'A Tedious and Perilous Controversy': Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 19181926 Author(s): Peter

J. Beck Reviewed work(s): Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Apr., 1981), pp. 256-276 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282832 . Accessed: 10/12/2011 08:56
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Britain 'A Tediousand PerilousControversy': and the Settlementof the Mosul Dispute, 19181926
Peter J. Beck
The emergence of Kemal's nationalist movement in Turkey resultednot just in the abolition of the Sultanatein November 1922 but also in the rejectionof the Peace Treaty of Sevres, which had been signed by the Sultan's government. Kemal's revisionist stand, while reflecting in part the internal revolution occurring within Turkey, and especially the principles enunciated in the National Pact of 1920, was further encouraged by military successes against Greece as well as by divisions between the Allied Powers. The peace negotiations, which followed the Greco-TurkishWar and began at Lausanne in November 1922, proved extremely difficult, as demonstrated not just by the violent disagreementsover several issues and the fears of a resumptionof war but also by the break in the conferencefrom Februaryto April 1923; it was not until 24 July 1923 that the Treaty of Lausanne was finally signed. In many respects, the latter representeda victory for Turkey, whose success in retaining a foothold in Europe and in securing boundariessimilarto those claimed in the National Pact, was reinforcedduring October 1923 by the proclamationof the Turkish Republic, of which Kemal would be president and of which Angora would become the capital, and by the Allied evacuation of Turkish territory occupied duringthe First World War. However, the conclusion of the peace treaty did not remove all points of difficulty, since the dispute over the possession of the vilayet of Mosul, or rather over the exact frontierline between Turkey and Iraq, still remainedin a state of deadlock.' The disputants were Turkey, which had held the territory until the First World War, Iraq, a British mandate to whom Mosul had been assigned by the Treaty of Sevres, and Britainwhich had occupied Mosul at the close of 1918 and which representedthe interests of its mandate.In spite of the fact that Iraq, which was supportedby Britishforces, was in defacto control of most of the area in dispute, Turkey refused to relinquishits claims to territory specified in the National Pact; the sanctity of the latter in conjunctionwith the needs of the nationalist revolution and the strong feelings aroused upon the subject in the Turkish Grand National Assembly meant that Mosul was not a matter for compromise.2The area's oil potential and strategic value further encouraged Kemal to press his claims to Mosul, especially as he felt that Turkey had already won a moral victory over a British government whose support for Greece in the recent war had proved abortive.The large numberof Kurds residing within the Mosul vilayet introduced an additionalfactor, since the success of the Turkish policy of assimilation within its existing territory would be influencedby the fate of the Mosul Kurds. Although the Mosul question was basically one of whetherthe vilayet should be assigned to either Iraq or Turkey, the dispute tended to become one between

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Britain and Turkey. In fact, it has been alleged that the British government, which was supposed to be acting on behalf of Iraq, was more concerned to champion British interests in Mosul, especially in respect of oil, even if at the time governments consciously attemptedto deflect such criticisms, such as by deliberately stating that the dispute was over the Turco-Iraq frontier rather than over the control of Mosul.3 Consequently, British interests in the dispute have been the subject of much debate, both by contemporaries and by historians, and the Mosul problem has become, for instance, a key part of any analysis concerning the role of oil in British foreign policy. However, such a discussion is complicated by the fact that, while the Foreign Office performed the major role in regard to the diplomatic aspects of the dispute, several other government departmentspossessed a stake in the matter, and inevitably they approached it from varying viewpoints. This was shown, for example, by the complaints of Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary from 1919 to 1924, about departmentalinterferencewith his policy as well as by the continualdifferences of opinion during the years 1923-25 between the Colonial and Foreign Offices. The strategicargument,whichjustifiedthe Britishoccupation of Mosul in 1918 and explained the consequent stress upon the area's value both for imperial communications and for Britain'swhole position in the Middle East, meant that the Mosul dispute involved not just the Foreign and Colonial Offices but also the India Office, the War Office and the Admiralty. In addition,the developmentof air communicationsbetweenEgypt and India and of the RAF's role in the Middle East during the early 1920s brought the Air Ministry into the debate, especially after October 1922 when Churchill, the Secretary of State for Colonies (1921-22), transferred military control in Iraq from the War Office to the Air Ministry. The strategic argumentcentred upon the claim that the control of Mosul, which was separatedphysically from Turkey by mountain ranges rising to 4168 metres at Clio Dagi, would not only ensure Iraq's survival but would also provide a more secure boundary against Turkey; it was feared that the latter, which was viewed as 'an aggressive Islamic state', might utilise Mosul as a springboardfor an attack upon Iraq and, in time, upon Britishinterestsin the Persian Gulf. Iraq's acquisition of Mosul would, it was argued, not only improve security but would also enable the continued reductionof Britishcommitmentsto Iraq. The significanceof this point derivedfrom the questioningof Britain'sposition there, especially after the problems associated with the Arab insurrectionof 1920; the resulting debate, which was partly reflected in the press 'scuttle' campaign, centred around complaints about the extent of British commitments in Iraq both in terms of finance and of manpower. This reassessment of the situation resulted in two Anglo-Iraqi agreements during 1922-23, thereby transformingBritain'sposition in Iraq, which was originallybased upon direct administrationand regulatedby the mandateobligationsof Article XXII of the Covenant, into more of an alliance relationship; such modifications, while meeting Iraqi desires for greaterautonomy, would, by making Iraq responsible for a larger share of its administration and defence, permit the gradual reduction and eventual withdrawal of British forces from the country. In addition, it was envisaged that Iraq would join the League of Nations once its

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political stability had been secured and its frontiers properly defined. In the meantime, the defence of Iraq would depend mainly upon 'air control', since this offered an economical means of securing a relativelylarge area of difficult terrain.4 The role of oil in British policy-the so-called 'trail of oil'-is more debatable, since the denials of such ministers as Bonar Law, Curzon, MacDonald and Austen Chamberlain that oil influenced their attitudes have been challenged by recent studies, which have frequently stressed that the Mosul question was basically over British oil interests; it is argued that the tendency of British governments to emphasise strategic, racial and other considerations served merely to camouflage their true motives and to avoid arousing excessive domestic and international criticism.5 The debate upon British motives, and particularly upon what Curzon referredto as the 'dirty mess of Mosul oil', will undoubtedly continue, especially as different departmentsregardedoil in varying ways; for example,the Board of Trade and the Colonial Office assumed a greater interest in Mosul oil than the Foreign Office, as demonstratedin their disagreementsduring 1924 over the conclusion of a concession agreementbetween Iraq and the Turkish PetroleumCompany, in which Britain, including the government through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, had a significant stake.6 However, it seems reasonable to conclude that, even without oil, the British government would have been reluctant to make concessions on Mosul; a concern for the strategic integrity of its mandate, Iraq, and for imperial considerationsencouraged the adoption of an uncompromising attitude, a stand reinforced by the crucial importance attached to the vilayet by the Iraqi government, as highlightedby the rider on its acquisition accompanying Iraq's somewhat reluctant ratification of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 1924. Nevertheless, oil, which brought in yet another department,the Board of Trade, constituted an additionalif not decisive factor, since Turkish control of Mosul would not only deprive Iraq of a resource valuable for the country's development but would also, it was claimed, prove more beneficialto American and French oil interests than to those of Britain; there were even fears that, in the long term, Turkey might threaten British oil supplies from the Persian Gulf.7 Whatever the motives determining British policy towards Mosul, successive governments proved reluctant to compromise upon its disposition in spite of the frequent assertions that it was not a vital Britishinterest. For instance, Curzon 'found Bonar [Law] longing to clear out of Mosul', while MacDonald stated his governmentwas merely acting as the 'custodian for Iraq'; they were followed by Chamberlainwho minutedin 1925 that 'Mosul really matters very little to us-we can exist and flourish without Irak'.8 The inability to secure an Anglo-Turkish settlementon Mosul at Lausanne, in conjunction with a desire to prevent either a diplomatic rupture or a breakdownof the peace talks, resultedin Article 3 paragraph2 of the Treaty of Lausanne, which provided for further bilateral negotiations on this question after the peace conference. In the event, the Mosul problemcontinued to prove a serious internationalissue during the next two or three years, exacerbating not just Anglo-Turkish relations, as seen in their respective military

