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Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for CROTTY,PATRICK

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PATRICK CROTTY

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613 N.E.2d 993

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613 N.E.2d 993 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993, 62 USLW 2116, 1993 -Ohio-

613 N.E.2d 993

66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993, 62 USLW 2116, 1993 -Ohio- 178 (Cite as: 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993)

FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY

Page 1

St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993) FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY Page 1 Supreme Court of Ohio. BROWNING

Supreme Court of Ohio.

BROWNING et al., Appellees,

v.

BURT; Blue et al., Appellants. MITCHELL, Appellee,

v.

BURT; St. Elizabeth Medical Center, Appellant. Nos. 91-2079, 91-2121.

Submitted Jan. 20, 1993. Decided June 30, 1993.

Patients brought actions alleging medical malprac- tice in connection with vaginal reconstruction sur- gery and alleging hospital's negligent credentialing of physicians. The Court of Common Pleas, Mont- gomery County, entered summary judgment in fa- vor of hospital and one physician. Patients ap- pealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed with respect to claim against physician, but reversed summary judgment in favor of hospital. Motions to certify re- cord were allowed, and cases were consolidated. The Supreme Court, Douglas , J., held that: (1) ac- tion against hospital for negligent credentialing of physician is subject to two-year statute of limita- tions applicable to action for bodily injury; (2) stat- ute of limitations commences to run when victim knows or should have discovered that he or she was injured as result of hospital's negligent credential- ing procedures or practices; and (3) peer review statute does not provide hospital with immunity from liability for negligence in granting and/or con- tinuing staff privileges of incompetent physician.

Affirmed.

Moyer , C.J., concurred in part, dissented in part, and filed opinion in which Deborah L. Cook , J., sit- ting by assignment, concurred.

Wright, J., concurred in part, dissented in part, and filed opinion.

West Headnotes

[1] Limitation of Actions 241

filed opinion. West Headnotes [1] Limitation of Actions 241 55(3) 241 Limitation of Actions 241II Computation

55(3)

241 Limitation of Actions 241II Computation of Period of Limitation 241II(A) Accrual of Right of Action or De-

fense

241k55 Torts 241k55(3) k. Negligence in Perform- ance of Professional Services. Most Cited Cases Claims against hospital for negligent credentialing of physicians were not for medical malpractice and, therefore, were not governed by “cognizable event” test for commencing statute of limitations for med- ical malpractice action. R.C. § 2305.11(B)(1) .

[2] Health 198H

action. R.C. § 2305.11(B)(1) . [2] Health 198H 656 198H Health 198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or

656

198H Health 198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of Duty

198HV(C) Particular Procedures 198Hk655 Hospitals in General 198Hk656 k. In General. Most Cited

Cases (Formerly 204k7 Hospitals) Hospital does not practice medicine and is incap- able of committing malpractice.

[3] Health 198H

is incap- able of committing malpractice. [3] Health 198H 811 198H Health 198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or

811

198H Health 198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of Duty

198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 198Hk811 k. Limitations; Time Require- ments. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 204k8 Hospitals) Hospital negligence arising out of care of patient is “medical claim” within meaning of statute of limit- ations requiring action upon medical claim to be commenced within one year. R.C. § 2305.11(B)(1), (D)(3) .

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

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[4] Health 198H

as: 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993) [4] Health 198H 811 198H Health 198HV Malpractice,

811

198H Health 198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of Duty

198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 198Hk811 k. Limitations; Time Require- ments. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 204k8 Hospitals) “Care” as used in statute of limitations requiring ac- tion upon medical claim to be commenced within one year and defining medical claim as claim arising out of medical care means prevention or al- leviation of physical or mental defect or illness. R.C. § 2305.11(B)(1), (D)(3) .

[5] Health 198H

illness. R.C. § 2305.11(B)(1), (D)(3) . [5] Health 198H 811 198H Health 198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or

811

198H Health 198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of Duty

198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 198Hk811 k. Limitations; Time Require- ments. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 204k8 Hospitals) Negligent credentialing of physician by hospital is not “medical diagnosis, care, or treatment” within meaning of statute of limitations requiring action upon medical claim to be commenced within one year and defining medical claim as claim arising out of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment. R.C. § 2305.11(B)(1), (D)(3) .

[6] Health 198H

R.C. § 2305.11(B)(1), (D)(3) . [6] Health 198H 660 198H Health 198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or

660

198H Health 198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of Duty

198HV(C) Particular Procedures 198Hk655 Hospitals in General 198Hk660 k. Negligent Hiring or Su- pervision. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 204k7 Hospitals) While acts or omissions of hospital in granting and/ or continuing staff privileges to incompetent physi- cian may ultimately lead to act of medical malprac-

tice by the physician, physician's ultimate act of medical malpractice is factually and legally sever- able and distinct from hospital's acts or omissions in negligently credentialing physician with staff membership or professional privileges.

[7] Health 198H

membership or professional privileges. [7] Health 198H 811 198H Health 198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or

811

198H Health 198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of Duty

198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 198Hk811 k. Limitations; Time Require- ments. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 204k8 Hospitals) Hospital's negligent credentialing of physician is not “malpractice” and does not give rise to “medical claim” within meaning of statute of limit- ations requiring action upon medical claim to be commenced within one year. R.C. § 2305.11(B)(1) .

[8] Health 198H

within one year. R.C. § 2305.11(B)(1) . [8] Health 198H 811 198H Health 198HV Malpractice, Negligence,

811

198H Health 198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of Duty

198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 198Hk811 k. Limitations; Time Require- ments. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 204k8 Hospitals) Action against hospital for bodily injury arising out of negligent credentialing of physician is subject to two-year limitations period for action for bodily in- jury. R.C. § 2305.10 .

[9] Limitation of Actions 241

jury. R.C. § 2305.10 . [9] Limitation of Actions 241 55(4) 241 Limitation of Actions 241II

55(4)

241 Limitation of Actions 241II Computation of Period of Limitation 241II(A) Accrual of Right of Action or De-

fense

241k55 Torts 241k55(4) k. Injuries to Person. Most

Cited Cases “Arose” within meaning of statute of limitations re- quiring action for bodily injury to be brought within

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two years after cause of action arose is synonymous with “accrued” within meaning of statute of limita- tions requiring action upon medical claim to be commenced within one year after action accrued. R.C. §§ 2305.10 , 2305.11(B)(1) .

[10] Limitation of Actions 241

, 2305.11(B)(1) . [10] Limitation of Actions 241 95(3) 241 Limitation of Actions 241II Computation of

95(3)

241 Limitation of Actions

241II Computation of Period of Limitation 241II(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action 241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 241k95(3) k. Nature of Harm or Dam- age, in General. Most Cited Cases Discovery rule applies to accrual of claim alleging hospital negligence in credentialing physician. R.C. § 2305.10 .

[11] Limitation of Actions 241

95(3)R.C. § 2305.10 . [11] Limitation of Actions 241 241 Limitation of Actions 241II Computation of

241 Limitation of Actions

241II Computation of Period of Limitation 241II(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action 241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 241k95(3) k. Nature of Harm or Dam- age, in General. Most Cited Cases Facts or events which might trigger running of stat- ute of limitations for medical malpractice claims against physician do not necessarily commence run- ning of statute of limitations on claims against hos- pital for hospital negligence unrelated to medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of person. R.C. §§ 2305.10 , 2305.11(B)(1) .

[12] Limitation of Actions 241

, 2305.11(B)(1) . [12] Limitation of Actions 241 95(3) 241 Limitation of Actions 241II Computation of

95(3)

241 Limitation of Actions

241II Computation of Period of Limitation 241II(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action 241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 241k95(3) k. Nature of Harm or Dam- age, in General. Most Cited Cases Cause of action for hospital's negligent credential-

ing arises, and statute of limitations begins to run, when victim knows or should have discovered that he or she was injured as result of hospital's negli- gent credentialing procedures or practices. R.C. §

[13] Limitation of Actions 241

R.C. § 2305.10 . [13] Limitation of Actions 241 95(3) 241 Limitation of Actions 241II Computation

95(3)

241 Limitation of Actions

241II Computation of Period of Limitation 241II(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action 241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 241k95(3) k. Nature of Harm or Dam- age, in General. Most Cited Cases Television program making patients aware that physician's ex-patients suffered from surgical ab- normalities similar to their own was “alerting event” commencing statute of limitations applicable to action alleging hospital's negligent credentialing of physician, even though patients signed special consent form related to physician; until watching television show, patients did not have actual or con- structive knowledge that hospital had done something wrong in granting or continuing priv- ileges. R.C. § 2305.10 .

[14] Limitation of Actions 241

95(3)ileges. R.C. § 2305.10 . [14] Limitation of Actions 241 241 Limitation of Actions 241II Computation

241 Limitation of Actions

241II Computation of Period of Limitation 241II(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action 241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 241k95(3) k. Nature of Harm or Dam- age, in General. Most Cited Cases Statute of limitations applicable to claim for hospit- al's negligent credentialing of physician begins to run if patient discovers or, through exercise of reas- onable diligence, should have discovered some definitive information that would reasonably war- rant investigation of hospital's credentialing prac- tices. R.C. § 2305.10 .

[15] Limitation of Actions 241

tices. R.C. § 2305.10 . [15] Limitation of Actions 241 95(3) © 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No

95(3)

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241 Limitation of Actions 241II Computation of Period of Limitation 241II(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action 241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 241k95(3) k. Nature of Harm or Dam- age, in General. Most Cited Cases Discovery of physician's medical malpractice does not, in itself, constitute “alerting event” commen- cing statute of limitations applicable to claim for hospital's negligent credentialing of physician. R.C. § 2305.10 .

[16] Health 198H

of physician. R.C. § 2305.10 . [16] Health 198H 274 198H Health 198HI Regulation in General

274

198H Health 198HI Regulation in General 198HI(C) Institutions and Facilities 198Hk268 Staff Privileges and Peer Re-

view

198Hk274 k. Liability or Immunity. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 204k7 Hospitals) Peer review statute immunizing hospital from liab- ility for acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct within scope of functions of committee does not provide hospital with immunity from liability for its negligence in granting and/or continuing staff priv- ileges of incompetent physician. R.C. § 2305.25 .

[17] Health 198H

physician. R.C. § 2305.25 . [17] Health 198H 820 198H Health 198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or

820

198H Health 198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of Duty

198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 198Hk815 Evidence 198Hk820 k. Admissibility. Most

Cited Cases (Formerly 204k8 Hospitals) Peer review statutes do not prohibit admission of evidence needed for hospital to defend itself against claims for negligent peer review. R.C. §§ 1742.141 , 2305.25 , 2305.251 .

*544 **995 Syllabus by the Court

1. Hospital negligence arising out of the “care” of a

patient is a “medical claim” within the meaning of R.C. 2305.11(D)(3) and is subject to the period of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) . “Care” as used in R.C. 2305.11(D)(3) is the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness.

2. Negligent credentialing of a physician by a hos-

pital is not “medical diagnosis, care, or treatment”

within the meaning of R.C. 2305.11 .

**996 *545 3. An action against a hospital for bod- ily injury arising out of the negligent credentialing of a physician is subject to the two-year limitations period set forth in R.C. 2305.10 .

4. The period of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.10 commences to run when the victim knows or should have discovered that he or she was in- jured as a result of the hospital's negligent creden- tialing procedures or practices.

5. R.C. 2305.25 does not provide a hospital with

immunity from liability for the hospital's negli- gence in granting and/or continuing the staff priv- ileges of an incompetent physician.

The two cases before us today are representative of many actions filed in Montgomery County relating to the drastically unconventional surgical practices of Dr. James C. Burt during his former service at St. Elizabeth Medical Center (“SEMC”) in Dayton. Case No. 91-2079 involves the timeliness of claims asserted against SEMC for its alleged negligence in having granted and/or continued the staff member- ship or professional privileges of Dr. Burt and an- other former member of the SEMC medical staff,

Dr. Max Blue, Jr. FN1 This case also includes a claim for loss of consortium. Case No. 91-2121 in- volves the timeliness of a negligence action against SEMC for continuing Dr. Burt's staff membership or professional privileges at the hospital. The two cases have been consolidated sua sponte for de- cision. See (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 1502, 583 N.E.2d

973 .

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FN1. These claims are referred to by the parties as claims for “negligent credential- ing.”

Case No. 91-2079

On April 17, 1989, Jimmie Dean Browning (“Browning”) and her husband, Lawrence Brown- ing, appellees, filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County against Dr. Burt and appellants, SEMC and Dr. Blue. Browning alleged that in February 1982, Drs. Burt and Blue negligently, willfully and wantonly performed un- necessary and experimental “vaginal reconstruction surgery” upon her without her consent, restructur- ing her *546 genital organs to an unnatural and bizarre anatomical configuration. Browning alleged that she was advised by Blue that the surgery was necessary to treat a bladder condition. Browning also alleged that Blue negligently performed a total of sixteen unnecessary surgeries upon her between January 1981 and August 1986. Browning asserted that SEMC negligently, intentionally, and willfully permitted Drs. Burt and Blue to perform the unne- cessary and experimental surgeries at SEMC by failing to provide adequate peer review of Drs. Burt and Blue, and by failing to protect Browning from known incompetent medical care.

In her complaint, Browning sought recovery against Drs. Burt and Blue for medical malpractice. She sought recovery against SEMC for its alleged negli- gence in granting and/or continuing the staff mem- bership or professional privileges of Drs. Burt and Blue. Lawrence Browning sought recovery against all defendants for loss of consortium.

