THE JOURNAL

OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
A. K. Narain
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA
Heinz Bechert
Universitiit Gdttingen, FRG
Lewis Lancaster
EDITORS
Leon Hurvitz
UBC, Vancouver, Canada
University of California, Berkeley, USA
Alexander W. MacDonald
Universite de Paris X, Nanterre, France
Alex Wayman B.]. Stavisky
WNIIR, Moscow, USSR Columbia University, New York, USA
ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Stephan Beyer
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA
Volume 3 1980 Number 1
the watermark
THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF BUDDHIST STUDIES, INC.
This Journal is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Studies,
Inc., and is governed by the objectives of the Association and accepts
scholarly contributions pertaining to Buddhist Studies in all the various
disciplines such as philosophy, history, religion, sociology, anthropology, art,
archaeology, psychology, textual studies, etc. The jIABS is published twice
yearly in the Spring and Fall.
The Association and the Editors assume no responsibility for the views
expressed by the authors in the Association's Journal and other related
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Manuscripts for publication and correspondence concerning articles should
be submitted to A. K. Narain, Editor-in-Chief,jIABS, Department of South
Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, U.S.A.
The Editor-in-Chief is responsible for the final content of the Journal and
reserves the right to reject any material deemed inappropriate for publication
and is not obliged to give reasons therefor.
Books for review should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief. The Editors cannot
guarantee to publish reviews of unsolicited books nor to return those books to
the senders.
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Andre Bareau (France) JosephM. Kitagawa (USA)
John Brough (U.K.) Jacques May (Switzerland)
MN. Deshpande (India) Hajime Nakamura (japan)
R. Card (USA) John Rosenfield (USA)
B.C. Cokhale (USA) Bardwell L. Smith (USA)
P.S.Jaini (USA) David Snellgrove (U.K.)
J. W. de Jong (Australia) E. Zurcher (Netherlands)
Editorial Assistant: Roger Jackson
The Editor-in-Chief wishes to thank Rena Haggarty for assistance in the
preparation of this volume.
Copyright The International Association of Buddhist Studies 1980
ISSN: 0193-600X
Sponsored by Department of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin,
Madison, and the Anonymous Fund of the University of Wisconsin, Madison,
Wisconsin, U.S.A.
CONTENTS
1. ARTICLES
L A Study of the Madhyamika Method of Refutation,
Especially of its Affinity to that of Kathiivatthu,
by Shohei Ichimura 7
2. Prajnaparamita and the Buddhahood of the Non-Sentient
World: The San-Lun Assimilation of Buddha-Nature
and Middle Path Doctrine, by Aaron K. Koseki 16
3. A Clue to the Authorship of the Awakening of Faith:
"Sik1?ananda's" Redaction to the Word "Nien,"
by Whalen W. Lai 34
4. The Abhidharmika Notion of Vijiui7Ja
and its Soteriological Significance, by Braj M. Sinha 54
5. Some Comments on Tsong kha pa's Lam rim chen mo and
Professor Wayman's Calming the Mind and Discerning the
Real, by Geshe Sopa 68
Alex Wayman Replies to Geshe Sopa 93
Geshe Sop a Replies to Alex Wayman 98
II. SHORT PAPERS
1. Archaeological Excavations at Piprahwa and Ganwaria
and the Identification of Kapilavastu, by K. M. Srivastava 103
2. Notes on the Textcritical Editing of the
Bodhisattvavadiinakalpalata, by Frances Wilson III
III. BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES
1. Santideva: Mystique bouddhiste des VIle et VIlle siedes,
by Amalia Pezzali 115
2. On Knowing Reality: The Tattvartha Chapter of Asanga's
Bodhisattvabhumi, by Janice Dean Willis 117
3. Women in Buddhism: Images of the Feminine in
Mahayana Tradition, by Diana Y. Paul 120
4. Wittgenstein and Buddhism, by Chris Gudmunsen. 122
IV. NOTES AND NEWS
1. A Report on the 2nd Conference of the lABS
2. Report on A Critical Dictionary of Piili
Contributors
127
130
132
A Study of the Madhyamika Method of
Refutation, Especially of its Affinity to
that of Kathiivatthu
by Shohei I chimura
-1-
It was a quarter of a century ago that Prof. T.R.V. Murti published his
work on the Madhyamika philosophy,
1
which has made one essential
point of Madhyamika negation thoroughly known to post-war scholar-
ship, i.e., that Madhyamika philosophy is a critique of all philosophical
theses, and that this critique does not imply any thesis of its own but
exclusively reveals an inherent self-contradiction in any and every
philosophical thesis. This method has been called reductio-ad-absurdum
argument after the fashion Stcherbatsky used. My use of the term
Miidhyamika Dialectic is also in this particular sense.
Although Madhyamika dialectic is an age-old subject and has also
been treated in modern scholarship frequently, I found that little atten-
tion has been given to the fact that there is an intrinsic affinity between
the Madhyamika and the pre-classical Abhidharmist methods of
refutation. I am especially referring to the method which is recorded in
the Kathiivatthu or the Points of Controversy. 2 To demonstrate this affinity
is my primary objective in this paper. In orderto accomplish this demon-
stration, first, I will try to show why the pre-classical Buddhist debators
knew the two basic rules of Syllogistic Inference, namely anvaya and
vyatireka, which I may translate as 'positive and contra positive instantia-
tions.' They applied these rules in order to defend their own thesis in
terms of logicality, while refuting the other's in terms of illogicality.
Secondly, I shall make some point of affinity clear as to the Madhyamika
method in parallel to that of the Kathiivatthu.
7
-,-1I-
In the Vigrahavyavartani, and especially in his self-commentary,
Nagarjuna frequently equates the term nif;,svabhava, or absence of own-
being with that of sunyata, or emptiness.
3
He states, for instance, that
'light' and 'darkness' do not possess their own-being. They have no self-
identifying essence, because they are co-relative, mutually interdepen-
dent and hence unable to come into existence by themselves. Tradi-
, ,
tionally, this absence of own-being, as equated by Nagarjuna with the
concept of sunyata, has been regarded as one of the hardest subjects for
rational and intellectual understanding, because the method of its
exposition was and has been exclusively dialectical. In common sense
thinking, we regard both the faculty of cognition (prarniir:a) and its object
(prameya) as two different things, and yet we take their coalescence for
granted for the fact of cognition. This is comparable to the fact of illumi-
nation in which both a candle light and its object of illumination somehow
partake. As the major objective of the Nagarjuna
applies his dialectic to this particular context. I found an intrinsic affinity
between his dialectical method as applied in this text and that of the
Kathiivatthu.
We know that our language works not only as an instrument for
expressing inner thoughts, but also as an instrument for their communi-
cation. Because of this, we accept that each and every word or sentence
has its 'own-being,' or its self-identifying principle. For, such own-being
constitutes not only the essence of a conception that each expression
signifies, but also of an external existent it refers to. Accordingly, the
above two terms, i.e., light and darkness, are regarded as differentiating
their respective meanings in our consciousness as well as their respective
objects extraneous to us as referents. Nevertheless, Nagarjuna arid his
Madhyamika followers state that our very insistence upon the nature
and function of our language convention ipso facto commits us to the
truth of the reciprocal dependence of any two related terms and
sentences, and that we are in fact subscribing ourselves to the truth of
absence of own-being.
4
The questio:'l is: How and why can the Madhya-
mika dialectic be said to be the only method that is capable of revealing
the fact of universal reciprocity (parasparapek:jata) and absence of own-
being I believe that the aspect of universal interdepen-
dence can be disclosed by logically analysing the Madhyamika method of
refutation.
8
-III-
In Indian Syllogistic Inference, when two predications are related
causally. or tautologically, they constitute a necessary relation which
Buddhist and Hindu logicians called vyiipti. Logically, this relation or
pervasion of one predication by another consists of the preceding predi-
cation of Reason (hetu) and of the subsequent one as Thesis or Conclu-
sion (siidhya). As briefly referred to, Dignaga (a Buddhist logician of the
5th century) introduced three conditions for the validity of any given
vyiipti and theorized the dual rules of positive and contrapositive instan-
tiations. In order to explain these rules, let me take one of the stock
examples of the classical logicians, namely an inference of the existence
of fire from the existence of smoke. In order for a person to let others
know a breakout of a fire on a distant mountain, what he must do is to
remind the listener of the commonly-known concomitance between
smoke and fire by pointing at the rising smoke. On the part of the
listener, upon perceiving a particular smoke rising from the slope of the
mountain, his mind regulates itself into recalling a causal association of
smoke and fire. It is this logical process of the mind itself that actually consists of
the dual instantiations positive and contrapositive. I shall explain this point
briefly.
In order than an inference be correct, two logically related predica-
tions (hetu and siidhya) must be verified by the substratum intended to be
known. In our example the substratum, such as a mountain, must be able
to bear smoke as well as fire simultaneously, because, otherwise, it may
happen that the mountain may bear smoke but not fire, and vice versa. If
this is the case with the substrarum in question, it is obvious that no valid
inference becomes possible. The speaker, therefore, is obliged to
demonstrate whether the substratum (a mountain) is a member of the
class whose members are invariably able to bear smoke and fire. This is
called positive instantiation, or anvaya. The same speaker, however, is
also obliged to give contra positive instantiation as to whether the
substratum in question is clearly outside the scope of the contrapositive
class, because the latter members are neither capable of bearing fire nor
smoke. This is contrapositive instantiation, or vyatireka, for which the
speaker presents an instance, such as a lake or a water-dam, etc., where
neither of the two predications can be applied. In short, by means of dual
processes of instantiations, the speaker can confirm the demarcation
between positive and contrapositive classes (sapak!;a and vipak!;a resp.)
and thereby determine the particular substratum as a member of the
positive one.
5
9
As to the question of why appeal has to be made not only to positive
instantiation but also to the contra positive one, I believe it will become
self-evident in my subsequent demonstration. H ~ r e it suffices to say that
positive instantiation alone cannot fully differentiate those class
members which are either "capable of bearing smoke but not fire," or
"capable of bearing fire but not smoke." Suppose when, knowing all this,
someone encounters an opponent in the arena of debate. How should he
conduct his argument? He has to explore every possible error in his
opponent's logic. Sometimes, he may even try to deliberately induce
logical errors in his opponent. Nevertheless, he is obliged to abide in
accordance with the basic rules of logic, such as dual instantiations. I
believe that the debators of the Katluivatthu applied such method and in
following their step N agarjuna innovated his Madhyamika method of
refutation.
-IV-
There is clear evidence for the fact that the pre-classical Buddhist
debators were fully aware of the dual rules of logical instantiation, and
applied these as a method of refutation. The procedure of argument in
the text is so repetitive in form that I shall have to take up only the
initial refutation. The controversy here is concerned with the status of
pudgala. The orthodox Theravadin who rejects the reality of pudgala
faces the challenge by the Pudgalavadin in the arena of debate. Formally,
the refutation consists of five consecutive sessions. First, the Theravadin
presents (1) Refutation against the Pudgalavadin, which is followed by
the latter's (2) Rejoinder, (3) Refutation, (4) Application, and (5) Conclu-
sion.
6
Their arguments invariably include the dual demonstrations
being applied positively and contrapositively.
No.1
Two related predications cum substratum
lO
\.
"P": (Pudgala) "is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing"
(puggalo upalabbhati saccikatthaparamattheniiti)
"Q": (Pudgala) "is k n o ~ n in the same way a genuinely real thing is
known" (yo saccikattho paramattho tato so puggalo upalabbhati
saccikatthaparamattheniiti)
The two predications, which lquoted from Mrs. Rhys Davids' transla-
tion, can be transcribed as "P" and "Q" respectively. A notation "P" is
given to the predication: A pudgala "is known in the sense of a genuinely
real thing," and another notation "Q" to: A pudgala "is known in the
same way a genuinely real thing is known."
No.2
Positive (anvaya) and Contrapositive (vyatireka) Instantiations:
Theravadin: "P and Q" is assumed to be verified by substratum
such as dharmas, while "-Q and -P" is to be falsified by
substratum such as pudgalas.
Pudgalavadin: "Q and P" is assumed to be verified by substratum,
such as pudgalas as well as dharmas, while "-P and -Q" is to be
verified by all those remaining.
In No. 2, I specify two mutually contrary concomitances as well as
their respective contrapositions, which the Theravadin and the
Pudgalavadin apply throughout their demonstration. It is also intended
to show the workings of positive and contrapositive instantiations which
respectively determine the positive and contrapositive classes
and For the Theravadin, dharmas alone are real, and hence,
they constitute the positive class. Accordingly, the position "P and Q"
and its contraposition "-Q and -P" should respectively serve as criteria to
distinguish whatever is real like a dharma and whatever is unreal like
an empirical person For the Pudgalavadin, however, applying.
the same concomitance as that of the Theravadin is obviously
disadvantageous. Therefore, he introduces an exactly contrary con-
comitance to refute the Theravadin, namely, "Q and P" and its contra-
position, "-P and -Q". But the Theravadin logical strategy, and especially
the Pudgalavadin's, cannot be understood fully without help from the
Western form of logical implication, which I prepare in No.3.
No.3
Hypothetical Syllogism based upon "P then Q" and "Q then P":
If "P then Q," and "P," therefore "Q." (modus ponendo ponens)
11
If"P then Q," and "-Q," therefore "-P." (modusponendo to liens)
If"Q then P," and "Q," therefore "P."
If"Q then P," and "-P," therefore "-Q."
The one obvious reason for the usefulness of western forms is
evidentin the chart given in No. 4, i.e., the antecedent statement always binds
to the consequent, and this conditional implication can best be expressed in the
hypothetical syllogism oj the West.
No.4
Five Refutational Sessions between Theravadin and Pudgalavadin:
I
Theravadin Refutation
Pudgalavadin thesis "P.-Q" is
false, because P ::J Q;
"P.-Q" is false,
because -Q ::J -P;
Therefore, Pudgalavadin
thesis "P.-Q" is false.
III
Pudgalavadin Refutation
Theravadin thesis "-P.Q" can
be refuted, because
-P ::J -Q;
"-P.Q" can be refuted,
because Q ::J P;
Therefore, Theravadin thesis
"-P.Q" can be refuted.
II
Pudgalavadin Rejoinder
Theravadin thesis "-P.Q" is
false, because -P ::J -Q;
"-P.Q" is false,
because Q::J P;
Therefore, Theravadin thesis
"-P.Q" is false.
IV
Pudgalavadin Application
Our thesis "P.-Q" is not falsi-
fied,and
Your refutation "-(P.-Q)" is
not acceptable, because
P ::J Q, and -Q ::J P
Therefore, your refutation
"-(P.-Q)" is not acceptable.
V
Pudgalavadin Conclusion
Our thesis "P.-Q" is not refuted,
because "P.Q" is not compelled;
Your refutation "-(P.-Q)" is not convincing,
because "-Q.-P" is not compelled;
Because "P.Q" and "-Q.-P" are not compelled,
our thesis "P.-Q" is not refuted.
No.4 shows my transcription of the five consecutive sessions of argu-
ments.
6
I consistently replace the form of Indian logical concomitance
with that of Western logical implication. As a result, the chart shows not
only the dynamism of the sessions but also the logical context in which
12
indeterminancy ensued. There seem to be two basic reasons for the
indetermination of the controversy: (1) both parties violated the logical
boundary of positive and contrapositive classes, and (2) this in turn
allowed the Pudga:Iavadin to apply the contrary implication.
F i r s ~ , for the Theravadin, both predications "P" and "Q" should be
verified by the substratum of dharmas, i.e., a dharma "is known in the
sense of a genuinely real thing" (="P"), and "is known in the same way a
genuinely real thing is known" (="Q"). Therefore, he uses this implica-
tion as a criterion to defend the reality of dharmas and to refute the
Pudgalavadin heresy that pudgalas are also real. But he faces a problem
here,because, he cannot reject "Q" about pudgalas though no problem
to do so with "P." This means that the Theravadin violated the logical
boundary of sapak:ja and vipak:ja in applying "Q" not only to dharmas but
also to pudgalas.
This logical ambivalence is in fact derived from doctrinal reasons.
The repudiation of an empirical person (pudgala) constitutes the core
of Buddhist doctrine. The Theravadin is obliged to assert "Q" because
the unreality of pudgalas is knowable only through the way the reality of
psycho-physical elements (dharmas) is known. To further complicate
the matter, the Pudgalavadin also shows a similar logical ambivalence
due to similar doctrinal reasons. He asserts "P" about pudgalas but fails
to assert "Q," because if he does so, he is ipso facto completely identifying
pudgala with dharma, which is heresy for the Pudgalavadin as well.
Logically, he also violates the boundary between the classes of dharmas
arid pudgalas in applying "P" to them equally.
Second, the strike of ingenuity on the part of the Pudgalavadin is the
use of contrary implication as a weapon to demonstrate the logical vulner_-
ability of his opponent. This possibility must have been intuited from the
fact that the two contestants stood in an exact contrariety, i.e., "-P.Q" by
the Theravadin and "P.-Q" by the Pudgalavadin. Their forces of
argument, as shown in the chart, come to an equal balance. The Thera-
vadin argues: If you Pudgalavadin assert the reality of pudgala "P," you
are also obliged to assert its knowability in the same way as dharmas are
known "Q." But you do not, i.e., "-Q." If you do not assert "Q,"you are
also obliged logically not to assert "P," i.e., "-Q::J -P." But you assert "P,"
Therefore, your claim "P.-Q" is false. Now, the Pudgalavadin replies: If
you Theravadin assert the knowability of pudgala in the same way
dharmas are known "Q," you should also assert its reality "P." But you do
not, i.e., "-P." Since you do not assert "P," you are also obliged logically
not to assert 'Q," i.e., "-p::J -Q." But you assert "Q." Therefore, your
claim "-P.Q" is false.
13
'-v-
My finding about the Madhyamika method as parallel to that of the
Kathavatthu is rather a simple one, namely that it seeks to create a discon-
nective relationship between conceptual terms, predications, or propo-
sitions in the forms of"P.-Q" and "-P.Q." If one speaks of a motion, for
instance, we can match his statement with another about its agent as
regards to their relationship.7 In the Nagarjuna
creates this particular context by the metaphor of 'light' and 'darkness.'
He reminds us that our cognition always involves cognizer and cognized
just as the fact of illumination. He assigns predications to the ilumining
and the illumined respectively as "is capable of illumining" ("P") and "is
capable of darkening" ("Q"). By applying both predications to 'light' and
'darkness,' he obtains the formulas of "P.-Q" and "-P.Q." He argues:
Wherever there is a light illumining, there should be no darkness ("P.-
Q") and vice versa ("-P,Q"), which means that the two never can meet.
8
The state of affairs is precisely parallel to that of the Kathdvatthu
controversy.
How did NagaIjuna try to solve this logical absurdity? As I understand,
he generally takes two approaches. First, in accordance with convention,
which assumes both 'light' and 'darkness' for the fact of illumination, he
points out that the only way to make this positive concomitance "P.Q"
possible is to repudiate the concept of own-being (self-identifying prin-
ciple) from these entities, so as to accept light and darkness in terms of
their reciprocal exchangeability. Second, in accordance to trans-con-
vention, he repudiates both "P.-Q" and "-P.Q," which he must have
justified in reference to two contrary implications "P ::J Q" and "Q ::J P" in
parallel to the Kathdvatthu controversy. Here may I point out the fact that
"P ::J Q" and "Q::J P" together express logical reciprocity.
In concluding my paper, I am obliged to state two points: (1) As evi-
dent in my demonstration, the logical concomitance of two predications
differentiated four different classes of variables. I believe that the
Buddhist fourfold logical category such as has its relevant basis
in this logic of concomitance. (2) Our conceptual and logical treatment
of religiotis insight in general has its own limitation. To deal with the
statements that refer to the dialectical dimension which bridges the
empirical and the trans-empirical in terms oflogical rules is itself to beg
further question. In this sense, I cannot go along with the idea to identify
religious truth with the logical formula of reciprocity such as
"p::J Q.Q::J P." Nevertheless, I am convinced that this kind.of analysis
14
helps us to understand better as to how the same problem was
approached by the ancients.
NOTES
1. The Central Conception of Buddhism, London: 1960.
2. Kathiivatthu ed. by A.C. Taylor, PTS: 1894-7; tr. by S.Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys
Davids, PTS: 1915.
3. The Romanized text, ed. by Johnston and Kunst,MCB IX (1951), Appendix.
sarvatra svabhiivo na vidyata iti krtvii siinyiilf sarvabhiivii iti/ ....
yasmiin n0svabhiivas tasmiic chiinyalf/ (Comment on kiirikii 1; lac. cit., p. 10)
The pattern of argument: "whatever is devoid of own-being is empty," recurs throughout
the work.
4. Lac. cit., p. 52: kiirikii 70:
prabhavati ca siinyateyaTfl yasya prabhavanti tasya sarviirthiih)
prabhavati na tasya kiTfl cinna prabhavati fiinyatii yasya/ /
5. Sankrasvamin formulated Dignag's theory in his Nyiiyapravdaka-
sutram very concisely as follows: (GOS Vol. 33, 1930, p. 1):
pak:jadharmatvaTfl sapak:je sattvam vipak:je ciisattvam iti/ /
The process involved in anvaya and vyatireka is threefold: (1) to determine in a the
class of sapak:ja, of all of whose members the two related predications are correct separately
and jointly; (2) to determine in a contra positive drHiinta the class of vipak:ja, of all of whose
members those two predications are not correct in the same way; and (3) to apply this
concomitance of those predications to a particular class member in question.
15
6. Respectively, Anuloma, Pa(ikamma, Niggaha, Upanayana, and Niggamana.
7. Madhyamikakiirikii, Chp. 2, kiirikii 10:
pak:jo gantii gacchatiti yasya tasya prasajyate/
gamanena vinii gantii gantur gamanam icchatalf/ /
8. Vigraha., kiirikii 37 (lac. cit., p. 34):
niisti tama! ca jvalane yatra ca t4thati pariitmani jvalanaf?/
kurute kathaTfl prakiisaTfl sa hi prakiiSo 'ndhakiiravadhaf?/ /
Prajiiciparamita and the Buddahood of
the Non-Sentient World: The San-Lun
Assimilation of Buddha-Nature and
Middle Path Doctrine
by Aaron K. Koseki
Prior to the Sui-T'ang period, the concept of Buddha-nature,l the
fundamental or universal nature of enlightenment in sentient beings,
was already a topic of central importance to Chinese Buddhists. In 418,
when Fa-hsien translated the Nirviir;a-sutra in six fascicles (Ta-pan ni-
yuan ching), the debate centering on Buddha-nature, as is well known,
concerned Tao-sheng's (?-434) view of the icchantika, a spiritual outcast
forever excluded from enlightenment. Tao-sheng's thesis that all
sentient beings, including the icchantika, possessed the potentiality for
Buddhahood was substantiated when the so-called "Northern edition"
of the Nirviir;a-sutra was translated in 421 by (385-433).
2
While the icchantika issue would again surface during the T'ang with
the popularity of the Fa-hsiang school and its triyiina doctrine, by the Sui
period (589-612) the ekayiina theme was well established. In the inter-
vening years of the Liang and Ch'en dynasties, Chinese Buddhists in
the south had moved on to other aspects of the Buddha-nature theory
and were primarily concerned with the composition of exegetical
commentaries which speculated on the specific meanings of universal
enlightenment. That a variety of commentaries and Buddha-nature
theories existed during this period can be seen if one examines the
Liang compilation of the Collection oj Nirvar;a-sutra Commentaries (Ta-
pan n'!!,h-p'an ching chi-chueh).3 The Collection, however, represents the
peak of Nirvar;a-sutra study in the south, for following the end of the
Liang and Ch'en periods, the study of this text was superseded by the
rise of Prajiiaparamita-based traditions like San-lun and T'ien-t'ai.
Exegesis of the Nirvar;a-sutra and debate on the meaning of Buddha-
nature continued within these schools, and while an independent
16
scholastic tradition centering on the sutra had long passed from the
Buddhist horizon by Sui times, it was during this period that the discus-
sion of universal enlightenment was taken to a new degree of explicit-
ness.
In the case of the San-Iun tradition, the most intriguing discussion
on this subject occurred in the writings of its systematizer, Chi-tsang
(549-623).4 In his Buddha-nature essay, contained in the Ta-ch'eng
hsOOn-lun (A Compendium of Mahiiyana Doctrine), Chi-tsang sought to
integrate the Prajiiaparamici. doctrine of emptiness and the NirvaTJa-
sutra concept of Buddha-nature.
5
Assimilating two radically different
aspects of Buddhist thought, Chi-tsang was the first individual in the
history of East Asian Buddhism to argue that the inanimate world of
grasses and trees also had the possibility of achieving Buddhahood.
The most obvious pecularity of this theory was the fact that, prior to
Chi-tsang's time it was not a commonly accepted view of universal
enlightenment. Indeed, it was a view totally rejected by earlier
commentators of the NirvaTJa-sutra, who associated the potentiality for
Buddhahood with anthropocentric concepts such as "mind," "luminous
spirit," "alaya-vijiiiina, " and "inherently pure mind." The textual basis
for these earlier views was, of course, already established by the
NirvaTJa-sutra, which extended the promise of Buddhahood to all
sentient existence, that is, to those who possessed the faculty of "mind."
Although there was no doctrinal precedent for Chi-tsang's assertion, in
his examination of Buddhist texts he found several passages to
substantiate his theory of a comprehensive Buddha-nature. As we shall
see, Chi-tsang took a highly qualified step in expanding the notion of
salvation to include all of the natural, phenomenal world. As a San-Iun
scholar, however, Chi-tsang was neither interested, in a Taoist sort of
way, in elevating nature to a religious dimension, nor simply concerned
with the NirvaTJa-sutra's anthropocentrically-limited promise of eventual
enlightenment. Rather, Chi-tsang's most significant contribution to the
discussion lay in his assertion that the Buddha-nature was a synonym
for the middle path doctrine. The route by which he came to his
expanded conception of Buddha-nature, then, was based on his
primary view of prajiiii, and it is this that we wish to investigate in what
follows.
17
The Buddha-N atuTe Theories of the North-South Period
Based on material preserved in Chi-tsang's essay, it appears that,
when Buddhists of the North-South period debated the question of
Buddhahood, they were primarily interested in defining the manner
in which the Buddha-nature exists and in identifying its location or
scope. Of the two characters comprising the term, "nature" (hsing) a was
generally understood to mean "a seminal cause for enlighenment."
The primary concern for Buddha-nature advocates lay in defining the
"primary" or "true" cause for attaining Buddhahood (cheng-yin).bThat
is to say, does the Buddha-nature "inherently exist" (pen-yu),c or is it
something "acquired" (shih-yu).d Again, was the Buddha-nature a
"result" stemming from some antecedent cause, or was it already a
complete Buddha-essence? In the opening sections of his Buddha-
nature essay, Chi-tsang presented, in broad, retrospective terms, a
group of eleven theories that had beforehand advanced canonical
evidence for universal enlightenment. These eleven theories on "true
cause" were further divided into three major categories, "individual,"e
"mind and vijiuina,"f and "principle,"g which are outlined as follows:
I. Individual
1. Sentient being
2. Six elements (five skandha, fictious whole)
II. Mind and Vijiuina
3. Mind
4. Perpetual activities of mind
5. "Avoiding suffering and seeking bliss"
6. Luminous spirit
7. Alaya-vijiuina, inherently pure mind
III. Principle
8. Future result
9. Principle of realizing Buddhahood
10. Tathata
11. Emptiness
6
Although the present discussion does not seek to recapitulate the finer
details of these individual theories, it is of importance to note here that
the earlier theories were explicitly concerned with the problem of
identifying the basic cause of enlightenment with some component
element of either sar[lSara (theories 1-7) or nirvii'YJa (theories 8-11).
Implicitly, the problem was also limited to the enlightenment of
18
sentient existence alone. While Chi-tsang seems to have been concerned
with collecting and reviewing the various earlier speculations, the
traditional material he presented was essentially used to clarify and to
emphasize doctrinal differences. Accordingly, after summarizing the
earlier theories, Chi-tsang remarked:
The Dharma-masters Ho-hsi Tao-lang and trans-
lated the Niroa:Tfa-siitra together. [Tao-lang] intimately received
instruction from the Tripitaka master and wrote a commentary
on the sutra (Nieh-p'an i-su). He correctly interpreted the meaning
of Buddha-nature as the middle path. Consequently, later
masters all depended on Master Lang's commentary to lecture on
the NiroiirJa-siitra and to interpret the meaning of Buddha-nature.
7
This comment is significant, for it suggests the motivation behind Chi-
tsang's summary dismissal of the traditional theories. To Chi-tsang, it
seemed obvious that, in the years that had passed since Tao-lang had
commented on the sutra, Buddha-nature advocates---:-if we may judge
from his summary-no longer discussed the Buddha-nature theory on
the basis of the middle path doctrine. Based on his own reading of the
Niroii1fa-siitra, Chi-tsang also felt that the earlier theories ignored the
Prajnaparamita doctrine articulated in the "Bodhisattva Lion's Roar"
chapter on the identity of prajiui and Buddha-nature, viz., "The
Buddha-nature is called the first principle of emptiness; the first prin-
ciple of emptiness is called prajnii."8 Thus, in reviewing the earlier
arguments from the perspective of non-duality, Chi-tsang isolated two
major streams of thought, one arguing for enlightenment as a seminal
cause (theories 1-7), and the other arguing for an a priori or inherent
view of Buddha-nature as an ultimate principle 8-11).
Central to this distinction were, of course, the somewhat ambigu-
ous statements found in the Niroii1fa-siitra itself. Certain passages in the
sutra, for example, would assert the real existence of the Buddha-
nature, while other passages would claim that it was something
acquired. Buddhists who adhered to the "inherent" view would
explain, again following the similes given in the sutra, that the Buddha-
nature was like a 'Jewel on the brow of a wrestler," 9 the "treasure store
of a poor woman," 10 or the "sweet herb of the Himalayas." 11 That is to
say, the Buddha-nature originally exists, but is not manifested or
readily perceived. Other passages, however, were used to explain that
this "fruit of Buddhahood" was the result of some "profound cause,"
and the most commonly cited examples on incipient possession were
19
the "seed and the sprout" and "milk and cream." 12
What these similes actually meant to Buddhists in the time
preceding the Sui-Tang period can again be seen in Chi-tsang's
summary of seven arguments, six by earlier North-South masters
associated with the Nirvar.ta cum Ch'eng-shih (Tattvasiddhi?)htradition
and one by a Ti-Iun master identified as Ching-yin Hui-yiian 523-592):
20
1. The two characters, "Buddha" and "nature," both refer to
the result. "Buddha" is a term for "enlightenment," and for this
reason it is not the cause. "Nature" means "unchanging," and
hence, the essence of the result is permanent. For this reason it
does not change. Because the deluded mind is present in cause, it
is not enlightenment, but because it changes, it cannot be called
nature. However, sentient beings will certainly realize this
principle of the Buddha-nature because it is said that they all have
the Buddha-nature.
2. The Buddha-nature is present within cause. Since the sutra
. says that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature, how can it
be said that this term is not present within cause? Sentient beings
are Buddhas because is present within cause. They
possess a "principle of certainty"! which is called an unchanging
nature.
3. "Buddha" is a term for result and "nature" is a term for
cause. Sentient beings are deluded and defiled, and consequently
they do not possess prajiiii. If they possess the dharma of enlight-
enment, one can then acknowledge their Buddhahood and
enlightenment. However, since sentient beings are completely
unenlightened, how can one say that they are Buddhas? Ac-
cordingly, by refining an inferior knowledge of sarrsara, in the.
end it becomes the result-stage of great enlightenment. This
result is initially called Buddhahood, and thus, Buddha is a term
for result. However, sentient beings will certainly attain it. Since
this principle of realizing Buddhahood is unchanging, it is called
nature. "Nature" is simply the principle [of realizing Buddha-
hood] and is present within cause. 13
4. The Buddha-nature of sentient beings inherently exists
it is the principle nature) the luminous spirit, k the alaya-
VZJnana.
5. Since the sutra explains that the fruit of Buddhahood arises
from a profound cause, how could impurities already exist within
food? Therefore, we know that the Buddha-nature is acquired.
6. It is called inherent existence because inherent means "what
will come about."
7. [The Ti-lun master said:] "There are two kinds of Buddha-
nature, viz., the principle nature and the nature of practice'!
Because the principle is not a created thing (samskrta), it inherently
exists. Because the nature of practice depends on the completion
of practice, the Buddha-nature is acquired."14
Although we are simply presented with brief descriptions of the
earlier arguments, in almost every case they parallel the enigmatic
position of the sutra. However, the predominant interpretation of
Buddha-nature advocates in the south, and Chi-tsang was no ex-
ception, was the presentation of Buddha-nature much more in terms
of something already actualized than in terms of a potentiality. For
exegetes, however, it was especially important to determine the overall
them of the sutra, and the distinction of cause vs. result or inherent vs.
acquired was a matter of selective emphasis. To Chi-tsang, however,
the seemingly contradictory doctrine expressed by the Nirviir:a-siitra
was simply a device designed to wean people away from conceptualized
views of Buddhahood. Following the middle path doctrine, it was his
opinion that the earlier theories created false distinctions, and this
became the determining factor that aligned them under the heading of
"dualistic interpretations." In the first argument, for example,
although Buddhahood is defined as a result, the use of the term
"deluded mind," viz., an antecedent stage, still implies the view of
Buddha-nature as a seminal cause despite the initial thesis of a
complete Buddha-essence. In the second and third arguments,
Buddha-nature is defined as cause, but here, too, enlightenment is
again seen as something which, by right ("principle of certainty"), is
possessed by sentient beings from the outset. There were similar
problems in the remaining four theories, where the question of
enlightenment was discussed in acquired-inherent terms. In each
argument certain conditions were still necessary to act in collaboration
to produce the result. The seventh interpretation even argues for both
inherent and acquired. It describes Buddha-nature as a complete
Buddha-essence, and yet argues that the dynamics of enlightenment
require progressive stages of development.
"True Cause": The Buddha-Nature of the Middle Path
In his review of the earlier arguments, Chi-tsang felt that their
basic conceptual error lay in conceiving of Buddha-nature within a
causative and temporal framework. By emphasizing one aspect over
21
the other, the earlier theories had in effect created two equally offe
centered attitudes toward the "principle" reality of the middle path of
non-duality. Two specific realms of understanding are implied,
creating two parallel orders which do not participate in a process of
mutual identity. His own approach was to combine two passages from
the NirvarJa-siitra: 1) the twelve-fold chain of causation (pratl-tya-
samutpada) as "neither arising nor ceasing, neither cause nor result," 15
and 2) the identity of Buddha-nature and the twelve-fold chain of
causation.
