Jiabs 9-1

THE JOURNAL
Of THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION Of

BUDDHIST STUDIES
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
A.K. Narain
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA
fL.M.Joshi
Punjabi University
Patiala, India
Alexander W. Macdonald
Universite de Paris X
Nanterre, France
Bardwell Smith
Carleton College
Northfield, Minnesota, USA
EDITORS
Ernst Steinkellner
University of Vienna
Wien, Austria
Jikido Takasaki
University of Tokyo
Tokyo,Japan
Robert Thurman
Amherst College
Amherst, Massachusetts, USA
ASSISTANT EDITOR
Volume 9
Roger Jackson
Fairfield University
Fairfield, Connecticut, USA
1986 Number 1
THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF BUDDHIST STUDIES, INC.
This Journal is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
Inc. It is governed by the objectives of the Association and accepts scholar!;
contributions pertaining to Buddhist Studies in all the various disciplines such
as philosophy, history, religion, sociology, anthropology, art, archaeology,
psychology, textual studies, etc. The JIABS is published twice yearly in the
summer and winter.
Manuscripts for publication (we must have two copies) and correspondence
concerning articles should be submitted to the JIABS editorial office at the
address given below. Please refer to the guidelines for contributors to the
JIABS printed on the inside back cover of every issue. Books for review should
also be sent to the address below. The Editors cannot guarantee to publish
reviews of unsolicited books nor to return those books to the senders.
The Association and the Editors assume no responsibility for the views
expressed by the authors in the Association's Journal and other related
publications.
Andre Bareau (France)
MN. Deshpande (India)
R. Card (USA)
B.C. Cokhale (USA)
P.S. Jaini (USA)
J. W. de Jong (Australia)
JIABS
c/o Dept. of Religious Studies
230 Sycamore Hall
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47405
USA
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Joseph M Kitagawa (USA)
Jacques May (Switzerland)
HaJime Nakamura Uapan)
John Rosenfield (USA)
David Snellgrove (U.KJ
E. Zurcher (Netherlands)
The Editor wishes to thank Ms. Rena Haggarty for her invaluable
help in the preparation of this issue.
Copyright The International Association of Buddhist Studies 1986
ISSN: 0193-600X
Sponsored by Department of South Asian Studies, University ofWis-
consin, Madison.
Indexed in Religion Index One: Periodicals, American Theological Li-
brary Association, Chicago, available online through BRS (Bibliog-
raphic Retrieval Services), Latham, New York, and DIALOG Informa-
tion Services, Pal Alto, California.
Composition by Publications Division, Grote Deutsch & Co., Madison, WI 53704.
Printing by Thomson-Shore, Inc., Dexter, MI 48130.
CONTENTS
I. ARTICLES
1.
The Meaning ofVijiiapti in Vasubandhu's Concept of
Mind, by Bruce Cameron Hall 7
2.
"Signless" Meditations in Pali Buddhism,
by Peter Harvey 25
3.
Dagen Casts Off"What": An Analysis of Shinjin
Datsuraku, by Steven Heine 53
:4.
Buddhism and the Caste System, by Y. Krishan 71
!-.."
:;5. The Early Chinese Buddhist Understanding of the
Psyche: Chen Hui's Commentary on the
Yin Chih Ju Ching, by Whalen Lai 85
:6. The Special Theory of Pratityasamutpada: The Cycle
of Dependent Origination, by Geshe Lhundub Sopa 105
II. BOOK REVIEWS
Chinese Religions in Western Languages: A Comprehensive
and Classified Bibliography of Publications in English,
French and German through 1980, by Laurence C.
Thompson
(Yves Hervouet) 121
;2.
The Cycle of Day and Night, by N amkhai N orbu
(A.W. Hanson-Barber) 122
.3.
Dharma and Gospel: Two Ways of Seeing, edited by Rev.
C.W. Houston
(Christopher Chapple) 123
Meditation on Emptiness, by Jeffrey Hopkins
(J.W. deJong) 124
5. Philosophy of Mind in Sixth Century China, Paramartha's
'Evolution ofConsciousness,'by Diana Y. Paul
(l.W. deJong)
129
Diana Paul Replies
133
].W. deJongReplies
135
6. Seven Works ofVasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological
Doctor, by Stefan Anacker
(A.W. Hanson-Barber)
136
7. Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essense of True
Eloquence: Reason and Enlightenment in the Central
Philosophy of Tibet, translated by Robert A.F.
Thurman
(l anet Gyatso)
138
III. NOTES AND NEWS
l. Election Results, lABS
143
2. Conference Announcements
144
8th Conference, lABS
144
32ndlCANAS
145
7 th World Sanskrit Conference
145
3. AAR Buddhism Group
146
OBITUARIES 147
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS 156
The Meaning of Vijiiapti In Vasubandhu's
. Concept of Mind
by Bruce Cameron Hall
For the Mahayana it is determined that the whole of the three
realms is vijiiapti-only (vijiiapti-matra), according to the sutra: "It
is thought-only (citta-matra), You Sons of the Conqueror, that is
the whole of the three realms." Thought (citta) , mind (manas) ,
awareness (vijiiana), and vijiiapti are synonyms. Here "thought"
(citta) implies "[thought itself] along with its concomitants." The
[word] "only" serves to rule out [external] referents (artha).
So begins the Virizsatikii-vr:tti (VV), 1 Vasubandhu's auto-com-
mentary on the VirizSatikii-kiirikii (VK). The first stanza of VK
reads:
2
This [universe]is certainly vijiiapti-only, since there are appear-
ances of non-existent [external] referents, as when someone with
an eye disease sees a non-existent "knot of hair" and so on. /VK 11
VK (with VV) and the Tririzsikii-ki'irikii (TK) together make
up the Vijiiaptimiitratii-siddhi, or "Establishing That There is Vi-
jnapti-Only."3 Clearly, vijiiapti-miitra is being equated here with
.citta-miitra ("mind-only" or "thought-only"), which is an alternate
title for Vasubandhu's Vijnanavada philosophy. While the Tririz-
siM presents Vasubandhu's own doctrine in some detail, the
VirhSatikii (VK and VV) is a polemical work in the form of a
dialogue between Vasubandhu and an imaginary opponent.
'This opponent is a fellow Buddhist, but a realist or, one might
say, a literalist.
The vijiiapti-miitra of the Vijiiaptimiitratii-siddhi has been vari-
9usly translated as "representation-only,,,4 "ideation-only,,,5.
7
8 JIABS VOL. 9 NO.1
"perception-only,,,6 and so on. Although none of these glosses
is completely satisfactory, t?e purpose of the present essay is
not to suggest another EnglIsh eqUIvalent, but rather to analyze
the term vijnapti, its usage, and the concept it designates. Such
analysis may help clarify the general conception of mind in the
so-called "Y ogacara idealism" as presented by Vasubandhu. This
analysis amounts to a commentary on the first paragraph of
VV. The elements to be explicated in this commentary are: (1)
the term vijnapti itself, (2) its equation with other terms for
mind, (3) the significance of the "only" in "mind-only," and (4)
how it is that the "whole of the three realms" can be identified
as "mind-only." In addition to the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi itself
reference will be made to four other works ascribed to V a s u b a n ~
dhu: Abhidharmakosa-karika (AKK), Abhidharmarkosa-bhas,ya
(AKB), Karmasiddhi-prakaraTja (KSP), and Pancaskandha-pra_
karaTja (PSP).7 The controversy over whether these works were
written by one or more Vasubandhus is here ignored: the author
of the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi is evidently fluent in the Sarvastiva-
din Abhidharma, which is outlined in AKK and treated critically
in AKB, KSP, and PSP.
I. The Term Itself
Vijnapti is a technical term of the Sarvastivadin Abhidharma,
which Vasubandhu has here appropriated and used in a special
sense. An investigation of this term can illustrate in miniature.
the widespread appropriation and redefinition of the.
Abhidharma in Vijnanavada philosophy. An interpretation of.
such a technical term should consider its ordinary use, its etymol-
ogy, and its technical use (both in specific contexts and also in
relation to a cluster of other technical terms). This ought to
reveal Vasubandhu's precise intention in reapplying the term.,
In ordinary parlance vijnapti (Pali vinnatti) means "informa-
tion" or the act of informing someone, that is "report" or "proc-<
lamation," especially a report to a superior, and hence, "request"
. or "entreaty." Vijnapti is a noun of action derived from the ..
causative stem (jnapaya- or jnapaya-) of the verb rootjna ("know")
with the prefix vi-.
s
Etymologically the term vijnapti would mean
the act of causing [someone] to know [something] distinctly,or
VASUBANDHU
9
in a concrete sense, that which causes [one] to know distinctly.
Another important term derived from the causative of jiiii (with
the prefix pra-) is prajiiapti (Pali paiiiiatti) , which means "declara-
.tion" or manifestation in words, and hence, "verbal or conven-
tional designation," or perhaps even "concept."g Another paral-
lel formation which would be well known to a Buddhist monk
is the unprefIxed form jiiapti or jiiiipti (Pali iiatti), the technical
term for a formal "motion" or "proposal" in a meeting of the'
'monastic community, for example: the motion to ordain a new
.monk.l0 These three terms share the sense of a public act of
"making known."
. In the Sarvastivadin Abhidharma both vijiiapti and its oppo-
site, avijiiapti, appear as technical terms, particularly in the dis-
i.cussion of karma. Here karma specifIcally means ethically sig-
;.lnifIcant action: acts or deeds.
ll
In chapter 4 of the Abhidha-
;i'rmakosa Vasubandhu defInes karma as: "volition and that de-
hrived from it,,,12 quoting a sutra: "there are two [kinds of] kar-
i.m
as
: volition and the act subsequent to volition." 13 This two-fold
\:karma is expanded into three types: mental (corresponding to
and vocal or bodily (corresponding to "post-voli-
action). Vocal and bodily karma is further classifIed as
both vijiiapti- and avijiiapti-karma, "manifest" and "un-
) manifest" acts, that is, karma manifest or not manifest to some
!consciousness.
/i;
i( One should .note that, from an Abhidharmic perspective,
hhe common-sense notion of "an act" is analyzed into a succes-
;';sion of momentary dharmas. In the case of vocal and bodily
:Lacts the dharmas would be moments of sound or color-shape.
;:These audible or visible forms are understood to be dharmas
in the "aggregate of material forms" (riipa-skandha) ,
given the momentariness of phenomena, the Abhidharma
r:aliows no real distinction between "acts" and "things." So far
'the Abhidharmic analysis is clear. DiffIculty arises in that the
act is also included as one of the 75 dharmas
t'accepted by the Sarvastivadins, and this dharma, avijiiapti-rupa,
also included in the aggregate of material forms. 14
. Contrary to what one might assume at fIrst glance, this
;."unmanifest" karma is not some kind of private act not observed
!,py others, since an act is vijiiapti (for the Sarvastivadins) if it
t:could be "manifest" to another consciousness. [For the Vi-
10
JIABS VOL. 9 NO.1
j:fianavadins vijiiapti means "manifest to any consciousness," in-
cluding that ofthe agent, and in this sense mental karma would
be entirely vijiiapti, since consciousness is, by definition, self-
manifesting.] Instead, is used to explain karmic
continuity in certain contexts. A "manifest" vocal or bodily act
is karmic, in the sense of ethically significant, because of its
dependence on volition. But, since it is also "dharmic," that is
a momentary event, how can one account for the
between this momentary act and its future consequence? The
explanation of karmic continuity is a general problem for the
Sarvastivadins, and it is in this context that avijiiapti-rupa is added
to the list of dharmas. The following sequence is postulated: (1)
[manifest, mental] volition, (2) [manifest, material] vocal or bod-
ily act, (3) [unmanifest, material] (4) [manifest;
material] consequence [that is, a later, consequent manifestation
of rupaJ. Since both the preceding act and the succeed-
ing (vijiiapti) consequence are "material," it follows that the in-
tervening (avijiiapti) dharmas, although imperceptible, are also
"material"-that is, they belong to the rupa-skandha.
This notion of avijiiapti-rupa is filled with difficulties, and
Vasubandhu presents it with considerable qualms in the
Abhidharmakosa. In the Karmasiddhi-prakararJa, the whole concept
of / rupa is rigorously criticized and finally
rejected, and all karma is reduced to volition.
15
Given this, it is
tempting to see the title Vijiiaptimatrata-siddhi as Vasubandhu's
proclamation that he has solved this problem by eliminating the
category of In any case, the Vijiiaptimatrata system re-
fers the problem of karmic continuity to the concept of
jiiana, the "store-consciousness" which contains the "residue"
(vasana) of past acts and the "seeds" (bija) of future ones. The
new meaning assigned to vijiiapti can best be explained by con-
sidering next the other three terms equated with it in the.
ing passage of VV.