Dr. Burt failed to respond to the complaint and,

upon motion, appellees obtained a default judgment

against him.

answered the complaint and asserted defenses based upon the “applicable statute of limitations.” Appel- lants then deposed Browning in July 1989 for pur- poses of developing their statute of limitations de- fenses. The following relevant matters can be gleaned from Browning's deposition testimony.

SEMC and Dr. Blue, appellants,

FN2

FN2. A hearing for the assessment of dam- ages was held in abeyance pending further court order.

In 1980, Browning sought treatment from Dr. Blue,

a urologist, for bladder infections and difficulties

she experienced voiding urine. Blue performed sur- gery upon Browning, but Browning's condition did not improve. By 1982, Browning began complain-

ing of constant bladder pain. She also complained

of pain she experienced during sexual relations with

her husband. Thus, in February 1982, Blue referred her to Dr. Burt for an “exploratory pelvic laparo- tomy with lysis” and “vaginoplasty.”

**997 Dr. Burt met with Browning prior to surgery. Burt explained to Browning that the pain she exper- ienced during sexual relations was caused by her husband's penis striking her bladder. Burt explained that Drs. Burt and Blue would perform surgery to place her bladder upon a “pedestal,” and that this procedure would correct her problems voiding urine and alleviate the pain she suffered during inter- course. Burt also indicated that he would do some “cosmetic things” to improve Browning's sex life.

With respect to this special surgical procedure Burt performed at SEMC, a form letter was required by SEMC to be submitted to Burt's patients prior to surgery. A copy of the letter bearing Browning's signature (and a “witness” signature dated February 5, 1982) was presented by SEMC at Browning's

*547 deposition.

Browning testified that she

could not recall having ever seen the letter. The form letter, which bears the SEMC letterhead,

states:

FN3

FN3. It is undisputed that the letter bearing Browning's signature appeared in her hos- pital records at SEMC.

“Dear Patient:

“The Executive Committee of the Medical Staff of St. Elizabeth Medical Center wishes to inform you that the ‘female coital area reconstruction’ surgery

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you are about to undergo is:

“1. Not documented by ordinary standards of sci- entific reporting and publication.

“2. Not a generally accepted procedure.

“3. As yet not duplicated by other investigators.

“4. Detailed only in non-scientific literature.

“You should be informed that the Executive Com- mittee of the Medical Staff considers the aforemen- tioned procedure an unproven, non-standard prac- tice of gynecology.” FN4

FN4. An identical form letter appears in the record in case No. 91-2121. Answers to interrogatories in that case reveal that this “special Burt consent” form was used by SEMC beginning in 1979 in connection with Dr. Burt's “vaginal reconstruction sur- geries.” The forms were provided to Burt by SEMC and were required to be com- pleted before or at the time of hospital ad- mission. Burt began conducting vaginal re- construction surgeries at SEMC in 1969.

Drs. Burt and Blue performed “vaginal reconstruc- tion surgery” upon Browning at SEMC in February 1982. Browning testified at the deposition that she underwent the surgery explained to her by Burt to correct her painful bladder condition. FN5

FN5. The parties to this appeal agree that the surgery actually performed upon Browning consisted of an exploratory pel- vic laparotomy, vaginal reconstruction, cir- cumcision of the clitoris and insertion of a urinary catheter. The vaginal reconstruc- tion consisted of, among other things, a re- direction and elongation of her vagina. In her deposition, Browning claimed that she was not fully informed of the true nature of the surgery, although she admitted that her signature appeared on a consent form in- dicating that the surgical procedure “Pelvic

Laparotomy, Vaginal Reconstruction” had been explained to her satisfaction.

Browning was required to employ an indwelling ur- inary catheter for six months following the recon- struction surgery. When the catheter was removed by Dr. Burt, Browning could not void properly and became “obstructed.” The obstruction caused ex- treme pain and vomiting and subsequent hospitaliz- ation at SEMC. Browning testified that after her February 1982 “love surgery,” she continued to suf- fer from bladder infections and developed problems with urinary incontinence. Her bladder infections after the surgery *548 were worse (more frequent) than before. Additionally, following the surgery, Browning could not engage in sexual relations without extreme pain and difficulties. At some point, she also began to develop severe kidney problems, for which Dr. Blue provided treatment. Browning was last treated by Dr. Burt sometime in 1983. Burt left Browning a message that he was leaving town and that she need not see him any- more. Browning continued her treatment at SEMC with Dr. Blue.

Browning underwent a myriad of additional surger- ies performed by Dr. Blue at SEMC between 1982 and 1986. After each surgery, Dr. Blue told Brown- ing that after the next surgery, she would be “just fine.” **998 The final surgery performed by Blue occurred on August 22, 1986, when he removed Browning's right kidney. However, none of these surgeries improved Browning's condition. Indeed, Browning stated that her condition worsened. She continued to suffer bladder infections, difficulties voiding, problems during sexual intercourse, and periods of urinary incontinence. She also developed bowel problems sometime during her treatment with Burt and/or Blue. After the August 22, 1986 surgery, Browning began experiencing right flank pain, and her mental health deteriorated.

When her problems persisted, Browning arranged to be examined by Dr. Montague, a urologist, at the Cleveland Clinic. Browning went to see Montague for an explanation why her medical condition did

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not improve following Dr. Blue's August 1986 sur- gery. Montague examined Browning in June 1987 and, according to Browning:

“A. He told me that I was voiding pretty good and that he thought that I should go for some counseling because I wasn't willing to accept my condition or change my life-style or something. * * *

“Q. What did you tell Dr. Montague?

“A. I told him that I thought that something was wrong, you know, from the surgery I'd had, that I didn't get over it and when he [Blue] took my kid- ney out, I thought I wouldn't have any more prob- lems.”

In June or July 1987, Montague sent a report of his examination to Browning and Blue. According to Browning, the report indicated there was a “flaw” in her surgery. Browning, who underwent approx- imately sixteen surgeries, did not know the surgery to which Dr. Montague was referring. She never questioned Montague about the report.

Sometime between July and August 1987 (but after receiving the report from Cleveland Clinic), Browning confronted Dr. Blue in Blue's office. Browning told Blue that she thought Blue “had done a malpractice operation” because her medical condition was not improving. She also told Blue that *549 before Dr. Burt left town in 1983, Burt had told Browning that half of Browning's prior surgeries were malpractice. Browning had had a number of surgeries before she last saw Burt in 1983 (including a number of surgeries not per- formed by Burt or Blue), but Browning assumed that Burt was referring to Blue's prior surgeries. Browning said that during the confrontation at Blue's office, Blue denied any wrongdoing and re- commended that she see a psychiatrist.

At Blue's suggestion, Browning entered SEMC for psychiatric treatment in August 1987 under the care of Dr. Patwa. According to Browning, Blue visited her at the hospital “because he wanted me to forget

everything that letter said from Cleveland Clinic and I told him he was a liar.” Blue tried to prescribe medication for Browning during this time, but Dr. Patwa would not allow it. Browning stated in her deposition that she began to suspect in August 1987 that Dr. Blue may have committed malpractice upon her. Browning never returned to see Dr. Blue for treatment after her August 1987 hospitalization. Browning told Dr. Patwa in August or September 1987 that Dr. Blue had ruined her life because Blue removed her kidney and she was not well, and nev-

er would be well.

FN6

FN6. Browning testified at the deposition that she continues to suffer from urinary incontinence, abdominal flank pain, severe bowel problems, severe anxiety and de- pression, chronic back pain, and pain dur- ing sexual intercourse to the point that she is virtually unable to participate in sexual relations with her husband. She testified that she was told by a gynecologist two months before the deposition that the sur- gery performed upon her could not be cor- rected, and that Dr. Burt “had cut away everything.”

On September 29, 1989, SEMC filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that appellees' claims against SEMC, all of which arose from SEMC's al- leged negligent credentialing of Drs. Burt and Blue, were time-barred by the one-year statute of limita- tions set forth in R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) . Relying upon portions of the deposition testimony, SEMC argued, citing **999 Allenius v. Thomas (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 131, 538 N.E.2d 93, that the statute began to run by August 1987 at the latest when “cognizable events” occurred which should have led Browning to believe that her condition was related to her pre- vious treatments with Burt and Blue, and which should have alerted Browning of the need to pursue her remedies. On November 3, 1989, Blue moved for summary judgment on Browning's malpractice claim and Lawrence Browning's consortium claim. For reasons similar to those advanced by SEMC,

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Blue argued that appellees' claims against him were barred by R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) .

Appellees responded to each motion for summary judgment and submitted an affidavit by Browning. The affidavit submitted in response to SEMC's *550 motion (which is similar to the one submitted in response to Blue's motion) provides, in part:

“I saw the television program West 57th Street on October 30, 1988. I had the same symptoms as Dr. Burt's patients, which were on that show, com- plained of.

“I had surgery performed by Dr. Burt and Dr. Blue, and I wanted to know whether they had performed experimental surgery on me.

“***

“I did not know or believe prior to seeing the West 57th Street program, that the surgeries performed on me by Dr. Blue and Dr. Burt were unnecessary and/or experimental.”

The trial court granted the motions for summary judgment and dismissed the action against SEMC and Blue. FN7 The trial court held that appellees' claims accrued in August 1987 at the latest when Browning knew of Dr. Montague's report, knew of the continued and/or worsened nature of her condi- tion, and told Blue that Blue had committed a “malpractice operation.” The trial court held that under Allenius, supra, appellees were placed on no- tice (by a “cognizable event”) in August 1987 to pursue any possible claims against SEMC and Blue, and because appellees did not do so within the one- year period of limitation, R.C. 2305.11 barred the action. By entry dated April 4, 1990, the trial court expressly determined that there was “no just cause for delay” of an appeal from the dismissals of the action against SEMC and Blue, leaving only the damages on appellees' default judgment against Dr. Burt to be adjudicated.

FN7. The trial court granted SEMC's mo- tion by decision dated December 5, 1989.

All claims against SEMC were dismissed by entry dated January 3, 1990. The trial court granted Blue's motion by decision dated February 2, 1990, and the action against Blue was dismissed on March 6, 1990. The trial court's decisions granting SEMC's motion and Blue's motion are nearly identical.

On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the judg- ment of the trial court with respect to the dismissal of appellees' claims against SEMC. Applying the R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) statute of limitations, and the “cognizable event” test of Allenius, the court of ap- peals held that there was no evidence that appellees knew or should have known, prior to viewing the “West 57th” television program, that Browning may have been injured as a result of SEMC's negli- gence in credentialing Drs. Burt and Blue. Accord- ingly, the court of appeals held that summary judg- ment was inappropriate, as appellees' causes of ac- tion against SEMC may not have accrued until Oc- tober 1988, and, thus, *551 the action against SEMC (commenced in April 1989) may have been timely filed.

The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court with respect to the dismissal of Brown- ing's malpractice claim against Blue, finding that the cause of action accrued in August 1987 at the latest when Browning knew or should have known that she may have been the victim of medical mal- practice. However, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court with respect to the dis- missal of Lawrence Browning's consortium claim against Blue, finding that Lawrence's claim was governed by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.09 .

Case No. 91-2121

Coney Mitchell, appellee, underwent “vaginal re- construction surgery” performed **1000 by Dr. Burt at SEMC in January 1985. Prior to surgery, Mitchell suffered from urinary incontinence, blad- der infections, bladder and pelvic pain, vaginal in-

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fections, bowel problems, and painful sexual inter- course. Before surgery, Burt explained to Mitchell that her bladder was being bruised during sexual re- lations with her husband, and that surgery was ne- cessary to “lift” her bladder “out of the way.” Burt told Mitchell that the surgical procedure would al- leviate her pelvic pain and correct her bladder prob- lems. Mitchell signed a consent form for “Anterior Colporrhaphy, Vaginal Reconstruction, Cysto- scopy.” She also apparently signed the special form letter required by SEMC for Burt's vaginal recon- struction surgeries. FN8

FN8. The contents of the form letter appear in the facts in case No. 91-2079, supra. It is undisputed that the letter bearing Mitchell's signature appeared in her hospit- al file at SEMC.

Mitchell's condition worsened within a short time after the surgery. FN9 When the catheter was re- moved, Mitchell lost all bladder control. Her blad- der pain and vaginal infections continued. She also began to experience severe bowel problems and felt like everything inside of her was “tearing loose.” She “stayed sick,” and her condition never im- proved.

FN9. We surmise from the record that the procedure Mitchell underwent was similar to the surgery performed upon Browning, which included, among other things, va- ginal redirection and elongation, insertion of a urinary catheter, and a general restruc- turing of body organs, muscle and tissue. See fn. 5, supra.

At Dr. Burt's urging, Mitchell and her husband at- tempted to resume sexual relations approximately four months after the reconstruction surgery. However, penetration was impossible and Mitchell began bleeding profusely. At this time, Mitchell ex- amined her vagina and noticed that it had been “sewn up.” She immediately contacted Burt, who indicated that everything was normal, and that she needed time to heal. Burt instructed Mitchell not to

see *552 any other doctor. He told Mitchell that any other doctor could cause her to bleed to death. Thus, Mitchell continued treatments with Dr. Burt.

During subsequent treatments, Burt continually in- sisted that Mitchell could resume normal sexual re- lations with her husband. However, Mitchell main- tained that this was not possible. At some point, Burt met with Mitchell's husband and told him that Mitchell would get better, and he (Mitchell's hus- band) should not “take no for an answer.” Eventu- ally, in 1987, Mitchell had a heated argument with Burt and decided to terminate her treatment with him. Mitchell has never been able to resume sexual relations with her husband.

