1

]leather lieldhouse completed her Ph.D. in Philosophy at Michigan State in May

2004. She is currently a isiting assistant proessor in the Center or Integratie
Study in the Arts and lumanities at Michigan State Uniersity.

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1he Iailure of the Kantian 1heory of Indirect Duties
to Animals

leather lieldhouse]

Kant amously holds that we hae no direct duties to animals,
but we hae indirect duties with regard to them. One o his key
points in this argument is that we ought not treat animals cruelly, as it
damages our natural sympathies and thus can harden us in our
dealings with other human beings. 1hus our duties with regard to
animals are actually duties to human beings. \e use them as means
to our ends, or een kill them, but we must aoid being cruel as we
do it ,6:443, 2:458-460,.
1hese conclusions are reminiscent o what is sometimes
termed an animal welarist position, in that animals hae no rights,
but we still ought not to treat them cruelly and must strie to
minimize their suering. loweer, it is important to note that
whereas an animal welarist typically holds that the source o these
duties ,howeer minimal, is some morally releant eature o the
animal itsel, Kant holds that our obligation to aoid mistreating
animals is not really an obligation to the animals themseles. Instead,
it is an obligation to ourseles and to other human beings, the
ulillment o which in some cases happens to inole the treatment
o animals. 1he animals themseles are mere things without moral
worth.
Such iews are today widely considered to be antiquated,
prejudiced, and anathema to champions o animal rights and
liberation. As Kant`s theories and ethical tradition is still ery
inluential in the contemporary arena, howeer, Kant cannot be easily
dismissed. Kantian ethics is at its best when it deals with humans,
using powerul concepts o respect, and dignity, and inalienable
worth, such as are related to current notions o rights. Kant proides
an appealing alternatie to utilitarianism or those who hold ast to
the belie that some actions are wrong regardless o the possible
beneit deried rom them. Utilitarianism, ater all, aords no rights
or undamental protections to anyone, except the right to hae one`s
interests gien equal consideration in the grand calculation. Although
utilitarianism was a huge adance in that it made sentience not reason
the basis o moral consideration, and thereby brought animals into
the scope o ethical consideration, it leaes the door open or those
who would claim that at least some cruel uses o animals can be
justiied by the greater happiness that would result or human beings.
As argued by animal rights theorists, indirect duties is grossly
inadequate or the purposes o protecting animals rom unjust
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exploitation. But in order to proide or direct duties to animals, a
Kantian would hae to substantially reise Kant`s claims about the
source o moral alue. Moral considerability and moral agency are
closely linked in the Kantian ramework, separating them would not
be a triial task. In this essay, I will argue that the attempt by Kant
and his ollowers to establish indirect duties to animals as an
adequate moral ramework regarding animals is unsuccessul. Kant`s
deenders hae been unable to rectiy its two primary laws: that it is
deeply counterintuitie, and that it rests on a dubious psychological
claim. As a result o these ailings, Kantianism cannot proide a irm
basis or een minimal duties to animals.

Kant's Contemporary Defenders
1he basic implausibility o Kant`s indirect duty theory has led some
Kantians ,Christine Korsgaard and Allen \ood being two recent
examples, to discard it in aor o a Kantian approach that
acknowledges direct duties to animals. 1heir task is diicult. Kant
makes moral agency, which he equates with rational autonomy, the
source o all moral worth. Len i we recognize ,as Kant did not,
that many animals hae some ability to use reason to sole problems,
it would not be enough to show that they hae moral alue or Kant,
since the type o rationality that he is concerned with is moral
reasoning - the ability to set ends or onesel according to the
dictates o morality. In order to proide or direct duties to animals,
a Kantian would hae to substantially reise Kant`s claims about the
source o moral alue. As moral considerability and moral agency are
closely linked in the Kantian ramework, separating them is a diicult
task.
laced with such a daunting alternatie, some recent Kantians
hae tried to deend Kant`s indirect duty iew against claims o
implausibility, and to show that Kant`s iew allows or a satisactory
leel o obligation with regard to animals. Dan Lgonsson, or
instance, tries to show that it can go beyond just the basic prohibition
against wanton cruelty, and be used to deend ethical egetarianism.
According to Kant, being cruel to animals tends to make a
person also insensitie to his ellow man, that is why apparent duties
to animals are actually indirect duties, since ultimately they are duties
to mankind. 1his argument does not seem to apply to meat-eating,
howeer, since it is possible to eat meat without being inoled
onesel in the raising and slaughtering o the animal, in act, most
people are ery distanced rom this process. Lgonsson, howeer,
writes that we can plausibly extend Kant`s remarks to also encompass
accetivg cruelty to animals ,4,. Anyone who eats intensiely-
armed meat is implicitly accepting cruelty to animals.
1
Accepting
cruelty to animals means accepting that other people are being
desensitized to suering in the way that Kant describes. 1his could
result in their humanity being damaged, and could lead to their
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treating other human beings with cruelty as a result. le concludes
that a Kantian should thereore regard egetarianism as a duty.
Lgonsson shows that an indirect duty theory would not
necessarily be limited to a ery narrow obligation to aoid wanton
cruelty. In addition to endorsing egetarianism, such a theory could
similarly show that many o our current uses o animals are wrong.
1he endorsement o the indirect duty iew could hae some
rhetorical alue or animal protection groups, since it would link the
treatment o animals with duties to humans, thus sidestepping the
more controersial and less generally-accepted claim that animals
hae intrinsic rights.
Although the indirect duty iew has some beneits, I beliee
that its laws cannot be oerlooked. Attempts to reconcile the
indirect duty iew with contemporary sensitiity about animal issues
hae ailed to rescue it rom its two central problems.