II. The Other Terms for "Mind"
The translation of citta, manas, and vZJnana above as
"thought," "mind," and "awareness" should be understood as.
merely tentative. In fact, much argument has been devoted to
VASUBANDHU 11
the problem of translating these terms. Brian Galloway, for
example, has argued that the "correct translation" is "mind"
(citta) , "consciousness" (manas), and "perception" (vijiulna), and
that the "formerly prevailing" translations are wrong.
16
Unfor-
tunately, "the correct translation" is not so easy to come by. Not
only do the Sanskrit terms have several meanings and various
uses, but the suggested equivalents are all imprecise terms in
English. Any translation will thus mean something different
depending on what a vague word such as "consciousness"
suggests to each translator or reader. Once again, what is needed
is not simply another English equivalent, but an explanation of
the actual usage of the Sanskrit term. Furthermore, one should
not forget that, in any case, these three terms are here stated
to be synonyms.
VV presupposes that: "citta, manas, and vijiiiina have a single
meaning.,,17 All three are terms for mind, not as a substantial
entity, but as a stream of momentary mental dharmas. All three
signify the same dharma or dharmas. Why, then, does Vasuban-
dhu use three different terms for the same reality? One might
'answer that, as a member of the Buddhist scholastic tradition
that employs these three terms, Vasubandhu is obliged to ex-
plain them. One might also suggest that using three words, and
.thus pointing at the same reality from several perspectives, pro-
vides a depth of description that a single word could not. The
Abhidharma literature consists largely of intersecting and cross-
referenced lists of terms. The three main terms for mind appear
traditionally in different lists, with a different connotation and
context.
Citta is perhaps the most basic term for "mind" or "thought."
.' It is the term that signifies a single thought, or better, a single
thought-moment. Citta is also used to designate a particular
mind as opposed to other minds, though in this sense the proper
.technical term is citta-samtiina, "thought-series," a synonym for
"stream of consciousness." Citta is the mental as
contrasted with the material (rupa) , and bare consciousness as
.contrasted with mental states (caitasika, caitta, or citta-sam-
prayukta-samskiira). [In the present passage; however, it is stated
that citta here means consciousness along with its "concomit-
ants," the mental states; it is "mind" or "consciousness" in the
most general sense to which the equation of citta, manas, vijiiana,
12 JIABS VOL. 9 NO.1
and vijnapti refers.] In the Sarvastivadin Abhidharma, the older
classification of the five "aggregates" (skandhas) is replaced
(schematically at least) by the tabulation of the 75 dharmas under
the five headings of "material form" (rupa) , "consciousness"
(citta) , "dispositions conjoined with consciousness" (citta-sam_
prayukta-samskara); "dispositions disjoined from consciousness"
(citta-viprayukta-samskara) , and .the "unconditioned" (asamskr:
ta
).
In this context, the single dharma, citta, takes the place of the
"aggregate of awareness" (vrynana-skandha).
Manas, on the other hand, is the term for "mind" as the
sixth of. the six organs or faculties of perception (sensory or
mental) in the list of twelve "sense-fields" (ayatana): the six "sense
organs" (indriya) and six "sense objects" (v4aya). Here, "mental"
is contrasted riot with "material" but rather with "sensory." Per-
ception can also be analyzed into three aspects: the object of
cognition (alambana) , the organ of cognition (asraya) , and the
corresponding act of awareness (vrynana). In this way, the twelve
sense-fields become the eighteen dhatus (elements of percep-
tion), with the addition of visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory,
tactile, and mental vijnana (perception or awareness). "Mental
perceptions" are strictly-mental perceptions-that is, percep-
tions of ideas, concepts, or mental objects, whether derived from
previous sensory perception or not. Vasubandhu (in AKK-AKB
1.16-17) finds no "dharmic" distinction between "mind" (manas
as an "organ") and "mental perception" (mano-vijnana) " Al-
though the logic of the scheme requires a corresponding "organ"
(asraya or indriya) for each object and perception, the "organ"
for mental perception is simply previous moments of awareness, .
which serve as a causal basis for the arisal of the present mental
perception. Once again, mind is not a substantial or quasi-ma-
terial entity, but a stream of causally related thought-moments.
Vijnana may be translated as "awareness," "consciousness,"
"cognition," "perception," and so on. Vasubandhu gives the
following definition (AKK 1.16): "Vry'nanr;t is 'respective' vijnapti."
(AKB:) "The apprehension that is the1vry"napti with respect to
the various sense objects is called the vijnana-skandha.,,18 Vijniina
occurs as a term in a great number of Abhidharmic lists; for
example, the fifth of the five skandhas and six of the eighteen
dhiitus are called vrynana. The vry'nana-skandha has already been
equated with citta above. In AKB on AKK 1.16, it is also equated
VASUBANDHU 13
with manas and with the last six of the eighteen dhatus. In this
last case, vijnana quite clearly means "perception." To translate
caklur-vijnana andsrotra-vijnana, for example, as "eye-conscious-
. ness" and "ear-consciousness" (with the plural "conscious-
nesses")- rather than "visual perception" and "auditory percep-
tion"-is not simply pecular English; it might even suggest a
strangely animistic notion of consciousness.
However, "perception" or even "cognition" does not quite
fit some of the other uses of vijnana. Such, for example, is vijnana
as the sixth of the six dhatus-a different set of dhatus-the other
five being earth, air, water, fire, and akasa (here meaning "ether"
rather than "space," as it usually does in Buddhism). There is
also the third of the twelve links in the chain of dependent
arising (pratztya-samutpada): a vijnana that arises in dependence
on sarilskaras, and in dependence on which there arises "name
and form" (nama-rupa). This is related to the use of v&nana as
a term for that which "passes over" in rebirth. The specifically
Yogacara term alaya-vijnana ("store-consciousness") has also
been mentioned above. In these instances, where vijnana
suggests something prior to or more general than perception
br cognition, "awareness" or "consciousness" would seem to be
a better translation.
These terms, citta, manas, and vijnana, all illuminate a con-
cept of mind as a stream of causally related thought-moments,
each of which is a specific act of bare awareness. What is it that
vijnapti, which Vasubandhu here gives as the fourth synonym,
adds to the picture? V&napti here signifies more than vijnapti-
karma, but retains a sense of activity or function. Vijnapti desig-
nates the basic phenomenon of conscious experience, withou.1:
requiring its separation into object, subject, and act of cognition .
. What then is "vijnapti-only"?
III. The Significance of "Only"
The word matra means "measure" or "extent." It is fre-
quently added as the second member of compounds (which may
be understood as bahuvrzhis based on appositionalkarmadharayas)
in the form of "X-matra" meaning "having X as its full extent,"
hence "only X." Often the sense is pejorative: "mere X." It is
clear, however, that in the present context no pejorative sense
is required. "Mind-only" means "consisting only of mind," "no-
thing but mind," "bare mind," "sheer mind," and so on.
19
A
matra compound, then, affirms one factor while denying all
others that might apply. The passage itself makes clear what is
denied here: objects as external substantial entities. Yetcitta-
matra, the term used in the sutra passage cited, would suffice
to deny external objects. What is the point of specifically affirm-
ing vifnapti by using the compound vijnapti-matra?
The term signifies a "phenomenon" of conscious_
ness,20 a "manifestation" to consciousness, or a "percept,,21_
so
long as one bears in mind that these terms should not be taken
in a naively realistic or a naively idealistic sense. The translation
"perception" is not bad, especially considering the ambiguity of
the English word. "Perception" can denote a quality, a faculty,
a process, or the apparently objective aspect of that process: its
contents. However, it might be better to retain "perception" for
translating or v&'iiana (at least in some of its senses).
To translate vijnapti here by "representation" conveys its "pub-
lic" aspect, but seems to imply representation of something,
presumably of an external object or referent, which suggests a
"representational" theory of knowledge. On the contrary, the
purpose of the argument throughout the Virhsatika is to show
that the concept of vijnapti suffices to make sense of perception,
and that the concept of an external referent (artha) is logically
superfluous. It is specifically stated in the initial quotation that
"the [word] 'only' serves to rule out [external] referents." Clearly,
then, when vijnapti is qualified as "vijnapti-only," it cannot be
meant as a representation of anything else, especially not of an .
external object.
This would seem to imply that the theory of knowledge
involved here, if not representational, is some sort of subjective
or absolute idealism.
22
This has, in fact, been the most common
"outside" interpretation of Vijftanavada, not only by modern
writers, but by its ancient opponents, both and Buddhist.
Any statement to the effect that the world is mind-only" seems
to imply that, given a set of material and mental factors, the
former are denied and the latter are affirmed, or the former
are reduced to the latter. Even the translation "ideation-only"
for vijnapti-matra seems to suggest that matter is unreal while
VASUBANDHU 15
. consciousness alone is real.
It is one thing to accuse the Vijiianavadins of falling into a
reification of mind, and quite another to assume that such is
:.their intention. The former position is certainly arguable, and
'was strongly argued by their Madhyamika rivals. If anything, it
is the concept of iilaya-vijiiiina, rather than that of vijiiapti-miitra,
which most exposes the Vijiianavadins to the charge of turning
consciousness into some kind of substance or self. Here I would
argue that, as is so often the case in Buddhist philosophy, Vas-
ubandhu is consciously navigating between two extremes, which
in this case may be called realism and idealism.
In negative terms, vijiiapti-miitra rules out the realist ex-
treme: substantial external objects of cognition are denied. How-
lever, vijiiapti-miitra has also a positive connotation, and the fact
that Vasubandhu here affirms precisely vijiiapti-rather than
.vijiiiina or citta, which might more easily be misunderstood-
"seems to indicate an intent to avoid the idealist extreme as well.
,What is exclusively affirmed is not consciousness as an abiding
entity, but the content of momentary acts of consciousness.
this vijiiapti is equated with citta; manas, and vijiiiina; it
;follows that mind itself is vijiiapti-miitra: it consists of nothing
ielse than the contents of momentary mental acts. The intention
'here is not to reduce the material to the mental, but to deny
the dichotomy, while affirming that the basic reality is more
hsefuIiy discussed in the terms belonging to a correct under-
standing of the mental.
'IV. The Whole of the Three Realms
.. The compound vijiiapti-miitra involves a denial and an affir-
rmation. The extent of this denial/affirmation is truly universal.
frrhe term used in the passage is traidhiitukam, which may be
;;understood, grammatically and contextually, as meaning idam
tfraidhiitukam: "this [universe] consisting of three dhiitus.,,23 Here
meet a third, cosmological, sense of the term dhiitu in the
.;i\bhidharma lexicon. There are three cosmological "realms."
t!... The "realm of desires" (kiima-dhiitu) is the world of "ordi-
experience, that is to say the world experienced by beings
:in hell, ghosts, animals, most humans, and the lower orders
among the divinities. The two higher "realms" may be entered
through either meditation or apparitional birth. The "realm of
forms" (rupa-dhiitu) corresponds to the refined experiences of
those in the first four levels of meditation (the four dhyanas)
and the analogous experiences of certain classes of gods. The
"realm of formlessness" (arupya-dhiitu) consists of the experi-
ences of those meditators and divinities abiding in the formless
meditations. These are given as four: infinite space, infinite
awareness (vijiiana) , nothingness, and neither conception nor
non-conception (with sometimes a fifth added: the cessation of
conception and feeling).
Taken together, these three "realms" comprise the whole'
cosmos. "The whole of the three realms" is synonymous with
sarilsara and with "all conditioned (samskrta) dharmas." If Vas-
ubandhu's statement that the whole of the three realms is no-
thing but vijiiapti is taken in the "idealist" sense, then this implies
that there is really nothing "out there"-the whole universe is
in the mind. Among other consequences, this interpretation
inevitably raises the problem of solipsism: "the whole universe
is in my mind." On the contrary, taking the interpretation ar- .
gued in this paper, Vasubandhu's statement means that the
whole universe is nothing but the contents of consciousness
(that is, all the contents of everyone's consciousness). Does this
amount to the truism that we cannot conceive of anything that
we cannot conceive of? I would argue, instead, that the intention
of the vijiiapti-matra doctrine is not to draw"boundaries around
reality but rather to point at the nature of specific experiences.
Vasubandhu himself states the purpose of this doctrine in
VK-VV 7-10. His imaginary opponent poses the scriptural o b ~
jection that, if consciousness alone exists, why does the Buddha
speak of all twelve sense-fields (objects and organs of percep-
tion)? Vasubandhu replies that the Buddha taught with "a spe-
cial intention," depending on the needs of a specific audience.
Both the teaching of the twelve ayatanas ana the teaching of
vijiiapti-matra involve such a special intention, being two stages
in the teaching of "no-self." .