In October 1988, Mitchell viewed the “West 57th” television program regarding Dr. Burt's surgical practices. She realized that her symptoms were the same as those discussed by Burt's ex-patients ap- pearing on the show. Thus, Mitchell contacted a doctor, Dr. Busacco, whose name she obtained from watching the program. Mitchell was examined by Busacco in December 1988. Busacco performed whatever corrective surgery was possible-rein- forcing the rectum, reconstructing the vagina, re- moving pockets of urine which had been collecting bacteria within the urinary system-but Busacco in- formed Mitchell that she had been surgically mutil- ated.

Mitchell commenced suit on December 14, 1988 against Dr. Burt and appellant, SEMC. Mitchell al- leged that Burt negligently and fraudulently per- formed inappropriate, unnecessary and experiment- al surgery upon her without her knowledge and consent. Mitchell alleged that SEMC knew of Burt's surgical practices and failed to protect her from a known incompetent physician. Mitchell also claimed that SEMC was negligent in failing to provide adequate peer review of Dr. Burt.

Mitchell sought recovery from Dr. Burt for medical malpractice. She sought recovery from SEMC for its alleged negligence in granting and continuing hospital privileges to Dr. Burt.

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SEMC responded to the complaint and eventually moved for summary judgment on the basis of the R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) statute of limitations. Burt failed to answer **1001 (or defend against) the claim of medical malpractice.

The trial court granted SEMC's motion for sum- mary judgment. In its decision, the trial court noted that SEMC and Mitchell apparently assumed that all claims against SEMC were “medical claims” within the meaning of R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) and (D)(3) . Applying Allenius, supra, the trial court held that the R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) period of limita- tions began to run in December 1985 at the latest. However, it is apparent that the trial court was un- sure whether R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) was applicable. In dismissing the action against SEMC, the trial court stated, in part:

*553 “The Court finds that an action upon a medic- al claim against St. Elizabeth Medical Center was not commenced within one year after the action ac- crued and therefore under R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) the claims should be DISMISSED. The Court further finds that the claims of the Plaintiff for bodily in- jury not related to a medical claim must be DIS- MISSED because the action was not brought within the two years after the cause thereof arose pursuant to R.C. 2305.10 . This case was filed December 14,

1988.”

Subsequently, the trial court entered a default judg- ment against Burt and in favor of Mitchell. By sep- arate entry, the trial court expressly determined that there was “no just cause for delay” of an appeal from the dismissal of the action against SEMC.

On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the judg- ment of the trial court. The court of appeals determ- ined that there was nothing in the record to suggest that Mitchell should have discovered the alleged negligence of SEMC prior to viewing the “West 57th” television program in October 1988. Accord- ingly, the court of appeals, relying on its decision in the Browning case, held that summary judgment was not appropriate.

The two cases, having been consolidated, are now before this court pursuant to the allowance of mo- tions to certify the record. Spangenberg, Shibley, Traci, Lancione & Liber, John G. Lancione , John D. Liber and Peter H. Weinberger , Cleveland, for appellees Browning in case No. 91-2079 and appellee Mitchell in case No.

91-2121.

Freund, Freeze & Arnold, Neil F. Freund and Robert N. Snyder , Dayton, for appellant Max Blue, Jr., M.D., in case No. 91-2079.

Dinsmore & Shohl, Frank C. Woodside III , John E. Schlosser and K.C. Green , Cincinnati, for appellant St. Elizabeth Medical Center in case Nos. 91-2079 and 91-2121.

Bricker & Eckler, James J. Hughes and Catherine M. Ballard , Columbus, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Hosp. Ass'n, in case Nos. 91-2079 and

91-2121.

DOUGLAS , Justice.

DOUGLAS, J. The narrow issue in these consolid- ated cases is whether the negligent credentialing causes of action against SEMC for granting and continuing staff privileges to Dr. Burt (and Dr. Blue in case No. 91-2079) were timely filed pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations. Case No. 91-2079 involves additional issues concerning the court of appeals' reinstatement *554 of Lawrence Browning's consortium claim against Dr. Blue and SEMC. FN10 Given the procedural disposition of these cases, the pertinent facts (where applicable) must be construed in a light most favorable to ap- pellees who opposed the motions for summary judgment at the trial court level. See Civ.R. 56 .

FN10. The malpractice of Dr. Burt has been established in both cases by virtue of the default judgments entered against him even if the causes of action for malpractice against Dr. Burt were untimely filed. Browning did not appeal to this court from

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the determination that her malpractice ac- tion against Dr. Blue was untimely filed and, thus, the judgment of the court of ap- peals on that issue is final.

I

Hospital Liability/Negligent Credentialing

SEMC appeals in both cases, urging that the claims asserted against it for negligent credentialing are time-barred by R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) . Specifically, SEMC suggests that the court of appeals erred in determining **1002 that discovery (by appellees Mitchell and Browning) of the hospital's negligence was necessary to commence the running of the R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) period of limitations on the negligent credentialing claims. SEMC asserts that the “cognizable events” triggering the running of the statute of limitations on Mitchell's and Browning's medical malpractice claims against the doctor(s) were sufficient to commence the running of the period of limitations on their negligent credential- ing causes of action against the hospital.

In support of its position, SEMC cites Allenius, supra, and a number of our other cases such as Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found. (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 111, 5 OBR 247, 449 N.E.2d 438, Richards v. St. Thomas Hosp. (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 27, 24 OBR 71, 492 N.E.2d 821, Hoffman v. David- son (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 60, 31 OBR 165, 508 N.E.2d 958, Hershberger v. Akron City Hosp. (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 1, 516 N.E.2d 204, and Flowers v. Walker (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 546, 589 N.E.2d 1284 . This line of cases deals with the ac- crual of causes of action for medical malpractice under R.C. 2305.11 , and the necessity of investiga- tion and pursuit of remedies when a medical condi- tion and its relationship to a previous medical pro- cedure, treatment or diagnosis are “discovered.”

Conversely, appellees contend that under Allenius, supra, the “West 57th” television program was the

“cognizable event” which commenced the running of the R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) period of limitations on the negligent credentialing causes of action. Thus, appellees assert that Mitchell's and Browning's claims against SEMC were filed within the R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) period of limitations.

*555 Upon reflection, we cannot accept either of the parties' positions, which assume that R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) and our cases governing the accrual of causes of action for medical malpractice apply to claims of hospital liability for negligent credential- ing.

The theory of hospital liability at issue in these cases was discussed at some length in Albain v. Flower Hosp. (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 251, 257-260, 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1044-1047 . In Albain, paragraph two of the syllabus, this court held that:

“In regard to staff privileges, a hospital has a direct duty to grant and to continue such privileges only to competent physicians. * * * In order to recover for

a breach of this duty, a plaintiff injured by the neg-

ligence of a staff physician must demonstrate that but for the lack of care in the selection or the reten- tion of the physician, the physician would not have been granted staff privileges, and the plaintiff would not have been injured.” (Emphasis added.)

The general duty imposed upon hospitals to grant and continue staff privileges only to competent physicians was identified in Albain as an “independent” duty of care owed directly to those admitted to the hospital. Id. at 257-260, 553 N.E.2d at 1044-1047 . See, also, Taylor v. Flower Deacon- ess Home & Hosp. (1922), 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 . One of the areas in which the hospital owes the independent and direct duty to a patient is in establishing (and adhering to) reasonable peer re- view procedures:

“ * * * [O]nce a competent and careful physician

has been granted staff privileges, the hospital will not thereafter be liable unless it had reason to know that the act of malpractice would most likely take

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place. That is, where a previously competent physi- cian with staff privileges develops a pattern of in- competence, which the hospital should become aware of through its peer review process, the hos- pital must stand ready to answer for its retention of such physician.” (Footnote omitted.) Albain, 50 Ohio St.3d at 258, 553 N.E.2d at 1045 .

In addition, the majority in Albain quoted with ap- proval the following statement:

“ ‘ * * * [A hospital] is not required to pass upon the efficacy of treatment; it may not decide for a doctor whether an operation is necessary, or, if one be necessary, the nature thereof; but it owes to every patient whom it admits the duty of saving him from an illegal operation [or] false, fraudulent, or fictitious medical treatment.’ ” Albain, at 259, 553 N.E.2d at 1046, quoting **1003 Hendrickson v. Hodkin (1937), 250 A.D. 619, 621, 294 N.Y.S. 982, 984-985 (Lazansky, P.J., dissenting), reversed (1937), 276 N.Y. 252, 11 N.E.2d 899 .

*556 [1][2] The complaints against SEMC in the cases before us allege that the hospital breached these independent duties owed directly to Browning and Mitchell as patients at SEMC. The “negligent credentialing” causes of action include allegations that SEMC failed to exercise prudence in granting or continuing staff privileges, failed to conduct reasonable peer review, failed to protect appellees Mitchell and Browning from known incompetent medical care, and otherwise failed to save appellees Mitchell and Browning from medical treatment (surgery) of an unnecessary and experimental nature. These claims are not claims for medical malpractice and, thus, the medical malpractice line of cases and the “cognizable event” test do not ap- ply. A hospital does not practice medicine and is in- capable of committing malpractice. See, generally, Lombard v. Good Samaritan Med. Ctr. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 471, 23 O.O.3d 410, 433 N.E.2d 162, and Richardson v. Doe (1964), 176 Ohio St. 370, 27 O.O.2d 345, 199 N.E.2d 878 (only physicians can commit “medical malpractice”). Further, ap- pellees' claims against the hospital have nothing to

do with any issue concerning derivative liability of the hospital for the acts of its agent or employee- physicians. The question whether Burt or Blue is employed by SEMC is neither clear on the record before us nor particularly relevant to our discus- sion. Mitchell's and Browning's negligent creden- tialing claims against SEMC are independent claims asserted directly against SEMC for the hos- pital's own acts or omissions in granting and/or continuing the staff privileges of the doctor(s). Thus, we must determine what type of claim is be- ing asserted by Browning and Mitchell against SEMC and, in addition, what statute of limitations applies to such claims.

II

R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) provides, in part:

“ * * * [A]n action upon a medical * * * claim shall be commenced within one year after the action ac- crued * * *.”

R.C. 2305.11(D)(3) provides, in part:

“ ‘Medical claim’ means any claim that is asserted

in any civil action against a physician, podiatrist, or hospital, against any employee or agent of a physician, podiatrist, or hospital, or against a re- gistered nurse or physical therapist, and that arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)

[3][4] A careful reading of R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) and

(D)(3) FN11 demonstrates that not all claims asser- ted against a hospital are “medical claims” subject

to the *557 period of limitations set forth in R.C.

2305.11(B)(1) . Rather, a claim against a hospital is

a “medical claim” within the meaning of R.C.

2305.11(D)(3) , and is subject to the one-year limit- ation period set forth in R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) , only if

the claim arises out of the medical diagnosis, care,

or treatment of a person. The terms “medical dia-

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gnosis” and “treatment” are terms of art having a specific and particular meaning relating to the iden- tification and alleviation of a physical or mental ill- ness, disease, or defect. See, generally, Black's Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990), at 453-454 and 1502. Con- versely, the word “care” is a general word without a specific legal meaning until placed in a particular context. Under the ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction, “care” as used in R.C. 2305.11(D)(3) (where the word is preceded by terms such as “physician,” “hospital,” “nurse,” and “medical dia- gnosis”) means the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness. Thus, the term “care” in R.C. 2305.11(D)(3) should not be broadly interpreted when the context in which it is used is properly understood.

FN11. The current version of R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) and (D)(3) has remained un- changed since the amendment to R.C. 2305.11 effective October 20, 1987. See 142 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3322-3325.

[5][6] With the foregoing discussion in mind, we believe that claims asserted **1004 against a hos- pital for negligent credentialing do not arise out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a per- son. Negligent credentialing claims arise out of the hospital's failure to satisfy its independent duty to grant and continue staff privileges only to compet- ent physicians. This independent duty does not dir- ectly involve diagnosis or the medical care and treatment of a patient. While the acts or omissions of a hospital in granting and/or continuing staff privileges to an incompetent physician may ulti- mately lead to an act of medical malpractice by the incompetent physician, the physician's ultimate act of medical malpractice is factually and legally sev- erable and distinct from the hospital's acts or omis- sions in negligently credentialing him or her with staff membership or professional privileges.

[7] Accordingly, we conclude that an action against a hospital for bodily injury arising out of the hospit- al's negligence in credentialing a physician is neither “malpractice” nor a “medical claim” to

which the limitations period found in R.C. 2305.11 applies. FN12

FN12. We reach this conclusion no matter which of the many previous versions of R.C. 2305.11 is considered. Prior to the October 1987 amendment to R.C. 2305.11 (142 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3322-3325), former versions of R.C. 2305.11(A) provided, in part, that “[a]n action for * * * malpractice, including an action for mal- practice against a * * * hospital, * * * shall be brought within one year after the cause thereof accrued * * *.” See 141 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3228; 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2153; 136 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3841; and 136 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2810. Again, a hospital does not practice medicine and cannot commit “malpractice.” Lombard and Richardson, supra.

*558 III

Discovery Rule- R.C. 2305.10

[8] If a negligent credentialing cause of action is not a claim for malpractice or a medical claim, the obvious question becomes: What is it? It is, simply, a claim for bodily injury arising out of negligence which is not covered by the limitation periods found in R.C. 2305.11 . Thus, we look to R.C. 2305.10 , which provides in part:

“An action for bodily injury or injuring personal property shall be brought within two years after the cause thereof arose.”

