health and safety of the people in Caloocan city, the TRO later granted by the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that under RA 3931 (Pollution Control Law), the order is reviewable both on the law and facts by the CA and not the RTC. Respondent presiding RTC judge Serapio dismissed a motion to dismiss the case,

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD 210 SCRA 558 GRIO-AQUINO; June 29, 1992
FACTS - In 1973, Martha David purchased from Fereit Realty Development Corporation (FRDC) a condominium unit which was in the process of

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completion, with a parking space, in the condominium project known as "Europa Condominium Villas" in Baguio City. - The agreed purchase price was P217,000. David made a 20% down payment of P43,400 on the price, leaving a balance of P173,600 which was payable in 60 equal monthly installments of P3,861.64 per installment. She took possession, as owner, of the condominium unit, with notice to the management. As of October, 1976, she had paid at least twenty-two (22) monthly installments of the price of the condominium unit. - In January 1978, FRDC, without the knowledge of David, and without the prior approval of the National Housing Authority, mortgaged the condominium project to Bancom Development Corporation , predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP), as security for a loan of P40,000,000. - As FRDC failed to pay its obligation which, Bancom foreclosed the mortgage on 45 condominium units, including the unit of David. The Sheriff executed a Certificate of Sale to Bancom and the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). After the expiration of the redemption period, UBP held out the units for sale. - David and the purchaser of her unit, Quazon, filed a complaint in the HLURB, against FRDC, UBP and FEBTC to annul the title of UBP and FEBTC over David's condominium unit and to order the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Quazon. The complaint sought the following reliefs: - UBP filed a motion to dismiss. UBP's main argument is that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over the complaint for consignation which should have been filed in the regular trial courts. Furthermore, as the HLURB was created in 1981 (E.O. No. 641), it has no jurisdiction over contracts that took effect prior to 1981. - HLURB Arbiter Manuel denied the motion of UBP, on the ground that the motion will render nugatory the summary nature of proceedings before this Office. In due time, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction was filed by UBP. ISSUE WON the HLURB for brevity has jurisdiction to hear and decide a condominium buyer's complaint for: (a) annulment of a real estate mortgage constituted by the project owner without his consent and without the prior written consent of the National Housing Authority; (b) for annulment of the foreclosure sale; and (c) for annulment of the condominium certificate of title that was issued to the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale. HELD YES The applicable provisions of P.D. No. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree" provide that the NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of the decree. Sec. 18. No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior written approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been

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provided to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereof. - P.D. No. 1344 of April 2, 1978 expanded the jurisdiction of the NHA to include the following: Sec. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in PD No. 957, the NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A. Unsound real estate business practices; B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman. - On February 7, 1981, EO No. 648 transferred the regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the NHA to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. Sec. 8. The regulatory functions of the NHA pursuant to PD No. 957, 1216, 1344 and other related laws are hereby transferred to the Commission, together with such applicable personnel appropriation, records, equipment and property necessary for the enforcement and implementation of such functions. Among these regulatory functions are: 1. Regulation of the real estate trade and business; 2. Registration of subdivision lots and condominium projects; 3. Issuance of license to sell subdivision lots and condominium units in the registered units; 4. Approval of performance bond and the suspension of license to sell; 5. Registration of dealers, brokers, and salesmen engaged in the business of selling subdivision lots or condominium units; 6. Revocation of registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen; 7. Approval of mortgage on any subdivision lot or condominium unit made by the owner or developer; 8. Granting of permits for the alteration of plans and the extension of period for completion of subdivision or condominium projects; 9. Approval of the conversion to other purposes of roads and open spaces found within the project which have been donated to the city or municipality concerned; 10. Regulation of the relationship between lessors and lessees; and 11. Hear and decide cases on unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers or salesmen and cases of specific performance. - EO No. 90 dated December 17, 1986 changed the name of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission to HLURB. - Clearly, FRDC's act of mortgaging the condominium project to Bancom and FEBTC, without the knowledge and consent of David as buyer of a unit therein, and without the approval of the NHA (now HLURB) as required by P.D. No. 957, was not only an unsound real estate business practice but also highly prejudicial to the buyer, David, who has a cause of action for annulment of the mortgage, the mortgage foreclosure sale, and the condominium certificate of title that

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was issued to UBP and FEBTC as highest bidders at the sale. The case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NHA (now HLURB) as provided in P.D. No. 957 of 1976 and P.D. No. 1344 of 1978. - The allegations of UBP that the contract between FRDC and David had been rescinded, that the installment payments made by David had been forefeited, that it is FRDC who should refund the said installment payments to David, are mere matters of defense which are not proper in a petition for certiorari (Planters Products Inc. vs. CA, 193 SCRA 563: Commercial Corp. vs. PNB, 175 SCRA 1).

AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE V. FACTORA 00 SCRA 00 SANDOVAL-GUITIERREZ, February 27, 2002

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS -Sevenis Enterprises, Inc. (Sevenis-land owner = LO) owns a parcel of land at Paranaque. It engaged the services of Jesus Factora (Factora construction) to construct a four-storey condo bldg. on said lot. Sevenis obtained a P3.9 M loan from Fund Centrum Finance, Inc. (Fund Centrum Creditor), secured by a mortgage on the realty project. Sevenis also had a P1.3+ debt with Factora as contractors fees. Sevenis entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Fund Centrum and Factora wherein through a Dacion in Payment, Sevenis assigned and conveyed to Fund Centrum the land and improvements on the lot. Sevenis debt with Factora was also recognized as contractors lien with all the rights provided for by law. He was assigned 3 units. By virtue of the Dacion, Sevenis is relieved from any liabilities to Fund Centrum and Factora, without prejudice to receiving its share in the net residue. -Fund Centrum sold the condo bldg to Supreme Capital (Supreme buyer1), Supreme Capital resold the property to MCI Real Estate and Devt Corp. (MCI second buyer/lessor). MCI leased property with AMA Computer College (AMA lessee) which converted the condo into a computer school. The conversion included 3 units assigned to Factora based on MOA. -so Factora filed 2 complaints against Fund Cenrum, Supreme Capital, and AMA with Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for recovery of condominium certificates and title and damages. OAALA dismissed the complaints for lack of jurisdiction. Factora appealed to HLURB Board of Commissioners, Board affirmed OAALA decision. Factora elevated decision to the Office of the President. Exec. Sec Torres issued a resolution setting aside the Boards decision and remanding the records of the case to HLURB. So AMA filed petition for review with CA. CA dismissed AMAs petition. AMA filed MFR, denied. ISSUES WON HLURB had NO jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaints because Factora did not acquire ownership of the subject

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condominium units pursuant to the MOA (Not being the owner, he is not a condominium buyer within the purview of P.D. 957) HELD YES Ratio. Sec. 1 of P.D. 1344 expanded the jurisdiction of the HLURB under P.D. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree," to include: (1) any claims filed by condominium buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman, and (2) cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. Corollarily, a transaction to "buy" and "purchase" under P.D. 957 has been defined as "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire for a valuable consideration x x x a condominium unit in a condominium project." The term "buyer" is not limited to those who enter into contracts of sale. Its concept is broad enough as to include those who "acquire for a valuable consideration" a condominium unit. Thus, a buyer of said unit seeking to enforce the performance of an obligation arising from such transaction, or claiming damages therefrom, may bring an action with the HLURB. Reasoning. Factora is a buyer within the contemplation of P.D. 957. He acquired the three condominium units as they were assigned to him by Sevenis in payment for its indebtedness in the amount of P1,333,523.00 as contractor's fee. Clearly, his acquisition of the units was for a valuable consideration. -on contention that the MOA merely intends to recognize the indebtedness of Sevenis to respondent as a contractor's lien, hence no assignment has been made: While the MOA recognizes Sevenis' indebtedness as a lien, however, it expressly provides for the settlement of such indebtedness by the assignment of the three 2-BR units to respondent. Thus, by virtue of the assignment, respondent relieved Sevenis from its indebtedness to him. The extinguishment of the indebtedness vested upon respondent the right to own said units. -on theory that respondent is not the owner of the said condominium, therefore HLURB had no jurisdiction over the case: cases for specific performance of contractual obligations against condominium owners filed by buyers fall within its competence and expertise. Arranza vs. B.F. Homes, Inc: P.D. 957 was promulgated to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. It is aimed at providing for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of its provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take recourse.

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a Contract to Sell a House and Lot Unit. A month after occupying the house, its front and back walls cracked. - Osea lodged a complaint against respondents with the Office of the Building Official of Quezon City for violation of the National Building Code. The spouses Osea subsequently filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of QC. - Respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC, contending that it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). - In the meantime, the Office of the Building Official of QC found that the building and occupancy permits were validly issued and that minor and insignificant deviation pertaining to installed girt and rafters at the roof framing of subject unit-house would not in any way affect the structural strength of the one-storey residence. - RTC QC promulgated its decision, finding for petitioners and granting their prayer for actual, moral, and exemplary damages. - CA declared null and void the RTC decision for lack of jurisdiction as it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the complaint. - Petitioners MFR was also denied. Petitioners Claims - The complaint before the RTC is clearly for a breach of contract in view of respondents failure to comply with the building plans and technical specifications of the residential dwelling. - Their rights to the lot, which they admit to be under the jurisdiction of HLURB, is separate from their rights to the house built thereon which they allege to be enforceable only in the regular courts. ISSUE WON HLURB has jurisdiction (and not the RTC) HELD YES Ratio Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. Reasoning Sec. 11 of P.D. 1344 clarifies and spells out the quasijudicial dimensions of the grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB. - The extent to which the HLURB has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must also be determined by referring to the terms of P.D. 957, THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS' PROTECTIVE DECREE which provides that The National Housing

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Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with this Decree. - The intention was aimed at providing for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take recourse. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. - This Court has consistently held that complaints for breach of contract or specific performance with damages filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. - Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, & services of the admin. tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. Dispositive Petition is DENIED. The assailed CA Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.