1he Problem of Counterintuitive Implications
1he irst o the two main problems with the indirect duty iew is that
it has certain consequences that are extremely counter-intuitie. I
torturing animals had no eect on our attitude towards other
humans, then according to the indirect-duty iew, we would hae no
obligation to rerain rom doing it. Most people would want to say
that it would be wrong een i it had no eect on our treatment o
human beings, but indirect-duty theorists must reject this claim.
lurthermore, as noted by \ood, i it happened that somehow
torturing animals made us kinder to humans ,or instance, by
allowing us to release aggression,, then we would be obliged to do it
,194-195,.
Christina lo gies the example o a man who has always
acted kindly towards his amily and towards human beings in general,
but who is in the habit o secretly burning stray dogs to death.
According to Kant, he would not be wronging the dogs, since we
hae no duties to dogs. Instead, he would be guilty o wronging
humanity, because such dealings with animals tend to make one hard
towards human beings. 1he terrible suering o the dogs is in itsel
o no importance. Indeed, beore the arrial o mankind on the
eolutionary scene, no animal suering or happiness had any alue
whatsoeer, and upon the awakening o rationality, it took on a
merely indirect signiicance. lo regards this as implausible and
counter to our moral intuitions ,6,.
In lo`s iew, this implausible claim belies a deep law in
Kantian ethics. I there are any moral truths,` she writes, this one
is clearly among them: suering is an eil, and gratuitously and
deliberately to inlict pain and suering is a moral eil. 1his needs
qualiication, but we must be wary o any moral theory . . . that loses
sight o it` ,68,. lurthermore, Kant is unable to satisactorily
account or mentally impaired humans in his ethics: either they are
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simply means to an end, like animals, or else some sort o leeway
must be introduced to allow them moral recognition - but any such
leeway is likely to make it een more diicult to exclude animals. It
is implausible that our duty to eed a hungry retarded child would
turn out to be indirect and, in this respect, essentially distinct rom
our duty to eed a normal child` ,68,.
Are the counterintuitie consequences o Kant`s iew a
problem, aside rom making the position unpalatable Alexander
Broadie and Llizabeth Pybus point out that, since Kant belieed his
moral system to accord with the ordinary moral intuitions o the
common person, it is legitimate to criticize his ramework i it does
not in act accord with these intuitions. Arguing rom intuition is
always raught with peril, howeer, since intuitions are seldom
uniersal. lurthermore, it is probably impossible or any consistent
theory to satisy all our intuitions. 1here is, howeer, another strong
criticism o Kant`s theory which does not rest on intuitions.