A cause of action for negligent credentialing of a

physician by a hospital which results in bodily in- jury is an action falling under the umbrella of R.C. 2305.10 .

[9][10] Pursuant to R.C. 2305.10 , the two-year peri-

od of limitations begins to run when a cause of ac-

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tion for bodily injury “arose,” while the R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) statute of limitations for “medical claims” begins to run when a cause of action “accrued.” However, we believe that the terms “arose” and “accrued” are synonymous and that the rule of discovery long recognized in Ohio as applic- able to the “accrual” of causes of action should be applied to the R.C. 2305.10 statute of limitations for claims of hospital negligence in credentialing a physician.

The history of the so-called discovery rule in Ohio is long and storied. The rule of discovery was ori- ginally recognized by this court in the medical mal- practice context, but the rule has been generally ac- cepted and applied in numerous areas of the law. See Shover v. Cordis Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 213, 223-227, 574 N.E.2d 457, 464-467 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Of particular significance, the dis- covery rule has been judicially applied to the gener- al statute of limitations for bodily injury actions un- der former R.C. 2305.10. In O'Stricker v. Jim Wal- ter Corp. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 4 OBR 335, 447 N.E.2d 727, paragraphs one and two of the syl- labus, this court held that:

“1. Absent legislative definition, it is left to the ju- diciary to determine when a cause ‘arose’ for pur- poses of statutes of limitations.

“2. When an injury does not manifest itself immedi- ately, the cause of action does not arise until the

plaintiff knows or, by the exercise of reasonable di- ligence should have known, that he had been in- jured by the conduct of *559 defendant, for pur- poses of the statute of limitations contained in R.C.

2305.10 .”

**1005 O'Stricker was decided under a version of R.C. 2305.10 in effect prior to the 1980 amendment to the statute. The 1980 amendment to R.C. 2305.10 specifically adopted a discovery rule for bodily injury actions caused by exposure to asbes- tos and chromium. 138 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3412. In Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 59, 609 N.E.2d 140, where a discovery rule provided

by the General Assembly for DES-related injuries was found to be insufficient, we again had occasion to announce that a discovery rule applies to the R.C. 2305.10 general statute of limitations for bod- ily injury actions. Here, we extend the discovery rule to bodily injury actions resulting from a hospit- al's negligence in credentialing a physician.

IV

“Cognizable Event”

Although not directly applicable to the claims of hospital negligence in the cases before us, the rule of discovery for the accrual of causes of action for medical malpractice under R.C. 2305.11 was ex- plained in Allenius, supra, as requiring the occur- rence of a “cognizable event” “which does or should lead the patient to believe that the condition of which the patient complains is related to a med- ical procedure, treatment or diagnosis previously rendered to the patient and where the cognizable event does or should place the patient on notice of the need to pursue his possible remedies.” Id. at syllabus.

Today, we borrow from Allenius in constructing a rule of discovery applicable to R.C. 2305.10 for bodily injury actions arising from negligent creden- tialing by a hospital. We emphasize, however, that Allenius and our cases governing the accrual of causes of action for medical malpractice are not ap- plicable to causes of action for hospital negligence in credentialing a physician. By its very nature, the discovery rule (concept) must be specially tailored to the particular context in which it is to be applied. Our decisions concerning the accrual of causes of action for medical malpractice are not applicable to determine the accrual date of claims not related to the medical malpractice of a physician.

The court of appeals found that the critical inquiry for determining the accrual date of the negligent credentialing causes of action requires pinpointing

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when the victims should have discovered that SEMC had failed to “provide adequate supervision or review of” Dr. Burt (and Dr. Blue in the Brown- ing case). The court of appeals found no evidence that Mitchell or Browning discovered or should have discovered that SEMC had failed to perform its legal duties until the women viewed the televi- sion program in October 1988 *560 and realized that other former patients of Dr. Burt suffered from maladies similar to their own. Thus, the court of ap- peals held that summary judgment on the basis of the R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) statute of limitations was not proper in either case, since the complaints were filed within one year of the discovery of pertinent facts which placed appellees on notice to pursue a remedy against the hospital.

[11] We agree with the court of appeals that in both cases the October 1988 television program was the event which triggered the running of the statute of limitations on Browning's and Mitchell's claims against SEMC-although it is the R.C. 2305.10 peri- od of limitations which should have been applied. The court of appeals was absolutely correct in re- cognizing that the facts or events which might trig- ger the running of the statute of limitations for med- ical malpractice claims against a doctor do not ne- cessarily commence the running of a statute of lim- itations on claims against a hospital for hospital negligence unrelated to the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a person. We, mildly and respect- fully, disagree with the court of appeals to the ex- tent that it found the “cognizable event” test of Al- lenius to be directly applicable in determining the accrual date of appellees' negligent credentialing claims. Mere mention of Allenius and the “cognizable event” test conjures up images of med- ical malpractice (to anyone who is familiar with our cases in this area), which may be one reason for the confusion **1006 in the court of appeals, resulting in application of the wrong statute of limitations to appellees' causes of action for hospital negligence.

V

“Alerting Event”

[12][13] In tailoring a rule of discovery applicable to R.C. 2305.10 for bodily injury actions arising from negligent credentialing by a hospital, we hold that a cause of action for negligent credentialing arises when the plaintiff knows or should know that he or she was injured as a result of the hospital's negligent credentialing procedures or practices. In our judgment, the only evidence of any perspicuous event which should have alerted appellees Brown- ing and Mitchell to pursue their negligence claims against SEMC occurred in October 1988. Upon viewing a television program, Browning and Mitchell became aware that many of Burt's ex- patients suffered from abnormalities similar to their own as a consequence of Burt's surgical practices at SEMC. The record is devoid of evidence that ap- pellees knew or should have known prior to Octo- ber 1988 that SEMC may have done something wrong in granting or continuing privileges to Dr. Burt or Blue. The “special Burt consent” form in Browning's and Mitchell's hospital records would not have apprised Mitchell *561 and Browning that their doctor(s) may have committed a number of harmful, improper or unwarranted surgeries upon a number of unsuspecting patients such that SEMC's credentialing practices could reasonably be brought into question. Accordingly, the R.C. 2305.10 statute of limitations was triggered in October 1988, and the complaints against SEMC were filed well with- in the applicable two-year period of limitations. FN13

FN13. It is interesting to note that even if Browning's negligent credentialing claims against SEMC accrued in August 1987 as the trial court suggested, the action would still have been timely filed against SEMC under the applicable two-year period of limitations.

[14][15] Obviously, we do not hold that a television

program like the one at issue in these cases is ne- cessary to trigger the running of the R.C. 2305.10

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statute of limitations in every case of negligent cre- dentialing. It is sufficient if a plaintiff discovers or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered some definitive information that would reasonably warrant investigation of the hos- pital's credentialing practices. Such an occurrence might be termed an “alerting event,” if for no other reason than to contrast the occurrence triggering the commencement of the statute of limitations for neg- ligence in R.C. 2305.10 from the “cognizable event” of R.C. 2305.11 limitation periods. However, discovery of a physician's medical mal- practice does not, in itself, constitute an “alerting event” nor does such discovery implicate the hos- pital's credentialing practices or require investiga- tion of the hospital in this regard. To hold otherwise would encourage baseless claims of negligent cre- dentialing and a hospital would be named in nearly every lawsuit involving the malpractice of a physi- cian.

VI

[16] SEMC and amicus curiae, Ohio Hospital As- sociation, suggest that hospitals are immune from liability for the acts, omissions and decisions of their peer review committees by virtue of R.C. 2305.25 and that, therefore, a hospital cannot be li- able for negligent peer review. We reject this argu- ment.

R.C. 2305.25 provides, in part:

No hospital, no state or local society, and no indi- vidual who is a member or employee of any of the following committees shall be liable in damages to any person for any acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct within the scope of the functions of the committee:

“***

*562 “(E) A peer review committee, professional standards review committee, or arbitration commit- tee of a state or local society composed of doctors of medicine, doctors of osteopathic medicine and surgery, doctors of dentistry, doctors of optometry, doctors **1007 of podiatric medicine, psycholo- gists, or registered pharmacists[.]” (Emphasis ad- ded.)

Following a listing of the specific review boards and committees, R.C. 2305.25 provides that:

“Nothing in this section shall relieve any individual or hospital from liability arising from treatment of a patient.

“This section shall also apply to any member or employee of a nonprofit corporation engaged in performing the functions of a peer review commit- tee of nursing home providers or administrators or of a peer review or professional standards review committee. No person who provides information under this section and provides such information without malice and in the reasonable belief that such information is warranted by the facts known to him shall be subject to suit for civil damages as a result thereof.”

The purposes of R.C. 2305.25 are clear. The statute extends limited protection to those who provide in- formation to certain review boards and committees to encourage the free flow of information without threat of reprisal in the form of civil liability. See, generally, Jacobs v. Frank (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 111, 113, 573 N.E.2d 609, 612 . The statute also seeks to protect those serving on committees and committee employees for the obvious reason that it could be difficult to staff a committee absent such protections. However, the cases at bar do not in- volve a situation where SEMC has been either the provider of information to a committee (see, e.g., R.C. 1742.141 ), or the participant on a commit- tee. It is clear to us that R.C. 2305.25 does not provide blanket immunity to a hospital for negli- gence in granting and/or continuing staff privileges of an incompetent physician.

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[17] SEMC protests that R.C. 2305.25 and 2305.251 prevent a hospital from defending itself against claims for negligent peer review. According to SEMC, these statutes require that no evidence as to any matter brought to the attention of peer re- view committees, or actions taken by those commit- tees, can be introduced into evidence in the hospit- al's defense. We reject SEMC's contentions for a number of reasons, but quoting from the following portion of R.C. 2305.251 should dispel any notion that SEMC's arguments are meritorious:

“ * * * Information, documents, or records other- wise available from original sources are not to be construed as being unavailable for discovery or for use in any civil action merely because they were presented during proceedings of a committee nor should any person testifying before a committee or who is *563 a member of the committee be preven- ted from testifying as to matters within his know- ledge, but the witness cannot be asked about his testimony before the committee or opinion formed by him as a result of the committee hearing.”

VII

Summary of Holdings re Claims Against SEMC

In summarizing our discussion concerning the claims against SEMC, we hold that:

1. Hospital negligence arising out of the “care” of a

patient is a “medical claim” within the meaning of R.C. 2305.11(D)(3) and is subject to the period of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) . “Care” as used in R.C. 2305.11(D)(3) is the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness.

2. Negligent credentialing of a physician by a hos-

pital is not “medical diagnosis, care, or treatment” within the meaning of R.C. 2305.11 .

3. An action against a hospital for bodily injury arising out of the negligent credentialing of a physi-

cian is subject to the two-year limitations period set forth in R.C. 2305.10 .

4. The period of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.10 commences to run when the victim knows or should have discovered that he or she was in- jured as a result of the hospital's negligent creden- tialing procedures or practices.

5. R.C. 2305.25 does not provide a hospital with immunity from liability for the hospital's negli- gence in granting and/or **1008 continuing the staff privileges of an incompetent physician.

For the reasons stated herein, which differ, in part, from the reasoning of the court of appeals, we af- firm the court of appeals' judgment in case No. 91-2121 (Mitchell) and that portion of the court of appeals' judgment in case No. 91-2079 (Browning) which reversed the judgment of the trial court with respect to the dismissal of the action against SEMC. FN14

FN14. Lawrence Browning's consortium action against SEMC, premised upon SEMC's alleged negligence in credential- ing Drs. Burt and Blue, was timely filed and we reject SEMC's arguments to the contrary.

VIII

Consortium Claim of Lawrence Browning Against

Blue

The only remaining question before us concerns the appeal of Dr. Blue in case No. 91-2079 (Browning) regarding the reinstatement of Lawrence *564 Browning's consortium claim against Blue. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Blue contends that Lawrence Browning did not ap- peal to the court of appeals and, thus, the appellate court had no jurisdiction to reverse the judgment of

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the trial court on any issue relating to Lawrence's claim against Blue. However, the record does not support this contention and, therefore, we reject Blue's argument.

Blue also suggests that the court of appeals abused its discretion in finding that the R.C. 2305.09 stat- ute of limitations applied to Lawrence's consortium claim against Blue, since no party briefed or argued the issue or raised the question in an assignment of error to the court of appeals. We find no abuse of discretion. The law is clear that spousal consortium claims arising from medical malpractice are gov- erned by the R.C. 2305.09(D) four-year period of limitations, when the principal claim for malprac- tice accrued, as it did here, prior to the effective date of the October 1987 amendment to R.C. 2305.11 . Hershberger, supra, 34 Ohio St.3d at 6,

cided by the court of appeals did not involve the constitutionality of a statute and, thus, the case of State v. 1981 Dodge Ram Van (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 168, 522 N.E.2d 524, is distinguishable. A number of other cases cited by Blue merely recite the general rule of law that issues may be treated as waived if not raised at the first opportunity or as- signed as error in the court of appeals. However, there is no general prohibition in App.R. 12(A) re- quiring that issues be treated as waived.

FN15

Furthermore, the issue de-

FN15. In this regard, we note that the Oc- tober 1987 amendment to R.C. 2305.11

specifically made certain derivative claims subject to the same period of limitations as the principal claim. See R.C. 2305.11(D)(3) ; 142 Ohio Laws, Part II, at

3324.