MATEO V CA (STA. MARIA) 247 SCRA 284 PUNO; August 14, 1995
NATURE Petiton for certiorari FACTS -Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees, petitioners, Aniceto Mateo, Maximo San Diego, Quirino Mateo, Daniel Francisco and Leonila Kuizon, all Board Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager. -On December 13, 1992, private respondent was placed under preventive suspension. He was later dismissed on January 7, 1993. -On January 18, 1993, private respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, challenging his dismissal by petitioners. -Petitioners, in turn, moved to dismiss the case on two (2) grounds: (1) the court had no jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees which is vested exclusively in the Civil Service Commission; and (2) quo warranto was not the proper remedy. -Respondent Judge Arturo Marave denied the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Reconsideration -Petitioners then elevated the matter to this Court through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which was referred to respondent Court of Appeals -CA dismissed the petition and denied the Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE WON the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction over cases involving the dismissal of an employee of quasi-public corporation

SPOUSES OSEA V AMRBOSIO AND PEREZ 486 SCRA 599 CARPIO-MORALES; April 7, 2006
FACTS - Petitioner Osea and respondent Ambrosio (owner/developer of the Villa San Agustin Subdivision located at Novaliches, QC) entered into

SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A. Unsound real estate business practices; B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

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HELD No. -MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. -In Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commission, the Court en banc ruled that employees of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission -As early as Baguio Water District v. Trajano et, al., We already ruled that a water district is a corporation created pursuant to a special law, P.D. No. 198, and as such its officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service Law. -Indeed, the established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of goverment-own and controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations. -Presidential Decee No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, under the present rule, as provided by Revised Circular No. 1-91 as amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1, 1995, the party may appeal the final resolution of the Commission to the Court of Appeals (under former rule, private respondent could only go on certiorari to the SC under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court). Disposition Petition is GRANTED

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that direct connection of industry to NPC is no longer necessary in the franchise area of the specific utility or cooperative meeting standards of financial and technical capability, with satisfactory guarantees of non-prejudice to industry, to be set in consultation with NPC and relevant government agencies; and reviewed periodically by the regulatory board.' . . . -In its Petition, ILPI alleged, inter alia, that it can meet, even surpass, the set of financial standards adopted by the ERB pursuant to the policy guidelines set by the Cabinet . . ."AMI filed its 'Answer with Affirmative Defenses and/or Motion to Dismiss,' 'without accepting jurisdiction of the Honorable Board over the subject matter of the petition,' on the following grounds, to wit: 1) lack of jurisdiction to hear the petition for implementation of Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power Sector following the transfer of its non-price regulatory jurisdiction and functions to the Department of Energy under Rep. Act No. 7638; -On January 4, 1994, the ERB denied in open court AMI's motion to dismiss the petition. Likewise, AMI's motion for reconsideration was denied by the ERB in its order dated April 7, 1994 . . . Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul the aforesaid order dated April 7, 1994 and to prohibit respondent ERB from proceeding with the hearing of ILPI's petition." ISSUE WON ERB is the agency of the government which has jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute HELD NO. DOE and ERB Reasoning The foregoing sufficiently indicates that it is now the Department of Energy that has jurisdiction over the regulation of the marketing and the distribution of energy resources. It may be true that this function formerly belonged to the ERB, by virtue of the "Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Energy Sector" embodied in the Cabinet Memorandum of January 23, 1987, and EO 172 issued May 8, 1987. However, pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7638, which was subsequently enacted by Congress on December 9, 1992, the non-rate-fixing jurisdiction, powers and functions of the ERB have been transferred to the Department of Energy. The applications for the NPC's direct supply or disconnection of power involve essentially the distribution of energy resources, not by any incident the determination of power rates. Consequently, these applications must be resolved by the DOE. It is of no moment that the petition instituted by ILPI before the ERB was captioned "for the Implementation of the 1987 Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power Sector." The relief it specifically sought was the discontinuation of NPC's direct supply of power to private respondent's member-companies. Definitely then, the distribution of an energy resource was its main purpose. Neither does the Court agree with the petitioners' claim that the regulatory functions of the ERB that were transferred to the DOE concerned those relating to the petroleum industry only and not to electric power. Section 3 of EO 172 broadly defines energy resource as "any substance or phenomenon which by itself or in combination with others emanates, [or] generates energy," Electric power or electricity has been in turn defined as "an imponderable and invisible agent producing light, heat, chemical decomposition, and other

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physical phenomena." Undoubtedly, electricity produces or generates energy. By simple logic, it is an energy resource. The regulation of its distribution is, therefore, among those functions formerly belonging to the ERB, which have been transferred to the DOE as expressly directed in Section 18 of RA 7638. Nowhere in this provision is there any restriction of its scope to petroleum and its products only. The reference to petroleum is merely by way of example of what an energy resource is. In fact, the set of examples of energy resources enumerated in the law is prefaced with "such as but not limited to." This can only mean that the enumeration is nonrestrictive. -Moreover, Section 5 of RA 7638 defines the powers and functions of the DOE as follows: "SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. The Department shall have the following powers and functions: (d) Exercise supervision and control over all government activities relative to energy projects in order to attain the goods embodied in Section 2 of this Act. & (e) Regulate private sector activities relative to energy projects as provided for under existing laws; Provided, That the Department shall endeavor to provide for an environment conducive to free and active private sector participation and involvement in all energy activities." -As to what energy projects encompass, Section 3 of the same law gives this definition: "SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. (a) 'Energy projects' shall mean activities or projects relative to the exploration, extraction, production, importation-exportation, processing, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling or storage of all forms of energy products and resources." Disposition Petition DENIED

ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD V. CA (AMI) G.R. No. 127373 PANGANIBAN; March 25, 1999
FACTS -The members of the Association of Mindanao Industries are enterprises based in Mindanao and registered with the Board of Investments which were among those granted direct connection facility by the National Power Corporation although operating within the franchise area of private respondent Iligan Light and Power, Inc. (Iligan for short). -On October 12, 1993, Iligan filed with the respondent Energy Regulatory Board (ERB for short) a petition for the implementation of the 1987 Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power Sector, praying specifically that the direct supply of power to industries within its franchise area be discontinued by the National Power Corporation (NPC, for short). -The Cabinet Policy Reforms referred to were among those approved by the President of the Philippines and her cabinet on January 21, 1987, the pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows: 2. Continue direct connections for industries authorized under the BOI-NPC Memorandum of Understanding of 12 January 1981, until such time as the appropriate regulatory board determines

UNILONGO V. CA (MENDIOLA) G.R. No. 123910. KAPUNAN; April 5, 1999

FACTS -On 4 July 1989, the Sto. Nio de Cul de Sac Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SNSNAI), was incorporated and registered by petitioners (hereafter referred to as the Unilongo group) as a non-stock corporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). petitioners comprised SNSNAIs original Board of Trustees. -However, since no elections for a new Board of Trustees and for a new set of corporate officers were held from the time of its incorporation, private respondents (hereafter referred to as the Dio group) aired their complaints and sought the intervention of the Office of the Mayor of Paraaque and the SEC. -On 29 April 1991, the Unilongo group amended the SNSNAIs ByLaws by changing the term of office of the Board of Trustees from 1 year to 2 years. -Despite the above amendment, elections were held on 5 May 1991 and the Dio group emerged as the new Board of Trustees of the SNSNAI. -On 21 May 1991, in order to perpetuate themselves in office, the Unilongo group established the Sto. Nio de Cul de Sac Homeowners

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Association, Inc. (CDSHA) and registered it with the Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC). -On 27 June 1991, the CDSHA filed a complaint for injunction and damages with the HIGC against the Dio group. -On 25 October 1992, elections were conducted for the 1992-1993 SNSNAI Board of Trustees. The Dio group was re-elected as members of the Board of Trustees. -Thereafter the CDSHA filed a "Motion to Cite for Contempt (private respondents) and To Annul Elections of 25 October 1992" in HIGC Case. -SNSNAI is saying that by forming a separate and distinct corporation (CDSHA) the Unilongo group is "unlawfully, maliciously, unwarrantedly and capriciously, whimsically and oppressively, holding and exercising in bad faith and under unlawful pretenses, and ultimately performing the functions of the offices and/or positions of private respondents in their capacities as duly and legally elected members of the BOARD OF TRUSTEES and OFFICERS of the Sto. Nio de Cul de Sac Neighborhood Association, Inc. (for short, "SNSNAI") -SNSNAI filed before the trial court. -Unilongo Group filed motion to dismiss on the ground that Disputes involving homeowners associations fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC) as expressly provided by E.O. Nos. 90 and 535 amending R.A. No. 580 -TC denied motion. CA dismissed petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Unilongo Group ISSUE WON Disputes involving homeowners associations fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC) HELD YES. Reasoning jurisdiction of the SEC over homeowners associations has been transferred to the Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC), the new name given by Executive Order No. 90, Section 1(d) to what was formerly the Home Financing Corporation (HFC) created under R.A. No. 580. -Implementing E.O. No. 535, the HIGC issued the Revised Rules of Procedure in the Hearing of Homeowners Disputes, thus: Rule II Disputes Triable by HIGC/ Nature of Proceedings SECTION 1. Types of Disputes. The HIGC or any person, officer, body, board, or committee duly designated or created by it shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the following: a) Devices or schemes employed by or any facts of the Board of Directors or officers of the association amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public or of the members of the association or the association registered with HIGC. b) Controversies arising out if intra-corporate relations between and among members of the association, between any and/or all of them and the association of which they are members, and insofar as it concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity, between the association and the state/general public or other entity.

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c) Controversies in the election, appointment, or selection of directors, officers, or members of the association, including the regularity thereof and eligibilities of such directors, officers or members. d) Suspension or revocation of the certificate of registration of any homeowners association duly registered by HIGC upon any of the grounds provided by law, rules and regulation of HIGC, including but not limited to the following: 1. Fraud or misrepresentation in procuring its certificate of registration; 2. Serious misrepresentation as to what the association can do or is doing; 3. Refusal to comply with or defiance of any lawful order of HIGC or its hearing officers; 4. Misuse of a right, privilege, or franchise conferred upon it by law, or exercise of a right, privilege or franchise in contravention of law; 5. Commission or omission of an act which amounts to a surrender of its corporate rights, privileges, or franchise; 6. Violation of any provision of HIGC rules and regulations and those of the Corporations Code whenever the same is applicable; 7. Continuous inoperation or inactivity for a period of at least five (5) years; and 8. Failure to file required reports in appropriate forms as determined by HIGC within the prescribed period. -In sum, the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate matters concerning homeowners associations, including their dissolution has now been transferred to the HIGC. In this case, the entities involved are homeowners associations. Although the SNSNAI is registered with the SEC as a non-stock, non-profit corporation, the purposes for which this neighborhood association was established correspond to the requirements laid down in the HIGC Disposition Petition GRANTED.

