Eminent Domain and Due Process Masikip vs.

City of Pasig The taking is done for the benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility, notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away, such taking cannot be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid. Power of eminent domain - the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor. It has also been described as the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. [Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160)] Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) The adequacy of the compensation,(b) The necessity of the taking, and(c) The public use character of the purpose of the taking Ruling: There is no genuine necessity to justify the expropriation. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from the necessity and the taking must be limited to such necessity. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit. Brgy. Sindalan vs. CA Expropriation, if misused or abused, would trench on the property rights of individuals without due process of law. The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional provisions: (1) That private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 9 (2) That no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property without due process of law Public use is defined as whatever is beneficially employed for the community - The number of people is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use, provided the use is exercisable in common and is not limited to particular individuals Requisites for a valid exercise of Eminent domain: 1. Expropriation is for a public use 2. The payment of just compensation to the property owner.a. it must be real, substantial, full, and ampleb. should be made within a reasonable time from the taking of the propertyc. any further delay in the payment will result in the imposition of 12% interest per annum.

On the matter of due process The property owner must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the issues of public use and just compensation and to present objections to and claims on them Taking of property for a private use or without just compensation is a deprivation of property without due process of law Issues: Whether the taking of the land was for a public purpose or use. Whether private property can be taken by law from one person and given to another in the guise of public purpose. Ruling:NO 1.) The expropriation will actually benefit the subdivisions owner who will be able to circumvent his commitment to provide road access to the subdivision in conjunction with his development permit and license to sell from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and also be relieved of spending his own funds for a right-of-way. The expropriation of respondents lot is for the actual benefit of the Davsan II Subdivision owner, with incidental benefit to the subdivision homeowners.

2.) The residents who need a feeder road are all subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision owner to acquire a right-of-way for them. To deprive respondents of their property instead of compelling the subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under the law is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is patently illegal. 3.) Public funds can be used only for a public purpose. In this proposed condemnation, government funds would be employed for the benefit of a private individual without any legal mooring. Estate of Heirs of the late Ex-justice JBL Reyes vs. City of Manila During the pendency of the two ejectment cases [filed by JBL reyes] against respondents Abiog and Maglonso [formers tenants], respondent City filed on April 25, 1995 a complaint for eminent domain (expropriation) of the properties of petitioners. The complaint was based on Ordinance No. 7818 enacted on November 29, 1993 authorizing the City Mayor of Manila to expropriate certain parcels of land. According to the ordinance, the said properties were to be distributed to the intended beneficiaries, who were the occupants of the said parcels of land who (had) been occupying the said lands as lessees or any term thereof for a period of at least 10 years. Issues: Whether or not Ordinance 7818 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution and for abridging the contracts between petitioners and prospective buyers of the subject parcels of land; Whether or not respondent Citys act of expropriation is illegal because it did not comply with Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7279 (The Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) Ruling: Before respondent City can exercise its power of eminent domain, the same must be sanctioned and must not violate any law. Being a mere creation of the legislature, a local government unit can only exercise powers granted to it by the legislature. Such is the nature of the constitutional power of control of Congress over local government units, the latter being mere creations of the former. When it expropriated the subject properties, respondent City relied on its powers granted by Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991and RA 409 (The Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The latter specifically gives respondent City the power to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program.

Respondent City, however, is also mandated to follow the conditions and standards prescribed byRA 7279 (the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992), the law governing the expropriation of property for urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279 specifically provide that: Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order: (a) Those owned by the Government or any of its sub-divisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;(d) Those within the declared Areas of Priority Development, Zonal Improvement sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and(f)Privately-owned lands. Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include xxx and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted:xxxx Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Respondent City failed to prove strict compliance with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Respondent City neither alleged in its complaint nor proved during the proceedings before the trial court that it complied with said requirements. Even in the Court of Appeals, respondent City in its pleadings failed to show its compliance with the law. The Court of Appeals was likewise silent on this specific jurisdictional issue. This is a clear violation of the right to due process of the petitioners.

Didipio Earh-saversMulti-purpose Assoc. vs. Gozun Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Issues: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void because they allow the unjust and unlawful taking of property without payment of just compensation , in violation of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution. Public respondents contention: 1.) Petitioners eminent domain claim is not ripe for adjudication as they fail to allege that CAMC has actually taken their properties nor do they allege that their property rights have been endangered or are in danger on account of CAMCs FTAA. The court cannot await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial intervention. Actual eviction of the land owners and occupants need not happen for this Court to intervene. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty 2.) The issue of eminent domain is not a justiciable controversy which this Court can take cognizance of. The transcendental importance of the issues raised and the magnitude of the public interest involved will have a bearing on the countrys economy which is to a greater extent dependent upon the mining industry. Also affected by the resolution of this case are the proprietary rights of numerous residents in the mining contract areas as well as the social existence of indigenous peoples which are threatened. Based on these considerations, this Court deems it proper to take cognizance of the instant petition. The 4 conditions of judicial review are present. Ruling:NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL

While the Court declares that the assailed provision is a taking provision, this does not mean that it is unconstitutional on the ground that it allows taking of private property without the determination of public use and the payment of just compensation. Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the country and is a vital tool in the governments thrust of accelerated recovery. Irrefragably, mining is an industry which is of public benefit. It is contended that Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 encroach on the power of the trial courts to determine just compensation in eminent domain cases inasmuch as the same determination of proper compensation are cognizable only by the Panel of Arbitrators. Determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Even as the executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations, the same cannot prevail over the courts findings.

There is nothing wrong with the grant of primary jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board to determine in a preliminary matter the reasonable compensation due the affected landowners or occupants. The original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts to decide determination of just compensation remains intact despite the preliminary determination made by the administrative agency. The jurisdiction of the Court is not any less "original and exclusive" as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination.

Taking in Eminent Domain vs Regulation in Police Power Takingunde r Police Power Takingunde r Eminent domain

A property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its continued existence would be injurious to public interest The entering upon private property is for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, Use of the property by the owner was limited, but no aspect of the property is used by or for the public. The deprivation of use can in fact be total and it will not constitute compensable taking if nobody else acquires use of the property or any interest therein. Informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. The deprivation is with compensation Property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. Taking may include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was intended such as the establishment of an easement. NAPOCOR vs. Aurellano S. Tianco, Lourdes S. Tianco and Nestor S. Tianco Issue: With respect to the amount of just compensation that must be paid the respondents for the expropriated

portion (19,423 square meters) of their property: 1. Is it to be based on the 1984 or the 1993 valuation? 2. Should NPC pay for the value of the land being taken, or should it be limited to what is provided for under P.D. 938, that is, ten per cent (10%) of its market value as declared by the owner or the assessor (whichever is lower), considering that the purpose for which the property is being taken is merely for the establishment of a safe and free passage for its overhead transmission lines? Ruling: Neither of the two determinations made by the courts below is therefore correct. (1) In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be considered in determining the just compensation. For purposes of just compensation, the respondents should be paid the value of the property as of the time of the filing of the complaint which is deemed to be the time of taking the property. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. In this case, this simply means the propertys fair market value at the time of the filing of the complaint, or "that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. (2) True, an easement of a right-of-way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and the respondents would retain full ownership of the property taken. Nonetheless, the acquisition of such easement is notg ratis (free). If the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary, then the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land . NAPOCOR vs. Bongbong Issue: Whether the procedure laid down in Rule 67 should be followed in determining just compensation Ruling: The trial court erred in the determination of just compensation at P300.00 per sq m based on the fact that it paid a similar rate to the other landowners whose properties were likewise acquired by petitioner. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. The subject property is "agricultural."

Rule 67

need not be followed where the expropriator has violated procedural requirements. When a government

agency itself violates procedural requirements, it waives the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67. The present case is not an action for expropriation. Respondents complaint is an ordinary civil action for the recovery of possession of the Property or its value, and damages. Under these circumstances, a trial before commissioners is not necessary No expropriation proceeding was filed, there is no need for appointment of commissioners [who would examine and evaluate the subject property for the determination of just compensation.]

Heirs of Pidacan vs. ATO Private property converted into airport. Actual taking preceeded the filing of the expropriation proceeding [years later] Issue: When should the subject property be valued for the determination of just compensation Ruling: As a rule, the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is reckoned from the time of taking. In this case, however, application of the said rule would lead to grave injustice. Note that the ATO had been using petitioners property as airport since 1948 without having instituted the proper expropriation proceedings. To peg the value of the property at the time of taking in 1948, despite the exponential increase in its value considering the lapse of over half a century, would be iniquitous. We cannot allow the ATO to conveniently invoke the right of eminent domain to take advantage of the ridiculously low value of the property at the time of taking that it arbitrarily chooses to the prejudice of petitioners. The appropriate reckoning point for the valuation of petitioners property is when the trial court made its order of expropriation in 2001. Nepomuceno vs. City of Surigao Property taken used as City road. Petitioners claim that, in fixing the value of their property, justice and equity demand that the value at the time of actual payment should be the basis, not the value at the time of the taking as the RTC and CA held. Ruling: Where actual taking is made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and the owner seeks recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation Reason for such rule: The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. Thus, the value of petitioners' property must be ascertained as of 1960 when it was actually taken. It is as of that time that the real measure of their loss may fairly be adjudged. Phil. Natl Oil Company vs. Maglasang Expropriation proceeding filed first before actual taking Subject properties to be used in the construction and operation of geothermal plant project.