Finally, Blue suggests that even under the R.C. 2305.09 statute of limitations, Lawrence Brown- ing's action against Blue for loss of consortium was untimely filed. Specifically, Blue urges that Mrs. Browning's malpractice claim against Blue “accrued” within the meaning of R.C. 2305.11 as early as 1983 and, thus, Lawrence Browning had four years from that time to commence suit against

Blue, but failed to do so. However, Mrs. Brown- ing's malpractice claim against Blue was found by the trial court and court of appeals to have accrued in August 1987 at the latest. Since the R.C. 2305.09(D) four-year period of limitations on Lawrence's claim against Blue commenced to run on the same date that the R.C. 2305.11 one-year period of limitations began to run on Browning's malpractice claim against Blue, Hershberger, supra, paragraph two of the syllabus, Lawrence's claim was timely filed. This is especially true given the fact that Browning continued *565 her treat- ment with Blue until August 1987. See Frysinger v. Leech (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 38, 512 N.E.2d 337, paragraph one of the syllabus.

IX

Conclusion

In reaching our conclusions, we do not pass judg- ment (since issues of alleged liability **1009 are yet to be determined) on Dr. Blue or SEMC, although it is tempting to do so given what the record shows has happened to these two women. Perhaps now they, and others, will have their day in court, where the conspiracy of silence in the local medical com- munity which permitted the atrocities to be commit- ted, and the atrocities themselves, can be more fully explored. Further, nothing in our opinion should be read to stand in the way of the proper performance of progressive medicine.

For all the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the difficult and courageous judgments of the court of appeals.

Judgments affirmed.

A. WILLIAM SWEENEY, FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, Sr. , and PFEIFER , JJ., concur. MOYER , C.J., and WRIGHT and COOK , JJ., con- cur in part and dissent in part. DEBORAH L. COOK , J., of the Ninth Appellate

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District, sitting for RESNICK , J. MOYER , Chief Justice, concurring and dissenting. MOYER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur with the majority's disposition of Lawrence Browning's consortium claim against Dr. Blue. However, I respectfully dissent from the ma- jority opinion because (1) a “negligent credential- ing” cause of action is a “medical claim” and is subject to the one-year limitations period set forth in former R.C. 2305.11, and (2) plaintiffs' claims against St. Elizabeth Medical Center (“SEMC”) had already accrued and were time-barred by the time plaintiffs viewed the “West 57th” television pro- gram.

I

Because the majority's newly styled “negligent cre- dentialing” cause of action is created from the lan- guage of a previous decision of this court, it is im- portant to first consult that language before analyz- ing the cases sub judice. In Albain v. Flower Hosp. (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 251, 553 N.E.2d 1038, we re- cognized, as an exception to the independent con- tractor rule, the right of a plaintiff to hold an em- ployer directly liable for injuries proximately caused by the employer's own negligence in select- ing or retaining an independent contractor. We ap- plied this rule to the hospital setting and held that a *566 hospital can be held liable for the medical malpractice of a staff physician where the injured party can prove that the hospital was negligent in granting or in continuing the staff privileges of the independent physician. Paragraph two of the syl- labus of that decision reads:

“In regard to staff privileges, a hospital has a direct duty to grant and to continue such privileges only to competent physicians. A hospital is not an in- surer of the skills of private physicians to whom staff privileges have been granted. In order to re- cover for a breach of this duty, a plaintiff injured by the negligence of a staff physician must demon- strate that but for the lack of care in the selection or the retention of the physician, the physician would

not have been granted staff privileges, and the plaintiff would not have been injured. ” (Emphasis added.)

The above-emphasized language underscores a cru- cial point underemphasized by the majority's opin- ion: under Albain, claims against a hospital for neg- ligent retention or selection of a staff physician are dependent on an underlying medical malpractice claim against the staff physician. In order to prevail in a cause of action for negligent credentialing against a hospital pursuant to Albain, the plaintiff must establish not only negligent selection and/or retention of a physician, but also that but for the hospital's negligence, the plaintiff would not have been injured. That is, Albain requires that the un-

derlying malpractice of the physician be proven be- fore the plaintiff can recover damages against the hospital for its own negligence. Without an under- lying harm to the hospital's patient through medical malpractice, an action against the hospital for negli- gent credentialing will never arise. Although med- ical malpractice claims against the doctor and neg- ligent credentialing claims against the hospital are separate causes of action, with separate and distinct duties owed to a **1010 singular class of individu- als, both causes of action fail without proof that the physician's failure to abide by ordinary standards of care proximately caused the patient's harm.

Having failed to fully appreciate the significance of the interdependence between the negligent creden- tialing claims and the underlying malpractice claims, the majority has also erroneously held that a negligent credentialing cause of action is subject to the two-year limitations period set forth in R.C. 2305.10 , rather than the one-year period found in former R.C. 2305.11. FN16

FN16. Current R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) , unlike the former version of the statute, specific- ally states that an action on a “medical * * * claim” (like those actions based upon a dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim) is required to be commenced within one year after the action accrued. Under R.C.

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2305.11(D)(3) , “medical claim” includes claims which seek to hold a hospital re- sponsible for its own torts as well as those alleging the hospital is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of its employees and agents. In both cases, the claim must be one that “ arises out of the medical dia- gnosis, care, or treatment of any person” before the one-year limitations period is applicable. (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2305.11(D)(3) reads:

“ ‘Medical claim’ means any claim that is asserted in any civil action against a physician, podiatrist, or hospital, against any employee or agent of a physician, podiatrist, or hospital, or against a re- gistered nurse or physical therapist, and that arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person. ‘Medical claim’ includes derivative claims for relief that arise from the med- ical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a person.” (Emphasis added.)

*567 Under the version of R.C. 2305.11 in effect at the time the plaintiffs' causes of action arose, “medical claim” was defined in R.C. 2305.11(D)(3) as “any claim asserted in any civil action against a physician, podiatrist, or hospital arising out of the diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person.” (Emphasis added.) 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2154. Al- though former R.C. 2305.11 did not explicitly state that a “medical claim” is subject to the one-year limitations period contained in former R.C. 2305.11(A), I believe that the one-year statute of limitations is nonetheless applicable. As Justice Holmes correctly explained in his dissent in Lom- bard v. Good Samaritan Med. Ctr. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 471, 475-476, 23 O.O.3d 410, 413, 433 N.E.2d 162, 165, the General Assembly intended the words “malpractice” and “medical claim” to be used interchangeably:

“ * * * The second paragraph of R.C. 2305.11(A) allows one to serve written notice, prior to expira-

tion of the time in R.C. 2305.11(A) , upon a person and extend the time in which a suit may be brought against that person by up to 180 days from the time notice is given. This paragraph does not refer at all to malpractice. Rather, it uses the phrase ‘medical claim.’ This is evidence that the General Assembly considered the words ‘malpractice’ and ‘medical claim’ to be synonymous, for if the legislative in- tent was to give these words different meanings, it would make little sense to include actions such as the present one in a subsection that did not apply to them.”

I would, therefore, hold that a negligent credential- ing cause of action against a hospital, like a medical malpractice lawsuit brought against a physician, is subject to the one-year statute of limitations of R.C. 2305.11 . Claims asserted against a hospital for neg- ligent credentialing do arise out of a patient's med- ical diagnosis, care, or treatment. In every instance, the plaintiff-patient is alleging that the staff physi- cian has rendered him or her substandard diagnosis, care, or treatment which proximately resulted in plaintiff's alleged injuries. The negligent credential- ing claim against the hospital would not have arisen but for the underlying medical malpractice. Accord- ingly, the instant actions against the hospital are “medical claim[s]” within the meaning of former R.C. 2305.11(D)(3) and the plaintiffs had one year from the time of accrual in which to file their law- suits.

*568 II

What remains to be determined is the proper accru- al date of the plaintiffs' negligent credentialing causes of action against SEMC. Our prior decisions establish that a cause of action for medical malprac- tice accrues when the patient discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have **1011 discovered the resulting injury, or when the physi- cian-patient relationship for that condition termin- ates, whichever occurs later. Frysinger v. Leech (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 38, 512 N.E.2d 337, syllabus. The term “cognizable event” was used in Allenius

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v. Thomas (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 131, 538 N.E.2d 93, to identify the point in time when the patient in fact discovers or reasonably should have discovered the resulting injury. Allenius cited the following language of Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found. (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 111, 5 OBR 247, 449 N.E.2d 438, paragraph one of the syllabus: “ ‘Under R.C. 2305.11(A) , a cause of action for med- ical malpractice accrues and the statute of limita- tions commences to run when the patient discovers, or, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have discovered, the resulting injury.’ ” Al- lenius, supra, 42 Ohio St.3d at 133, 538 N.E.2d at

95 .

Therefore, a “cognizable event” is an occurrence “which does or should lead the patient to believe that the condition of which the patient complains is related to a medical procedure, treatment or dia- gnosis previously rendered to the patient and where the cognizable event does or should place the pa- tient on notice of the need to pursue his possible remedies.” Allenius, supra, at syllabus. Concurring in that opinion in order to emphasize that it is dis- covery of the physical injury-not discovery of the legal claim-which triggers the statute of limitations, I stated:

“[I]n determining when the statute of limitations is triggered, ‘ “[t]he test is whether the plaintiff has information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the opportun- ity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his or her investigation.” ’ * * * As indicated by the ma- jority, it is a cognizable event such as the occur- rence of pain or injury ‘ * * * rather than know- ledge of its legal significance that starts the running of the statute of limitations.’ ” Allenius, supra, at 135, 538 N.E.2d at 97 .

That proposition was recognized in a later decision by this court in Flowers v. Walker (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 546, 549, 589 N.E.2d 1284, 1287-1288:

“Moreover, constructive knowledge of facts, rather than actual knowledge of their legal significance, is

enough to start the statute of limitations running un- der the discovery rule. * * * A plaintiff need not have discovered all the relevant facts necessary to file a claim in order to trigger the statute of limita- tions. * * * Rather, the ‘cognizable event’ itself puts the plaintiff on *569 notice to investigate the facts and circumstances relevant to her claim in or- der to pursue her remedies. * * * ” (Emphasis sic. )

The facts or circumstances which give rise to a “cognizable event” for purposes of discovery of a medical malpractice claim do not automatically give rise to a claim against a hospital for negligent credentialing. “A physician's negligence does not automatically mean that the hospital is liable, and does not raise a presumption that the hospital was negligent in granting the physician staff privileges.” Albain, supra, 50 Ohio St.3d at 258-259, 553 N.E.2d at 1046 . As noted by the majority, the stat- ute of limitations for negligent credentialing begins to run when the “plaintiff discovers or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have dis- covered some definitive information that would reasonably warrant investigation of the hospital's credentialing practices.” Here, the majority has fol- lowed the lead of the court of appeals in determin- ing that there was no evidence before the trial court that the plaintiffs knew or should have known that the hospital had failed to perform its legal duty to- ward them until plaintiffs viewed the “West 57th” television show. I strongly disagree because I be- lieve the plaintiffs had earlier notice of SEMC's negligence in granting staff privileges to the de- fendant-physicians.

The record indicates that both Browning and Mitchell signed the following acknowledgement on SEMC letterhead prior to having Dr. Burt perform vaginal reconstruction surgery:

**1012 “Dear Patient:

“The Executive Committee of the Medical Staff of St. Elizabeth Medical Center wishes to inform you that the ‘female coital area reconstruction’ surgery you are about to undergo is:

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“1. Not documented by ordinary standards of sci- entific reporting and publication.

“2. Not a generally accepted procedure.

“3. As yet not duplicated by other investigators.

“4. Detailed only in non-scientific literature.

“You should be informed that the Executive Com- mittee of the Medical Staff considers the aforemen- tioned procedure an unproven, non-standard prac- tice of gynecology.”

The majority completely overlooks the impact of the signed consent form in determining when the plaintiffs' negligent credentialing causes of action against SEMC accrued. Instead, the majority holds that plaintiffs' causes of action accrued no earlier than the date Browning and Mitchell viewed the “West 57th” television program. In this regard, the majority asserts that *570 notice of a hospital's neg- ligent credentialing practices only occurs where the patient has been apprised that his or her doctor “may have committed a number of harmful, im- proper or unwarranted surgeries upon a number of unsuspecting patients such that [a hospital's] cre- dentialing practices could reasonably be brought in- to question.” I disagree and would hold, contrary to the majority opinion, that the plaintiffs' causes of action against SEMC could accrue even without no- tice that other former patients were suffering from similar conditions.

One is not left to imagine the purpose SEMC had in supplying this form letter to patients about to un- dergo Dr. Burt's unusual surgery. SEMC was clearly attempting to insulate itself from liability. In doing so, the hospital was telling its patients that Dr. Burt's specific brand of reconstruction surgery was unlike any other known form of reconstruction surgery. The experimental nature of this surgery therefore carried with it additional risks not associ- ated with standard and generally accepted surgical procedures. Because it is not before this court, we leave unresolved the issue whether the hospital can

effectively assert this letter as a defense to the Browning and Mitchell lawsuits. However, the let- ter's relevance in placing these former patients on notice that SEMC itself may have breached a duty owed to them by allowing such surgeries to be per- formed on its premises should not likewise go unre- solved.