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against respondents, Green Mountain Farm, Roberto Ongpin and Almus Alabe. - Sheriff Ventura then proceeded to enforce the writ by garnishing certain personal properties of respondents. - Findings that said judgment debtors do not have sufficient personal properties to satisfy the monetary award, Sheriff Ventura proceeded to levy upon a real property covered by Tax Declaration No. 9697, registered in the name of Roberto Ongpin, one of the respondents in the labor case. - Thereafter, Sheriff Ventura caused the publication on the Baguio Midland Courier the date of the public auction of said real property. - A month before the scheduled auction sale, DELTA filed before the NLRC a third-party claim asserting ownership over the property levied upon and subject of the Sheriff notice of sale. LA Rivera thus issued an order directing the suspension of the auction sale until the merits of petitioner's claim has been resolved. - DELTA filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO against Sheriff Ventura, reiterating the same allegations it raised in the third party claim it field with the NLRC. - Judge Cabato eventually issued a TRO, enjoining respondents in the DELTA v. Ventura et al civil case to hold in abeyance any action relative to the enforcement of the decision in the labor case. - DELTA also filed a complaint (in the NLRC) questioning its authority to hear the case, the matter being within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. LA Rivera dismissed it. - Bernardino et al moved for the dismissal of the civil case on the ground of the court's lack of jurisdiction. - RTC s decision: RTC is equal rank with the NLRC, hence, has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction against the execution of the NLRC decision; NLRC retains authority over all proceedings anent the execution of its decision. This power carries with it the right to determine every question which may be involved in the execution of its decision; DELTA should rely on and comply with the Rules of the NLRC because it is the principal procedure to be followed, the Rules of Court being merely suppletory in application; ESTOPPEL is N/A. . . . . [B]efore the defendants have filed their formal answer to the amended complaint, they moved to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction; DELTA having in the first place addressed to the jurisdiction of the NLRC by filing with it a Third Party Claim may not at the same time pursue the present amended Complaint under the forum shopping rule. (Deltas MR was denied) ISSUE WON RTC may take cognizance of the complaint filed by DELTA and consequently provide the injunction relief sought. (or WON the acts complained of are related to, connected or interwoven with the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the LA or the NLRC) HELD NO. The subject matter of Deltas third party claim is an incident of the labor case which is a matter beyond the jurisdiction of the regular courts, as the complaint was, in essence, a motion to quash the writ of

DELTAVENTURES RESOURCES, INC. v CABATO 327 SCRA 521 QUISUMBING; March 9, 2000
FACTS: (*This action seeks to annual the Order dated November 7, 1994, of Judge Cabato (RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet) which dismissed DELTAs amended third-party complaint, and to annul as well the Order denying the MR.) - In 1992, a Decision was rendered by Exec. LA Norma Olegario, (NLRC CAR) in the case of "Alejandro Bernardino, et al, vs. Green Mountain Farm, Roberto Ongpin and Almus Alabe", wherein the respondents were found guilty of Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice and ordered the respondents to pay the Bernardino et al, in solidum, a certain amount per person (see list in the orig case nlng!) plus attys fees. - Complainants in the abovementioned labor case filed before the NLRC a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution as respondent's appeal to the NLRC and SC were respectively denied. - In 1994, Exec LA Gelacio C. Rivera, Jr. to whom the case was reassigned in view of LA Olegario's transfer, issued a writ of execution directing NLRC Deputy Sheriff Adam Ventura to execute the judgment

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execution of a decision rendered w/in the jurisdiction of the LA/ NLRC (i.e. the illegal dismissal and ULP case.) Ratio: Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complainant which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action. (r6 sec 3 ROC) -Multinational Village Homeowners Ass., Inc. v. CA, et al.~ Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complainant, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein - a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Reasoning: - Delta asserts that the instant case does not involve a labor dispute, as no ER-EE relationship exists between the parties. Nor is the case related in any way to either parties' case before the NLRC-CAR hence, not within the jurisdiction of the NLRC. - However, by filing its third-party claim with the deputy sheriff, Delta submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the NLRC acting through the LA. - Precedents abound confirming the rule that said courts have no labor jurisdiction to act on labor cases or various incidents arising therefrom, including the execution of decisions, awards or orders as these pertain exclusively to the proper labor official concerned under the DOLE. To hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. - Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. - Whatever irregularities attended the issuance and execution of the alias writ of execution should be referred to the same administrative tribunal which rendered the decision. - This is because any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. - Articles 217, 218 and 224 of the Labor Code can only be interpreted as vesting in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connection with or relating to labor disputes, as the controversy under consideration, to the exclusion of the regular courts. - A254 LC explicitly prohibits issuance of a temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes by any court or other entity (except as otherwise provided in Arts. 218 and 264). - In denying the petition for injunction, the court a quo is merely upholding the time-honored principle that a RTC, being a co-equal body of the NLRC has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution of any decision of the latter.

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- Respondents said they tendered payments for their bills less charges for power cost adjustment, currency exchange rate adjustment and surcharge, w/c petitioner refused to accept. Because of refusal, respondents consigned to court. - Respondents filed with RTC a complaint against petitioner for unjust enrichment, recovery of sums of money, recovery of customers deposits, breach of contract, consignation, injunction and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction. - City of Cagayan de Oro filed complaint in intervention. - TC denied respondents application for preliminary injunction, - TC dismissed complaint and complaint in intervention on ground that the court had no jurisdiction over subject matter - TC denied MFR. Respondents appealed to CA. - CA set aside the orders of dismissal of complaint and complaint in intervention. Hence this petition. ISSUE WON jurisdiction over subject matter is with regular courts or Energy Regulatory Board HELD Subject is within jurisdiction of RTC. - RTC is a court of general jurisdiction. On the other hand, RA 6173, as amended by PD 1206 empowered the ERB to regulate & fix power rates to be charged by electric companies. Power to fix rates doesnt carry with it power to determine whether or not petitioner is guilty of overcharging customers. This falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. - The question of determining the breakdown and itemization of the power adjustment billed by an electric power company to its customers is not a matter that pertains to the ERB's supervision, control or jurisdiction to regulated and fix power rate but falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. - Petitioner is a public utility company. If, indeed, petitioner used the deposits, discounts, surcharges, PCA and CERA rates as instruments to obtain undue profits through various loan activities and benefits provided to petitioner's employees, then respondents may have causes of action against petitioner to be litigated before the regular courts and decided on the basis of evidence which the parties may present during the trial. Disposition Petition is dismissed.

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Orendain as a Receiver. - Orendain instituted a central security system and unified the 65 homeowners' associations into an umbrella homeowners' association called United BF Homeowners' Associations, Inc. (UBFHAI), which was thereafter incorporated with the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) - Orendain, turned over to UBFHAI control and administration of security in the subdivision, the Clubhouse and the open spaces. Through the Philippine Waterworks and Construction Corporation (PWCC), respondent's managing company for waterworks in the various BF Homes subdivisions, respondent entered into an agreement with UBFHAI for the annual collection of community assessment fund and for the purchase of eight new pumps to replace the over-capacitated pumps in the old wells - Orendain was relieved by the SEC of his duties as a Receiver. The new Board revoked the authority given by Orendain to use the open spaces at Concha Cruz Drive and to collect community assessment funds; deferred the purchase of new pumps; recognized BF Paraaque Homeowners' Association, Inc., (BFPHAI) as the representative of all homeowners in the subdivision; took over the management of the Clubhouse; and deployed its own security guards in the subdivision. - Petitioners filed with the HLURB a class suit "for and in behalf of the more than 7,000 homeowners in the subdivision" against respondents. Petitioners raised "issues" on the following basic needs of the homeowners: rights-of-way; water; open spaces; road and perimeter wall repairs; security; and the interlocking corporations that allegedly made it convenient for respondent "to compartmentalize its obligations as general developer, even if all of these are hooked into the water, roads, drainage and sewer systems of the subdivision." - HLURB Arbiter issued a 20-day TRO to avoid rendering nugatory and ineffectual any judgment that could be issued in the case; and subsequently, an Order granting petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction was issued ISSUE WON it is the SEC and not the HLURB that has jurisdiction over a complaint filed by subdivision homeowners against a subdivision developer that is under receivership for specific performance regarding basic homeowners' needs HELD NO Ratio Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any court or tribunal. It is determined by the averments of the complaint and not by the defense contained in the answer. Hence, the jurisdictional issue involved here shall be determined upon an examination of the applicable laws and the allegations of petitioners' complaint before the HLURB Reasoning - LAW: Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree) empowered the NHA with the "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business." P.D. No. 1344 was issued to expand the jurisdiction of the NHA to include unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund and

CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER AND LIGHT CO., INC. V. CONSTANCIO F. COLLERA ET. AL. GR No. 102184 PARDO; April 12, 2000
FACTS - Cagayan Electric had been collecting payments for electric consumption from respondents under the Power Adjustment Clause.