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preparations in case of war, but also influencing the links between the European powers, and especially between Britain, France and Italy. In addition, the dispute affected the development of the League of Nations, since the Treaty of Lausanne stipulated that, if the direct talks failed to yield an agreement within nine months, the matter would be referredto the League; Turkey, although a non-member, would be assured of representationfor the purposes of this particular dispute. Both disputants agreed that, 'pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontiers', no military or other movements which might modify the territorialstatus quo should occur. However, Article 3 paragraph 2, which merely involved an agreement to shelve the dispute, was only achieved with great difficultyin view of the marked Anglo-Turkish differences at Lausanne over both the type and method of solution; their failure to agree upon an actual frontier line was parallelledby disagreementsover a suitable mode of pacific settlementin the event of direct negotiations proving abortive. In fact, at times between 1922 to 1926, a resort to war seemed the most likely possibility, while the eventual solution, which involved keeping the League in reserve, does appear somewhat surprisingon account both of the relative coolness of the Conservative Government of 1922-24 towards the League and of Turkey's non-membershipand distrust of the latter. However, in the end, a reference to a third party, such as the League, began to seem, at least to Britain, as the only way out of an impasse; British willingness to eventually submit the dispute to the League derived not just from its responsibilities for a League mandate, Iraq, but also from an anxiety to avoid a military solution in an area where Britainwas scaling-down its military commitments. Curzon, who was in any case confident of the strength of Iraq's claim to Mosul, believed that there might perhaps be a greater chance of the Kemal government making concessions through a third party rather than directly to Britain and Iraq, particularly as past experience gave little cause for optimism in respect of bilateralnegotiations. Curzon, who had gone to Lausanne with the objective of achieving a rapid settlement on British terms, had found the Turks frustratingpeople to negotiate with, and he had become increasingly infuriatedby the failure of Ismet Pasha, his Turkish counterpart,to bend underthe pressureof his 'steam-rollertactics' as well as by Ismet's tendency to use his deafness to advantage; Curzon lamented that 'I might as well have appealed to the Sphinx of Egypt, or apostrophised the mummy of Tutank-amen(sic.)'.9 Child, a member of the American delegation at Lausanne, observed Curzon's frustration,stating that 'it must be a terrible experience for Curzon to turn his splendid flow of beautiful English upon this man, and then find Ismet, with his little quizzical face, wholly untouched'.10 Curzon and Ismet commenced conversationson Mosul on 26 November 1922, but such private exchanges tended to highlight points of differenceratherthan to facilitate a settlement,and on 23 January 1923 Curzon broughtthe question before the Territorial and Military Commission, of which he was president. Although Turkish intransigenceon Mosul was partly ascribed to the needs of domestic politics and to Soviet pressure, Curzon complained also about the high entertainment allowances paid to the Turkish delegation, whose uncompromising attitude was reinforced by their alleged preference for 'the

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fleshpots of Lausanne to the austerities of Angora'."1In addition, Curzon regrettedthe lack of unity among the Allies, who were already dividedover the Ruhr problem, since this forced him to fight 'a forlorn and solitary battle' on Mosul, and he began to envisage the League as an extra means through which to enlist French and Italian support against Turkey; for example, he claimed that his speech at the commission on 23 January 1923, during the course of which he stressed the need to use the League, had made a good impression upon 'opinion' at Lausanne, thus ensuring future support.12 In fact, the League's role had already been touched upon several times during the conference in connection with such questions as minorities, the Straits, guarantees of territory,and Turkish membershipof the League, and in a sense Curzon's proposal for a League referenceon Mosul arose as much out of these earlier discussions as out of an appreciation of the value of employing the League as an adjunct of British diplomacy. The proposal, which won the support of both the Iraqi governmentand the Colonial Office, was given added emphasis by Curzon's threat, which followed interchangesbetweenthe Foreign Office and Drummond, the League's Secretary-General,to submit the Mosul dispute to the League anyway, since, under Article XI of the Covenant, it could be interpretedas a factor threateningto disturbinternationalrelations.13 However, such pressure, which was accompanied by Curzon's threat to leave Lausanne unless a rapid settlementwas secured on Mosul and the other issues in dispute, exerted little impact upon the Turkish delegation; Ismet voiced his government's opposition to any form of third party intervention, especially as the League was viewed as an instrumentdominated by the great powers. In any case, the only acceptable foundation for arbitrationwas one based upon Turkish terms. Thus, at the Territorialand Military Commission on 23 January 1923, Ismet countered with the suggestion of utilising a plebiscite to decide upon the fate of Mosul, although this proposal proved as unwelcome to the British government as the League referencewas to Turkey. Although Curzon had not been very impressed by recent Europeanplebiscites, his main argument concerned the device's irrelevance to the Middle East in general, and to Mosul in particular.'4A variety of objections sprang to his mind, for instance, that a plebiscite, by allegedly upholding the principle of national self-determination, ignored strategic, economic and geographical factors, which he regarded as equally important; in any case, it would be difficult to precisely delimit, or even to agree upon, the area covered by the plebiscite. Additional problems derived, he claimed, from deciding upon who would be eligible to vote and upon the type of questions to be asked, while the illiterate and nomadic nature of Mosul's population merely exacerbated the problem. Curzon also expressed concern about the maintenance of order during the plebiscite, since a free vote requiredthe withdrawal of British and Turkish forces from the area if undue pressure was not to be exerted upon voters. Although Curzon believed that such points constituted a cogent case against the plebiscite scheme, his basic objection arose out of his commitment to an alternativemode of settling the problem,and towards the end of January 1923 he decided that it was time to show Turkey his determinationto bringthe dispute 'within the four corners of the Covenant'.'5 Accordingly, on 25

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January 1923, the matter was referredto the Council, which, after receiving a British statement delivered by Lord Balfour at its session on 30 January, decided to note the dispute but to suspend action pending further talks at Lausanne.16 However, Curzon thought that, by bringing the matter to the notice of the League and by publicisingthe issues in dispute, he had made his point, and on 4 February he agreed to suspend a League referencefor one year in order to allow the resumption of efforts to reach a direct understanding. Thus, Curzon and Ismet reached agreementupon Mosulprior to the rupturein the conference, which resulted from other issues, such as capitulations and economic matters. However, Curzon and Ismet had only agreed to postpone a definitive solution of the frontier dispute, and it was not until June that the disputants accepted the formula which became Article 3 paragraph 2 of the final treaty; this allowed nine months for bilateralnegotiations, a period which representeda compromise between the six month period advocated by Britain and the one year period favouredby Turkey."7 It is clear that the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne, including the acceptance of Article 32, represented no real alteration of the situation on Mosul, for Britain and Turkey, who were still only prepared to compromise upon their own terms, remained as far apart as ever. In reality, at Lausanne they had merely agreed to disagree. In addition, the agreement upon an eventual League reference did not terminate Turkey's campaign for a plebiscite, while the debates in the Grand National Assembly upon the Lausanne Treaty tended to stiffen Kemal's resolve on the Mosul question. It was also realised in Turkey that the postponementof a solution might result in an internationalsituation more favourable to its seizure of Mosul. Meanwhile in Britain, MacDonald's Labour Government of 1924, like its Conservative predecessor,possessed little hope that the negotiations providedfor in Article 3 paragraph2 would yield a settlement,and such pessimism was soon confirmed both by the delays in getting the talks started and by the state of deadlock rapidly reached at the Constantinople Conference during May-June 1924; in fact, it proved impossible at the latter to even agree upon a draft for a joint reference of the dispute to the League in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne.18MacDonald, whose interest in Turkey had been stimulatedby a visit there in 1923, was particularly unhappy about the continued unsatisfactory state of Anglo-Turkish relations, as demonstrated by the breakdown of the bilateral negotiations.'9 On 6 August 1924, that is, one month after the expiry of the nine-month period prescribed by Article 3 paragraph2 for direct negotiations, the Britishgovernmentreferredthe dispute to the League, which meant that the interestsof the latter now became a further consideration to be taken into account, especially in Britain where no government could afford to ignore pro-League opinion.20During September, the League Council, which had even postponed the matter in order to allow Turkey to be representedupon 'a footing of equality', allowed both disputants to argue their cases at length, although Lord Parmoor, the British representative,and Fethi Bey, the President of the Turkish Assembly, were doing little more than going over old ground, repeatingprevious argumentsand proposals.2' However, the Council, which was assisted by Branting(Sweden)