The purpose of the ayatana doctrine (and, by implication,
of the whole Abhidharma analysis into dharmas) is to introduce
pudgala-nairatmya ("the fact that there is no self in persons,,).24
Analysis into dharmas can dissolve the substantiality of "things"
VASUBANDHU 17
and "beings," yet dharmas too can be reified. The purpose of
the vijiiapti-matra doctrine is to introduce the second stage in
understanding "no-seW': dharma-nairatmya ("the fact that there
.is no self in dharmas"). The opponent objects that this seems
to deny the of dharmas altogether, which would mean
that vijiiapti-matra too is non-existent. Vasubandhu replies that
what is denied is not the existence of dharmas as moments of
experience, but rather "that mentally constructed self that is the
intrinsic nature of dharmas imagined by naive people as object,
subject, and so on. ,,25 This does not deny that the dharmas
themselves, as perceived by the Buddha, exist. However, the
dharmas as perceived by the Buddha are inexpressible
(anabhilapya) by philosophy. Furthermore, Vasubandhu points
out that this teaching of dharma-nairatmya works only when vi-
jiwpti-matra itself is understood to be vijiiapti-only. Clearly, no
reification of consciousness is intended here.
One further passage may clarify Vasubandhu's intention.
:To the repeated assertion that dreams prove the possibility of
perception without external referents, the opponent objects:
"Someone not yet awakened does not understand the non-exis-
tence of a sense object seen in a dream.,,26 Vasubandhu replies
that, on the contrary, we are all asleep:27
In this way, the world-asleep with a sleep that is the residue of
the imposition of false conceptualizing-is seeing, as in a dream,
a non-existent [external] referent. Not having been awakened,
it does not understand, as it is, the non-existence of that [refe-
rent]. But, when one has been awakened through obtaining the
transcendental non-conceptual cognition that is the antidote to
that [sleep], then-through the direct realization of the purified
mundane cognition that is obtained after that-one understands,
as it is, the non-existence of the [sense] object.
V. Conclusion
I find it misleading to call Vasubandhu's approach "absolute
idealism." Instead, I would see Vasubandhu's argument in the
Vimsatika as one more attempt to find the Buddhist "middle
way" between positive and negative extremes, in this case the
extremes of reification and reductionism. "Common sense" takes
the objects of perception to be substantial external entities, that
is, "things." Analytical concepts such as atoms or dharmas are
powerful tools that can demolish such "things," but atoms or
dharmas can themselves be reified. Vasubandhu's argument
denies the necessity to posit any entities external to perception
itself, and rejects, successively, the reification of things, atoms,
dharrnas, and even vry'napti itself. In Vasubandhu's Vijiianavada
vijnaptis, in effect, take the place of dharmas in the Abhidharma;
as conceptual devices to prevent the reification of objects. The
doctrine of vijnapti-matra is not the metaphysical assertion of a
transcendental reality consisting of "mind-only." It is a practical
injunction to suspend judgment: "Stop at the bare percept; no
need to posit any entity behind it."
Rather than asserting "mind-only" as the true nature of
unconditioned reality, Vasubandhu presents "mind-only" as a
description of our delusion: the dreams of this sleep from which
the Buddha has awakened. It is, after all, sarhsara that is declared
to be vijnapti-matra. Yet if "mind-only" is merely skepticism about
reified external entities, how does it avoid the opposite extreme
of reductionism? The world is neither completely real, nor com-
pletely unreal, but like a dream. A dream has its own presence
and continuity, but its objects lack the substantiality of external
objects. Whether common-sense things or Abhidharmic dhar-
mas, dream-objects are bare percepts. If the dream-world
sarhsara is "mind-only" then freedom and the Buddhist path
are possible-we can "change our minds." If the realms ofmedi-
tation are "mind-only" then one can create a counter-dream
within the dream of the world's delusion. Most important, one
can awaken from a dream.
Is it then correct to call the Y ogacara, as presented by Vas-
ubandhu, "Buddhist idealism"? The term "idealism" designates
a number of different philosophies. At the least one should be
aware that the "idealism" that Vasubandhu attempts to assert
and the "idealism" for which his opponent! criticize him ma.r
be different "idealisms'" The argument over whether Vl-
jiianavada is idealistic or realisitic bears a marked resemblance
to the controversy as to whether Madhyamaka is nihilism or
transcendental absolutism.
Mistaking taxonomy for understanding is a fault not limited
VASUBANDHU 19
to modern writers on Buddhism. A similar excessive concern
for and trust in doctrinal labels can be seen in ancient Indian
philosophers and Tibetan scholastics, and even in the
>Abhidharma itself. Instead of seeking the correct label for Vas-
ubandhu's philosophy, we would do better to try to understand
it in its own terms. The identification of one school with another
. (such as that of Vijiianavada with some Western form of
idealism) is not only likely to be misleading; it is all too often
the point at which the argument stops. A more fruitful approach
to comparative philosophy would begin by tentatively accepting
several comparable philosophies as coherent systems in their
:own terms, and would proceed to apply their several viewpoints
to specific problems of philosophy.
'NOTES
1. All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. For the sources
of Sanskrit texts here translated see below, notes 3 and 7. The passage from
:VV translated here is missing from the Sanskrit MS, and was reconstructed
.by Sylvain Levi as follows (1925, p.3):
Mahiiyiine traidhiitukam vyavasthiipyate / cittamiitram bho Jinaputrii yad uta
traidhiitukam iti siltriit / cittam mano vijiiiinam vijiiaptiS ceti paryiiyiih- I cittam atra
abhipretam I miitram ity arthaprati:jedhiirtham / .
2. The first kiirikii of VK is still quoted or translated by some writers
as it was first reconstnkted and printed in Levi 1925. As emended in Levi
;1932 (on the basis of new MSS of VK) the stanza reads:
vijiwptimiitram evedam asadarthiivabhiisaniit /
yadvat taimirikasyiisatkeso1J.q,rakiididarsanam /1.
3. Sources used here for the Vijiiaptimiitratii-siddhi are:
Louis de La Vallee Poussin, "Vasubandhu, Virhsakakirikiprakarar;ta:
Traite des vingt slokas, avec Ie commentaire de l'auteur," Museon (New Series)
13 (1912): 53-90. [Romanized Tibetan text of VV, with French translation.]
Sylvain Levi, Vijiiaptimiitratiisiddhi: Deux tratisde Vasubandhu, Vimsatikii et
TriritSikii, Bibliotheque de I'Ecole des Hautes Etudes (sciences historiques et
philologiques) fascicule 245 (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion,
1925). [Sanskrit text of VK, VV, TK, and TB (Sthiramati's commentary on
TK).]
Sylvain Levi, Matiriaux pour !'etude du systeme Vijiiaptimiitra, Bibliotheque
de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes (sciences historiques et philologiques) fascicule
\260 (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion, 1932). [Includes Sanskrit
emendations and French translation for Levi 1925.]
Clarence H. Hamilton, Wei Shih Er Shih Lun:The Treatise in Twenty Stanzas
on Representation-only, by Vasubandhu (Translated from the Chinese Version of HSiian
Tsang, Tripitaka Master oftheT'ang Dynasty), American Oriental Series, 13 (New
Haven: American Oriental Society, 1938). [Hsuan-tsang's Chinese text ofVV
with English translation.]
Sitamsu Sekhar Bagchi, "Vijnaptimatratasiddhi," Nava-Nalanda_
Mahavihara Research Publication 1 (1957): 367-389 (+ Sanskrit'pages 1-12).
[Sanskrit text of VK"VV (Levi 1925 without emendations), with English trans_
lation of VK-VV embedded in Bagchi's interpretation.]
Wing-tsit Chan, "The Thirty Verses on the Mind-Only Doctrine," in
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore editors, A Source Book in
Indian Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 333-337.
[English translation of TK from Hsuan-tsang's Chinese version, along with
(pp. 328-333) a partial reprint of Hamilton 1938.]
Thomas A. Kochumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Trans-
lation and Interpretation of the Works ofVasubandhu the Yogacarin (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1982). [Includes English translations of VK-VV and TK.
Kochumuttom seems to have depended entirely for the Sanskrit text of VK,
"V, TK, and TB on an extremely unreliable edition: Svami MaheSvarananda,
Acarya vasubandhu prarj,'ita / vijitapti matratasiddhift, / paiicasatika / sav'(ttika trim-
satika karika / acarya sthiramati prarJiitam trirMika [sic!] (Varal).asi::
Gltadharma Karyalaya, 1962), Some of the new departures in Kochumuttom's
translation seem to be based on Mahesvarananda's misprints. The misprint
on MaheSvarananda's title page has apparently misled Kochumuttom into
consistently calling TK the "Trimsatika."]
Stefan Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological
Doctor, Religion of Asia Series, 4 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984). [Includes
English translations of Vadavidhi, Paiicaskandhaprakararj,a (PSP), Karmasiddhi-
prakaraYJa (KSP), VK-VV, TK, (MVB), and Tris-
vabhavanirdesa (TSN), and reprints Sanskrit editions of VV, TK, MVB, and
TSN.]
4. E.g., Hamilton (1938).
5. E.g., Chan (1957).
6. E.g., Anacker (1984).
7. For AKK-AKB I have used the Sanskrit edition of Prahlad Pradhan,
ofVasubandhu, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, 8 (Patna:
K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967; reprinted 1975). I have also consulted
the French translation of Louis de LaVallee Poussin, L'Abhidharmakosa de Vas-
ubandhu, 6 volumes, Melanges chinois et bouddhiques, 16 (Bruxelles: Institut
BeIge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 1971 reprint; 1 st ed. Paris: Paul Geuthner,
1923-31).
KSP is lost in Sanskrit, but survives in one Tibetan translation (T6hoku
4062 = Otani 5563) and two Chinese translations (Taish6 1608, 1609). There
is an English translation (from Tibetan) in Anacker (1984), and a French
translation (with the Chinese and Tibetan textsy in Etienne Lamotte, "Le
Traite de l'acte de Vasubandhu, KarmasiddhiprikaraI).a," Melanges chinois et
bouddhiques 4 (1935-36) (Bruxelles: Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes
VASUBANDHU 21
ps.p is also lost in Sanskrit, surviving in one Tibetan translation (Tohoku
4059 = Otani 5560) and one Chinese translation (Taisho 1612). There is an
English translation (from Tibetan) in Anacker (1984), and a French translation
(with Chinese and Tibetan texts) in Jean Dantinne, Le TraiN des cing aggregats
de Vasubandhv;l, Publications de I'Institut Beige des
Hautes Etudes Bouddhiques, Serie "Etudes et Texts,"7 (Bruxelles: Institut
Belge des Hautes Etudes Bouddhiques, 1980). PSP is discussed in V.V.
Gokhale, "The Paiicaskandhaka by Vasubandhu and its Commentary by
Sthiramati," Annals of the Bhandarkar Research Institute (Poona) 18.3 (1937):
276-286. There is a discussion and a Sanskrit retranslation of PSP in Shanti
Bhikshu Shastri, "Paiicaskandhaprakaral).a of Vasubandhu," Indian Historical
. Quarterly 32 (1956): 368-'-385. Another work by Shanti Bhikshu Shastri, which
I have seen cited but have not been able to find, is PaiicaskandhaprakaraTJa of
Vasubandhu: A Restitution into Sanskrit from the Tibetan Version together with an
Introduction, English translation, Notes, a Tibetan-Sanskrit vocabulary and an Index
of important Sanskrit Words (Kelaniya, 1969).
8. Compare Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and
Dictionary, Volume II: Dictionary (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953;
reprints Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970, etc.), s.v. vijiiapti.
9. Compare Edgerton (1953), s.v. prajiiapti.
10. Compare Edgerton (1953), s.v.jiiapti, and the documents dealing
with upasampadii ("ordination") in the collection of official acts of a Sangha
known as the Karmaviicanii (Pali Kammaviicii).
11. The classic sources for the discussion of karma are AKK-AKB chap-
ter 4, and KSP.
12. AKK 4.1b: cetanii tatkr:tam ca tat.
13. AKB on AKK 4.1 b: dve karmaTJI cetanii karma cetayitvii ca.
14. Avijiiapti-rupa is discussed in detail at AKK-AKB 1.11 and 4.1-22,
and in KSP. See also Thomas Lee Dowling, Vasubandhu on the "Avijiiapti-rupa":
A Study in Fifth-Century Abhidharma Buddhism (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia
University: 1976).
15. AKB on AKK 4.4 presents the controversy between the Sautrantika
position that avij'iiapti does not exist as a substantial entity (dravya) and the
. Sarvastivadin or position that it does. For KSP see especially
Anacker's (1984) translation and notes.
16. See two articles by Brian Galloway, "Vijnana, Samjna, and Manas,"
The Middle Way vol. 53, no. 2 (1978): 72-75, and "A Yogacara Analysis of the
Mind, Based on the Vijiiiina Section of Vasubandhu's PaiicaskandhaprakaraTJa
with GUl).amati's Commentary, " Journal of the International Association of Buddhist
Studies vol. 3, no. 2 (1980): 7-20. Galloway'S very interesting argument is
unfortunately weakened by the stridency of his tone, which is not justified by
the limited scope of his evidence. The ambiguity of the Sanskrit and English
terms involved is not exhausted by considering the PaiicaskandhaprakaraTJa
and the Oxford English Dictionary. For example, Galloway's argument for trans-
lating vijiiiina as "perception" rather than "consciousness" relies very heavily
on the PSP and other contexts in which vijiiiina clearly does mean "perception,';
but rather ignores other uses of the term vij'iiiina (discussed in the present
22
JIABS VOL. 9 NO.1
essay) for which "consciousness" is at least an arguable translation.