16
While the first passage emphasized the Prajiiaparamici
basis for the NirvarJa-siitra, the second passage articulated their
common theme. The conflation of middle path doctrine and Buddha-
nature theory may be seen in the following definition of "true cause":
If one knows that cause and result are equal and nondual, then
one can speak of Buddha-nature. Hence, the NirvarJa-siitra says:
"Neither cause nor result is called the Buddha-nature."
Now, the meaning of Buddha-nature explained by our doctrinal
transmission is neither existent nor inexistent and neither
inherent nor acquired; also, it is not what' will be manifested.
Therefore, a sutra rVimalakirti] says: "Only because of worldly
conventions, letters, numbers, is it said that the three time periods
exist." It does not say that enlightenment has a past, a future, or a
present. This is because it is neither inherent nor acquired. Or,
one can say it is because of pratz1ya-samutpada. 17
The difference between his approach and the earlier theories is charac-
teristic of the Prajiiaparamici approach to the question of universal
enlightenment. Since the relation between cause and result is asserted
in terms of essential emptiness, and hence, identity, this interpretation
of Buddha-nature is not concerned with the temporal production of
enlightenment. There are no conditions antecedent to Buddha-nature
as it presently exists. By associating "true cause" with an element of
sa'T[[sara (e.g., "sentient beings," "six elements," etc.), the earlier argu-
ments also ran the danger of implying that Buddha-nature was not
only incomplete and imperfect, but a svabhava as w e l ~ In contrast, by
defining Buddhahood in terms of non-duality, Chi-tsang's "middle
path = true cause" approach avoids relegating Buddha-nature to any
incipient status and rejects any identification of a complete Buddha-
essence with any specific component of the phenomenal or noumenal
realms. By placing the question of universal enlightenment within a
middle path framework, Chi-tsang tried to overcome this type of
distinction.
22
Buddha-Nature and the Non-Sentient World: The Extensive View
When Chi-tsang established the middle path framework for
examining the Buddha-nature theory, he did not criticize the earlier
speculations only on the basis of their causative and temporal interpre-
tations of this theory. He also accused them of holding wrong views of
the Buddha-nature's location. To support the position of sentient
enlightenment alone, Buddhists of the North-South period usually
relied on passages from the "Bodhisattva Lion's Roar" and the
"Kasyapa" chapters of the Nirvii:rJa-sutra.
18
These passages assured
eventual enlightenment to those who possessed a "mind" and
identified all of the natural world, viz., walls, tiles, rocks, etc., as non-
sentient, and hence, without Buddha-nature. What theNirvii'f!a-sutra's
position actually meant to Buddhists prior to Chi-tsang's time can be
seen to some extent in the writings of Seng-liang (438-496) and Pao-
liang (444-509), two prominent Nirvii'f!a-sutra scholars of the North-
South period. 19 Following material preserved in the Liang Collection, it
appeares that both monks relied on the Srimiiliidevi-sutra for their
definition of "true cause," viz., "avoiding suffering and seeking bliss"
[T12, 222b]. Seng-liang, for example, declared that non-sentient
existence was without the "nature of liberation."2o Since the "true
cause" of enlightenment was defined as "avoiding suffering and
seeking bliss," Buddha-nature was limited to those who possessed this'
impulse or "functional quality" of mind. This attribute of sentient
existence was maintained by the following generation of Nirvii'f!a-sutra
exegetes and was adopted by the masters of the Liang Ch'eng-shih
tradition. Pao-liang's view, for example, continued through his
disciple, Kuang-chai Fa-yiin (467-522), one of three eminent Ch'eng-
shih scholars. Fa-yiin's theory is preserved in the Nieh-p'an tsung-yao, a
Tang commentary written by the Korean monk Wonhyo:
[Fa-yiin said:] "The mind of sentient beings differs from trees
and rocks because, by right, they have the nature of avoiding
suffering and seeking bliss. Because they have this nature, they
cultivate a myriad of practices and in the end realize supreme
enlightenment. Therefore, it is said that the nature of mind is the
essence of the true cause .... "21
Still another theory of sentient enlightenment may be seen in the
following passage which defines "true cause" as a "luminous spirit":
The mind possesses a nature which is not lost. This luminous spirit
23
is the essence of the true cause. Since it is already present within
the body, it differs from trees, rocks, etc., objects which do not
have this nature of the mind. This means that the nature of the
luminous spirit already exists within cause, and hence, one can
realize the fruit of true Buddhahood.
22
.
Although the only feature that distinguishes these theories is the defi-
nition of "true cause," it is clear that the question of universal enlighten-
ment was limited to the framework of "all sentient beings have the
Buddha-nature." That is to say, the question concerning the location of
Buddha-nature was primarily discussed in terms of "mind and vijfiiina."
The motives for this view, if any, are difficult to establish. This type of
thinking is at least coincident with the primary objective of the NirviirJa-
sutra, namely, the establishment of the icchantika's potentiality for
enlightenment. In this respect, Buddhists of the North-South period
may have simply followed the lead of the sutra, and expanding the
boundaries of enlightenment to include all of the natural world was of
secondary importance. With the establishment of ekayiina traditions
during the Sui-Tang period, however, the earlier interpretations came
under increasing scrutiny and challenge, and the broader implications
of a universal Buddha-nature became an important question for San-
lun and Tien-t'ai Buddhists.
23
In the San-Iun tradition, the distinction between sentient and
non-sentient was analyzed in terms of "within and apart from the
path"ID and "within and apart from principle."il These terms refer
neither to the distinction between Buddhism and heterodox traditions
nor to a distinction between the "actual" and "theoretical" possibility of
non-sentient Buddhahood. For Chi-tsang, "principle" was synonymous
with non-duality, and his assessment of non-sentient Buddha-nature
concerns the development of a middle path perspective. When this
perspective of identity and interdependency was applied to the tradi-
tional distinction between sentient (intensive) and non-sentient (com-
prehensive) beings, Chi-tsang maintained:
If one seeks to explain the existence of Buddha-nature, then not
only do sentient beings have the Buddha-nature, grasses and
trees also have the Buddha-nature. This contrasts the inexistence
of Buddha-nature apart from principle [middle path] by discus-
sing the existence of Buddha-nature within principle. 24
This passage, which established the framework for investigating non-
sentient enlightenment, shocked many Buddhists of his day. The
24
assertion of non-sentient Buddha-nature ignored the premise established
by the Nirvii1}ll-siit:ra and was without doctrinal precedent. To substantiate
his position, Chi-tsang cited the following passages from siitras and
sastras. His comments on each passage follows the citations:
1. AvataT[tSaka-siitra: "Samantabhadra saw the stately mansion
of Maitreya and then realized innumerable Dharma-gates." [Isn't
this insight into objects, seeing their nature, and then realizing
innumerable samiidhi-s?]
2. Mahiisa1(lnipiita-siitra: "The Buddhas and bodhisattvas see
that all the dharmas are not without enlightenment." [This
explains that, because of the delusion of Buddha-nature, there is
sa1(lsiira. Comprehension of a myriad of dharmas is identical with
enlightenment.]
3. "Not Absolute, But Empty" [Seng-chao]: "Is the path far
away? While identical with objects, it remains ultimate. Is the sage
far away? When you understand him, you are identical with his
spirit." [If all the dharmas are not without enlightenment, then
why is there no comprehension that all is Buddha-nature?]
4. Nirviir;,a-siitra: "All the dharmas are completely endowed
with the nature of bliss."
5. Wei-shih-lun: "There is consciousness only; the external
realm does not exist." [This explains that mountains, rivers,
grasses, and trees are all mind; apart from the mind, there does
not exist a separate dharma.]25
According to Chi-tsang these passages supported his view of a
"pervasive" theory of enlightenment. The sources for this view are
taken from a wide spectrum of texts, but the major idea that appears is
the concept of non-duality. His view of non-sentient Buddha-nature,
then, is concerned primarily with the relationship that exists between
sentient and non-sentient beings. The key to this reduction is, again,
prajiiii. The technical terms used to express this relationship are iO and
cheng. P While these two terms are generally associated with primary
and secondary retributions (e.g., the body and its external world), in his
use of the terms, i ("secondary," "dependent") refers to the object-of-
cognition (e.g., rocks, trees, etc.) and cheng ("primary," "chief') refers
to the cognizing subject. His objective here is to rationalize the compre-
hensive scope of Buddha-nature by describing a world in which all
things are endowed with this non-duality quality:q
25
These passages explain that, within principle, all the dharmas are
non-dual in terms of subject and object. Because of the non-duality
of subject and object, if sentient beings have the Buddha-nature,
then grasses and trees also have Buddha-nature ____ If you
comprehend the equality of dharmas and do not see their dual
marks of subject and object, the principle, in truth, is without the
marks of attainment and non-attainment. 26
This line of thought is coincident with Chi-tsang's discussion of the
inherent and acquired status of Buddha-nature_ In that context, since
the "true cause = middle path" was removed from a causative and
temporal framework, it also followed that any attempt to locate the
Buddha-nature would not only falsely identify it with some element of
sa1(lSara, but would also deny the universality of the middle path_
The Intensive View: Prajiiaparamita vs_ Vijiianavada
From the preceding, one gains the impression that Chi-tsang was
interested in the Buddhahood of the non-sentient world not because
he was especially attuned to nature, but primarily because he was inter-
ested in exploring the possible consequences of his Prajiiaparmita
position. Yet, despite the face that the aim of his essay was to describe
and rationalize Buddha-nature in middle path terms, Chi-tsang was
equally sensitive to the qualities that distinguished the natural world
from all that was human_ He did acknowledge the existence of "mind"
in the make-up of sentient beings, for after defining the "pervasive"
theory, he turned his attention to the "specific" theory or intensive view
of Buddha-nature and wrote:
Because sentient beings have the mind of delusion, they can
realize the principle of enlightenment. Because grasses and trees
are without mind, they are not deluded. How could they have the
principle of enlightenment? For example, to dream is to experience
and not to dream is not to experienceY
An important element of enlightenment, then, was an experiential
quality limited to those having "mind," and the Vijiianavada idea of
"consciousness" was the determining factor. Not to experience or
function, then, was simply not to exist in a sentient way. This type of
thinking is similar to the Buddha-nature theory of Chi-tsang's con-
temporary, the Ti-Iun scholar Hui-yUan. Although there is very little
criticism of Hui-yUan's thesis in Chi-tsang's essay, the above Ti-Iun
26
position bothered Chi-tsang, not because it restricted enlightenment
to sentient existence per se, but because the theoretical basis for that
interpretation was quite different from his own. The conceptual
difference between the two positions was left unstated in Chi-tsang's
essay, and it remained for later San-Iun scholars to resolve what, at first
sight at least, appeared to be two mutually exclusive views. For
example, when asked about the differences between the intensive vs.
extensive views, the Japanese Sanron scholar Chinkai (1091-1152)
replied:
The seventh master [i.e., Hui-yiian] said: "The iilaya-vijiiiina,
inherently pure mind, is the true cause of Buddha-nature."
These interpretations on mind and vijiiiina are not used in our
tradition. The meaning of the [Ta-ch'eng] I-chang is that the
nature of the "knower," the mind of the true vijiiiina, is the
doctrine of Buddha-nature. The middle path, the first principle
of emptiness, viz., [Hui-yiian's] "nature of the known," is the
secondary meaning. Now, we hold that the middle path, the first
principle of emptiness, is the true cause of Buddha-nature.
28
Chinkai's analysis suggests that the differences between the two
positions are primarily conceptual. If we examine Hui-yiian's essay on
Buddha-nature,29 he does, to a limited degree, also affirm the
existence of Buddha-nature in non-sentient objects. For example, as it
exists apart from the mind of sentient beings, the "nature of the
known"r was synonymous with dharmatii, S "true mark," and the first
principle of emptiness. This aspect of the VijIianavada theory of mind
was referred to as the "general theory" and distinguished between the
Buddha-nature existing "within" (sentient beings) and "without" (non-
sentient beings).30 Hui-yiian's main concern as a Ti-Iun scholar,
however, was in describing the "nature of the knower,"t the iilaya-
vijiuina or the "mind of the true vijiiiina."u Thus, as far as a San-Iun
scholar like Chinkai was concerned, this aspect of Hui-yiian's theory
represented his fundamental doctrine. Within this dual context of the
"knower" and the "known," the Buddha-nature was specifically
identified with the "nature of the knower," and, according to Hui-
yiian, did not "pervade non-sentient existence."3! For this reason, Hui-
yiian's theory of non-sentient Buddhahood is not, in strictest terms,
Buddha-nature, but dharmatii. While his interpretation of the "nature
of the known" can be broadly construed to mean Buddha-nature, Hui-
yiian's idea of "true cause" was limited to those possessing an iilaya-vijiiiina.
27
Chinkai's evaluation of the two positions also defines the limits of
Chi-tsang's theory. In the first place, the San-Iun tradition is concerned
with the so-called "secondary meaning" of Buddha-nature (i.e., Hui-
yiian's "nature of the known"). Again, there is also a difference in the
use of the terms "within" and "without." When Hui-yiian uses these
terms, he is associating them with the alaya-vijiiiina and the remaining
seven vijiiiina. In contrast, when Chi-tsang uses the same expressions
they are specifically associated with prajiiii, the middle path. These
differences are explicit in the following San-Iun interpretation of
"subject" ("nature of the knower") and "object-of-cognition" ("nature
of the known"):
Now, when we speak of prajiia, it is not the past explanation of
prajna. In the past it was simply explained that prajiiii was [sub-
jective] knowledge and not the object-of-cognition. This, too, is a
one-sided view and cannot be called the middle path. 32
When we compare the above with the Ti-Iun concept of "true cause,"
viz., "principle nature" and the "nature of practice," the "principle
nature" refers to the Buddha-nature "within" (alaya-vijiiiina, pure
mind). From this perspective, there is no strict distinction in the Ti-lun
theory between the Buddha-nature "within" and "without," since one
aspect of this "principle nature" corresponds to the "nature of the'
known" in the sense of dharmatii, the emptiness of all dharmas. In this
respect, the positions are not mutually exclusive. However, when the
Buddha-nature was explained in terms of the "nature of practice,"
then Buddhahood was limited to sentient beings, since they alone
possessed the "true cause" and were endowed with the "nature of the
knower." Thus, in Ti-lun terms, when the adventitious covering of
kleSa was removed, sentient beings achieved Buddhahood and realized
the alaya-vijiiana in its pure form. From the Ti-Iun standpoint of
practice, prajiia was limited to sentient existence, and grasses and trees
were incapable of having Buddha-nature simply because they, along
with everything else in the phenomenal world, were without both
aspects of the "true cause."
Since Chi-tsang was a San-Iun scholar, his position differs from
Hui-yiian's arguments inasmuch as he is less interested in positing a
quality that distinguishes sentient from non-sentient and more
interested in pursuing and clarifying the Buddha-nature's connection
with the middle path. To specify the real existence of such a quality
28
would, of course, mean to conceive of Buddha-nature in svabhiiva-
terms. A key difference between the two positions, then, is that, for
Chi-tsang, there was virtually no distinction between Buddha-nature
and dharmatii, since both terms referred to the essential emptiness, and
hence, identity, of sentient and non-sentient beings. As seen in the
preceding passage, prajiui is not simply a quality possessed by the
sentient (i.e., "subject") world, but is the principle that defines the
proper relationship between the phenomenal and human spheres.
These conceptual differences between the San-Iun and Vijiianavada
perspectives are also dear in the following definition of vijiuina:
The meaning ofVasubandhu's "consciousness only" is to borrow
the mind to dispel the object. The dispelled object does not reside
in the mind; though still and without point d'appui, the principles
of themselves profoundly meet.
33
Again, in his commentary on the SnmaUidevi-siitra, the Sh'eng-man p'ao-
ku, Chi-tsang briefly discussed the differences between the Buddha-
nature as form (rupa) and mind:
The Awakening of Faith in the Mahiiyana says: "Form and mind are
non-dual; the nature of form is identical with knowledge and the
nature of knowledge is identical with form."34
The most striking aspect of this interpretation of vijnana is that it
borrows Seng-chao's concept of identity and defines mind in terms of
prajna.
35
While there is no contradiction with the original meaning of
the concept, the Vijiianavada notion of "mind" is manipulated in such a
way that it is primarily a means for rationalizing the San-Iun view of
interdependency ("stillness of subject and object"). It is regrettable that
Chi-tsang did not further define this quality of sentient existence. As a
San-Iun scholar, he reduced almost everything to middle path terms.
Beyond this point, he was unwilling to speculate on the nature of
"mind." However, in his desire to describe Buddha-nature as the
complete interdependency of all things, he did, nevertheless, emphasize
the contemplative experience of prajiui:
29
When the contemplative mind looks at it, what is the difference
between sentient beings and grasses and trees? If the Buddha-
nature exists, then it exists in both; if it inexists, then, it inexists in
both. It both exists' and inexists, and neither exists nor inexists.
For this reason, if you comprehend that existence and inexistence
are non-dual and equal, then you can initially speak of the true
cause of Buddha-nature ....
The true caus.: is the very mind enlightened to it. However,
nothing can describe this contemplative mind. Thus, Kasyapa
always sighed, saying, "Inconceivable."36
By identifying prajiui as a quality equally possessed by sentient and non-
sentient beings, Chi-tsang essentialy dissolved the traditional distinc-
tion. He did not, of course, state that grasses and trees are capable of
having Buddha-nature, but that, in a middle path context, both are
equal participants in a process of pratztya-samutpada. The location of the
Buddha-nature could be as intensive as sentient beings or as extensive
as the entire natural world. This contrasts with the view of Buddha-
nature as something projected from the sentient mind. For Chi-tsang,
the Buddha-nature of the middle path was purely an operational term
meant to expose the fallacy of conceiving of enlightenment in
causative, temporal, and spatial terms. For this reason he is not
describing a situation in which sentient existence is always primary; it is
not a world in which those with the faculty of "mind" alone possess
Buddha-nature. The question of non-sentient enlightenment, then,
could not be answered by appealing to some quality that distinguished
the human world from the natural world. Rather, the question for him
was where the line could be drawn in terms of the location of the
middle path itself. In Prajiiaparamici terms, no such line could be
drawn, for to deny the Buddhahood of the non-sentient world was, in
effect, to deny the enlightenment of sentient existence.
Chinese Glossary
a
'[1
h p!z j(
r fiJi' 9<lJt1
b
i
S 1id1
c j :@. tl:
t 5;Q '[1
d
k
JU$
u Ji;
e
A
1 IT t!t
o{:&
f ie,\ m rt'l ill 5'1'- ill
PiE
g :@.
n rt'l :@. 5'1'- q{:&iE:::G=
30
NOTES
1. Buddha-dhiitu or Buddha-gotra. Here we follow Takasaki]ikido, Nyoraizo Shiso
no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1974), p. 11. See, also, his article, "Nyoraizo-Bussho
shiso," Koza Bukkyo Shiso, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Rishosha, 1975), pp. 101-133. Further, see
Ogawa Ichijo, Nyoraizo-BusshO no Kenkyu (Kyoto: Buneido, 1974), pp. 62-66.
2. Several works in]apanese deal with this early period of Niroii1Ja-siitra study.
See, for instance, Fuse Kogaku, Nehandhu no Kenkyu, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai,
1973), pp. 12-44. See, also, Tokiwa Daijo, BusshO no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai,
1972), pp. 178-180.
3. A discussion of the Collection and its compiler (attributed to Pao-liang) can be
found in Fuse, Nehanshu no Kenkyii, vol. 2, pp. 74-85. See, also, Ogawa K6kan, Chugoku
Nyoraizo ShishO no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Nakayama Shooo, 1976), pp. 210-225.
4. For an overview of Chi-tsang's theories, see Kamata Shigeo, Chugoku Bukkyo
Shiso-shi Kenkyu (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1968), pp. 31-46, and Hirai Shun'ei, Chugoku
Hannya ShishO-shi Kenkyu (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1976), pp. 617-637.
5. TaishO shinshu Daizokyo (hereafter T), 45, 35b-42b.
6. For further discussion of these earlier theories, see Aaron K. Koseki, Chi-
tsang's Ta-ch'eng-hsuan-lun: The Two Truths and the Buddha-nature (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1977), pp. 200-2J7. While Chi-tsang's
essay does not refer to specific masters, the names of Buddhists associated with these
interpretations of "true cause" are given in Chiin-cheng's Ssu-lun-hsuan-i [Cf. Daihion
Zokuzokyo (hereafter ZZK), 1,1,74 recto b46l: 1. Sentient beings, Chuang yen Seng-min, a
Ch'eng-shih scholar; 2. Six elements, Seng-jou (431-494) and K'ai-shan Chih-tsang, both
Ch'eng-shih scholars; 3. Mind, also attributed to Seng-jou and Chih-tsang; 4. Perpetual
activities of mind, Hsiao-an; 5. Avoiding suffering and seeking bliss, Kuang-chai Fa-yiin,
a Ch'eng-shih scholar; 6. Luminous spirit, Liang-Wu-ti (emperor) and Ling-wei Pao-
liang; 7. Alaya-vijiiiina, inherently pure mind, Hui-yuan; 8. Future result, Dharma-
master Ai of Pai-ma temple; also attributed to Tao-sheng; 9. Principle of attaining
Buddhahood, Ling-ken Seng-cheng, a Ch'eng-shih scholar; 10. Tathatii, Pao-liang; and
11. Emptiness, an unidentified "Mahayana master of the North."
7. T45, 35c. Tao-lang's commentary is no longer extant. Portions of it are
preserved in Kuan-ting's (561-633) Ta-pan nieh-p'an ching-su, T38, 43a-b.
8. Cf. the "Southern edition" of the Nirvii1Ja-siitra, T12, 767c.
9. T12, 649a.
10. TI2,648b.
11. TI2,649a-b.
12. See, for example, T12, 775c, 776a, 777b.
13. The translations are summaries of the main points of each of the seven
arguments. The complete section is in T45, 38b-39a and 39a-b. The first three
arguments may be attributed to Ch'eng-shih scholars: (1) Lung-kuang Seng-ch'o; (2)
K'ai-shan Chih-tsang; and (3) Chuang-yen Seng-min. With the exception of short
excerpts preserved in Chi-tsang's WritiIlgS, the Liang Ch'eng-shih doctrines are not
extant. For further discussion on the Liang theories, especially the two truths doctrine,
see Whalen Lai, "Sinitic Understanding of the Two Truths Theory in Laing Dynasty,"
31
and "Further Developments on the Two Truths Theory in China: Toward a Reconstruc-
tion of Chou Yung's San-tsung-lun," both forthcoming in Philosophy East and West.
14. The proponents of the fourth, fifth, and sixth arguments are difficult to
identify, and it appears that Chi-tsang simply combined.several different tenets. The
expression, "principle nature," viz., the "principle of achieving Buddhahood," may be
traced to Fa-yao (Kao-seng-chuan, T50, 374b-c) whose theory is found in the Liang
Collection, T37, 448c. In Chi-tsang's short Niroii:,!a-siitra commentary (Nieh-p'an yu-i), the
doctrine of the "luminous spirit" is attributed to Pao-liang, the compiler of the Liang
Collection (T38, 237c). The seventh theory is clearly associated with the Ti-lun scholar
Hui-yuan whose theories on niroa,,!-a and Buddha-nature are found in the Ta-ch'eng i-
chang, T44, 817a and 473b-474a.
15. Tl2,768b.
16. T12,768c.
17. T45,38c.
18. "All who have mind will certainly realize supreme enlightenment .... " [TI2,
769al.
"Those without Buddha-nature are non-sentient objects such as walls, tiles, and
rocks; what is apart from non-sentient objects such.as these is called Buddha-nature."
[Tl2,838bl
19. For further discussion of their Buddha-nature theories, see Ogawa, Chiigoku
Nyoraizii ShishO, pp. 236-244. On Seng-Liang, see Fuse, Nehanshii no Kenkyii, pp. 232-241.
20. T37,598b.
21. T38, 249a.
22. Cited in Ssu-lun hsiian-i, ZZK, 1,1,74 recto b46.
23. For an extensive discussion of non-sentient enlightenment, see Kamata
Shigeo, Chiigoku Kegon ShisiJ-shi no Kenkyii (Tokyo, 1965), pp. 434-443. Kamata's work
(pp. 466-473) also discusses the Buddha-nature theories of Chan-jan (711-782), a T'ien-
t'ai monk who is generally credited with the definitive theoretical formulation of non-
sentient enlightenment in China. On the basis of written material, however, it appears
that Chi-tsang may have been the first to advocate the theory of non-sentient Buddha-
hood. In his study of Chan-jan's works, such as the Chin-kangpei-lun and the Chih-kuan fu-
hsing-chuan-hung-chiien, Kamata believes that Chi-tsang and Chan-jan approached the
question of non-sentient enlightenment from a similar doctrinal standpoint, viz., the
"non-duality of subject and object" discussed below.
24. T45, 40b.
25. T45, 40c. The citation from Seng-chao's essay has been slightly altered from
"it touches objects" to "identical with objects." The change is minor, but it may have been
a conscious alteration i ~ view of Chi-tsang's desire to establish the theme of identity. The
reference to "consciousness only" is taken from the Bodhiruci (arrived in China in 508)
translation of the VirrJatikii-vijiiaptimatrata-siddhi, T31, 63c and 64b.
26. T45, 40c.
27. Ibid.,40c.
28. Sanron myiJkyiJshiJ, T70, 714b.
29. Ta-ch'engi-chang, T44, 472a-477c.
30. Ibid., 472c.
31. Ibid., 472a.
32. T45, 37c.
32
33
33. Ching-ming hsilan-lun, T38, 857c.
34. Sheng-man p'ao-ku, T37, 85b.
35. Cf. Preface to the Hundred Treatise, T30, 167c-68a.
36. T45, 41b, 39a.
NINTH WISCONSIN CONFERENCE
ON SOUTH ASIA
November 7 - 9, 1980
The 1980 Conference on South Asia will be
presenting 35 panels on a variety of topics, with
a special emphasis on Tibet, Bangladesh and
Afghanistan. If further information is desired,
please contact:
South Asian Area Center
Outreach Office
1249 Van Hise Hall
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706
(608) 263-5839
A Clue to the Authorship of the
. ,
Awakening of Faith:
Redaction of the Word "Nien"a
by Whalen W. Lai
This teaching ... sets up wu-nien
b
(no-thought) as its doctrine,
wu-hsiang
C
(no-form) as its substance and wu-chu
d
(non-abiding)
as its basis. No-form is dissociation from form in the midst of
form; no-thought is refraining from thought in the midst of
thought; non-abiding is the entrance (ju1)e into Original Nature.
-The Platform Sutra
The text, Ta-ch' eng ch'i-hsin lun f (The Awakening ofF aith in Mahayana,
henceforth abbreviated as AFM), has been the center of a long contro-
versy in the field of Buddhist studies. It has been suspected by
Mochizuki Shinkog2 and others to be a Chinese fabrication, while
Tokiwa Daijoh and others defend its alleged Indian origin. The
present short article will not review the past and present scholarship on
the AFM or bring in my own studies on the matter.
3
It will be devoted to
one tiny but crucial issue: the fate of a key concept in the two "transla-
tions"-Paramartha's original (AFM) and version (AFMS
for short). The concept is nien and wu-nien. To state the conclusion here
so as to simplify our discussion: the nien complex, in my opinion,
cannot be understood without reference to a pre-Buddhist (Han
Chinese) usage of the term. It is foreign or jarring enough to the
person responsible for the AFMS that it has been systematically
modified or outright substituted so as to bring the AFM in line with the
Yogacara (Wei-shih,i Vijiiaptimatrata) philosophy. By showing the
sinitic character of the nien ideology, its centrality in the AFM, and the
redaction of it by the AFMS, we can come one step closer to resolving
the long controversy over the authorship of the AFM. From the limited
evidence in this one short study, it would appear that the AFM was
34
authored in China and the AFMS was a conscious redaction of the
AFM in China (or Korea?4) to bring this work into line with the demands
of Hsiian-tsang'sj Wei-shih philosophy.
We will begin with a survey of modern Sanskritists' attempts at
identifying nien and why such attempts have ultimately failed. Then we
will look at a similar attempt by the AFMS to edit off the nien ideology
and how by so doing it violated the integrity of the original AFM
message. The sinitic meaning of the term nien and wu-nien will be
demonstrated with precedents in Han thought, usages in the Six
Dynasties and in Ch'an. k I will conclude with a word on why AFMS was
produced.
Attempts at Identifying Nien and Wu-nien
That nien and especially wu-nien are important concepts can be
seen in the passage cited in the beginning from the Platform siitra. Wu-
nien is supposed to be the doctrine of Southern eh'an and li-nien
l
that
of the Northern Ch'an. If till now I have not rendered them into
English, it is because of the controversial nature of these terms. Both li-
nien and wu-nien came from the AFM. In 1900, when D. T. Suzuki
m
(then not yet the Zen spokesman he would later be) translated the
AFMS, he added this note.
The term (nien) is usually rendered by recollection or memory
(smrti) but (sic) used it apparently in a different sense.
It must mean subjectivity, or the perception of particularity, or
that mental activity which is not in accordance with the suchness
of things; if otherwise, the whole drift of the present Discourse
becomes totally unintelligible.
5
This simplistic re-Sanskritization is based on the popular Japanese
word nembutsu (Chinese: nienjon) for buddhanusmrti. Suzuki sidetracks
the issue by using the English "subjectivity" to render the meaning of
nien, drawing upon, no doubt, his study then on the Lmikiivatara siitra.
Later, in 1949, as a Zenist introducing Hui-neng in the Zen Doctrine of
No Mind, Suzuki suggested for nien. 6 In this he is closer to one of
the literal meanings of nien. He also changed his vocabulary in accord-
ance with the current interest in the "Unconscious." The No-Mind
(wu-nien, wu-hsin)O ideal was dubbed the discovery of the creative
35
Unconscious. In the end, neither smrti nor subjectivity or U ncon-
scious, exhausts the full range of meaning of nien or wu-nien.
Jacques Gernet in his study of Shen-hui, the leading disciple of
Hui-neng who capitalized on wu-nien, offers acitta, acittaka, asa'T(tjiiisamii-
patti and nirodhasamiipatti for wu-nien.
7
All these Sanskrit words suggest
the absence of mind or mental activity. They are better choices and
justifiable as part of the Ch'an psychology. It is, however, risky to re-
Sanskritize Ch'an terms since this tradition has always freely used
words. Acitta etc., furthermore, cannot solve our problems with the
AFM or the AFMS. Gernet works on the assumption, as Suzuki has to a
large extent, that wu-nien is a synonym for wu-hsin (no-mind). Some-
times in Ch'an, wu-hsin is indeed just one more radical way of saying wu-
nien, but in the case of the AFM, the two terms are not the same. In
almost all cases, nien is an inferior reality to hsin. Wu-hsin is used once
only. Nien, as we will see, is intrinsically "negative." It is something to be
"negated" (wu), emptied, abolished, so as to free the Mind (hsin). Hsin
does not share the same negative connotations. If a negative mind is
intended, the prefix wangP (deluded) is usually added, but it is almost
redundant to add wang to the negative nien.
PhilIp Yampolsky's translation of the Plaiform Siitra (1967)
appeared at the same time as Yoshito Hakeda's translation of the AFM.
Yampolsky has offered no-thought for wu-nien (with a reference to
Gernet
8
). Hakeda however consistently departs from his colleague in
not using "no-thought." Instead he equates vikalpa with nien and takes
wu-nien to imply its opposite, avikalpa, or else acintya. His choice is based
on the assumption that nien is short for wang-nien (deluded thought), a
synonym of wang-hsiangq (deluded thought), or fen-pieh
r
(differentia-
tion), the preferred translations for vikalpa (differentiation,
ating consciousness). The AFM does use the term wang-nien, and even
wang-hsin (deluded mind). However, there are two technical problems
here: (a) the AFM often uses nien simply by itself without the adjective
wang, and (b) Hakeda also associates vikalpa with the AFM discussion
on the ming-tzu-hsiang
S
function of the mind (the form of mind that
differentiates names and realities).
It is wu-nien that poses the greatest challenge to Hakeda's reading.
Avoiding "no-thought," Hakeda takes wu-nien to mean acintya (the
mithinkable) and the avikalpa (what is not analyzable by the intellect).
In English, he stays with either "beyond empirical predication or deter-
mination" and "beyond what they are thought to be."9 To do so,
however, he often has to go around the original by using qualifiers.
36
Ironically, Hakeda is often only doing what the AFMS has tried to do. " S i k ~ a
nanda," the alleged translator to the AFMS, had had the same trouble
with nien and wu-nien.
The AFMS' Attempts at Editing the Nienldeology
Through a comparison of the AFM and the AFMS ideology, 10 we
see, very interestingly, how the AFMS consistently (a) adds the adjective
wang, deluded, to nien, thought, and (b) drops all references to wu-nien,
even at the risk of tampering with the organic whole of the discourse.
Because the AFM has more internal consistency than the AFMS in this
and other areas 11, it can be assumed that the AFM is the original and
the AFMS a redaction, and not the other way around. Below is one
passage of the AFM (in my literal translation), followed by the same in
the AFMS (Suzuki's, somewhat edited) and Hakeda's translation. The
AFMS drops wu-nien, and adds such a long substitute passage that I
have to skip some part of it.
AFM: The object-realms of the five senses and the mind are ultimately
wu-nien (no-thought) .... Sentient beings ... deluded by igno-
rance mistake the mind as thought (nien) but the mind itself never
moves (tung). t If a person can so examine it and realize that the
mind itself is wu-nien (no-thought), he would smoothly and in due
accord enter the gate of Suchness. 12
The AFM reference to wu-nien does not make the best of sense.
How can the first five senses (matter, smell, etc.) be thoughtless?