If the majority properly applied Allenius and Flowers to these facts, the conclusion would be that the form letter was effective to place both Brown- ing and Mitchell on notice that SEMC may have failed to properly perform its credentialing duties by permitting a physician's questionable surgical procedures. The next question to be answered is when the statute of limitations began to run on the patients' negligent credentialing causes of action against SEMC. Obviously, the statute did not begin to run when Browning and Mitchell were supplied with the form letter because the surgeries had yet to be performed and they, therefore, could claim no resulting injury. Since they had no reason to believe they were harmed, it is equally unfair to hold that the statute of limitations was triggered when the op- erations were first performed. In medical malprac- tice cases, the running of the statute of limitations is delayed from the traditional date of injury to the date a “cognizable event” is discovered, in order to eliminate unfairness to medical malpractice plaintiffs. See Flowers, supra, 63 Ohio St.3d at 550, 589 N.E.2d at 1288 . Accordingly, it was not until Browning and Mitchell became aware that the injuries they complained of were related to the doc- tors' surgeries that they should have appreciated the significance of the hospital's form letter. Allenius clearly envisions and requires that the patient in- vestigate and pursue all “possible *571 remedies” once he or she has been put on notice by the cog- nizable event. See Allenius, 42 Ohio St.3d 131, 538 N.E.2d 93, syllabus.

Among the “possible remedies” of a plaintiff harmed by the malpractice of a **1013 physician are claims against a hospital for negligent creden- tialing procedures when that patient has informa-

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tion of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry that the hospital may have breached a duty owed to him or her. At the time their causes of action against the doctors accrued, the form letter provided notice to plaintiffs of a possible claim against SEMC or at least should have alerted them to the need to investigate such claim.

In case No. 91-2079, Browning informed Dr. Blue at the latest in August 1987 that he had committed malpractice on her. By that time, Browning had un- dergone approximately sixteen surgeries and her physical and emotional health was continuing to de- cline. The trial court, therefore, correctly found that August 1987, at the very latest, was the time when Browning was put on notice by a “cognizable event” to pursue her medical malpractice claim and the one-year statute of limitations of R.C. 2305.11 began to run. To hold otherwise is to cast aside the “cognizable event” test this court announced just four years ago in an effort to give trial courts some useful standard in medical malpractice cases. Be- cause Browning should also have been aware of SEMC's negligence in permitting her doctor's ex- perimental surgery, her cause of action against the hospital for negligent credentialing and retention also accrued on this date. Both causes of action were barred because Browning filed her complaint on April 17, 1989, outside the one-year period of limitations.

In case No. 91-2121, Mitchell underwent Dr. Burt's reconstruction surgery in January 1985. The medic- al problems to be alleviated by this surgery (which included urinary incontinence, bladder and vaginal infections and painful sexual intercourse) actually worsened within a few months after the January 1985 surgical procedure. The record indicates that by mid-1985, intense pain and massive vaginal bleeding made it impossible for Mitchell to engage in sexual intercourse with her husband. Mitchell was also aware of the unusual appearance of her va- gina at this time. She discovered that her vagina “was covered over” and “sewn up.” Certainly, these

occurrences gave rise to a “cognizable event” for purposes of Mitchell's discovery of her medical malpractice claim. Like Browning, the SEMC form letter could reasonably be expected to place Mitchell on notice of the need to pursue her “possible remedy” against the hospital. Since Mitchell's complaint against the hospital was filed more than three years after she was placed on no- tice, the trial court correctly found it was time- barred.

*572 For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals as it relates to the claims of plaintiffs against SEMC and reinstate the grants of summary judgment by the trial court.

COOK , J., concurs in the foregoing opin- ion.WRIGHT, Justice, concurring in part and dis- senting in part. WRIGHT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. Along with the Chief Justice, I agree with the majority's disposition of Lawrence Browning's con- sortium claim, but disagree with the majority's dis- position of the plaintiffs' negligent credentialing claims against St. Elizabeth Medical Center. Unlike the Chief Justice though, because I believe a negli- gent credentialing claim is necessarily grounded in negligence, I agree with the majority's holding in paragraph three of the syllabus that “[a]n action

against a hospital for bodily injury arising out of the negligent credentialing of a physician is subject to the two-year limitations period set forth in R.C.

2305.10 .”

However, I find it completely unnecessary to create

a new event, the “alerting event,” as the accrual

date for the running of the statute of limitations. The “cognizable event” which we recognized in Al- lenius v. Thomas (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 131, 538 N.E.2d 93, the event by which “ ‘the patient discov-

ers, or, in the exercise of reasonable care and dili- gence should have discovered, the resulting injury,’

” is the event which “place[s] the patient on notice

of the need to pursue his possible remedies.” Id. at

133, 538 N.E.2d at 95, and at syllabus (quoting, in part, **1014 Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health

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Found. [1983], 5 Ohio St.3d 111, 5 OBR 247, 449 N.E.2d 438, paragraph one of the syllabus). One of the “possible remedies” of which the plaintiff is on notice is a negligent credentialing claim.

2116, 1993 -Ohio- 178

END OF DOCUMENT

I certainly agree with the majority that not every

case of malpractice will give rise to a negligent cre- dentialing claim. However, as the Chief Justice points out, every negligent credentialing claim will

by necessity arise out of a malpractice claim be- cause the plaintiff must have been injured by the hospital's actions in negligently credentialing the physician in question. Therefore, it seems to me that the cognizable event which is the accrual date for a malpractice action is the same point in time at which, as the majority writes, the “plaintiff discov- ers or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered some definitive information that would reasonably warrant investigation of the hospital's credentialing practices.” (Emphasis ad- ded.)

I disagree with the majority that use of this cogniz-

able event to trigger the statute of limitations for a

negligent credentialing claim will “encourage base- less claims of negligent credentialing and a hospital would be named in nearly every lawsuit involving the malpractice of a physician.” The majority *573 overlooks the fact that the malpractice action has a one-year limitations period while the negligent cre- dentialing claim will have a two-year limitations period. This allows plaintiffs additional time to in- vestigate whether the injury caused by the malprac- tice was a result of the hospital's negligent creden- tialing of the physician.

My view of the record is that the “cognizable event” as to both appellees with respect to the hos- pital took place at a far earlier time than the televi- sion show described by the majority. Accordingly, I would remand the matter to the trial court to de- termine the precise time frames involved.

Ohio,1993.

Browning v. Burt

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AUTHORIZED FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY KEYCITE Date of Printing: Jul 06, 2009 Browning v. Burt

AUTHORIZED FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY

KEYCITE

Date of Printing: Jul 06, 2009

Browning v. Burt , 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993, 62 USLW 2116, 1993-Ohio-178 Browning v. Burt, 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993, 62 USLW 2116, 1993-Ohio-178 (Ohio,Jun 30, 1993) (NO. 91-2079, 91-2121, 7672)

History

Direct History

Browning v. Burt, 1991 WL 227775 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Aug 20, 1991) (NO. 12176)1

1

Motion to Certify Allowed by

Browning v. Burt, 62 Ohio St.3d 1496, 583 N.E.2d 967 (Ohio Jan 15, 1992) (Table, NO.2

2

=>

91-2079)

AND Judgment Affirmed by

3 Browning v. Burt, 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993, 62 USLW 2116, 1993-Ohio-178 (Ohio Jun 30, 1993) (NO. 7672, 91-2079, 91-2121)

Rehearing Denied by

Browning v. Burt, 67 Ohio St.3d 1439, 617 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio Aug 25, 1993) (Table, NO.4

4

91-2079)

 

AND Rehearing Denied by

Mitchell v. Burt, 67 Ohio St.3d 1439, 617 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio Aug 25, 1993) (Table, NO. 91-2121)5

5

 

AND Certiorari Denied by

St. Elizabeth Medical Center v. Browning, 510 U.S. 1111, 114 S.Ct. 1054, 127 L.Ed.2d 375, 62 USLW 3542, 62 USLW 3551 (U.S.Ohio Feb 22, 1994) (NO. 93-832)6

6

Mitchell v. Burt, 1991 WL 163437 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Aug 26, 1991) (NO. 12244)7

7

 

Motion to Certify Allowed by

Mitchell v. Burt, 62 Ohio St.3d 1502, 583 N.E.2d 973 (Ohio Jan 22, 1992) (Table, NO. 91-2121)8

8

=>

AND Judgment Affirmed by

9 Browning v. Burt, 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993, 62 USLW 2116, 1993-Ohio-178 (Ohio Jun 30, 1993) (NO. 7672, 91-2079, 91-2121)

Rehearing Denied by

Browning v. Burt, 67 Ohio St.3d 1439, 617 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio Aug 25, 1993) (Table, NO.30, 1993) (NO. 7672, 91-2079, 91-2121) Rehearing Denied by 10 91-2079) AND Rehearing Denied by Mitchell

10

91-2079)

AND Rehearing Denied by

Mitchell v. Burt, 67 Ohio St.3d 1439, 617 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio Aug 25, 1993) (Table, NO. 91-2121)25, 1993) (Table, NO. 10 91-2079) AND Rehearing Denied by 11 AND Certiorari Denied by St.

11

AND Certiorari Denied by

St. Elizabeth Medical Center v. Browning, 510 U.S. 1111, 114 S.Ct. 1054, 127 L.Ed.2d 375, 62688 (Ohio Aug 25, 1993) (Table, NO. 91-2121) 11 AND Certiorari Denied by 12 © 2009

12

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AUTHORIZED FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY

USLW 3542, 62 USLW 3551 (U.S.Ohio Feb 22, 1994) (NO. 93-832)

Negative Citing References (U.S.A.)

Declined to Extend by

Negative Citing References (U.S.A.) Declined to Extend by 13 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.

13 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 129 Ohio App.3d 45, 716 N.E.2d 1201

(Ohio App. 2 Dist. Jul 10, 1998) (NO. 16518)

716 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Jul 10, 1998) (NO. 16518) HN: 1,15 (N.E.2d) Distinguished

HN: 1,15 (N.E.2d)

Distinguished by

14 Cramer v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 158 Ohio App.3d 110, 814 N.E.2d 97, 2004-Ohio-3891 (Ohio

14 Cramer v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 158 Ohio App.3d 110, 814 N.E.2d 97, 2004-Ohio-3891 (Ohio App. 1 Dist. Jul 23, 2004) (NO. C-030827, C-040061)

Cincinnati, 158 Ohio App.3d 110, 814 N.E.2d 97, 2004-Ohio-3891 (Ohio App. 1 Dist. Jul 23, 2004)
15 Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 109 Ohio St.3d 491, 849 N.E.2d 268, 2006-Ohio-2625 (Ohio

15 Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 109 Ohio St.3d 491, 849 N.E.2d 268, 2006-Ohio-2625 (Ohio

May 31, 2006) (NO. 2005-0702, 2005-0734, 2897)

(Ohio May 31, 2006) (NO. 2005-0702, 2005-0734, 2897) HN: 12,13,14 (N.E.2d) 16 Jett v. Interim Healthcare,

HN: 12,13,14 (N.E.2d)

16 Jett v. Interim Healthcare, 2008 WL 5104678, 2008-Ohio-6332 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Dec 05, 2008)

(NO. 22727)

2008-Ohio-6332 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Dec 05, 2008) (NO. 22727) HN: 4,5 (N.E.2d) Court Documents Appellate

HN: 4,5 (N.E.2d)

Court Documents

Appellate Court Documents (U.S.A.)

Ohio Appellate Briefs

17 In the Case of Jimmie Dean BROWNING, Et Al., Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. James BURT, M.D., Et Al., Defendants - Appellants., 1991 WL 11236700 (Appellate Brief) (Ohio Oct. 17, 1991) Brief Amicus Curiae of Ohio Hospital Association in Support of Jurisdiction (NO. 91-2079)

18 Coney MITCHELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James C. BURT, M.D., Defendant Max Blue, M.D., St. Elizabeth Medical Center, Defendant-Appellants., 1991 WL 11236706 (Appellate Brief) (Ohio Dec. 31, 1991) Plaintiff-Appellee Connie Mitchell's Opposition to Defendant-Appel- lant St. Elizabeth Medical Center's Motion to Strike Appendix (NO. 91-2121)

19 In the Case of Jimmie Dean BROWNING, Et Al., Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. James BURT, M.D., Et Al., Defendants - Appellants., 1992 WL 12137617 (Appellate Brief) (Ohio Feb. 24, 1992) Brief Amicus Curiae of Ohio Hospital Association (NO. 91-2079)

20 In the Case of Coney MITCHELL, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. James BURT, M.D., Et Al., Defend- ants - Appellants., 1992 WL 12137630 (Appellate Brief) (Ohio Feb. 28, 1992) Brief Amicus Curiae of Ohio Hospital Association (NO. 91-2121)

21 Jimmie Dean BROWING, et al., Appellees, v. James C. BURT, M.D., Defendant, Max Blue, M.D., and St. Elizabeth Medical Center, Appellants., 1992 WL 12137618 (Appellate Brief) (Ohio Mar. 05, 1992) Brief of Appellant St. Elizabeth Medical Center (NO. 91-2079)

22 Jimmie Dean BROWNING, et al., Plaintiff-Appellees, v. James C. BURT, M.D., Defendant Max Blue, M.D. and St. Elizabeth Medical Center, Defendant-Appellants., 1992 WL 12137619 (Appellate Brief) (Ohio Mar. 06, 1992) Defendant-Appellant Dr. Max Blue's Brief (NO.

91-2079)

23 Coney MITCHELL, Appellee, v. James C. BURT, M.D., Defendant, St. Elizabeth Medical Cen- ter, Appellant., 1992 WL 12137631 (Appellate Brief) (Ohio Mar. 11, 1992) Brief of Appellant

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

AUTHORIZED FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY

St. Elizabeth Medical Center (NO. 91-2121)

24 Jimmie Dean BROWNING, et al., Appellees, v. James C. BURT, M.D., et al., Appellants. Coney Mitchell, Appellee, v. James C. Burt, M.D., et al., Appellants., 1992 WL 12137620 (Appellate Brief) (Ohio Jun. 12, 1992) Brief of Appellees Jimmie Dean Browning, Lawrence Browning and Coney Mitchell (NO. 91-2079, 91-2121)

25 Jimmie Dean BROWNING, et al., Plaintiff-Appellees, v. James C. BURT, M.D., Defendant Max Blue, M.D. and St. Elizabeth Medical Center, Defendant-Appellants., 1992 WL 12137621 (Appellate Brief) (Ohio Jul. 02, 1992) Defendant-Appellant Dr. Max Blue's Reply Brief (NO.