Particularly helpful discussions of these terms are given by Th. Stcher_
batsky in The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma"
(London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923; reprints Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
1970, etc.), and by Shwe Zan Aung in his introduction to the translation of
Anuruddha's AbhidhammaHhasangaha in S.Z. Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids
The Compendium of Philosophy, Pali Text Society, Translation Series, 2 (London;
Luzac & Co., 1910; reprints by Pali Text Society, London).
17. AKK 2.34a-bl: cittarh mano 'tha vijiiiinam ekiirtham. Compare AKB
and PSP. The equating of these three terms for mind is at least as earlv as
Sarhyutta-nikiiya II: 95 (Kindred Sayings II: 66). '
18. AKK 1.16c: vijiiiinarh prativijiiaptilJ. AKB: v4ayarh prati vijiiap_
tir upalabdhir ity ucyate. Compare the definition in PSP, which
Shanti Bhikshu Shastri (1956: 381), Galloway (1980: 10), and Anacker (1984:
71) all take as: iilambanavijiiaptilJ.
19. I am indebted to Professor M. David Eckel, Harvard University, for
stressing to me the non-negative connotation of -miitra in such contexts:
20. I have in mind here the first definition of "phenomenon" given in
the American Heritage Dictionary: "an occurrence or fact that can be perceived
by the senses"-remembering that for Buddhists "mind" (manas) is, of course,
one of the senses.
21. I am following the excellent definition of "percept" given in J.P.
Chaplin, Dictionary of Psychology (new revised edition, New York: Dell Publish-
ing, 1975), p. 376; "percept: 1. that which is perceived. 2. a perceptual act.
The use of the term percept refers to the conscious experience and not to the
physical object. Physical objects of perception are referred to as stimuli."
22. This is the view of Vijfianavada held by such writers as Stcherbatsky
and Dasgupta, and presented in A.K. Chatterjee, The Yogiiciira Idealism (2nd
ed., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975). One classical source for this interpreta-
tion is the hostile and wildly inaccurate chapter on Buddhism in the late
Vedantin work, Sarvadarsana-sarhgraha. However, those modern writers who
interpret Vijfianavada in this way usually consider it very similar to Vedanta.
Kochumuttom (1982) strongly criticizes this idealistic interpretation, especially
in chapter 6.
23. Kochumuttom (1982: 165-166) objects strenuously to the translation
of traidhiitukam here as "the three worlds." He declares that: "This translation
ignores the fact that the term 'traidhiituka' is an adjective meaning 'belonging
to the three worlds', and that it is not a substantive meaning 'the three worlds.'"
He goes on to say that such an adjective must modify an understood noun,
supplying "citta and caittas" as the understood noun. Accordingly (p. 260), he
translates the passage: "those belonging to the three worlds are mere represen-
tations of consciousness," and the sutra quotation: "those belonging to the
three worlds are mere mind"-"those" being cittas and caittas. As evidence for
calling Vasubandhu's philosophy "pluralistic realism" this fails to convince.
Kochumuttom confuses etymology with meaning and forgets the grammar
of the sentence. It is true that traidhiituka- is etym110gically an adjective. It is
a secondary derivative in -ka from the compound word tri-dhiitu, and means
VASUBANDHU
23
"pertammg to the three realms." In the passage, however, we have
traidhatukam, which seems in context to be a nominative singular neuter form.
Theoretically it could modify cittam, and theoretically the passage could mean
that the citta that pertains to the triple world is mere-citta or mere-vijiiapti,
but this is mere-tautology. In Sanskrit, secondary derivatives are often used
as substantives: A good example is the very term caitta, "pertaining to citta."
The interpretation that best fits this passage is [idani] or [sarvani] traidhatukam-
"all this [universe] that pertains to the three realms."
24. Nairatmya is often translated "selflessness." Although the translation
is etymologically correct, the English word "selflessness" connotes unselfish
behaviour, which may in fact be encouraged by the philosophical idea of
nairatmya, but is not identical with it. [I am indebted to Professor Luis O.
Gomez, University of Michigan, for pointing out to me the ambiguity of
"selflessness. "]
25. VV on VK lOd2: yo biilair dharmarJ,ani svabhavo grahyagrahakadih
parikalpitas . ...
26. VK 17cd: svapnadr:gv4ayabhiivani naprabuddho 'vagacchati.
27. VV on VK 17cd: evani vitathavikalpabhyasavasananidraya prasupto lokah
svapna ivabhutam arthani paiyan na prabuddhas tadabhiivani yathiivan navagacchati
/ yada tu prabuddho bhavati tada
... tatpn(halabdhasuddhalaukikajiianasanimukhfbhavad v4ayabhiivani yathiivad ava-
gacchatfti samanam etat / .
UDai Kan o' Jiten"p3volumes)
By Dr. Tetsuii Mer-ohashi '
-A Chinese chanu::ter dictionary of
the highest standard of scholarship_
Outstanding features:
1. Thoroughly Revised and Updated
The revision has been made to incorporate recent and updated
ideographic information as well as constantly evolving language usage
patterns.
2. Accurate Sources
Accurate sources and examples have been included through an ex-
haustive study of original texts and references.
3. Supplemental and Elymological Analysis
Etymological explanations of interest were added where appropriate to
incorporate new studies made of ancient inscriptions on tortoise shells
and stone tablets.
4. Revision 01 Pronunciation
Following recent studies in phonology, a revised pronunciation of certain
Chinese characters has been suggested.
5. Comprehensive Bibliography
New techniques of reproduction have made ancient ideograms visually
distinguishable. These and new materials from recently published
Chinese dictionaries have been combined to form a comprehensive
bibliography.
6. Dictionary to Grace Your Bookshelf
Having been made using the most modern techniques of paper preserva-
tion and bookmaking, the 13-volume dictionary can be used-and will
grace your bookshelf-for generations to come.
210mm x 297mm, Deluxe cloth-bound edition. Price 17,OOO per volume
Great Zen Buddhism Dictionary
Compiled under the general supervision of the editing staff of
the "Great Zen Buddhism Dictionary", Komazawa University
The Great Zen Buddhism Dictionary in Japanese contains
a total of 32,000 vocabulary entries as well as phrases and
terminologies encompassing theoretical concepts and the
vast sweep of history of Zen as it evolved in India, China,
Korea and Japan. The entries and nomenclature range
from special technical phrases and catechetical terms to
place names and titles of famous works.
The dictionary is a thoroughly revised edition with con-
cise commentary and explanations based on recent
scholastic research into all aspects of Zen Buddhism.
182mm x 257mm, Deluxe edition, 1,938 pages. Prices: 25,OOO
Taishukan Publishing Co., ltd.
3-24, Kanda Nishiki-cho, Chiyoda-ku 101. tel. (03) 294-2221
"Sigilless" Meditations In Pali Buddhism*
by Peter Harvey
The animitta or "signless," is a relatively unexplored region
of Buddhist doctrine; 1 unlike, for example, the system ofjhanas,
it seems to be in some need of clarification and systematisation.
This is suggested by the great variety of states said to be "animitta"
in the PaE material, in which there is reference to animitta-
samadhi (or ceto-samadhi),
2
ceto-vimutti,
3
vimokkha,
4
vimokkha-
mukha,5 vihara,6 samapatti,
7
vihara-samapatti,
8
phassa
9
and dhatu. 10
This variety also applies to the closely related sufifiata (void) and
apparpihita (de sireless) states that, with the animitta, play an im-
portant role in the path to nibbana.
This paper aims to differentiate the variety of animitta states,
and to gain some understanding of their nature, drawing on
the Pali suttas, Abhidhamma, and commentaries.
A convenient place to begin is with the overview of animitta
states at MA.II 355
11
:
"Thirteen dhammas are named 'animitta-ceto-vimutti': vipas-
sana, the 4 formless states, the four paths and the four fruitions.
In this connection, 'vipassana removes the sign of permanence
(nicca-nimittan:t) , the sign of happiness (sukha-), the sign of self
(atta- ),' so it is known as animitta. The four formless states are
known as animitta due to the non-existence of the sign of form
(rupa-) (in them). The paths and fruitions are animitta due to the
non-existence of defilements that make signs (nimitta-karakanan:t)
[in them.] Nibbiina is just animitta. But that is not a ceto-vimutti,
so it is not taken [here as a fourteenth]."
This statement seems quite well founded in the Tipitaka.
The highest level animitta-ceto-vimutti is suggested by a verse at
25
Thag.92 and Dhp.92, which says that an arahant's "field of
action (gocaro) is void and signless liberation (suiiiiato animitto ca
vimokkho)." That there are lower-level animitta states is indicated .'
by A.IIl.397, which says that a monk ma:y attain animitta-ceto_
sarriadhi, but later return to lay life, due to keeping too much
company. Similarly, at A.IV. 78-9, Brahma-gods say of someone'
who abides in animitta-ceto-samadhi that, if he practices further,
he will attain the goal of the holy life, and describe him as still
having a remainder of grasping (sa-upadisese).
1. The Formless States as Animitta
Some support is given to this notion in the Tipitaka. Firstly,
it should be noted that animitta-samadhi is listed after,12 or said ..
to be entered after,13 the four formless states,14 and that the
animitta (and void and desireless) stimulations (phassas) are said
to impinge on a person emerging from the cessation-of-percep-
tion-and-feeling, which is entered from the fourth formless state
(M.l. 302). There is, therefore, a clear affinity between a n i m i t t a ~
samadhi and the formless states. That the formless states are"
themselves animitta, in a certain sense, is indicated by. Ps.II.36,
which describes the four formless attainments as "liberation as
emergence [from the object] externally (bahiddhiivutthiino vimok-
kho)," for nimittas are often said to be "external"; 15 indeed, p.
35 goes on to say that each of the four paths "emerges externally
from all signs (sabbanimittehi)."
An interesting passage linking the formless states to animitta
ones, and also indicating something of the nature of animitta
states, is at A.IV.426-8. Here Ananda describes:
"the attainment of a chance over the crowding obstacle [i.e., the
five kamagu'IPas] awakened to by the Exalted One ... for the bring- .
ing to an end of dukkha.,,16
He explains this thus:
"There will be just the eye, but one will not experience those.'
visible shapes and that sense-sphere (te rupa tan: cayatanarT;L no
patisarT;Lvedissati); ... there will be just the body, but one will not
experience those touchables and that sensr-sphere."
pAUBUDDHISM 27
In answer to a question, he explains that a person in such a
state is conscious (saiiiii), not unconscious, and that he is either
in one of the first three formless states, or in a samadhi which
he had previously described thus:
"Sister, this samadhi which is neither inclined towards (abhinato),
nor inclined away (apanato) , in which the restraint is not con-
trolled by conscious effort (sasmikhara-), but has the habit of
self-denial, which from its release is steadfast (vimuttattii thito),
from its steadfastness is content, from its contentment is not
troubled-this samadhi, Sister, is said by the Exalted One to have
gnosis as fruition (afifiiiphalo)." 17
The description of this samadhi matches that of one at S.1.28,
which very probably describes animitta-samadhi. There the
Buddha is in much pain from an injury to his foot. As he bears
it mindfully, gods come to praise him, one saying, "See how his
citta is well-practiced in samadhi and released. It is not inclined
towards ... (etc.) ... self-denial." Now as D.lI.lOO describes the
dying Buddha as entering animitta-samadhi to attain ease from
his pains, such a pain-transcending samadhi is very likely to be
animitta-samadhi too. This is confirmed by a passage at M.Il!.l 08,
which says of a person in animitta-ceto-samadhi:
"He comprehends, 'This perceiving is empty of the plane of
no-thing ... of the plane of neither-perception-nor-non-percep-
tion. And there is only this that is not void (asufifiatam), that is
to say, the six sensory spheres (the sense-organs) that, conditioned
by life (j'ivita-), are grounded on the body itself.'"
Such a description would be applicable to the state at A.IV.426-
8, "There will be just the eye ... ," which is thus confirmed as
.an animitta state.
We see, therefore, that animitta-samadhi is closely associated
with the formless states, and that the latter are animitta in the
sense of having transcended external sensory "signs." In both
the formless states and in animitta-samadhi, a person is not
hemmed in by the kama-gur],as, the strands of sensual-pleasure,
but is in a state where he is fully conscious (except in the fourth
formless state), with sense-organs operative, yet without ex-
periencing any of the five sense-objects. In the animitta-samadhi,
28
JIABS VOL. 9 NO.1
however, the mind also transcends the (mental) objects of th
formless states, and is in a state that results in gnosis 0 e
h h
, r
ara ants lp.