However, the basic message in Chinese is: the mind is passive ("never
moves") until it is deluded ("moved") by thought, nien. To know that
mind and reality are essentially free from thought, wu-nien, is to return
the mind to Suchness. Suchness is, says the AFM, "free from thought." 13
AFMS: These modes of existence such as matter etc. (the skandhas)
are imperfect. Why are they imperfect? When we divide some
gross (or composite) matter, we can reduce it to atoms (anu). But
as the atom will also be subject to further division, all forms of
material existence, whether gross or fine, are nothing but the
shadow of particularization produced by a subjective mind
[vikalpa], and we cannot ascribe any degree of -(absolute or
independent) reality to them. [The same applies to the other
skandhas and the asa1[lkrtadharmas-the AFMS goes on at length to
37
enumerate.] All beings, because of their misleading ignorance,
imagine that the mind is being disturbed, while in reality it is not.
But when they understand that the disturbance of the mind is
"neither birth nor death" 14 [Suzuki's translation: immortality]15,
they would then enter into the gate of Suchness.
16
The AFMS passage here realizes precisely that one cannot appro-
priately refer to the five senses (eyes, ears, nose, mouth and touch) as
having "thought." Thought at best can be the correlate to the sixth
faculty, the mind. Therefore the AFMS "very logically" re-interprets
the passage by dropping the reference to wu-nien and reads the
message as one of "absence of substance" in the skandhas misperceived
by the "subjective mind." The AFMS then has to resurrect the theory of
atoms, anu (used in the Abhidharma-kosa and more recently incorporated
into the V ijitaptimiitratiisiddhi) to fill the gap left by its dropping wu-nien.
This brings in the whole discussion of the compounded and uncom-
pounded dharmas that have played no role in the AFM and no role in
the rest of the AFMS. It is logical to assume that this is the result of
redaction by the AFMS.
Hakeda: The objects of the five senses and of the mind are in the final
analysis beyond what they are thought to be (wu-nien) . ... People,
because of their ignorance, assume Mind (Suchness) to be what
they think it to be, though Mind in fact is unaffected (tung) even if
it is falsely predicated. If a man is able to observe and understand
that Mind is beyond what it is thought to be, then he will be able to
conform to and enter the realm of Suchness. 17
Hakeda's translation is rather round-about. Probably relying on
the AFMS, it manages to make better (Sanskrit) sense of wu-nien. It also
follows the AFMS in taking the word tung (move) in the passive voice to
mean "being disturbed" or "being affected." The mind is "unaffected
even if it is falsely predicated." This reading is not warranted by the
grammar. 18 It also does not concur with the discussion on hsin and nien
elsewhere in the AFM. Tung is clearly the movement brought about by
nien; this is called at one point wang-tung, deluded movement. 19 The
mind by itself does not move; the nien naturally does. To mistake the
movement of nien for the immovable mind is the mark of the ignorant;
the reversal is the entrance into Suchness. So elsewhere the AFM well
says, and Hakeda himself acknowledges:
38
AFM (Hakeda): Water and wind are inseparable; but water is not
mobile by nature (tung . ... Likewise, man's Mind, pure in its own
nature, is stirred (tung) by the wind of ignorance .... Yet Mind is
not mobile by nature .... 20
The AFMS, incidentally, has changed somewhat this crucial passage in
the AFM.21
The immutability of mind is as clearly set forth in another crucial
passage in the AFM.
AFM (My translation): In other words, the nature of the mind is
always wu-nien (without thought); therefore it is said to be immuta-
ble (pu-pien). U Because the mind may not (always) attain the One
Dharmadhatu, therefore it fails to correspond (to Suchness).
Suddenly a thought rose and this constituted ignorance. 22
AFM (Hakeda): What is called the essential nature of Mind is always
beyond thoughts. It is, therefore, defined as "immutable." When
the One W orId of Reality is yet to be realized, the Mind (is
mutable and) is not in perfect unity (with Suchess). Suddenly, (a
deluded) thought arises; (this state) is called ignorance. 23
In long notations, Hakeda suggests akasmiit for the Chinese hu-jan.
24v
The AFMS preserves the sense of the changless mind, buy typically, it
edits off all reference to wu-nien.
AFMS (Suzuki, with minor changes): While the essence of the mind is
eternally clean and pure, the influence of ignorance makes
possible the existence of a defiled mind. But despite the defiled
mind, the mind (itself) is eternal, clear, pure, and not subject to
transformation. Further as its original nature is free from particu-
larization ifen-pieh, vikalpa) , it knows in itself no change what-
ever, though it produces everywhere the various modes of ex-
istence. When the (Dharmadhatu) is not recognized, there is
lacking the correspondence (with Suchness). Ignorance and
particularization then arise, giving rise to various defiled
consciousnesses.
25
The Sinitic Meaning of Nien and Wu-nien
Nien is a complex concept involving several layers of meanings
drawn from Indian and Chinese connotations. Of the Sanskrit, smrti is
39
tangential, even though the Platform sutra later would make free use of
it (nien chenj'u
26
,w mindfulness of Suchness as the meaning of nien in
wu-nien). K ~ a n a is often implied. Vikalpa is the most relevant. The AFM
and AFMS accept the inspiration of wu-nien as coming from a sidra.
The sutra is suspected to be the Lankiivatiira sutra.
AFM (My translation): Thus asutra says, "If there is any sentient being
who can perceive wu-nien, he would be advancing toward
Buddha-wisdom." (Hakeda gives "that which is beyond thought"
for wu-nien.)27
AFMS (Suzuki): Therefore it is said in the Sutra that those who have
an insight into the nonreality (wu-hsiang kharacterlessness}) of all
subjectivity (wang-nien, vikalpa) attain the wisdom of the Tathagata.
28
The cited passage is not found in the Lankiivatiira sutra but the AFMS is
probably right in prudently re-constituting wu-nien as wu-hsiang and
wang-nien (vikalpa). It is safe to assume that the AFM simplifies the
sutra's denunciation of vikalpa into wu-nien.
Wu-nien, however, is more than vikalpa. Even Suzuki, Gernet and
Yampolsky accept a Taoist source for wu-hsin or wu-nien. The boldest
statement is that ofWing-tsit Chan commenting on the Platform sutra:
The doctrine of the absence of thought (wu-nien) is no cult of
unconsciousness. Nor is it a Zen invention (in the Platform Sutra).
It goes back to Taoism, Neo-Taoism and the Early Seven Schools
of Buddhism, all of which taught "having no mind of one's own,"
that is, having no mental attachment which would keep the mind
in bondage. 29
Indeed, one can find the idea of wu-hsin or hsin-wu in Chuang-tzu
Z
and
in the commentary on it by Kuo Hsiang. Y Below are offered a few
samplings from the Eastern Chin and the Six Dynasties period, up to
Tan Ch'ien, Z the first known scholar of the AFM:
40
a) Chih Min-tuaaofthe hsin-wuabschool: "When thesutra teaches
that all dharmas are empty, it is intending that the people
would empty their minds so as not to hold on to the empty
illusions." 30
b) Ho Ch' eng-t'ien, ac an anti-Buddhist thinker: "The Great Man
and the gentleman make humanity (jen)ad their concern.
Their minds do not harbour nien, but take on form and shapes
as [expedient] ornaments ... so that they be approachable to
common men."3!
c) Hui-yiian, ae defender of faith: "That which receives karma is
without a master or lord. It is the mind. The mind has no
permanent master. It receives stimuli from things without,
and reacts accordingly. The responses can be speedy or slow,
therefore the karmic retribution can be immediate or
delayed."32 And, "Do not let emotions burden down sheng
af
(read hsing, ag nature) or sheng burden down shen
ah
(spirit)."33
Read hsinaI for shen.
d) Tsung Ping, aj his student: "The Sage is without a permanent
mind; he uses the mind of things as his mind," i.e., he goes
along with things as his guide. 34
e) T'an-ch'ien, first known student of AFM: "There being no
mind, all pros and cons (shih-fei, ak conflicts) would cease."35
There is, however, a fallacy in equating nien withhsin. Chuang-tzu
did not know of wu-nien. Wu-nien has a shade of meaning, not available
immediately in wu-hsin. After it has incorporated Sanskrit overtones,
nien has the meaning of k:jana, "one sixtieth of a snap of a finger," that is
not in its classical sense. Therefore nien is often best rendered as
"thought-instance" or an "instance of thought," so as to preserve both
the time element (momentariness) and its ideational content (thought).
Because of the suggestion of "impermanence" (k:jana), nien is repeatedly
contrasted with the permanence or invariability, pu-tung or pu-pien, of
the absolute, pure mind, Suchness or Buddha-nature. Thus we have
the set phrase, nien-nien hsiang-shu, al "moment-to-moment continuity"
(implying actually also discontinuity, orpu-ch'ang
am
). Hsiang-shu stands
usually for santana as in citta-santarw (hsiang-shu hsin, an or, hsiang-shu
shih, ao mental continuum). In the AFM and the AFMS, this is associated
with the 36 A review of all the passages in the AFM
involving nien would substantiate our contention that nien should be
read within this larger matrix of meanings. The translations are mine;
reference is given to the page number in Hakeda's translation.
T. 576a/Hakeda 32: All the various dharmas, realities, are differen-
tiated only because of wang-nien, deluded thoughts. If one li-nien
departs or dissociates oneself from thought, then there would be
no form to the object-realm at all.
Wang-nien is explicitly named here; it is vikalpa that creates the uncalled-
for differentiations. Li-nien, departure or freedom from thought,
would bring us back to the undifferentiated state.
41
T. 576aiHakeda 34: [In truth] although all the various dharmas appear
as thought-moments, there is neither that which can conceive of
them (k'o-nien)ap nor that which can be perceived of such (neng-
nien).aq
The disappearance of the object-realm (the object to the senses) as well
as the subject is dramatically put forth.
The last part is not easily intelligible unless one is familiar with the
usage of nien in meditation (smrti). As early as the third century A.D.,
Chinese following the Anapana sutra (An-pan shou-i ching)ar began to
understand and use the word nien with reference to the psychological
reduction of self and phenomena into thought-instances (nien, ~ a r : a )
that the mind is mindful of (nien, smrti) at the moment. All realities are
momentary, and are due to the nien (not due to the mind, hsin). In so far
as nien (vikalpa) is false, the True itself is beyond nien (wu-nien), beyond
the conceiver or the conceived of (so-nien
37
,as neng-nien). In Suchness,
there is neither the subject nor the object. (See citations later.)
T. 576a/Hakeda 34: By the Emptiness of Suchness is meant ... that
it is free (li) from the all the differentiated forms of the dharmas
because [the Suchness Mind] has no hsii-wang-hsin-nien, at vain,
deluded, psychic thoughts (vikalpa).
In contrast to this ideal, there is the deluded mind of sentient beings.
T. 576b/Hakeda 35: Because all sentient beings, possessing the
wang-hsin, deluded mind, experience nien-nien, the succession of
thought-moments, each being different and not mutually corres-
ponding, therefore (they have to be told that) everything is
empty. However, once free from the deluded mind, li-wang-hsin,
(they would know that) there is actually nothing here to be emptied.
Here we see the several meanings of nien entering into the overall defi-
nition of the "deluded thought." This passage also shows the properly
qualified use of the term wang-hsin. One can say li-nien or li-wang-hsin
but never li-hsin
au
by itself.
T. 376b/Hakeda 38-39: The common people may attain (some)
chiieh, av (realization): in knowing that a former nien, thought, has
given rise to evil, they can stop a succeeding thought from
rising .... The Two Vehicles of the sravaka and the pratyekabuddha
as well as the initiate bodhisattva may realize, within nien-i, ay the
variant thought, nien-wu-i, ax the nonvariance of thoughts .... The
42
Dharmakiiya bodhisattva may (further) realize, within nien-chu, ax
the abiding thought, nien-wu-chu, the nonabiding thought ....
(Only) he who completes all the bodhisattva bhumis and the upiiyas
can in i-nien, az a single instant, align (his mind with Suchness),
realizing that when the mind is first aroused, the mind itself has
no initial form, because, in itself, the mind is far from (J'Uan-li) ba
even the smallest of nien [that rises] .... Therefore a surra says "If
there is any sentient being who can perceive wu-nien, he would be
advancing toward Buddha-wisdom."
The above passage involves an unorthodox use of the four forms ( s s u ~
hsiang), bb i.e., the Sarvastivadin analysis of four "moments" in any
dharma-event, what I translated (in keeping with the meaning of the
Chinese) as the rise, the abiding, the variance and the cessation of nien.
The Four Moments and Their Reversal
...
jati sthiti anaythatva nirodha
birth ---........ abiding --_.-1 .... varying
(sheng) (chu) (i)
- __ II" cessation
(mieh)hc
the enlightened the Dharmakaya Two Vehicles and commoners can
realizes the bodhisattvas can initiate bodhisattvas cease this
unborn .... I---- attain nonabiding..- can realize non- .... 1------
variance
Key: --..progression of life and death (sa1{!Sara)
~ reversal to nirvaTfa
The second half of the diagram shows where the AFM places the
achievement of the various yiinas. (The classification is itself a proble-
matical innovation.) The logic is based on a gloss of the term sheng-
mieh bd (jiiti and nirodha) for sa'T(tSiira. This is possible only in Chinese.
Sheng-mieh happens also to be one Chinese rendition of sa'T(tSiira. The
argument then goes: the progression from sheng to mieh means sa'T(tSiira;
the regression from mieh to sheng is therefore nirvii1Ja. Nirvii1Ja is the
Unborn (that which is prior to evenjiiti). Such liberal usages of sheng-
mieh are found as early as the fourth century A.D. in China.
How and when did the whole process of nien-nien sheng-mieh be
(the arising and the dying of the continuous nien) begin? The answer is:
The nien is beginningless.
T. 576bc/Hakeda 40: As to the arousing of the Mind, there is no
incipient form that can be known. To say that it can be known is
43
(to attain) wu-nien, no-thought. (Failing this) therefore all sentient
beings are not said to be enlightened. This is because (for them),
from the very beginning, thought has succeeded thought, nien-nien
hsiang-hsil, and (they have) yet to li-nien, dissociate themselves
from that stream of thought. Therefofe they are said to be in
"beginningless ignorance." If a person attains wu-nien, no-thought,
then he realizes how the forms of the mind undergo (the four
forms of) rise, abiding, variance and cessation. This is because he
is one with no-thought.
Before the '''beginningless ignorance" is wu-nien. The wu-nien
(suchness) mind is free from the vicissitude of thought-moments. For
the deluded, there has always been nien in endless succession, hsiang-
hsii from the beginning. To know the ultitnate paradox-how an incipi-
ent thought can emerge from a thought-free mind-is the same as
attaining wu-nien itself. Free from nien, a person can perceive the
rising, abiding, varying and ceasing of nien itself. To do that, a person
must break the "continuous mind," the hsiang-shii hsin, citta-santiina,
that is, says the AFM, the iilaya-vijiuina.
T. 376/Hakeda 41: He destroys the compound consciousness [the
iilaya-vijiUina] and brings an end to the forms of the continuous
mind, thereby letting manifest the Dharmakaya ... because all
hsin-shih chih-hsiang, bf forms of mind and consciousness, are
ignorance itself.
But where does the continuity consciousness itself come from?
From the mind! The hsin "somehow" gives. rise to nien which then
continues on by itself with no end.
T. 577a/Hakeda 45: Concerning the form of continuity: ... the Mind
gives rise to nien, thought, and it correspondingly continues with
no end.
T. 577b/Hakeda 48: Concerning the continuity consciousness
[evolved from the Mind]: as it corresponds to nien, it continues
with no end.
Nien is the form of ignorance itself. Sometimes it is ignorance that
is the root of nien. Elsewhere, it is said that the sudden emergence of
nien constitutes ignorance. Both ignorance and nien are beginningless.
It is'also ignorance acting as Suchness
38
that gives rise to wang-hsin, bg a
44
deluded mind (vikalpa) within. Then, later, the deluded objects appear
without.
T. 755c/Hakeda 50: Suddenly a thought arises; this is called ignorance.
T 578a/Hakeda 56: Because (ignorance) perfumes Suchness, there is
the deluded mind .... The unenlightened nien, thought, arises
and thereby the deluded object-realm is manifested.
Nien is, within man, the deluded thought; in consciousness, it is
the momentary frame by which all things are known; in time, it is a
moment; in contrast with the immovable mind, it is the ever-changing'
santiina. But is nien real? No.
T. 579c/Hakeda 73: The object-realms of the five senses and the
mind are ultimately wu-nien (not structured according to our
thoughts) .... Sentient beings ... deluded by ignorance mistake
the mind as nien [which changes], but the mind never moves. If a
person could so examine it and realize that the mind itself is wu-
nien (without thoughts), he would smoothly and in due accord
enter the gate of Suchness.
39
Aside from those passages in which nien means "meditative recol-
lection," these are virtually all the key passages in the AFM involving
nien. The AFMS edited some of these, did away with wu-nien all
together but, as with Hakeda, it is unable to abandon the tone of other
nien passages. The editing being haphazard, the AFMS is better
considered a redaction. Nien being somehow non-Sanskritic yet
integral to the AFM, the AFM is better considered Chinese in origin.
Differences between nien and hsin mean that wu-nien cannot be
simply traced back to Chuang-tzu's "no-mind" as so many scholars
suggest. The deeper nuance of nien has to be found elsewhere. In the
chapter on (human) nature and feeling, hsing-ch'ing, bh in the Po-hu-t'ung
bi
(Comprehensive Discussion at the White Tiger Hall [in A.D. 39 under
imperial sponsorship]),40 we find this subtler Han classification of hsin
and nien: "What do hsing and ch'ing signify? Hsing is the work of yang bj
as ch'ing that of yin. bkMan is born out of the reception of the yin-yang
ethers and is thus endowed with the Five Natures [the five virtues] and
the Six Emotions Goy, anger, grief, happiness, love, hatred]. Ch'ingalso
means passivity (ching) bI while hsing bm is existence (sheng). bn Their
reception procures life. Therefore, the Kou ming chueh says: 'Emotions
45
rise from yin; it is desires based on shih nien bo (momentary thought).
Nature comes from yang; it is always in tune to the li bp(Principle).' Yang
is considerate of other; yin knows only selfIsh gain. Therefore, emotions
are greedy and nature is directed at humanity.42"
T'ang Yung-t'ung bqcites a slightly different edition, which reads
in part:
Nien-lii br(thinking and pondering) is in accordance with
shih (time) ... and hsing (human nature).42
Hsing should be read as ch'ing in the last line, i.e. nien-lii is associated
with activated hsing or the emotions.
The Chinese character nien is a combination of "present" and
"mind." Its ties with shih (time) explain why it was chosen to render
k!jaTJa, moment. Nien usually is employed to denote "to think of, to
remember; thought, recollection." This is the reason for its being
chosen to translate sm'(ti, to recall or be presently mindful of. The word
did not have as yet a negative connotation in the classical period, but by
Han, under the influence of yin-yang classifIcation, the mind (hsin) is
aligned with yang and nien (and a host of other mental functions like i
and lU) came to be regarded as yin. Such mental activities distract the
mind from its originally passive, wholesome state. The mind becomes
active, extroverted and restless in its mental activities (nien). This yin-
yang division parallels the more basic one attending hsing and ch'ing.
The Music chapter of the Book of Rites says:
A human being at birth (sheng) is passive; this is his nature. In
contact with things, [emotions] are activated; this is the desiring
aspect of his nature. 43
The yang nature is the pen, bSbasis; the yin emotions are mo, btthe subse-
quents. One should always preserve or return to the pen and not be
misled by the mo. In the psyche, this means abiding with the passive
mind, hsin, and not being pulled down by the active nien. In Han
thought, the Sage abides with the pen so much so that he is said to be wu-
ch'ing, bu without emotions. He is impassive as impartial Heaven itself.
Although the original ideal in Confucian anthropology is not to elimi-
nate feelings (jen-ch'ing
bv
) altogether but to fInd the harmony between
hsing and ch'ing (cf. the Doctrine of the Mean), post-Han thought leans
more and more toward ascetical denial, being more aware of the harm
46
the i or the nien can do to the immobile mind. When the AFM describes
the mind as basically pu-tung (not moving) and blames all deluded
movements, wang-tung, on the nien, it is following this Han tradition
much more than any known legitimate Indian Buddhist precedent.
Han Psychology
AFM Psychology
I
Nature, yang, and li
Mind, passive, Suchness
noutnenal
phenomenal
yin, and nien I
Consciousness, active, nien
The structural continuity is diagrammed above. The disjunction of
.. having yang and passivity together on the "noumenal" side is a problem
native to the Han classificatory system itself.
Wu-nien is an early Chinese Buddhist ideal, a gateway to nirvii1fa
and enlightenment long before Chinese knew all the fme points about
vikalpa as the differentiating consciousness. Wu-nien was used as is, with
no apology, and in need of no prefix, i.e. wu-wang-nien (avikalpa).
Together with i (a close cousin of nien, meaning also the first stirring of
mind), nien was understood as the incipient thought in the early An-pan
shou-i (Amipana) meditative tradition. K'ang Seng-hui's bwpreface to
this sutra describes the freedom gained through the four dhyiinas, or
how the extraneous nien or deflled i-nien can be fmally removed:
The mind is then controlled. The nien (thought process) has been
reversed. The various skandhas are dead. This is called "returning."
The various desires having died down, the mind is wu-hsiang
(without thought). This is called "purity."44
Vikalpa is not an issue here. The Lankiivatiira sutra was then unknown,
even to India. In the running commentary to the first chapter of the
Ming-tu-ching bx(Chih Ch'ien by polished retranslation of the 14tasiihasrikii
Prajiiaparamitiisutra)45 from the same period (ca. 222-229), we encounter
the same general use of nien and wu-nien by the commentator.
47
Concerning consciousness as the root of all realities) jhe Dharma-
pada has said, "The mind is the root of all realities. All good and
evil come from it. Misfortune and punishment are likewise due to
consciousness." When (our) skandhas are flawed (by desires and
activity), we cannot recognize the truth of wu-nien. Wu-nien is
without a source.
46
Not only is wu-nien beginningless, the emergence of the first thought or
nien from the originally wu-nien mind is just as mysterious. Since nien
gives rise to life and death of phenomena (jiiti-nirodha), the reversal of
nien is freely seen as the negation of life and death or saT[tSiira (sheng-
mieh):
By activity is meant the mind oflife and death (sa'f!iSiira). The dark
skandhas give rise secretly to the nien. Erase the nien and one can,
in one step, attain the wu-pu-weibz(the wu-wei, nonaction, that is
wu-pu-wei, accomplishing all).47
The Ming-tu commentary contains more explanations of the native
concepts of i and nien. Examples from this early period can be multi-
plied, but perhaps the most lucid usage that reveals its link with the Po-
hu-tung is from Hsi Ch'ao, caa student of Chih Tun, cbin the fourth
century. In his Fengja-yao cc (Essentials of Faith), he returns to the
familiar theme of the mind as the creator of all realities, spoken of by
the Dharmapiida. 48 The word i (intention) is often chosen in this period
to render that active side of citta (mind, cetana, will) as well as the psychic
predispositions, saT[tSkiira, in the twelve nidiinas.
The Vimalakirti Sutra says: All the various dharmas take form
(hsing) according to i (intention, thought). cd The sign of good
fortune stirs (within) as the incipient elements and the affairs (of
the world) respond accordingly as the result. As a nien rises, there
is yu ce (being). As a lii ceases, there is wu ct (nonbeing). Where the i
(intentions) is at peace, all encounters run smoothly. Where the
ch'ing (feelings) are obstructed, hazards abound. Therefore it is
said: Causes for penetration and impediment lie within ourselves
and not in things.
49
It is also said:
In his mind (the man of the Way) should guard against the tiniest
beginning of lii. With the ultimate li (Principle) as his castle, he
commands over the fundamental (pen) and restrains the secon-
daries (mo, subsequents). He would not, prior to the events taking
shape (hsing) , ever so lightly arouse any hsin-nien (mental
thoughts).50
Here we see the more detailed parallel structure to the Po-Hu-tung:
48
changeless
passive formless
li (Principle)
hsing (nature) wu (nonbeing) pen (origin)
-----
~ - - - - - -----
------
active
i (intention) yu (being) mo (subsequent.s)
ch'ing
nien (thought) hsing (form)
(emotions)
lU (pondering)
The same structure then emerges in the AFM in the form of:
Such ness Mind, ideal wu-nien i neither life nor death, immobile
___ ~ ~ ~ : : ~ : ~ ~ : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ t __ _
Continuous nien (tilayavijiitina) I life and death, sa1(!stira, change
Decidedly the AFM structure is much more complicated. The descent
from pen (hsin, mind) into the mo (subsequent consciousness) alone is
extremely intricate. Suchness is also given a double aspect just under
the effable side of its essence: the siinya and the aSiinya (empty and not
empty) etc. Still, the sinitic stamp of aligning hsin (mind) with an invari-
able principle (Suchness) and shih (consciousness)-and the culpable
nien-with momentary changes is unmistakable. There is indeed this
basic thread running through Han reflection on hsin-nien and the AFM
quasi-Yogacara psychology. The key concepts of nien and wu-nien in
the AFM cannot be understood outside this native framework.
Reasonsfor the Redaction of the AFM into the AFMS
The above study shows that nien and wu-nien are problematical
concepts in the AFM. They have defied the Sanskritist's attempts at
direct correlation because they contain elements drawn from a Chinese
pre-Buddhist use of the term. We have seen how Hakeda has repeatedly
tried to make sense of the terms by remolding them so as to accord with
Indian logic. The same motivation lies behind the AFMS redaction of
the AFM. Within fifty years after the appearance of the AFM in China,
there were already charges that the AFM was a six-century forgery by
the masters of the DaSabhiimika sa.stra in the North. The criticism came
from the Sa:qtgraha school founded by Paramartha in the South.
Hsuan-tsang was frustrated enough with this unsettled controversy, so
it is said, that he went to India to bring back the definitive answer. Due
49
to his translation of the Vijiiaptimiitratra-siddhi, Ch'eng Wei-shih-lun, cq the
AFM was further discredited. We might never know who produced the
AFMS or even where, but the AFMS preface shows what might be the
motive for producing it. There the AFMS is said to be translated under
,
S i k ~ a n a n d a into two scrolls:
However, there are discrepancies between it and the older transla-
tion. This may be due to the different intention of the translators
or that there might be different Sanskrit originals. 51
These are still the reasons offered by people for arguing Indian
authorship. I think the real reason is found in this other statement:.
The more mysterious the principle, the more difficult it is for
people to believe it. The more sacred the Way, the more active is
the Devil (who seeks to discredit it). How much more so in this
defIled and degenerate age! Therefore men of biased opinions,
holding on to the Vijiiaptimiitratii-siddhi, denounce this work (and
its doctrine of) the mutual perfuming of Suchness and avidya.
(The ineffable truth) being given in words can be obstructed
because of the audience of that time. The previous dew of
Mahayana can thus be turned (by irresponsible persons) into
poison. 52
The preface then listed canonical justification for what the AFM
preface characterized as its unique message ofju-li yuan-ch'i ch(causality
from out of the suchness principle).53 The AFMS was probably
produced in China, during that debate or in Wonhyo's ciKorea, known
for "harmonious" teachings.
Given these remarks in the AFMS preface, I would suggest that
the AFMS was authored to counter the attacks of the new Wei-shih
school. At that time, someone, comparable to Hakeda in our time, tried
to rectify the AFM by rendering it in such a way that it would not be too
offensive to the better Yogacara rationality. Those troublesome
passages involving nien and wu-nien were therefore changed, to make
the text "acceptable." It is not that the redactor consciously changed the
text. He sincerely believed that the AFM concurred with the Vijiiapti-
miitratii-siddhi logic but had a deeper message. The discrepancies, he
thought, could be smoothed out. In the end, they cannot be smoothed
out. The AFMS is so much love labour's lost. It never attracted the
attention that the AFM did, nor resolved the conflict. The conflict
between AFM and Wei-shih was a standoff. Fa-tsang then defended
50
the superiority of the Fa-hsingcj position of the AFM and henceforth
demoted Wei-shih to the dubious inferiority of Fa-hsiang c l ~ ... All
that, however, would belong to another study for another occasion.
54
NOTES
1. Given as jend (thus often translated as "man's original nature"); it could be
ju
cm
("to enter"). Translation mine.
2. Mochizuki, Daijo kishinron no kenkyu
Cn
(Kyoto, 1922).
3. Ongoing project since my dissertation (Harvard, 1975).
4. Mochizuki suggests Korea because of the discovery of the AFMS in Korea.
5. Suzuki, Asvaghosa's Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana
(Chicago: Open Court, 1900), p. 56.
6. ap. cit. (London: Rider & Co., 1949), pp. 29-30, 56.
7. Gernet, Entretiens duMaitre de Dhyana Chen-houei duHo-tso (Hanoi, 1949), pp.
12-13, note 5. He offers the French "absence de pensee."
8. Yampolsky, The Platform Sutra of The Sixth Patriarch (New York: Columbia
Uni. Press, 1967), pp. 137-39, with note 69 devoted to wu-nien.
9. Hakeda, Awakening of Faith Attributed to Asvaghosa (New York: Columbia Uni.
Press, 1967), p. 73 note.
10. Kashiwagi Hiroo failed to do this in his "Shikushananda no yaku to tsutaera-
rem Daijo kishinron," Indogaku Bukkyogaku kenkyu, 10.2 (1962), pp. 124-25.
11. Another test-case is AFMS' redaction of the "water-wave" metaphor.
12. T. 44, p. 579c.
13. T. 44, p. 576ab.
14. Often taken in China to mean nirva:,!-a, but AFMS might have in mind the
original dialectics of Madhyamika.
15. Suzuki trans. cit., p. 104. Unwarranted reading.
16. T. 44, p. 588a.
17. Hakeda, trans. cit., pp. 72-73.
18. The passive voice is not intended; the AFMS of Suzuki is probably the model.
19. T. 44, p. 580a.
20. Hakeda, trans. cit., p. 41.
21. Dealt with in my dissertation.
51
22. T. 44, p. 577c.
23. Hakeda, trans. cit., p. 5l.
24. The more immediate precedent of hu-jan is Hsi Ch'ao's Fengja-yao or, further
back, Kuo Hsiang's use of k'uai-jan;co this issue is to be dealt with in companion pieces on
"hu-jan nieh-ch'i"cP in the AFM. .
25. Suzuki, trans. cit., p. 79.
26. Platform sutra but only in the later popular version.
27. T. 44, p. 576b and Hakeda, trans. cit., p. 39.
28. Suzuki, trans. cit., p. 65.
29. A Source Book of Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton Uni. Press, 1963), p. 435.
30. As reported by Chi-tsang
cq
in his Chung-Iun-shu. cr
31. T. 52, p. 19b.
32. T. 52, p. 34b.
33. T. 52, p. 30c.
34. From my translation in an ongoing study of his Mingjo-Iun, cs T. 52, p. 18c.
35. From his Wang shihjei-Iun;ct see my translation in "T'an-ch'ien and the Early
Ch'an Tradition," Early Ch'an in China and Tibet, ed. by W. Lai and Lewis Lancaster, forth-
coming from the Berkeley Buddhist Series.
36. T. 44, pp. 577b, 586a.
37. AFM gives k'o-nien
cu
("can be thought of'); AFMS gives the preferred so-
nien
cv
("that which is being thought of'); see T. 44, pp. 576a, 584c.
38. Touchy issue in the AFM philosophy. Wonhyocw realized that to posit this is
contrary to the logic of Y ogaca.ra as listed in the Sa1!lgraha.
39. Translation slightly different from one offered earlier.
40. See translation by Tjan Tjoe Som, Po Hu Tung, in Sinica Leidensia (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1952).
41. My translation; compare ibid., vol. II, p. 565.
42. T'ang, Han-Wei liang-Chin Nan-pei-chao Fo-chiao-shih (Peking reissue: Chung
hua, 1955).
43. My translation; see Theodore de Bary ed., Sources of Chinese Tradition (New
York: Columbia Uni. Press, 1960), p. 168.
44. T. 55, p. 43b. Wu-hsiang is close to meaning wu-nien.
45. T. 8, no. 225, pp. 478-508.
46. T. 8, p. 480b. From my completed translation of this running commentary.
47. T. 8, p. 479a.
48. The first chapter in the Pali Dhammapada.
49. My translation, from T. 52, p. 88b; compare Zurcher's version in op. cit., I, p. 172.
50. My translation, from T. 52, p. 87a; compare Zurcher's, ibid., p. 167.
5. T. 52, p. 583c.
52. Ibid.
53. T, 52, p. 575a.
54. See my "Fa-tsang'sCX Criticism of Wei-shih," paper read at the national con-
ference of the Association for Asian Studies (1979) in the North American Buddhist
Association session; this is based on a translation of the hsin-shih-Iun
cy
chapter in the Wu-
chiao-chang,-cz see also an accompanying piece to the present study, "Suddenly a Thougl
Rose: Chinese Understanding of Mind and Conciousness" (mn., 1980).
52
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53
Chinese Glossary
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af bf 'L' Z t
ag Ii bg IL'
ah *$ bh 'Iw
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The Abhidharmika Notion of V ijiiiina
and its Soteriological Significance*
by Bra} M. Sinha
Introduction
This paper is an attempt to articulate the Abhidharmika conception of
vijiuina in phenomenological idiom. Our concern here is to bring out
the uniqueness of the Abhidharmika understanding of the problem of
consciousness and its relationship to the question of subjectivity,
temporality and transcendence.
For the Abhidharmika, reification of time, as an abstract category
independent of entities and conditioning their mode of being, is a
metaphysical presupposition which is not indispensable for an under-
standing of the phenomenon of temporality. Temporality, then, is not
conceived of as adjectival synonym of time as the transcendent condi-
tion of our being and cognition. The whole question of temporality in
Abhidharmika Buddhism revolves around the nature and structure of
vijiuina as a dharma. V ~ i i u i n a , from the Abhidharmika point of view, as a
dharma, is continually changing, is never self-identical, and as the
structure of becoming and phenomenal conditioning it is essentially
temporal. Temporality of the vijiiana then implies both the fact of the
change and finitude of phenomenal existence as well as its "subjective"
expenence .
. Within the Abhidharmika scheme, one can discern two modes of
the functioning of vijiiiina. First is the cognitive mode Qf consciousness,
which implies the claiming of the object as the other by the subject
(samyoga). The other is the reflective mode of consciousness leading to
the disclaiming of this otherness of subject and object (visamyoga). First
is the temporal mode of becoming, where the vijiiiina functions asa
dharma, as the structure of world involvement of the existentially finite
subject. Later is the mode of transcendence of vijiiana which goes
54
beyond the subject-object otherness of the world of becoming.