LIM ARRANZA V BF HOMES G.R. No. 131683 DAVIDE; June 19, 2000
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Respondent filed with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation and a declaration that it was in a state of suspension of payments. SEC placed respondent under a management committee, and appointed

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any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. The regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the NHA were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) by virtue of EO No. 648. Section 8 thereof specifies the functions of the NHA that were transferred to the HSRC including the authority to hear and decide "cases on unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers or salesmen and cases of specific performance." EO No. 90 renamed the HSRC as the HLURB. - The fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest the HLURB of that jurisdiction. A receiver is a person appointed by the court, or in this instance, by a quasi-judicial administrative agency, in behalf of all the parties for the purpose of preserving and conserving the property and preventing its possible destruction or dissipation, if it were left in the possession of any of the parties. It is the duty of the receiver to administer the assets of the receivership estate; and in the management and disposition of the property committed to his possession, he acts in a fiduciary capacity and with impartiality towards all interested persons. The appointment of a receiver does not dissolve a corporation, nor does it interfere with the exercise of its corporate rights. - No violation of the SEC order suspending payments to creditors would result as far as petitioners' complaint before the HLURB is concerned. To reiterate, what petitioners seek to enforce are respondent's obligations as a subdivision developer. Such claims are basically not pecuniary in nature although it could incidentally involve monetary considerations Neither may petitioners be considered as having "claims" against respondent within the context of the following proviso of Section 6 (c) of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended by P.D. Nos. 1653, 1758 and 1799, to warrant suspension of the HLURB proceedings. 2 The word "claim" as used in Sec. 6 (c) of P.D. 902-A, as amended, refers to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature. - LAW: For the SEC to acquire jurisdiction over any controversy under P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, two elements must be considered: (1) the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. The first element requires that the controversy must arise "out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the State in so far as it concerns their individual franchises." The second element requires that the dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation or the internal affairs of the corporation, partnership or association

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- Petitioners are not stockholders, members or associates of respondent. They are lot buyers and now homeowners in the subdivision developed by the respondent. Also, the controversy here is remotely related to the "regulation" of respondent corporation or to respondent's "internal affairs." - These two quasi-judicial agencies exercise functions that are distinct from each other. The SEC has authority over the operation of all kinds of corporations, partnerships or associations with the end in view of protecting the interests of the investing public and creditors. On the other hand, the HLURB has jurisdiction over matters relating to observance of laws governing corporations engaged in the specific business of development of subdivisions and condominiums. The HLURB and the SEC being bestowed with distinct powers and functions, the exercise of those functions by one shall not abate the performance by the other of its own functions. There is no contradiction between P.D. No. 902-A and P.D. No. 957. - P.D. No. 957 was promulgated to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. It is aimed at providing for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of its provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take recourse. Nonetheless, the powers of the HLURB may not in any way be deemed as in derogation of the SEC's authority. P.D. Nos. 902-A and 957, as far as both are concerned with corporations, are laws in pari materia. P.D. No. 902-A relates to all corporations, while P.D. No. 957 pertains to corporations engaged in the particular business of developing subdivisions and condominiums. Although the provisions of these decrees on the issue of jurisdiction appear to collide when a corporation engaged in developing subdivisions and condominiums is under receivership, the same decrees should be construed as far as reasonably possible to be in harmony with each other to attain the purpose of an expressed national policy.

Dean Carlota
quo. The CDA questioned the propriety of the TRO before the CA. The CA issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from enforcing its TRO. - Hence, the CDA continued with the proceedings and issued a resolution directing the holding of a special general assembly of the members of DARBCI and the election of new officers and members of the board of directors. The officers filed a petition for prohibition with the CA which issued a resolution restraining the CDA and the administrator of DARBCI from proceeding with the election. A joint venture partner of DARBCI, Investa Land Corp., also filed a petition for annulment of the CDAs orders in the Polomolok RTC which also granted a TRO. - Due to the TROs, the planned election did not take place. Nevertheless, the majority of the members of DARBCI, on their own initiative, convened a general assembly and held an election. The original officers filed Twin Motions for Contempt of Court and to Nullify Proceedings with the CA. The CA granted the petition declaring the election null & void. ISSUES 1. WON the CDA is vested with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes in view of its powers, functions and responsibilities under Sec 3 of RA 6939 HELD 1. NO. Ratio The authority of the CDA is to discharge purely administrative functions which consist of policy-making, registration, fiscal and technical assistance to cooperatives and implementation of cooperative laws. Reasoning Sec 3 of RA 6939 enumerates the powers, functions and responsibilities of the CDA, thus: SEC. 3. Powers, Functions and Responsibilities. The Authority shall have the following powers, functions and responsibilities: (a) Formulate, adopt and implement integrated and comprehensive plans and programs on cooperative development consistent with the national policy on cooperatives and the overall socio-economic development plan of the Government; (b) Develop and conduct management and training programs upon request of cooperatives that will provide members of cooperatives with the entrepreneurial capabilities, managerial expertise, and technical skills required for the efficient operation of their cooperatives and inculcate in them the true spirit of cooperativism and provide, when necessary, technical and professional assistance to ensure the viability and growth of cooperatives with special concern for agrarian reform, fishery and economically depressed sectors; (c) Support the voluntary organization and consensual development of activities that promote cooperative movements and provide assistance to wards upgrading managerial and technical expertise upon request of the cooperatives concerned; (d) Coordinate the effects of the local government units and the private sector in the promotion, organization, and development of cooperatives; (e) Register all cooperatives and their federations and unions, including their division, merger, consolidation, dissolution or liquidation. It shall also register the transfer of all or substantially all of their assets

COOP. DEVT. AUTHORITY V DOLEFIL AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES COOP. GR No. 137489 DE LEON, JR.; May 29, 2002
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - The CDA received from certain members of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI), a cooperative that owns 8,860 hectares of land in Polomolok, South Cotabato, several complaints alleging mismanagement and/or misappropriation of funds of DARBCI by the officers and members of the BOD (officers for brevity). The CDA freezed DARBCIs funds. The officers filed a petition for certiorari in Polomolok RTC assailing the CDAs jurisdiction. - The CDA placed the officers under preventive suspension paving the way for the newly-created management committee to assume office. Polomolok RTC issued a TRO directing the parties to restore status

2 [U]pon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly

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and liabilities and such other matters as may be required by the Authority; (f) Require all cooperatives, their federations and unions to submit their annual financial statements, duly audited by certified public accountants, and general information sheets; (g) Order the cancellation after due notice and hearing of the cooperatives certificate of registration for non-compliance with administrative requirements and in cases of voluntary dissolution; (h) Assist cooperatives in arranging for financial and other forms of assistance under such terms and conditions as are calculated to strengthen their viability and autonomy; (i) Establish extension offices as may be necessary and financially viable to implement this Act. Initially, there shall be extension offices in the Cities of Dagupan, Manila, Naga, Iloilo, Cebu, Cagayan de Oro and Davao; (j) Impose and collect reasonable fees and charges in connection with the registration of cooperatives; (k) Administer all grants and donations coursed through the Government for cooperative development, without prejudice to the right of cooperatives to directly receive and administer such grants and donations upon agreement with the grantors and donors thereof; (l) Formulate and adopt continuing policy initiatives consultation with the cooperative sector through public hearing; (m) Adopt rules and regulations for the conduct of its internal operations; (n) Submit an annual report to the President and Congress on the state of the cooperative movement; (o) Exercise such other functions as may be necessary to implement the provisions of the cooperative laws and, in the performance thereof, the Authority may summarily punish for direct contempt any person guilty of misconduct in the presence of the Authority which seriously interrupts any hearing or inquiry with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos (P500) or imprisonment of not more than ten (10) days, or both. Acts constituting indirect contempt as defined under Rule 71 of the ROC shall be punished in accordance with the said Rule. - When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is only room for application. Nowhere in RA 6939 can it be found any express grant to the CDA of authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes. At most, Sec 8 of the same law provides that "upon request of either or both parties, the Authority shall mediate and conciliate disputes with a cooperative or between cooperatives" however, with a restriction "that if no mediation or conciliation succeeds within 3 months from request, a certificate of non-resolution shall be issued by the commission prior to the filing of appropriate action before the proper courts". Being an administrative agency, the CDA has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those which are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. - The Court also quoted the deliberations in both the Senate and the House to show that the legislative intent was NOT to grant quasijudicial authority to the CDA in accordance with the policy of the government granting autonomy to cooperatives. The Court noted that in the past 75 years cooperativism failed to flourish in the Philippines due to the stifling attitude of the government toward cooperatives. While the government wished to help, it invariably wanted to control.

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Also, in its anxious efforts to push cooperativism, it smothered cooperatives with so much help that they failed to develop selfreliance. As one cooperative expert put it, "The strong embrace of government ends with a kiss of death for cooperatives. Disposition Petition is DENIED. But the CA order nullifying the election is SET ASIDE for lack of due process. [Kasi, no notice & opportunity to be heard was given to the new officers.]

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imprisoned for not more than 2 years, and deported if he is an alien. ISSUES 1. WON the two proceedings are incompatible with each other and that the institution of the court action amounted to a renunciation of the administrative proceeding; and that, upon the filing of the criminal case, the warrant of exclusion became unenforceable. HELD 1. NO Reasoning This situation is analogous to that where the same act constitutes 2 or more different offenses not covered by Article 48 of the RPC, except that, in this case, one offense is punishable as a felony or crime, and the other is to be dealt with administratively. The one is not legally inconsistent with the other, and the prosecution of the former does not entail a waiver of the action due for the latter. The alleged conflict is, at best, purely physical in that the conflicts affect mainly the time and place at which certain things will have to be done (for example, if hes tried in one case, it may be impossible for him to appear at the hearing of another case, which consequently might have to be postpoed to another date; or, for example, the service of several sentences might not be served simultaneously, etc.) supported by substantial evidence. Disposition the aforementioned decision of respondent Court is set aside, with costs against Chun.

DE JESUS v COMMISSION ON AUDIT (Sarah) 4. Administrative and Judicial Proceedings arising from the same facts GALANG V CA (TEE HOOK CHUN) 2 SCRA 234 CONCEPCION; May 30, 1961
NATURE Original action for a writ of certiorari to set aside a decision of, as well as a b ail bond granted by, the CA. FACTS (sorry guys! a lot of the case is in Spanish ) - Upon some facts (in Spanish! All I know for sure is Chun was a foreigner, and the CFI found him guilty of evading some immigration law, and sentenced him to 1 year of prison and a P1,000 fine, and I think it ordered him to be deported to Hongkong for the service of the prison sentence), the CA found that a petition filed by Chun for a write of habeas corpus was well taken, and allowed Chun bail, and denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. This was based on the theory that the warrant of exclusion and the judgment of conviction of Chun are based upon the same facts; that the administrative proceeding for his exclusion is incompatible with his criminal prosecution in our courts of justice; that the institution of the criminal action implied a waiver of the authority to exclude him by administrative proceeding; and that the warrant of exclusion issued by the petitioner became ineffective upon the filing of the mentioned criminal case. - both proceedings arose from the same facts but: - the warrant of exclusion was based on section 29(a)(17) of Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 which said (a) The following classes of aliens shall be ecluded from entry into the Philippines (17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be required under the provisions of this Act. - On the other hand, the charge in the criminal case was for an offense punishable under Section 45(e) of the same Act, which provided that Any individual who (e) being an alien, shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to evade any requirement of the immigration laws shall be guilty of an offense, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than P1000, and