II. Vipassana as Anirriitta
~ h i s is probably described at S.IV.269, where Moggall
ana
descnbes how the Buddha had helped him with his training:
"So I, friend, paying no attention to any sign (sabbanimittiinam
amanasikiirii), entered on and dwelt in animitta-ceto-samiidhi; but
dwelling in that dwelling, my consciousness was following after
signs (nimittiinusari-viiiiiiir}a'f[!)."
This clearly refers to a relatively weak form of animitta-ceto-
samadhi, for D.III.249 says that it is impossible for one who has
developed animitta-ceto-vimutti to have a consciousness that "fol-
lows after signs," for this ceto-vimutti is the "escape" (nissarar}an;)
from all signs. The animitta-ceto-samadhi of S.IV.269, then, is not
fully developed: indeed the Buddha is said to come to Moggal-
lana to urge him to make his citta steadfast, one-pointed, and
composed in the ceto-samadhi. Moggallana's state is probably a
form of vipassana-samadhi, as the commentary, SA.III. 90, states.
Ps.II.63, describing the vipassana stage of "understanding
of appearance as terror," says, "When he gives attention [to
phenomena] as impermanent, the sign appears to him as terror
(bhayato) ," 18 while Ps.I. 91 clearly seems to see this as the animitta
dwelling (vihara; as at S.IV.269, above):
Contemplating the sign as terror, from being resolved on the
animitta, he sees decay (vaya'f[!) each time he applies his contem-
plation; this is the animitta dwelling.
19
"Animitta-ceto-samadhi" and "animitta vihara," then, seem to be
terms used in the Tipitaka for certain states involving vipassana
into impermanence. The state that exists at the interface of the
development of vipassana and the occurrence of the path (and
assigned to neither) is also an animitta state. This is "change of
lineage" (gotrabhu), or "understanding of emergence and turn-
pALl BUDDHISM 29
ing away from the external," of which Ps.II.64 says:
When he gives attention as impermanent, his citta emerges from
the sign; his citta enters into (pakkhandati) the animitta.
20
;ps.I.66 adds that it "overcomes," for example, "the sign," and
3lso "the sign of all formations externally" (b(Lhiddhiisankhara-
nimittarlJ,), so as to "enter into," respectively, the animitta, and
. "stopping (nirodho), nibbana."
III. The Paths (Maggas) and Fruitions (Phalas) as Animitta
. That animitta states play an important role in the path to
'nibbana is clearly seen at S.IV.360:
"And what, monks, is the path which goes to the unconditioned?
Void samadhi, animitta-samadhi, desireless samadhi."
:Indeed, we have seen above that a samadhi identifiable as
Panimitta is said to have "gnosis as fruition."21 Ps.II.63-4, after
: discussing the animitta states "understanding appearance as ter-
ror," and "change oflineage" (as above), says of path-knowlege,
!;"When he gives attention as impermanent, he is freed (vimuccati)
by the animitta liberation (vimokkhena) .... " That is, states of
(path-consciousness are animitta, and at this level (upwards),
animitta states are forms of "liberation." It is probably at this
stage, too (or at "change of lineage"), that an animitta ,state be-
e comes known as a "gateway to liberation (vimokkha-mukha),"
where citta "enters into (-sampakkhandataya) the animitta state
i(dhiitu)" (Ps.II.48).22
\ As regards the fruitions, Ps.II.42 says that the "desireless"
.liberation is the four paths, four fruitions and nibbana. As the
:"desireless" is otherwise treated parallel to the animitta, this im-
'plies that the same can be said of the animitta. A passage at
Ps.I.91 probably describes an animitta fruition:
When he contemplates the signs as terror by treating [their]
occurrence with equanimity, and adverting to stopping, nibbana,
as animitta, and enters upon attainment because he is resolved
upon the animitta, this is animitta attainment (samiipatti).
Indeed, the commentary on this sees such an animitta "attain-
ment" as the "attainment of fruition.,,23,
. _ The Abhidhamma treats the fruitions in a slightly
dIfferent way. The DhammasmigaTf,z descrIbes the first path as:
i) any of the four (or five) supramundane jhanas (277 and
343),24 or
ii) any of the four (or five) supramundanejhanas that are void
'(344-5), or
iii) that are desireless (351-2).25
No mention is made of any animitta supramundane jhana as
path. On the fruitions, however, it is said that for any of the
above three types of first path, their fruits will be a
dane jhana that is void, animitta, or desireless (505-22).26
IV. Is There an Animitta Path?
The above conflict between the Abhidhamma and the suttas
(Ps.) as to whether there is an animitta path is taken up in the,
commentarialliterature. An examination of this discussion gives --
an insight into some of the reasons why animitta states are known
as "animitta." As1.221 and Vism.668 discuss this and say that a
path can be known as "void," "animitta" or "desireless"for three
reasons:
i) "From (way of) arrival (agamanato)": e.g., a path will be
"void" if the vipassana that leads to it is "void"; the vipassanii '"
will be "void" if its dominant feature is insight into anatta,.
seeing formations (sankharas) as void (suiiiia).
ii) "From its own special qualities (saguTf,ato)": it is "void" as it is
empty of attachment, hatred and delusion; it is "animitta" ,
due to the absence of the "signs" of sense-objects, or the
"signs" of attachment, etc.; it is "desireless" due to the ab-,
sence of desire as attachment, etc.
iii) "From its object (arammaTf,ato)": a path takes nibbana as its
object, and this is void (as void of attachment, etc.) animitta
and desireless.
As1.221 explains that the method of the suttas gives a name to
a path by meth,ods ii) and iii), but the Abhi1hamma only does
pALIBUDDHISM 31
by method i), and animitta-vipassana cannot give its name to the
path it is "not (nip-
pariyayato) anzmztta (Vlsm.659). ThIs IS because, whIle It severs
"signs" of permanence, happiness and self, so as to be to some
extent "signless," still it "frequents (carati) sign-dhammas"
(As1.223); "it is not opposed to the discernment of imperma-
nence which has the signs of formations as its object" (As1.224),
and "there is no abandoning the sign of formations" (Vism.659).
That is; inasmuch as vipassana is taken up with the "sign" of
conditioned phenomena, it can never be wholly "signless," and
so cannot give its name to a "signless" path, in the Abhidhamma
method. Nevertheless, there can still be animitta fruitions by this
method, as we have seen.
V. The Meaning of Nimitta
Having mapped out the range of states known as "animitta,"
we can now investigate the nature and range of "nimittas, " before
going on to examine the method of practice that leads beyond
them, and the nature of the animitta states to which such practices
lead.
While nimitta has been translated as "sign" so far, we can
see its range of meaning, in general usage, as being:
i) A deliberately made sign, or "hint," as when the Buddha
made a broad nimitta about the possibility of his living on for
the rest of the aeon. 27
ii) . A natural sign or indication, not deliberately made as a sign.
At S.V.I50, for example, in not noting what his master says
he likes, and reaches out for, etc., an inexperienced cook is
said not to take proper note of his master's nimitta. One who
reads the mind of another, without going off what anyone
says, and without using the power of meditation for direct
thought-reading, is said to do so by means of a nimitta, i.e., a
behavioural sign.
28
Earthquakes are said to be the nimittas,
or signs, of the four main events in a buddha's life,29 while
ageing, sickness, death, and an ascetic are the fournimittas,
or "indications" of the nature of life, leading to a bodhisatta's
renunciation. 30
.. iii) A specific type of natural sign-a sign of what is to come, a
portent. Thus, "diviners of nimittas" examined the 32 marks
on the body of the newborn bodhisatta,31 taking three of
them as the nimitta, or "sign" of 10ngevity.32 Similarly, We
read that "that is a prior sign (pubbe nimittar(t) of the manifes-
Brahma, when the light arises, and the glory
shmes. 33 ..
iv) A marker, as when hillsides and rocks, etc. are taken as nim-
ittas showing the boundaries of a monastic residence. 34
v) A (male or female) sexual organ (Vin.IIL28, and 21) or sex-
ual characteristic (Dhs. 633, 644).
vi) Characteristic, as in biilanimittani, "the characteristics of a
fool" (M.IILI63), and as implied in "But you, householder,
have all the characteristic marks and signs (akara te liriga te
nimitta) of a householder,,,35 and in the phrase "face-nim-
itta," which is what is said to be seen to be seen and pondered
in a mirror (M.LI 00).
vii) General appearance, or gestalt, as in the common passage,
"Having seen a visible shape with the eye, he does not seize
on the general appearance (nimittaggahi), he does not seize
on the detail (anubyanjanaggahZ) .... ,,36
viii) Ground, reason or cause, as when the Buddha says that he
does not behold the nimitta on which anyone could reprove
him for having asavas not yet destroyed.
37
Similarly, at
M.IILIS7, a monk says that he does not know nimitta, the
reason, why, in his attempts to see gods, their light and visi-
ble form come to disappear. 38
ix) Aim, as when an archer "takes a straight aim (nimittarlJ ujum
karoti)" (Miln.418).
x) The object of concentration in samatha meditation: this is
well attested in the commentarial literature, e.g., at
Vism.12S-6: in concentrating on an external device, such as
a clay disc, the device itself is the "preliminary" nimitta; by
concentrating on it, the meditator comes to see a mental
image of it, even with closed eyes-this is the "learning"
nimitta: by his concentrating on this, it appears in a purified,
abstracted form, the "counterpart" nimitta. In the latter two
cases, the nimitta can be seen as a "reflex image," which is
both a "sign" that the meditation is proceeding well and the
"target" of concentration (cf. sense ix, above). Such
samadhi-nimittas are also alluded to in the suttas. The "pre-
pALIBUDDHISM
33
liminary" sign is alluded to at Ps.II.38, which says, "Here,
someone gives attention to the nimitta of blue-black inter-
nally in himself," the commentary explaining this to mean a
person's hair. A reflex-image nimitta is referred to, e.g., at
A.IV.418, on a monk who is unskilled at entering on and
dwelling in the firstjhiina:" he does not pursue, nor develop,
nor cultivate that nimitta. ,,39
We see then that, in general usage, nimitta means a sign or
indication, which may be a hint, or an indication of contempo-
rary or future thoughts, desires, events or features of life, or a
(boundary) marker, sexual or other characteristic, general ap-
pearance, ground or reason, aim, or a meditation object that is
.either physical or a mental reflex image. It is a delimited object
of attention, that may, or should be taken as indicating some-
thing beyond itself or the general features of that to which it
belongs.
VI. Types of "Signs"
To investigate the range of "signs," a useful passage is that
at S.1.188 (and Thag.224-6) where Ananda gives advice to a
monk affected by attachment (raga):
" i) Your citta is on fire because of a perversion of perception
(saiiiiiiya vipariyesii);
ii) Avoid [any] pleasant (subham) nimitta, connected to attach-
ment;
iii) Look on formations as other, as dukkha, not as self,
iv) Quench this great attachment, do not burn again and again.
v) Develop the citta, one-pointed and well-concentrated, to the
[contemplation of] the unpleasant (asubhiiya),
vi) Let your mindfulness be concerned with the body, be full of
disenchantment (nibbidii-)
vii) And develop the animitta, cast out the latent tendency to con-
ceit (miiniinusayam);
viii) Then by the full understanding of conceit, you will wander
calm.,,4o
Firstly, this passage sees the mind as "burning" with attach-
ment due to a "perversion of perception" that focusses on attach-
ment-linked "pleasant-nimittas." A.I1.52 sees such "perversions"
(vipallasa) of perception (and of citta and view) as being seeing
permanence in the impermanent, dukkha in the not-dukkha, atta
in the anatta, and the pleasant in the unpleasant. This implies
that "pleasant-nimittas" are deceptive in their nature.
Secondly, the passage shows that "pleasant-nimittas" are
clearly an important type of nimitta. We see, for example, at
A.1.3, that it is lack of systematic attention to a pleasant-nimitta
that leads to the arising and strengthening of sensual-desire
(kiima-cchando),41 and lack of systematic attention to the repulsive
(patigha-)-nimitta that leads to malevolence. Key forms of pleas-
ant nimittas must be sexual ones, and indeed, "nimitta" can itself
mean a male or female sexual organ or characteristic, as seen
above. Related to the pleasant-nimitta is the dear-nimitta, referred
to at S.IV.73 and Thag.98:
"Seeing a visible object, his mindfulness is confused, attending
to a sign of what is dear (piyanimittam).
With an attached (siiratto-) citta he experiences (it), and stays
clinging to it"
(this is then repeated for the other five sense-channels).
Attending to "signs" in things, and seeing them as pleasant or
dear, leads to an attached state of mind that clings to such signs.
Such attachment is broken, at S.1.188, above, by a process involv-
ing insight into the three marks, contemplation of the "unpleas-
ant," and developing the animitta state.