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as the rapporteur, refrained from actuallyentering into the substanceof the in dispute viewof the widegulfseparating two parties; the the instead, Council decided 30 September createa commission inquiry order adviseit on to in of to upona suitable basisfor arbitration, whichwouldparticularly reflect views the of the peopleof Mosul as derivedfromon-the-spot The investigations. latter method,whichwas welcomed the Britishgovernment, by involved implicit an rejectionof the Turkishcase for a plebiscite.The commissionof inquiry comprisedthree members,who were intentionally selectedfrom small, and supposedly impartial, Europeanpowers,and from those personswho could a contribute rangeof relevantskills to the work;they wereM. de Wirsen,a Swedishdiplomat,Count Teleki,a geographer an ex-PrimeMinister and of Hungary,and ColonelPaulisof the Belgianarmy.The Councilresolution of 30 September also recordedthe fact that both parties,by recognising the Councilas the arbitrator, undertook acceptin advancethe decisionof the 'to Councilon the question referred it'. to Althoughboth disputantswere remindedof their obligationsunderthe
Treaty of Lausanne to respect the status quo, there was, for example, no

in attempt the Councilresolution specifymeasures counter incidents to to any whichmightarisein the disputedareaduring periodleadingup to a final the settlement.However,this omission, althoughregrettedat the time by the ForeignOffice,only becamesignificant retrospect, in when,in spiteof previous minor frontierclashes occurred;these clashes, which were undertakings, accompaniedby mutual recriminations, were encouragedboth by the vagueness the frontier on theground by the policyof bothparties of line and to tightenup theircontrolover the area they interpreted fallingwithintheir as jurisdiction. instance,therewere seriousclashesin the Hakkiyari For district between the Assyrians and the Turkish authorities,as reflectedin the destruction Assyrianvillagesand in the flightof Assyriansinto Iraq,and of duringSeptember, that is, while the Councilwas still in session,the British government kepta close eye on theill-treatment the Assyrians wellas had of as upon continualTurkishencroachments the area claimedby Britainfor into In Iraq.22 fact, the Assyrianproblem recently had assumed greater importance in Britishpolicy, since it was realisedthat the championing theirinterests, of whilehelpingBritainat the League,could also be utilisedto justifya frontier line morefavourable Iraq.23 the Turkish to But government, spiteof British in protests,dated 29 September and 5 October,and of the use of air power againsttheirtroopmovements, remained occupation territory in of claimed by Britain, on 9 October1924thelatterdelivered ultimatum theTurkish and an to and government, threatened resume'full libertyof action'unlessTurkish to troopswerewithdrawn within48 hours.24 Meanwhile, Turkish the government,
which disputed Britain's version of the status quo and recalled the National

Assembly in order to emphasisenational unity, partiallyoutmanoeuvred Britainby appealingto the League againstthe ultimatum. Althoughsome people,including Lindsay,the Britishambassador Turkey,argued to that the issue was worth a war with Turkeyin orderto teach Kemal a lesson, the British government was forced to suspendthe ultimatumand decidedto

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a request, underArticleXI of the Covenant, specialCouncilsessionin order to dealwiththe frontier clashes.25 As a result, a special session of the Council was convokedto meet in the Brussels on 27 October, and, as anticipated, basic problemdividing Parmoorand Fethi Bey concernedthe precise area which each party was entitled control.26 Councilsub-committee, to A whichwas chaired Branting by and also includedGuani(Uruguay)and Leon (Spain),examined matter, the and advised the Council upon a frontierline on the map-the so-called 'BrusselsLine'-which could serveas a temporary line demarcation untilthe commission's reportwas ready.Thisline,whichwas baseduponthe adviceof and cartographers the interpretation existingarrangements, of tendedin factto be favourable the Britishclaim,although was stressedthat it wouldnot to it prejudice final settlement. 29 October,the Council,including the On Britain and Turkey,acceptedthe 'BrusselsLine'as a temporary it frontier, although was advisedby the sub-committee such factorsas the remoteness the of that frontier area and the attitude of the Kurds ruled out an on-the-spot demarcation the line; both disputants, who agreedto withdraw their to of respectivesides of the 'BrusselsLine' by 15 November,were authorised to exercise administrative full controlovertheirown sectors. In November 1924, the commissionof inquiry,whose task had been facilitated the decisionstaken at Brussels,beganwork,and, aftervisiting by London, Angora and Baghdad,it reachedMosul in January 1925, when Britishand Turkishassessorswere appointed help the commissioners.27 to However,theirreportwas not readyuntilJuly 1925, and such a delayled to criticismsand impatience, especiallyin Britain,whereconcernhad already been expressed aboutthe timetakenin actuallysettingup the commission.28 Although AustenChamberlain, took overthe Foreign who Officein November 1924, decidedto wait for the report,it is clear that some of his Cabinet colleaguesas well as certainsectionswithinboth the Foreignand Colonial Officeswererather criticalnotjust of the delaybut also of the commissioners themselves. Withinthe ForeignOffice,for example, both Croweand Lindsay theirdoubts,referring expressed to disdainfully the 'smallnationmentality of League representatives'.29 They feared that the commissioners would be influenced by the meritsof the case thanby matters less irrelevant the issues to at stake,such as by responding the pressure the Turkish to of assessoror by a desireto showthatthe Leaguedidnot alwayssupport greatpoweragainsta a smallone.Crowe,expressing traditional a the antagonism towards implications of the 'newdiplomacy', that complained 'whenimportant interests the Great of Powersare concerned, decisionsare almostinevitably to subjects minor left of Powerswho rarelyhave the courageor experience handlesuch questions to with real skill, judgementand impartiality'. Such assertions,which reflect concernabout abdicating decisionsupon Britishintereststo a thirdparty, indicatethat some elementsstill possessedreservations about submitting the Mosuldispute the League. to Chamberlain foundit necessaryto curbthe impatience Amery,the also of ColonialSecretary, who was in any case unenthusiastic aboutthe Leagueas a

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whole, and to refutehis suggestions that the commissionmightdeliberately that in decideagainstBritain orderto disavowaccusations the Leaguewas the tool of the greatpowers.30 Chamberlain sharedAmery'simpatience Although of with the delays in the production the reportand appreciated Colonial the Office'sanxietyat the effectof thisuponIraq'sstability, refused interfere he to with the commission,such as by raisingthe matterat the MarchCouncil in adviceto the Foreign Officethat session,especially the lightof Drummond's the to pressurising commission expediteits work wouldmerelyresultin two one. reportsrather thanin a unanimous Amery,somewhat reluctantly, agreed fromDobbs,who, as the not to pressthe point.Further emanated complaints in BritishHigh Commissioner Iraq,receivedthe comrnission Baghdad; in he also suggestedanotherreasonfor the delays,whenhe complained aboutthe commissioners'excessive drinking habits and penchant for the High Commission'schampagne.31 However, Dobbs' criticisms,while coloured threatto his drinkstocks and by theiralleged partlyby the commissioners' consumption ten dozenbottlesof champagne, of derived from fundamentally his concernabout theirmode of procedure, seen in his complaints as about theirattemptsto secureinformation againstthe existingIraqiadministration andaboutthe apparent of influence the Turkish assessoroverthe commission. In turn,the latterexpressed concern aboutthe constant of policesupervision its activitiesand about the imprisonment those favourable Turkey;the to of commission even stoppedworkfor a few days,untilthe authorities Iraqhad in on givensatisfaction thesepoints. However, whenthe commission's in reportwas studied Britain, manyof the criticisms in advanced the pastby suchpeopleas Ameryor Croweaboutdelay or bias wereforgotten, sincethe commissioners' conclusions clearlyfavoured the Britishclaim, althoughat the same time such recommendations merely confirmedTurkishdoubts about the League'simpartiality.32 order to In determine fate of Mosul,the commission the to attempted adopta balanced and scientific approach the of through application a seriesof tests,whichwere basedupongeographical, ethnic,historical, economicand strategic factorsas well as upon what the commissioners as interpreted the wishes of the Its population. conclusions,which were supported accompanying by maps, graphsandstatistics, claimed that,whilethe geographical ethnictestswere and indecisive, the other criteria tended to favour Iraq. Perhaps, the key consideration, especiallyin the lightof the recentstressuponthe principle of national self-determination of theTurkish and desirefora plebiscite, concerned the allegedwishesof Mosul'spopulation, if theseviewswerederived even from ratherthan througha plebiscite; fact, the commission in personalimpression acceptedthe Britishargument the regarding 'insuperable practical difficulties' of holdinga plebiscitein the disputedzone. It was arguedthat, 'takingthe territory a whole,the desiresexpressed thepopulation morein favour as by are of Iraqthanof Turkey... the attitude mostof the peoplewas influenced of by the desire for effective support under the mandate, and by economic rather than by any feeling of solidaritywith the Arab considerations, Kingdom'. Although 'pro-Iraq sentiments somewhat are tepid,therecan at the sametimebe no doubtthatthe Turkish to Government's assertions, the effect