CO SAN V DIRECTOR OF PATENTS GR 10563 BAUTISTA ANGELO; Feb. 23, 1961

FACTS - Respondent Jose Ong Lian Bio filed with the Philippine Patent Office two applications for the issuance of letters patent on two designs for luggages. Subsequently, the Director of Patents issued Letters Patent Nos. 6 and 7 in his favor. Petitioner Co San, however, filed with the Patent Office a petition for cancellation of said letters patent on the grounds provided for in sub-sections (a) and (b) of section 28 of Republic Act No. 165, to wit: . (a) The design allegedly invented by Mr. Ong Lian Bio is not now patentable in accordance with sec 7, 8, and 9 of Chapter II of RA 165. (b) The specification submitted by said party does not comply with the requirements of Section 14, Chapter III of said Act. - The petition for cancellation was dismissed by the Director of Patents without hearing and reception of evidence because of his lack of statutory authority to consider the cancellation of design patents. Upon review, however, by SC, the Director of Patents was ordered to hear the petition for cancellation. - Petitioner adduced only documentary evidence and relied heavily on the CA decision in People v. Co San, in which he was acquitted of the crime of unfair competition. - The Director of Patents, after analyzing the CA decision, dismissed the petition for cancellation for insufficiency of evidence. - Petitioner-appellant contends that the Director of Patents erred in not accepting as final and conclusive the findings of fact of the Court of

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Appeals, namely, that the Petitioner was the prior user of the design in question, and that the designs in Letters Patent Nos. 6 and 7 are not new and original. The Director of Patents held that these findings are not "clear", "satisfactory" and "free from doubt." ISSUE/S WON the Director of Patents is bound in the cancellation proceedings by the findings arrived at by CA in the Criminal case against petitioner. HELD NO. Reasoning In the cancellation proceedings the question refers to the validity of the design patents issued to respondent Jose Ong Lian Bio, while in the criminal case the inquiry is whether Co San unfairly competed against the luggage of said respondent protected by design patent No. 7. The first is within the cognizance of the Patent Office (Section 28, Republic Act No. 165, as amended) ; the second under the jurisdiction of the court of first instance (Article 189, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 172). The acquittal of the petitioner by the Court of Appeals was not based on the cancellation of a patent, but on the opinion that the accused (petitioner) had not deceived or defrauded the complainant (respondents). Disposition Petition for review is dismissed

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WON petitioner was afforded fair trial when she was dismissed based solely on one testimony in an unfinished investigation and her conviction in the criminal case. HELD: NO -The plea that the decision of the Court of Appeals which found petitioner-appellee guilty of libel against the complainants in the administrative case, which arose from the same allegedly slanderous remarks, is enough basis for respondent-appellant's decision is equally without merit. -A condemnatory decision in a criminal case, even if final, by itself alone, cannot serve as basis for a decision in an administrative case involving the same facts, for the simple reason that matters that are material in the administrative case are not necessarily relevant in the criminal case -Even where criminal conviction is specified by law as a ground for suspension or removal of an official or employee, such conviction does not ex proprio vigore justify automatic suspension without investigation and hearing as to such conviction. -Not even final conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, as distinguished from conviction pending appeal, dispenses with the requisite notice and hearing. Final conviction is in sec 2188 of Revised Administrative Code as ground for proceeding administratively against the convicted officer but does not operate as automatic removal doing away with the formalities of an administrative hearing.

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- After promulgation on February 7, 1969 of the verdict of acquittal, however, respondent-accused filed on February 19, 1969 a motion for amendment of respondent court's decision, alleging for the first time that respondent had already been dismissed from the service of the Railways because of the very incident subject matter of the criminal charge of which respondent court had acquitted him, and praying that respondent court amend its decision so as to include therein his reinstatement, with payment of back salaries and restoration of all accrued rights and privileges. - Respondent court in its order dated March 3, 1969 set hearing of the motion on March 15, 1969 and ordered that the parties and the general manager of the Philippine National Railways be notified thereof, and thereafter issued its "amendatory decision" dated March 27, 1969, noting that there was no appearance nor opposition from the Railways at the hearing and granting respondent's motion, by adding an order to reinstate the accused immediately to his position from which he was dismissed on July 4, 1967 and to pay his salary in full during the period beginning July 4, 1967 to the date of reinstatement, and to restore the said accused to such benefits and rights and privileges arising from the position that he held which should have accrued to him during the period aforesaid. - Respondent court had denied PNRs motion to set aside the amendatory decision on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over it and over the subject matter of reinstatement and back salaries and of lack of due process. Upon petitioner's motion and bond, the Court issued on August 27, 1969 a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement and execution of the amendatory decision. ISSUE: WON the TC may properly decree the payment of salaries and order the reinstatement of the accused HELD: NO - The general rule that the court has no such authority has long been uniformly pronounced by the Court. In People vs. Maago: "In a criminal proceeding against an accused, the judgment that the law authorizes to be rendered, is either one of acquittal or of conviction with indemnity and the accessory penalties provided for by law. The payment of salary of an employee during the period of his suspension cannot, as a general rule, be properly decreed by the trial court in a judgment of acquittal." - In the analogous case of Manila Railroad Co. vs. Baltazar, the Court further elaborated that "In criminal cases courts of first instance may dismiss an information, try and acquit or convict and impose upon the defendant the penalty provided by law. - The only civil responsibility that may be imposed by the court is that which arises from the criminal act. The acquittal of the defendant does not mean necessarily that he is not civilly liable unless the verdict and judgment of acquittal is that he did not commit the crime charged. But whether a defendant acquitted of a criminal charge is entitled to his salary during suspension is not within the power of the court to grant in the criminal case where the defendant is acquitted. Neither the Revised Penal code nor the Rules of Court on criminal procedure vests in the court authority to grant such relief.

VILLANOS V SUBIDO 45 SCRA 142 BARREDO J; May 31,1971

FACTS: -Villanos, a long-time and highly- regarded teacher in Ilocos Sur. Due to a letter she wrote to two-co-teachers containing libelous remarks, a criminal case for libel was filed against her by the recipients of such letter. A few days later, before the Division Superintendent of Schools an administrative charge against petitioner-appellee for (1) gross discourtesy to them as her co-teachers, and for (2) notoriously disgraceful and/or immoral language and/or conduct. They supported their charge with the same libelous letter, basis of the criminal action.was also filed against her. -pending the decision on the administrative case, Villanos was found guilty of libel. The administrative case was delayed due to motions filed by Villanos for a different investigator for the administrative case. Due to the long period of time that the case was left hanging, the admin case was indorsed to the Secretary of Education. Based on the testimony of one witness and such conviction for libel, the Secretary recommended that petitioner-appellee be transferred to another station, reprimanded and warned that the commission by her of the same or similar offense will be severely dealt with -Subido, judge of the Civil Service Commission, disregarded such recommendation and instead dismissed Villanos from office. -CA reversed on the ground that petitioner was not afforded fair trial. ISSUE:

PNR V DOMINGO G.R. No. L-30772 Teehankee: October 29, 1971

FACTS: - Private respondent Juan Mafe, a mechanic in the employ of the Philippine National Railways was charged in an information for qualified theft for having stolen one brass bearing valued at P45.00 from his employer's shop. - The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of the Railways' policeman who apprehended respondent in street clothes on his way out at about 4 p.m. of July 4, 1967 with a traveling bag which contained the brass bearing; of the Manila Police Department patrolman who took down the respondent's extrajudicial confession; and of the corroborative testimony of the Railways' security guard who participated in respondent's apprehension; as well as of the said objects taken from respondent - Respondent, on his part, disowned any criminal intent claiming he was on his way to return the brass bearing and repudiated his extrajudicial confession, asserting that he was coerced into signing the same without being allowed to read its contents, which were different from what he stated at the police investigation. - Respondent court, in its decision of January 18, 1969, ruled that "the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt" and rendered judgment "acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt."

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THE POLICE COMMISSION V LOOD G.R. No. L-34230D TEEHANKEE; March 31, 1980
FACTS - An administrative complaint was filed against Captain Gabriel Paile, Corporal Reynaldo Alano and five other members of the Makati Police Department charging them with grave misconduct. The succeeding year, twin criminal cases were filed in the city court of Manila charging the same administrative respondents with grave coercion based on the same acts for which they had already been administratively charged. Soon thereafter, acting Manila Mayor Jose C. Luciano issued a Memorandum Order effecting the suspension from office of the seven accused members of the Makati Police Department. - After due investigation, polcom rendered its decision declaring Paile et al. guilty of grave misconduct and ordering their dismissal from the service. In the meantime, the City Court of Manila rendered judgment in the criminal cases against Paile et al., acquitting them of the charges for grave coercion on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. - In implementation of the decision of the Polcom, acting Mayor Luciano issued Administrative Order No. 39, Series of 1970, ordering the dismissal of the said administrative respondents from the service. - Respondents filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal presided by respondent judge Guardson R. Lood against the Polcom, the Mayor and the Chief of Police of Makati, and the Makati Board of Investigators seeking, inter alia, the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction requiring the Mayor of Makati to immediately reinstate them to their former positions in the Makati Police Department on their theory that, by reason of their acquittal of the criminal charges for grave coercion by the City Court of Manila, the Mayor of Makati had the duty specifically enjoined to be performed by him by the second paragraph of Section 16, R.A. No. 4864, to immediately reinstate [them] and order the payment of the entire salary they failed to receive during their suspension. - Respondent judge declared respondents' dismissal from the service as "without authority of law, null and void and without force and effect", and directed the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to reinstate them to their respective positions as Captain and Corporal in the Makati Police Department, with all the rights and privileges thereto appertaining, including the payment of their salaries during the period of their suspension from office. - The Polcom thus filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari to assail the orders of the presiding judge of the court a quo. ISSUE WON respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and declaring respondents' dismissal from the service as null and void HELD YES - It is a fundamental principle of administrative law, as reaffirmed by the Court in Philippines National Railways v. Domingo that "the administrative case may generally proceed against a respondent

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independently of a criminal action for the same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal charge, as in the analogous cases provided by Art. 33 of the Civil Code." Here, the administrative case against respondents did proceed independently of the criminal action and resulted in an earlier administrative verdict of dismissal from the service. The subsequent acquittal of said respondents as accused in the criminal case was of no consequence since such acquittal merely relieved them from criminal liability but in no way carried with it relief from the administrative liability of dismissal from the service under the final order of the Polcom in the administrative case. - Respondent judges reasoning in his challenged order that "the administrative proceedings before the respondent Polcom had not in fact been terminated, and as a matter of fact there is no showing that the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial had in fact been resolved. The result therefore is that the dismissal of the petitioners thus partook of the nature of a punishment even while their case is under consideration, a clear violation of their constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved., is a patent error. The proceedings in the administrative case before the Polcom had already become final and had been executed.