91-2079)

26 Jimmie Dean BROWNING, et al., Appellees, v. James C. BURT, M.D., Defendant, Max Blue, M.D., Et Al., Appellants. Coney Mitchell, Appellee, v. James C. Burt, M.D., Defendant, St. Elizabeth Medical Center, Appellant., 1992 WL 12137622 (Appellate Brief) (Ohio Jul. 21, 1992) Reply Brief of Appellant St. Elizabeth Medical Center (NO. 91-2079/2121)

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Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for CROTTY,PATRICK

Date/Time of Request:

Monday, July 6, 2009 11:17 Central

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AUTHORIZED FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY KEYCITE Date of Printing: Jul 06, 2009 Browning v. Burt

AUTHORIZED FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY

KEYCITE

Date of Printing: Jul 06, 2009

Browning v. Burt , 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993, 62 USLW 2116, 1993-Ohio-178 Browning v. Burt, 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993, 62 USLW 2116, 1993-Ohio-178 (Ohio Jun 30, 1993) (NO. 91-2079, 91-2121, 7672)

Citing References

Negative Cases (U.S.A.)

Declined to Extend by

References Negative Cases (U.S.A.) Declined to Extend by 1 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.

1 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 716 N.E.2d 1201, 1204+, 129 Ohio

App.3d 45, 49+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Jul 10, 1998) (NO. 16518) "

45, 49+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Jul 10, 1998) (NO. 16518) " HN: 1,15 (N.E.2d) Distinguished

HN: 1,15 (N.E.2d)

Distinguished by

2

Jett v. Interim Healthcare, 2008 WL 5104678, *2+, 2008-Ohio-6332, 6332+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist.

Dec 05, 2008) (NO. 22727) "

HN: 4,5 (N.E.2d)

HN: 4,5 (N.E.2d)

 

Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 849 N.E.2d 268, 273+, 109 Ohio St.3d 491, 495+, 2006-Ohio-2625, 2625+ (Ohio May 31, 2006) (NO. 2005-0702, 2005-0734, 2897) " HN: 12,13,14 (N.E.2d) HN: 12,13,14 (N.E.2d)

3

491, 495+, 2006-Ohio-2625, 2625+ (Ohio May 31, 2006) (NO. 2005-0702, 2005-0734, 2897) " HN: 12,13,14 (N.E.2d)

Cramer v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 814 N.E.2d 97, 101+, 158 Ohio App.3d 110, 115+, 2004-Ohio-3891, 3891+ (Ohio App. 1 Dist. Jul 23, 2004) (NO. C-030827, C-040061)4

4

97, 101+, 158 Ohio App.3d 110, 115+, 2004-Ohio-3891, 3891+ (Ohio App. 1 Dist. Jul 23, 2004)
 

Positive Cases (U.S.A.)

 
Examined

Examined

Dicks v. U.S. Health Corp. of Southern Ohio, 1996 WL 263239, *1+ (Ohio App. 4 Dist. May 10, 1996) (NO. 95 CA 2350) " HN: 1,6,7 (N.E.2d) HN: 1,6,7 (N.E.2d)

5

Phillips v. Burt, 1995 WL 353861, *3+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Jun 14, 1995) (NO. 14532) " HN: HN:

6

6,13,15 (N.E.2d)

Wilson v. Burt, 1994 WL 723506, *4+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Dec 07, 1994) (NO. 13096, 12389) " HN: 13,14,15 (N.E.2d) HN: 13,14,15 (N.E.2d)

7

Dresher v. Burt, 1994 WL 527675, *2+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Sep 28, 1994) (NO. 13088) " HN: HN:

8

6,13,16 (N.E.2d)

Kennard v. Burt, 1994 WL 484167, *1+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Sep 09, 1994) (NO. 12388) " HN: HN:

9

13,14,15 (N.E.2d)

Miles v. Burt, 1994 WL 483521, *2+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Sep 07, 1994) (NO. 13098) " HN: HN:

10

12,13,14 (N.E.2d)

Kelsay v. Burt, 1994 WL 484180, *1+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Sep 07, 1994) (NO. 12463) " HN: HN:

11

1,13,15 (N.E.2d)

Jeffery v. Burt, 1994 WL 484184, *2+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Sep 07, 1994) (NO. 13086) " HN: HN:

12

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

AUTHORIZED FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY

13,14,15 (N.E.2d)

Chappell v. Burt, 1994 WL 484189, *2+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Sep 07, 1994) (NO. 13081) " HN: HN:

13

6,13,16 (N.E.2d)

Hopkins v. Burt, 1994 WL 484202, *2+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Sep 07, 1994) (NO. 13094) " HN: HN:

14

12,13,15 (N.E.2d)

Eiford v. Burt, 1994 WL 470319, *2+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Sep 02, 1994) (NO. 12392) " HN: HN:

15

13,14,15 (N.E.2d)

Tripoli v. Burt, 1994 WL 483505, *2+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Aug 07, 1994) (NO. 13082) " HN: HN:

16

12,13,14 (N.E.2d)

Moore v. Burt, 645 N.E.2d 749, 751+, 96 Ohio App.3d 520, 524+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Aug 03, 1994) (NO. 13097) " HN: 13,14,15 (N.E.2d) HN: 13,14,15 (N.E.2d)

17

Doe v. Lieberth, 2003 WL 25797041, *25797041+ (Trial Order) (Ohio Com.Pl. May 30, 2003) (NO. 03497920)18

18

 
  Discussed

Discussed

Norgard v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 766 N.E.2d 977, 979+, 95 Ohio St.3d 165, 167+, 2002-Ohio-2007, 2007+ (Ohio May 08, 2002) (NO. 2001-0063) " HN: 13,14 (N.E.2d) HN: 13,14 (N.E.2d)

19

Phillips v. Burt, 673 N.E.2d 1380, 1380+, 77 Ohio St.3d 1229, 1230+, 1997-Ohio-268, 268+ (Ohio Jan 22, 1997) (NO. 95-1522, 9498) (in dissent) HN: 15 (N.E.2d) (in dissent) HN: 15 (N.E.2d)

20

Dresher v. Burt, 662 N.E.2d 264, 265+, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 280+, 1996-Ohio-107, 107+ (Ohio Mar 06, 1996) (NO. 94-2612, 9147) HN: 4 (N.E.2d) HN: 4 (N.E.2d)

21

Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 629 N.E.2d 402, 408+, 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 538+, 89 Ed. Law Rep. 580, 580+, 1994-Ohio-531, 531+ (Ohio Mar 30, 1994) (NO. 92-2392, 8064) " HN: HN:

22

11,13,15 (N.E.2d)

Erwin v. Bryan, 2009 WL 418753, *4+, 2009-Ohio-758, 758+ (Ohio App. 5 Dist. Feb 10, 2009) (NO. 08-CA-28) " HN: 14 (N.E.2d) HN: 14 (N.E.2d)

23

Schelling v. Humphrey, 2007 WL 2965773, *2+, 2007-Ohio-5469, 5469+ (Ohio App. 6 Dist. Oct 12, 2007) (NO. WM-07-001) " HN: 1,6,7 (N.E.2d) HN: 1,6,7 (N.E.2d)

24

Summers v. Midwest Allergy Associates, Inc., 2002 WL 31894902, *3+, 2002-Ohio-7357, 7357+ (Ohio App. 10 Dist. Dec 31, 2002) (NO. 02AP-280) HN: 4,5,11 (N.E.2d) HN: 4,5,11 (N.E.2d)

25

Grandillo v. Montesclaros, 739 N.E.2d 863, 871+, 137 Ohio App.3d 691, 701+, 2000-Ohio-1839, 1839+ (Ohio App. 3 Dist. May 25, 2000) (NO. 13-99-49) " HN: 5,6 (N.E.2d) HN: 5,6 (N.E.2d)

26

Spriestersbach v. Ohio Edison Co., 1995 WL 641146, *2+ (Ohio App. 9 Dist. Nov 01, 1995) (NO. 95CA006026) " HN: 13,15 (N.E.2d) HN: 13,15 (N.E.2d)

27

Hanks v. Burt, 650 N.E.2d 955, 956+, 99 Ohio App.3d 403, 405+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Dec 21, 1994) (NO. 14616) " HN: 14 (N.E.2d) HN: 14 (N.E.2d)

28

Ginter v. Burt, 1994 WL 484196, *1+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Sep 07, 1994) (NO. 13091) " HN: HN:

29

13,14 (N.E.2d)

Yearyean v. Burt, 1994 WL 472097, *2+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Sep 02, 1994) (NO. 12546) " HN: HN:

30

13,15 (N.E.2d)

Koth v. Burt, 1994 WL 472230, *2+ (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Sep 02, 1994) (NO. 12391) " HN: HN:

31

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AUTHORIZED FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY

12,13,15 (N.E.2d)

Holmes v. Community College of Cuyahoga Cty., 647 N.E.2d 498, 502+, 97 Ohio App.3d 678, 684+, 98 Ed. Law Rep. 357, 357+ (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Aug 11, 1994) (NO. 66025) " HN: 1 HN: 1

32

(N.E.2d)

Jane DOE, #1, et. al, Plaintiffs, v. ARCHDIOCESE OF CINCINNATI, et. al, Defendants., 2004 WL 5346114, *5346114+ (Trial Order) (Ohio Com.Pl. Oct 08, 2004) Decision, Order and Entry Sustaining in Part and Overruling in Part Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Decision, Order and Entry Sustaining in Part and Overruling in Part Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Filed 5/14/04 and 6/25/04 (NO. 2004CV2016) HN: 11,15 (N.E.2d)

33

Pamela Jones MIDDLETON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Robert A. BAKER, M.D., et al., Defendants., 2003 WL 25293191, *25293191+ (Trial Order) (Ohio Com.Pl. May 14, 2003) Decision (NO. Decision (NO.

34

2001-CVA-114)

 
  Cited

Cited

Harris v. Liston, 714 N.E.2d 377, 379, 86 Ohio St.3d 203, 203, 1999-Ohio-159, 159 (Ohio Aug 25, 1999) (NO. 98-1338, 73644)35

35

Liddell v. SCA Serv. of Ohio, Inc., 635 N.E.2d 1233, 1238, 70 Ohio St.3d 6, 11, 1994-Ohio-328, 328 (Ohio Aug 03, 1994) (NO. 8231, 93-294) HN: 15 (N.E.2d) HN: 15 (N.E.2d)

36

Rome v. Flower Mem. Hosp., 635 N.E.2d 1239, 1241, 70 Ohio St.3d 14, 16, 1994-Ohio-43, 43 (Ohio Aug 03, 1994) (NO. 8211, 93-1517) HN: 4 (N.E.2d) HN: 4 (N.E.2d)

37

Desai v. Franklin, 895 N.E.2d 875, 883, 177 Ohio App.3d 679, 690, 2008-Ohio-3957, 3957 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. Aug 06, 2008) (NO. 23930, 23939) HN: 10 (N.E.2d) HN: 10 (N.E.2d)

38

Huntsman v. Aultman Hosp., 2008 WL 2572598, *7, 2008-Ohio-2554, 2554 (Ohio App. 5 Dist. May 27, 2008) (NO. 2006 CA 00331) HN: 16 (N.E.2d) HN: 16 (N.E.2d)

39

Legg v. Hallet, 2007 WL 4305900, *6+, 2007-Ohio-6595, 6595+ (Ohio App. 10 Dist. Dec 11, 2007) (NO. 07AP-170) HN: 6,16 (N.E.2d) HN: 6,16 (N.E.2d)

40

Doe v. Robinson, 2007 WL 3120279, *4, 2007-Ohio-5746, 5746 (Ohio App. 6 Dist. Oct 26, 2007) (NO. L-07-1051) HN: 10 (N.E.2d) HN: 10 (N.E.2d)

41

Craver v. Doogan, 2006 WL 902420, *1, 2006-Ohio-1783, 1783 (Ohio App. 12 Dist. Apr 10, 2006) (NO. CA2005-06-055)42

42

Smith v. Manor Care of Canton, Inc., 2006 WL 636975, *4, 2006-Ohio-1182, 1182 (Ohio App. 5 Dist. Mar 13, 2006) (NO. 2005-CA-00100, 2005-CA-00174, 2005-CA-00160, 2005-CA-00162)43

43

Akers v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., 2005 WL 2387615, *6, 2005-Ohio-5160, 5160 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. Sep 29, 2005) (NO. 04AP-575) HN: 16 (N.E.2d) HN: 16 (N.E.2d)

44

Brzozowski v. Univ. Hospitals Health Systems, 2005 WL 1245631, *2+, 2005-Ohio-2628, 2628+ (Ohio App. 8 Dist. May 26, 2005) (NO. 85097) HN: 6,16 (N.E.2d) HN: 6,16 (N.E.2d)

45

Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2005 WL 517345, *4, RICO Bus.Disp.Guide 10,857, 10857, 2005-Ohio-960, 960 (Ohio App. 3 Dist. Mar 07, 2005) (NO. 17-04-10) HN: 12 (N.E.2d) HN: 12 (N.E.2d)