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thatthe majority the peopleof the vilayetof Mosulareindisputably of anxious to return Turkey,areincorrect'. doubtswereexpressed aboutthe to Although in manner whichthese 'desires' wereobtained,such extractsdo illustrate the commission'sattemptto interpretthe evidencein as balanceda way as possible,a point which also explainswhy the commission, havingrejected partition, proposedtwo alternative solutions,whichwouldboth be consistent withits findings. preferable The coursewouldbe the unionof MosulwithIraq on condition the latterremained British that for a mandate 25 yearsandagreed to respectthe wishesof the Kurds.In fact, the Kurdishquestion, whichhad been recentlyhighlighted the Kurdishrevoltin TurkeyfromFebruary by to April 1925, proveda significant a factor, since the Kurdsconstituted large proportion Mosul's population; Kurds, who were described one of the by observeras a turbulent nationalgrouping with a predilection shootingat for movingobjects,preferably evenif, human,shouldhavetheirwishesrespected, as the commissionargued,their sense of nationalconsciousnesswas still if undeveloped.33 However, theseconditions couldnot be satisfied, disputed the territory, apartfromIraq'sretention Diyalahfor irrigation of should purposes, be placedunderthe controlof Turkey, whichwas adjudged be 'morestable' to than Iraq.In fact, the exact wordingof this secondrecommendation, 'it that wouldbe moreadvantageous the territory remain for to underthe sovereignty of Turkey',caused some debatein view of Britishclaimsto the area since
1918.34

TheLeaguereport camebefore British the on Cabinet 7 August1925,and,in Chamberlain's absence,Amery,who remained anxiousto upholdIraq'sclaim to Mosul,persuaded Cabinetcolleagues acceptthe conditions his to attached to Iraq's acquisition Mosul.35 of Such approvalwas facilitated Hoare's by reassurances no additional that defenceobligations wouldbe involved, whileit was also pointedout that, by workingfor stabilityin Iraq, Britaincould acceleratenot just the latter's -entry to the League but also the complete withdrawal Britishforces fromthe area.Havingacceptedboth the report of andthe conditions relating the Mosulaward, British to the government, which had alreadyrequestedan earlieropeningto the September session of the Councilin orderto allow time for the consideration the Mosulproblem, of hopedthat the way was now clear for a finalsettlement.36 the event,the In positionwas now complicated the actionof the Turkish by government, which not only rejected report, the whoseassumptions questioned, alsoopposed it but both the Council'srightof jurisdiction the claimthat its awardwouldbe and binding.However,such assertionswere not entirelyunexpected, since they followedon from variousTurkishstatements during1924-25, whichtended to qualify its previous undertakings the Council. When the Council to assembled,Amery, who represented Britain for this particularquestion, carefullyrefutedthe arguments advanced a 'moredramatic eloquent' in and manner the Turkish by Tewfik representative, RushdiBey,whowas, according to one observer,'flashinghis gold teeth everywhere'; Tewfik,who evaded Amery'squestionsaboutthe fate of the Kurdsin Mosulif they wereplaced underTurkishrule, stressedthat the only solutionwas to reinstate Turkish controldefacto over an areawhereits dejure sovereignty neverceased.37 had

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of While the Council reconvenedthe sub-committee Three, which had Line'and was now headedby Unden beenusedto fix the 'Brussels originally in (Sweden)as the rapporteur, order to advise it upon the commission's the recommendations, controversyconcerningthe status of the Council's decision was referredto the PermanentCourt for judgement,in spite of Turkey's either admitthe Court's to or refusal jurisdiction to appear beforeit. These Anglo-Turkish over the report and the powers of the differences Councilwereaccompanied, again,by mutual the yet complaints concerning illtreatment the population Mosulandbreaches the 'Brussels of of of Line'.38 For example, Tewfikcomplained actiontakenagainst of thosewho hadexpressed a preferencefor Turkey to the commission,whereas Amery respondedby withthe continued charging Turkey of In persecution the Assyrians. fact,on 24 the September Council,actingupona proposalmadeby Amery,decided that such allegations shouldbe investigated, thisresulted the appointment and in of in General an an Laidoner, Estonian, orderto perform on-the-spot into enquiry the validityof the chargesmadeby Britainand Turkeyas well as to keepthe of in Councilinformed developments the areaadjacent the 'Brussels to Line'.39 However, the Turkish government, which opposed this decision, refused for permission Laidoner travelon the Turkish of the line. to side The finalstage of the League'sinvolvement the Mosuldisputeoccurred in with the Councilsessionof December1925, since this receivednot only the of recommendations the sub-committee Three and Laidoner's of reportbut also the opinionof the Permanent Court. The latter'sjudgement,that the Council'sdecisionon the frontier wouldbe a bindingarbitral awardand that such a decision,excluding votes of the disputants, to be unanimous, the had clearedthe way for a settlement, had delivered especiallyafterLaidoner his to report the Councilon 10 December; fact,Laidoner lefttwo assistants in had in Mosulas a continuing Leaguepresence.40 whilecomplaining Laidoner, that Turkey'srefusalto allow him across the 'BrusselsLine' had prevented the fulfilment all of his functions, of advisedthat neitherBritain Turkeyhad nor intentionally violatedthe 'BrusselsLine';he arguedthat such incidents were inevitable,since the line, which was not markedon the ground,did not represent natural a boundary. However, certainsectionsof his report serve did as an indictment Turkishadministration, of such as demonstrated the by evidenceof rape and massacreat Baijo,where'fortymen are statedto have beensuddenly takenawayfromtheirfamilies, shutup in a remote building, and in assassinated cold bloodby Turkish who no doubtwereanxious soldiers, not to be disturbed theirorgiesby the husbands parents the womenthey in and of intended outrage.'Such evidencedid not help Turkishclaimsfor territory to which included non-Turks,and contributedto the Council's unanimous decision in favour of Iraq, subject to the conditions specified in the commission's report.4' Although Turkish the government ceasedto attend had the Councilafterthe Permanent Court'sjudgement been acceptedon 8 had December,it did send a note to the Leaguein orderto place on recordits repudiation the Council's powers of arbitration of and its assertionthat Turkish rightsin Mosulremained intact.BothAmeryand Chamberlain, while satisfied with the outcome of the Council session, were critical of the

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diplomaticintriguesbehind the scenes at Geneva, and especiallyof the shownfor Turkeyby the smaller for sympathy Chamberlain powers; instance, view of Unden,the rapporteur, 'a little saw no reasonto modifyhis earlier as mandealing withbig affairs'.42 Naturally, Turkish the government critical the Councilaward, its was of and increasingly intransigent attitude, demonstrated by its absence as both fromthe Councilandby the toneof its noteto the League, in resulted fearsthatit might defy the League'sdecision,and perhaps,with Russianencouragement, even resortto force. Such concernwas reinforced the fact that,throughout by the periodin which the League had been involvedin the dispute,the Turkish whichhad neverbeenenthusiastic government, aboutthe use of an institution felt to be underthe controlof the greatpowers,continually proposeddirect negotiationsin preferenceto League arbitration.However, neither the MacDonald nor Baldwin governmentsresponded favourably to these proposals, whichwereusuallymadethrough Turkish the Minister London; in in fact, the appointment ZekiaiBey to this post in September of 1924 was allegedlydesignedto facilitatesuch negotiations.43 example,ZekiaiBey For raised the matter upon the occasion of his first meeting with Austen Chamberlain November1924, but the latter,even morethanMacDonald, in refusedto becomeinvolved bilateral in negotiations, partlybecausesuchtalks would be interpretedas by-passing the League, and would, therefore, antagoniseLeague opinionin Britain,and partly becausethere seemedno reasonto believein the feasibility a negotiated of settlement; addition, in the Turkish Minister, wasdescribed Tyrrell 'a slippery withwhomI who by as gent would be sorry to deal', did not really impressthe ForeignOfficewith his sincerity."In any case, the type of agreement suggestedby Turkey,that Britain shouldrecognise Turkish controlof Mosulin return somequidpro for quo, such as oil concessions, wouldhave beenheavilycriticised bothat home andabroad. Thus, during 1924-25 the Turkishattitudeproved increasinglyambivalent, as seen on the one hand by the proposalsfor direct negotiations and on the otherhandby the threatto oppose,possiblyby force,an adverse Councildecision. a result,the British As was its government forcedto consider responsein the eventof an Anglo-Turkish or of a Turkish war defiance the of League, especially in the light of reports concerning Turkish troop in concentrations the disputedarea and Russianencouragement Turkish of belligerence.45 Initially,such as at the time of the LausanneConference or the during earlypartof 1924,thisstudyconcentrated uponwhatBritain herself could do, althoughonce the League became involved possible countermeasureswere widened to include sanctions appliedby its members;in the particular, affairprovidesone of the fullestaccountsof Britishattitudes duringthe 1920s towardsthe natureand feasibility Leaguesanctions.In of thesestudies, attention focusseduponairandnavalactionrather thanthe more expensive armyoperations.46 stressuponthe RAF for the 'immediate The and drasticbombing' Turkish of and troopconcentrations linesof-communication the reflected decisionmadein 1922to transfer controlin Iraqfromthe military WarOfficeto the Air Ministry viewof the greater in of for suitability airpower

