met9203.

jnw PHILOSOPHY 201/301 METAPHYSICS KANT'S ARGUMENT FOR ABSOLUTE SPACE

Introduction: Absolute versus relational views of space '\That is space? Historically, there have been two main views on the nature of space. These are (a) The Absolute Theory of Space and (b) The Relational Theory of Space. Exactly what these theories are is rather difficult to explain. Roughly, the 'absolute' theory of space says that space is a thing. On this view, if we had to list all of the things in the universe, the list might include The Earth The Sun The Pacific Ocean Space New Zealand etc. On this view, space is just another one of the 'inhabitants' of the universe. Metaphorically speaking, it's just another one of the things our universe 'contains'. (Although note: it doesn't literally contain space.) Advocates of the relational theory of space say that this way of viewing things is wrong. They say that the Earth exists all right, and so does the Sun, etc. But it is a mistake to include space in this list. There is really no such thing as space, on the relational view. I think that our initial common-sense reaction favours what I am calling the relational view. Common sense seems to indicate that there is something confused or wrong with including space as one of the things that exist, along with New Zealand, the Pacific Ocean, etc. However, the absolutist (as I will call an advocate of the absolute theory of space) has a reply to this. 'How, then,' the absolutist may ask, 'do you account for the fact that sometimes we say things like "There is space between the book and the coffee cup" or "You have left too much space between these two letters" or "There is a great deal of space between the Milky Vlay and the galaxy of Andromeda"?, Th~se sentences, which we all are prepared. to assert, seem to commit us. to saying that there is indeed a thing called' space' . Consider the follov.ring sentence:

'There is a pen between this coffee cup and this book.' This sentence logically entails: 'There is a pen' which is just a way of saying 'A pen exists.' The inference from the first sentence to the conclusion' A pen exists' seems to be perfectly acceptable. But now consider the following inference: 'There is space between this coffee cup and this book.' so 'There is space'

that is ' Space exists.' The absolutist may argue that if we are prepared to accept the first inference to the conclusion that a pen exists, then consistency demands that we should also accept the second inference to the conclusion that space exists. So, the absolutist may conclude, we should say that space does exist. How would a relationist reply to this argument? Characteristically, the way relationists reply is as follows. They say: 'The sentence "There is space between this coffee cup and this book" is actually misleading, and should be replaced by another sentence. It should be replaced with some sentence such as "This pen and this book are spatially related in a particular way".' At first, this suggestion by the relationist might seem like a purely verbal quibble. But the point the relationists are making can be brought out by considering another example. Suppose that we say 'There is friendship between Mary and Jane.' It would clearly be strange to reason: 'There is friendship between Mary and lane.' Therefore 'There is friendship.'

that is 'Friendship exists.' Obviously we do not have here one entity (Mary), another entity (lane) and a third entity (friendship) that exists between them, as, say, a chair might exist between them. We have only two entities -- Mary and lane -- who. are friends. Vole might say 'There is friendship between lane and Mary' but this is just a long way of saying that lane and Mary are both friends.

\Ve can use another example to illustrate the same point. Suppose that Mike and Mal are brothers. We might say 'There is a relation of brotherhood between Mike and Mal' but it would clearly be foolish to conclude that we have here three things: l\1ike, Mal and the relation of brotherhood between them. That is, we do not have

;~".

Mike

Brotherhood

Mal

Rather, we only have two 'things: Mike and Mal. l\1ike and Mal are related as brothers, but that does not mean that there is a third entity -- brotherhood -- as well as Mike and Mal. Those who adopt a relationist view of space say we can adopt a similar view of statements about space. Consider the sentence: There is space between this book and this coffee cup. This should, according to the relationist, be interpreted as meaning: This book and this coffee cup are spatially related in a certain way where this does not mean that there are three things: the book, the cup and space, rather there are only two things, the book and the cup. Those two things are related spatially, but there are still only two things. (Just as Mike and Mal are related, but there are still only two things, not three things.) We can give a more general characterisation of the relational view of space as follows: Advocates of the relational view of space say that any sentence of the form: 'There is space between a and b.' should be understood as asserting ,a and b are spatially related.' (2) (1)

where (2) does not imply the existence of any entity space. (2) only implies the existence of the objects a and b. More briefly, advocates of the reladonis! view of space say that statements apparently about space should be properly understood as statements about relations between objects. (That is why their view is called the reladonis! view of space.)