1he Problem with Lstablishing the Causal Connection
1he second main problem cited against Kant`s theory is that he
cannot successully make the causal connection between cruel
treatment o humans and cruel treatment o animals. Broadie and
Pybus show that Kant beliees this connection is ounded on an
analogy. Although animals are only things and not persons, Kant
claimed that they hae some qualities which are analogous to human
qualities ,3,. loweer, lis claim that animals are analogous to
persons appears to mean no more than that they behae as i they
hae psychological states that we take to characterize people` ,38,.
1here is no urther claim being made, Kant certainly does not mean
that they hae anything like a aculty o reason.
Although according to Kant animals are things with eatures
analogous to ours, they are neertheless still things, and thereore we
do not hae direct duties to them. Kant reers to the mistaken
notion that we hae duties to beings other than men as an amphiboly
o the moral concepts o relection ,6:442,. Broadie and Pybus note
that Kant uses the term amphiboly` to reer to a mistake in
reasoning ,39,. In the context o ethics, Kant deines amphiboly
simply as taking what is a human being`s duty to himsel or a duty
to other beings` ,6:442,. 1his means that our eeling o obligation
towards animals is based on a misunderstanding.
Although Kant argues that we do not hae direct duties to
animals, he holds that maltreatment o animals is wrong irst
because it leads us to be unsympathetic to . . . other people. In other
words it leads us to treat other people merely as a means` ,Broadie
and Pybus 382,. Second, it is wrong because it does iolence to our
own humanity, i.e., it leads us to treat ourseles as a means.
Broadie and Pybus regard this position as inconsistent,
because Kant is claiming that in using certain things ,animals, as
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means, by analogy we are led to treat people as means. Kant cannot
point to any morally releant dierence between an animal and any
other sort o mere thing, since the only possible morally releant
dierence would be the possession o rationality, which animals do
not hae. 1hereore, the authors claim, Kant is orced to say that
nothing may be used as a means, we hae an indirect duty to any
thing not to use it as a means. 1his is not merely absurd, but
contrary to his imperatie o skill` ,382,. 1hey also claim that Kant
cannot proe een an indirect duty to animals, because Kant`s
position rests on a speculatie psychological claim about human
nature - that cruel dealings with animals make people hard towards
other people - which, een i he could proe it true, is irreleant
because it is a contingent matter o act about bvvav beings, and not
a act about ratiovat beings` ,382,.
1hat it is a matter o act about human beings and not about
all rational beings should not be a problem or Kant. It is true that
Kant regards the moral law as applying equally to all rational beings
,including nonhuman rational beings, i they proe to exist,, but
contingent, empirical acts can aect how the moral law is expressed.
lor instance, lying is morally wrong according to the moral law, but
in order or there een to be such thing as lying, we hae to be the
sort o beings who can communicate with each other, and who can
express themseles alsely, and so on. 1he speciic act in this case
inoles the psychology o human beings, but the maxim ,i.e. the rule
according to which one acts, could be construed as I will not
perorm actions that tend to harm my ability to behae morally.`
1his rule would apply to any rational beings, but in order to it, we do
o course hae to look at the empirical acts about what does tend to
harm this ability in a certain type o being.
1om Regan responds to the aorementioned article with the
remark that, although Kant`s position may go against intuition, it is
not internally inconsistent. Kant neer claims, Regan points out, that
we ought not use animals as means ,as beasts o burden, or
example,. le claims that we ought not maltreat them, which is a
narrower claim. lor we can, gien Kant`s iews, use an animal as a
means without at the same time necessarily maltreating it, as when,
or example, a blind man uses a seeing eye dog but treats him with
loe and deotion` ,41,.
Regan`s response is brie, and does not address the central
problem: what does it mean to maltreat something \e cannot
deine it as to use something in such a way that goes against
rationality ,or morality,` because that begs the question. Maltreating
something cannot merely mean using it as a means, or the reasons
that Regan gies.
1here is a hint in the Lectures on Lthics where Kant is
reported as saying, Viisectionists, who use liing animals or their
experiments, certainly act cruelly, although their aim is praiseworthy,
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and they can justiy their cruelty, since animals must be regarded as
man`s instruments, but any such cruelty or sport cannot be justiied`
,2:460,. So, maltreating an animal or Kant is treating it with
unnecessary cruelty. \hether a gien cruelty is necessary is probably
dependent on whether it is required or ulilling a direct duty ,or
possibly een an indirect duty, to human beings.
Broadie and Pybus`s analysis o the belie that we hae direct
duties to animals as an amphiboly, or mistaken analogy, raises an
interesting point. I it is a mistake that leads us to connect human
and animal suering, and i it is this psychological connection that
leads to the causal connection between the two kinds o cruelty,
wouldn`t the solution be to train ourseles not to make that mistake
Kant`s theory seems to be aimed at damage control, rather than
preention. Rather than accept that we will make that mistake, and
then try to make sure it doesn`t harm our sensibilities, it seems better
to learn not to make the mistake at all.
Skidmore makes a similar point. A weak or moderate
connection between cruelty to animals and inappropriate attitudes or
behaior towards humans ,i.e., that the ormer occa.iovatt, or v.vatt,
leads to the latter, is not enough to establish indirect duties to
animals. I the weak or moderate connection were established, it
would not show that all agents hae such duties, only certain agents
would be so obliged, and the others could treat animals howeer they
pleased. In order or the indirect duties to be uniersally applicable,
it must be true that cruel treatment o animals atvo.t atra,., or atvo.t
att agents, results in inappropriate attitudes or behaior towards
humans ,Skidmore,. 1here is a lack o empirical eidence or this
connection, and some eidence that suggests it is alse. Surely some
cultures hae existed in which animals were treated brutally, without
eeryone in turn being brutal to each other. Consider Spain, or
instance, blood sports such as bullighting are traditional and popular,
yet there is no eidence that the people o that country are any more
brutal to each other than in countries where such eents are rowned
upon.
1he strong connection required or the indirect duty iew
may not be true, but een i it is true, Skidmore argues, the
connection would not be a necessary one. I, as the indirect duty
theorist claims, there is a clear moral dierence between humans and
animals, then it should be possible or us to harm animals without
harming our sympathy or ellow human beings. In act, since
sympathy or animals sometimes can distract our attention rom our
true duties, it is not morally ideal. 1hereore, we ought to try to
shape our sympathy to relect better the clear and crucial moral
distinction ,on Kant`s iew, between animals and persons`
,Skidmore,.
1he indirect duty theorist must then claim that shaping our
natural sympathy in this way is impossible. 1his claim is ery