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dealingwith such areas as the MiddleEast. In any case groundoperations wouldbe difficult expensive a regionwherethe RAF hadalready and in proved its relativevalue,as demonstrated its employment counterborder by to raids on the Turco-Iraq in frontier 1923andits bombing Turkish of forces'invading' the territory claimedby Britain September in 1924. Aerialbombing wouldbe accompanied navalaction,whichwas designed seizea portion Turkish by to of as territory a bargaining counterin the eventof a Turkish of occupation Iraqi territory. to However,during1924 it provedunnecessary put suchplansinto to operation,althoughthe Britishultimatum Turkeyin Octoberbroughtthe of the remained under possibility actioncloser.Nevertheless, question constant of review,especiallyduringthe periodfollowingthe publication the Mosul commission's reportin July 1925 in view of Turkey'sreactionagainstthe commission's and recommendations of news of Turkish in troopmovements the borderarea.In fact, in October1925 British that intelligence reported the Turkish governmenthad, albeit on the pretext of unrest in Kurdistan, and concentrated about 13,000infantry 5,000 cavalrytroopscloseto theIraqi frontierand that reinforcements were still being sent along the Nisibin railway.4' The discussionupon the natureof the Britishresponseto Turkishaction continued be conducted to withinthe framework the determination avoid of to a large-scale with confrontation Turkey;neitherBonarLaw nor MacDonald wanteda warover Mosul,andevenBaldwin, who was not notedfor involving himselfin international issues,summoned fromthe ForeignOfficeon Gregory 22 September1925 in orderto indicatehis personaloppositionto such an 'unpopular' war.48 need to avoid extensive The military commitments the for defenceof Iraqwas repeated Baldwin theCommittee Imperial by at of Defence on 15 October; bothChurchill Ameryagreed, and the although latterqualified his statement indicating natureof Britishtreatyobligations Iraq.49 by the to whose reservations the early 1920s werenow reinforced his Churchill, of by Treasury responsibilities, arguedthat Iraq shouldfightits own battles;'I am personally opposedto riskinga singleBritish in defenceof Mesopotamia', unit since'it wouldbe madness get entangled to there'. who represented Tyrrell, the Foreign Office during Chamberlain's absence at Locarno, agreed, while stressingthat it was the League'sresponsibility recommendsanctions to againstany defiance its decisionon Mosul;in addition, of Laidoner's presence in the borderarearendered desirable it that any unilateral immediate and air and naval action by Britainshould only occur in responseto a 'flagrant' violationof the frontierby Turkey.The Committeeof ImperialDefence's recommendations, British that actionforMosulshouldbe limited nature in and that Britainshouldact throughthe League,were acceptedby the Cabinet, whilethe latterdecided thatanyimmediate British response, whichshouldonly occur in the event of what it specifiedas 'a conspicuous breach'of the Iraqi frontier,would be justifiedin terms of countering Turkishdefianceof the League.50 Aerialbombing wouldconstitute significant of suchimmediate a part in action,whilethe Admiralty, spiteof doubtsabouta possibleviolation the of StraitsConvention 1923,was instructed prepare of to plansfor the occupation of Turkish islandsat the entrance the Dardanelles, withairsupport, of and, for

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passingthroughthe Straitsto blockadeConstantinople. Duringthe next few months, these plans were furtherrefined,such as to includethe possible movementof troopsfrom India,althoughthe Britishgovernment hoped still that force would not be required. Thus, it provedessentialnot to provoke Turkey,and Chamberlain, who was aware of the latter'scomplaintsabout British navalandairmovements the AegeanSea during in August1925,urged the need not to give Turkeycause for concern.5" of However,the Committee Imperial Defence'sdiscussionsrangedbeyondthe sphereof militaryaction, sincea sub-committee, whosereport not readyuntilJanuary1926,studied was the feasibility employing of economicsanctionsagainstTurkey.52 it was But, concludedthat, even if the sanctionswere League-wide, impositionof the economicmeasures wouldbe futile,particularly Russia,whichwas not a as member the Leagueand hadjust concluded new treatywithTurkey, of a was likelyto facilitate Turkish any efforts evadea Leagueblockade. to Therefore, natureof the Britishresponse, the whichinvolved use of air the andnavalactionin conjunction the League,was fairlyclearin the case of with a Turkishresort to force; the situationwas more complexif the Turkish whilerefusing recognise Leaguedecisionon Mosul,didnot government, to any for actually fight. Chamberlain, example, remaineduncertainas to the course of action in such an eventuality, appropriate althoughafterOctober 1925 he hoped that the moral pressureof the League, which had been enhanced the latter'ssuccessin halting Greco-Bulgarian by the would conflict, provesufficient.53 a result,the Leagueremained integral As an partof British thinkingupon the Mosul disputebecauseof the advantages that a Leaguebasedpolicy appeared possess to a Britishgovernment, to whichwas acutely aware of the limitations Britishpower and of the dangersof an Angloof Turkishwar. In particular, towardsthe end of 1925, Chamberlain used the Leagueas an instrument fosterthe unityof the Locarno to Powers,andthusas a meansof avoiding divisions the ranksof the AlliedPowerswhichhad the in hamperedBritish policy during the Lausanne Conference.In fact, his expectation of the support of the other members of the League led like Chamberlain, Amery,to becomerather irritated the way in whichsome at of the smaller powers,whichhadcontinually beentryingto persuade Britain to underwrite League sanctionson a world-wide basis, such as throughthe GenevaProtocol(1924), draggedtheir feet on the Mosul question;'are the sanctionsavailable', asked,'only if Britain he appliesthemfor someoneelse's
protection?'54

Likehis predecessors, Chamberlain anxiousto securethe assistance was of the othergreatpowerson accountof his appreciation just of the potential not valueof theirsupport also of theimpactof greatpowerunityupon military but the Turkish he government; was also concerned to allowthe Mosulaffair not to disrupt unityforgedrecentlybetween greatpowersat Locarnoand the the duringthe Greco-Bulgarian dispute.AlthoughFrench commercial and oil interests werehopingto profitfromTurkey's acquisition Mosul,therewere of at the same time a number cogentreasonswhichencouraged French of the to to government respond for favourably Chamberlain's such requests support, as in respectof permitting use of Syria,a Frenchmandate, an airbase the as