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ISSUE WON COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without jurisdiction in continuing to take action on the administrative case. HELD NO - The COMELEC's authority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the Constitution is virtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters, and also under Section 52, Article VII, of the Omnibus Election Code. - The administrative case against Tan, taken cognizance of by, and still pending with, the COMELEC, is in relation to the performance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as a city prosecutor. The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. - To ensure that such officials and EEs of govt carry out their respective assigned tasks, law provides that upon the COMELEC's recommendation, the corresponding proper authority (DOJ Sec.) shall take appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from office the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply with instructions, orders, decision or rulings of the COMELEC. But before making its recommendation, COMELEC must first satisfy itself that there indeed has been an infraction of the law, by the person administratively charged. - Note: COMELEC merely may issue a recommendation for disciplinary action but that it is the executive dept to which the charged official or employee belongs which has the ultimate authority to impose the disciplinary penalty. - The investigation then being conducted by the Ombudsman on the criminal case for falsification and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on the one hand, and the inquiry into the administrative charges by the COMELEC, on the other hand, are entirely independent proceedings. Neither would the results in one conclude the other. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution Disposition Petition DISMISSED

TAN V COMELEC 237 SCRA 353 VITUG; October 4, 1994

FACTS - Petitioner Tan, as incumbent city Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by COMELEC as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers (CBC) of Davao City for 1992 national and local elections conformably with the provisions of RA 6646 and of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). - On the basis of the votes canvassed by the Board of Canvassers, Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate as representative of Second District of Davao City in the House of Representatives. - Private respondent Alterado, himself a candidate for the position, filed cases questioning the validity of the proclamation of Garcia and accusing the members of the CBC of "unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass." - Meanwhile, the electoral protest of private respondent Alterado was dismissed by the House HRET. The criminal complaint for "Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the the Ombudsman was also dismissed for lack of criminal intent. Still pending is an administrative charge, the case now before SC, instituted in the COMELEC against the CBC, including Tan, for "Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence and Acts Inimical to the Service." - Tan moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against him for alleged lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC, he being under the Executive Dept of the government. COMELEC denied petitioner's MTD. Hence, the instant petition.

OCAMPO v OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 322 SCRA 17 Buena ; Jan. 18, 2000
FACTS -Ocampo (petitioner) is the Training Coordinator of. NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the National Irrigation Administration. -K.N. Paudel of the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) requested a training proposal on small-scale community irrigation development.

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-NIACONSULT conducted the training program for six Nepalese Junior Engineers from February 6 to March 7, 1989. ADBN, thru its representative, Deutsche Gesselschaft ) Technische Zusummenarbeit (GTZ) Gmbh Technical Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany paid to the petitioner the agreed training fee in two installments of P61,488.00 and P143,472.00. -NIACONSULT, through its president, Wilfredo S. Tiongco, wrote a letter to petitioner demanding the turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN which petitioner personally received. Despite receipt of the letter, petitioner failed to remit the said amount prompting NIACONSULT through its president, Maximino Eclipse, to file an administrative case before respondent OMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust. -Finding enough basis to proceed with the administrative case, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the respondent OMBUDSMAN, on February 17, 1992, issued an order requiring petitioner to file his counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt with a caveat that failure to file the same would be deemed a waiver of his right to present evidence. Despite notice, petitioner failed to comply with the said order. -A year later OMBUDSMAN issued another order giving petitioner another chance to file his counter-affidavit and controverting evidence. Again, petitioner failed. Thus private respondent was required to appear before the OMBUDSMAN to present evidence to support its complaint. -OMBUDSMAN issued Resolution that Ocampo be discharged from the service. -The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.18 [Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ramon G. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1 (1993)] Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.19 [Office of the Court Administrator vs. Matas, 247 SCRA 9, 22-23 (1995)] ISSUE WON Ocampo was denied the opportunity to be heard. HELD NO Petitioner has been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to answer the complaint against him. In fact, petitioner was given considerable length of time to submit his counter-affidavit. It

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took more than one year from February 17, 1992 before petitioner was considered to have waived his right to file his counter-affidavit and the formal presentation of the complainant's evidence was set. The March 17, 1993 order was issued to give the petitioner a last chance to present his defense, despite the private respondent's objections. But petitioner failed to comply with the second order. Thus, petitioner's failure to present evidence is solely of his own making and cannot escape his own remissness by passing the blame on the graft investigator. While the respondent OMBUDSMAN has shown forebearance, petitioner has not displayed corresponding vigilance. He therefore cannot validly claim that his right to due process was violated. We need only to reiterate that a party who chooses not to avail of the opportunity to answer the charges cannot complain of a denial of due process.21 [Esber vs. Sto. Tomas, 225 SCRA 664.] Petitioner's claim that he was not given any notice of the order declaring him to have waived his right to file his counter-affidavit and of allowing the private respondent to present evidence ex-parte is unmeritorious. The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.20 [Concerned Officials of the MWSS vs. Hon. Omubudsman Conrado Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502.] The orders of respondent OMBUDSMAN requiring petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and which was admittedly received by the latter explicitly contain a warning that if no counter-affidavit was filed within the given period, a waiver would be considered and the administrative proceedings shall continue according to the rules. Thus, respondent OMBUDSMAN need not issue another order notifying petitioner that he has waived his right to file a counter-affidavit. In the same way, petitioner need not be notified of the ex-parte hearing for the reception of private respondent's evidence. As such, he could not have been expected to appear at the ex-parte hearing. With regard to the petitioner's claim that he made requests for the production of the documents alleged to be material to his defense, the record is bereft of any proof of such requests. If it were true that the graft investigator did not act on such requests, petitioner should have filed the proper motion before the respondent OMBUDSMAN for the production of the documents or to compel the respondent complainant to produce whatever record necessary for his defense. Petitioner did not. It was only after the respondent OMBUDSMAN issued the assailed resolution of November 18, 1993 that he bewailed the alleged failure of respondent's graft investigator to require the production of the records of the subject transaction.

Dean Carlota
MIRALLES V GO 349 SCRA 596 PANGANIBAN; January 18, 2001
FACTS - An administrative complaint was filed before the Office of the Hearing Officer of NAPOLCOM against petitioner Manuel Miralles for Grave Misconduct. It was alleged that he killed Patrolman Nilo Resurrecion and Ernesto Merculio. - After an investigation, the hearing officer submitted to the Adjudication Board finding Miralles guilty and recommending his dismissal from service. The Adjudication Board also found him guilty. - petitioner appealed to the Special Appellate Committee of the NAPOLCOM. The appeal was dismissed since no appeal brief, memorandum or any pleading was filed by the petitioner after a period of more than one (1) year and seven (7) months. - Petitioner filed an MFR. The Special Appelate Committee however affirmed the decision of the Adjudication Board. - Petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA ruled that the petitioners recourse was premature because the SAC-Napolcoms decision should have been appealed first before the Civil Service Commission, pursuant to RA 6975. Even if it would, as it did, rule on the merits, the CA held that petitioners appeal must still fail. The CA gave great weight to the documents presented and to an eyewitness account. It also ruled that the petitioner failed to substantiate his claim of selfdefense ISSUE/S 1. WON the recourse to the CA was proper 2. WON the evidence was sufficient to support the Boards conclusion 3. WON the RTCs dismissal of the criminal case against him was conclusive of his innocence HELD 1. NO. Reasoning - Petitioner contends that his appeal is not governed by RA 6975 since it was promulgated only on January 2, 1991 and the assailed resolution of SAC-Napolcom had been issued on October 20, 1989. However, petitioner filed its appeal to the CA only on December 4, 1996. By then, the law in force, RA 6975, had already prescribed that appeals from the Decision of the Napolcom should be lodged first with the DILG and then with the Civil Service Commission. It did not matter that the assailed Napolcom ruling had been promulgated in 1989. 2. YES. Ratio As a rule, administrative agencies factual findings that are affirmed by the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by the SC. Reasoning - On the documents presented: The bulk of these documents, except Exhibits B and C, are public documents consisting of reports made by government officials in the performance of their functions. Hence, they are prima facie evidence of the facts they stated.

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- On the eyewitness testimony: Petitioner claims, however, that Lamsen was not credible because he subsequently recanted his testimony during cross-examination. A cursory perusal of the records indicates that it was not made on cross-examination. On the contrary, the recantation was done when Lamsen appeared as a witness for the defense, after he had testified for the complainants and been crossexamined as such. His subsequent testimony for the defense was, however, rightly brushed aside, because he had failed to appear for cross-examination despite due notice. Indeed, the Napolcom Adjudication Board wrote: However, he failed to appear for crossexamination despite due notice at the later stages of the formal investigation prompting the prosecution to move for the striking out of this portion of his testimony for the defense from the records and which motion was granted by the Hearing Officer. 3. NO. Ratio An administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may proceed independently thereof. Indeed, the quantum of proof in the latter is different, such that the verdict in one need not necessarily be the same as in the other Reasoning It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.

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Commission for certificates of public convenience to operate additional trips between Manila and various municipalities and barrios in Bataan. - The Pampanga Bus Company (PAMBUSCO) and La Mallorca (respondents) opposed these applications, both alleging that they are authorized to operate and are actually operating a fleet of auto-trucks on the lines applied for and rendering adequate and satisfactory service; that the additional services applied for are superfluous, will not promote public interest in a proper and suitable manner, and will result in cut-throat and ruinous competition. - The Commission, after hearing the parties denied the applications on the grounds that petitioner had not made a case for the grant of the certificates applied for, that the service of the oppositors was adequate and sufficient for the actual needs of the public and that grant of the applications would only result in unnecessary or wasteful competition. - To prove the inadequacy of the present service, 14 witnesses took the stand for petitioner and testified to the insufficiency of transportation facilities and the need for additional service on the lines applied for. Documentary proof, consisting of resolutions of municipal councils of Balanga, Dinalupihan, Limay, and Orani, and a petition of the Association of Citizens of Orion, was also adduced to show the need for the solicited additional service, and there was also mention of the inability of the Pampanga Bus Company to register its authorized number of units, as well as the alleged noncompliance on the part of the two respondents companies with the terms of their certificates by suppressing trips on hours when they do not expect a sufficient number of passengers. On their part the two respondent companies presented six witnesses, and documentary proof too, to show that they were rendering service in accordance with the requirements of their certificates and that the needs of the traveling public were being adequately served. - Unable at first to arrive at a decision from the conflicting evidence presented for both parties, the Commission ordered a survey of the passenger traffic on the lines applied for. The agents found that existing passenger traffic in all the lines do not warrant the authorization of additional service. ISSUE WON the trips rendered by all the Bus lines are adequate to serve the public need. HELD YES. There is no need for additional services. Ratio The law, in investing the Public Service Commission with the power of supervision and control over public transportation, has also clothed it with broad discretion in the exercise of that power. With that discretion this Court is not supposed to interfere except in case of clear abuse. Reasoning While it is true that the two oppositors have authority to operate direct service only on three of the nine lines applied for by petitioner, in reality these direct lines pass through the other routes applied for like Orani and Orion, and the two oppositors have sufficient and convenient trips going to the other destinations, whose hours of departure and arrival are coordinated with those on the direct trips to Manila.