In summary The Absolutist yiew of space is that space exists. Not only do objects in space such as tables, ._If.," chairs, cups, etc. exist, but also space itself exists. On the Relational view of space space does not exist. Only objects such as tables, chairs, etc. exist. These objects are spatially related, but space itself does not exist. (There is perhaps one point that needs to be cleared up here. The absolute view of space should not be confused with the view that the space that actually exists is Euclidean space. (Euclidean space is just the space of common sense.) Similarly the relational view of space should not be confused with the view that the space that actually exists in the universe is some strange non-Euclid~an space. It is possible to hold that actual space is Euclidean and hold a relational view of space.) \Vhich view is correct, the absolute view of space or the relational view? Before we start to critically evaluate the two views, we need to clarify the absolute view of space a little. The absolutists say that space exists. But exactly what type of thing is space claimed to be? If it is said 'There is space between this coffee cup and this book' so 'There is space',

it is being claimed that space is the type of thing that can lie between objects. So it seems to be assumed that space is some kind of substance -- perhaps something like air only more 'rarefied'. But such a view seems to be clearly quite VvTong.If space were some kind of substance then it would seem that it ought to be possible for it to, say, react chemically with other substances. But it obviously cannot do that. A scientist could say 'I will see if iron reacts with sulphuric acid' or 'I will see if helium reacts with sulphuric acid', but it would clearly be nonsensical for him to consider whether space reacts with sulphuric acid. But if space were a kind of substance, then it would not be nonsensical to ask whether it could react ",rith e.g. sulphuric acid. This constitutes a good reason for saying that space is not a substance. Another reason for saying that space is not a substance is that it seems to be possible to remove all the substance from a region and yet space remains. A region from which all space has been removed is a vacuum. Yet there is still space inside, e.g., an evacuated flask. Since it is possible to remove all substance and yet for space to remain, space cannot be a substance. So, let us grant that, whatever it is, space is not a substance. This raises the question of what it is. We ",rillreturn to this question later. .

\Vhich view of space is correct -- the absolute view or the relational yiew? I will now consider a famous argument for the absolute view of space. The argument is due to Kant. I \\rill call it Kant's handedness argument for absolute space. Kant's Handedness Argument for Absolute Space Consider your right hand and your left hand. There are certain differences between them but also certain similarities. There are some differences which :wewill ignore. For example, on the back of your left hand there may be a freckle that is absent from the back of your right hand. Ignore those differences. Still your right hand is different from your left hand. Try fitting vour left hand into a right-handed glove. You can't do it. 'What this shows is that the ~. ~shape of your left hand really is different from the shape of your right hand. Now, the shape of a thing is a spatial property of that thing. Roughly, to say that something has a certain shape is to make a claim about what space it occupies. So, your left hand and your right hand must occupy different space, and so their spatial properties must be different. Recall that, according to relationists, statements about space should be understood as really being statements about spatial relations between objects. Now, let us make two assumptions: Let us assume that there is nothing in the universe but a single human hand. Let us also assume for the sake of the argument that the relationist view of space is correct. Kant claims that this hand existing out in space would have to be either a left hand or a right hand. For example, it would have to fit into either a right hand glove or a left hand glove. If it didn't fit into either then we would doubt whether it is a human hand at all. Let us, for the sake of argument, grant that the hand would have to be a left hand or a right hand. We will come back to this point later. Now, as we noted before, a left hand and a right hand occupy different bits of space. You can't fit a left hand into a right handed glove, so the space a left hand occupies must be different from the space a right hand occupies. The question now arises, can a relationist account for the fact that a single human hand, existing out in space, would be either a left hand or a right hand? Kant argues that the relationist cannot account for this. Essentially what Kant argues is this. If there were nothing but a single human hand in the universe, and if the relationist view of space were correct, there would be no difference. between it being a left hand and it being a right hand. Note that Kant is not simply or merely claiming that if a single human hand were the only thing we could not tell whether it was right or left. Rather, he is claiming that if the relationists' view of space were correct, there