However, since world involvement is structural to the very being of
vijiuina, the transcendence also implies the dissolution of vijiiiina, the
empiric consciousness which operates in the realm of otherness. Thus,
the overcoming of temporality, the process of becomingness of the
conditioned dharmas (samskrtatua) is essentially the dissolution of the
subjectivity in the mode of otherness. The consciousness which loses
the other through which alone could it express itself, loses its subject-
hood. Thus the eternity of nirviirJa as the stillness 6f consciousness
(sthita) overcomes the flow of temporality through complete extinction
of consciousness as the cognitional basis of all temporality. In this lies
the dialectical character of consciousness.
The Category of Time and the Theory of Dharma as Temporal
It is in early Abhidharmika literature that we find the first
attempt to understand temporality in non-substantive terms. The
Abhidharmika tradition disregarded the question of the substantive
reality of time as a factor exists as an independent reality which in
them was not whether time exists as an independent reality which in
conjunction with other realities or events constitutes temporal deter-
minations. Their primary concern was to account for the knowledge of
things as temporally determined and that they could do by acknowledg"
ing the reality of dharmas as past, present and future. Thus the
on Jiianaprasthtina declared that everything is real; the
past (atl-ta) and the future (aniigata) are as much real as the present
(pratyutpanna). The theory proposed here does not make any distinc-
tion between things in themselves such as past and future matter, and
the representations one has of them. It is here that we find the realism
of Abhidharmikas present in its most pronounced form. It is not the
reality of past, present and future as three points of time that is posited
by rather, it is the reality of things or dharmas as past,
present and future that is admitted here. Time is no factor in the deter-
mination of things or dharmas as past, present or future. In early
Abhidharmika literature we come across an alternative to Kiilaviidins,
when Abhidharmikas point out that the temporal determinations of
things are built into the very structure of the becomingness of a being.
Thus points out:
55
If all the three have not yet been active, the
dharma is called future. If one of them has already finished its
activity and thus is just active, then the dharma is called present.
If it has already finished its activity, the dharma is called past.
l
It is important to note that early Abhidharmika literature never
considered the determination of a dharma's tempor;;tl quality to be a
function of transcendental eternal time which somehow contains
things in three receptacles of time and is responsible for the temporal
designations of past, present and future. Thus the Mahiivibhii!;a clearly
rejected the option which would seem to suggest that
the svabhava of time is nitya, but the svabhava of the sainskrtadharmas
is a:"itya. The samskrtadharmas wander across the times just as a
frUlt from one pot to another or as man from one house into
another. This is also the case with the sarhiskrtadharmas: going out
of the future they enter into the present, and they go out of the
present and enter into the past.
2
In this rejection of the receptum notion of time is implicit the basic
Buddhist denial of substantiality and permanence, a model set by the
Mahavibhii!;a which is consistently adhered to by Abhidharmikas. All
Abhidharmika statements about the reality of past, present and future
must be interpreted in correspondence with this understanding of
temporal determinations. It is true that in Abhidharmika literature we
come aCrOSS statements to the effect that "dharmas wander across the
three times, that nirva1fa lies beyond the three times; that there exists a
future, a past, etc. ... " But all these statements, as Schayer has already
noted, are expressed in colloquial sense and must be interpreted as
metaphorical statements, rather than literally. Thus in the statement
"each dharma exists in the three times as future, present, and past" the
term "three times" is "consequently only a synonymous denomination
(adhivacana) for sarhskrtadharma."3
Early Abhidharmika literature clearly rejected any distinction
between a dharma and its temporal determination. Temporal deter-
minations, instead of being a function of an eternal transcendent time,
are built into the very structure of the becomingness of a dharma.
Accordingly, they argued that there is no distinction between the
temporality of a dharma and its conditionedness (sarhskrta). What is
given as temporal flow is nothing but an incessant flow of conditioned
56
dharmas, apart from which time does not have an independent reality.
In other words, time consists of conditional dharmas and conditional
dharmas are time, and time is a manifestation of sarhskrta dharmas. The
theory, then, considers time as a mere modality of the conditioned
dharmas, apart from which it does not have any reality.
In view of the above articulation of the Abhidharmika under-
standing of temporality, it is surprising to note a tendency-among some
modern scholars to suggest that the Abhidharmika contributed to a
view of time which conceived time as an ontological reality containing
change. Drawing upon P:ili sources, David J. Kalupahana maintains
that "the Sarvastivada represented a school of realism and ... they
upheld the independent reality not only of things, but also of time."4
John M. Koller agrees with Kalupahana's interpretation of the Sarvasti-
vada and maintains that Nagarjuna's critique of time is "directed
primarily at the Sarvastivadin, who took time to be an ontological
container of change and divided the container into three segments:
past, present and future."5
In the first place, both Koller and Kalupahana are mistaken in
assuming that Nagarjuna's critique of time is directed against the
Sarvastivada. There is nothing in N agarjuna's kiila parik:ja to substanti-
ate their contention that the view of time criticized by Nagarjuna is in
fact the one held by the Sarvastivadins.
6
As a matter of fact, it may be
gathered from the Candrakirti's Vrtti on the Miilamadhyamakiirikii that
the target of Nagarjuna's attack is a certain K:ilavadin who does not
subscribe to the views of Buddha. The K:ilavadin (the upholder of the
reality of time), under attack of Nagarjuna's relentless dialectic, refers
to Buddha as the teacher of his opponents.
7
It is equally interesting to
note that while Nagarjuna specifically rejects the reality of time, his
critique never mentions the concept of dharma that is so central to
Sarvastivada articulation of the problem.
8
In arguing that the Abhidharmika believed in the reality of time
both Koller and Kalupahana seem to be victims of confusion between a
view which takes the reality of things or dharmasas past, present and
future as the ontological givens and a view which accords time a
primary ontological status as the container of things or dharmas. That
the Abhidharmika position is not the latter will be set forth in the body
of the thesis. It may be noted here that there is no evidence from the
Abhidharmika sources to support the contention that the Sarvastivadins
believed in the reality of time. Time as a category is conspicuously
absent from the Sarvastivada scheme of things. Secondly, as we will
57
show, they are primarily concerned with the reality status of dharmas or
elements of existence which are either relegated to a non-actual mode
of existence or which are still to achieve actuality. Accordingly, the
doctrine is primarily concerned with postulating the reality of dharmas
as past, present and future rather than the reality of dharmas in past,
present and future as three distinct slices of time which somehow
contain these dharmas.
The Abhidharmikas attempt to provide a coherent picture of
reality in terms of a whole conceived as a process, at the same time
retaining the uniqueness of the irreducible events which go into the
making of the process. In asserting the reality of all (sarvam asti) ,
Abhidharmikas insisted that dharmas are the ultimate constiuents of all
phenomena, meaning by dharma what is discerned to be existent and
real in all the three temporal phases. The reality, as such, of the conglo-
meration of these dharmas is specifically denied. The basis of this denial
is our experience, which consists only of a succession of dharmas. There
is no warrant from experience to believe that cognition reveals such a
thing as a continuing "being" or "self," the ultimate reference point
being only the discrete dharmas which constitute as such the nature
(svabhava) of reality. Our cognition reveals only the being of dharmas
(svabhava) in the three temporal phases. The existence of dharmas as
past, present and future is cognized without any mutual contradiction,
experience being itself structured in terms of succession. It is signifi-
cant that the Abhidharmikas do not recognize the existence of dharmas
in past, present and future moments of time, but recognize their
existence as past, present and future. There is no transcendental or
empirical time in which real events may be conceived to take place or
reside. Time is not an empty mould in which dharmas are deposited as
they arise, stay and pass away. Time conceived as a transcendental
background of our cognition or as an over-arching receptum of entities
is totally unacceptable to any schoolof Buddhist thought, Abhidharmi-
kas being no exception in this regard. The Abhidharmika discussions
are conducted on the level where the concern is with lived time. The
dharmas are tempoal in the sense of possessing reality by virtue of their
own intrinsic nature in the three modes of temporal existence.
The Cognitive Consciousness and Temporality
The grounds for the reality of dharmas in the past, present and
58
i future mode of being are to be discerned within the framework of the
empirically and realistically slanted epistemology of Sarvastivada. A
careful review of the arguments offered by the Abhidharmikas in
. support of their assertion will serve to highlight the nature of their
orientation to knowledge. The empiricist-realist approach to cogni-
tional experience and its compatibility with the soteriological goal of
realizing freedom (nirvaTfa) are reflected in their arguments. The role
of epistemology is conceived here, in conformity with the general tenor
of Indian philosophy, as ancillary pursuit in the service of soteriology,
and a mutually reinforcing role is assigned to them.
9
According to Abhidharmikas, all cognitions are contingent on
two factors: 10 (a) the objective correlate (v'4aya, alambana) and the (b)
cognizing consciousnes (citta, vijiiana). While sense experience relates
to the cognition or consciousness of the present the mental cognition
refers to past and future objects as well. If past or future objects (v'4aya)
are denied reality, then on this basis, argues the Abhidharmika, there
could arise no cognition produced by the coming together of the v'4aya
and the citta.
The Abhidhatmika seeks support for this common-sense theory
from the "scripture" by referring to the unequivocal statement of
" Buddha to such effect. 11 The postulation of the existence of reals in all
three modes is implicit in this contention of the Buddha, and a denial of
it will amount to the contradiction of the scripture (agamaviruddha) .
.. The upshot of the argument formulated above is the realistic convic-
tion that whatever causes mental cognition must have objective ex-
istence, or be objectively real. 12 There is mental cognition of past and
future dharmas. The crucial datum, here, on which the Abhidharmika
builds or constructs his theory is the fact of the givenness of past and
future dharmas to mental cognition. If they (past and future dharmas)
. are not objectively real, how could there be mental cognition of them?
Were they not real, "knowledge" of them would not be different from
fantasy: their cognition will be non-cognition. A cognition by definition
must have a specific real as its object. 13
Arguing against the position that cognition is possible without the
objective correlate-which is the point of view of Sautrantika-the
Abhidharmika argues: a consciousness (vijiiana) can only be defined
qua "what cognizes" (vijanati vijnanam); if there is no object to be
cognized (vijiieya), then it necessarily follows that no consciousness as
cognition can exist.
The Sautrantika alternative is that a consciousness as cognition
59
may be defined just by the 'mere fact of its being the "illuminating
accompaniment" (bodhiinugama) of all cognitions.
14
There is no
warrant, according to them, for invoking the object of cognition as part
of the definition. To this the Abhidharmika answers in the following
way: the "illumination" itself constitutes the objective correlate of
consciousness as cognition. Cognition is defined as the coming
together of consciousness (vijiiiina) and its objective correlate (rupa,
vedana, etc.). But the two factors (the subjective vijiuina and objective
riipa, vedanii, etc.), acording to the Abhidharmikas, stand on the same
ontological footing in the sense that they are dharmas. As dharmas, they
carry their "own nature" (svabhiiva). The "illuminating" element in the
cognition is the "own nature" (svabhiiva) consciousness (vijiiiina) which
consists of the dharma being objectively real. Thus, illuminating
accompaniment (bodhiinugama) in cognition too is an objective element
which has an independent reality as the svahbava or vijfiana in the
three phases of its existence. This is the thesis of the Abhidharmika.
Consciousness and Transcendence of Temporality
The Abhidharmikas propose a purely functional understanding
of consciousness. Emphasis here shifts from the givenness of conscious-
ness as a transcendental condition of all reflection and cognition to the
very process of the operation of consciousness, conceived as immanent
in the functions of cognition and reflection. Consciousness is not the
mode of being of a self-identical self which, essentially, is a-temporal
and without differentiation and fissuration. Rather, consciousness
(vijiiana) as a dharma is continually changing, is never self-identical; and
as the structure of becoming and causal conditioning it is essentially
temporal. IS Change, differentiation and fissuration are built into the
mode of being of consciousness as a dharma. 16 Temporality, therefore
cannot be overcome by consciousness as long as it is consciousness.
Overcoming of temporality, i.e., transcendence of the realm of
temporal existence implies the overcoming of the fissuration, change
and becomingness of consciousness. But since these are structural to
consciousness, it follows that its transcendence is its dissolution.
Nirvar;a, or freedom, is not the recovery of an original mode of being of
consciousness; it is the dissolution of any mode of being of conscious-
ness. It is extinction of the very structure of the consciousness as flow.
Phenomenologically speaking, the distinction between the
60
overcoming of temporality in the recovery of consciousness and the
dissolution of consciousness is an extremely important distinction.
Losing sight of this distinction will lead to an underestimation of the
basic orientation of the Abhidharmikas. For the Abhidharmikas,
temporality is essentially an imperfection!7 characteristic of finitude,
and ought to be overcome in the mode of being of the non-temporal.
However, the mode of being of the non-temporal has drastically
different implications for the subject as the structure of world involve-
ment. While for Samkhya-Yoga, the subject as pure consciousness
retains its individuated identity and recovers its original mode of being,
for Abhidharmikas the subject must give up its original mode of being
and its individuality in order to attain nirva'l'}ll. N.irva'l'}ll, though eternally
existent and constantly present, is not an original mode of being that
the subject somehow lost and regains. World (samsara) as the structure
of temporal becoming does not share the ontological character of
nirva1fa, which for the Abhidharmikas is eternally existent and beyond
the operation of the forces of conditionedness (sainskrtatva).!8
It is important to be reminded that for Abhidharmika Buddhism,
nirva1fa is not a negative concept; it is not an emptiness either in the
form of an ontological nothingness without any substance or a state of
being which is rendered non-existent on conceptual analysis.!9 Rather,
nirva""rJ,a is a mode of positive being, an eternal existence which is
acquired or reached and Possssed (prapti).20 Nirva1fa is eternally
existent and as a reality it is posited over and against the reality of
temporally determined dharmas. Within the Abhidharmika context, it
is possible to discern a distinction reminiscent of the Samkhya-Yoga
categories of permanence (pariniimi nityata) and eternity (kutastha
nityata). Saintana, or the continuum which, theoretically, is never-ending
and is in that sense "permanent," is not, however, a case of the
overcoming of temporality. 2! Endlessness is not conquest of temporality
at all, but is, rather, a prolongation or perpetuation of temporality'S
defect. Saintana (continuum) may be described as having a temporal
mode of permanence in the sense that its coming to an end is not part of
its meaning as becoming. But this "permanence" of the continuum can
not be ascribed the value of eternity, because it is only continuity of
imperfection (conditionedness), prolongation of non-perfection.
Nirva1fa, on the other hand, is described by Abhidharmika as eternal
(nitya) in a non-temporal sense. As dharma, or reality, nirva1fa is eternity
precisely in the sense that it transcends the mode of imperfection or
conditionedness (sainskr:tatva).22 Nirva1fa is unconditioned and eternal
61
because it is not subject to the operation of the forces of conditioned-
ness, namely, jati, jam, sthiti, etc. 23
As the realm of eternity, nirva7Ja is fullness of spiritual being, a
completedness that constitutes the horizon into which the individual as
subject dissolves. Overcoming of temporality in the present case also is
a function of reflection as a mode of the being of the subjectivity as
consciousness. As reflection, subjectivity is essentially in fellowship
with what is contemplated. Reflection as an act of consciousness
consists of a fellowship of what is contemplated and what contemplates. 24
Contrasted with Samkhya-Yoga, which admits the possibility of
consciousness without content, Abhidharma proposes an essential
reciprocity of the and its content.
In this reciprocity of consciousness and content consists the
essential imperfection of consciousness (samskrtatva), for consciousness
itself is both conditioning and conditioned by other dharmas.
25
Reci-
procity and mutual conditioning also imply reciprocal otherness
between the two. While Samkyha-Yoga recognizes this otherness as the
very condition for freedom, the Abhidharmika holds that the other-
ness must be dissolved. However, the dissolution of the otherness does
not consist in the discerning of an identity overreaching the different,
i.e., the consciousness claiming the object or the content of it as its own
(such would be a case of the inveterate tendency to conceptualize in
terms of being, the satkiiyadnti, which the Abhidharmika rejects). It
consists in the disclaiming of consciousness as well as its content
(visamyoga).26
Thus, the overcoming of temporality, the process of becoming-
ness of the conditioned dharmas (samskrtatva) is essentially the dissolu-
tion of the subjectivity in the mode of otherness. Subjectivity or
consciousness which loses the other: through which alone it can express
itself, loses its subjecthood. Just as the objects that become the posses-
sion of the consciousness are not mere objects, and must be described
as that which belongs to the consciousness (caitesika),27 so consciousness
bereft of its content must completely lose its existing character as
conSCIousness.
Thus, within Abhidharmika scheme, at least two moments in
consciousness can be discerned. Cognition is the mode of claiming of
object as other by the subject. Reflection is the mode of disclaiming this
otherness. It is the realization that all dharmas as conditioned are
essentially on the same ontological footing. It is the realization that
consciousness, as much as its content, is essentially impermanent and
62
conditioned. Reflection as an act of consciousness, then, inevitably
brings about, as it were, a perfect unity of subject and object, but this
unity is nothing other than the abrogation of the subject by its complete
annulment. Temporality surely is overcome through the negation of
the distinction of subject and object. But it must not be forgotten that
this, in turn, entails an overcoming of subjecthood. The eternity of
nirvarJa as the stillness of consciousness (sthita) overcomes the flow of
temporality through complete extinction of consciousness as the
cognitional basis of all temporality. In this lies the dialectical character
of consciousness.
There is another implication of this dialectic of consciousness.
Consciousness, according to the Abhidharmikas, takes the form of the
object that it cognizes. Accordingly the consciousness which cognizes
nirvarJa must also become of the nature of nirvarJa. Consciousness itself
is temporal because it is both conditioning and conditioned. It retains
this character of temporality in its encounter with the objects which
themselves are temporal and conditioned (sarhskrta dharma). But in its
encounter with that which is unconditioned and beyond temporality
and becomingness, consciousness necessarily must lose its own condi-
tionedness and temporality. In other words it must lose its character of
conSCIOusness.
Eternity of nirvarJa in the sense of constant presence, or "eternal
now," within the grasp of consciousness as reflection, brings out the
true soteriological import of Abhidharmika speculation about the
structure of temporal becoming. Here too structural similarity and
thematic congruity with the Samkhya-Yoga soteriology are quite
prominent. For both systems, freedom is not in the future, but it is in
the present. It is not to be realized at some distant moment, when the
temporal process will come to an end. The process of temporal
becoming as the structure of world participation is a given fact, and as a
fact it cannot be annihilated or terminated. It will never come to an
end. The process as fact is permanent (in the temporal sense). Its
termination is not conceivable. Freedom, therefore, necessarily lies in
the present. It is in the temporal present that the nirvar;a can be
attained. It is the present that constitutes the stepping-stone to the
"eternal now." The realization of nirvar;a as eternity is possible
precisely because it is an existent fact. It is not something previously
nonexistent which becomes existent in the present. It is eternally
present and as such is the very opposite of the temporal now which
is constantly moving. But the act of transcendence as an act of
63
conSCIousness IS performed within the compass of this temporal
present.
Concluding Observations
We have attempted to offer a phenomenological perspective on
the Abhidharmika articulation of temporality and its implications for
consciousness. The thrust of the argument was to bring out the
structure of metaphyical transcendentalism as represented in the .
conception of eternity that the system implies. Of pivotal importance to
Abhidarma Buddhism is to analyze the experience of temporality
defined as finitude, and to determine whether or not experiencing
temporality necessarily implies positing a transcendental time as the
receptum of entities. In other words, is temporality an experience of the
flow of entities and events as they are present to consciousness in the
original mode of their limitation, i.e., finitude, or is it an experience of
the flow of entities and events as mediated through a transcendental
principle of time ? We have attempted to show that in the Abhidharmika
system temporality is explained in terms of our experience, which is
radically and essentially a revelation of our immediate contact with the
world of dynamic change and flow, exemplifying finitude. From this
point of view, temporal differentiation is not an appearance to the pure
subject, but enters into awareness as a specific fact in the life-history of
subjectivity as the structure of world involvement.
Thus, from Abhidharmika point of view, any attempt to reduce
temporality to appearance in and for an atemporal consciousness is an
exercise in futility. For a proper understanding of the phenomenon of
temporality, the possibility of experience of temporality for an
atemporal consciousness must be ruled out. The Abhidharmika
position implies that the experience of temporality entails subjectivity
immanent to the structure of world-involvement (the structure of
skandhas, in the case of Abhidharma Buddhism). Subjectivity is
immanent in this structure is always losing its autonomy precisely in the
sense that subjectivity as empirical consciousness is inconceivable
without the content of consciousness. In the mode of being of
subjectivity, the mutual otherness of subject and object or conscious-
ness and its content is constantly and steadily overcome. It is subject to
systematic disapperance. This is what is implied by becoming aware of
something. Awareness or experience, then, in a sense, is this very
64
structure of the "disappearance" of consciousness as consciousness,
i.e., as entailing the otherness of subject and object. This is the mode of
being of empiric consciousness which always is "consciousness of' (citta,
[ruddhi). Phenomenologically speaking, this structure of "disappearance"
of discernible in the experience of temporal becoming
or temporality also provides the due for the transcendence of
temporality. If empirical consciousness loses itself partially in the
experience of temporality, it loses itself completely in the experience of
eternity. This latter is accomplished through self-reflection or critical
reflection as a mode of transcendence which is intrinsic to the very
structure of consciousness as reflection.
NOTES
* The paper was originally delivered at the Second International Association of
Buddhist Studies Conference held at Nalanda on 17-19 January, 1980. The paper has
been revised for the purpose of publication in The Journal of the International Association of
Buddhist Studies.
1. Mahiivibh(4ii, 394a, cf. Schayer, Contributions to the Problem of Time in Indian
Philosophy, Karkowie, 1938, p. 20.
2. Mahavibh(4ii, 393a, cf. Ibid., p. 15.
3. Schayer, op. cit., p. 27.
4. David]. Kalupahana, "The Buddhist Coneption of Time and Temporality,"
Philosophy East and West, Vol. 24, No.2, April 1974, p. 187.,
5. See Kenneth K. Inada, N iigiirjuna: A Translation of His Mulamadhyamakakiirikii,
Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970, pp. 117-119.
6. John M. Koller, "On the Buddhist Views of Devouring Time," Philosophy East
and West, Vol. 24, No.2, April 1974, p. 205.
7. See Niigiirjuna, op. cit., pp. 117-119.
8. See Y. Kanakura, "The Question of Time in Connection of Mi1indapaiiha,
Abhidharma and Madhyamakakiirikii," Osaki Gakaho, Vol. 115, 1962, pp. 1-17. This is
one of the most illuminating papers on the subject. Its special merit consists in its ability to
see the question of time as integral to the ontological question. The relationship of the
Milindapanha to the Abhidharmika tradition has been well brought out.
65
9. It is conceivable that Nagarjuna would have opposed the Sarvastivadin articu-
lation of temporality in terms of the svabhiiva and a dharma. (See infra, p. 208). But no
e;x:plicit rejection of Sarvastivada can be discerned in the Kiilapariksii, nor is there any
claim that Sarvastivadins believed in the independent reality status of time. We tend to
agree with Shoson Miyamoto when he observes: "Nagarjuna agreed with the Sarvasti-
vadins' denial of the existence of time, but opposed their concept of entity-realism
(svabhiivaviida). He drew the conclusion of the nonexistence of time from the Miidhyamika
standpoint of non-substantiality (nihsvabhiivaviida), which was arestatement of the
original Buddhist teaching of non-self." Shoson Miyamoto, "Time and Eternity in
Buddhism," Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Toyko: Vol. 7, No.2, 1959, p. 824.
10. Thus, the Abhidharmika argued that past and future dharmas are real
because the Buddha had taught that an enlightened disciple (iirya-friivaka) becomes
indifferent to past and future material objects (riipa) only by concentrating on their riipas: .
Uktam hi Bhgavatii atitam ched bhiksavo riipam niibhavisyanna srutaviiniiryaSriivako'tite
rupe'napeksobhav4yat. yasmiittahryastyatitam riiq,m tasmiiccrutaviiniiryaSravokotite rupenapekso
bhavati. aniigatam cedriipam nabhavisyai na Srutaviiniirya friivakao'niigatam riipa niibhyana.
ndisyat. yasmiittahryastyaniigatam riipam iti vistarah. Abhidharmkosam, 1972, op. cit., p. 804.
Also, see Sphutiirtha on the above.
11. dvayam pratitya vijiiiinasyotpadah, ityuktam. dvayam katamat caksu riipiini yavat
manodharmii iti. asati viititiiniigate tadiilambanam vijiiiinam dvayam pratitya na syiit. evam
tiivadiigamato'styatitiiniigatam. Abhidharmakosam, 1972, op. cit., p. 804.
12. The vogue of appealing to Buddha vacana for justification of the validity of
statements is comparable to the Brahmanical use of sabda pramii1f-a (testimony as a valid
means of knowledge). It is very difficult to decide which particular use is earlier, but
there is a striking consensus among scholars over the question of the "priority" of the
dIscussion of pramii1f-a at the hands of Buddhist logicians like Vasubandhu, Dignaga and
Dharmakirti. The latter gave rise to the preoccupation with pramii1f-a in the differentsutra
commentarialliterature in Brahmanical Hinduism.
13. See Vasubandhu's Bhiiva on Abhidharmkosa, kiirikii 24. sati v4aye vijiiiinam
pravrtate, niisati. yadi ciititiiniigatam na syiidasadiilambanam vijiiiinam syiit. tato vijiiiinameva na
syad; iilambaniibhiiviit. Abhidharmkosam, op. cit., p. 805.
14. atz-tiijiitayorjiiiinamanyathii'visayain bhavet; Tattvasamgraha, 1788, op. cit., p. 504.
Also see Paiijika on it: prativast urijiiiiptyiitmakam vijiiiinam, asati ca jiieye na kincidanena
jneyamityavijiiiinameva syiit, Ibid., p. 505.
15. Bodhiinugatimiitrena vijiiiinamiti cocyate; Tattvasamgraha, 1849, op. cit., p. 518.
'16. Vijiiiina is a sarhskrta dharma. By definition, sarhskrta dharmas are temporal
(adhva) and impermanent: ta eva sarhskrta gatagacchadgamisyadbhiiviidadhviinah, adyante
nityatayeti vii; Abhidharmakosam, (1970), op. cit., p. 26, adyante' nityatayii bhaksyanta
ityadhviina iti samskrtii eviidhvaSabdena bhagvatii desitiih; SPhu!iirthii Abhidharmakosa Vyiikhyii,
1949, p. 23.
17. "sarhskrta dharmas are called temporal (dhva) precisely because change or
impermanence (anityata) eats them up." Ibid.
18. This is the connotation of the term vikrti, characteristic of phenomena as
modification of prakrti in Samkhya-Yoga. A similar understanding of phenomena, as
constituted of sarhskrta dharma, is present in the Abhidharma literature.
66
19. The question of the existence of nirvii1Ja as a separate dharma not subject to the
. forces of conditionedness has been a matter of controversy between the Sarvastiviidins
and the Sautriintikas. While the Sautriintikas deny that nirvii1Ja exists or is real, Sarviistiviida
;&-firms its reality as a separate dharma. For the details of the argument and counterargu-
ment, see Abhidharmakosam, op. cit., pp. 318-328. Also see SPhu!iirthiiAbhidharmakosa
Vyakhyii, op .. cit., pp. 145-152.
20. "Negativism" as a philosophical doctrine (siinyaviida) is associated with Niigar-
juna, though its "negativity" is increasingly in modern times. Saffikara
criticized it as expressly a negative doctrine (see Samkara's Bh(4ya on Brahma Siitra,
2.2.31). The other exponent of negativism as a viable philosophical doctrine is
Prajiiakarmati, the author of the Paiijika on the Bodhicaryiivatiira of Santideva.
As a paradigm of a negativism implying dissolution through conceptual
analysis may be cited the Advaita Vediinta, according to which the state of being is
rendered in retrospection non-existent by means of conceptual separation of the ground
and the superimposed. see Mandana's Brahmasiddhi, Madras: Madras Law Journal Press,
1932, p. 136ff.
21. Abhidharmkosam, op. cit., pp. 23, 211-212, 319.
22. nityam kuSalam casti dravyiintaram. tadvisamyogascocyate pratisamkhyii (=nirviina)
nirodhasceti sarvamevasamskrtamadravyamiti, Ibid., p. 321.
23. etiini hi samskrtasYa catviiri laksaniini. yatraitiini bhavanti sa dharmalf samskrto
lakryate viparyiidasamskrtalf. Ibid., p. 253.
24. According to Abhidharikas, a citta, manas and vijiiiina are interchangeable
terms for consciousness. Consciousness is always dependent upon what it cognizes: cittam
mano' tha vijiiiinamekiirtha pamcadha, Abhidharmakosam, op' cit., p. 208-209, samprayuktaka-
hetustu cittachaittiih, Ibid., p. 306; also saman alrayo yesiim 'te cittacaitta anyonyam samprayukta-
hetulf, Ibid., p. 307.
25. Cittacaitah sahiivaryam sarva samskrtalaJganf!ih priiptyii, Ibid., pp. 185-186.
26. Visaihyogah Jgayo dhiyii.
Jgayah = nirodhalf dhi = prajiiii. tena pratisamkhyiinirodho visamyogaphalamityuktam
bhavati, Abhidharmkosam, 1970, op. cit., p. 332. .
27. See Abhidharmkosam, 1970, kiirika 23-33 and bhi4Ya on them, Ibid., pp. 186-211.
67
Some Comments on Tsong kha pa's
Lam rim chen mo and Professor Wayman's
Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real!
by Geshe S opa
I
Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the great scholar-yogin and founder of the
dGe lugs pa teaching, whose followers were to reunify Tibet at the time
of the Fifth Dalai Lama, is one of the most important figures in the
history of Tibetan Buddhism and one of the hardest to approach. He
appeared several centuries after another great Tibetan religious
teacher much better known to Western readers, the venerable.
Milarepa. Unlike the charismatic qualities of Milarepa's simple life and
lyricism, which are not lost even in poor, awkward English translations,
Tsong kha pa's thought is often hard to approach even in Tibetan. The
difference is partially in their respective audiences. Milarepa's time saw
a revival of Buddhist learning and activity in Tibet, which continued
unabated right up to the time ofTsong kha pa. By then, however, these
very efforts had produced such an accretion of guru-transmissions,
learned exegeses and yoga practices-often at loggerheads with one
another-that a simple understanding of the thought of the Buddha
and of the great iiciiryas of Buddhism was increasingly hard to arrive at.
Thus,one writing at the time of Tsong kha pa had perforce to address
his works to a Buddhist public that was at once complex and erudite.
Such a writer, in composing any explanation of the teaching of the
Buddhist tripitaka, needed also more or less to follow the traditional
format of rejecting other explanations perceived as objectionable,
establishing his own position, and dispelling anticipated criticism of his
position.
Tsong kha pa traveled widely in Tibet and studied with many of
the most famous teachers of his time, representatives of all the sects of
68
Tibetan Buddhism. Later, he composed his own works, covering all
major phases of Buddhism, both sutra and tantra. In composing these
works, Tsong kha pa had churned the milk-ocean of Indian and
Tibetan Buddhist learning and, like the gods of Indian legend,
brought forth the most precious things, including the amrta-such was
the judgement of many people of his own time and subsequently.
Among Tsong kha pa's major works is the Lam rim chen mo (the
longer "Steps of the Path"), his great manual of Buddhist yoga, a
veritable vade mecum that for size and complexity finds little parallel in
Western religious literature. It looks mainly to the Bodhipathapradipa
(Lamp to the Path to Enlightenment) of Atisa, in which Tsong kha pa
perceived many special virtues, in particular its quality of "holding
level all the teachings of Buddhism, without a slant." A long section
(about 150 Tibetan folios) in the final portion of the Lam rim chen mo is
devoted to "right view," and this section constitutes one of Tsong kha
pa's four main commentaries on the Madhyamika.
2
As a Madhyamika
himself, Tsong kha pa upheld the superiority of the Prasailgika view of
Buddhapalita and Candrakirti, which he especially tried to delineate
dearly for Tibetans, and while he was not the first Tibetan teacher to
maintain the supremacy of the Prasailgika Madhyamika, he was the
{oremost in attempting to clarify it.
II
Professor Alex Wayman's Claming the Mind and Discerning the Real,
3
taken from the Lam rim chen mo, represents the first translation of a
major work of Tsong kha pa into English, and contains Tsong kha pa's
entire section on "right view" together with his immediately preceding
section on the development of one-pointedness of mind, the lhag
mthong (vipaJyarui) and ziti gnas (samatha) sections, respectively. The
translation is of about two hundred folios of the original work's five
hundred. In addition, the translation is provided with a substantial
series of introductory essays and about fifty pages of notes, glossaries
and bibliography. Professor Wayman brings to his work many years of
devoted study and research into his subject-matter, along with a quite
genuine appreciation and understanding of much important auxiliary
material used by Tsong kha pa, and the translator's familiarity with this
material serves to enrich both the translation and the introductory
essays and notes.
69
On the other hand, while the book serves to show some of the
main features of Tsong kha pa's presentation of the meaning of the
Madhymika and the system of meditation based on the siitras, a reader
who cannot refer to the Tibetan original needs often to be extremely
cautious in coping with the sense of this or that specific sentence or
passage, for the translation is quite heavily spotted with misconstruals
of the original, and the introductory essays display some uneveness as
well.
The first essay, "The Lineage, and Atisa's 'Light on the Path to
Enlightenment,'" discusses the guru-transmission of the Lam rim chen
mo and gives a translation of Atisa's Bodhipathapradipa, the Lam rim chen
mo's root text. The translation is especially helpful in placing the topics
of "Calming" (zhi-gnas) and "Discerning" (lhag mthong) in their proper
sequence as steps of the path. This is followed by "The Author of the
Lam rim chen mo," a short biographical essay ably put together from the
works of mKhas grub and bLo bzang bstan pa'i rgyal mtshan dpal
bzang. The next, "Asanga on the Ancillaries of Calming and the Super-
normal Faculties," is principally translation of passages from the
Snivakabhiimi that supplement Tsong kha pa's treatment of "Calming."
"Discursive Thought and the bSam-yas Debate" is a substantial and
important essay on the debate at bSam yas. Professor Wayman
champions Tsong kha pa's view that the debate at bSam yas between
the Indian iiciirya Kamalasila and the Chinese Ch'an master Hva-shang
Mahayana was not an argument between "sudden" and "gradualist"
schools, but dealt with the nature of discursive thought and its role in
meditation. Unfortunately, the final essay, "Tsoil kha pa's Position on
Discerning," while advancing the meaning of the Madhyamika as
middleism, contains two singularly misleading subsections, the "U se of
Buddhist Logic" and "Svabhiiva of the Path." These, instead of guiding
the reader through a rather long and quite important stretch of the
translation, can only serve to confuse him.