Petitioner insists that contrary to the findings of the two courts below, the determination of just compensation should be reckoned prior to the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation. According to petitioner in Civil Case No. 3267-O, petitioner took possession of the land on January 1, 1992 when PNOC leased the same from its administrator as evidenced by a Lease Agreement for the period of January 1, 1992 to December 31, 1992. Thus, taking, for purposes of computing just compensation, should have been reckoned from January 1, 1992. Ruling:

we rejected the States contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to a permanent right to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made for a determinate time, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand. Neither can it be said that the right of eminent domain may be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated. Where, as here, the owner was compensated and not deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property by its being diverted to public use, there is no taking within the constitutional sense. The time of the taking may be reckoned in 1994. For Lot 11900, on October 24, 1994, the date of the filing of the complaint although the plaintiff took possession of the property in 1991 due to a lease contract executed between plaintiff and defendant yet the intention to expropriate was manifested only upon the filing of the complaint NAPOCOR vs Co Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint Petitioner filed a complaint for the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over three (3) lots belonging to respondent, in connection with the construction of its transmission lines for its Lahar Affected Transmission Line Project (Lahar Project). Issues: Is Republic Act No. 8974 (2000), otherwise known as "An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of- Way, site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and for other purposes," applicable to actions for eminent domain filed by the Napocor pursuant to its charter (Rep. Act. No. 6395, as amended) for the purpose of constructing power transmission lines on the properties subject of said actions? YES Petitioner expropriated respondents property for its Lahar Project, a project for public use. R.A. No. 8974 covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects R.A. No. 8974 should govern the expropriation of respondent's property since the Lahar Project is a national government project. It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of "immediate payment" in cases involving national government infrastructure projects. At the same time, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules recognizes the continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural aspects. Whether what should be paid is the full fair market value of the property or a mere easement fee. When petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts. Construction of the transmission lines will definitely have limitations and will indefinitely deprive the owners of the land of their normal use. Petitioner is thus liable to pay respondent the full market value of the property. Reckoning date for the determination of just compensation. Petitioner contends that the computation should be made as of 27 June 2001, the date when it filed the expropriation complaint, as provided in Rule 67. We agree. Rule 67 The value of just compensation shall "be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. [GENERAL RULE]

Exceptions: Grave injustice to the property owner. The taking did not have color of legal authority, The taking of the property was not initially for expropriation The owner will be given undue increment advantages because of the expropriation.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation. Forfom vs Phil Natl Railways President Ferdinand E. Marcos approved the Presidential Commuter Service Project, more commonly known as the Carmona Project. The San Pedro-Carmona Commuter Line Project was implemented with the installation of railroad facilities and appurtenances. During the construction of said commuter line, several properties owned by private individuals/corporations were traversed as right-of-way. Forfom filed a complaint for Recovery of Posssession of Real Property and/or Damages. Defendant neither commenced an expropriation proceedings nor paid just compensation prior to its occupation and construction of railroad lines on the subject property. Issue: Can petitioner Forfom recover possession of its property because respondent PNR failed to file any expropriation case and to pay just compensation? Ruling:NO Plaintiff's prayer to recover the property cannot be granted. Forfom accepted the fact of the taking of its land when it negotiated with PNR for just compensation, knowing fully well that there was no expropriation case filed at all. Forfom's inaction for almost eighteen (18) years to question the absence of expropriation proceedings and its discussions with PNR as to how much petitioner shall be paid for its land preclude it from questioning the PNR's power to expropriate or the public purpose for which the power was exercised. In other words, it has waived its right and is estopped from assailing the takeover of its land on the ground that there was no case for expropriation that was commenced by PNR. The primary reason for thus denying to the owner the remedies usually afforded to him against usurpers is the irremedial injury which would result to the railroad company and to the public in general. It will readily be seen that the interruption of the transportation service at any point on the right of way impedes the entire service of the company and causes loss and inconvenience to all passengers and shippers using the line. Public policy, if not public necessity, demands that the owner of the land be denied the ordinarily remedies of ejectment and injunction. The owner of land, who stands by, without objection, and sees a public railroad constructed over it, can not, after the road is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company. In such a casethere can only remain to the owner a right of compensation. The non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. When just compensation should be fixed. Is it at the time of the taking or, as Forfom maintains, at the time when the price is actually paid? Where actual taking was made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and the owner sought recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, the Court has invariably ruled that it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation. Admittedly, the PNR's occupation of Forfom's property for almost eighteen (18) years entitles the latter to payment of interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent on the value of the land at the time of taking until full payment is made by the PNR