wouldn't actually be any difference between a left hand and a right hand. Why does Kant say this? We already know that a left hand and a right hand have a different shape. A left "hand and a right hand occupy different space. They must occupy different space, because they have a different shape. So, to say that a left hand and a right hand have different shape is to attribute some spatial difference to them. Now, relationists say that statements about space are really statements about objects that are spatially related. So, the relationist about space \\rill have to say that the following sentence: There would be some spatial difference between a left hand existing all by itself (i.e. as the only thing in the universe) and a right hand existing all by itself. is really a statement about objects that are spatially related. We have now arrived at the core of Kant's argument. Can the relationist say what the difference is between a left hand and a right hand in terms of spatial relations betw~en objects? It seems not. Consider a left hand existing out in space by itself. There will be certain spatial relationships between its parts. For example, there will be a certain angle between the thumb and the index finger. There will be certain angles between the other fingers. There 'Willbe other spatial relationships: for example, the little finger will be, say, 3/4 the length of the ring finger, and so on. Now, let's consider a right hand existing out in space by itself. Ignore differences like a freckle on the left hand that is not on the right hand. The point is, the right hand will have exactly the same spatial relationshipsbetween its parts as the left hand. There will be the same angle between the thumb and the index fmger, between the other fingers, etc. The spatial relationships between the various parts of the left hand will be exactly the same as the spatial relationships between the various parts of (he right hand. And if we assume that there aren't any other objects for the hands to be spatially related to, this means that all the spatial relationships that the left hand has, the right hand also has. But if they have all the same spatial relationships, then according to the relationist, there can be no spatial difference between them. But, if one of them is a left hand and the other is a right hand, there must be a spatial difference between them -- they have a different shape. So, the relationist view of space must be wrong. We can summarise the argument as follows:

1.
")

There is a difference in shape between a left hand and a right hand (a left hand won't fit into a right handed glove). Differences in shape are spatial differences. There is a spatial difference between a left hand and a right hand. (From 1 and 2)

).

4.

According to relationists, all claims about space are really claims about objects that are spatially related. According to relationists, any spatial difference between two objects (such as a left hand and a right hand) must be a difference between the spatial relationships between the parts of the left hand and the spatial relationships between the parts of the right hand. (From 4) If a human hand were the only object in the universe, it would have to be either a left hand or a right hand. Call this hand 'the solitary hand'. There would be a spatial difference between a left hand existing alone in the universe and a right hand existing alone in the universe. (From 1, 2 and 6) The relationist must say that the spatial difference between a solitary hand that was a left hand, and a solitary hand that was a right hand would be a difference between the spatial relationships that would hold between the parts of the left solitary hand and the right solitary hand. (From 5 and 7) But, there is no difference in the spatial relations that would hold between the parts of a solitary left hand the the parts of a solitary right hand. So, the relationist must say there is no spatial difference between a solitary left hand and a solitary right hand. (From 9) But there is a spatial difference between a solitary left hand and a solitary right hand. (They have a different shape.) (This is 7 again.) Therefore, the relationist view of space is v,Tong. (From 10, 11)

5.

6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12.

A Critical Eyaluation of Kant's Handedness Argument Step 6 in Kant's argument might be questioned. This step is that if a single human hand was the only object in the universe, it would have to be either a left hand or a right hand. This is a crucial step in Kant's argument, and some philosophers have denied it. They suggest that if a human hand were the only object in the universe, it would be indetenninate as to whether it was right or left. Why do they say this? To understand this, we need to look at why Kant said that if a hand were the only thing in existence, it would have to be either a right hand or a left hand. Kant's reason for saying this is as follows: i\ny hand must 'fit on' one wrist of a handless human body, but cannot fit on both. What does this mean? Suppose I put my right hand against my chest, so that my palm is pressed up against my chest. Then my thumb will point upwards. Similarly, if I put my left hand against my chest, with my palm. against my chest, my left thumb will point upward. Now, it's clear that only a right hand will fit onto a right v,Tistin this way. Suppose ;you put

a left hand onto a right v.Tist,and then pressed the palm of the hand against the chest. Then the thumb would point downward. Similarly, if you put a right hand on a left wrist, then the thumb would also point downward when the palm of the hand was pressed against the chest. This seems to provide us with a way of telling whether a hand -- floating out in space by itself as the only thing in the universe -- would be a left hand or a right hand.
.