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implausible, gien the ariation among people and cultures.
Skidmore uses the example o abortion. Some people hae an acute
sympathy een or embryos, whereas others see them as nothing
more than inconsequential tissue. It seems rather obious that many
people can and do shape their sympathies to relect more adequately
the moral belies they come to hold` ,Skidmore,.
An additional point along these lines ,though not raised by
Skidmore, is that at least some agents will, in the course o ulilling
their duties to humans, hae to inlict acute suering on animals.
1he researcher who must injure, poison, and inlict diseases upon
animals or the beneit o humankind knows that this is his duty. It
seems that he has two choices: he can unlearn his natural sympathy
or animals because o his understanding that it is not morally
appropriate, or he can harm animals despite his sympathy, and
thereore also damage his sympathy or human beings. 1he latter
would be immoral or the indirect duty theorist, but i the ormer is
possible then the strong connection does not hold. Lither the
indirect duty theory must be abandoned, or else it must become so
strong that any use o animals which causes suering - including
medical research - is orbidden. 1hat may sound like an initing
approach, but it would no longer be plausible to regard it as an ivairect
duty iew at that point. 1he idea behind indirect duties is that our
improed treatment o animals is really aimed at ulilling our
obligations to humans, humans are still the center o the moral
unierse. \et surely i that were true, we would be justiied in
harming animals in at least those ew cases ,probably ewer than
most people, Kant among them, recognize, where it would be
required to directly support human interests. lurthermore, as
preiously noted, the strong connection that would be required or
such a iew ,that harming animals results in mistreatment o humans
atvo.t atra,., is not plausible.