Not only does attention to certain nimittas lead to attach-
ment, but we also find that the commentaries see attachment,
etc., as themselves being nimittas. In discussing what nimittas are
absent in an animitta state, including nibbana, they refer to at-
tachment-, hatred- and delusion-nimittas.
42
M.1.297 also says that attachment, etc., produce nimittas,
which MA.II.355 explains thus:
Just so, when a person's attachment does not arise, then one is
not able to know [him as] "ariyan" or "worlding." But when attach-
ment arises, it arises as if making a nimitta for perceiving "this
person, indeed, is one with attachment"-just as a brand identifies
a calf as belonging to a certain herd.
pALIBUDDHISM 35
'.That attachment, etc., betray what kind of a person someone
is.
Another type of nimitta consists simply of sense-objects. This
is the meaning in the common phrase "this consciousness-
informed (sensitive) body and all external (bahiddha) nimittas"
(e.g., M.III.1S), meaning the sentient organism and all it can
perceive. This meaning is also found at S.I1L) 0, where venerable
says:
"And how is one a token-follower (niketasarf)? One who is in
bondage of token-following to the nimitta of visible shapes (rupa-
nimitta-), is called a 'token follower'" (parallel passages follow on
the other five sense-objects). .
Commentarial passages on nimittas that are absent in animitta
states also refer to rupa-nimitta, etc.
43
MA.IL352, commenting
on the "all nimittas" that one in animitta-ceto-samadhi does not
attend to (M.L296-7), says, "all objects (arammar],as), visual shape
etc.," though p. 353 qualifies this by saying that a person has
nibbana as object.
.... Another type of nimitta said by the commentaries to be
absent in animitta states comprises permanence-, happiness-,
and self-nimittas.
44
A final type of nimitta is formations-nimitta: we have seen
that vipassana still frequents sarikhara-nimitta (p. 31), and that
"change of lineage" overcomes "the sign of all formations exter-
nally" (sec. II). As to what the "nimittas of formations" are, this
issuggested by the Abhidharmakosa, which says that nirvar],a, ob-
ject of animitta-samadhi, lacks various nimittas, including "the
three birth, duration-change and death.,,45
.This alludes to a passage found at A.L152, which describes the
"three constructed characteristics of the constructed" (sari-
sarikhata-lakkhar],ani) as those of "arising" (uppado) ,
"decay" (vayo), and "becoming otherwise of what persists"
(thitassa annathattam).
Several of these senses of nimitta are included in a passage
at Ps.I1.6S, which says:
What is the animitta liberation? Knowledge of contemplation of
impermanence is animitta liberation, since it liberates from the
nimitta as permanent.
This formula is then repeated, replacing "impermanence" and
"as permanent," respectively, by: "dukkha" and "as happy'"
"anatta" and "as self'; "disenchantment" and "as delight"
diya); "detachment" (viraga) and "as attachment"; "stopping"
and "as origin" (samudayato); "relinquishment" and "as grasp_
ing"; "the animitta" and "all nimittas"; "the desireless" and "as
desire" (parJidhiya); "the void" and "as misinterpretation"
(abhinivesato) .
We have seen above that nimittas may be delusive: this would
apply to pleasant-, dear-, permanence-, happiness- and self-
nimittas. These indicate to the mind features of the world that
on examination, are seen to be empty. Attachment-,
and delusion nimittas would be nimittas in the sense of being
"characteristics,': though we have also seen that they themselves
produce nimittas, i.e., give indications of the nature of a person.
Sense-object nimittas would be nimittas due to being the target
of perceptions, and are taken to indicate particular features of
the world. Certain such object-nimittas are those selected as
samadhi-nimittas in the jhanas, which are finally transcended in
the formless attainments, said to be animitta because they are
not tied down or limited by any sensory object. Formation-nimit-
tas would be the "characteristics" that indicate the nature of
formations.
VII. Escape from the Bondage of Nimittas
The state of being entranced by nimittas is clearly portrayed,
in the suttas, as one full of danger. A graphic passage at S.IV.168
ironically asserts:
"It would be a good thing, monks, if the organ of sight were
seared with a red-hot iron pin, on fire, all ablaze, a glowing mass
of flames. Then there would be no seizing of the general appear-
ance (nimitta) or details of visible shapes discernible by the eye.
Monks, consciousness, persisting, might persist in being tied by
the satisfaction in the general appearance or details."
To die in such a state, or in one where one is taken up with
objects of the other five senses, is said to lead to rebirth in hell
pALl BUDDHISM 37
or as an anima1.
46
The idea that entrancement by sense-object
nimittas brings a state of bondage and limitation is emphasised
at M.III.225, where Venerable Kaccana (cf. sec. VI) says:
"If, your reverences, after a monk has seen a visual shape with
the eye, his consciousness runs after visual-shape-signs (rupa-
nimittiinusiirf), is tied by satisfaction in visual-shape-signs, is bound
to satisfaction in visual-shape-signs, is fettered by the fetter of
satisfaction in visual-shape-signs, then the consciousness of what
is external (bahiddhii viiiiiiir]arIJ) is said 10 be confused and dis-
tracted" (and so on for the other five sense-channels).
To escape such bondage, the practitioner begins by "guarding.
the senses." Rather than seizing on the general appearance or
details of a sense-object, it is said:
"If he dwells with the organ of sight uncontrolled, covetousness
and dejection, evil unskilled states of mind, might predominate.
So he fares along controlling it; he guards the organ of sight"
(and so on for the other five sense channels).47
. Vism.20 classifies this practice under sfla, and explains it thus:
"He does not seize on the general appearance"-he does not
seize on the sign of a woman or a man, or any sign that is a basis
for defilement such as the sign of the pleasant, etc.; he stops at
what is merely seen. "He does not seize on the details of it"-he
does not seize on any aspect classed as hand, foot, smile, laughter,
talk, looking ahead, looking aside, etc., ... But he seizes only on
that which is really there.
In such a practice, the mind does not proliferate the mere objects
.. of the senses into "indications" of entrancing phenomena. Bud-
dhaghosa's illustration here is that of a laughing woman who
ran past a monk: the monk saw no "woman," but, from noticing
the teeth, perceived only a collection of bones (and attained
arahantship). Buddhaghosa's explanation is reminiscent of a
passage at S.IV.72-3 (cf. Ud.S). There the Buddha gives a
"teaching in brief' to the ageing Malunkyaputta, apparently so
as to rid him of all desire, attachment and fondness for sense-ob-
jects, which lead to an attached mind clinging to a sign of what
is dear (see sec. VI, above). The teaching is:
" ... in the seen, there will be just the seen; in the heard, there
will be just the heard; in the sensed (mute), there will be just the
sensed; in the discerned (viii:nate), there will be just the discerned."
SA.II.383 comments here:
yisual consciousness sees in a visual shape merely a visual shape,
It does not see the (sabhava) of permanence
etc .... When a visual shape comes within range of visual
sciousness, one does not become attached, hate, or become deluded.
The S.IV.72-3 teaching continues:
"From that (tato) , you, Malunkyaputta, will not be by that (na
tena); as (yato) you will not be by that, hence (tato) you will not'
be there (na tattha); as you, Malunkyaputta, will not be there,
hence you will not be here (-idha), beyond (huram), nor in between
(-antarena) the two. This is the end of dukMa."
The meaning ofthis mysterious passage will be discussed below:.
but here we may note that keeping what is seen to the merely-
seen, etc., dearly involves more than sUa.
48
Part of sUa,
would be controlling unskilful thoughts arising from attention
to certain nimittas. In doing this, a monk should attend, instead,
to another nimitta associated with what is skilled (M.I.119). This
ieads on to the practice of samadhi, where the mind turns in-
ward, away from "external" nimittas and toward the skilful
samadhi-nimitta.
49
Finally, the practice of vipassana starts to cuC
away all attachment to nimittas. S.IV.170, in a continuation of
the S.IV.168 passage quoted above, says:
"Let alone searing the faculty of sight with a red-hot iron
pin ... what if I attend thus: impermanent is the eye, imperma-
nent are visual shapes, impermanent is visual consciousness, im-
permanent is visual stimulation, impermanent are pleasant,
pleasant and neutral feelings arising from visual stimulation"
(etc., for the other five sense-channels).
Such a practice is said to lead to being disenchanted (nibbindati) ..
pALIBUDDHISM
39
with the eye, etc., so as to be detached (virajjati) and freed,
attaining arahantship.
VIII. The Nature of the Animitta
The last quoted passage shows the connection of insight
-into impermanence with overcoming attachment to nimittas. A
similar passage, at S.IV.50, describes a monk who sees "all nimit-
tas"-i.e., all the phenomena mentioned in S.IV.170, above-as
"becoming other" (afifiato) , such that he abandons avijja. This
is significant, as NettipakararJa.119 sees the asava of avijja as
abandoned by the animitta liberation. 50 As we have already seen
{po 29), the Pa#sambhidamagga links insight into impermanence
with the animitta dwelling. On the three liberations, it says:
When one who has great resolution gives attention as imperma-
nent, he acquires animitta liberation. When one who has great
tranquility gives attention as dukkha, he acquires desireless liber-
ation. When one who has great wisdom gives attention as anatta,
he acquires void liberation (Ps.II.58).
Attention to phenomena as impermanent is said to have the
following effect:
When he gives attention as impermanent, he knows and sees the
nimitta as it really is. Hence "right seeing" is said. Thus, by infer-
ence from that, all formations are seen as impermanent. Herein,
doubt is abandoned.
The nature of this seeing of the nimitta as it really is is amplified
Ps.II.48:
Now there are three gateways to liberation which lead to outlet
from the world: i) to the contemplation of all formations as limited
and circumscribed (pariccheda-parivattumato) and to the entering
of citta into the animitta dhiitu (nibbiina).51
Vism.657 comments here, "both as limited by rise and fall and
as circumscribed by them." Vism.668 adds to this by saying:
When the path is arrived at by abandoning the signs of perma_
nence, lastingness and eternalness, by effecting the resolution of
the compact (ghana-vinibbhogarIJ katvii) of formations through the
means of contemplation of impermanence, then it is called
animitta [by the sutta method]. .
Insight into impermanence, then, leads to animitta states by re-
solving the "solid," "lasting" signs presented by the senses into
a complex of components that have weak sign-value to the grasp-
ing mind and that themselves come and go so fast as to be
insignificant and unworthy of attention. As Ps.II.36 says, in the
animitta liberation, one "construes" (karoti) no sign in what one
contemplates. In such a state, the mind can easily turn towards
that which is beyond all signs, nibbana. As M.I.296 says:
"There are two conditions, your reverence, for the attainment
of the animitta-ceto-vimutti: paying no attention to any nimitta, and
paying attention to the animitta dhiitu."S2
"May it be, venerable sir, that a monk's acquiring of
may be of such a sort that, though he does not attend to eye
visible shapes ... to body or touchables, though he does not at-,,;
tend to solidity cohesion, heat or motion; to the sphere .;i
of infinite space, or of infinite consciousness, or of
or of neither-perception-nor-non-perception; though he does 0
not attend to this world, or a world beyond; though whatever
seen, heard, sensed, discerned, attained, sought after, thought,;}
round by mind (manasii)-to (all) that he does not attend, and
i
\
yet he does attend?"
To this, the Buddha replies (p. 322) that there is such a
as follows: ....
pALIBUDDHISM 41
"Herein, Ananda, a monk attends thus: this is the real, this is
the excellent, that is to say, the calming of all formations, the
renunciation of all substrate, the destruction of craving, detach-
ment (virago), stopping (nirodho), nibbana." .
This description seems a perfect match to the M.I.296 descrip-
tion of animitta-ceto-vimutti: not attending to a variety of worldly
nimittas, and attending to nibbana, the animitta. It also tallies
with the Ps.I.66 description (above, p. 29) of "change oflineage,"
which is said to overcome "the sign of formations externally,"
and to "enter into stopping, nibbana.,,54
The attention to " ... detachment, stopping, nibbana" is an
interesting feature of the above passage. At A.V.IIO, one who
contemplates "This is the real ... detachment, nibbana," is said
to have viraga-saniui, and one who contemplates "This is the
real ... stopping, nibbana," is said to have nirodha-sanna. The
first of these perceptions is among five perceptions that "bring
vimutti to maturity" (D.III.243), and both are among six percep-
tions that are "part of knowledge" (vijja-hhiigiya) (A.III.334).
Likewise, at S.V.129-34, they are among a variety of perceptions
that, if "developed and made much of," lead to one of the two
fruits: the gnosis of the arahant, or the state of non-returning. 55
Such perceptions are also alluded to in the Ps.II.68 description
of animitta liberation (p. 29, above). There, "knowledge of con-
templation of stopping is animitta liberation, since it liberates
from the sign as origin (samudayato)" and "knowledge of contem-
plation of detachment is animitta liberation, since it liberates
from the sign as attachment (ragato)." These passages suggest
that insight into impermanence and into the constant cessation
of specific phenomena undermine perceiving the sign of the
arising of phenomena, to which the mind is usually attached,
and open out into the perception of the cessation of the rise
and fall of phenomena, nibbana.
