TIOPIANCO , FRANCIS PAOLO

2008-78270

Explanation: I made these 3 digests ahead of the others required for last Thursdays meeting. Unfortunately, I added those other digests (from Borromeo to Neri) to the People v. Reyes set because I thought that it was the same file where I placed these 3 digests. When I realized that I made the mistake, I was already in school and didnt have the original file of these 3 digests. Im hoping for your kind understanding.

TUPAS v. NHC Facts: - NHC is a GOCC organized under the old corporation law. - TUPAS is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC. - TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. - The petition was dismissed by the med-arbiter on the ground that as employees of a GOCC, they are prohibited from joining any labor organization. - The BLR initially reversed said ruling. But it was set aside on reconsideration. - Hence, this petition. Held: 1. The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees' organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that "(t)he right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged." This principle is reiterated in Sec. 3, Art. XIII and more specifically par. 5, Sec. 2, Art. IX-B. 2. As a general rule, the majority of the world's countries now entertain public service unions. What they really add up to is that the employees of the government form their own association. Generally, they do not bargain for wages because these are fixed in the budget but they do acquire a forum where, among other things, professional and self-development is (sic) promoted and encouraged. They also act as watchdogs of their own bosses so that when graft and corruption is committed, generally, it is the unions who are no longer afraid by virtue of the armor of self-organization that become the public's own allies for detecting graft and corruption and for exposing it. 3. Therefore, there is no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by Sec. 244 of the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. 4. Subsequent statutory developments have rendered academic even the distinction between the two types of government-owned or controlled corporations and the laws governing employment relations therein, as hereinbefore discussed. For, whether the employees of NHC are covered by the Labor Code or by the civil service laws, a certification election may be conducted.

SSSEA v. CA Facts: - Officers and members of SSSEA staged a strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS. - It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands. - The strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work. However, the strikers refused to return to work. - SSS filed this complaint with the RTC with a prayer for injunction. The RTC granted the same and ruled that the strike was illegal. - CA affirmed the RTC. Hence, this petition. Held: 1. While there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike. So the Court resorted to the intent of the framers of the Constitution in construing these provisions. The Court looked at the statements made by Commissioner Lerum, who was one of the principal sponsors of Sec. 2 (5), Art. IX-B. He said that: When we proposed this amendment providing for self-organization of government employees, it does not mean that

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because they have the right to organize, they also have the right to strike. That is a different matter. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as a union. The Court pointed to EO 180, which provided guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees, as the statutory basis for its ruling. Said EO in turn referred to Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress, which was an apparent reference to Memorandum Circular No. 6 of the CSC. The circular enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. SSS is covered by said circular because it is part of the civil service, being a GOCC with original charter. The general rule in the past and up to the present is that 'the terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law. Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. In government employment, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements. Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor - Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of law (in this case, RTC) for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

Bangalisan v. CA Facts: - Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 public school teachers who staged mass actions on to dramatize their grievances concerning the alleged failure of the public authorities to implement in a just and correct manner certain laws and measures intended for their material benefit. - The DECS Secretary issued a return-to-work order. Petitioners failed to comply. - The Secretary charged them with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, etc., which led to their preventive suspension. - After failing to answer despite due notice, petitioners were dismissed from service. - Upon reconsideration, the penalty was reduced to 9-month suspension. - Failing in their appeals with the MSPB, CSC, and CA, we have this petition. Held: 1. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. 2. The mass actions were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons. It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. 3. As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memorandum Circular No. 6, public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in a work stoppage against a public employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public employees was clearly recognized at common law. Indeed, it is frequently declared that modern rules which prohibit such strikes, either by statute or by judicial decision, simply incorporate or reassert the common law rule.