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the againstTurkey,and of preventing passage of Turkishtroops along the NisibinrailwaythroughSyria.Briand's whichwas in accordwith agreement, an earlier Frenchpledgeon the subject 25 November1921,was encouraged on by his desireto maintainAnglo-French not solidarity, just in relationto the Germanproblembut also in the MiddleEast, such as in regard the recent to Druzerevoltin Syria(July 1925);he was also consciousof the factthatMosul mightestablish precedent Turkish a for claimsto Alexandretta Aleppo.On and the whole,Chamberlain admitted satisfaction Briand's his with which response, includedthe exertionof Frenchpressureupon Unden to restrainhis proTurkish tendencies, although occasionalproblems arose,suchas overthe still Nisibin railway and over the 'independent' activitiesof'Paul-Boncour, the Frenchdelegate,at Genevaduringthe Councilsessionof December1925.55 Italianhelp was deemedequallydesirable, especiallyin view of its potential to ability offerbothnavalandairsupport against whilethelikelihood Turkey, of such cooperation facilitated was both by Italianterritorial ambitions against Turkeyandby the continued development Anglo-Italian of relations uponthe foundations downby Chamberlain Mussoliniat Romein December laid and 1924.56 For example,in April 1925 the Britishgovernment had recognised Italian rightsin Iraq,such as in respectof participating the latter's in economic development, while an Anglo-Italian exchangeof notes in December1925, providing the mutualrecognition theirrespective for of concessionclaimsin Ethiopia, markeda further stagein theirrelationship; fact,the exchange in of notes has resulted claims,whichare unsupported the evidence, in by thatthe Ethiopianagreement was a quidpro quo for Italianhelp over Mosul.s In addition, Chamberlain's to Rapalloat the endof December visit 1925provided not just a further opportunity meetMussolini also served, Turkey's to but for as benefit, another outward manifestation Anglo-Italian of harmony.58 Britisheffortsto createa kind of 'TripleEntente' betweenBritain, France and Italy were clearlyhelpedby the relativecoincidence interests of existing between them in respect of Turkey, althoughrecent events, such as the LocarnoConference, Greco-Bulgarian the disputeand the Ethiopian question also promotedharmony.'Is Mosul', Chamberlain asked,'to be allowedto In destroywhat has been accomplished?'59 fact, therewereeven reportsthat the Stresemann, GermanForeignMinister,had reprimanded Nadolny, his in for representative Constantinople, encouraging Turkeyto look for German contacts with the great powers were support on Mosul.60Chamberlain's he of supplemented the attention paid to the threemembers the Council's by sub-committee, concentrated Guani, Leon and Unden;he particularly upon British in Leon,who was, in turn,seeking in troubles support respectof Spain's Moroccoandof its desirefor a permanent on the LeagueCouncil.6' seat The cooperation the great powers,which was backed by a threatof of materialand moral sanctions,undoubtedly contributed the decision of to Turkey,albeitreluctantly, acquiescein, or rathernot to openlydefy, the to Council's decisionon the Turco-Iraq its frontier, although dislikeof an award, whose validityit refusedto admit,was highlighted 17 December1925 by on the conclusion a Russo-Turkish of less derived from Treaty,whosesignificance its contentsthanfromthe date and the fact of its signature. addition, In there

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and was, predictably, strongreactionwithinTurkeyagainstboth Britain the a into in was League,although the eventsuchopposition not translated military of action againstIraq, partlybecauseof an appreciation the realitiesof the international situationand partlybecauseof a consciousdiplomatic efforton the part of the Britishgovernment reconcileTurkeyat the same time as to an Britain fulfilling termsof the Councildecision; example, Anglowas the for Iraqi Treaty,which was signedon 13 January1926 and approvedby the in mandate Iraq,although an Leaguein April,extended term of Britain's the of for escape clauseprovided the earlytermination the mandateupon Iraq's entryto the League.62 However,as earlyas 4 December1925, Chamberlain, Turkish the anticipating hostilityto the forthcoming Councilaward,examined of Kemalsomeface-saving whichcouldthen possibility offering arrangement, Even Baldwin, becomethe basis for an Anglo-Turkish reconciliation. such as in conversation ZekiaiBey,personally with suchan agreement.63 promoted Thus, the Baldwingovernmentaccepted the need to actively appease in the Turkey,and this attitudefacilitated openingof bilateral negotiations April 1926 and the eventualconclusionof the Treatyof Angoraon 5 June Turkishacceptance both of the Turco1926.64 Althoughthe latterembodied Iraq frontierline as 'definiteand inviolable'and of the creationof a joint boundarycommissionto trace the line on the ground,the progressof the negotiations was initially hindered by Turkish demands for territorial to adjustments the frontierline decidedupon by the Council.However,the British government only prepared agreeto minormodifications, as was to such to give Turkey control of the road from Alamun to Ashunta;the main concessionsmadeto Turkey, whichreviveda proposal discussedat Lausanne in 1923,comprised arrangement an compensating Turkeyfor any oil foundin Mosulwitheither10%of the oil royalties 25 yearsor a compound of sum for In ?0.5 million. this way, the oil question, whichsome see as the rootcauseof the Mosuldispute, of helpedto solvethe problem whatsortof treatyshouldbe in concluded the causeof Anglo-Turkish reconciliation. The Treatyof Angora of June 1926, ratherthan the Leaguedecisionof December1925,effectively terminated Anglo-Turkish the conflictoverMosul; the dispute, whichhad originated 1918,hadprovedboth'tedious', shown in as by the lengthyandoftenabortive negotiations the subject, 'perilous', on and as seenin the persistent fearsof andpreparations anAnglo-Turkish as well for war as in Britain'sdescriptionof Turkey as an 'aggressiveIslamic state'.65 the Nevertheless, fact that the Anglo-Turkish treatyconfirmed Council's the decisionand that the disputehad apparently been settledthrough League the meantthatthe latterreceived creditat the time,especially the Mosulaward as was made at the same time as the League'ssuccess in the solutionof the Greco-Bulgarian dispute.As such,the Mosulaffairconstituted further a stage in the evolutionof the peace-keeping of the League,whiledemonstrating role also the range of resourcesat the latter'sdisposal,such as the role of the the rapporteur, operationof a commission inquiry,the interaction the of of Councilwith the International of Court,as well as the natureand feasibility such as the delaysin the thereweredifficulties, Leaguesanctions.Naturally, in thesewereto be expected a of completion the commission's report, although

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developing in institution; fact, certainlessons derivedfrom this disputewere immediately into effectduring Greco-Bulgarian put the incident, seenin the as of of whichcomprised composition the RumboldCommission Enquiry, five members whomthreecamefromBritain, of FranceandItaly. Once the Mosul problem had been referredto the League, British governments beenconcerned act through League, Chamberlain, had to the and for example, to suchdoubting constantlyendeavoured persuade colleagues as Ameryto acceptthis line of policy; their difference attitudetowardsthe of League's role reflected just personalfactorsbut also the varyingoutlooks not of their respective in departments regardto the international situation,since Ameryplaceda greater the emphasis uponimperial considerations, including interestsof Iraq, than Chamberlain. Nevertheless, Amery'sratherguarded attitude towardsthe Leaguewas modified his visitsto the LeagueCouncil, by even if his doubtswere neverentirelydissipated; returned he from Geneva, impressed the League'svalueas a social and politicalgathering, by since'we danced-even the Congressof Vienna cannot have danced more'.66 But, behindthe fa9adeof a League-based the policy,the greatpowersperformed major role, therebyjustifying,to some extent, Turkishcriticismsthat the Leaguehad beenthe 'tool of the imperialist powers'. Although 'imperialist' the natureof Britishpolicy is a matterof debate,it is clearthat it suitedBritish as governments, in the case of Mosul,to utilisethe Leagueas an instrument of foreignpolicy; the Leaguewas viewed as an adjunctto Britishdiplomacy, means of settling a difficultproblemin a manner offeringan alternative to favourable the British pointof view.Suchan attitude, whichemphasised the League's inter-governmental nature, resulted a policyof usingthe Leagueto in bail Britainout of a difficultsituationarisingfrom the failureof bilateral negotiations wellas to depoliticise question as the through intervention a the of thirdparty.The Leaguealso offereda platform publicise to whatthe British government saw as Turkey'sunreasonable attitude,and thus as a meansof securingboth moral and materialsupportfrom other members; Tyrrell as reliance minuted, uponthe LeagueplacedBritain a muchstronger 'in position to deal with her [Turkey] than we shouldbe in in the eventof the failureof direct negotiations'.67 Britain'sreluctanceto employ force against Turkey reinforced this particular In consideration. addition,it was realisedthat a based upon the League would be welcomedby League policy apparently opinionin Britain,and particularly the Leagueof NationsUnion;in fact, by the Baldwingovernment, whichhad been criticised rejecting Geneva for the Protocolin March1925,attempted conciliate to suchopinion pointing its by to supportof the Leaguein both the Mosul and Greco-Bulgarian disputes.For example, Chamberlain informed LeagueAssembly September the in 1925that 'no greaterproof of the influence which the Leaguehas gained ... can be offered thanby the actionwhichmy Government takenin connection has with the difference Mosul'.68 concerning this However, stressuponthe League's couldnot disguise fact that, role the the Councildecisionof 16 December1925,whilesettling fateof Mosul,did the not reallysolve the Anglo-Turkish dispute. The Turkish government's refusal to acceptthe Mosulawardimplied that it was merelybidingits timeuntilthe

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moment seemed appropriatefor settling it to Turkey's satisfaction, such as at a time when Britishforces had been completely withdrawnfrom Iraq or when the great powers were less united. The state of Anglo-Turkishrelations at the close of 1925 was, therefore, a potential threat to peace, as well as to the future stability of Iraq, and this illustratesthe limitationsof the League's achievement. It was left to direct negotiations outside of the League to secure a more permanentAnglo-Turkishreconciliation, albeit upon the-basis of the territorial solution advocated by the League. The Treaty of Angora of 1926, by removing one of the principal stumbling-blocks to improved Anglo-Turkish relations, facilitated their rapprochement, although the latter did not become obvious until the early 1930s.69 In fact, in 1932, Turkey, like Iraq, even entered the League of Nations. The 1926 agreement also promoted the political and economic development of Iraq, and especially the exploitation of Mosul oil, which had performeda role in the origins, course and settlementof the Mosul dispute.