Here, the "Use of Buddhist Logic" is simply a misnomer. At the
beginning, Professor Wayman notes that Tsong kha pa "devotes the
first large topic in the 'Discerning' section to determining the principle
to be refuted by considering the 'over pervasion' (ativyiipti, Tib. khyab
ches pa) and 'non pervasion' (avyiipti, Tib. khyab chung pa) of the principle
to be refuted."4 He proceeds to identify these as "fallacies of the reason
(hetu) in earlier Indian logic, which includes the Buddhist logic that was
transmitted to Tibet. ... " 5 While these terms do have a technical
meaning in Buddhist logic, specifically as fallacies involving a non-
70
concomitance between the two terms of a major premise, they also have
()ther meanings, in common usage. These common meanings, like "to
be too broad" or "to be too narrow," are preferable here, as Tsong kha
is not dealing with the khyab pa of the logicians in any way, neither
talking about logical concomitance nor using the notion oflogical con-
comitance to talk about other things. In his discussion of the determina-
tion of the object being denied by the negation entailed by emptiness,
Tsong kha pa states simply that some scholars, by denying that things
exist even conventionally, overextend the negation and make it cover
tOO broad an object, i.e., overpervasionism (khyab ckes ba), w h e r e ~ others,
in failing to deny that things exist by some kind of inherent nature, do
not extent it far enough, i.e., underpervasionism (khyab chung ba).
Much more serious, therefore, is the writer's complete inversion of
Tsong kha pa's actual use of the terms. He says, "the overpervasion,
affirms svabhiiva (self-existence); and the ... nonpervasion, denies
svabhiiva."6 In fact, in Tsong kha pa's use of the terms, overpervasionism
denies svabhiiva and is nihilistic, while underpervasionism fails to deny
svabhiiva properly and is substantialist or eternalist.
7
The difficulty does
not end there, however, for the writer goes on to identify the overper-
vasionists as the realists, including the Yogacarins and Svatantrika
Madhyamikas, and the underpervasionists as "the insider of the
Madhymika, Prasangika school who has quite properly denied svabhiiva
as a principle and then falsely denies svabhiiva in the Buddhist path."s
Again, something more like the opposite is what Tsong kha pa is
saying. In discussing overpervasionism, i.e., nihilism, Tsong kha pa
addresses himself mainly to those Tibetan adherents of the Prasangika
Madhyamika whose svabhiiva-denial is too all-encompassing; and in
discussing underpervasionism he is addressing himself to those
Madhyamikas, again mainly Prasangikas, whose svabhiiva-denial does
not altogether relinquish the notion of existence by way of some kind of
svabhiiva.
The writer's confusion here cannot altogether be explained away
as an effort on his part to bring the overpervasionists and underperva-
sionists into accord with his inversion of their definitions, for as he
notes on page 61, Tsong kha pa "first treats overpervasion in lengthy
fashion (40 folios), then the nonpervasion rather briefly (4 folios)."
Possibly, he has himself taken and overextended a discussion in Tsong
kha pa's treatment of overpervasionism, where Tsong kha pa
compares those Madhyamikas who see some contradiction between
dt';nial of svabhava and acceptance of such dharmas as origination, cessa-
71
tion, sainsiira, nirvii1J-a, etc., as being like the realists, who also see such a
contradiction-a point, incidentally, which is altogether lost in
Professor Wayman's translation. Beyond this, there is litde help from
the translation itself, which is rather to be explained by this essay
instead of the essay's being supported by the translation, for the transla-
tion here is generally so obscure as to who is talking about what that it
may easily leave a reader with considerable uncertainty as to whether
the positions being set fOItL' so unclearly are those of realists, Y ogaca-
rins, or Svatantrika or Prasailgika Madhyamikas. .
III
Tn the [hag mthong, the "Discerning" section of the original, Tsong
kha pa begins his actual discussion of overpervasionism (CMDR, pp.
189-191) by stating its basic positions, arguments and citations from
authority. Tsong kha pa states fairly explicidy that he is setting forth a
view of the meaning of the Madhyamika that was current in his time
and that he considered nihilistic. The basic view is that nothing exists,
and its proofs are the classic Madhyamika arguments of Nagarjuna
against svabhiiva, i.e., that things are not produced from self, other,
both or neither, etc. In appealing to authority, it cites Candrakiiti's
Madhyamakiivatiira and Prasannapadii. All this clearly identifies over-
pervasionism as a kind of Prasailgika Madhyamika viewpoint current
in Tibet in Tsong kha pa's time.
The translation has Tsong kha pa begin his discussion of over-
pervasionism with the following:
The generality of modern-day (i.e., Tibetan) adherents of the
Madhyamika, while setting forth its meaning, say .... 9
In spite of its misconstrual of' dod pa as "adherent," and its misconstrual
of the syntax of smra bar as "while setting forth," the passage more or
less translates the sense of the original, and such tiny falts should barely
deserve comment, did not the accumulation of many such small
misconstruals, along with some major ones, obscure the sense of much
of the original discussion here. The passage should read something
like the following: 10
72
Nowadays, the majority who wish to explain the meaning of
the Madhyamika say ... .u
In what follows, most other such minor obscurantist mistranslations
that do not seriously damage the sense of the passage will not be noted,
as the reviewer wishes to comment on those that do, and to do so
without becoming too long.
The. discussion continues by stating that the overpervasionist
position h ~ l d s t h ~ t nothing can withstand scrutiny by t ~ e reason that
examines Its realIty, because not even an atom can wIthstand such
scrutiny and, as the translation puts it,
.... because when one refutes all the four alternatives of "it
exists," "it does not exist," etc., there is no unconstructed nature
(asainskrta-dharma) therein (i.e., in the four alternatives). 12
Here, apparently, ma 'dus pa'i chos has been misconstrued as 'dus ma byas
chos (asainskrta-dharma), but the passage should read something like:
.... because by rejection of all four alternatives, "it is," "it is not,"
etc., there is no dharma that is not included in those (four alterna-
tives).13
The translation continues:
Moreover, when with the noble knowledge that sees reality one
sees that there is no (dharma) whatever of birth and decease,
bondage and liberation, etc., then it must be the case as
authorized by that (noble samiipatti), so there is no birth, etc. 14
Here, aside from the misconstrual of gzhal as "authorized," the transla-
tion mainly fails to take into account the syntactical ambiguity in med par
gzigs pa, which forms the basis for discussion later (p. 217), where med
par gzigs pa vs. ma gzigs pa is a moot point, and consequently it might
better be translated something like:
73
Moreover, since production, passing away, sainsara, nirva7fa, etc.,
are perceived as not at all existent by the arya's gnosis that
perceives reality, there is no production, because it (production,
etc.) ought to be as understood by that (arya's gnosis).15
The translation continues:
If one claims that there is birth, etc., then either it can withstand
or not withstand the examination with a principle that examines
the reality in that case. In the event it can withstand (that examina_
tion), there would be (proved) explicitly as true that there is an
entity which withstands the examinati(m by the principle. In the
event it cannot withstand that examination, how could it be valid
that there exists an entity countered by the principle?16
While it is not important that the first sentence is a question, syntactiCal
misconstruals reduce the second sentence to bare redundancy, which
loses the definition it is setting forth; of the third there is little criticism.
The passage should read something like:
If one accepts production, etc., does it or does it not withstand
scrutiny by the reason that examines its reality? If it withstands,
then it becomes a real entity, by virtue of being an entity that
withstands scrutiny by (such a) reason. 17 If it does not withstand
scrutiny, how can one admit the existence of an entity that is
repudiated by the reason? 18
The translation continues:
Accordingly, if one claims an existence of birth , etc., it is either
proved or not proved by an authority. In the first case (i.e.,
proved by an authority), since it is proved by that knowledge
(=arya-samapatti) which sees reality (directly), it is not valid that it
sees the nonexistence of birth. If it is claimed to be proved by the
cognition of the conventional eye, etc. (ear and so on), it is refuted
that they constitute an authority, because the Samadhiraja-sutra
shows as invalid that they (eye, etc.) serve to prove (form, etc.), as
in this passage (IX, 23): "(The perception based on) eye is not an
authority (pramarpa), nor are (the perceptions based on) ear, nose,
tongue, body, and mind authorities. If these (perceptions based
on) sense organs were authorities, who would need to resort to
the Noble Truth!" 19
Again, the first sentence ought to be a question. However, the second
sentence of the translation completely inverts the sense of the original,
for according to the view Tsong kha pa is setting forth as pUrvapakja
(i.e., a view to be criticized), the arya's gnosis validates, not invalidates,
the nonexistence of production. Particularly objectionable in the final
sentence before the quotation is the gloss, "(form, etc.)" in "they they
(eye, etc.) serve to prove (form, etc.) .... " This gloss is quite gratuitous
and misleading, and the same may be said about glossing the quotation
74
the Samiidhiriija-sutra with "(the perception based on)." The
,passage is quite complete as it stands without these glosses, and the
. objects for which they do not constitute an avenue of validity are simply
not stated. In fact, the whole question here, and later on, is just exactly
for what objects they do not constitute an avenue of validity, i.e., their
respective sense-objects or reality itself? The Samiidhiriija quotation
itends, even on the surface, clearly to favor the latter, and would do so in
"English, had not the translator misconstrued phags pa'i lam as "Noble
,Truth" rather than correctly translating it as "Noble Path," for again
the reference is to the iirya's gnosis that directly perceives reality. We
would translate the passage somewhat as follows:
Likewise, if one accepts that there is a production, etc., is it
established by an avenue of validity, or is it not so established? If
the former, then since no origination is seen by the gnosis that
perceives reality, it cannot be admitted as established by that
(gnosis); but if one accepts it as established by the conventional
consciousness of the eyes, etc., these are inadmissible as an avenue
of validity in the Samiidhiriija-siitra: "The eyes, the ears, the nose
are not an avenue of validity; the tongue, the body, the mental-
consciousness are not an avenue of validity, either. If these sense
qrgans were an avenue of validity, what need has anyone for the
Aryan Path?" 20
The translation continues:
And also because the Avatiira (=Madhyamakiivatiira, VI, 31a)
states, "The world with its multitudinous aspects is not an
authority." The claim that it exists although not proved by an
authority is not held by us, and since it is not a principle it is
(highly) invalid. If one claims there is birth, while denying it in an
absolute sense, it is necessary that he claim it so in a conventional
sense, but this is not proper, because this passage of the Avatiira
(VI, 36) states that the principle by which birth is denied in the
absolute sense, also denies it conventionally: "By whatever
principle in the phase of reality there is no reason for birth from
oneself or from another, by that principle there is no reason for it
conventionally. Therefore, how can there be your -birth I 21
In the Avatiira quotation, "with its multitudinous aspects" is an indefen-
sible translation of mam kun, "all its aspects." Aside from the fact that
kun can mean only "all" and never "many," only something like "in all
its aspects" can communicate the necessary ambiguity as to whether
75
rnam kun signifies "in every aspect" or "in any aspect," which is a moot
point later on (p. 221). Confronting this problem on page 221, the
translator changes his translation of the same passage to "by all means,
the world is not an authority," and if one has to choose between a
correct translation of kun or rnam, this is better. The next sentence has a
slight syntactical problem in failing to assimilate the 'dod pa to 'dod pas
on account of the cing. The next sentence again completely inverts the
sense of the original by "but that is not proper," which makes it say the
opposite of the original's meaning. Finally, the translation of the
Avatiira quote does not distinguish between the noun rigs pa, meaning
"reason," or "a reason," and the verb rigs pa, "to be true," or "to be
right," and this creates a slight obscuration. We would translate the
passage somewhat as follows:
Also, because the Avatiira says, "The world in all its aspects is not
an avenue of validity." To accept that it (production, etc.) exists,
even though it is not established by an avenue of validity, is
inadmissible, because even you will not accept that, and because it
is illogical. If, in accepting production, one has to accept it
conventionally because one cannot accept it as an ultimate, this is
not right, because the Avatiira says that the reason that rejects
production as an ultimate also rejects it as a phenomenon: "By
what will your production become existent if it is false even
conventionally by the reason that origination from a self or other
is untrue by whatever line of reason one examines its reality?"22
The translation continues:
And also because a thing does not arise from itself, from another,
and so on-four in all-so if one claims that it arises, he counters
by imagining the four alternatives to be a refutation of birth in the
absolute sense and so do not disallow (birth); but (the f o ~ r alterna-
tive means) there is no birth of them at all. Suppose there were
birth from a particular one of the four alternatives, and denying
three of them, suppose it were necessary to be born from another
thing-that is not proper, because the Avatiira states (VI, 32d):
"Even according to the world the birth is not from another."
Therefore, when refuting birth, one should not apply the special
feature of paramiirtha, because the Prasannapadii refutes the
application in particular of paramiirtha. 23
The first sentence contains numerous syntactical misconstruals, which
are not commented on, because the main difficulty is that in lieu of a
76
''careful construal of the original, the translator simply has superimposed
upon it a completely wrong sense, and is making Tsong kha pa repre-
sent the overpervasionists as showing their own criticism of an
essentially Svatantrika position, which they are not even remotely
referring.to. So far in this section, Tsong kha pa has been showing the
arguments of the overpervasionists by way of dichotomy; and he
to do so here. Just above, the overpervasionists have shown
their criticism of accepting production by means of an avenue of
validity (pramii1Ja). Now, if someone is still accepting production, etc.,
just conventionally, he still confronts the problem of the tetralemma,
i.e., it exists, it does not exist, it both exists and does not exist, it neither
exists nor does not exist. So, again, dichotomizing: if one accepts even a
conventional production, it either fits into the tetralemma or is outside
it. If it is outside it, which is to say that there is a middle ground among
the four alternatives, then production as an absolute or ultimate cannot
be repudiated by the tetralemma, and this, of course, is unacceptable to
Tsong kha pa's opponents' opponents, who are Madhymikas. On the
other hand, if a conventional production is accepted as within the
tetralemma, then the only that will be admitted is a conven-
tional production from another, for all schools of Buddhism but the
PcisaIigika do admit some kind of production from another while
rejecting the other three alternatives; but even a conventional produc-
tion from other is rejected by the leading exponent of the Prasangika
school, the ricrirya Candrakirti. So, without commenting further on the
translation of this passage, we simply give our own translation as some-
.' thing like the following:
77
Moreover, if one accepts production even if it is not produced
from any of the four alternatives, "from self," "from other," etc.,
the rejection of production as an ultimate becomes a non-rejection,
by denying it within the four alternatives, because there is
production that is none of these. If (you allow) production from
one of the four alternatives, by not accepting the other three,
production must be from other; and this is false, for the Avatara
says, "There is not even a conventional production from
another." Therefore, one should not put the designation,
"ultimate," on the denial of production, because the Prasannapadii
repudiates putting this designation of "ultimate." 24
The translation of this section concludes:
In this matter also, some assert that they do not admit birth,
etc., even conventionally; and some claim that there is (birth, etc:)
conventionally. But all agree with a principle in refuti.ng for the
dharmas a self-existence produced by own-nature, because while
this acarya's school does not affirm and ,then deny, he simultane_
ously refutes the production by self-existence in the sense of both
truths. If that is the way there is no self-existence, then what (else)
is there? Therefore, the special application of paramiirtha to the
refutable principle is now explained with special clarity to be only
the school of the Madhyamika-Svatantrika.
25
We have no criticism of the translation of the first sentence, butthe
second, in addition to various syntactical misconstruals, mistranslates
bsnyon, "to deny the apparent," as "to affirm and then deny"; "simul-
taneously" is gloss, and should be bracketed as such. We have no criticism
of the third sentence. In the fourth, "application in particular"
mistranslates khyad par sbyor, as "refutable principle" does dgag bya, and
"with special clarity" does mgring pa bsal nas; "now" is again gloss and
ought to be bracketed. In particular, the loss of the picturesque quality
of mgring pa bsal nas, along with the interpolation of "now," may leave
the reader with an ambiguous impression of this sentence that
concludes the discussion of the positions of overpervasionism, for it
may appear that Tsong kha pa is saying that in the next section he
himself will "now" explain "with special clarity" that the qualification of
a negation by "it does not exist 'as an ultimate'" is just the school of the
Svatantrika Madhyamika; however, this is just the conclusion of the
setting forth of the positions of the overpervasionists. We would
translate the passage somewhat as follows:
Here also some state that origination, etc., is inadmissible as a
phenomenon, and others that it is existent phenomenally, but all
say that in the school of this acarya (Candrakirti) there is no
denying the obvious that the (above) reason rejects that dharmas
have an inherently existent nature, because in both truths he
rejects an inherent nature. Thus, if there is no nature, what else is
there? Therefore, dearing their throats, they expatiate that a
qualification of the negated thing by ("it does not exist") "as an
ultimate" is the system of just the Svatantrika Madhyamika.
26
This concludes Tsong kha pa's laying out of the positions of the
overpervasionists, and even from this much it ought to be quite dear
that he is dealing only with a school of interpretation of the Prasarigika
Madhyamika, and in no way with realism, etc.
78
IV
Tsong kha pa's discussion now shifts to his own criticism of the
above positions, and the translation gives the new topic headings:
(2) SHOWING THAT THE THESIS IS NOT VALID
This has two parts: (a) Showing that the special refutation of
dharma by that school is not common to the Madhyamika .... 27.
"Showing that the thesis is not valid" is partly gloss, and should be
indicated as such by brackets. The original merely states, "Showing that
this is inadmissible." Also, in supplying the gloss of "the thesis," why not
"the theses," since many theses have been set forth and are treated later
one by one? This is a minor point; more serious is the syntactical
misconstrual, "Showing that the special refutation of dharma by that
school is not common to the Madhyamika." This should read
something like, "Showing that this school repudiates a special feature
unique to the Madhyamika." This special feature of the Madhyamika is
the first main topic of the new discussions that these headings have
served to introduce.
Introducing this topic of the special feature, or dharma, of the
Madhyamika, Tsong kha pa begins his discussion by quoting a dedication
by Nagarjuna extolling the two sublime bodies, or aggregates of illus-
trious qualities, of a Buddha, which are the final result of the double
accumulation, of wisdom and merit. Tsong kha pa then comments in a
brief passage that the attainment of these resultant two bodies, the
rupaktiya and dharmakiiya, is possible only through the path that joins
wisdom (prajiiaj and method (upaya); and the joining of wisdom and
method, in turn, is possible only through a proper understanding of
the two truths. The conclusion of this passage Professor Wayman
translates:
Accordingly, a) the method of establishing the basic view that
does not mistake the essential causal path for attaining both
bodies in the phase of the fruit, and b) the method of establishing
the view that depends on that (basic view) achieve the (two)
certainties in the two truths as just explained.
28
Again, on account of some syntactical problems, the sense of the
original has become slightly inverted, and we would translate it rather
something like:
79
Thus, inasmuch as not mistaking the essentials of the path (that is)
the cause of obtaining the Two Bodies at the time of its fruition is
dependent on the method of establishing the view of the funda_
mentals (on which the path and its final result rest), and the
method of establishing the view is getting ascertainment of the
two truths as just explained. 29
There follows immediately a quite important passage, which
Professor Wayman translates:
Except for this kind of Madhyamika, what manner of other
person who observes (only) the gathering of refutation and is
ignorant of holding the irrefutable, would be called a Madhyamika
skilled in possession of broad and possessed of
subtle learning! Thus, the one skilled in the means of compre-
hending the two truths, who is established without even a
question of refutation, and resorts to achieving the ultimate
purport of the Victor, engenders wondrous devotion to his
teacher and the Teaching and gains understanding guided by the
pure voice and words that tell him again and.again the mysterious
words: the meaning of the voidness which is void of self-existence
is the meaning of dependent origination, but is not the meaning
of absence void of efficiency (arthakriyakiiritua).30
The translation of this passage is singularly garbled by numerous
syntactical misconstruals and by misconstruals of a number of words,
i.e., 'gal, "to be contradictory," as "to refute"; 'chad, "to say" or "to
explain," as "to hold"; 'gal ba'i dri tsam, "the slightest smell of contra-
diction," as "even the question of refutation"; shad gsangs, "dear voice,"
as "mysterious words"; and sgrags, "to make a big sound" or "to
proclaim loudly," as "to tell." In particular, the mistranslation of 'gal,
"to be contradictory," is most harmful to the sense ofthis passage, and
of others later (e.g., p. 200),31 which set forth some ofthe key ideas of
Tsong kha pa's position. The passage ought to be translated something
like:
80
Here even anybody else, except a Madhyamika, on seeing the
contradictory brought together, will not know how to explain it as
not contradicting, but a master possessing a subtle, keen and very
far-reaching wisdom, (our) so-called "Madhyamika," by his skill
in the method of understanding the two truths, establishes
(denial of self-existence and acceptance of origination, etc.)
without the faintest scent of contradiction; he discovers the final
purport of the Jina; and by having recourse to that (final
purport), he proclaims again and again a high, clear voice,
with pure words brought forth by the bIrth of a wondrous
devotion to the Teacher and the Teaching, "You who have under-
standing! The meaning of emptiness which is void of self-existence
is dependent origination, but its meaning is not a nonentityness
devoid of the capacity to do work!"32
This non-contradictoriness between denial of and
acceptance of dharmas like production, passing away, etc., which is
based on the equivalence of absence of self-existence and dependent
origination (i.e., cause and effect), is one of the cardinal features of
Tsong kha pa's own views as a Madhyamika, and with it he proceeds at
length to counter one by one the positions of the overpervasionists, all
of which are on the side of nihilism.
v
When, later, he finishes with overpervasionism, Tsong kha pa
turns to a brief consideration of underpervasionism.
Like the overpervasionists, the underpervasionists are also
exegetes of the meaning of the Madhyamika. Tsong kha pa categorizes
them as underpervasionists because instead of negating that things
exist by virtue of a self-existence (svabJuiva) that is established by an
own-entityness (svariipa), they merely deny a nature (svabJuiva) that is
uncaused, unchanging and non-relative. Tsong kha pa argues that
since the lower schools of Buddhism already understand that origina-
ting things are not uncaused and unchanging, what need is there for the
Madhyamika to deny existence by way of self-existence (svabhava) ifit
means only that?
The translation says here:
Accordingly, when insiders (i.e., the Sautrantikas,
etc.) hold that constructed natures (sainskrta) are generated by
causes and conditions, if it is not required for them (i.e., those
insiders) to comprehend that entities lack self-existence, with that
(your determination) where is the unshared refutable (pertaining
to the view that comprehends voidness)!33
This has many syntactical misconstruals, and should read something
like:
81
Thus, inasmuch as our own schools already understand that
conditioned things are produced by causes and conditions, there
are these objections, that there would be no need to prove no self-
existence to them, and that they also would understand that
things are without self-existence, etc.; therefore, how can that
(kind of nature) be the object of (the Madhyamika's) unique
denial?34
However, Tsong kha pa's main criticism of this underpervasionist
view is that it does not go nearly deep enough to uproot the innate
nescience that is the basis for clinging to the two kinds of self, i.e., of
persons and of dharmas, this clinging being the bond that ties all
sentients to the round of suffering existences (sainsiira). Toward the
end of this section, Tsang kha pa has this same criticism of another
kind ofunderpervasionist view, which is essentially that oftheJo nang
pa, who adhered to a kind of extreme realism, in particular with regard
to the ultimate truth.
Consequently, as the underpervasionists are Madhyamikas dearly
not on the side of nihilism, it is difficult to understand the translator's
placing them there in his essay on the "Use of Buddhist Logic."
According to Tsong kha pa's view of the extremes, the extreme of
nihilism is to hold that things do not exist at all, whereas the extreme of
eternalism is to hold that things exist by an own-entityness. On page
258 of the translation, Tsong kha pa comments on a quotation from
Candraklrti:
In this context, the existence and non-existence of the entity was
explained previously when speaking of the two possibilities, to
wit, it exists with its own-form or it doesn't exist at all.
Since "possibilities" is an unbracketed and misleading gloss, and gnyis
su smra ba has been misconstrued, we would prefer to see this translation
something more like the following:
Here, as explained above in the section on the adherents of the
two (extremes), entity and nonentity are (respectively) "existing
by an own-entityness" and "not existing at all."35
Elsewhere, Tsang kha pa defines the side of nihilism as holding that
things do not exist even nominally, and the side of eternalism as
holding that they exist as ultimates.
82
Still more difficult and misleading is the statement in the "Use of
Buddhist Logic," "Under the nonpervasion [i.e., our 'underpervasion-
ism'], Tsong kha pa places the insider of the Madhyamika, Prasangika
school who has quite properly denied svabhiiva as a principle and then
falsely denies svabhiiva in the Buddhist path; i.e., takes it as the
refutable of the path." 36 As indicated above, in Tsong kha pa'syiew the
underpervasionist has not properly denied svabhava, and it is Tsong
kha pa himself who takes the proper refutation of svabhava as the main
object of understanding in the Buddhist path, as follows.
Having indicated his view that the underpervasionist does not go
far enough in his denial of svabhiiva, Tsong kha pa proceeds to show
that the mere denial that phenomenal things have any uncaused and
unchanging nature encounters also a problem with dharmatii (empti-
ness, or the ultimate truth), which is the final nature (svabhiiva) of any
and all dharmas, which is itself uncaused and unchanging, and which is
the principal object of meditation on the Buddhist path. In the
"Svabhava of the Path," Professor Wayman notes, "Small wonder that
the Miidhyamika school should be misunderstood, when it vigorously
rejects the svabhiiva that is something to establish by the mundane
reasoning, and then upholds the svabhiiva that is something to realize in
Yoga attainment." 37 In Tsong kha pa's treatment of this subject, there
is no inconsistency here, for it is not that something called svabhiiva is
first being denied on all phenomenal things and then the same thing
called svabhva is later being affirmed on the ultimate truth, or dharmata,
for the denial that things exist by way of an own-nature (svabhavatiis-
siddha) is not to deny that they lack all logical definition or nature
(svabhiiva) as well.
Consequently, when svabhiiva is denied, what is being denied is
rang gi ngo bos grub pa, "existence by an own-entityness," or rang bzhin
gyis grub pa, "existence by an own-nature" (i.e., by svabhiiva). These are
identified by Tsong kha pa as the essential object of negation for the
Madhyamika in many passages, including that immediately following
the one cited above: " ... this (preceding) is not the (Madhyamika's)
unique object of negation. (But), if one establishes a nature which exists
by an own-entityness .... " Other synonyms are also used, mainly, don
dam par grub pa, "existence as an ultimate," yang dag par grub pa,
"existence as a true thing," and bden par grub pa, "existence as a real."
The existence of a nature establishable by an own-entityness Tsong kha
pa denies for all dharmas, and for dharmatii as well, as will be shown later
on. On the other hand, the svabhiiva that is affirmed on dharmatii is its
83
nature of uncausedness, its nature of unchangingness, its nature of
being the final nature of all dharmas, etc. In precisely the same sense, all
dharmas have their respective natures (svabhiiva), like fire its nature of
hotness, water its nature of wetness, all dharmastheir final nature of
dharmatri, etc.
In discussing this affirmation of svabhiiva, Tsong kha pa cites and
comments on a passage from Candrakirti, translated by Professor
Wayman as follows:
"By svabhriva one understands this innate nature, uncreate, which
has not deviated in the fire in the past, present, and future; which
did not arise earlier and will not arise later; which is not
dependent on causes and conditions as are the heat of water, (one
or another) of this side and the other side, long and short. Well
then, does this own-nature of fire that is of such a manner (i.e.,
uncreate, nor dependent) exist? (In reply:) This (svabhiiva of such
sort) neither exists nor does not exist by reason of own-nature.
While this is the case, still in order to avoid frightening the
hearers, we conventionally make affirmations (such as 'svabhiiva'
and 'dharmatri') and say it exists." Thus that svabhiiva is said
conventionally to exist, after its accomplishment by own-nature
was denied. Now, while that represents to teach with designations
so as to avoid frightening the hearers, does that not contradict the
ricrirya himself? (In reply:) That is not right, because it is necessary
(to avoid frightening the hearers); in fact all other dharmas as well
are expressed by designations, because they are (all) nonexistent!38
Of the many misconstruals involved in the translation of the above, by
far the most unfortunate is the total inversion of Tsong kha pa's
meaning on such a crucial point, and the passage should read
somewhat as follows:
84
"That (heat) of fire, which is the uncreate, inherent and nondelu-
sory nature of fire even in the three times, which is not something
that arises later not having arise before, (and) which does not
have a dependence on causes and conditions like the heat of
water, this side and that side, and the long and the short, that is
said to be svabhiiva. If it is asked, 'What? Does something exist that
is like the nature of fire?' it is neither so that it exists by an own-
entityness nor is it so that it does not exist. So it is, but notwith-
standing, in order to dispel the alarm of a hearer, we say it exists
conventionally by imputation." Thus it is stated that this nature
(svabhiiva), having been denied as existing by an own-entityness,
exists nominally. If, on account of the statement that is shown by
imputation in order to dispel the alarm of a hearer, one thinks it is
not being accepted as existent, this would be incorrect, because
other dharmas would become nonexistent as well, since they are
also stated as imputations for this purpose.
39
Finally, in concluding this discussion, Tsong kha pa brings these
twO together, for that svabhiiva which is both the ultimate truth and the
final nature of all dharmas is just the non-existence of all things by an
own-entityness (and this includes the ultimate truth, paramartha satya,
itself), for the meaning of the ultimate truth does not go beyond just
this absence of existence by way of svabhiiva. He first discusses briefly
this kind of ultimate truth as understood conceptually, whereby
phenomenal things are known as empty, i.e. dharmas are the loci of
emptiness as an attribute-this way of understanding emptiness is
called "the imputed ultimate truth"; then he shows the same emptiness
as understood by yogic direct-perception, in which the dharmic locus
(i.e., the phenomenal thing) does not appear:
Now (in considering emptiness), dharmas have an emptiness
that is the emptiness of self-existence (and) that is established as
the nonexistence of even an atom establishable as a nature
existing by an own-entityness, and because (this emptiness) is an
attribute that takes (the dharmas of) form, etc., as a locus, both of
these as the object of a single discernment is not contradictory;
and, since there is no turning away of this appearance as two (i.e.,
attribute and locus of attribute), this emptiness is the imputed
ultimate truth.
Whenever by acclimitization to this view that understands the
absence of self-existence-in the face of perceiving directly this
object (i.e., emptiness)-there is no seeing of these loci of form,
etc., by the knowledge that directly perceives this reality, because
every illusory appearance wherein the absence of a self appears as
a nature is turned away. Inasmuch as, in the fact of this discern-
ment, there is not both a reality of this kind and a locus, this
positing of both, a reality and its locus, has to be established from
the point of view of another conventional way of discerning. Thus
ultimate truth is set forth as just the turning away of any illusion
of false appearances whereby things, while being without a self-
existence, appear so (i.e., as self-existent), (this) in addition to its
being free of any illusion of an own-entityness, and therefore,
when one accepts that, what need is there for accepting a self-
existence that is established as an entity?40
Here, to avoid a complete loss of continuity in our own discussion, we
have included only our own suggested translation. We find it
85
preferable to Professor Wayman's translation, on page 258, where he
has glossed Tsong kha pa's own view as the position of opponents.
Professor Wayman's version is included in the notes.
41
From the above, it should be clear thatsvabluiva, in the sense of a
nature existent by its own-entityness, is the very object that Tsong kha
pa accepts as the primary object of negation on the Buddhist path, and
a writer composing an essay on "Tson kha pa's Position on Discerning"
need not look much farther than that. Consequently, the search by the
sub-essay, on "Svabluiva of the Path," for a positive meaning for Tsong
kha pa's view of the ultimate truth, called a svabluiva, is misled and
misleading. In particular, the writer's effort at identification of this
svabluiva as "name-and-form" brings together two incompatible passages
from Asvaghosa and Asanga, in only the former of which "mune-and-
form" functions as one of the members of the chain of dependent
orgination, whereas in the latter passage it is something quite different.
Likewise, the assertion that "the svabluiva which is here alluded to as
'name-and-form,' or the reality which is the object of discerning
(vipaJyana) , is also referred to in this literature as the 'true nature'
(dharmatii) , " 42 also brings together certain similar things without noting
their important differences, for the various schools of Buddhism have
a variety of views on such subjects as "name-and-form," vipasyanri,
dharmatii, etc. Tsong kha pa's own position on "Discerning" is that of a
Madhyamika, which all these eclectic speculations do not help clarify.
"The Middle View," the remaining sub-essay in "Tson kha pa's
,Position on Discerning," states that it is often held that the Prasangika
rejects all views and has none of its own, and that according to Tsong
kha pa there is a great misunderstanding here. This seems very correct,
as Tsong kha pa has devoted many pages to this subject, and comments
at length on many of the key passages in Candrakirti from which the
notion that the Madhyamika has no view has arisen. Professor Wayman
goes on and develops the idea that while the Madhyamika definitely
has a position of its own, it delineates this position negatively by
rejecting other positions, and refutes an opponent without putting
forth its own position. Here, it is a bit unclear whether this means to say
that the Madhyamika never advances a thesis and always defines its
own positions negatively; or whether it means that the Madhyamika,
even when it refutes another position without setting forth a position of
its own, has a position even at that time, and might on another occasion
set forth its position. At any rate, the former will fmd little support in
the "Discerning" section, whereas the latter will fmd many passages
86
supporting it. We refrain from looking at any more passages, as we
already have become rather long, and should conclude.
VI
As a writer, Tsong kha pa contributed valuable innovations to the
style of Tibetan philosophical writing. He looked past his contempo-
raries to the older Tibetan writers and translators, whose style he made
more congenial to contemporary scholars and, in a sense, updated.
Both his thought and his style are clear and lucid, although given an
often quite difficult subject matter, are hard to approach at first. His
sentences are often turgid, as well as long and periodic, and his Tibetan
requires that great attention be given to his constructions. Too great a
looseness in dealing with Tsong kha pa's sentence construction is the
single greatest problem in Professor Wayman's translation. Not only
has it often led to obscure and misleading translations, but other
qualities and nuances of the original, like a greater sharpness in
presentation, or a greater profundity, or deference, or humor, or
rhetorical exaggeration, etc., have generally disappeared into a mono-
tone. Sometimes, the most explicit of these have been recolored, e.g., the
following, from Candrakirti: "(The Madhyamika replies with compas-
sionate interjection.) Alas! Because you are without ears or heart you
have thrown a challenge that is severe on us!" The actual reading
should be something more like, "Ouch! The hardship of an argument
by one without ears or wits (i.e., a blockhead) has landed on me!" Also,
isn't "nescience's caul" a little too strong for "nescience's defective
vision" (rab rib)?