If the solitaryhand were placed on a (handless)right human v.Tist,and the thumb

pointed up when the palm was placed against the chest, then the hand would be a right hand. If the thumb pointed down, then the hand would be a left hand.

But it seems to be possible to object to Kant's argument at this point. The difficulty is that this provides us with a way of telling whether the hand is left or right only if we know whether it is attached to a left or right human wrist. But now a new problem arises. If a handless human body was floating out in space all by itself, would it be determinate which of its wrists was the right wrist and which was the left? It seems though Kant's argumentfor as saying that the hand must be either right or left is based on the assumption that a human wrist would have to be either right or left. But this assumption is surely just as questionable as the original claim that the hand must be right or left. It is widely believed by philosophers that Kant's argument is faulty at this point. It seems as though Kant is guilty of the fallacy of begging the question, that is, of assuming (as one of the premises in the argument) the very thing that needs to be proved. However, is Kant guilty of this fallacy? I will argue that he is not. But before I do, I need to establish a preliminary; point. If we are to establish that' A or B' is true, do we need to establish that A is true or B is true? At first, it might not be clear what the question I am asking is, but it can be illustrated with an example. Consider the following setup:

I I

Let us suppose that you know what the system is like: Le., you know the internal design of the system and what it is like in the box even though you can't actually see inside the box. But, let us suppose that if you drop a marble in you do not know whether the marble goes into box A or Box B. However, because you know the internal design of what is in the box, you know that the marble must go into either box A or box B.

What this shO\vs is that sometimes you can know that' A or B' is true even though you do not know which of A or B is true. Now, what bearing does this have on Kant's argument? Kant says that if a single human hand were the only thing in the universe, it would have to be either a left hand or a right hand. His reason for saying this is that any hand must 'fit on' one wrist of a handless human body, but cannot fit on both. We can represent Kant's argument as follows: If a hand can fit on one wrist of a human body but not on both, then that hand must be left or right. Where what it means to say that a hand fits on a v.Tistis that, if it were attached to the wrist and the palm pressed against the chest, then the thumb must point upward. Now, expressed in this way, the above argument doesn't assume that any particular wrist is a left wrist or a right wrist. Also, it doesn't tell us if the hand is left or right in the sense that it doesn't tell us which one -- left or right -- the hand is. But, if the argument is sound, then it must tell us that the hand must be either left or right (it can't be both) even though it doesn't tell us which one it is. (Remember, sometimes we can know that' A or B' is true even though we don't know which of A or B is true.) And this is all that Kant's argument needs. (Step 6 of the argument is simply that a hand existing out in space would have to be either left or right -- it doesn't require that we be able to tell which it is.) So Kant's handedness argument seems to be a powerful one. However, it should be noted that many philosophers do not accept Kant's argument. Many philosophers accept that it begs the question. The points I have just made are not v.idely known amongst philosophers. An Extension of Kant's Handedness Argument

-- ~erlich's

Knees

We have seen that Kant has an argument which seems to show that the relationist view of space is wrong. It cannot explain why, if a human hand were the only thing in space, it would have to be a left hand or a right hand. On the relationist view of space, it seems, there would be no difference between a left hand and a right hand if they were the only things in space. This is an argument against the relationist view of space. Is it also an argument for an absolutist view of space? It would be if the following argument were sound: Premise One: Either the absolutist view of space is correct or the relationist view of space is correct. ?remise Two: The relationist view of space is not correct. Therefore: The absolutist view of space is correct.

We have seen Kant's argument for premise two. Is premise one correct? It may be correct, but then again it may not be. It would seem to be at least possible for there to be some third theory of space, neither relationist nor absolute. So the above argument cannot really be regarded as an absolutely conclusive argument for the absolute view of space. Are there any better arguments for the absolute view of space? Yes there are. At this point we must leave Kant and study a contemporary philosopher -- Graham Nerlich. Nerlich calls

these things

'knees':

