Literature on Convention Pelle Guldborg Hansen May 30, 2008

This extended list covering the literature on convention is part of a report to be titled: "Hansen, P.G. (2008) Readings on Convention, Working Paper #, Science Studies Group, Roskilde University". The criterion used for selection is that the article, paper, or book should at some point address some discussion within the theory of convention directly. Please do not cite without permission, but do remember to cite all that you like --- asking me will also help me directing your attention to the full report if it has become published in the meantime. If you should know of any literature that is missing from the list, do please let me know. Pelle Guldborg Hansen

Bibliography on the Theory of Convention

Aumann, Robert J. (1976) `Agreeing to disagree'. The Annals of Statistics, 4, 1236-1239. Bennett, Jonathan (1973) `The meaning-nominalist strategy'. Foundations of Language, 10, 141-68. Bicchieri, Cristina (1988) `Methodological rules as conventions'. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 18, 477-95. Bicchieri, Cristina (1993) Rationality and Coordination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.** Bicchieri, Cristina (2006) The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.** Binmore, Ken (1993) Game theory and the social contract Vol. 1: Playing Fair. Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press.** Binmore, Ken (1998) Game theory and the social contract Vol. 2: Just Playing. Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press.** Blume, Andreas & Temzelides, Ted (2003) `On the geography of conventions'. Economic Theory, 22, 863-73. Boyer, Robert & Orlan, Andr (1992) `How do conventions evolve?'. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2, 165-77. Bruin, B. de (2005) `Game theory in philosophy'. Topoi, 24, 197-208.

Burge, Tyler (1975) `On Knowledge and Convention'. The Philosophical Review, 84, 249-55. Charron, W. (1980) `Convention, games of strategy and Hume's philosophy of law and government'. American Philosophical Quarterly, 17, 327-34. Chwe, Michael Suk-Young (2001) Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge. Princeton University Press. (check year) Cooper, David E. (1977) `Lewis on our Knowledge of Conventions'. Mind, New Series, 86, 256-61. Cubitt, Robin & Sugden, Robert (2003) `Common knowledge, salience and convention: a reconstruction of David Lewis's game theory'. Economics and Philosophy, 19, 175-210. Davidson, Donald (1984) `Communication and convention'. Synthese, 59, 3-17. Delgado, Jordi (2002) `Emergence of social conventions in complex networks', Artificial Intelligence, 141, 171-85. Dupuy, Jean-Pierre (1989) `Convention et common knowledge'. Revue conomique, 40, 361-400. Dupuy, Jean-Pierre (1989) `Common knowledge, common sense'. Theory and Decision, 27, 37-62. Elster, Jon (1989) `Social norms and economic theory'. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, 99-117. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D. (1998) The Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press.** Garrod, Simon & Doherty, Gwyneth (1994) `Conversation, Co-ordination and Convention: An Empirical Investigation of How Groups Establish Linguistic Conventions'. Cognition, 53, 181-215. Gauthier, David (1975) `Coordination'. Dialogue, 14, 195-221. Gilbert, Margaret (1974) `About conventions'. Second-Order, 3, xx-xx.* Gilbert, Margaret (1981) `Game Theory and Convention'. Synthese, 46, 41-93. Gilbert, Margaret (1983) `Notes on the Concept of a Social Convention'. New Literary History, 14, 225-51. Gilbert, Margaret (1983) `Agreements, conventions, and language'. Synthese, 54, 375-407. Gilbert, Margaret (1983) `Some limitations of rationality', Journal of Philosophy, LXXX, 615. Gilbert, Margaret (1989) On Social Facts. Routledge.** Gilbert, Margaret (1989) `Rationality and salience'. Philosophical Studies, 57, 61-77. Gilbert, Margaret (1990) `Rationality, coordination and convention'. Synthese, 84, 1-21. Goyal, Sanjeev & Janssen, Maarten C.W. (1996) `Can we rationally learn to coordinate?'. Theory and Decision, 40, 2950. Goyal, Sanjeev & Janssen, Maarten C.W. (1997) `Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination'. Journal of Economic Theory, 77, 34-57. Grandy, Richard E. (1977) `Convention: A Philosophical Study by David K. Lewis'. The Journal of Philosophy, 74, 129-39. Green, Leslie (1985) `Authority and Convention'. The Philosophical Quarterly, 35, 329-46. Hjek, Alan (2006) `David Lewis'. The New Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Scribners.*