The series of objects not attended to at A.V.321-2 corres-
ponds to that at M.III.I04 ff., where a monk is said to be pro-
gressively "attending to the perception" of human beings, a
village, the forest, earth, each of the four formless states, and
animitta-samadhi; with each of the perceptions being "empty"
(sunno) of the previous ones. Human beings, a village, and the
forest correspond to the five sense-objects and senses, at
AV.321-2; earth, very probably as a meditation "device," cor-
responds to the first of the four elements; the four formless
states are found in both passages, and the animitta-samadhi stands
out beyond all these.
56
Both passages seem to describe the
animitta state as one reached by means of a progressive emptying,
in which the signs of both gross and subtle phenomena are
transcended.
Another Nissaya-vagga a! AV.318-9 (cf. p.7-8),
reinforces this impression. Here, Ananda asks the Buddha:
"May it be, venerable sir, that a monk's acquiring of samadhi is
of such a sort that in solidity he is not percipient of solidity
... [this formula is then repeated for
each of the items following solidity at A.V.32 1-2] ... and yet he
is percipient (safifi'i)?"
The Buddha replies that there is such a samadhi, where a monk
is "percipient thus (evarlJ-sanni): this is the real ... detachment,
stopping, nibbana." Such a samadhi must surely be the same as
that at AV.321-2, and is also reminiscent of the samadhi at
AIV.426-8, which we have argued (p. 26) to be an animitta
samadhi. The description of the samadhi is indeed paradoxicaL
It is not so much that a person just does not attend to solidity,
etc., but that in solidity, no solidity is perceived, as AAV.2 says
(on AV.7-8), "having made solidity his object (aramma'Y}arlJ), he
would not be percipient with the arisen perception 'solidity.'"
Solidity is perceived, as it were, as being empty of "solidity":
sanna-"perception," "cognition," "recognition," or "interpreta-
tion," that which classifies or labels experience (correctly or in-
correctly)
57
-does not latch onto a "sign" as a basis for seeing
solidity as solidity. Rather, the mind attends to or perceives
nibbana, the signless; not attending to signs of solidity etc., it
"sees through" solidity, etc., and focusses on that which is sign-
less.
Another Nissaya-vagga passage illustrates this process. At
AV.324-6, the Buddha describes a monk who "meditates"
(jhiiyati) in such a way that his meditation is not dependent
(nissaya) on any of the phenomena listed at p. 318-9, and yet
he does meditate. The parallel between the passages suggests we
are again dealing with animitta-samadhi. At the passage in ques-
tion, however, the Buddha explains (p. 325-6) the type of medi-
tation by saying:
pALl BUDDHISM 43
" ... for the goodly thoroughbred of men, in solidity, the percep-
tion of solidity is vibhuta."58
. "Vibhilta" can mean "made clear" or "destroyed," with AA.V.80
preferring the former:
arisen perception of four-fold or five-foldjhiina, with solidity as
object, is vibhilta, unconcealed (pakata) ... here: it is born vibhuta
from the state of being seen as anicca-dukkha-anatta by means of
vipassana.
The samadhi, however, is not seen only as vipassana, which has
formations <;is object, but as going further, too: .
he meditates on what is made clear (vibhutam), he meditates with
fruition-attainment with nibbana as object.
The nature of the animitta apprehension of nibbana is
s u g g e s t ~ d by a passage at A.V.8-9. Here, Ananda asks Sariputta
the same question as he puts to the Buddha at p. 318-19 (above).
In reply, Sariputta says that he had previously attained such a
samadhi, in which he was still percipient:
"'the stopping of becoming (bhava-nirodho) [is] nibbana, the stop-
ping of becoming [is] nibbana,' indeed to me, your reverence,
one perception arose, and another ceased (niruJjhati). Just as,
your reverence, from a burning splinter fire, one spark arises,
another spark ceases .... ,,59
That is, in animitta-samtidhi, brought about by insight into imper-
manence, as we have seen, even the perception of imperma-
nence and of nibbana as the stopping of the impermanent flow
of phenomena (becoming)6o is experienced as impermanent.
When the mind thoroughly contemplates any item of be-
coming, such as solidity, as impermanent, it overcomes the sign
of permanence, etc., so as to perceive merely a stream of chang-
ing sense-objects not "indicative" of anything but themselves.
This is the stage of vipassana, which still has the sign of forma-
tions, of visible objects, etc., as its object. In the paths and frui-
tions, however, the mind does not even perceive the sign of
sense-objects. It no longer registers what has been the object of
contemplation-it sees "through" these, for it has so developed
the perception of perpetual (arising and) cessation, that it natur_
ally turns towards nibbana, the cessation of the very process of
arising and ceasing. The perception ofphetlOmena as imperma_
nent, liable to cessation (nirodha-dhammas; M.III.IOS), leads on
to the perception of nibbana: the stopping (nirodha) of such a
cessation-prone flux.
The animitta-samadhi, as comprised of a flux of perceptions
(A.V.S-g), is clearly itself impermanent. As M.IILIOS says, it is
known:
"as constructed (abhisar(lkhato) and thought out ... (it is) imper-
manent and liable to cessation."
One who knows this goes beyond animitta-samadhi and attains
arahantship. For reasons that cannot be gone into here, I would
argue, on the basis of the early Pali texts (e.g., the four Nikayas),
that the experience of arahantship transcends other animitta
states, as it has no object, not even the animitta nibbana. Rather,
it is nibbana, in the form of an objectless (anaramma'Yja), unsup-
ported (appatiffhita) , non-manifestive (anidassana) , infinite
(ananta), unconstructed (asmikhata) and stopped (niruddha) con-
sciousness. In the timeless experience of arahantship, viiiiiia'Yja,
schooled so as not to be taken in by nimittas and wordly objects,
does not even take nibbana as Dbject, but, objectless, transcends
conditions and is the unconditioned.
61
IX. The Animitta and Conceit
S.1.1SS, quoted above, shows an association between the
animitta and the destruction of conceit: " ... and develop the
animitta, cast out the latent tendency to conceit." This is due to
the fact that the animitta-samadhi grows out of strong insight
into impermanence, and:
"the perception of impermanence is to be developed Jor the
uprooting of the '1 am' conceit (asmimano). Meghiya, of one who
is percipient of impermanence, the perception of anatta endures;
one who is percipient of anatta wins the uprooting of the '1 am'
conceit, nibbana, even in this life.,,62
pALIBUDDHISM
45
Insight into impermanence must undermine the ability to "con-
ceive" of things in relation to ego-ideas, using them as ego-
related "signs":
By whatever they conceive it, it becomes otherwise from that;
and that becomes false (musa) for him, a peurile, delusive (mosa-)
dhamma. Nibbana is the undelusive dhamma ... (Sn.757-8).63
Knowing the swiftly changing nature of all nimittas, one con-
ceives nothing on them, and turns from them as false, to nibbana
as the real. S.IV.72-3, quoted above, sec. VII, describes the state
of one who does not conceive of phenomena as "this thing" or
"that thing" in realtion to one's "self." SA.II.384 comments:
"by that" ... you will not be impassioned by that (tena) attach-
ment .... "you will not be there" ... in the seen, heard, sensed
or discerned, you will not be bound, adhering and fIxed.
As Ud.A.92 adds, on a parallel passage:
you will not be adhering or fIxed in the seen, heard, sensed or
discerned by craving, conceit and views, "this is mine, this I am,
this is my self."
X. The Animitta, Void, and Desireless Liberations
The connection of the animitta to the uprooting of conceit
and the understanding of anatta shows that the animitta state is
closely associated with the "void" state, which comes from insight
into phenomena as void of "self" (e.g., M.I.297). We see at
Ps.II.59, indeed:
When one who has great resolution gives attention as imperma-
nent, the animitta liberation is dominant in him. In development,
two liberations (the void and desireless) follow upon it, are co-
nascent conditions ....
At anyone time, only one of the three liberations is dominant
(Ps.II.65), but the others are there in a secondary sense for, in
the animitta liberation for example, one has no desire for the
46
JIABS VOL. 9 NO.1
signs one has been liberated from, and is void of such desire
(Ps.II.66). Indeed, we have seen how one in animitta-samadhi
perceives sense-objects as being "empty" of themselves.
M.I.297-8 also explains that while the void and signless ceto-
vimuttis are in one sense different-as reflection on phenomena
as void of self, and as not attending to any signs-in another
sense they are the same. This is because attachment, hatred and
delusion are each "productive of signs,,,64 and an arahant has
destroyed these three, so that:
"To the extent that ceto-vimuttis are animitta, unshakeable (akuppii)
ceto-vimutti is shown to be their chief, for that unshakeable ceto-
vimutti is void (suiiiiii) of attachment, hatred and delusion."
This implies that "unshakeable ceto-vimutti"---described at
M.I.204-5 as the goal of the holy life, and at MA.II.354 as
arahatta-phala-ceto-vimutti- is both the highest void ceto-vimutti
and the highest animitta-ceto-vimutti.
XI. Conclusion
In conclusion, let us draw together the strands of this survey.
In a person's normal state, it is often the case that consciousness
runs after, follows, clings to and is tied to "signs," that is, to
"external" sensory objects that are taken as more than simple
phenomena, but as indicating "people" and "things" in the world
that are experienced as entrancing. The mind experiences them
as "signs" with pleasant, sensuous, annoying, or dear associa-
tions. It also misperceives them so as to see permanence, happi-
ness and I-ness where there is none. In this way, the "signs" ot'
characteristics of attachment, hatred and delusion arise in the
mind, and these "signs" give rise to more visible behavioural
"signs" indicating the nature of the person.
The way beyond this trapped state of consciousness involves
the practice of "guarding the senses": of mindfully monitoring
the input of the senses so that there is no seizing on such mis-
leading troublesome sensory indications, but a viewing of sense-
objects as simply sense-objects. On the other hand, there may
be the development of awareness of more salutory "signs," such
pALIBUDDHISM
47
as that of the unpleasant, and usually ignored aspects of bodily
existence. The development of inward states of calm concentra-
tion are also important. These turn the mind away from the
distraction of "external" signs and focus on some chosen salutary
"sign," which might concern some aspect of the foulness of the
body, as referred to above, or one of the many other objects of
samatha meditation, such as the breath. In such meditations, the
mind gets taken-up with a single, simple "sign," using it as a
vehicle for developing profound levels of calm and purity, the
four jhanas. From the fourthjhana, a meditator can refine the
process even further, by entering the four formless attainments.
These go beyond any external sensory "sign" and, in this respect,
are "signless." While they are still concerned with mental "signs,"
they transcend the five sense-objects and so provide the mind
with no such "sign" to latch on to, not even the subtle "sign"
used in the J"htinas. Beyond the fourth formless state, moreover,
lie states that are "signless" in a fuller sense, but cannot be
entered unless vipassanii, or insight meditation, has been de-
veloped.
Insight into impermanence is the basis for a series of "sign-
less" samadhis, insight into suffering is the basis of a series of
"desireless" samadhis, and insight into non-self is the basis for
a series of "void" samadhis. Any level of insight into imperma-
nence is known as "signless," as it undermines or removes the
misperception that seizes on delusive "signs" of permanence;
the corresponding insights into suffering and non-self also re-
move the "signs" of happiness and self. Insight is not considered
"signless" according to the Abhidhamma method, however, as it
still contemplates the signs of sensory objects and of conditioned
phenomena in general; it is aware of such phenomena and of
their rise and fall. As insight reaches a high pitch, "change of
lineage" occurs, which turns the mind away from conditioned
phenomena towards the unconditioned, the signless nibbana.
The first apprehension of this, in the path-moment of stream-
entry, is known as a "signless liberation" if it is attained on the
basis of strong insight into impermanence. Indeed, any of the
four paths and fruitions may be characterised as "signless" states
on this basis (though the Abhidhamma has some terminological
reservations, as we have seen). All such paths and fruitions are
free of the signs of sense-objects or of conditioned phenomena,
and are free of the "signs" of attachment, hatred and delusion,
and the behavioural signs these produce.
Insight into impermanence leads to such signless liberations
in the following way. As is well known, in insight meditation
the practitioner first contemplates the rising and falling of
phenomena, and then focusses simply on their falling away, Or
cessation: "he sees decay each time he applies his contemplation"
(p. 28, above). This leads to the "right seeing" of signs, so that
the perception of them is "made clear" (p. 43). This is because
he is aware of the limited, circumscribed nature of fleeting sen-
sory phenomena; because he does not see compacted "things"
and "people," but only such ephemeral phenomena. In this way,
the mind comes to see such phenomena as wholly insignificant;
it construes no "signs" in them. Sanna, perception, does not
latch on to any "sign" such as that of "solidity"; in solidity, no
"solidity" is perceived. The emphemeral nature of conditioned
phenomena means that the mind progressively becomes empty
of any perception of them: all, even "solidity," are seen as empty
of any solid reality. In such a state, the mind can pass beyond
its previous terror at constant decay, to have total equanimity
at conditioned phenomena; it is "neither inclined towards nor
inclined away" (p. 27, above). Setting aside ignorance (ignore-
ance), it can "see through" conditioned phenomena so as to
attend to the unconditioned: the signless nibbana, which is de-
void of graspable "signs." In the four paths and the first three
fruitions, consciousness takes signless nibbana as its object, while
in the fruition of arahantship, I contend, consciousness (vinnar],a)
has no object, not even a signless one, but is nibbana.