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- The discriminatory attitude imputed to the Commission by reason of its having, to petitioner's prejudice, allegedly deviated from its consistent policy of approving applications for direct service since such kind of service is more convenient to the traveling public than the broken trips, is more fancied than real, considering the finding that the present authorized trips are more than adequate to take care of the passenger traffic along the routes in question. - The fact that respondents have dispatched trips without previous authority may call for some kind of disciplinary action. But it would not be a good ground for authorizing additional trips where the Commission has found that there is already more than adequate service along the main highway. With regard to Rules of Evidence - What appears is that the Commission, faced with the conflict of evidence on the adequacy or inadequacy of the present service, has sought to discover the truth through an on-the-ground inspection and observation by its own agents and has, on the basis of information thus obtained, arrived at the conclusion that the additional service applied for is uncalled for because there is already amplitude, if not superabundance, in the number of authorized trips. That conclusion is amply supported by the record and is far from being the product of partiality or unfair discrimination. - The findings from the documents and the Commissions own investigation were supported by more than substantial evidence and therefore binding upon this Court, which is not required to examine the proof de novo and determine for itself whether or not the preponderance of evidence really justifies the decision. DISPOSITION Decision is affirmed, costs against the petitioner.

5. Rules of Evidence PHILIPPINE MOVE PICTURES WORKERS ASSOCIATION v PREMIER PRODUCTION (Jonas) ESTATE OF FLORENCIO BUAN V PAMBUSCO 99 PHIL 373 REYES, A.; MAY 31, 1956
FACTS - The estate of Florencio P. Buan (petitioner), is an authorized bus operator along various lines in central and northern Luzon, with authority to operate 8 auto-trucks along the Manila-Bagac line and 11 along the Moron Dinalupihan line. Allegedly in response to various resolutions of municipal councils and on petition of civic and labor groups in the province of Bataan urging extension of its services to their respective municipalities, petitioner applied in four cases in the

RIZAL LIGHT & ICE CO., INC. V MUNICIPALITY OF MORONG, RIZAL, PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 24 SCRA 285 ZALDIVAR; September 28, 1968
FACTS -Rizal Light & Ice Co., Inc. is a domestic corporation with business address at Morong, Rizal. In 1949, it was granted by the Commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the installation, operation and maintenance of an electric light, heat and power service in the municipality of Morong, Rizal. -Dec19, 1956: the Commission required Rizal Light to appear before to show cause why it should not be penalized for violation of the conditions of its certificate of public convenience and the regulations of the Commission, and for failure to comply with the directives to raise its service voltage and maintain them within the limits prescribed in the Revised Order No. 1 of the Commission, and to acquire and install a kilowatt meter to indicate the load in kilowatts at any particular time of the generating unit. -Rizal Light failed to appear. The Commission ordered the cancellation and revocation of Rizal Light's certificate of public convenience and necessity and the forfeiture of its franchise. Rizal Light filed MFR on the ground that its manager, Juan D. Francisco, was not aware of said hearing. Respondent municipality opposed; motion was set for hearing

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and it was found that the failure of Rizal Light to appear at the hearing the sole basis of the revocation of Rizal Light's certificate was really due to the illness of its manager. The Commission set aside its order of revocation. Respondent municipalitys MFR was denied. -June 25, 1958: the municipality formally asked the Commission to revoke Rizal Light's certificate of public convenience and to forfeit its franchise on the ground, among other things, that it failed to comply with the conditions of said certificate and franchise. Said petition was set for hearing jointly with the order to show cause. The hearings had been postponed several times. -Meanwhile, inspections had been made of Rizal Light's electric plant and installations by the engineers of the Commission. When the case was called for hearing on July 5, 1961, Rizal Light failed to appear. Respondent municipality was then allowed to present its documentary evidence, and thereafter the case was submitted for decision. -July 7, 1961: Rizal Light filed a motion to reopen the case upon the ground that it had not been furnished with a copy of the report of the June 21-24, 1961 inspection for it to reply as previously agreed. Rizal Light was granted a period of 10days within which to submit its written reply to said inspection report, on condition that should it fail to do so within the said period the case would be considered submitted for decision. Rizal Light failed to file the reply. And the Commission proceeded to decide the case. On July 29, 1962 Rizal Light's electric plant was burned. -August 20, 1962: the Commission, on the basis of the inspection reports of its aforenamed engineers, found that the Rizal Light had failed to comply with the directives contained in its letters, and had violated the conditions of its certificate of public convenience as well as the rules and regulations of the Commission. Accordingly, it ordered the cancellation and revocation of Rizal Light's certificate of public convenience and the forfeiture of its franchise. -Sept 18, 1962: Rizal Light filed MFR, alleging that before its electric plant was burned, its service was greatly improved and that it had still existing investment which the Commission should protect. -Eight days before said MFR was filed, Morong Electric, having been granted a municipal franchise, filed with the Commission an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity for said service. Rizal Light opposed in writing said application. -The company also filed MTD the application upon the ground that applicant Morong Electric had no legal personality when it filed its application, because its certificate of incorporation was at that time, not yet issued by the SEC. this MTD was denied (Morong Electric was a de facto corporation). Sir says we can omit this corpo law part =) -The case was heard on the merits and both parties presented their respective evidence. On the basis of the evidence adduced, the Commission approved the application of Morong Electric and ordered the issuance in its favor of the corresponding certificate of public convenience and necessity. -Rizal Light filed with this SC these petitions for review. ISSUES 1. WON the Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it delegated the hearing of the case and the reception of evidence to Mr. Pedro S. Talavera who is not allowed by law to hear the same

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2. WON the cancellation of Rizal Light's certificate of public convenience was unwarranted because no sufficient evidence was adduced against the Rizal Light and that Rizal Light was not able to present evidence in its defense 3. WON the Commission failed to give protection to Rizal Light's investment 4. WON the Commission erred in imposing the extreme penalty of revocation of the certificate. NOTE: The other issues are under Corporation Law, which are therefore omitted, as per instructions in the outline. HELD A factual determination will not be disturbed by SC unless patently unsupported by evidence. The findings and conclusions of fact made by the Public Service Commission, after weighing the evidence adduced by the parties in a public service case, will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court unless those findings and conclusions appear not to be reasonably supported by evidence. 1. Rizal Light is estopped from raising this as an issue. Ratio Objection to the delegation of authority to hear a case filed before the Commission and to receive the evidence in connection therewith is a procedural, not a jurisdictional point, and is waived by failure to interpose timely the objection and the case had been decided by the Commission. Reasoning While Mr. Pedro S. Talavera, who conducted the hearings of the case below, is a division chief, he is not a lawyer. As such, under Section 32 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, the Commission should not have delegated to him the authority to conduct the hearings for the reception of evidence of the parties. -However, since Rizal Light has never raised any objection to the authority of Mr. Talavera before the Commission, it should be deemed to have waived such procedural defect, and consonant with the precedents on the matter, Rizal Light's claim that the Commission acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in so authorizing Mr. Talavera should be dismissed. 2. NO. -In reviewing the decision of the Public Service Commission this Court is not required to examine the proof de novo and determine for itself whether or not the preponderance of evidence really justifies the decision. The only function of this Court is to determine whether or not there is evidence before the Commission upon which its decision might reasonably be based. This Court will not substitute its discretion for that of the Commission on questions of fact and will not interfere in the latter's decision unless it clearly appears that there is no evidence to support it. -The Commission based its decision on the inspection reports submitted by its engineers who conducted the inspection of Rizal Light's electric service upon orders of the Commission. Said inspection reports specify in detail the deficiencies incurred, and violations committed, by the Rizal Light resulting in the inadequacy of its service. Said reports are sufficient to serve reasonably as bases of the decision in question, for these are not mere documentary proofs presented for the consideration of the Commission, but are the results of the Commission's own observations and investigations which it can rightfully take into consideration

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-Re: Rizal Light's failure to present evidence, as well as its failure to cross-examine the authors of the inspection reports Rizal Light should not complain because it had waived not only its right to crossexamine but also its right to present evidence in open court through its counsel Atty. Luque. -Re: Rizal Light's claim that the Commission should have taken into consideration the testimony of Mr. Bernardino The Commission could not have taken judicial cognizance of said testimony, for various reasons: first, it is not a proper subject of judicial notice, as it is not a "known" fact; second, it was given in a subsequent and distinct case after the Rizal Light's MFR was heard by the Commission en banc and submitted for decision; and third, it was not brought to the attention of the Commission in this case through an appropriate pleading. -Re: the contention of Rizal Light that the Commission had acted both as prosecutor and judge There are two matters that had to be decided in this case, namely, the order to show cause and the petition or complaint filed by respondent municipality. Both matters were heard jointly, and the record shows that respondent municipality had been allowed to present its evidence to substantiate its complaint. It can not be said, therefore, that in this case the Commission had acted as prosecutor and judge. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that there was a commingling of the prosecuting and investigating functions, this exercise of dual functions, is authorized by Sec17(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended. -Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Estate of F.P. Buan (1958) the power of the Commission to cancel and revoke a certificate of public convenience and necessity may be exercised by it even without a formal charge filed by any interested party, with the only limitation that the holder of the certificate should be given his day in court. -When prosecuting and investigating duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, as in the case of the Public Service Commission, said body may take steps it believes appropriate for the proper exercise of said duties, particularly in the manner of informing itself whether there is probable violation of the law and/or its rules and regulations. It may initiate an investigation, file a complaint, and then try the charge as preferred. So long as the respondent is given a day in court, there can be no denial of due process, and objections to said procedure cannot be sustained. 3. The rule is inapplicable. -"protection-of-investment rule" - Batangas Transpo Co. vs. Orlanes -"The Government having taken over the control and supervision of all public utilities, so long as an operator under a prior license complies with the terms and conditions of his license and reasonable rules and regulations for its operation and meets the reasonable demands of the public, it is the duty of the commission to protect rather than to destroy his investment by the granting of the second license to another person for the same thing over the same route of travel. The granting of such a license does not serve its convenience or promote the interests of the public." -This rule is not absolute, for nobody has exclusive right to secure a franchise or a certificate of public convenience. Where, as in the present case, it has been shown by ample evidence that the Rizal Light, despite ample time and opportunity given to it by the Commission, had failed to render adequate, sufficient and satisfactory service and had violated the important conditions of its certificate as