Many Tibetan words have a common meaning as well as a special
meaning in Buddhist philosophy. There is a tendency on the part of
the translator to give too little attention to context and consequently to
overlook the common meanings of these contingently technical words,
and this had led to many mistranslations. The problem of taking over-
pervasion and underpervasion as technical logical terms has already
been mentioned. In another passage (p. 285), on account of yul thams
cad du, a passage that ought to read, "However, the direct perception of
(smoke and fire in the kitchen) does not establish a concomitance
{between smoke and fire) everywhere," becomes, "so when there is (smoke,
directly perceived) in all the sensory domain (v4aya), there is no (demon-
stration of pervasion of smoke by fire). A little further down, Professor
87
Wayman translates, "Also, there is no (demonstration of that pervasion
connection) by inference, because it (the authorityofinference)jinnly
decides the object (vi.<;aya), as is now shown. The object of inference (as
an authority) is the qualified negation oj all." Here, nges pa can and tharns
cad ma yin respectively are at fault, and the passage should read
something like, "Likewise, inference does not establish a concomitance
either, because, again, its object is particularized. Thus, the object of an
inference is not all (comparable instances)."43
Sometimes, because of 'gog and other such words that mean,
among other things, "to refute," and sometimes because of glosses,
much of the "Discerning" section has too many "refutations," "refuta-
bIes," "opponents," "antagonists," etc., and reads like a very long
debate on obscure points whose purport the general reader will most of
the time be at a loss to discover. On the other hand, the most patient
and determined reader, who is willing to put up with the inevitable
idiosyncracies of any translator's translationese in dealing wi.th a work
of this kind, will leave the book much less well-rewarded for his pains
than he ought to be, because the sense of the original simply isn't there
much of the time.
Notwithstanding these numerous faults, such translations,
especially those dealing with the Madhyamika, have had a long and
honorable history in the development of Western Buddhist scholar-
ship, especially in pioneer works, and Professor Wayman's translation
is indeed a pioneer work. As both the rhetoric and dialectic of the West
and of India-Tibet have developed so differently, each presents its own
distinctive difficulties in the translation of any Tibetan philosophical .
work into English. When a translator essays a translation of the
"Discerning" section of the Lam rim chen mo, all the problems of
translating every kind of text converge on him at once, for not only is
the subject-mater often quite difficult, but so too can be the styles of the
innumerable quotations from authorities, ranging in types and periods
of literary composition over a period of more than fifteen hundred
years. In addition, Western Buddhist scholarship has produced to date
little reliable translation of the historical classics of the Madhyamika,
and Tibetan-English and other lexicons frequently fail to show the
meanings of Tibetan words as used in many classes of religio-philo-
sophical texts, the terminology of the Madhyamika, Prajiiaparamitii
and logic being particularly poorly represented in such dictionaries.
However, the greatest difficulty of all is perhaps the mainstream
Western interpretive tendency to explain the sense of the Prajiiapara-
88
rnici and the Madhyamika as atotal rejection of conventional reality in
favor of some kind of bare non-dual knowledge, with Nagarjuna's
criticism of the svabhiiva of dharmas taken to mean a wholesale
repudiation of dharmas and abhidharma altogether.
Professor Wayman's translation has avoided this in providing
another important hermeneutical option by making available for the
first time a major philosophical work by one of the foremost Tibetan
exponents of the Madhyamika. Professor Wayman is to be congratulated
for his long labor in translating and publishing a work which-not-
withstanding its numerous faults in translation-may still give many
readers a first real glimpse of an important sytem of Tibetan Buddhist
meditation and a persistent dialectic that makes relativity itself the most
unassailable basis for the development of certainty in matters of faith
and morals.
NOTES
1. I would like to thank Elvin W. Jones for asssistance in the preparation of this
article.
2. His others are his commentary on the Mulamadhyarnakakiirikiis of Nagarjuna
together with Candraklrti's Prasannapadii (the so-called Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho) , his
commentary on the Madhyamaluivatiira of Candrakirti (the dBu rna dgongs pa rab gsal) , and
his Drang nges legs bshad snying po.
3. Alex Wayman, tr., Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1978. Hereafter referred to as CMDR.
4. CMDR, p. 60.
5. CMDR, p. 61.
6. ibid.
7. Strictly speaking, both overpervasionism and underpervasionism, being
exegeses of the meaning of the Madhyamika, and Tsong kha pa's own view of the exact
meaning of Middleism (or Madhyamika), all deny svabhiiva. However, in the context of
Tsong kha pa's discussion here on the ascertainment of precisely what is being negated
by the reasons that deny svabhiiva, overpervasionism falls to one side of what Tsong kha
pa views as the middle, and underpervasionism falls to the other. With this qualification,
therefore, we see no fault with Professor Wayman's saying that one side "affirms"
svabhiiva, at least in the sense that it has failed to deny it adequately, and our chief concern
here is with Professor Wayman's reversal of the meanings of the two sides.
8. CMDR, p. 63.
9. CMDR, p. 189.
10. In following our own preferences in translation-words for our suggested
translations of the various passages, we do not mean to imply any criticism of Professor
Wayman's own choice of translation-words.
89
11. da Ita dbu rna'i don smra bar' dod pa phal mo che na rei Lam rim chen mo, Kalim pong,
1964, 375.b.1. Re!evant overpervasionism material at Peking Tibetan Tripitaka, vol. 152,
pp. 132-3-3 to 133-1-6.
12. CMDR, p. 189.
13. yod med la sogs pa'i mu bzhi po thams cad bkag pas na der ma 'dus pa'i chos med pa'i
phyir TOI 375.b.2.
14. CMDR, pp. 189-90.
15. gzhan yang de kho na nyid gzigs pa'i 'phags pa'i ye shes kyi skye 'gag dang beings grol
sags ci yang med par gzigs pas na des gzhal ba Itar yin dgos pas skye ba sags med dol 37S.b.2-3.
16. CMDR, p. 190.
17. Here, and through to. the end of this section laying out the positions of the
overpervasionists, the word "reason" refers only to "the reason that scrutinizes the reality
of the object under consideration."
18. gal te skye ba sags 'dod na de la de nyid dpyod pa'i rigs pas dpyad bzod dam mi bzod/
bzod na ni rigs pas dpyad bzod kyi dngos po yod pas bden dngos su 'gyur ro/ dpyad mi bzod na ni rigs
pas khegs pa'i don yod pa ji Itar 'thadI375.b.3-4.
19. CMDR, p. 190.
20. de bzhin duskye ba la sags pa yod par' dod na tshad mas grub bam ma grub/ dangpo Itar
na de kho na nyid gzigs pa'i ye shes kyis ni skye ba med par gzigs pas des grub par mi 'thad la/ tha
snyad pa'i mig gishes pa lasogs pas grub par' dod na ni de M.'; tshad ma yin pa bkagpa'i phyir de dag
sgrub byed kyi tshad mar mi 'thad de ting nge ' dzin gyi rgyal po lasl mig dang rna ba sna yang tshad
ma mini Ice dang Ius dang yid kyand tshad ma mini gal te dbang po 'di dag tshad yin nal 'phags pa'i
lam gyis su la ei zhig byal 375.b.4-376.a.1.
21. CMDR, p. 190.
22. 'jug par Y(1ngl rnam kun 'jig rten tshad min zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro/ tshad mas ma
grub kyang yod par' dod pa ni rang yang mi 'dod eing rigs pa'ang min pas mi 'thad dol gal te skye ba
khas len na don dam parmi 'dod pas kun rdzob tu 'dod dgos na de ni mi rigs tel 'jugpa las/ de nyid
skabs su rigs pa gang zhig gisl bdag dang gzhan las skye ba rigs min pa'il rigs des tha snyad du yang
rigs min nal khyod kyi skye ba gang gis yin par 'gyur/ zhes don dam par skye ba 'gogpa'i rigs pas tha
snyad du'ang 'gog par gsungs pa'i phyir rol 376.a.1-3.
23. CMDR, pp. 190-91.
24. gzhan yang bdag gzhan lasogs pa bzhi po gang rung las mi skye yang skye bar 'dod na
ni don dam par skye ba 'gog pa la mu bzhir brtags nas bkag pas mi khegs bar 'gyur tel de dag gang
yang min pa'i skye ba yod pa'i phyir rol mu bzhi gang rung las skye na gzhan gsum mi 'dod pas gzhan
las skye dgos na don mi rigs tel 'jug pa lasl gzhan las skye ba 'jig rten las kyang medl ces gsungs pas
sol de'i phyir skye ba 'gog pa la don dam pa'i khyad par yang sbyar bar mi bya ste tshig gsallas don
dam pa'i khyad par sbyor ba bkag pa'i phyir rol 376.a.3-6.
25. CMDR, p. 191.
26. 'di la'ang kha cig ni skye ba la sogs pa tha snyad du'ang mi 'dod zer lal kha eig ni tha
snyad du yod par 'dod cingl thams cad kyang 'diskad durigspas chosrnams larang gi ngo bas grub
pas rang bzhin 'gogpa ni slob dpon 'di yi lugs la bsnyon du med del bden pa gnyis char du rang bzhin
gyis grub pa bkag pa'i phyir rol de ltar rang bzhin med na de nas ei zhig yodl de'i phyir dgag bya la
don dam gyi khyad par sbyor ni dbu ma rang rgyud pa khona'i lugs yin no zhes mgrin pa bsal nas
'chad par byed dol 376.a.6-376.b.2.
27. CMDR, p. 191. gnyis pa de mi 'thad par bstan pa la gynisllugs des dbu ma'i thun
mong ma yin pa'i khyad chos bkag par bstan pa dangl 376.b.2-3.
28. CMDR, p. 192.
90
29. de ltar 'bras bu'i shabs susku gnyis 'thob pa'i rgyu larn gyi gnad rni 'phyugpa gzhi'i Ita ba
gta
n
la 'bebs tshulla rag las pa'i Ita ba gtan la 'bebs tshul ni de rna thag tu bshad pa'i bden gnyis la
ng
es
pa rnyed pa 'di yin no/ 377.a.2-3.
30. CMDR, p. 192. .
3 L Professor Wayman translates: "In short, if they wish to refute the non-self-
existence, bondage and liberation, arising and passing away, etc., then the two truths
which validate all establishments of sarhsiira and nirviir:a and the void which is void of
self-existence are not proper anywhere, so they have opposed only the special dharma of
the Madhyamika." We would translate this somewhat as follows: "If you accept an
absence of self-existence as contradictory to bondage, liberation, production and passing
away, etc., then with regard to the emptiness that is the emptiness of self-existence, you
are contradicting just the special feature of the Madhyamika, because you cannot admit
the categories of nirviir:a and sarhsiira into either of the two truths."
Professor Wayman further translates: "If they claim they do not oppose those
(establishment of bondage and liberation, etc.) then there is certainly no need to add the
special thing (of pararniirtha, etc.) to the thing opposed (i.e., arising, passing away, etc.) by
(their) principle of cessation of self-existence, so there is no genuine reason at all for their
belief about arising and passing away, and passing away of bondage and liberation." Our
translation would run something like: "If you do not accept them (i.e., absence of self-
existence on the one hand and bondage, liberation, production, passing away, etc., on the
other) as contradictory, there is no right reason at all for accepting that bondage, libera-
tion, production, passing away, etc., are unqualifiedly denied by the reason that rejects a
self-existence. "
32. 'di na dbu rna pa rna gtogs pa gang zag gzhan su'i ngor yang 'gal ba 'du parrnthong nas
mi 'gal bar 'chad mi shes pa la phra zhing rndzangs la shin tu rgya ehe ba'i rnarn dpyod dang ldan
pa'i rnkhas pa dbu ma pa zhes pa des/ bden pa gnyis rtogs pa'i thabs la rnkhas pas 'gal ba'i dri tsarn
yang med par gtan La phab nas rgyal ba'i dgongs pa'i rnthar thugpa rnyed del de la brten nas rang gi
ston pa dang bstan pa la shin tu gus pa rrnad du byung ba skyes pas drangs pa'i ngag tshig rnam par
dag pas/ shes ldan dag rang bzhin gyis stong pa'i stong pa nyid kyi don ni rten eing 'brei par 'byung
ba'i don yin gyi/ don byed pa'i nus pas stongpa'i dngos po rned pa'i don ni rna yin no zhes shad gsangs
mthon pos yang dang yang du sgrogs par rndzaddo/ 377 .a.3-6.
33. CMDR, p. 253.
34. de ltar na 'dus byas rnams rgyu rkyen gyis bskyed pa dang gzhan du 'gyur ba ni rang gi
sde pa rnams kyis grub zin pas de dag la rang bzhin med pa bsgrub mi dgos par 'gyur ba dang/ de dag
gis kyang dngos po rnams rang bzhin med par rtogs par 'gyur ba sogs kyi skyon yod pas de thun rnong
rna yin pa'i dgag bya ga la yin/ 415.a.2-4. In P.T.T., vol. 152, the discussion of underperva-
sionism runs from p. 145-4-7 to 147-2-6.
35. 'dir dngos po yod rned ni sngar gnyis su srnra ba'i shabs su bshad pa ltarrang gi ngo bos
yod pa dang ye rned yin no/ 418.aA.
36. CMDR, p. 63.
37. CMDR, p. 69.
38. CMDR, p. 256.
39. dus gsurn du 'angme larne 'khrul bagnyugma'ingo bo rna beospagangzhig sngarrna
byung ba las phyis 'byung ba rna yin pa gang zhig/ ehu'i tsha ba'arn tshu rol dangpha rolla rna ring
po dang thung du ltar rgyu dang rkyen la ltos pa dang beas par ma gyur pa gang yin pa de rang
bzhin yin par brjod dol ei me'i rang gi ngo bo de Ita bur gyur pa de yod darn zhe na de ni rang gi ngo bos
yod pa'ang rna yin la rned pa' ang rna yin no/ de Ita yin rnod kyi 'on kyang nyan pa po rnams kyi skrag
91
paspag bar bya ba'i phyir sgro btags nas kun rdzob tu de yod do z.hes brjod par bya'ol z.hes rang bz.hin
de yang rang gi ngo bos grub pa bkag nas tha snyad du yod par gsungs sol gal te nyan pa po skrag pa
spang ba'i phyir du sgro btags nas bstan bar gsungs pas yod par mi bz.hed do snyam na de ni rigs pa
rna yin tol dgos pa de'i phyir 'dibtags nas gsungs pa ni chos {['...han rnams kyangyin pas de dag kyang
med par 'gyur rol 416.b.6-417.a.3.
40. da Ita chos roams la rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i rang bz.hin du grub pa rdul tsam yang
med par gtan la phab pa'i rang bz.hin gyis stong ba'i stong nyid nil gzugs sogs kyi chos 'di dag khyad
gz.hir byas pa'i steng du khyad chos su yod pas blo gcig gi yul na de gnyis ka yod pa mi 'gal z.hing gnyis
snang de ma log pas stong nyid de don dam bden pa btags pa bar 'gyur rol gang gi tshe rang bzhin
med par nogs pa'i Ita ba de nyid goms pas don de mngon sum du rtogs pa'i ngor ni rang bzhin med
bz.hin du rang bz.hin du snang ba'i khrul snang thams cad ldog pas na chos nyid de mngon sum du
byas pa'i shes pas chos can gzugs sogs de mi dmigs pasl de Ita bu'i chos nyid dang chos can gnyis blo
de'i ngo na med pas de gnyis chos nyid dang chos can du jog pa ni tha snyad pa'i blo gz.han z.hig gi
ngos nas bz.hag dgos sol de ltar na don dam pa'i bden pa ni rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i spros pa thams
cad z.hi ba'i steng du rang bzhin med bz.hin du der snang ba'i 'khrul snang gi spros pa thams cad
kyang mam par log pa tsam la jog pas de khas blangs kyang rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i rang bzhin
khas blang ga na dgosl 418.a.4-418.b.3.
41. "Nowadays, they establish the dharmas that are without even an atom accom-
plished as self-existent, accomplished by own-nature, as the voidness of what is void of
self-existence. Now these dharmas of form, etc., amount to the 'special basis' (khyad gzhi)
(i.e., void of self-existence); and thereupon there is a presence in the sense of the 'special
dharma' (khyad chos) (i.e., voidness), thus in the scope of a single discrimination (eka-
buddhi). (They say that) there is no contradiction in there being both of these (i.e., the
special basis-form, etc.; and the special dharma-voidness), and that the second
appearance is not wayward. But this voidness is the factitious (kiilpanika) paramartha-satya.
"At whatever time, by habituation in that view which comprehends the absence
of self-existence, one comprehends this entity in immediacy-on this face (of
comprehension) one wards off all delusive appearance that takes what is without self-
existence to be self-existent. The awareness which realizes directly that true nature
(dharmata) does not have in view the factual bases (dharmin) form, etc. Thus, the two, the
true nature of that sort (=voidness) and factual bases (form, etc.) are the absence on the
face of buddhi. So the positing of these two, the true nature and the factual base, requires a
positing by the face of a different buddhi that is conventional. That being the case, para-
martha-satya is the quiescence of all elaboration (prapaiica) accomplished by own-form,
and on it is the absence of self-existence; but whatever appears there, namely all the
elaboration of delusive apparance, is what one posits just in waywardness. So, while
accepting that Iparamartha), where is the necessity to accept a self-existence accomplished
by own-form!"
42. CMDR, p. 69.
43. 424.a.4-5. Emphasis in Wayman passages ours.
92
Alex Wayman Replies to Geshe Sopa
While responding to Geshe Sopa's COmments on my translation of the
last tWO parts of Tsong-kha-pa's Lam rim chen mo (New York, .1978), I should
like first to thank the learned Geshe for writing at length to make his point,
because only so is it possible to use his comments to further the point I wish to
make. Certain Tibetan sects represented by Western establishments have
insisted that their important books should not be translated by Westerners
except in collaboration with, or by help of native Tibetans who are more
sensitive to the meanings and nuances of such texts. While this Geshe of the
Gelugpa order does not explicitly say this, the attitude is rather pronounced,
partly by his denial that any of the Madhyamika classics have been reliably
translated into Western languages, and partly by a charged language in his
comments. So as he makes this point, taking my translation up for comment, I
too can make a point, to wit, that no matter how a learned Tibetan informant
might help with this or that text, I did succeed by myself on the part of the Lam
rim chen mo rendered from the Tibetan language with the title Calming the Mind
and Discerning the Real. For this point, may I initially explain, what the Geshe
never mentioned in his review article, that for every sentence of the Discerning
section-on which the Geshe makes comments-besides original Sanskrit
when available for quotations, I employed the 'four annotation' (mchan bzhi)
commentarial edition of the Lam rim chen mo (cf. my book pp. 70-71). Thus, I
resorted to informants of the Path lineage, who had taken great pains in
writing up these annotations.
The Geshe finds "particularly objectionable" certain glosses in my trans-
lation, such as "eye, etc." in a Samiidhiriija-siitra citation. As I mentioned in my
introduction, almost all glosses in parentheses, and including these ones, that
are within the translation come from the 'four annotation' commentaries of
the text. Also when I cite Asanga for an explanation of name-and-form (niima-
rnpa), implicating it as the 'reality' object of vipalyanii (Discerning) and so also
in Tsong-kha-pa's position, the Geshe disagrees on the grounds that "Tsong
kha pa's own position on 'Discerning' is that of a Madhyamika." Then the
Geshe should also disagree with Tsong-kha-pa'sown section on 'Varieties of
Discerning' (my book, pp. 386-390) since these varieties are just taken from
Asanga's Sriivakabhiimi and from the Yogacara scripture Sa7[ldhinirmocana. Of
course, the Geshe might well be right that Asanga's mention of name-and-
form as I cited it, is irrelevant, but he might be right merely as an outsider to
the Path lineage, because as I showed in my introduction, Atisa's lineage,
exemplified by Tsong-kha-pa in the Lam rim chen mo, is a combination of the
93
lineages of Nagarjuna and Santideva (both Madhyamika) and of Asanga
(Yogacara).
The Geshe feels that my translation should be used with caution by
persons who cannot read the original Tibetan. I should hope the readers are
cautious, both for my translation and for what the Geshe has to say about it.
This raises the question of whether educated Tibetans while reading in the
Tibetan language can understand Tsong-kha-pa's Discerning section. I for
one would prefer that they could, but there are some disquieting COunter_
indications. Thus, it has been called to my attention that in the generation
following Tsong-kha-pa, there was an eminent monk of the Sa-kya-pa order
named Gorampa who sought to refute Tsong-kha-pa's type of Madhyamika,
labelling it. a nihilism, and in a work entitled Dbu ma spyi don criticized this very
Discerning section. Of course, Geshe Sopa and I both know that this nihilism
charge is not justified. But then, the readers of the Geshe's review of my book
should wonder why a monk so learned as Gorampa would misunderstand. Is it
enough to say that he belongs to a rival sect, apprehensive of the then rising
strength of the Gelugpa order, and so deliberately misrepresents Tsong-kha_
pa's position? Suppose we do discount Gorampa as an 'opponent' and credit a
learned Gelugpa monk with ability to understand the Discerning section on
the grounds that he is a sympathetic 'insider.' Of course, when the Geshe
makes his various comments, he expects readers to believe him (since the argu-
ments deal with subtle matters) as an 'insider.' Well, so far I have not found
this Geshe talking as an insider of the Path lineage when he objects to glosses
within parentheses taken from Path lineage annotations (calling them "parti-
cularly objectionable"), and when he insists we should accept Tsong-kha-pa in
the present context (including the introductions) as a Madhyamika, while
Atisa's lineage followed in the Lam rim chen mo is a combination of Madhyamika
and Yogacara. Indeed, the very title of Tsong-kha-pa's work abbreviated as
Lim rim chen mo shows he is writing here with Buddhist path lineage, not as a
commentator on a Madhyamika text, as he was in two other works with
commentaries on Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka-kiirikii and on Candrakirti's
Madhyamakiivatiira. But the Geshe's ability to read Tsong-kha-pa's work with
understanding should be taken for granted, until proven otherwise.
I do not deny that in a pioneer translation of this type-a rather long
stretch of difficult text with involved sentences, and worked at intermittently
over some years-I could, probably did miss some subtle points, or misrender
some phrases or sentences. Fortunately, Tsong-kha-pa's 'right views' are often
repeated, and anyone studying the text will eventually garner what he is
driving at. Geshe properly caught my slip in the Samiidhiriija passage, where I
had put 'Noble Truth' instead of 'Noble Path' (or 'Noble's Path'), and he is
certainly right in criticizing my rendering of ma 'dus pa'i chos-a bad slip. After
that, he made too much fuss over various passages without scholarly proof for
his "improvements." When the Geshe says bsnyon means "to deny the apparent"
94
and that I mistranslate "to affirm and then deny," he paid no attention to my note
referring to the Geshe Chos kyi grags native Tibetan dictionary, which I now
cite for the term bsnyon can: dang por yod ces dam bcas nas rjes par med ces snyon
rnkha
n
. Perhaps the trouble is that I have better reference works than the
reviewer, or else that I actually consult them. Then in his section VI he cites my
rendition, "(The Madhyamika replies with compassionate interjection.) Alas!
Because you are without ears or heart you have thrown a challenge that is
severe on us!" And the Geshe thinking to improve on this, first saying "by
something like" as though he were not sure, goes on with his version: "Ouch!
The hardship of an argument by one without ears or wits (i.e. a blockhead) has
landed on me!" Aside from the fact that his 'improvement' changes the rendi-
tion from a compassionate interjection to ajest, there is no word in the original
for 'ouch' and so forth. His kind of rendition is symptomatic of some of his
other 'improvements,' namely, that the first 500 English words learned by a
foreigner are superior to the words, such as 'severe' and 'caul,' found in larger
vocabularies. Unfortunately for his stance, Tsong-kha-pa had an extraordinary
. Tibetan vocabulary and did not write such books for the Tibetans who only
knew 500 Tibetan words or phrases. Why should the Western translator be so
limited for his own potential readers-hopefully intelligent persons?
Moreover, the Geshe's lengthy revision examples go along with attribu-
ting a host of 'miscontruals' on my part; and one has to go to his note 10 to
learn, "In following our own preferences in translation-words for our suggested
translations of the various passages, we do not mean to imply any criticism of
Professor Wayman's own choice of translation-words." It is impractical to take
up these various paragraphs of his; and I shall concern myself only with what
seem to bother the Geshe the most, to wit, my introductory section about
Buddhist logic, and Tsong-kha-pa's position about svabhava, supposedly
misrepresented by me.
First, as to the Geshe's own ability to render these technical terms, when
he renders the primary word of Buddhist logic, pramar;,a (Tib. tshad ma) as
'avenue of validity' he falls into the trap of translating it in instrumental
manner, in agreement with the Hindu Kumarila and the Jaina critics of
Dignaga, for whom pramar;,a is a phala (result), not an avenue (cf. Hattori,
Dignaga, on Perception, p. 99).
In the matter of my introductory chapter "Use of Buddhist Logic" (pp.
60-65), the Geshe's fervent denial that Tsong-kha-pa employed in strictly logical
manner the two terms I render 'overpervasion and 'non-pervasion'-is
amazing. It is hard to believe that anybody who had read through the entire
Discerning section. in its original Tibetan with attentiveness could have
avoided the conclusion that Tsong-kha-pa uses terms of Buddhist logic again
and again and with strict adherence to the technical meaning in the logic
system. So, for example, there occurred a great many times the term rtags in
the technical meaning of Skt. linga, sometimes with explicit mention of its two
95
stipulations, anvaya and vyatireka, which are two kinds of 'pervasion' (vyripti).
Besides, in Tsong-kha-pa's own little logic treatise, the 'Mun sel'-which my
manuscript translation entitles "Guided Tour through the Seven Books of
D harmakirti" - he discusses toward the end both the svatantra (rang rgyud:) and
the prasanga (thai 'gyur), which in their derivative forms, the Svatantrika and
the Prasangika, are the two main schools of Madhyamika. This suggests that
the reason for writing the logic treatise was to further arguments in Madhya_
mika discussions. Then there is the testimony of Gene Smith, Library of
Congress, who during his years at the Delhi office supervised the hundreds of
Tibetan books that are pre-catalogued and sent to various American univer_
sities and depositories. He once told me in his Delhi home that the Gelugpa
monks spend so much time reading the later yig cha-s (manuals) that they
rarely read even the works of their founder Tsong-kha-pa. It is true that the
usual monastic drill called mtshan nyid covering a number of years of learning
the main works of Abhidharma, etc., does not include any works of Tsong-
kha-pa, that there are many yig cha-s and other collected works of eminent
Lamas. However, we should have hoped that a learned monk like Geshe Sopa
would have at least read through Tsong-kha-pa's lhag mthong (Skt. vipaJyanaj
section before adopting so confident a pose in commenting upon my transla-
tion! After all, I as translator did not presume to know what this section was
saying prior to translating it.
Geshe writes about my Introduction, p. 61: "for the writer goes on to
identify the overpervasionists as the realists, including the Y ogacarins and
Svatantrika Madhyamikas." I made no such inclusion, saying rather, "The
opponents are especially the realists, ... Other opponents [my present italics]
are ... of the Yogacara school ... as well as the Madhyamika Svatantrika."
And of course these are indeed the opponents of the section (my translation,
pp. 189-252)," no matter how the Geshe tries to make them out as being other-
wise. And the opponents guilty of the non-pervasion are certain Prasangika
Madhyamikas of the next section (pp. 253-260) no matter how the Geshe tries
to make them out as being otherwise. Unfortunately, as I shall now show, the
Geshe's position itself is included in the deviation which Tsong-kha-pa refers
to as 'non-pervasion.'
Take the Geshe's conclusion (his own note 7): "Strictly speaking, both
overpervasionism and underpervasionism, being exegeses of the meaning of
the Madhyamika, and Tsong kha pa's own view of the exact meaning of
Middleism (or Madhyamika), all deny sviibhava." However, Tsong-kha-pa
(Tashilunpo edition of Lam rim chenmo, f. 389a-5,6) says: I gzugssogsrnamsrang
bzhin gnyis gang du 'angma grub "pas chos nyid la rang bzhin du byas pa'i rang bzhin de
blta ba'i phyir du lam bsgom pas na tshangs spyod kyang don med du mi 'gyur bar gsungs
shing . .. I As I translate (p. 257): "The (elements) such as form are not accom-
plished in either of the two svabhdvas ([annotation commentary:] the svabhriva
in the meaning of true nature and the svabhriva accomplished by own nature).
96
Since one cultivates the path so as to view the svabhava that is the svabhava in
the meaning of true nature, it is also said that the pure life is not purposeless."
This is not just Tsong-kha-pa's own position, because he makes these remarks
to introduce a passage of Candrakirti's Madhyarnakiivatara (on VI, 182) that
has the same message. One can read this in my translation at that point. I
. should explain here that the svabhava accomplished by own nature is what is
denied again and again by the M:idhyamikas, and this insight (prajitii) of
denial is referred to in AtlSa's Light on the Path to Enlightenrnent, verse 54 (my
work, p. 13). It is frequently referred to as the denial in an absolute sense
(pararnarthatas). Candrakirti's passage here clarifies that the svabhava of true
nature be witnessed on the path by the yogin in in
dependence on conventional truth (sarnvr:ti-satya). I should inform the readers
of this, my rebuttal, that when translating this Discerning section it was as
though I was in the presence of a great mind; and it would have been most
ungracious and unappreciative of me to have had an introduction section
entitled "Svabh:iva of the Path" (pp. 67-69), if the Tibetan author had not used
the words of the above-cited passage and emphasized the importance of his
communication at that point. If indeed my translation is guilty of numerous
small one can believe Geshe least I avoided the
huge 'misconstrual' of which the Geshe is guilty, namely, to have attributed a
universal denial of svabhava to Tsong-kha-pa, thus to have had no pervasion of
the svabhava of the path, thus to have been among the very partisans whose
views of such sort are rejected by Tsong-kha-pa in this very 'non-pervasion'
section.
The above discussion, not edifying for me to have to write, does lead to
a conclusion that even learned Tibetan monks, whether a spirited adversary
like Gorampa, or a self-appointed defender like Geshe Sopa, share an over-
confidence as to their ability to understand such texts. I am indeed happy to
have seen the appearance in form useful to Western readers of this large
section of Tsong-kha-pa's remarkable encyclopedic work, and to have written
for it various introductions which are faithful to the Path-lineage being
exposed; happy also to announce that an Indian reprint was quickly produced
in Delhi. I should like also to inform the readers of what I did not explain in
the book, why on the dedication page there occurs "in memory of Dilowa
Gegen Hutukhtu." It was because early in the 1950's this grand Lama of
Mongolia, carrier of the Path-lineage, at Berkeley, California, gave me the
advice of how to proceed in case any expression was obscure or difficult. I
followed his advice; while he did not say it, I am sure he would have approved
a consultation with any learned Tibetan of the Path Lineage.
97
Geshe Sop a Replies to Alex Wayman
I wish to thank the Editor for sending my review article to Prof. Wayman
and giving him an opportunity to respond. I am of course sorry that he is upset
by my observations on his translation.
First, I regret that Prof. Wayman suspects my intentions and regards
any criticism of mine of his own articles and translation as a wish to seize an
opportunity to denigrate Western Buddhist scholarship in general. I did not
say, as he quotes me, or even, I hope, seem to say that Western scholars have
produced no reliable translation of the Madhyamika classics. My statement
that Western Buddhist scholarship so far has produced few such translations
is, I believe, fair and made with reference to the general problematic of transla-
ting certain kinds of Buddhist texts in the absence of well-established norms
that have the consensus of a majority of Buddhist scholars themselves.
To an argument aimed not merely at me but at all dGe lugs pa monks and
scholars, I would like to respond. For Prof. Wayman to say that "the dGe lugs
pa'monks spend so much time reading the later that they rarely read
eVen the works of their founder Tsong kha pa" is like saying that American
college students take required courses and do required reading and little beyond
that. In both the Tibetan and American educational systems, there always have
been those who have gone beyond the requirements, and it is they, in general,
who become the scholars and teachers. Tsong kha pa himself enjoined the
study of the Buddhist classics (the gzhung chen ma) as offering the best advice
(men ngags) for practicing Buddhism, and many dGe lugs pa monks and
scholars have taken and continue to take him quite seriously here.
Prof. Wayman is, however, right that many educated Tibetans, while
reading in the Tibetan language, cannot understand Tsong kha pa's "Dis-
cerning" section. This is not even a question, but a simple matter of fact, and is
why Tibetan scholars spend a great deal of time learning these things from
other Tibetan scholars who are regarded as pure and authoritative sources of
the teaching-transmissions of important works. Even the reading of specific,
and generally difficult, passages of such texts is more to be determined by such
important teaching transmissions than by the way the meaning of a word may
apear in a Tibetan dictionary. In the instances of Tsong kha pa's works, these
teaching transmissions are thought to embody Tsong kha pa's own subsequent
commentary on his own compositions, and this is why they are regarded as
weighty by Tibetan scholars themselves. Some of these traditions are incor-
porated in the Lam rim's annotations (the mchan bzhi). I have not commented
on Prof. Wayman's use of the mchan bzhi, for the problem of utilizing them is
not so substantially different from that of reading the Lam rim itself, and the
handling ofthe Samiidhiriija citation is just such a case in point. "(Form, etc.),"
98
as the mchan bzhi note, is not the meaning of the passage but only its misunder-
standing by the overpervasionists.
As for myself, it is certainly unfair so gratuitously to imply that I have
agreed to undertake the review of the translation of a work that I have not
even read myself, and I wish to reassure Prof. Wayman that I have read the
Lam rim in "its entirety. Having had the good fortune to have studied the Lam
rim with some of its most famous teachers in Tibet, I was pleased to review its
translation when I was asked to. My background is public and needs no testi-
mony from me, and if Prof. Wayman has some serious doubts here, he can
determine the matter much more tactfully through a proper investigation on
his own.