The left knee

The right knee

These things have come to be knO\vnin the literature as 'Nerlich's knees'. Note that they exhibit many of the same features as hands. (In fact, they can be regarded as schematic hands.) There is a left one and a right one. They are reflections of each other, just as a right hand is a reflection of a left hand. And so on. Now, one difference between a left hand and a right hand is that they occupy different space. This can be shown by the fact that you can't put a right hand in a left glove -- at least without changing the shape of the glove. Also, the same thing applies to knees. We can represent the space occupied by a left knee by tracing around it on a flat piece of paper. Now, if we move the right knee around, keeping it on the paper all the time, we find that we can't get the right knee to occupy the same space as the left knee. In all this, Nerlich's knees are simple counterparts of the hands. Now, at this point, we need to briefly go into the concepts of one dimension, two dimensions and three dimensions. We can also speak of one-dimensional space, two-dimensional space and three-dimensional space (line, plane, ordinary space). The surface of a piece of paper or a blackboard can be regarded as a two-dimensional space. If we move the knees around only in two dimensional space, then we can never get the right knee to occupy the same space as the left knee. If we restrict the movement of the knees to two-dimensional space, then the relationship between the right knee and the left knee seems to be exactly the same as the relationship between the right hand and the left hand. But now, what happens if we allow the left knee to travel through three-dimensional space? If we lift the left knee off the piece of paper and turn it over, it is easy to then place it on the space occupied by the right knee. Now, the same effect can also be achieved by certain peculiar two-dimensional spaces, like the space represented by the surface of a Moebius strip. This is.a two-dimensional space like the surface of the blackboard, except that it has a mist in it. A right knee on the Moebius

strip can be made to occupy the same space as the left knee by taking it all the way around the strip. (But not if you just move it around locally.)

So what? you may very well ask. Well, let's notice an implication of this. If the knees can be moved around in three-dimensional space, or in a t\visted two-dimensional space like a Moebius strip, then there is no essential difference between a left knee and a right knee. But, if they are restricted to moving around in two-dimensional space, then there is an essential difference between a left knee and a right knee. This leads to the following important conclusion: Whether or not there is an essential difference between a left knee and a right knee depends upon the nature of the space that the knees are in. This is important because it means that the nature of space can be used to explain certain things. For example, suppose that there is an essential difference between the right knee and left knee. How do we explain this? We explain this by saying 'Because the knees are located in a flat (i.e. without twists) two-dimensional space.' Or if there is no essential difference between the knees, we can explain this by saying 'Because the knees can move through three-dimensional space.' The point is that this discussion shows that the nature of space can be used in explanations. Now, this has relevance for the theory of absolute space. The theory of absolute space is the theory that space exists and is a real thing. What Nerlich's argument shows is that space, or the nature of space, can be used in explanations. But it is widely accepted that if some thing X can be used to explain that thing it must be real, or exist. So, Nerlich's argument seems to show that space exists, or is real, because it can be used to explain certain things.

Why is it thought that if something can be used to provide explanations, then that thing exist, or is real? Well, consider, what evidence do we have that atoms exist? We cannot perceive them. We have evidence that they exist because the theory of the nature of atoms enables us to explain th~ results of numerous scientific experiments. We need not worry about the nature of those experiments here. So it seems to be a good principle that if X provides explanations for some facts, then we have good evidence that X is real. So, does Nerlich's argument show that space is real? It is important to note that there is a significant difference between the type of explanations provided by atoms and the type of observations provided by space. What type of thing might the hypothesis of atoms explain? A scientist might use the hypothesis of atoms to explain, for example, some yellow sparks or flashes observed on a screen. He would say that atoms perhaps caused these yellow flashes. So, atoms explain certain observations by causing them. In this sense the type of explanation offered by the theory of atoms is causal explanation. But space does not provide causal explanations in this sense. The shape of space does not cause there to be an essential difference benveen left and right knees. We can say that there is an essential difference betv.'een a left knee and a right knee if it is not possible to turn a left knee into the space occupied by a right knee, or, to turn a left knee into a right knee by moving it about. But whether or not it will be possible to do this will depend on the shape of space. In summary, the shape of space determines what movements are possible, which in turn determines whether it is possible to move a left knee into the space occupied by a right knee, which in turn determines whether there is an essential or real difference between left knees and right knees. The shape of space doesn't cause things, rather, it makes things possible; it makes certain motions possible. Now, before we said that we have good evidence that something is real if it provides explanations of things. But we must qualify that a little. V/hat most philosophers would accept is that if something X provides causal explanations of things, then we have good reason to believe that that thing X really exists. But we have just seen that space, or the shape of space, does not seem to provide causal explanations. So, it is to some extent unclear whether the explanation offered by the shape of space really constitutes a good reason for saying that space is real. This is not to say that space is not real, it's just to say that it's not clear how compelling the argument is. At this point another fact should be noted. Some philosophers say that the only genuine explanations are causal explanations. If this is accepted, then it is clear that the proposed explanation that uses the shape of space is.not a genuine explanation at all -- since it is not causal. Anyway, all this shows is that Nerlich's argument is not watertight. Some of the things that need to be sorted out if we are to settle whether Nerlich's argument is a good one are: What