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well as the directives and the rules and regulations of the Commission, the rule cannot apply. -To apply that rule unqualifiedly is to encourage violation or disregard of the terms and conditions of the certificate and the Commission's directives and regulations, and would close the door to other applicants who could establish, operate and provide adequate, efficient and satisfactory service for the benefit and convenience of the inhabitants. It should be emphasized that the paramount consideration should always be the public interest and public convenience. The duty of the Commission to protect the investment of a public utility operator refers only to operators of good standing - those who comply with the laws, rules and regulations and not to operators who are unconcerned with the public interest and whose investments have failed or deteriorated because of their own fault. 4. NO -Sec16(n) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, confers upon the Commission ample power and discretion to order the cancellation and revocation of any certificate of public convenience issued to an operator who has violated, or has willfully and contumaciously refused to comply with, any order, rule or regulation of the Commission or any provision of law. What matters is that there is evidence to support the action of the Commission. -In the instant case, as shown by the evidence, the contumacious refusal of the Rizal Light since 1954 to comply with the directives, rules and regulations of the Commission, its violation of the conditions of its certificate and its incapability to comply with its commitment as shown by its inadequate service, were the circumstances that warranted the action of the Commission in not merely imposing a fine but in revoking altogether Rizal Light's certificate. To allow Rizal Light to continue its operation would be to sacrifice public interest and convenience in favor of private interest. -The imposition of a fine may only be one of the remedies which the Commission may resort to, in its discretion. But that remedy is not exclusive of, or has preference over, the other remedies. And this Court will not substitute its discretion for that of the Commission, as long as there is evidence to support the exercise of that discretion by the Commission. Disposition The two decisions of the Public Service Commission affirmed, with costs in the two cases against Rizal Light & Ice Co., Inc.

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- Benjamin Yonzon, an attorney in the Department of Public Works and Communications, was designated by the Secretary to investigate the charges in the complaint. - A copy of the decision, purportedly signed by the Undersecretary, M. B. Bautista, was served upon counsel for Borja ordering the latter to remove the dams and/or dikes illegally constructed across the channel of the southern portion of Batacan-Matlaue - The foregoing decision of respondent Secretary was assailed by petitioner Borja. - The trial the court rendered the judgment granting the writs prayed for by petitioner; declaring null and void and of no legal effect all proceedings had by respondents in the administrative investigation, including the decision; restraining and prohibiting respondent Secretary from enforcing said decision, and declaring the injunction previously issued to be permanent. ISSUES 1. WON the lower Court erred in holding in effect that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional 2. The lower Court erred in not finding the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications supported by evidence. HELD 1. NO. - It is not true that the trial court ruled the foregoing provisions unconstitutional. On the contrary, it declined to pass upon the constitutional question on the ground that those provisions do not apply to the facts of the instant case. - The particular fact which removes this case from the purview of RA 2056 and which it considered duly established by the evidence is that the Matlaue stream which runs through the land of petitioner-appellee is not a public navigable river but his private property. - The implication is that the authority of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to proceed under the provisions of said statute covers only cases where there is no dispute as to the public navigable character of the river or waterway alleged to be illegally obstructed, but that when this is precisely a basic fact in contention the matter should be left to the courts for determination. - There is a certain danger in leaving the adjudication of a claim of private ownership of property, vis-a-vis the Government, in the hands of an executive official. This danger is demonstrated by the very argument of appellants under their third and fourth assignments of error. They point to the evidence submitted at the administrative investigation and, invoking the "substantial evidence" rule, assail the lower court's conclusion that the Matlaue stream is privately owned. - The said rule, indeed, which has been applied in a number of cases in this jurisdiction, is that if there is substantial evidence to support the findings of an administrative official in matters within his competence, that is, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" the courts are bound to look no further, not even to consider contrary evidence of a preponderant nature. - If the decision of the administrative official carries with it, as the premise upon which it rests, a finding that certain property claimed by a private party to be his is in fact part of the public domain, it does not

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seem fair to take that finding as conclusive upon the courts just because it is supported by substantial evidence, although there may be evidence to the contrary which, if properly considered and evaluated, would lead them to a different conclusion. 2. YES. - There is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of respondent Secretary that the Matlaue stream is a public navigable river. This evidence consists of the testimony of two witnesses, one a farmer and the other a fisherman, and of the result of the ocular inspection conducted by the investigator. - Nevertheless, the Court di not feel justified in affirming, for purposes of adjudication, the aforesaid conclusion of respondent Secretary, and reversing that of the trial court, for the investigation wherein the evidence was received was conducted with manifest disregard of the requirements of due process. And it was solely on that ground that the members of this Court agreed that the decision should be predicated.

MACEDA V ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD 199 SCRA 454 EN BANC; July 18, 1991
FACTS - Maceda seeks nullification of the Energy Regulatory Board Orders dated December 5 and 6, 1990 on the ground that the hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow him substantial cross-examination, in effect, allegedly, a denial of due process. - August 2, 1990 Respondent oil companies filed applications for an increase in oil prices with the ERB. - In an order dated September 21, 1990 - The ERB issued an order granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter. Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition on September 26, 1990 seeking to nullify the provisional increase. The petition was dismissed by the SC, saying that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex-parte, a provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to deny the application. - In the same order of September 21, 1990, authorizing provisional increase, the ERB set the applications for hearing with due notice to all interested parties on October 16, 1990. Petitioner Maceda failed to appear at said hearing as well as on the second hearing an October 17, 1990. The hearing was postponed to October 20 to afford the oppositors the chance to be heard. Another postponement followed on November 5 because of a written request by Maceda. - November 5, 1990 - The three oil companies filed their respective motions for leave to file or admit amended/supplemental applications to further increase the prices of petroleum products. - Hearing for the presentation of the evidence-in-chief commenced on November 21, 1990 with ERB ruling that

BORJA V MORENO, ET AL. 11 SCRA 568 MAKALINTAL; July 31, 1964

FACTS - Borja is the owner of a parcel of land. - An administrative complaint was filed against a number of landowners, among them petitioner Borja, for abatement of nuisance and demolition of illegally constructed dams, dikes or any other works in the public navigable rivers in Macabebe, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. - In the particular case of Borja, he was alleged to have closed the stream called Matlaue, supposedly public, which runs through his land.

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testimonies of witnesses were to be in the form of Affidavits. ERB subsequently outlined the procedure to be observed in the reception of evidence as follows: to defer the crossexamination of applicant Caltex's witness and ask the other applicants to present their evidence-in-chief so that the oppositors will have a better idea of what all of these will lead to. It was the intention of the Board to act on these applications on an industry-wide basis and the best way to give the oppositors and a clear picture of what the applicants are asking for is to have all the evidence-in-chief to the presented first. Cross-examination was to follow afterwards. - Maceda maintains that this order of proof deprived him of his right to finish his cross-examination of Petron's witnesses and denied him his right to cross-examine each of the witnesses of Caltex and Shell. He points out that this relaxed procedure resulted in the denial of due process. ISSUE WON the order of presentation of evidence has resulted to denial of due process HELD NO Ratio The order of testimony both with respect to the examination of the particular witness and to the general course of the trial is within the discretion of the court and the exercise of this discretion in permitting to be introduced out of the order prescribed by the rules is not improper. Reasoning - Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the ERB, which in matters of rate or price fixing, is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, function. As such administrative agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings - Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB provides that: These Rules shall govern pleadings, practice and procedure before the Energy Regulatory Board in all matters of inquiry, study, hearing, investigation and/or any other proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Board. However, in the broader interest of justice, the Board may, in any particular matter, except itself from these rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives of the Order. Disposition Petitions dismissed.

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independent contractors were the ERs). Labor Arbiter that there was and ordered reinstatement and payment of backwages. -On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an ER-EE relationship between the complainants and respondent company. -Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the CA which, although affirming the finding of the NLRC that an ER-EE rel existed bet. the contending parties, nonetheless agreed with respondent that the affidavits of some of the complainants, Bantolino and 6 others, should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. As a consequence, the CA dismissed their complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. (In the same decision, other complainants were declared regular employees since they were the only ones subjected to cross-examination) -Petitioners: CA should not have given weight to respondents claim of failure to cross-examine them. They insist that, unlike regular courts, labor cases are decided based merely on the parties position papers and affidavits in support of their allegations and subsequent pleadings that may be filed thereto. The Rules of Court should not be strictly applied in this case specifically by putting them on the witness stand to be cross-examined because the NLRC has its own rules of procedure which were applied by the Labor Arbiter in coming up with a decision in their favor. -Respondent: since the other alleged affiants were not presented in court to affirm their statements, much less to be cross-examined, their affidavits should be stricken off the records for being self-serving, hearsay and inadmissible in evidence ISSUE/S WON giving evidentiary value to the affidavits (despite the failure of the affiants to affirm their contents and undergo the test of crossexamination) is proper HELD YES - Rabago v NLRC: "the argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only." -Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC states: under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due process. -Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. The Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect -People v. Sorrel (cited by respondent) saying that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the present case

Dean Carlota
considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.

BANTOLINO V COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHIL G.R. No. 153660 BELLOSILLO; JUNE 10 2003
FACTS -Employees of Coca-Cola Bottlers filed complaint against the company for unfair labor practice through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the perpetuation of the "Cabo System. -Coca-cola denies that there was ER-EE relationship (said

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