Also, leaving aside all consideration of yoga or meditation, I do not
believe that the aims and methods of Western and Tibetan scholarship are so
very substantially different. Each aims at arriving at an actual understanding
of the thought of an author, and each utilizes the best means at its disposal for
doing this, neither limiting itself to the mere exercise of looking up words in a
dictionary and reading a few of somebody's footnotes. At any rate, while
anyone can claim that dGe lugs pa monks and scholars do not really under-
stand the thought of Tsong kha pa, it is indefensible to claim as well that they
do not even make the attempt. On the other hand, if someone is mainly
interested in the rediscovery of the real Tsong kha pa, he ought not to be too
disquieted in finding himself confuted by someone more traditionally-
minded, for this kind of originality always invites controversy. The burden of
proof, however, now rests with the innovator to demonstrate the advantages
of the "new" Tsong kha pa over the "old" one.
Here, I would like to make a few brief observations on the response:
Why say that I view Tsong kha pa's position as a total rejection of svabhiiva
when I have devoted three pages of my review article to trying briefly to
delineate the sense in which Tsong kha pa accepts as well as rejects svabhiiva?
Why say that Prof. Wayman has been misrepresented by my stating,
"realists, including Yogacarins and Svatantrika Madhyamikas" instead of
"realists and Yogacarins and Svatantrika Madhyamikas"? In my summarizing,
the "inclusion" may represent my view, not Prof. Wayman's, but the discussion
was not of what realism is and who the realists are, but of Tsong kha pa's view
of what overpervasionism is and who the overpervasionists are.
Why say that translating pramii7!a by an "avenue of validity" "falls into
the trap of translating it in the instrumental manner" (to wit, like a non-
Buddhist)? "Validity" is not a cognition, and "avenue of validity" is free of the
bifurcation into a consciousness (or cognition) and a pramii7!a-its agent or
means. Prof. Wayman should have observed the difference between "avenue
of validity" and "avenue" or "means of cognition."
"Ouch," as Professor Wayman has quite rightly noted in his response, is
indeed an unacceptable translation for kye ma kyi hu. It is too colloquial to
99
render an obsolete classical interjection, and "alas," or "woe is me" is mUch
better. The translation of the passage was in fact to have read "alas," but the
journal editors failed to incorporate this and some other corrections in the
copy sent to Prof. Wayman.
Beyond the above, there is still some rather questionable bit of misin_
formation about the Lam rim that Prof. Wayman seeks to promulgate in his
response. I refer to his highly misleading talk about the Lam rim's path lineage.
His claim that "Atisa's lineage followed in the Lam rim c h e ~ ma is a combination
of Y ogacara and Madhyamika" is unfounded, and, to avoid becoming too
long, J can only refer him to the Lam rim's introduction, where Tsong kha pa
identifies the two path lineages of the Badhipathapradipa as the zab ma lta ba'i
rgyud and the rgya chen spyad pa'i rgyud, through Naggrjuna and Asanga
respectively. These lineages, however, are by no means coextensive with the
Y ogacara and the Madhyamika as Prof. Wayman claims, and his difficulties on
this point may go a long way in explaining his difficulty in understanding my own
assertion that "Tsong kha pa's own position on discerning is that of a Madhya-
mika." Likewise, the Asanga-lineage, aside from not being the Yogacara, is not
particularly pertinent to Tsong kha pa's view of lhag mthong in the "Discerning"
section, for Tsong kha pa does not follow Asanga's explanation here, and in
calling Tsong kha pa's view on "Discerning" that of a Madhyamika, I am not
referring to his view of lhag mthang in general, but only of that speciallhagmthang
that perceives reality, and which is his major topic of discussion in the "Discern-
ing section.
In conclusion, if Prof. Wayman wished to discredit my objections to his
translation and was also able, he might certainly have done so by addressing
his response more to these objections and less "against the man." My rather
long article confined its scope to two topics where I found Prof. Wayman's
statements quite unrepresentative of Tsong kha pa's position. After all, these
topics do occupy seventy pages of his translation. The former, the topic of
overpervationism, is one of the larger and most important topics of the entire
"Discerning" section of which it stands at the head, and by devoting sO much
space to it Tsong kha pa evinces his quite genuine concern for nihilistic inter-
pretations of the Prasangika. Here he has quite painstakingly set forth these
nihilistic positions, grouped all the arguments proferred in their support into
four key reasons, has laid out the essentials of his own position as a Prasangika,
and has sought at great length to repudiate each of these positions along with
its logical underpinnings-for about eighty Tibetan pages. Where in all this
can Prof. Wayman find a single realist or a Yogacarin or a Svatantrika Madhya-
mika as the overpervasionist opponent? And if the realists, etc., are there, why
not bring them forth from so many pages, instead of flatly declaring, "Of
course these [the realists, etc.] are indeed the opponents of the section (my
translation, pp. 189-252), no matter how the Geshe tries to make them out
otherwise? Something similar may be said about the second topic, i.e., under-
pervasionism, which, far from being nihilist, is a position most congenial to
theism.
100
Archaeological Excavations at Piprahwa
and Ganwaria and the Identification
of Kapilavastu
by K.M. Srivastava
There has been a long-standing controversy regarding the loca-
tion of Kapilavastu, 1 the capital of the Sakyan State. As a result of our
recent archaeological excavations at Pipriliwa and Ganwaria
2
in the
Basti District of Uttar Pradesh, in India, we feel now encouraged to
identify the site of Kapilavastu. These sites are about twenth-three kilo-
metres north of N augarh, a tehsil headquarter and a railway station on
the Gorakhpur-Gondo loop line on the Northeastern Railway, and
they are nine kilometres north of Birdpur, which falls on the road to
Lumbini from Naugarh.
The first indication that Pipriliwa could be the site of the ancient
Kapilavastu was provided by w.e. Peppe
3
in 1897-98 when eighteen
feet below the summit of a stupa he came across a huge sandstone box
which contained, amongst other objects, five caskets. An inscription on
the lid of a steatite casket furnished a clue to the identification of
Kapilavastu by its reference to the Buddha and his community, the
Sakyas.
4
The following is the text of the inscription:
Sukiti bhatinam sa-puta-dalanam iyam salila-nidhane Budhasa
bhagavate sakiyanam.
Although the text has been edited and translated variously, the
reference to the enshrinement of the relics of the Buddha by the
/
Sakyas undoubtedly confirms the statement of the Buddhist text
Mahaparinibbanasuttanta that the Sakyas of Kapilavastu were one
amongst the eight claimants to a portion of the relics of the Buddha
after he was cremated at Kushinagar and that they ceremoniously
constructed a stupa over the relics.
s
103
It is interesting to note that according to the Chinese traveller
Fa-hsien,
6
Lumbini should be nine miles east of Kapilavastu, which
corresponds very well with the distance of Lumbini from the site of
Piprahwa. But this was not found to be ih conformity with the later
account of Hsuan Tsang,
7
and some scholars therefore made other
suggestions. Among them, Fuhrer (1897)8 and P.e. Mukherji (1899)9
thought of Tilaurakot, in the district of Taulihawa,in Nepal, as the site
of Kapilavastu. It may be noted, however, that the difference between
the routes and distances recorded by Fa-hsien and Hsuan Tsang, as
supposed by scholars, are very confounded and indeed sometimes
contradictory. Some scholars tried to reconcile the evidence of the two
diverse accounts by proposing the existence of two Kapilavastus, one at
Piprahwa and the other at Tilaurakot.
10
In 1962, Mrs. D. Mitra of the Arachaeological Survey of India led
an expedition of exploration and excavation in the Nepalese tarai.
During the course of her work, she excavated at Kodan and
Tilaurakot, but could not find any evidence identifying Tilaurakot
with Kapilavastu. In the absence of any evidence, she remarked, "In
case Nyagrodharma (not Nyagrodhika town) represents Piprahwa,
which is not unlikely, the remains of Kapilavastu are to be sought in the
mounds immediately around Piprahwa, and not at the distant site of
Tilaurakot." She further stated, "in fact, the inscription on the
reliquary found within the main stupa at Piprahwa coupled with
Piprahwa's correspondence with Fa-hsien's bearing and distance of
Kapilavastu in relation to Lumbini raises a strong presumption for
Piprahwa and its surrounding villages like Ganwaria being the ancient
site of Kapilavastu."11 But some scholars, however, continued to refer
to Tilaurakot as Kapilavastu. The district of Taulihawa, in Nepal, has
even been renamed Kapilavastu in one-inch-to-a-mile survey sheet
map No. 63 M/2 of Nepal.
In 1971, when the present author was posted in Patna, we started
a program of archaeological excavation at the site of Piprahwa with a
view to continuing the search for Kapilavastu. In view of the considerable
lapse of time between the death of the Buddha in 483 B.e. and
the Piprahwa inscription, which may not be earlier than the third
century, B.C., the author felt that the relic caskets found by Peppe in
1897-98 were not the original ones solemnised by the Sakyas immedi-
iately after the death of Buddha. This provided grounds for expecting
earlier and original caskets in the stupa. Sylvain Levi was of the opinion
that the inscription merely recalled a more ancient consecration
104
~ n d was engraved on the occasion of the reconstruction of the stupa. 12
Proceeding with the hypothesis that earlier and original relics
. were still below in the stupa, a small trench was sunk in its north-eastern
quadrant, which revealed interesting features. An outline of the shaft
bored by Peppe could be easily observed. At a depth of six metres from
the extant top of the stupa, two burnt brick chambers came to light.
These chambers, separated from one another by 65 ems. of yellowish
compact clay mixed with kankar, were at a much lower level than the
spot where the stone box containing the inscribed casket had been
found by Peppe. There was a pmd deposit, about six centimetres thick,
between the last course of the burnt brick stupa and the chambers. The
twO chambers were identical in shape, measuring 82 x 80 x 37 ems.
.. The specific purpose of the brick chambers, to keep the sacred
objects, was apparent enough from the nature of their construction. A
soapstone casket and a red ware dish placed close to each other were
observed in the northern chamber after the top three courses of brick
ha.d been removed (Plate I). This dish was covered by another dish of
the same type, which had broken into three pieces. Both the soapstone
casket and the dish were found to be carefully packed with the help of
bricks and brickbats. The casket contained fragments of charred bone.
The contents of the dish could not be distinguished, because it was
badly smashed and filled with earth. That there were no bone
fragments in it, is, however, certain. The positions of the casket and
dishes were different in the southern brick chamber. Two dishes, of
the same type and size as in the northern chamber, were placed side by
.side just below the topmost course of the brick. Both dishes were
reduced to fragments. When two further courses of brick were
removed, another soapstone casket, bigger in size, came to light. The
lid of the casket was found broken. On removal of the earth, which had
filled up the casket, charred bones were found inside.
Since the relic caskets were found in deposits contemporaneous
with the Northern Black Polished Ware, they could be dated to the
.fifth-fourth centuries B.C., and thus earlier than the inscribed relic
casket discovered by Peppe at a higher lever, and also distinguished
stratigraphically. The possibility that the stupa at Piprahwa could be the
same as that constructed by the Sakyas at Kapilavastu over their share
of relics received at Kushinagar increased. The excavation was, there-
fore, resumed in 1973. Greater attention was paid during that year to
the eastern monastery, which was partly exposed in the first two years.
When the cells and the verandah on the northern side of the monastery
105
were being exposed, some inscribed terr<lcotta sealings were found.
About forty of them have so far been collected, from a depth ranging
between 1.05 and 1.75 metres. The sealings were not found in a hoard
but occurred at different levels and spots. Generally round in shape'
some of the sealings were oval as well. The legend on the sealings c a n ' ~
classified into three groups. One of them reads "Om Devaputra Vihare
Kapilavastu Bhikkhusamghasa." The sealings in the second series have
been read as "Maha Kapilavastu Bhikshusamghasa" (Plate II). The
sealings in the third group carry the names of monks. One of them has
been read as Sarandasasa. The letters on the seatings are in Brahmi
characters of the first-second centuries A.D. In 1974, a pot-lid carrying
the same inscription as on the first group of sealings was also found, in
the eastern monastery.
The terracotta sealings and, above all, the pot-lid with the legend
Kapilavastu, found during the excavations at Pipriliwa, seem to us to
have settled the long-standing controversy regarding the precise loca-
tion of Kapilavastu. They also establish that the monastery was meant
for the order of monks at Kapilavastu. Further, the word Devaputra
indicates that the monastery was probably built by the Kushan kings.
That the stupa at Piprahw;i was built in its initial stages by the Sakyas of
Kapilavastu over the corporeal relics of the Buddha should also be
taken as settled now. Itwas reconstructed twice, first during the third
century B.C. and the second addition, a square base with niches,
appears to have been made during the period of Kushan kings. The
caskets found in the brick chambers were those placed by the Sakyas;
the rich and varied objects, along with five caskets contained in the
massive coffer, were placed in the third century B.C.; and the one
casket found by Peppe at a depth of ten feet was the donation of the
Kushan kings.
With the location of the Sakyan stupa and the monasteries of
Kapilavastu the task of the identification of the site as that of ancient
Kapilavastu seemed easy. After a limited exploration in the vicinity,
excavation was undertaken at an adjoining mound, in Ganwaria, a kilo-
metre to the southwest. The site is at least 200 (EW) x 250 (NS) metres
in extent, having a maximum occupational deposit of seven metres.
During the excavation, two massive burnt brick structural complexes,
with impressive projected entrances to the east, were exposed. Of the
two, the larger one, on the western fringe of the mound, is about thirty
metres square. It has twenty-five rooms with a gallery at each of the
four corners. In the last phase, the number of rooms had been raised to
106
tWenty-six with the help of a partition wall. The gallery at the corners
was in alignment with the cardinal directions. In all, there were five
phases in the The two rooms on side of the
were the most spaoous. Generally, the floonng was made of bnck
concrete mixed with lime, though in phase III pieces of burnt brick
were also used. A ring well of structural phase I, having a diameter of
85 ems., was observed in the gallery on the northwestern corner. With
an open courtyard about twenty-five metres square in the centre, the
rooms and galleries were constructed all around it. The width of the
outer wall was more than two metres and that of the inner one 1. 70
metres, on the top. The cross walls were more than a metre thick.
The larger structural complex embodied certain extraordinary
architectural features. Complete bricks were used only in the facing of
the walls and the core was filled up with brickbats. The bricks used in
the facing in the last two phases were rubbed and then set in order to
present a beautiful appearance and to provide more strength to the
structure. Two projecting bastion-like structures were constructed to
give a majestic appearance to the entrance. As an additional attraction,
three corners in each bastion were provided at the western end. In
'order to restrict entry, at a later stage, two walls, facing each other and
projecting from the bastions, were raised at the easternmost fringe of
the entrance. In front of the two walls there was a pavement made of
brickbats with complete bricks used in the facing. The opening of the
second entrance, however, continued to be 2.35 metres.
But for a few additional features, the smaller structural complex,
about thirty metres to the northeast, was, on the whole, similar to the
larger one. It was about twenty-six metres square and had twenty-one
rooms restricted to three phases. A small room in the northeast corner,
. meant either for lavatory or bath, was a new feature in this complex. To
maintain privacy, access to the room was provided through another
small room opening onto the central courtyard. Though the number
of rooms in the smaller complex was less, the entrance was wider,
measuring 3.15 metres. In the earlier stages, the entrance was towards
the east. Later on, it was sealed with the help of a curtain wall, and a
narrow entrance, 1.20 metres wide, was provided towards the
northern side. Unlike in the larger complex, the corner rooms on the
southeast and northwest were the biggest, and square in shape. The
entrances to the structural complexes at Ganwaria are not towards the
stupa, as they were in the cases of all the monasteries at Piprahwa.
On the basis of pottery and antiq?ities yielded by the excavation,
107
the earliest occupation at the site can be dated to about the eighth
century B.C. Amongst the principal ceramic industries, mention may
be made of grey ware, red ware vases associated with the Painted Grey
Ware in the western part of Northern India, black polished ware and
beautiful specimens of Northern Black Polished Ware in plenty. The
site was occupied till about the fourth century A.D.
The entire occupational deposit could be divided into four
Periods. Period I was represented by dishes having a red rim and grey
bottom, red ware vases, beautifully polished red ware dishes and boWls
occasionally painted in black and black polished ware. The deluxe
Northern Black Polished Ware characterized Period II. Period III is
post N.B.P. belonging to Sunga times. Period IV was characteristically
Kushan.
The proximity of these structures to the ancient site of Piprawha,
where the sealings with the name of Kapilavastu were found, their
impressive size and constructional features and the large quantity of
antiquities found within them, leave little doubt that the structures
formed the residential complex of the chief of the capital town, Kapila-
vastu, i.e., the Sakya King Suddhodhana and his predecessors.
NOTES
1. C. Lasen, Indische Altertumskunde (Leipzig 1858), vol. III, p. 201; A. Cunningham,
The Ancient Geography of India (reprinted, Varanasi 1963) p. 349; A.C.L. Carlleyle, in
Cunningham, Archaeological Survey of India Reports (reprinted, Varanasi 1972), vol. XII,
p. 87; A. Fuhrer, "Antiquities of the Buddha's birthplace in the Nepalese Terai," Archae-
ological Survey of India, New Imperial Series (reprinted Varanasi 1972), voI.XXVI, p. 44;
P. C. M ukherji and V.A. Smith, Antiquities of Kapilvastu, Tarai of Nepal, 1899, Archaelogical
Survey of India (reprinted Varanasi 1969) p. 50; T.W. Rhys Davids, Buddhist India
(London 1903) p. 18; W. Yost, "Identifications in the region of Kapilavastu,"jRAS, 1905,
p. 553; Debala Mitra, Buddhist Monuments (Calcutta 1972) p. 253.
2. Indian Archaeology, a Review, 1971-72, 1972-73; K.M. Srivastava, "A Note on
the Recent Excavations at Piprahwa, District Basti (U-P)," Puriitattva: Bulletin of the Indian
Archeological Society, 6 (1972-73) p. 51; "Buddha's Lost Town of Kapilavastu Identified,"
Vishveshvaranand Indological j oumal, vol. XV, pt. 1 (March 1977), also, Kapilavastu in Basti
District of V.P. (Nagpur 1978).
3. "Piprahwa Stupa containing relics of Buddha," jRAS, 1898, p. 573.
4. G. Buhler,jRAS, 1898, p. 387; T.W. Rhys Davids,jRAS, 1898, p. 588;J.F.
Fleet,JRAS, 1905, p. 679, 1906, p. 150; D.C. Sircar, ed., Select Inscriptions bearing on Indian
History and Civilisation (2nd ed.) vol. I (University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1965), p. 81.
5. Mahiiparibbiina sutta, ed. by Childers, injRAS, 1876, p. 258.
6. Fa-hsien, A Record of the Buddhist Countries, tr. Li Yung-hsi (Peking, 1957), p. 51.
7. T. Watters, On Yuan Chwang's travels In India (London, 1904-05), vol. II, p.
108
8. Fiihrer, op. cit., p. 44.
9. P.C. Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 50.
10. V.A. Smith, op. cit., p. 10; T.W. Rhys Davids, op. cit., p. 11, 18 f.n.1; but contra
w: Roey,JRAS, 1905, p. 454, W. Vast, op.cit., p. 553.
11. Buddhist Monuments, p. 253.
12. Iridian Antiquary, 36 (1907), p. 120.
Plate 1. Piprahwa. Soapstone casket and dish in the northern chamber.
109
Notes on the Textcritical Editing
of the Bodhisattviivadiinakalpalatii
by Frances Wilson
Fortunately, so the story! goes, K1?emendra was prevailed upon to
compose a Bodhisattuiivadiinakalpalatii [BAKL]. neat and
modest verse is a delight and deserves the care which de J ong has
bestowed upon his textcritical remarks made toward a textcritical
edition. (Textcritical Remarks on the Bodhisattviivadiinakalpalatii [Pallavas
42-108]. By].W. de Jong. Tokyo: The Reiyukai Library, 1979.
x + 303 pp.)
These remarks are to be read with
... the text published by Sarat Chandra Das and PaT,lqit Hari
Mohan (from 1906 onwards replaced by Satis
Chandra in the Bibliothecalndica (Calcutta, 1888-
1917). That edition was based on a Tibetan blockprint [published
1664-1665] which contains both the Sanskrit text in Tibetan
transliteration and the Tibetan translation. [Introduction, p. 3]
.. De Jong gives textcritical remarks on both the Sanskrit and Tibetan
manuscript traditions, which are described in the Introduction to
. pallavas 42-48.
2
The Introduction is concluded with a request that
readers offer critical remarks: de Jong notes that there are instances
where the choice between readings was difficult to make and other
instances where the Sanskrit was difficult to understand. I leave the
fulfillment of this request to others.
I can not fault the conservative and thorough textcritical remarks
made by de Jong. His method is standard: The authoratative manu-
script is Add. 1306, Cambridge University Library, written in 1302 A.D.,
just 150 years after composed the Kalpalatii. Within the
body of the textcritical remarks de J ong carefully describes the primary
entries and the secondary corrections contained within Add. 1306. He
III
also gives notes derivative from his use of other manuscripts of the
Kalpalata and from standard reference works such as Franklin
Edgerton's Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary. In a conversation Dr.
Leonard Zwilling confirmed that the edition was without fault. He felt
real indebtedness for this work, which clarifies the mistakes of previous
Sanskrit editions.
My concern about this edition (and all other editions focusing on
the BAKL) is the lack of a pratika index. It is not easy to find if de Jong
has over looked works that might have been pertinent to his volume. De
Jong has no pratika index and no list of the many other works that he
has used.
I must assume that de Jong has looked at all the other works of
I have yet to discover an entry from these works. They
must not have been pertinent to these verses, or I have not discovered
long's notes on them. Let me give an example of my difficulties
here. K!?emendra's AucityavicaracarciP includes three verses from the
Kalpalata. I can not place them in the BAKL tradition. It would help
the critical reader if pratika indices and lists of works used were given.
Furthermore, it would be dangerous but it might be in order at
some point to apply rules on aucitya to determine the
validity of readings. Certainly, this is usually a dubious if not
completely wrong method. is one of the few writers
whose works might be looked at in this way. He was both a writer on
alar[lkiira and a poet. Still, there would be hazards in applying his rules
to his poetic works. I give two examples.
1) Verse lab in pallava 91,
satyapathaprakisanarp.
karoty anillokapade sudipavat /
snang-ba med-pa'i gnas-rnams dag-tu sgron-ma bzhin /
legs-par bshad-pa bden-pa'i lam ni gsal-bar byed /
Read with A dipavat, cf. T.
Professor Narayana Rao remarked-in a casual conversation-
that A (Add. 1306) has a less euphonic reading. The reading does not
embody so nearly the principle of samata.
2) Verse 34ab in pallava 9l.
112
marge pradipayate
sarp.v:idena pritirp. vinda:ti /
with A rruirgalJ in a and para1(i, var,yati in b.
Again Professor Narayana Rao felt var,yati to be inappropriate
"(anaucitya) unless drought and deserts were the focus in the preceding
verses.
;.:: To 'conclude, I leave textcritical matters and give the text and
'iranslation of a few verses from the Mithila edition.
4
There are no text-
''critical remarks on these. These verses give a third minor variant to the
'two traditions of the Sibi story that I know.
J < ,
113
pura sibir nama nardvara4 I
babhuva dayadayitabandhavaq II 6
svargam naraiq. I
tasya samayayau I I 7
n:rpatim etya sa4 I
tadagrabhimukho 'bravit I I 8
anityaq. taralataravidyuddyutinibhaq. I
I I 9
ityuktva asit sa I "
k:rtciiijalir II 10
sadho mana4sukham I
te bhutva aham I I 11
iti vinayan provaca I
tvaya rajendra karomi kim II 12
pipasaparibhuto
" naitan rajan gurugauravam 1113
6. Sivavati town there was, at one time, a King by the name of
Sibi.
He was the beloved and generous friend of all beings.
7. When Indra's heaven was filled with men who had sat for
Sibi's meritorious instruction,
He of the hundred sacrifices went to him to test his resolution.
8. As he approached the place where the king sat surrounded
by the turrets of his jewel-pavilion,
Indra took the fprm of a ferocious demon and when right in
front of King Sibi, he said:
9. "This world of transmigration is momentary like flickering'
lightning flashes. "
It comes to an end in a dissolution of everything that has been
born or produced ..... "
1 O. When the demon had uttered half of the subl7ii.yita, he became
quiet;
King Sibi did him homage and with his hands raised folded
together in salutation he said:
11. "0 sadhu, say the last half of the subl7ii.yita for my benefit.
I am your student and would hear your voice which is a 'limb
of enligntenment.'"
12. The demon replied to the gentle address of the king:
"What can I do with you? You arecuseless as my pupil.
13. I am overcome by thirst and my belly is pierced by the pangs
of hunger.
I desire more, 0 king, than the homage paid a teacher."
NOTES
1. P.L. Vaidya, ed., Avadiina-kalpalatii of I andII. Buddhist
Sanskrit Texts, no. 22 and no. 23. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate
Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1959. Vol. I, p. 9. [DeJong nowhere refers to
this Mithila edition, which is "more or less a reprint ... of the Bibliotheca edition" (Vol. I,
p. vii) upon which de Jong bases his remarks.]
2. De Jong does not mention publication of pallavas 1-4l.
3. Dr. Sliryakanta, Studies. (Poona Oriental Series No. 91) Oriental
Book Agency, Poona, 1954, pp. 206 and 207.
4. Vaidya, op. cit., p. 518 (vol. II).
114
III. BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES
S(intideva: Mystique bouddhiste des VIle et VIlle siecles, by Amalia Pezzali.
Firenze: Vallecchi Editore, 1968. xviii + 161 p. $7.80.
Siintideva, by Amalia Pezzali, presents us with quite an exhaustive
account of the life and works of this great Indian Buddhist saint, at the
same time providing the reader with ~ good general summary of his
. thought.
. Ms. Pezzali organizes the book into three sections of approximately
equal length. The first, entitled "La vie" (The Life), presents the
accounts of three major Tibetan historians as well as the only known
Sanskrit versionof Santideva's biography. Though most of the transla-
tions of historical and textual passages given in this work have previously
appeared in Western languages, it is convenient to have the major bio-
graphical accounts (by Bu-ston, Taranatha, Sum-pa mKhan-po and an
anonymous Nepali manuscript) presented side by side in the original
languages for easy reference. In addition to the translations, the author
discusses the differences among the four accounts, and finally summa-
rizes the data in tabular form.
Yet for the tremendous work that was obviously done in editing
and translating the biographical sources, one would have expected
more discussion of a text-critical sort, especially with regard to redaction
criticism. With the wealth of textual material examined, it seems logical
to expect a substantial body of conclusions as regards the sources used
by the above historians. Yet Ms. Pezzali concludes only that Taranatha
and Sum-pa must have used Bu-ston (p. 21), and that Sum-pa must also
have had before him a copy of Taranatha (p. 26). Given the dates of
these scholars, the result can be hardly surprising.
It seems to me that other conclusions are evident. For one,
Taranatha must have drawn on a source other than Bu-ston (viz. the
gazelle episode, which is found in the former but not in the latter). Also,
Sum-pa must have drawn on a source different from both Bu-ston and
Taranatha (viz. his mention of Kaliriga which is missing in the other two
historians' accounts - p. 26). But statements of this sort are left implicit
in Ms. Pezzali's analysis and never brought to light. I must, however,
point out that the amount of data presented by the author does make it
possible for the interested scholar to pursue such questions individually.
The translations, I might add, are generally of a superior quality,
reflecting Ms. Pezzali's obvious expertise in Tibetan and Sanskrit.
The second section of the work entitled "Les oeuvres" (The
115
Works) is for the most part bibliographical in character. In it the author
lists and the various Sanskrit manuscripts of the Bodhicaryii_
vatiira and Sikjiisamuccaya as well as their translation into both European
and Asian languages. She also gives a very'good summary of the debate
as to' whether Santideva was the author of a Siitrasamuccaya, and she
comes, it seems to me, to a very reasonable conclusion when she states:
... one can conclude that Nagarjuna surely did write a Siitrasamuccaya ...
(and) I believe that one exclude with absolute certainty there having
been a Siitrasamuccaya of Santideva ... (p. 86 - my translation)
As for the third section on "La pensee" (The Thought) of Santideva,
It IS a good overview of Mahayana doctrine in general, and of the
Madhyamika in particular. There are, however, some points to which I
take exception.
First of all, I must object to the author's claim that it is "only with
the Mahayana" that the actual religion of the Buddha begins (p. 95).
Moreover, it is clear that in Ms. Pezzali's view it is only a "theologie
veritable" that establishes the seal of "religion" upon a philosophical
system. Yet this description of religion seems far too restrictive, for to
deprive the Hinayana of the title simply because it lacks the doctrine of
the trikiiya is to make too large a distinction over too small a difference.
What is more, it seems to me altogether too misleading to identify the
doctrine of the trikiiya with any sort of "true theology" in view of the
extensive refutations that the notion of God receives at the hands of
Mahayana Buddhist logicians such as Dharmakirti (PramiiTfavarttikam
chapter II).
There are also certain points to be raised about Ms. Pezzali's
exposition of emptiness.
(1) When she claims that emptiness is "a truth which is not intel-
lectual but more meditative" (p. 95) and also that it is impossible to
"understand the absolute (paramiirtha) by reason" (p. 103); or again
when she states that "he who eliminates all forms of thought can have
insight into the truth" (p. 102), that "it is just there where thought is
extinguished" (p. 103), it seems as though Ms. Pezzali falls into the same
quietist and anti-rationalist position of which Hva-shang Mahayana was
accused of during the famous bSam-yas debates. Granted that mere
intellectual understanding of siinyatii is insufficient for the attainment of
Buddhahood, but what must be remembered is that it is a prerequisite
for the latter. In the traditional three steps to realization, consisting of
hearing (thos-pa), thinking (bsam-pa) , and meditation (sgom-pa) , it is at the
second stage that this intellectual and discursive analysis takes place; its
indispensibility is continuously stressed in the Buddhist tradition.
(2) Though Buddhist scholars usually assert that the Mahayana
116
schools demean the Hinayana Arhant for cognizing only pudgalanairiitmya
d
not dharma-nairiitmya (pp. 98, 99 and 103 in Ms. Pezzali's work), it
an
should perhaps be made clear that not all Mahayana tenet schools
(siddhiinta) do so. For example, the Prasangika school, to which
Santideva belongs, asserts that Arhantship can only be attained if both
of these are realized. They thus make no distinction between the actual
nature of these two kinds of "selflessness," although they would of
course grant that the referent objects ("self' or "phenomena") are
different. ,
(3) As for Nagarjuna's critique of pramii7}-as, it must be under-
stood as a critique of p r a t y a ~ a and anumana having absolute power to
prove a logical syllogism. He is by no means rejecting the conventional
validity of logic, as seems to be suggested by Ms. Pezzali (p. 104).
Yet apart from these few technical points (some of which are
controversial in their own right) the author does give a rather good over-
view of Madhyamika thought in general, and particularly of Santideva's
place within it. The text of Ms. Pezzali, which gives us such a long-
sought-after compilation of the life, works and thought of this great
Buddhist saint is most certainly a welcome sight to the Buddhist Studies
community.
Jose Cabezon
On Knowing Reality: The Tattviirtha Chapter of Asanga's Bodhisattvabhiimi,
by Janice Dean Willis. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.202
p. $20.00.
Most people view Y ogacara as a philosophy of idealism. While
there have been exceptions, some scholars pointing out that such a
characterization may not be applicable to all Yogacarins, this view seems
fairly entrenched. Speaking for myself, it is the view I was first taught. I
didn't realize that it might be subject to modification until I began to
study the subject with some Gelugpa teachers who held differently.
Janice Willis, in her welcome book, joins the ranks of those who take
exception, and argues a good case.
Asanga, a prolific author, wrote the Bodhisattvabhiimi as one
division of a much larger work, the Yogiiciirabhiimi. Nearly all of the
Bodhisattvabhumi is practice oriented. Only one chapter actually takes
doctrine as its principal subject, so that chapter is important for under-
standing Asanga's views on reality. This is the Tattviirtha chapter, which
Dr. Willis has ably translated.
The odd thing about the Tattviirtha chapter, as Dr. Willis points out,
117
is that terms which one usually associates with the Yogacara, such as
cittamiitra, vijiiaptimiitra, etc., are conspicuously absent. Why does the
only chapter of a major work dealing with the nature of reality, written
by Asariga, not discuss things in terms of "mind only"? Perhaps the
answer is that Asanga did not consider mind as the ultimate mode of
existence. Indeed, in this chapter, Asanga speaks of siinyatii, not mind,
as ultimate truth.
To be sure, Asanga had his own view of siinyatii, for which he
argues in the Tattviirtha chapter against those whom he felt miscon_
strued siinyatii as meaning nothingness. Asanga's own view of siinyata is
like this:
Now, how is voidness righly conceptualized? Wherever and whatever
place something is not, one rightly observes that place to be void of the
thing. Moreover, whatever remains in that place one knows (prajanati) it as
it really is, that "here there is an existent." This is said to be engagement
with voidness as it really is and without waywardness. (II7)
For Asanga, what this means is that there is no dharma identical
with its verbal designation as "form," etc. So dharmas are void of identity
with their verbal designations. What remains is the basis for the designa-
tion. He who knows the basis asjust the basis and the designation as just
the designation, neither affirms what is non-existent (i.e. the identity of
designation and dharma) nor denies what is existent (i.e. the basis of the
identity). This is a middle path and is considered "voidness rightly
conceptualized. "
Asa:riga criticized what he considered the realist position (i.e. the
identity of dharmas and designations). He says that for each designa-
tion, there would have to be a corresponding thing, but since one thing
may have many designations, that idea is wrong. He argues against those
who say that there are no bases whatsoever for designations by saying
that if that were so, "no designations would occur at all."
It is at this point, Dr. Willis says, presumably following Asanga's
own exegesis to the text, that we can understand the three-nature theory
of Asanga. Parikalpita, imaginary nature, refers to the conception of the
identity of designations and dharmas. Paratantra, dependent nature, is
the dependent relation between designations and their base. Parini)-
panna, perfected nature, is the ultimate mode of the above two. Correct
understanding of just what is parikalpita and just what is paratantra
constitutes an understanding of p a r i n ~ p a n n a .