sort of explanation is the explanation that appeals to the shape of space? Is it a genuine explanation? .Are all genuine explanations causal? Even if it's unclear what sort of explanation, if any, is employed, does it nevertheless give us good reason to believe that space exists? We haven't got time to go into these questions here, but you can perhaps think about them if you are interested in \\Titing an essay on this topic. Let's now go back to the human hand existing on its own in space. But before we do that we need to go into some preliminary questions about dimensions. We all know about the three dimensions. Could there be a fourth dimension? Mathematically, yes, although we can't visualise it: our minds are three dimensional. At this point, however, we should note something. \\That we are talking about here is a possible fourth spatial dimension. It is sometimes said that time is 'the fourth dimension'. That's OK. If you say that there are three spatial dimensions then there is nothing wrong \\ith saying that space is a fourth dimension. But it's probably less confusing if we just forget about time for the moment. The question is, could there be a fourth spatial dimension? The answer that is generally accepted is ' Yes', there could be, in the sense that it is a possible thing, not incoherent in any way. But it's just that there isn't a fourth spatial dimension; in actual fact there are only three. The fourth spatial dimension is, on this view, like a unicorn -- there could have been a unicorn, a unicorn is a completely possible thing, it's just that there happen not to be any unicorns. So, on this view, a fourth spatial dimension is an entirely possible thing, it's just that there happens to be no such thing. (We will briefly note in passing that modern physics has speculated that maybe space has more than three dimensions. As far as I know, the most recent theory in theoretical physics is that space may have eleven dimensions. \\Thy exactly eleven rather than some other number I have no idea. But we will not worry about that here.) Now, you will recall that as long as we moved a left knee around in two dimensional space (flat two-dimensional space, i.e. not a Moebius strip-type two-dimensional space), then we could not turn the left knee into a right knee. But if we moved the knee out of two-dimensional space and turned it around in three-dimensional space, then it was easy to turn it into a right knee. Also, if the left knee was put in a two-dimensional space with a twist in it, such as the space of a Moebius strip, then it was possible to turn it into a right knee. Now, consider a human hand out in space. Let us suppose it is a left hand. Suppose we move it around in a normal three-dimensional space. Then we know that we will not be able to turn it into a right hand. But now the question arises: Suppose that we could turn the left hand through four-dimensional space -- would it then be possible to turn it into a right hand? The answer to this question is 'Yes'. Similarly, if our three-dimensional space had a twist in it, analogous to the twist in a Moebius strip, then it would be possible to convert the left hand into a right hand by moving it all the way. around this space. What this shows is that whether or not there is an intrinsic or necessary difference between a left hand and a right hand depends upon the nature of the space that the hand is in. If the hand is in a flat (i.e. not twisted or bent in any way) three-dimensional space (Euclidean