A Different Version of the Indirect Duty View
Peter Carruthers has deended an indirect duty approach to
animals, but with a shit in emphasis that allows him to aoid some
o these diiculties. \hereas Kant claims that cruelty to animals
tends to cause people to become hard in their dealings with other
human beings, Carruthers claims that cruelty to animals reeals an
existing law in the agent: a general indierence to suering, which
will probably also express itsel in the agent`s dealings with human
beings ,153-154,.
One adantage to Carruthers`s approach is its empirical
plausibility. Animal welare organizations oten emphasize a link
between iolence against animals ,especially in youth, and iolence
against humans. 1he implication is oten that the ormer causes the
latter, much has been made o the act that many inamous
murderers were preiously caught abusing animals. It could just as
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easily be said, howeer, that some underlying character law
,indierence to, or een enjoyment o, others` suering, is
responsible or both the animal and the human cruelty. Carruthers is
thereore not aced with the diiculty o showing how the one type
o cruelty causes the other, he only needs to show that there is a
connection. lurthermore, his iew better accounts or the case o
the iisectionist. 1he person who torments a dog or no good
reason reeals something dierent about her character than does the
person who reluctantly torments a dog because she beliees it will
sae human lies.
1he problem with Carruthers`s iew is that although it may
show why we hae a repugnance towards animal cruelty, it does not
show that these actions are immoral. I, as Kant holds, being cruel to
animals causes us to be cruel to humans, then we hae a duty to
rerain rom being cruel to animals. I the animal cruelty is only a
symptom o a character law, rather than the cause o it, then it
would be deplorable but not eil. \e would hae no duty to rerain
rom it, though we would be justiied in passing unaorable
judgment upon the moral character o those who engaged in it.
Carruthers gies the example o Astrid, an astronaut who has brought
her cat into space with her on a one-way trip out o the solar system
,thus ensuring that no other human beings will be distressed in any
way by her actions,. At some point in the journal, Astrid gets bored,
and decides to entertain hersel by hanging her cat rom the wall and
using it as a dartboard. According to Carruthers, Such actions are
wrong because they are cruel. 1hey betray an indierence to
suering that may maniest itsel . . . in that person`s dealings with
other rational agents` ,153-154,. le concludes that actions which
cause suering to animals will be wrong wheneer they are
perormed or no reason, or or triial reasons` ,154,.
Carruthers has not, howeer, established that Astrid`s action
was wrong, only that she is an unpleasant person, and is likely to
commit moral wrongs in the uture. ler actions reeal something
about her character, to be sure, but this does not proe that the
actions themseles are wrong. By way o analogy, consider the
mother who suspects that her son`s style o dress indicates that he is
inoled with the drug culture. 1his seems to be good reason or her
to be concerned about his character and liestyle, and perhaps een to
ind his style o dress unpleasant. loweer, it does not mean that
his clothes are inherently harmul, and i she responds by orbidding
him to wear them, most would think her prohibition is misguided. I
the clothes caused the liestyle, then the prohibition would make
sense. lence an indirect duty iew, to successully establish that we
ought to rerain rom being cruel to animals, must establish that such
cruelty itsel causes the character law that leads to cruel treatment o
humans, as Kant maintains.
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Since the causal approach is just as problematic as Carruthers`
reealed-character approach, I beliee that the attempt to establish
indirect duties to animals is unsuccessul. I conclude that a Kantian
has two options: either accept the counterintuitie result that we hae
no duties at all ,indirect or direct, to animals, or try to ind some
other way to establish duties to animals within Kant`s system. Since
the connection between rationality and moral considerability is deeply
rooted in Kant`s ethical theory, this is no small task. Gien the
enduring inluence o Kantian ethics, howeer, it would be a
worthwhile endeaor.

______________________________
1. Lgonsson uses the example o intensiely-armed meat presumably because
humanely-raised animals that are killed painlessly would not be suering, since
animals are only means, there would be nothing wrong with killing them or
ood proided there is no cruelty inoled with the raising and slaughtering.
Neertheless, since most o the meat which is readily aailable probably does
not meet this ideal standard, Lgonsson`s extension o Kant`s position would
tend to lead to egetarianism.

References

Broadie, Alexander and Llizabeth M. Pybus. "Kant's 1reatment o Animals."
Pbito.ob, 49. 194: 35-383.

Carruthers, Peter. 1be .vivat. ..ve. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 1992.

Lgonsson, Dan. "Kant's Vegetarianism." ]ovrvat of 1atve vqvir, 31.4. 199:
43-83.

lo, Christina. "Kant's Inidious lumanism." vrirovvevtat tbic. 5. 1983:
63-0.

Kant, Immanuel. Metab,.ic. of Morat.. 1rans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1996.

Kant, Immanuel. Practicat Pbito.ob,. 1rans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP. 1996.

Kant, Immanuel. ectvre. ov tbic.. 1rans. Peter leath. Ld. Peter leath and J. B.
Schneewind. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 199.

Korsgaard, Christine. "lellow Creatures: Kantian Lthics and Our Duties to
Animals." Author's personal web site. larard Uniersity. April 12, 2004.
http:,,www.people.as.harard.edu,~korsgaar,CMK.lellowCreatures.pd

Regan, 1om. "Broadie and Pybus on Kant." Pbito.ob, 51. 196: 41-2.

Skidmore, James. "1he Incoherence o Indirect Duties Regarding Animals."
Central Diision Meeting. 1he American Philosophical Association.
lyatt Regency, Minneapolis. 2-5 May 2-5, 2001.

\ood, Allen. "Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature I." Proceeaivg.
of tbe .ri.totetiav ociet, vtevevt 2. 1998: 189-210.