Cojuangco v. CA Facts: -

Danding Cojuangco was the owner of several racehorses which won prizes in PCSO-sponsored races. However, his winnings were withheld by the PCSO thru its chairman Carrascoso upon advice of the PCGG. When PCGG finally cleared payment, petitioner refused to accept because this action has already been instituted. RTC adjudged that the withholding was illegal and that Carrascoso liable for moral and exemplary damages for acting in bad faith. PCSO and Carrascoso appealed only the damages part. CA found that Carrascoso did not act in bad faith and thus ordered the deletion of damages. Hence, this petition.

Held: 1. A public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Carrascosos decision to withhold petitioners winnings could not be characterized as arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the properties of petitioner. He had acted upon the PCGGs statement that the subject prizes were part of those covered by the sequestration order. When PCGG posed no further objections to the release of the prizes, he willingly offered to remit the same. 2. Nevertheless, Carrascoso could still be held civilly liable under Art. 32 of the Civil Code, which provides: Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: xxx (6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law xxxx 3. Under the aforementioned article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of ones duties. Court held that petitioners right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While Respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGGs instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. 4. The purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear: no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity.

Tecson v. Sandiganbayan Facts: - Tecson was the Mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. Luzana, private complainant, is a resident of the same municipality. - Upon offer of Tecson, he and Luzana entered into an investment business, which involced selling tickets and using the proceeds to buy discounted appliances and cosmetics. - Luzana provided all the capital while Tecson acted as a sales agent. Tecson asked for a cash advance; otherwise, he would not issue a Mayors permit. Luzana acceded. - The business permit was however revoked by the SB, presided by Tecson, at the instance of the DTI provincial director. - As a result, private complainant filed administrative, civil, and criminal charges agains Tecson. - The Sangguniang Panlalawigan exonerated Tecson of the administrative charge. The civil case was amicably settled. But the Ombudsman filed the corresponding information against Tecson, which led to a conviction by the Sandiganbayan. Held: 1. It is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. The administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. Thus, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative complaint. Double jeopardy does not attach in this case. 2. As to the amicable settlement in the civil case, it is settled that a complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance against a public officer or employee cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the complainant. This

is because there is a need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities. Therefore, is the order of the trial court dismissing the civil case did not bar the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.

Ocampo v. Ombudsman Facts: - Ocampo was the Training Coordinator of. NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the National Irrigation Administration. - NIACONSULT conducted a training program for ADBN upon the latters request. ADBN paid the training fee to Ocampo. - When NIACONSULT demanded that Ocampo turn over the training fee, he failed to remit the same. - Hence, NIACONSULTs president filed an administrative case against Ocampo before the Ombudsman. - Ocampo failed to file his counter-affidavit before the Ombudsman despite being given 2 chances. - The Ombudsman ordered that Ocampo be dismissed from service. - It appears that a criminal complaint for estafa and falsification filed against him based on the same facts or incidents which gave rise to the administrative case, was dismissed by the RTC. Held: 1. The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there are other classes of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, might be adequate in civil cases (preponderance of evidence) or administrative cases (substantial evidence). 2. Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.

Lacson v. Executive Secretary Facts: - Petitioner Lacson, then PACC-TFH head with rank of Chief Superintendent, was implicated in the Kuratong Baleleng rubout. He was initially charged as principal by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan. Intervenors Acop and Zubia were charged as accessories after-the-fact. - Upon motion to reconsider the Ombudsmans action, the information against petitioner and intervenors were amended. They were now charged as accessories. - They questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because under RA 7975, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is limited to cases where one or more of the principal accused are government officials with SG 27 or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superinendent. - The Sandiganbayan initially ordered the transfer of the case to the RTC. - Meanwhile, RA 8249 was enacted which deleted the word principal from the pertinent provisions of RA 7975. - Given this development, the Sandiganbayan, upon motion by the prosecutor, reconsidered its earlier resolution. - Hence, this petition. Held: 1. To fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office. 2. The governing provision is paragraph (b) Sec. 4 of RA 8249 since petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under the RPC. The phrase other offenses or felonies is broad enough to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus,

under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 3. RA 8249 is not an ex post facto law because it is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. 4. Nevertheless, there is no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. Therefore, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case since it was not shown in the information that the offense charged was committed in relation to petitioners and intervenors official functions.