46

Sutton v. Wukmir, 2004 WL 3090179, *3, 2004-Ohio-7215, 7215 (Ohio App. 7 Dist. Dec 28, 2004) (NO. 03-MA-233)47

47

Doe v. Catholic Diocese of Cleveland, 813 N.E.2d 977, 985, 158 Ohio App.3d 49, 59, 2004-Ohio-3470, 3470 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Jul 01, 2004) (NO. 82542, 83021) (in dissent) (in dissent)

48

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AUTHORIZED FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY

Whiteman v. Rawitscher, 2003 WL 22149590, *2+, 2003-Ohio-4966, 4966+ (Ohio App. 6 Dist. Sep 19, 2003) (NO. L-02-1383) HN: 6,16 (N.E.2d) HN: 6,16 (N.E.2d)

Kay v. City Of Cleveland, 2003 WL 125280, *3+, 2003-Ohio-171, 171+ (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Jan 16, 2003) (NO. 81099) HN: 15 (N.E.2d) HN: 15 (N.E.2d)

Trangle v. Rojas, 782 N.E.2d 617, 622+, 150 Ohio App.3d 549, 555+, 2002-Ohio-6510, 6510+ (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Nov 27, 2002) (NO. 81190) HN: 6,16 (N.E.2d) HN: 6,16 (N.E.2d)

Wilson v. Barnesville Hosp., 783 N.E.2d 554, 558+, 151 Ohio App.3d 55, 60+, 2002-Ohio-5186, 5186+ (Ohio App. 7 Dist. Sep 27, 2002) (NO. 01 BA 40) HN: 6,16 (N.E.2d) HN: 6,16 (N.E.2d)

Ahmed v. University Hospitals Health Care System, Inc., 2002 WL 664026, *12, 2002-Ohio-1823, 1823 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Apr 18, 2002) (NO. 79016)App. 7 Dist. Sep 27, 2002) (NO. 01 BA 40) HN: 6,16 (N.E.2d) Saltis v. Lakes

Saltis v. Lakes Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 2001 WL 276346, *2 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. Mar 21, 2001) (NO. 20216)1823 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Apr 18, 2002) (NO. 79016) West 11th Street Limited Partnership v.

West 11th Street Limited Partnership v. City of Cleveland, 2001 WL 112121, *9, 2001-Ohio-4233, 4233 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Feb 08, 2001) (NO. 77327) HN: 9 (N.E.2d) HN: 9 (N.E.2d)

Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 2000 WL 1060649, *5 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Aug 03, 2000) (NO. 76594)(Ohio App. 8 Dist. Feb 08, 2001) (NO. 77327) HN: 9 (N.E.2d) Makris v. Scandinavian Health

Makris v. Scandinavian Health Spa, Inc., 1999 WL 759989, *2 (Ohio App. 7 Dist. Sep 20, 1999) (NO. 98 CA 183)WL 1060649, *5 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Aug 03, 2000) (NO. 76594) Talwar v. Kattan, 1999

Talwar v. Kattan, 1999 WL 446435, *6+, 16 IER Cases 121, 121+, 1999-Ohio-803, 803+ (Ohio App. 3 Dist. Jun 17, 1999) (NO. 1-98-83) HN: 16 (N.E.2d) HN: 16 (N.E.2d)

Harris v. Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp., 1998 WL 574557, *3 (Ohio App. 7 Dist. Aug 26, 1998) (NO. 95 CA 129) " HN: 4 (N.E.2d) HN: 4 (N.E.2d)

Cooke v. Sisters of Mercy, 1998 WL 221320, *3+ (Ohio App. 12 Dist. May 04, 1998) (NO. CA97-09-181) HN: 5 (N.E.2d) HN: 5 (N.E.2d)

Sullivan v. St. Charles Hosp., 1997 WL 728624, *2 (Ohio App. 6 Dist. Nov 21, 1997) (NO. L- 97-1101) HN: 16 (N.E.2d) HN: 16 (N.E.2d)

Dutton v. Acromed Corp., 691 N.E.2d 738, 743+, 117 Ohio App.3d 804, 813+ (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Jan 27, 1997) (NO. 69332, 69333, 69358) " HN: 4 (N.E.2d) HN: 4 (N.E.2d)

Squire v. Castle Ins. Co., 1996 WL 761232, *4 (Ohio App. 11 Dist. Dec 13, 1996) (NO. 96-T-5399) HN: 9 (N.E.2d) HN: 9 (N.E.2d)

O'Neill v. St. Luke's Medical Center, 1996 WL 684343, *5+, 13 IER Cases 534, 534+ (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Nov 27, 1996) (NO. 70372) HN: 16 (N.E.2d) HN: 16 (N.E.2d)

Butler v. Jewish Hospitals, Inc., 1995 WL 256297, *1 (Ohio App. 1 Dist. May 03, 1995) (NO. C- 940119) HN: 5 (N.E.2d) HN: 5 (N.E.2d)

Kalb v. Morehead, 654 N.E.2d 1039, 1042+, 100 Ohio App.3d 696, 700+ (Ohio App. 4 Dist. Jan 26, 1995) (NO. 93 CA 2178, 93 CA 2179) HN: 6,13,16 (N.E.2d) HN: 6,13,16 (N.E.2d)

Greenstreet v. Bickers, 647 N.E.2d 214, 216+, 97 Ohio App.3d 610, 614+ (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Oct 12, 1994) (NO. 66680) " HN: 5 (N.E.2d) HN: 5 (N.E.2d)

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137 QUALITY ASSURANCE AND HOSPITAL STRUCTURE: HOW THE PHYSICIAN-HOSPIT- AL RELATIONSHIP AFFECTS QUALITY MEASURES, 12

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140 YOU DO KNOW WHAT YOU'RE DOING? RIGHT, DOC? MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT CONTEMPLATES NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING

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144 CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGE OF PEER REVIEW INFORMATION: MORE IMA- GINED THAN REAL, 7 J.L.

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145 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW, MORALITY AND THE CULTURE WARS A Critical As- sessment of the

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146 PREFACE, 20 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1105, 1108+ (1994) HN: 12,14 (N.E.2d)

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147 OHIO COURT DECISIONS: 1992-93, 20 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 379, 402 (1993)

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148 NEGLIGENCE: STRUBHART v. PERRY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL: TAMING THE MON- STER OF CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE OR

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151 NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING: OHIO EXPANDS HOSPITAL LIABILITY IN THE WAKE OF "SURGERY OF LOVE," Browning

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152 SELECTED CASES: LIABILITY THEORIES AND BURDEN OF PROOF, SN031 American Law Institute-American Bar Association 41 (2008) HN: 6,14 (N.E.2d)

153 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW: LIABILITY THEORIES AND BURDEN OF PROOF, SM007 American Law Institute-American Bar Association 41 (2006)

154 TORT LIABILITY, SK072 American Law Institute-American Bar Association 89 (2005)

155 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW: THEORIES OF LIABILITY, SJ092 American Law Institute- American Bar Association 73 (2004)

156 TORT LIABILITY OF PHYSICIANS, HOSPITALS, AND OTHER HEALTH CARE PRO- VIDERS, SG095 American Law Institute-American Bar Association 29 (2002)

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158 WINTER2003 ATLA - Convention Reference Material 577, WHEN CLERGY FAIL THEIR FLOCK-INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTION, HEALING, AND JUSTICE (2003)

159 9/19/94 BNA Toxics Law Daily D2, Chlorine Gas: OHIO HIGH COURT EXTENDS DISCOV- ERY RULE TO TOXIC EXPOSURE SUITS INVOLVING CHLORINE (1994)

160 1/5/94 BNA U.S. Law Week - Supreme Court Today D2, Appellate Docket LIST OF CASES CARRIED OVER TO THE 1993-94 APPELLATE DOCKET (1994)

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Appellate Petitions, Motions and Filings

164 Survivor DOE, et al., Appellees, v. Gerald ROBINSON et al., Appellants., 2008 WL 974805, *974805 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ohio Jan 03, 2008) Survivor Does' Memor- andum In Opposition to Jurisdiction (NO. 2007-2271)

165 Loretta SCHELLING, et al., Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Stephen HUMPHREY, M.D., et al., Defend- ant/Appellant., 2007 WL 5082290, *5082290+ (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ohio Dec 21, 2007) Memorandum in Opposition to Jurisdiction of Appellee Loretta Schelling (NO.

to Jurisdiction of Appellee Loretta Schelling (NO. 2007-2202) 166 Donna GRIMME, et al., Appellees, v. TWIN

2007-2202)

Jurisdiction of Appellee Loretta Schelling (NO. 2007-2202) 166 Donna GRIMME, et al., Appellees, v. TWIN VALLEY

166 Donna GRIMME, et al., Appellees, v. TWIN VALLEY COMMUNITY LOCAL SCHOOL DIS- TRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Appellants., 2007 WL 5082278, *5082278+ (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ohio Dec 06, 2007) Memorandum in Support of Jur- isdiction of Appellant Fanning/howey Associates, Inc. (NO. 2007-2184)

167 Joseph A. PINGUE, Senior, Appellant, v. Joseph A. PINGUE, Junior, Appellee., 2007 WL 5082201, *5082201+ (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ohio Nov 30, 2007) Memor- andum in Response of Plaintiff/Appellee (NO. 07-2039)

168 Loretta SCHELLING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COMMUNITY HOSPITALS OF WILLIAMS COUNTY, Defendant-Appellant., 2007 WL 5082289, *5082289+ (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ohio Nov 26, 2007) Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, Ohio Hospital Association, in Support of Jurisdiction (NO. 07-2202)

169 Loretta SCHELLING, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. COMMUNITY HOSPITALS OF WILLIAMS COUNTY, Defendant/Appellant., 2007 WL 5082288, *5082288+ (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ohio Nov 20, 2007) Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction of Appellant Com- munity Hospitals of Williams County (NO. 07-2202)

170 John DOE, et al. and Mary Moe, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF CLEVELAND, et al., Defendants-Appellees., 2006 WL 4823034, *4823034+ (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ohio Nov 22, 2006) Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction of Plaintiffs-Appellants (NO. 2006-2164)

171 Sandra K. RICHARDS, et al., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George M. KERLAKIAN, M.D., et al., De- fendants-Appellants., 2005 WL 5469349, *5469349+ (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ohio Oct 10, 2005) Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction of Appellants George M. Ker- lakian, M.D. and Group Health Associates, Inc. (NO. 2005-1905)

172 Nancy L. JOHNSON, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Antoine Said MUNTHER, M.D., Defendant- Appellee., 2005 WL 5489199, *5489199+ (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ohio Sep 13, 2005) Memorandum by Antoine Said Munther, M.D., in Opposition to Appellants' Memor- andum in Support of Claimed Jurisdiction (NO. 2005-1584)

173 Christine A. BRZOZOWSKI, Executrix of the Estate of Lewis Richter, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants., 2005 WL 5478832, *5478832+ (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ohio Jul 21, 2005) Memor- andum in Support of Jurisdiction (NO. 2005-1332)

174 John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARCHDIOCESE OF CINCINNATI, et al., Defendants-Appel-

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lants., 2005 WL 5431146, *5431146+ (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ohio Apr 21, 2005) Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction of Appellants the Archdiocese of Cincinnati and Archbishop Daniel Pilarczyk (NO. 05-0702)

175 Bruce GEHRING, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ARCHDIOCESE OF CINCINNATI, et al., De- fendants-Appellees., 2005 WL 5434375, *5434375+ (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ohio Mar 15, 2005) Memorandum in Opposition to Jurisdiction of Defendants-Appellees the Archdiocese of Cincinnati and Archbishop Daniel Pilarczyk (NO. 2005-0330)

176 John Doe Numbers 1-7, 11, 12, 14-20, 22, 24-28, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Archdiocese of Cincin- nati, et al., Defendants-Appellees., 2005 WL 5434047, *5434047+ (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ohio Mar 09, 2005) Memorandum in Opposition to Jurisdiction of Defendants- Appellees the Archdiocese of Cincinnati and Archbishop Daniel Pilarczyk (NO. 2005-0262)

Cincinnati and Archbishop Daniel Pilarczyk (NO. 2005-0262) 177 Christy MILLER, Jane Doe #2, Teresa Ringel and
Cincinnati and Archbishop Daniel Pilarczyk (NO. 2005-0262) 177 Christy MILLER, Jane Doe #2, Teresa Ringel and
Cincinnati and Archbishop Daniel Pilarczyk (NO. 2005-0262) 177 Christy MILLER, Jane Doe #2, Teresa Ringel and

177 Christy MILLER, Jane Doe #2, Teresa Ringel and John Doe Numbers 1-17, 19-25, 32-37, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ARCHDIOCESE OF CINCINNATI, et al., Defendants-Appellees., 2005 WL 5434050, *5434050+ (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ohio Mar 09, 2005) Memor- andum in Opposition to Jurisdiction of Defendants-Appellees the Archdiocese of Cincinnati and Archbishop Daniel Pilarczyk (NO. 2005-0263)

178 Bruce GEHRING, et al., Appellants, v. ARCHDIOCESE OF CINCINNATI, et al., Appellees., 2005 WL 5434374, *5434374+ (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (Ohio Feb 14, 2005) Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction of Appellants Bruce Gehring, et al. (NO.

of Jurisdiction of Appellants Bruce Gehring, et al. (NO. 2005-0330) 179 John Doe Numbers 1-7, 11,

2005-0330)

of Appellants Bruce Gehring, et al. (NO. 2005-0330) 179 John Doe Numbers 1-7, 11, 12,14-20, 22,