space) then there is a necessary difference between a left hand and a right hand. But if the hand is in a four-dimensional space, or a three-dimensional space v.ith a twist in it (like the Moebius strip) then there isn't an essential difference between a left hand and a right hand. It is worthwhile briefly digressing at this point to consider some interesting implications of all this. Let us suppose, for example, that our three-dimensional space did have a twist in it like a Moebius strip. Then if a left hand was sent on a trip 'around the universe', it would come back as a right hand! Similarly, if a right handed person was sent on a trip around the universe in a rocket-ship, they would come back as a left-handed person, with their heart on the right side of their body, etc.! This would happen, not because their body had undergone any strange mutation or anything, but simply because their body had been turned around by the 'twist' in space. (Note, this would only happen if space had a Moebius-like twist in it, or if the body could somehowbe turned around in four-dimensional pace.) s Let us now return to our discussion of Kant's argument for absolute space. We have just seen that whether or not there is a necessary difference between a left hand and a right hand depends on the nature of the space that the hand is in. So, what happens to Kant's assumption that if a single human hand were the only thing in the universe it would have to be either a left hand or a right hand but not both? Have we discovered that this pr~mise in Kant's argument is false? We need to state things with care here. We can say (A) If space is assumed to be three-dimensional and flat (Euc1idean space) then, if a human hand were the only thing in the universe, it would have to be either a right hand or a left hand. If space is not assumed to be three-dimensional and flat -- if, for example, four-dimensional spaces are allowed or three-dimensional spaces with 'Moebius twists' in them, then, if a human hand were the only object in the universe, there would not be a determinate fact of the matter as to whether it was left or right. Kant evidently assumed that space was three-dimensional and flat. In Kant's day, that was the only type of space that was known. But if we allow that other spaces are possible, then Kant's assumption is not true. But does this really refute the basic thrust of Kant's argument? No, it doesn't. We still need space to account for things. In fact, in the light of our discussion, the basic argument for absolute space, which was what Kant was trying to defend, seems even stronger. First of all, we can note that a modified version of Kant's argument still goes through. Recall that one of the steps in Kant's argument was

(B)

6.

If a human hand were the only object in the universe, it would have to be either a left hand or a right hand (but not both).

Now, if we replace this premise with something like

6'.

If a human hand were the only object in the universe, and the space in that universe was the same as the space that actually exists, then that hand would have to be either a left hand or a right hand.

It might be thought that locutions such as 'the space in the universe is the same as the space that actually exists' beg the question against the relationist, since it involves talking about space as a thing. 'While such an objection would really just be a quibble, we can nevertheless meet it by replacing 6' with something like 6". If every object in the actual universe were destroyed except a single human hand, that human hand would have to be determinately either right or left.

Kant's argument would then go through. It would then show that one of the things that exist in the universe as it actually is, is absolute space, since you would need absolute space to explain why the hand was determinately either right or left, but not both. But let us not suppose that space is three-dimensional, flat space. Let us suppose, for example, that it is four dimensional. Then it will be false that if a hand were the only object in the universe, it would have to be determinately either right or left but not both. If this is so, what will happen to Kant's claim that any given human hand v.Tjll e able to fit onto one b human wrist correctly (i.e., when the palm is placed against the chest, the thumb points up), but not both? This argument will not go through. Why is this? Suppose we take a human hand that is a left hand. Then it will fit onto a left wrist correctly. We then take it off the left wrist, turn it around in four-dimensional space, and so turn it into a right hand, and then it will be able to fit onto the other wrist correctly. If the hand is in a four-dimensional space, it will be able to fit onto both wrists correctly. So, if space is allowed to be four-dimensional, Kant's argument doesn't go through. But note, if we do not make any assumptions about space, that is, if we allow all possible spaces -- i.e. three-dimensionalones, four-dimensional ones, flat ones, ones with twists in them, etc. -- then we will fmd that sometimes a hand can fit on both wrists, sometimes it will not. That is, if we consider all possible spaces, then there will be the following fact that requires explanation: Sometimes the hand can fit on both wrists, sometimes it cannot. How are we to explain this fact? The answer is that we explain it by appeal to the nature of space, or the shape .of space. But then space is playing an explanatory role. If space can play an explanatory role then we have good reason to believe that it is real, Le., that the theory of absolute space is correct. So, either way -- whether we restrict ourselves to three-dimensional
flat space, or consider all possible spaces

-- we

still get an argument going through showing

that the absolute theory of space is correct. But it should be noted that they are different arguments. If we assume three-dimensional flat space, then the argument for absolute space that goes through is the argument: There would be a difference between a left hand and a right hand even if it was the only object in the universe. But the relationist view of space cannot

account for that. So the relationist view of space is v,Tongand so the absolutist view of space is right 'by default' as it were. If we do not assume three-dimensional flat space but allow any sort of space, then the above argument does not go through, but another does. If we allow all possible spaces, then sometimes there will be an essential difference between a left hand and a right hand, sometimes not. We can explain this by appealing to the nature of space or the shape of space.. But then space plays an explanatory role and this constitutes evidence that space is a real thing. So this supports the absolutist view of space.