Hansen, Pelle G. (2007) Evolutionary games and social convention. In Athi-Veikko Pietraninen, editor, Game Theory and Linguistic Meaning vol. 18, Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface, Elsevier. Hansen, Pelle G. (2008) `Why mixed equilibria may not be conventions', forthcoming in Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 2008, edited by Finn Collin,... Hargreaves-Heap, Shaun & Varoufakis, Yanis (2002) `Some experimental evidence on the evolution of discrimination, co-operation and perceptions of fairness'. The Economic Journal, 112, 679--703. den Hartogh, G. (1998) `A conventionalist theory of obligation'. Law and Philosophy, 17, 351-76. den Hartogh, G. (2002) Mutual Expectations: A Conventionalist Theory of Law. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. Heal, Jane (1978) `Common knowledge'. Philosophical Quarterly, 28, 116-131. Hume, David (1740) A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge (2^{nd} edition). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.** Husak, Douglas N. & Thomas, George, C. (1992) `Date rape, social convention and reasonable mistakes'. Law and Philosophy, 11, 95-126. Van Huyck, J.; Battalio, R.; Mathur, S.; van Huyck, P. and Ortmann, A. (1995) `On the origin of convention: evidence from symmetric bargaining games'. International Journal of Game Theory, 95, 187-212. Van Huyck, J. (1997) `Emergent conventions in evolutionary games'. Forthcoming in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith (eds).* Jackman, Henry (1999) `Convention and language'. Synthese, 117, 295-312. Jamieson, D. (1975) `David Lewis on convention'. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 5, 73-81. Janssen, Maarten C.W. (1995) Rationalizing focal points. Tinbergen Institute Research paper No. TI95-35, Rotterdam.** Janssen, Maarten C.W. (2001) `On the principle of coordination'. Economics and Philosophy, 17, 221-234. Klein, Daniel B. (1997) `Convention, social Order, and the two coordinations'. Constitutional Political Economy, 8, 319-35. Kolstad, Ivar (2002) What constitutes a convention?: Implications for the coexistence of conventions. Discussion Paper, Bergen.* Kuflik, Arthur (1982) `Coordination, equilibrium, and rational choice'. Philosophical Studies, 42, 333--48. Latsis, J. S. (2005) `Is there redemption for conventions?'. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 29, 709-27. Leibenstein, H. (1984) `On the economics of conventions and institutions: an exploratory essay'. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 140, 74-86. Lecq, Fieke van der (1996) `Conventions and institutions in coordination problems'. De Economist, 144, 397-428. Lewis, David K. (1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.** Lewis, David K. (1975) `Languages and Language' in Keith Gunderson (ed.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7, University of Minnesota Press. Lewis, David K. (1976) `Convention: a reply to Jamieson'. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 6, 113-120.

Mansbridge, Jane (1998) `Starting with nothing: on the impossibility of grounding norms solely in self-interest'. In BenNer, Avner and Putterman, Louis (eds), Economics, Values, and Organization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.** Marmor, Andrei (1996) `On convention'. Synthese, 107, 349-71. Marmor, Andrei (2007) `Deep conventions'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74, 586-610. Metha, Judith; Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert (1994a) `Focal points in games with multiple equilibria: an experimental investigation'. Theory and Decision, 36, 163-85. Metha, Judith; Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert (1994b) `The nature of salience: an experimental investigation of pure coordination games'. American Economic Review, 84, 658-73. Miller, S. (1982) `Lewis on conventions'. Philosophical Papers, XI, 1-8. Miller, S. R. (1986) `Conventions, interdependence of action, and collective ends'. Nos, 20, 117-40. Miller, S. (1987) `Conventions, expectations and rationality'. Southern Journal of Philosophy, XXV, 357--72. Miller, S. (1987) `Conventions and Social Contracts'. Philosophical Papers, XVI, 85-106. Miller, Seumas (1990) `Rationalising conventions'. Synthese, 84, 23-41. Miller, Seumas (1992) `On conventions'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70, 435-44. Millikan, Ruth Garrett (1998) `Language conventions made simple'. The Journal of Philosophy, 95, 161-80. Mitchell, Lawrence E. (1999) `Understanding norms'. The University of Toronto Law Journal, 49, 177-248. Pettit, P. (1990)..... Postema, Gerald J. (1982) `Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law'. Journal of Legal Studies, XI, 165--203. Putnam, Hilary (1981) `Convention: a theme in philosophy'. New Literary History, 13, 1-14. Reynolds, Noel B. (1989) `Law as Convention'. Ratio Juris, 2, 105 - 20. van Rooy, Robert (2004) `Evolution of conventional meaning and conversational principles'. Synthese, 139, 331-66. van Rooy, Robert (2007) `The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure'. Bookreview in Studia Logica, 85, 13338. Schelling, Thomas C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.** Schiffer, Stephen (1972) Meaning. Oxford, chapter 5. Schlicht, Ekkehart (1998) On Custom in the Economy, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Schotter, Andrew (1981) The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shin, Hyun Song & Williamson, Timothy (1996) `How much common belief is necessary for convention?'. Games and Economic Behavior, 13, 252-68. Shoham, Yoav & Tennenholtz, Moshe (1997) `On the emergence of social conventions: modeling, analysis, and simulations'.*