What then of the terms like cittamiitra and vijiiaptimiitra, and why
have many Buddhologists been misled? Prof. Willis deals with these
questions in Chapter Three of the Introduction. She says, agreeing with
Yoshifumi U eda's article, "Two Streams of Thought in Yogacara Philo-
sophy" (Philosophy East and West. 17. pp. 155-65), that there were two
118
threads of Yogacira thought. The earlier, represented by Asariga and
vasubandhu, was not idealist. The later, represented by Dharmapala
. and Hsuan-tsang, was. It was a confusion between these two threads that
led to the classification of all of Yogacara as idealist.
As fqr the term cittamatra, Dr. Willis suggests that Asariga and
Vasubandhu do not use it to mean "mind only" in the sense that all is
mind. Rather, she sees three distinct uses. The first regards meditative
experience per se, referring to the yogi's object of ;meditation, a mental
image. The second regards its use as a device for weaning ordinary
beings from materiality. In this, she also accepts the views of Prasarigikas
like Tsong Kha Pa. Finally, the third treats the terms as the result of the
analysis and description of the cause of suffering. It is this last use that is
the most interesting. Instead of understanding cittamatra to refer to the
ultimacy of mind, we should understand it to refer to our ideas and
cognitions of the world, which are mistaken, non-ultimate-they are
'just thought," and therefore cause us misery.
It is in light of the third usage that Dr. Willis interprets Vasu-
bandhu's use of the term vijiiaptimatra, (here synonomous with citta-
rniitra) in the TrimSika. She discusses also the well-known phrase, citta-
miitram idam yad idam traidhatukam (these three realms are nothing but
mind). This phrase is best known from the Dalabhiimikasiitra, where it
appears in the midst of a discussion on dependent origination. Dr. Willis
points out that the interpretation of the phrase as meaning that there
are no external objects would be odd in view of the realistic language of
the rest of the sutra. The same phrase occurs earlier however, in the
Bhadrapalasiitra, where there is less doubt as to its meaning. There the
phrase is used in connection with a bodhisattva's meditation, in which he
realizes the illusory nature of the world.
Dr. Willis' arguments have served to call attention to a different
way of looking at Y ogacara in general and Asariga in particular. They
should provide stimulus to further discussion. The only drawback to the
book is that it could have gone into more detail concerning the above
questions. Dr. Willis explains in the Preface that the book does not go into
the detail that her dissertation (upon which the book is based) did. I, for
one, wish that it had. The arguments for her interpretation are good,
but more supporting evidence could make them ironclad. For instance,
she might have gone into some more discussion on the alayavijiiana. She
points out that it is not to be considered an ultimate, but she neglects to
mention its role in the creation of the objects of designation, something
which is quite relevant to her thesis. On the whole though, these draw-
backs should not deter anyone from reacting the book. I recommend it.
E. Todd Fenner
119
Women in Buddhism: Images of the Feminine in Mahayana Tradition, by
Diana Y. Paul (with contributions by Frances Wilson and foreword by
LB. Horner). Berkeley, California: Asian Humanities Press, 1979. pp.
v + 333 (glossary, bibliography, index).
Paul's examination of the "Images of the Feminine" is a worthy
addition to the growing number of studies abollt women's roles in
Buddhism and other institutional religions. Furthermore, Paul (for the
Chinese texts) and Wilson (for the Sanskrit) have contributed the first
English translations for nine of the nineteen accounts. By so doing, they
have made these texts accessible to the larger body of interested students.
In the book's three "Parts" and eight chapters, Paul covers a range
of images of women that can be found in the canonical literature of
Mahayana Buddhism. This range-from woman as "evil temptress" to
woman as Buddha-is generally well supported by the texts she has
included. In any such ambitious and innovative undertaking, some
strain and unevenness, as well as a degree of repetitiveness, is unavoidable.
Paul's weakest section is found in the first part. One suspects that
the exigencies of scholarly feminist consciousness underly the problems
with this section every bit as much as the actual content of the texts. Paul
apparently needed to introduce "implicit" or "latent" meanings to prove
that the male authors were actively misogynist. As presented, the texts
themselves ("The Sutra of the Buddha Teaching the Seven Daughters"
and "The Tale of King Udayana of Vats a") do not seem to convey the
denigration of all women that Paul suggests. Her introduction to the
section also is overtly one-sided. After quoting a statement that women
are " ... purely sensual with uncontrollable desires ... " (p. 5) she admits
only in a footnote that an unquoted statement discussed "the equivalent
obsession men have for women."
In her discussion on the role of "the Merchant's daughter" (in
"Sadaprarudita and the Merchant's Daughter") on page 110 she again
has relied on inference. On the basis of her translation, I question her
view that the Merchant's daughter was a "good friend" to Sadaprarudita,
acting out of pity or compassion for his sufferings. I read it as her reve-
rence and awe for his selfless dedication. If the latter view is valid, the
merchant's daughter's homage to Sadaprarudita represents no shift in
role, nor subjection of female to male per se, but rather of follower to
Bodhisattva. However, I make no claim to doctrinal expertise and would
be quick to admit that Paul must have additional evidence for her
interpretations, although those supports are not clearly stated.
There are other areas where my own disciplinary inclinations-
including psychological anthropology-make me uncomfortable with
her commentaries. In particular she seems to have adopted a primarily
120
Western psychoanalytic view of the relationship between dependency
and low self-image. Her argument-that the monk-authors resented
their dependence upon female householders because it contributed to a
loW self-image, and that dependency, and rejection of it, were a double-
bind leadIng to hate and the projection of self-hatred upon the women-
a ~ s u m e s that dependency is always contradictory to self-esteem. It may
be a firm tenet in the West, but such a view is not as universal as we think.
Furthermore, while CTOSS-CUTrents and conflicting views about the sexes
exist in many "societies-at-large," Paul fails to recognize the specifically
political considerations that arise between institutional religion and the
State. Buddhism has never been "out of this world" and its monastic
orders have never accurately reflected the "society-at-Iarge." Rather its
monastic order has been counterpoised against the State. Even Buddhist
kings have had to reconcile the conflicting demands of the sangha for
expanding its membership, and the demands of the State for people to
fulfill its requirements. Uusually these conflicts have been resolved by
"purifying" councils, sponsored by the State, to "preserve and purify"
and, incidentally, to limit sangha membership. Even in Buddhism's
heyday in China, the State regulated how many monks could belong to
each monastery by confining its subsidies to the permitted number. The
rigors of monastic life-including celibacy and the dread of sex-could
further restrict the attractiveness of membership. If the women also
flocked to the sangha, the State's labor pool would shrink even more.
Male abdication of the householder/progenitor role could be compensated
by plural wives. Female abdication would be much more difficult to
counteract. State-sangha rivalry well may underlie the difficulties placed
in the path of female-and male-aspirants to the monastic life.
These comments have not been intended to minimize the signifi-
cance of Paul's contribution, but to suggest avenues to be considered in
the next edition. Along these same lines, ekayiina is commonly inter-
preted as "universal salvation." However, salvation's Western connota-
tions of savior and saved make "salvation" less appropriate than "en-
lightenment" of "buddhahood" as the universal goal.
Hopefully, the next edition will not include reference to "the Louts
Sutra" (p. 115) one of the amazingly scarce typographical errors in the
volume, and will practice "truth in packaging" by entitling itself "Women
in Buddhist Texts':: Images of the Feminine in Mahayana Canonical
Literature. "
Beatrice D. Miller
121
Wittgenstein and Buddhism, by Chris Gudmunsen. London: Macmillan
Press, 1977. pp. viii + 128. Price: 8.95 (U.K.).
Wittgenstein approached philosophy with a remarkable freshness
of insight; some of his seminal reflections have, as a consequence, served
to open new vistas to contemporary inquiry into such important philoso_
phical issues as the foundations of logic and the role of language in
conceptual thought. His views, significantly, have a definite relevance to
other fields of investigation as well. Wittgenstein's characteristically
terse, suggestive and often arresting remarks on psychology, ethics,
aesthetics and religion, for example, are topical, illuminating, and on
occasion unusually instructive; and they have in turn attracted a good
deal of recent attention. (Cf. C. Barrett, ed., Wittgenstein's Lectures and
Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. Oxford, 1966.
The religious aspect of Wittgenstein's thought has been carefully
examined in W.D. Hudson, Wittgenstein and Religious Belief, New York,
1975.)
The relation of this acute and very influential Western thinker's
ideas to Buddhism-perhaps the most philosophical system of Oriental
religious thought-has been the subject of intermittent discussion for
some time among a select group of scholars engaged in the interpreta-
tive study of Eastern philosophical standpoints. Works that deserve
especial mention in this connection include those of F J. Streng (Empti-
ness: A Study in Religious Meaning, 1967), W.A. Shibles ("Wittgenstein and
Zen" in Wittgenstein, Language and Philosophy, 1969) and K.N.Jayatilleke
(Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, 1963). These efforts have to all
intents and purposes remained at the periphery of Wittgensteinian
studies: none of the more prominent exponents of Wittgenstein's
thought have ventured to comment upon them, or indicated an interest
in them. Still, the importance of such efforts cannot be gainsaid, simply
because there undoubtedly are some very striking resemblances between
the approaches ofWittgenstein and Buddhism; and, surprisingly, this is
so amidst many obviously deep seated differences between them-
differences of time and place of origin of the respective philosophies, as
well as the cultural contexts that generated them. The recognition of
such differences perhaps accounts for the reluctance felt by Wittgen-
stein scholars to compare these two systems of thought.
Nevertheless, the points on which the reflections of an outstanding
contemporary Western secular thinker who, evidently, was in search of
intellectual truth, tend to coincide with the approaches of an ancient
system of religious philosophy which, in contrast, elevated spiritual
emancipation above everything else, are indeed worthy of attention, and
deserve scholarly scrutiny. And such scrutiny-significantly enough, of
a notably sustained kind, and on a scale which has not been hitherto
122
attempted-is the object of Chris Gudmunsen's Wittgenstein and Buddhism.
Wittgenstein's philosophical views as well as the interpretation
h
at was given to some of the concepts and principles associated with
t .
Buddhism tended-of course in very different ways, and under the
influence qf very different types of factors-to change or evolve. There
is thus an 'early' and a 'later' Wittgenstein corresponding to the strikingly
dissimilar ideas elaborated in his two epochal works, the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (1921) and the posthumous Philosophical Investigations
(1953). It is possible similarly to make a distinction between the 'early'
Buddhism of the Pali texts on the one hand, and the 'later' Buddhism of
the Mahyanist thinkers on the other. Gudmunsen seeks for the most
part to draw attention to parallelisms that exist between the approaches
of 'later' Wittgenstein and 'later' (Mahayana) Buddhism. His central
. point is that "much of what the later Wittgenstein had to say was antici-
pated about 1,800 years ago in India." (p. 113)
This is a statement that might understandably astonish many:
Wittgenstein, after all, has been widely considered to be one of the
prime founts of philosophical modernity and innovation in our age-an
'original'thinker who has had no precursors in any serious sense.
However, the statement in question is amply-and on occasion impres-
sively and illuminatingly-substantiated in the course of Gudmunsen's
work. The author points to a number of topics on which there is a coinci-
dence of view between the late Wittgenstein and Mahayana thinkers.
Gudmunsen's discussion of these topics is preceded by an account
of a viewpoint he considers antithetical to the later Wittgenstein and
Mahayana Buddhism. This is identified as that of 'Russell and the
Abhidharmists,' and is elaborated in Part I of the work, which covers its
first two chapters. Here the author highlights early Buddhist Abhi-
dhamma thought in the philosophical idiom of Bertrand Russell.
Gudmunsen clearly underrates and disvalues the philosophical viability
of this viewpoint: its characteristic features are examined mainly in
order to contrast them polemically with those of the later Wittgenstein
and the Mahayanists which are held to be more cogent and persuasive.
This is a point that Gudmunsen emphasizes time and again, even in the
course of his main discussion, in Part II of the book. Like the Mahaya-
nists of old, he considers the approaches associated with the early
Buddhist schools to be defective or otherwise vitiated.
The major portion of the work is concerned with a systematic
comparison of the later Wittgenstein and Mahayana Buddhism. Part II,
'Wittgenstein and the Mahayana' is wholly devoted to this task; individual
topics for comparison are taken up systematically in chapters 3 to 7.
Gudmunsen identifies resemblances on such issues as the process of
knowing, the import of language and the function of language in
123
thinking, as well as the mind itself and its acts. He argues that many of
Wittgenstein's widely-acclaimed contributions to philosophical analysis
were, even in matters of detail, often foreshadowed in the Mahayana texts:
a striking case in point is his linkage of Wittgenstein's celebrated reflections
on the idea of'language-games' in the Philosophical Investigations with a
noted Madhyamika scriptural source. (Cf. pp. 48-49) Gudmunsen
refers to most major Mahayanist thinkers; yet Nagarjuna, under_
comes to the fore often: not only is his sunyata doctrine
compared to Wittgenstein's philosophy in several contexts, but it is also
argued that he actually anticipated some of the later Wittgenstein's
luminous and profound observations on the complex relationships that
exist between language and thought on the one hand, and thought and
reality on the other. The author places his greatest emphasis through_
out on the affinities between the Madhyamika and Wittgenstein. Some
attention, nevertheless, is also given to the Yogacaras.
It is important to point out that though the resemblances between
Wittgensteir, and Mahayana Buddhism form the primary focus of this
book, the differences that separate them are not disregarded, but are,
on the contrary, at times duly observed. Also, the resemblances
themselves are not traced to any influence Buddhism may have exerted
on Wittgenstein; they are, in his view, 'best explained as being similar
reactions to similar stimuli' -in sum, both Wittgenstein and the Maha-
yanists seem only to have responded to and interpreted experiential
reality in similar ways. (pp. 112-113)
Such, then, are the essential lines of argument in this short but
complex attempt to juxtapose two recondite systems of philosophy.
Though it has some shortcomings, it deserves to be recognized as a note-
worthy contribution to both comparative philosophy and Buddhist
(Mahayana) exegesis. Admirers of the Western analytic tradition in
particular should find its discussions instructive; for they do serve to
indicate that some of the philosophical techniques and procedures
developed in the West in this century were enunciated and applied long
before in India-though of course with different ends in view. (What
has to be recognized here is that even in circumstances that required
intellectual discussion or logical argument, the Buddhist stresses the
primacy of the soteriological motive; the need, in other words, to keep
the quest for liberation always in the foreground of our thinking.) At
another level, Gudmunsen's study can be said to afford a helpful and
timely reminder to one section of Buddhist scholarship-namely the
exponents of early or Theravada Buddhism-that Mahayana doctrines
(which the latter are apt to regard as metaphysical or speculative in a
somewhat pejorative sense), do in part actually exhibit the analytic
features and avant garde approaches of present-day Western philosophy,
124
and that those doctrines can, therefore, be exponded in a manner that
would appeal to the contemporary mind. This, evidently, is a point that
has a relevance to exegetical as well as apologetic efforts which proceed
from a Buddhist context. .
This,book is, by and large, laudable, but, as already hinted, it has a
few shortcomings. First of all, the author has failed to provide any back-
ground information on either Buddhism or Wittgenstein-it can
indeed be held against him that he plunges into a knotty inquiry beset
with many difficulties without preparatory observations of any kind.
This procedure, unfortunately, tends to diminish the book's usefulness
for those who lack considerable prior knowledge of the development of
Wittgenstein's philosophy and the interpretation of Buddhism in the
different schools. Of course, Gudmunsen's discussion is for the most
part technical, and it is no doubt mainly addressed to the 'specialist'
rather than the layman; but the 'specialist, it is well to add, will perhaps
have complaints of his own: it appears, for example, that the book offers
no systematic information-or for that matter clues of a serious kind-
on previous research into its field of inquiry; and yet the scholarly
reader might find such information valuable. The author is not unaware
of previous research of the sort just alluded to; in fact he exten-
sively uses the writings of Western interpreters of Buddhism who have
discussed Wittgenstein, often in lieu of a direct examination of the
primary sources on both sides, but sometimes, (and this might not be a
harsh judgement), as a substitute for independent thinking as well. The
bibliography-and indeed Gudmunsen's book as a whole-shows little
evidence of an acquaintance with the enormous expository and critical
literature on Wittgenstein's philosophy. The Buddhist scholar can
perhaps afford to overlook this, and might not view it as a desideratum;
but interpreters ofWittgenstein who happen to read this book cannot be
blamed if the feel otherwise.
These criticisms relate to the author's omissions; objections can
also be raised against what he in fact says: it is possible, for example, to
question the appositeness of some of the parallelisms that he draws. The
points on which such questioning is admissible will perhaps increase
when one delves into the philosophies as set forth in the original texts
rather than the translations which the author actually used. Though
Conze's largely negative approaches to comparative philosophy need
not, as Gudmunsen himself recognizes, be taken as a guide, Conze was
certainly not wrong when he cautioned that "the search for philosophical
parallels is frought with many pitfalls." (E. Conze, "Buddhist Philosophy
and Its European Parallels" in Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, London,
1967). Further, one can with justice take exception to the manner in
, which Gudmunsen views early Buddhism. The abrasive tones in which
125
he uses the term "Hinayana', and his largely negative assessment of that
school might understandably offend those who appreciate and value the
approaches of classical Buddhism. It is possible (and perhaps perferable)
to see the development of Buddhist thought from wider perspectives, in
a spirit of 'oecumenism.' Moreover, the tolerance this entails accords
with the quintessential temper of Buddhism. Those who choose to
adopt these perspectives and attitudes will no doubt f"md the author's
persistent endeavour to pit Hinayanism against Mahayanism not only
openly tendentious, but at times somewhat disagreeable, because it
appears to have sectarian overtones.
Though the shortcomings noted above are worthy of attention,
they do not seriously undermine the book's overall significance or value.
Gudmunsen's discussion clearly represents a substantial contribution to
an interesting, complex theme in comparative philosophy. He has not,
of course, exhausted it; but future scholars who seek to deal more amply
or in greater depth with the same theme will find much of what is written
in: Wittgenstein and Buddhism stimulating, provocative and, on the whole,
instructive; and therefore, well-nigh impossible to ignore.
Vijitha Rajapakse
INFORMATION FOR
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IN THE 1981JIABS nos. 1 AND 2
1. Since the first issue of the 1981 ]lABS will go to the printers soon, we will
be able to include your advertisement in this issue only if it is received by
us by the middle of May, 1981. Books received by January 31,1981, may
be reviewed in that issue.
2. The second number of the 1981 ]lABS is expected to go to the printers in
Mid-July. Books received by May 30th, 1981, may be reviewed in that issue.
The deadline for advertisements to be received by us for the JIABS no. 2
is, however, July 15th, 1981.
3. ADVERTISING RATES: ~ Full page-$100.00
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The above rates are set for Europe, the Americas,Japan, Australia, Taiwan,
Hong Kong and Korea. For other countries the rates may be reduced
upon inquiry. All advertisements should be submitted in a finished
format, ready for the printer.
126
IV. NOTES AND NEWS
A Report on the 2nd Conference
of the lABS
Held at N ava N alanda Mahavihara,
N alanda, Bihar, India
January 17-19, 1980
The 2nd C.onference .of the lABS, .originally scheduled t.o be
held fr.om the 17-19 .of December, 1979, and P.ostp.oned .on acc.ount .of
electi.ons in India, was held from the 17-19 .of January, 1980, at the
Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, Nalanda, Bihat, India. The hist.orical and
sentimental imp.ortance .of Nalanda as well as the enthusiasm .of the
;h.osts in .organizing the c.onference there made the event a mem.orable
.one. There were cl.ose t.o 200 participants fr.om the f.oll.owing countries:
:Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Pe.ople's
Republic .of China, England, France, West Germany, India, Israel,
Italy, Japan, K.orea, Ladakh, Nepal, Netherlands, N.orway, Sikkim,
Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, U.S.A., U.S.S.R.
The General President .of the c.onference was Profess.or Prahlad
Pradhan, .of Orissa, and the c.onference was ,inaugurated by His
. Excellency Dr. A.R. Kidwai, the Rajyapal .of Bihar. The .opening
. ~ e s s i . o n was graced by the presence .of Fuji Guruji fr.om Japan. Pr.ofessor
C.S. Upasak, Direct.or .of Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, was the L.ocal
Secretary f.or the c.onference.
There were about 85 papers submitted t.o the c.onference, s.ome
.of which were read in absentia, because s.ome .of th participants had
tD cancel their plans t.o attend .on account .of the P.ostp.onement .of the
dates. These papers c.overed the vari.ous fields .of Buddhist Studies
and were divided int.o 24 panels as fDll.ows: Phil.osophy and Psych.oI.ogy
(3 panels), Hist.ory, Meditati.on (2 panels), Religi.on and Ethics (3
panels), Literature (4 panels), Buddha, Buddhism and the W.orld (2
panels), Sangha and S.ociety (2 panels), Art (2 panels), Archae.oI.ogy,
Tantra, P.olitics, Study .of Buddhism, and Recent Buddhist M.ovements
(1 panel each).
While we h.ope t.o publish the Presidential Address as well as a
few .of the papers subject t.o the availability .of space in .our Journal, it is
prDP.osed to publish a separate vDlume .of transacti.ons which will
127
include the papers or abstracts thereof, along with the proceedings.
On the occasion of this conference the Archaeological Depart_
ment of the Government of India organized an exhibition on the art
and archaeology of Buddhism on the Nalanda Museum premises.
The Governor of Bihar unveiled a statue of the late Bikkhu ].
Kashyap, the Founder-director of Nava Nalanda Mahavihara on the
premises of the institute.
The following are the resolutions adopted at the conference:
1. It was resolved that the lABS considers of great import the publica-
tion, with an English translation, of a corpus of Buddhist inscriptions and
will support such a project by all means possible.
2. It was resolved that the lABS gives wholehearted backing to the
concept of a University devoted to Buddhist Studies, located at Nalanda, the
famous international center of Buddhist Studies in ancient India.
3. It was resolved that the lABS supports the continuation of the
project of the "Sanskrit Dictionary of Buddhist Texts from the Turfan Finds",
and the project of the "Systematic Survey of Buddhist Sanskrit Literture",
both projects being undertaken by the Akademie der Wissenschaften in
Goettingen, West Germany.
4. It was resolved that the lABS gives its full"support to the building of '
a scale model of the Sanctuary of Maha Bodhi as it existed in the 12th
century according to the photos of the model of Rahula Sankrityana.
5. It was resolved that the lABS as soon as financially possible should
undertake the publication of a directory of scholars and institutions of
Buddhist Studies throughout the world and in the meanwhile it should use
its influence to encourage other bodies to finance it, and requests Dr. Samtani
at Benares Hindu University to make preliminary explorations in this
direction.
6. It was resolved that the lABS should, as far as possible, encourage
the establishment of departments of Buddhist Studi'es in various Universities
through the world.
7. It was resolved that the lABS wishes to reiterate support for the
resolution passed at its first conference in September of 1978, that the lABS
take steps to investigate all the possibilities of support for the continuation of
the Bibliographique Bouddhique, and request Professor Alexander W.
Macdonald of the University of Paris X to take the initiative.
It was agreed to hold the 3rd Conference of the lABS at Winnipeg
Canada. Professor Herbert Guenther was elected as the General President of
the conference, and the Local Secretary is Professor Leslie Kawamura.
Following is a consolo dated statement of accounts as presented by Dr.
Beatrice Miller, the Treasurer, lABS.
128
SECOND ANNUAL TREASURER'S REPORT FOR THE lABS
for the period from 9/12/78-12/31/79
CURRENT ASSETS: $11,089.91
CURRENT LIABILITIES:
Business savings Acct:
One Year Passbook Acct:
90 day Passbook Acct:
Checking Account:
Total in Accounts:
INCOME:
Dues, subscriptions
and 2 Journal ads:
UNESCO contribution:
Interest on accounts:
Total income:
Balance from 9/12/78:
Total:
Less expenses:
Final total balance:
1979 Memberships:
Full:
Associate:
Student:
Founder:
Life:
Institutional:
Subscribing libraries:
Total:
$ 3265.06
$ 5056.57
$ 5086.57
$ 985.86
$11089.91
$ 6164.50
$ 1500.00
$ 444.09
$ 8108.59
EXPENSES:
Office:
Berkeley Publishers:
Offprints:
U.I.E. O.A. dues:
Legal fees:
ALA (mailing list):
Postage:
Bank Charges
(Exchange, returned
checks):
Total expenses:
$6145.47
$14254.06
-$3164.15
$11089.91
173
$ 175.00
$2312.45
$ 105.00
$ 50.00
$ 70.00
$ 98.17
$ 307.08
$ 46.45
$3164.15
(As of 12/29/79, Full and
97 Associate Members from 1977
3 and/or 1978 had not paid
21 their 1979 membership fees.)
21
4
19
8
173
A full report on the 2nd Conference and the Proceedings is proposed to be
published by Nava Nalanda Mahavhara study, and we will keep our members informed
as to how to obtain the complete records.
129
Copy of Report Elaborated For
Union Academique Internationale BruxeUes
A Critical Piili
PAST
Volume I of A Critical Frili Dictionary, treating words beginning
with the vowel A, appeared between 1924 and 1948. It comprised 11
fascicles and a supplement entitled Epilegomena. It was edited by
Dines Andersen (until 1940), Helmer Smith, and Hans Hendriksen
(from 1944). The costs, including those of publication, were met by
various Danish foundations.
A resolution passed at the XXIVth International Congress of
Orientalists at Munich in 1957 urged the resumption of the project,
and at a conference held in Copenhagen in 1958 it was agreed to
continue the CPD on an international basis. By 1971 all the material
for Volume II (the vowels A to 0) and material for the beginning of
Volume III (the consonants K onwards) had been shared out among
scholars from Czechoslovakia, Denmark, England, France, Germany,
Holland, India, Japan, and Sri Lanka, and many of them had paid
visits to Copenhagen to familarize themselves with working methods.
PRESENT
The first fascicle of Volume II appeared in 1960, and by the
beginning of 1976 nine fascicles had been published, thus equalling
or even bettering the rate of progress achieved during the publication
of Volume I. It was possible to calculate that the remaining material
would probably occupy another six fascicles.
Volume II was published first under the general supervision of
Mr. M011er-Kristensen, but from fascicle 5 onwards Professor Alsdorf
was appointed as Editor-in-Chief. In the earlier fascicles a wide diver-
gence between individual writers was discernible in their handling of
the material and in their treatment of linguistic problems. In subse-
quent fascicles, however, produced under Professor Alsdorfs editor-
ship, and in the case of fascicles 8 and 9 actually prepared for the
press by him, many of these inequalities of treatment have been
eliminated.
In 1975 Professor Alsdorf indicated that he <:lid not wish to
continue as Editor-in-Chief to the end of Volume II, and Mr.
Norman was asked to take over the responsibilities of producing the
130
fascicles of the volume, comprising the vowels E and O. Following the
tragic death of Professor Alsdorf in March 1978, which was a great
blow to QIe CPD, the task of supervising the remaining portions of the
vowels U and U was also entrusted to Mr. Norman.
Professor Alsdorfs death caused some delay to fascicle 10,
which was in the press; it was published recently, in March 1979. some
of the material for fascicle 11 has already gone to press. The
remainder should be ready by the summer of 1979, and the fascicle
should be published late in 1980 or early in 1981.
FUTURE
In March 1978 the Carlsberg Foundation and the Danish
Research Council, which together with UNESCO have met the costs
of Volume II to date, announced that they were unable to offer
[mancial aid to the CPD after the completion of Volume II (the
remaining vowel portions). At a meeting held at Mainz in February
1979, financed jointly by the Academy (responsible for the publica-
tion in concordance with the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and
Letters since Professor Alsdorf took over as Editor-in-Chief) and
CPISH, it was resolved that, despite the loss of financial backing,
preparation should be made for the continuation of the Dictionary.
It was reported that a certain arrangement between the "Bund" and
"Lander" of the German Federal Republic would make it possible for
the Mainz Academy to obtain a grant to enable an assistant to be
employed on the Dictionary work at Mainz, and it was hoped that
arrangements could be made for someone to be employed in Paris.
When the preparatory work has been done, it will be necessary to
recruit scholars to write articles and financial aid will have to be
sought to publish material as it is prepared.
131
April 1979
K. R. Norman, Cambridge
Editor-in-Chief
A Critical Pali Dictionary
52
DK-1l50 Copenhagen K
Names and AddJressres of Contributoll" to lIABS, Volume 3, NO.1
Mr. Jose Cabezon
Dept. of South Asian Studies
1244 Van Hise Hall
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53706
Mr. Edward Todd Fenner
Dept. of South Asian Studies
1244 Van Hise Hall
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53706
Dr. Shohei Ichimura
1176 Snada-Higashi-cho
Hachioji-Shi,
Tokyo 193
JAPAN
Professor Aaron Koseki
Program in Religious Studies
4016 Foreign Languages Bldg.
University of Illinois
Urbana, IL 61820
Professor Whalan W. Lai
Dept. of Religious Studies
University of California
Davis, CA 95606
Dr. Beatrice D. Miller
1227 Sweet Briar Rd.
Madison, WI 53705
Professor Kenneth Roy Norman
Faculty of Oriental Studies
Sidgwick A venue
Cambridge CB3 9DA
ENGLAND
Mr. Gudmunseni Rajpakse
35950 Timberlane Dr.
Solon, OH 44139
132
Professor Braj Mohan Sinha
Dept.' of Religious Studies
The College of Wooster
Wooster, OH 44691,
Professor Geshe Sopa
Dept. of South Asian Studies
1250 Van Hise Hall
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53706
Mr. K.M. Srivastava
B-58, Bangur Ave.
Calcutta 700055
INDIA
Professor Alex Wayman
Dept. of Middle East Languages
& Cultures
Columbia University
603 Kent Hall
New York, NY 10027
Professor Frances Wilson
Dept. of South Asian Studies
1246 Van Hise Hall
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53706
Books on Indian Religion and Philosophy
ACritical Study of Mahavastu
Brahma Sutra
Buddhist WiSdom: Th.e Mystery oj the Self
Buddhist Sects zn Indza
Buddhacharita: Acts of the Buddha
Conquest of Suffering... .
Dimensions [3 Renunczatzon zn Advazta
Vedanta
Doctrine of the J ainas
History oj Indian Philosophy (5 Vol.)
A History of Indian Logic
index to the Names in the Mahabharata
Indian and Indology-Selected articles
of Professor W. Norman Brown
indian Studies in Philosophy
Life as Yoga
Madhusudan Saraswati on Bhagvad Gita
Mahayana Buddhism
Nagarjuna's Philosophy
Nyayamanjari of Jayanta Bhatta (Vol. I)
Pratyabhijnahridyam
Reflections on the T antras
Rise of Esoteric Buddhism in Tibet
Sacred Books of the East Series (50 Vol.)
Sankhya Sutras of Pancasikkha and
S amkhyatattvalok
Studies in Buddhistic Culture oj India
Study of Yoga
.' The Prabhakam School of Purvamimasa
Vadiraja's Refutation of Sankara's Non-
'dualism: Clearing the way for theism
Vedic Metaphysics -
Yoga ofGuhya Samaj Tantra
Yoga System of Patanjali
Yoga as Philosophy and Religion
Bhikkhu Telwatte Rahula
Swami Sivananda
G. Grimm
Nalinaksha Dutt
F.H. Johnston
P.]. Saher
Kapil N. Tiwari
W. Schubring
S.N. Dasgupta
M.M. Satiscandra Vidya Bhushan
S. Sorensen
Ed., Professor Rosane Rocher
R.C. Pandeya
Vimala Thakar
S.K. Gupta
Nalinaksha Dutt
K. Venkata Ramanan
Tr. by].V. Bhattacharya
Tr. by Jaide Singh
S. Chattopadhyaya
Dr. Eva Dargyay
Ed. F. Max Muller
Hariharnanda Aranya
L.M.Joshi
J ajneshwar Ghosh
Ganganath Jha
L. Mefford Betty
Bharati Krishnatiratha
Alex Wayman
].H. Woods
S.N. Dasgupta
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R. E. Emmerick
'. A GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE ON KHOT AN
Studia Philologica Buddhica: Occasional Paper Series, HI) :
: (Tokyo: The Reiyukai Library, 1979) :
. vii + 63 pages
..
i ...................... ............... " .............. 0 .................................................. ,. ............ c .......... .
Khotan has been famous for its agricultural and manufacturing centre at the
southern edge of the Tarim Basin in an oasis, as well as for its cultural and
trading centre on the Tien-shan southern route of the Takla Makan Desert.
Buddhism seems to have been introduced to the Khotan area well before the
Christian era. It then flourished as a major centre of Mahayana studies as
. attested by well-known pilgrims, for example Fa-hsien, Hsuan-tsang and
Huei-chao, on their visits as early as the beginning of the fifth to the following
centuries. It continued until the tenth century.
All the material in the Khotanese language comes from the period covering
the seventh to the tenth centuries. Thus all the surviving literature of Khotan
is Buddhist in content, and even the secular documents are coloured by
Buddhism in some way.
In the present booklet the world-leading authority in the field of Khotanese
studies attempts a critical and comprehensive survey of the literature based
upon his own research work. It is not intended to provide a complete biblio-
graphy, but is furnished with extensive bibliographical notes on all of the
extant literature. The booklet will no doubt offer a good insight into the
various fields of relevant studies.
The author is very interested in obtaining any information regarding related
or parallel passages or texts in other languages.
Single copies of the Studia Philologica Buddhica (Occasional Paper Series) are
obtainable free of charge on request direct from the Reiyukai Library, Tokyo.
TI05 3%
1i. [gf
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Article manuscripts, including footnotes, should not exceed approximately 30
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,for short incluliing footnotes, should not consist of more than 2,000
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Italics: Italicize all non-English words except proper names; words listed in
,Webster's Third New International Dictionary are normally considered to be
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; the surname should precede the given name, except where modern writers or
!public figures have established known for the romanizations of
"their own names. For well-known place names, use the established forms.
Transcription - Sanskrit, Pali and Other South Asian Languages: For
,Sanskrit and Pali use the standard system given in A.L. Basham, The Wonder
"That Was India, Appendix X; for other South Asian languages use any available
standard transliteration system which is consistent and intelligible.
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for Korean use the system given in McCure-Reischauer, "The Romanization
of the Korean Language", Transactions of the Korean Branch, Royal Asiatic
Society, 29 (1939), 1-55.
Tibetan, Mongolian: For Tibetan use the transcription proposed by T. Wylie,
"A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription", Harvard journal of Asian
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,', Antoine Mostaert, Dictionnaire Ordos, 769-809.
Footnotes and bibliographical references: Keep notes to a minimum. All notes
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should follow the title, as in, e.g. A.L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India (N ew
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