NOTES

1. S.R. Sonyel,Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923. MustafaKemaland the Turkish Nationalist

Movement (London, 1975), 195-226; "F", 'Turkish Facts and Fantasies', Foreign Affairs, III, 1925, 589-603. For the Mosul problem, see: E. Kedourie, England and the Middle

East. TheDestruction the Ottoman of Empire1914-1921 (Hassocks,1978) 133, 175-213

2. 3. (on the historical context); A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1925, i (London, 1927), 471-531; V.F. Minorsky, The Mosul Question (Paris, 1926). Sonyel, op cit., 187-8, 195, 201, 211-12; R.H. Davison, 'Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne' in G.A. Craig and F. Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats 1919-1939, i, (New York: 1965), 172-209. Minutes, March 1924, FO.371/10076. E2682/7/65(24). British Foreign Office (FO.), Colonial Office (CO.), Admiralty (ADM.), and Cabinet (Cab.) Papers are located at the Public Record Office, London; MacDonald, Prime Minister, 26 March 1924, Hansard, 171, column 1351; MacDonald, 18 June 1924, Cabinet 38(24), Cab.23/48. On British policy in Iraq, see: Report of Cabinet Committee on Iraq, 23 March 1923, CP.167(23), Cab.24/159; Cabinet discussion, 26 April 1923, Cabinet 22(23), Cab.23/45; Minute, Sir J. Shuckburgh, Asst. Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, 8 Feb. 1924, CO.730/64. CO.6225; Memo. on InterdepartmentalMeeting, 16 May 1924, CO.730/65. CO.22074; H. Mejcher, 'Iraq's External Relations, 1921-1926', Middle Eastern Studies, 13, 1977, 340 (herafter Mejcher/MES). E.B. Scovill, 'The RAF and the Desert Frontiers of Iraq, 1919-1930', Aerospace Historian, 22, 1975, 84-5; P. Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932, Ithaca, 1976, 90, 160; N. Henderson, Water under the Bridges, London 1945, 119-20. For example, see: Curzon to Foreign Office, 19 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9060. E830/1/44(23); Minute, Shuckburgh, 14 Feb. 1924, CO.730/65. CO.6364; Macdonald Government's instructions for the Constantinople Conference, March 1924, FO.371/10076. E2053/7/65(24); Minutes, November 1924, FO.371/10080. E9561/7/65(24); Chamberlain to Worthington-Evans, 18 Dec. 1924, AC.51/1/237. The Austen Chamberlain Papers (AC.) are at Birmingham University. For assessments of British motives, see: e.g. K. Hoffman, Oelpolitik und angelsdchsicher Imperialismus (Berlin, 1926); H. Mejcher, Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928 (London: 1976), 131-2, 135-8, 165; Sluglett,

4. 5.

op.cit.,79-80, 103-4, 110-15; M. Kent,Oil andEmpire. BritishPolicyandMesopotamian Oil 1900-1920 (London:1976),126-8, 155-7; E. Monroe, in Britain's Moment theMiddle
East (London: 1963), 103. 6. For example, see the debate in 1924 on granting oil concessions in Mosul with the Foreign

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Office opposing the views of the Colonial Office and the Board of Trade: CO.730/65. CO.3719, CO.6364, CO.9955. On Curzon: Curzon to Bonar Law, 13 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9059. E589/1/44(23); Earl of Ronaldshay, TheLife of Lord Curzon, (London: iii 1928), 333. 7. S. Longrigg, ed, Oilin theMiddleEast (London: 1960), 24, 66-83. 8. Ronaldshay, op.cit., 332-3; MacDonald to Henderson, 30 June 1924, FO.371/10078. E5212/7/65(24); Minute, MacDonald, 31 Oct. 1924, FO.371/10080. E9561/7/65(24); Minute, Chamberlain, 2 Nov. 1925, FO.371/10826. E6772/32/65(25). Chamberlain insisted on spelling 'Irak' in this manner, and criticised the use of 'Iraq'. 9. Curzon to Foreign Office, 23 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9060. E959/1/44(23); Ronaldshay, op.cit., 329, 331. Rumbold, Curzon's debuty at Lausanne, referred to 'uppish Orientals'; M. Portrait a Diplomat. Gilbert, Sir HoraceRumbold. 1869-1941 (London: 1973), 280-98. of 10. R.W. Child, A Diplomat Looksat Europe (New York: 1925), 96. 11. Curzon to Foreign Office, 13 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9059. E590/l/44(23); Sonyel, op.cit.,185. 12. Curzon to Foreign Office, 12 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9059. E587/1/44(23); Curzon to Foreign Office, 23 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9060. E932 and E959/1/44(23); Curzon to Crowe, 9 Feb. 1923, FO.371/9063. E1386/l/44(23); Sonyel, op.cit.,189-90; Henderson, op.cit.,109. 13. Shuckburgh to Curzon, 12 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9059. E562/1/44(23); Curzon to Foreign Office, 19 Jani. 1923, FO.371/9060. E830/l/44(23). 14. Curzon to Foreign Office, 23 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9060. E959/l/44(23). 15. Curzon to Foreign Office, 24 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9060. E961/1/44(23); Crowe, Permament Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, to Drummond, 20 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9060. E967/1/44(23). 16. Leagueof Nations,Official Journal (LNOJ.), 1923, 20 1-2. iv, 17. Curzon to Foreign Office, 5 Feb. 1923, FO.371/9064. E1509/1/44(23); Curzon to Foreign Office, 4 Feb. 1923, FO.371/9065. E1586/1/44(23); Gilbert, op.cit,289. 18. Cabinet to Rumbold, 21 April 1923, Cabinet 22(23), Appendix, Cab, 23/45; Minute, D.G. Osborne, First Secretary, 8 March 1924, FO.371/10076. E2053/7/65(24). 19. MacDonald to Foreign Office, 10 June 1924, FO.371/10078. E5261/7/65(24). 20. LNOJ.,v, 1924, 1465. 21. LNOJ., v, 1924, 1291-2, 1318-24, 1337-9, 1358-60, 1670; Britain and Turkey sent memos. to the League on 14 Aug. and 5 Sept. 1924, LNOJ., v, 1924, 1566-83. 22. 29 Sept. 1924, Cabinet 51(24), Cab.23/48. 23. Minute, Osborne, 8 March 1924, FO.371/10076. E2053/7/65(24); Memo., 6 May 1924, CO.730/65. CO.22074. 24. LNOJ.,v, 1924, 1584-6, 1649-50; Memo., J. Thomas, Secretary of State for Colonies, 14 Oct. 1924, CO.730/65. CO.48890. 25. Minute, T. Spring Rice, Head of Eastern Dept., 20 Oct. 1924, FO.371/10080. E9241/7/65(24). 26. LNOJ.,v, 1924, 1648-54, 1659-62, 1670 (includes a map of the "Brussels Line"). 27. In London, the commission sent the Foreign Office a questionnaire: see FO.371/10081. E10538 and E10845/7/65(24). 28. See Minutes, Oct. 1924, FO.371/10080. E8949/7/65(24). 29. Lindsay to Chamberlain, 28 Jan. 1925, FO.371/10823. E516/32/65/25), and see Crowe's minute, 29 Jan. 1925; Minute, Crowe, 19 Feb. 1925, FO.371/10824. E964/32/65(25). Similar views were expressed in the Colonial Office, e.g. Minute, Shuckburgh, 23 May 1925, CO.730/84. CO.23573. 30. Amery to Chamberlain, 5 March 1925, FO.371/10824. E1469/32/65(25); Minute, Chamberlain, 3 April 1925, FO.371/10825. E2093/32/65(25); Chamberlain to Amery, 5 June 1925, AC.52/1/33; Amery to Chamberlain, 6 June 1925, AC.52/1/34; Chamberlain to Amery, 11 June 1925, FO.800/258; L.S. Amery, My PoliticalLife, ii (London: 1953), 308. 31. Dobbs to Chamberlain, 2 Feb. 1925, FO.371/10824. E1044/32/65(25). 32. Report, League doc. no.C400 M147 1925 VII. 33. Toynbee, op.cit., 507-11; W.L. Westerman, 'Kurdish Independence and Russian Expansion', ForeignAffairs, 24, 1946, 679. The exact number of Kurds in Mosul was debatable; Turkey, which put the total at 260,000, disagreed with the British estimate of 450,000.