Skyrms, Brian (1996) Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.** Skyrms, Brian (1998) `Salience and symmetry-breaking in the evolution of convention'. Law and Philosophy, 17, 41118. Skyrms, Brian (2000) `Game theory, rationality and evolution of the social contract'. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7, 269-84. Skyrms, Brian (2001) `The stag hunt'. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 75, 3141. Skyrms, Brian.(2004) The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007) `Convention', Stanford http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/convention (downloaded September 2007). Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Sugden, Robert (1986) The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.** Sugden, Robert (1989) `Spontaneous order'. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, 85-97. Sugden, Robert (1990) `Contractarianism and norms'. Ethics, 100, 768-86. Sugden, Robert (1990) `The coexistence of conventions'. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 28, 241-56. Sugden, Robert (1995) `A theory of focal points'. Economic Journal, 105, 533-50. Sugden, Robert (1998) 'Convention'. New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and Law. Sugden, Robert (1998) `The role of inductive reasoning in the evolution of conventions'. Law and Philosophy, 17, 377410. Sugden, Robert (1998) `Normative expectations: the simultaneous evolution of institutions and norms'. In Ben-Ner, Avner and Putterman, Louis (eds), Economics, Values, and Organization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.** Sugden, Robert (2000) `The motivating power of expectations'. In Nida-Rmelin, Julian and Spohn, Wolfgang (eds), Rationality, Rules and Structure. Dordrecht: Kluwer.** Sugden, Robert (2001) `The evolutionary turn in game theory'. Journal of Economic Methodology, 8, 113-130. Sugden, Robert (2001) `Ken Binmore's Evolutionary Social Theory'. Bookreview in The Economic Journal, 111, 21343. Sugden, Robert (2004) The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare (2^{nd} edition). Palgrave Macmillan.* Sugden, Robert & Zamarrn, Ignacio E. (2006) `Finding the key: the riddle of focal points'. Journal of Economic Psychology, 27, 609-21. Syverson, Paul F. (2003) Logic, Convention and Common Knowledge: A Conventionalist Account of Logic, University of Chicago Press. Ullmann-Margalit, Edna (1977) The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Clarendon Press.** Vanderschraaf, Peter (1994) Inductive learning, knowledge asymmetries and convention. In Ronald Fagin, editor, Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge V, Los Altos, California: Morgan Kaufman. Vanderschraaf, Peter (1995) `Convention as correlated equilibrium'. Erkenntnis, 42, 65-87.

Vanderschraaf, Peter (1998) `Knowledge, equilibrium and convention'. Erkenntnis, 49, 337-69. Vanderschraaf, Peter (1999) `Game theory, evolution, and justice'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 28, 325-58. Vanderschraaf, Peter (2001) Learning and Coordination: Inductive Deliberation, Equilibrium, and Convention, New York: Routledge. Verbeek, Bruno (2002) Instrumental Rationality and Moral Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Verbeek, Bruno (2002) `Game theory and moral norms: an overview and an application'. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 2, 337-52. Vromen, Jack, J. (2002) `Customs and conventions'. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 61, 511-8. Wrneryd, Karl (1990) `Conventions: an evolutionary approach'. Constitutional Political Economy, 1, 83-107. Young, H. Peyton (1993) `The evolution of conventions'. Econometrica, 61, 57-84. Young, H. Peyton (1996) `The economics of conventions'. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 105-22. Young, H. Peyton (1998) Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Young, H. Peyton (1998) `Social norms and economic welfare'. European Economic Review, 42, 821-30.