Ortiz v. COMELEC Facts: - Petitioner was appointed COMELEC by then Pres. Marcos for a term expiring May 17, 1992. - After the People Power revolution, he submitted a letter to Pres. Aquino in which he placed his position at the Presidents disposal. - The Executive Secretary communicated to the COMELEC Chairman that Ortizs resignation, along with those of others, was accepted by the President. - Petitioner applied for retirement but the COMELEC ruled that he was not entitled to retirement benefits under RA 1568. - Petitioner moved for reconsideration averring that he did not resign but simply placed his position at the disposal of the President. The MR was denied, as was the subsequent appeal to COA. - Hence, this petition. Held: 1. Petitioner's separation from government service as a result of the reorganization ordained by the then nascent Aquino government may not be considered a resignation within the contemplation of the law. Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of relinquishment. Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce and relinquish the office, and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority. 2. From the foregoing it is evident that petitioner's "resignation" lacks the element of clear intention to surrender his position. We cannot presume such intention from his statement in his letter of March 5, 1986 that he was placing his position at the disposal of the President. He did not categorically state therein that he was unconditionally giving up his position. It should be remembered that said letter was actually a response to Proclamation No. 1 which President Aquino issued on February 25, 1986 when she called on all appointive public officials to tender their "courtesy resignation" as a "first step to restore confidence in public administration. 3. A "courtesy resignation" cannot properly be interpreted as resignation in the legal sense for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to surrender his position. Rather, it manifests his submission to the will of the political authority and the appointing power. A stringent interpretation of courtesy resignations must therefore be observed, particularly in cases involving constitutional officials like the petitioner whose removal from office entails an impeachment proceeding. 4. The curtailment of his term not being attributable to any voluntary act on the part of the petitioner, equity and justice demand that he should be deemed to have completed his term albeit much ahead of the date stated in his appointment paper. Petitioner's case should be placed in the same category as that of an official holding a primarily confidential position whose tenure ends upon his superior's loss of confidence in him. His cessation from the service entails no removal but an expiration of his term. Petitioner should be considered retired from the service. And, in the absence of proof that he has been found guilty of malfeasance or misfeasance in office or that there is a pending administrative case against him, petitioner is entitled to a life pension under Republic Act No. 1568 as amended and reenacted by Republic Act No. 6118.

Estrada v. Desierto Facts: - At the height of the EDSA II revolution, former Pres. Estrada left Malacanang and sent a letter to the HouseSpeaker designating then-VP Arroyo as Acting President. - At that time, Arroyo already took her oath of office as the 14th President of the Republic before Chief Justice Davide. - The issue is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath of office. Held: 1. Resignation is a factual question. It has 2 elements: an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral or written, express or implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. 2. In resolving the issue, the Court looked at the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence. The Court proceeded to rule that Estrada had indeed resigned. 3. The Court relied heavily on the accounts of then-Executive Secretary Angara, which were published in the Inquirer, to determine Estradas state of mind. The Court mentioned the following facts: a. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. b. Angara asked Senator Pimentel to advise Estrada to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation. Estrada did not disagree but listened intently. He expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country. c. Estrada revealed to Secretary Angara, Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace. This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time. d. When former Pres. Ramos called Angara to ask for cooperation, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. e. During the first round of negotiations, the points included: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioners resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner. Again, the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. f. The President said. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want to clear my name, then I will go. Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation. g. During the second round of negotiations, Estradas resignation was again treated as a given fact. 4. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is already in the past tense. 5. The Court characterized the letter sent to the Speaker as mysterious. The Court found it strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. 6. Estrada cannot rely on this provision of RA 3019: Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery. The intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the

Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the RPC. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right. A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution. Furthermore, said Sec. 12 contemplates cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.