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275

34. See, e.g. Sir J. Fischer Williams, 'Sovereignty, Seisin and the League', British Yearbook of

International Law, 1926,26-7.

35. 7 August 1925, Cabinet 44(25), Cab.23/50. 36. LNOJ., vi, 1925, 892. 37. LNOJ., vi, 1925, 1307-37, 1377-82; Major-General A.C. Temperley, The Whispering Gallery of Europe, London, 1938, 32; Amery, op.cit., 326.

38. LNOJ.,vi, 1925, 1435-40. 39. LNOJ.,vi, 1925, 1404-5, 1583-6.

40. British Memorial to the Permanent Court, 21 Oct. 1925, FO.371/10826. E6305/32/65(25); the Court's judgement, 21 Nov. 1925, Publications of the Permanent Court of International

Justice,Series B, no.12, Collection AdvisoryOpinions; of LNOJ., vii, 1926, 120-9, 145,

305-8. On the continuing League presence, ibid. 538, 1040-1. 41. LNOJ., vii, 1926, 187-93. 42. Chamberlain to Ida, his sister, 19 Dec. 1925, AC.5/1/371, Chamberlain to Ivy, his wife, 9, 10 and 13 Dec. 1925, AC.6/l/626-8; Temperley, op.cit., 33; Minute, Chamberlain, 18 Sept. 1925, FO.371/10825. E5662/32/65(25); Amery, op.cit., 326. 43. Henderson to MacDonald, 20 Aug. 1924, FO.371/10079. E7314/7/65(24); Chamberlainto Worthington-Evans, 18 Dec. 1924, AC.51/1/237; Chamberlain to Lindsay, 21 Jan. 1925, FO.371/10823. E465/32/65(25); 8 April 1925, Cabinet 20(25), Cab.23/49; Chamberlainto Lindsay, 2 Nov. 1925, FO.371/10826. E6589/32/65(25). Drummond was kept informed of such approaches. 44. Minute, Tyrrell, 19 Nov. 1924, FO.371/10081. E10061/7/65(24). Although MacDonald opposed 'double negotiations', he was occasionally ambivalent on this point: Minute, MacDonald, 30 Sept. 1924, FO.371/10080. E8436/7/65(24). Minute, MacDonald, 1 Nov. 1924, FO.371/10080. E9561/7/65(24). 45. Lindsay to Chamberlain, 21 Nov. 1925, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, IA, i, doc.541; Minute, MacDonald, 1 Nov. 1924, FO.371/10081. E10061/7/65(24); CP.450(25), 23 Oct. 1925, Cab.24/175; Memo., G.W. Rendell, First Secretary, 19 Oct. 1925, FO.371/10826. E6418/32/65(25); Minute, J.D. Gregory, 2 Oct. 1925. FO.371/10825. E6004/32/65(25). 46. Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.) meetings 184, 5 May 1924, 185, 19 June 1924, 191, 11 Dec. 1924, Cab.2/4; Osborne to Colonial Office, 14 March 1924, CO.730/65. CO.12346; see also Foreign and Colonial Office contacts, Oct. 1924, CO.730/65. CO.50557; Memo., Thomas, 14 Oct. 1924, CO.730/65. CO.48890; Sluglett, op.cit., 115. 47. 13 Oct.1925, Cabinet 48(25), Cab.23/51; War Office Memo., 5 Oct. 1925, FO.371/10826. E6172/32/65(25). 48. Tyrrell to Chamberlain, 19 Oct. 1925, AC.52/l/770; Minute, Gregory, 22 Sept. 1925, FO.371/10825. E5845/32/65(25). 49. C.I.D. meeting 203, 15 Oct. 1925, Cab.2/4; Churchill to Chamberlain, 7 Sept. 1925, AC.52/1/169; Churchill to Baldwin, 7 Sept. 1925, S.B.P.115/112. The Stanley Baldwin Papers (S.B.P.) are at Cambridge University. 50. 21 Oct. 1925, Cabinet 49(25), Cab.23/51; CP.528(25), 15 Dec.1925, Cab.24/176. The Admiralty drew up the necessary plans; the details (Admiralty case no.1856, Adm. 116. 1925 - 50.4, MediterraneanSquadron) have been destroyed, but an outline can be found in Index 24550. 51. Chamberlain to Vice-Admiral Sir R. Keyes, Commander of the MediterraneanSquadron in the Aegean, 4 Nov. 1925, AC.52/1/541. A similar situation arose early in 1924 when the Foreign Office criticised the Colonial Office and Air Ministry plans for manoeuvres in Mosul; see CO.730/65. CO.12346. 52. C.I.D. Meeting 208, 26 Jan, 1926, Cab.2/4; 17 Feb. 1926, Cabinet 6(26), Cab.23/52.

53. J. Barros,TheLeagueof Nationsand the GreatPowers.TheGreek-Bulgarian Incident of 1925 (London,1970), 120; P.J. Beck,Britainand the Peacekeeping Role of theLeagueof
Nations, 1924-1929, University of London, Ph.D., Thesis, 1971, 173-214. 54. Chamberlain to Ida, 19 Dec. 1925, AC.5/1/371; Chamberlain to Ivy, 13 Dec. 1925, AC.6/1/628; Amery to Baldwin, 9 Dec. 1925, S.B.P.1 15/40; Minute, Chamberlain, 2 Nov. 1925, FO.371/10826. E6772/32/65(25). 55. Lord Crewe, British ambassador in Paris, to Selby, 17 Sept. 1925, FO.371/10825. Chamberlain to Crewe, 14 Nov. E5662/32/65(25); 1925, FO.371/10852.

276

MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES

56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

E6984/357/89(25); 3 Dec. 1925, Cabinet 57(25), 16 Dec. 1925, Cabinet 59(25), sur la 111eRepublique, ii Cab.23/5 1; J. Paul-Boncour, Entre Deux Guerres.Souvenirs (Paris: 1945), 174-5. Minute, Chamberlain, 1 Dec. 1925, FO.371/10826. E7369/32/65(25); Chamberlain to Graham, 13 April 1926, FO.800/259. For the debate on Anglo-Italian relations, see: P.G. StudiesReview, 1974, 4, Edwards, 'Britain, Fascist Italy and Ethiopia, 1925-28', European 359-60. On Italian rights in Iraq, see: CO.730/84. CO.19020. Journal,xiv, 1971, P. Edwards, 'The Austen Chamberlain-Mussolini Meetings' Historical 156-60. Minute, Chamberlain, 2 Nov. 1925, FO.371/10826. E6772/32/65(25); Documentson BritishForeignPolicy1919-1939, IA, i, doc. 566, Tyrrell to Lindsay, 30 Jan, 1926. Lindsay to Chamberlain, 4 Oct. 1925, FO.371/10826. E6195/32/65(25). Chamberlain to Leon, 3 and 11 Nov. 1925, FO.800/258. Command Paper(Cmd.)2587(26); British parliamentary debates, 17 Dec. 1925, 21 Dec. 1925, Hansard, 189, columns 1624-7, 2076-152; LNOJ., vii, 1926, 5023. For Iraq's reaction, see: A. Al-Marayati, A Diplomatic Historyof ModernIraq (New York: 1961), 53-4. Chamberlain to Lindsay, 4 Dec. 1925, FO.371/10826. E7485/32/65(25); Chamberlain to Salisbury, 4 Nov. 1925, FO.371/10826. E6875/32/65(25); 3 Dec. 1925, Cabinet 57(25), Cab.23/5 1. Cmd.2679(26); LNOJ., vii, 1926, 858-9. Cf. Curzon to Foreign Office, 30 Dec. 1922, FO.371/9058. E2/1/44(23); Minute, Osborne, 1 July 1924, FO.371/10079. E6205/7/65(24). on Chamberlain's statement to the Imperial Conference, 20 Oct. 1926, Documents British Foreign Policy1919-1939, IA, ii, 943. Amery, op.cit.,33 1-2; Amery to Baldwin, 18 Sept. 1926, S.B.P.1 15/120. Minute, Tyrrell, 19 Nov. 1924, FO.371/10081. E10061/7/65(24). Recordsof theSixthAssembly, 1925, 37. L. Zhivkova, Anglo-Turkish Relations 1933-1939,(London: 1976), 3.