By their insight into impermanence, the signless liberations
not only undermine ignorance, but also conceit, for they dissolve
away any apparently solid basis for I-ness into an insignificant,
ephemeral flux, "beyond" which lies the unconditioned, which
offers no "signs" as a basis for I-ness. The signless liberations
are also closely related to the "void" and "desireless" ones, for
they perceive phenomena as empty of themselves, are empty
of attachment, etc., and also undercut desire for signs.
pALIBUDDHISM 49
NOTES
* Given at the tenth Symposium on Indian Religions, Oxford, April
1984.
1. But see, e.g., Ps.II.35 ff., Vism.657-9, 668-9, As1.22I-4; E. Conze
Buddhist Thought in India, London, 1962, p. 61-7; P. Vajiranana Mahathera,
Buddhist Meditation in Theory and Practice, Buddhist Missionary Society, Kuala
Lumpur, 1975, ch. 29.
2. E.g., Vin.lll.92-3, A.1II.397, S.IV.360.
3. E.g., M.1.297 ff., D.1II.249.
4. E.g., Vin.lll.92-3, Ps.1I.35 ff., Thag.92 (=Dhp.92).
5. Ps.II.48 ff. and 69.
6. Ps.I.91 and 65.
7. Vin.lll.92-3, Ps.I.91.
8. Ps.I.91.
9. M.I.302.
10. Ps.1I.48.
11. Commentary on M.I.296 ff.
12. E.g., S.V.269.
13. M.IlI.105-S.
14. The "sphere of infinite space," the "sphere of infinite consciousness,"
the "sphere of nothingness," and the "sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-
perception." These are 4 mystical states entered after the four jhiinas, or
tranquil meditations. All eight states are part of the path of samatha, or "calm"
meditation. "Calm" meditation on its own cannot lead to nirval)a, for which
vipassana, or "insight" meditation is also needed.
15. E.g., M.III.225, M.III.18, and cf. Ps.1I.64 and 66.
16. That the "crowding obstacle" is the five kamagur).as, or "strands of
sensual pleasure," can be seen from A.IV.449 and from the commentary on
this A.IV.426-S passage.
17. In answer to the question "kiT(Lphalo." AA.IV.19S seems to construe
"annaphalo" as "is the fruition of anna," for it sees the samadhi itself as a phala,
explaining it as arahatta-phala-samadhi, the samadhi that is the fruition of
arahantship. The Critical Pali Dictionary, however, takes "aiiiiaphalo" here as
meaning "resulting in perfect knowlege," seeing "phalo" as an adjective.
18. "When he gives attention [to phenomena] as suffering, occurrence
(pavattaT(L) appears to him as terror. When he gives attention [to phenomena]
as non-self, the sign and occurrence appear to him as terror."
19. Parallel passages are then given with "desire" (par).idhiT(L), then "mis-
interpretation" (abhinivesaT(L) , for "sign," and with "the desireless," then "the
void," for "the animitta."
20. And giving attention as suffering and non-self are said, respectively,
to lead to citta emerging from "occurrence" (pavatta), and "the sign and occur-
rence," so as to enter, respectively, into "non-occurrence" and nirodha-nibbiina-
dhatu.
21. And cf. S.IIL93, which states "animitta-samadhi, developed and made
much of, is of great fruit (mahapphalo)."
50 JIABS VOL. 9 NO. 1.
22. Cf. L'Abhidharmakosa, trans!' L. de La Vallee Poussin, V.186-7
(ch.VIII, 25 a-b), which sees the animitta-samiidhi (and the desireless and void
ones) as being either pure and mundane, or immaculate, without cankers
(anasrava) and supramundane, a vimok:iamukha.
23. It may be, then, that an "animitta-attaimnent" is always at the level
of fruition, though Miln. 333 lists animitta-phala-samapatti (and the attainments
of the de sireless and void fruitions) separately from the fruitions of stream_
entry, non-returning and arahantship. Mort!over, Ps.I.91 not
only describes the animitta (and the desireless and void) "dwelling" (see above),
and "attainment," but also the animitta (and desireless and void) "dwelling-at_
tainment," described by combining the descriptions of the animitta "dwelling"
and "attainment." It is hard to say what this is, though it may possibly be what
Ps.I.65 refers to when it lists the four paths and four fruitions in ascending
order of spiritual development, and then lists "void-dwelling" and "animitta-
dwelling" (but not "desireless-dwelling," cf. Thag.92, above, p.25).
2.4. As!.214 sees suchjhanas as "of one momentary flash of conscious-
ness."
25. The other three paths have a more compressed treatment ( 362-4),
but the implication is that they are to be dealt with in a parallel way.
26. The other three fruitions have a more compressed treatment ( 553),
but the implication is that they are to be treated in a parallel way.
27. Vin.II.289, D.II.I03, S.V.259, A.IV.309, Ud.62, and cf. Vibh.352-3
definition of "signifying" (nemittakata).
28. A.I.l70-1; cf. D.III.l03-4 and Ps.II.227.
29. Bv.8, v.36.
30. Bv.18, v.28.
31. D.III.158 and 171, cf. D.I.9.
32. D.III.151, and cf. Sn.575: "life" (jivita'T(l) is animitta-withouta sign
as to its length.
33. D.I.220; cf. D.I.209 and 225.
34, Vin.I.l06; cf. A.III.lI0.
35. M.I.360; cf. D.II.62.
36. E.g., M.I.l80, D.I.70.
37. M.I.72; cf. A.II.9 and A.IV.83.
38. And at A.I.82, nimitta is used as if it were parallel in meaning to
nidana, hetu and paccaya.
39. And cf. Vibh.193, Ps.I.l64; M.III.l61; A.III.422; A.I.256, A.III.319
and S.V.278.
40. Lines ii. and v. are found at Sn.341; lines vii.-viii. are found at Sn.342
and Thig.21; line v. is the second half of Thig.20; line vi. is similar to the
first half of Thig.20; lin'es vii. and v. are reminiscent of Thig. 105; and line ii.
is reminiscent of M.I.26.
4l. Cf. the "crowding obstacle" of the strands of sensual note
16.
42. DA.1036, AA.III.347, Vism.668 (see above p. 30); on nibbana-
MA.II.367, Dhp.A.172 (on Dhp.92).
43. DA.I036, AA.III.347, Vism.668 (see above p. 30), and cf. L'Abhidhar-
makosa V.185 (ch. VIII, 24a).
pALIBUDDHISM 51
44: AAIlI.347, MA.II.355, Asl.223 (see above, p. 31).
45. L'Abhidharmakosa V.185 (ch. VIII, 24a).
46. In the case of the mental "sense-channel," there is no talk in terms
of nimittas.
47. E.g., M.I.l80, D.I.70.
48. At Ud.8, the recipient of this teaching, Bahiya, soon reaches
arahantship by its practice.
49. Cf. Thag.ll05 and S.V.156.
50. The "influxes" (asava) of sensual desire (kama) and becoming (bhava)
are seen as abandoned by the "desireless" liberation, and that of views (diahi)
by the "void" liberation.
51. ii) and iii) deal with how citta enters into the "desireless" dhiitu, and
the "void" dhiitu.
52. MAII.352 explains the animitta-dhiitu as nibbana.
53. AA.V.80 (on AV.325-6), and cf. AA.V.2-3 (on A.V.7-9).
54. Cf. L'Abhidharmakosa V.185 (ch. VIII, 24a), which describes the
animitta-samadhi as "the contemplation in which the ascetic considers nirodha."
55. Cf. M.1.435-6.
56. The rest of the items at A.V.321-2 seem to be of a summarising
nature.
57. See, e.g., 5.111.87, D.I.93, AsUI0 and Vism.462.
58. At AI.287-91, and A.1V.400, an arahant is said to be a "goodly
thoroughbred of men," and at A.1. 77 and A.II.114-S, "goodly thoroughbred"
horses are likened to arahants. But at A.I.244-6, such a horse is compared
to any ariyan person, such as a stream-enterer. Note that at 5.1.28, the Buddha
is said to be a thoroughbred because he mindfully endures pain-d. p. 27.
59. Cf. at 5.11.119, the non-arahant Narada reports that he has seen, as
it really is, by wisdom: "the stopping of becoming (is) nibbana."
60. "Becoming" is clearly a term used to cover "solidity," etc.-all condi-
tion phenomena. This is illustrated by S.IV.23-4, on one who "conceives"
(maiL'iiati) of the eighteen dhiitus and related forms of stimulation and feeling:
he is said to "delight in becoming."
61. The arahant's consciousness cannot be in this state all the time. For
arguments to back up this set of contentions, see my Ph.D. thesis, "The Concept
of the Person in Pali Buddhist Literature," Lancaster, 1981, chs. 10-11. See
also my "Consciousness and Nibbana in the Pali Suttas," Journal of Studies in
Mysticism (now incorporated in Religious Traditions), La Trobe University, Vol.
2, no. 2, Spring 1979, p. 70-85. In this article, I made a preliminary investi-
gation of the Nissaya-vagga passages; not realizing that the samadhi referred
to must be animitta-samadhi, I suggested that it was itself objectless, and com-
prised the "perception" of nibbana simply in the sense of the "seeing-through"
of empty conditioned phenomena. This misconception is also implicit in my
paper, "The Nature of the Taghagata," in Buddhist Studies - Ancient and Modern,
ed. P. Denwood and A. Piatigorsky, Curzon Press, London, 1983. A revised
version of the former article is to be published, as "Consciousness Mysticism
in Early Buddhism," in The Mystic and the Symbol-Studies in Indian and Compara-
tive Religious Thought, ed. Karel Werner.
52
JIABS VOL. 9 NO.1
62. A.IV.358, cf. S.Il.I55.
63. Cf. S.IV.170, p. 39: all nimittas are "becoming other."
64. See above, p. 34.
Abbreviations (all references are to Pali Text Society editions)
A.
AA.
As!'
D.
DA.
Dhp.
Dhp.A.=
Dhs.
M.
MA.
Miln.
Ps.
S.
SA.
Thag.
Thig.
Ud.
UdA
Vibh.
Vin.
Vism.
Ariguttara-nikiiya
Ariguttara-nikiiya-a((hakathii
Atthasiilin'i
D'igha-nikiiya
D'igha-nikiiya-a((hakathii
Dhammapada
Dhammapada-a((hakathii
Dhammasariga'fJ-'i
Majjhima-nikiiya
Majjhima-nikiiya-a\thakathii .
Milindapanha
Pa(isambhidiimagga
Samyutta-nikiiya
Samyutta-nikiiya-a((hakathii
Theragiithii
Ther'igiithii
Udiina
U diina-a((hakathii
Vibhariga
Vinaya
Visuddhimagga
Dogen Casts Off "What":
"An Analysis of Shinjin Datsuraku
by Steven Heine
i The Significance of the Doctrine
'.. Perhaps the single most compelling and characteristic doc-
"trine in Dagen'sa philosophy of Zen is shinjin datsuraku
b
, or "cast7
lng off body-mind." Shinjin datsuraku is significant for two inter-
related reasons. First, it is the expression used on the occasion
of Dagen's enlightenment experience, achieved under the guid-
ce of master Ju-ching
cl
. According to the major biographical
sources, including Kenzeiki
d
, Ju-ching chided the monk sitting
next to Dagen, who had fallen asleep during a prolonged and
Cintensive meditation session, "To study Zen is to cast off body-
mind. Why are you engaged in singleminded seated (zar
slumber rather than single-minded seated meditation (zazenl?"
<Upon hearing this reprimand, Dagen attained a "great awaken-
:ing" (daigo)g from his previous doubts concerning the relation
'between meditation and enlightenment.
2
He later entered Ju-
:ching's quarters and burned incense, reporting, "I have come
because body-mind is cast off." J u-ching responded approvingly,
"Body-mind is cast off (shinjin datsuraku); cast off body-mind
'(datsuraku shinjin)h." When Dagen cautioned, "Do not grant the
Seal [of transmission] indiscriminately," Ju-ching replied, "Cast
off casting off (datsuraku datsuraku)il" Thus, shinjin datsuraku
marks not only Dagen's personal satori, but constitutes the basis
'and substance of the transmission of the Dharma between
Chinese mentor and Japanese disciple. The phrase is particu-
larly noteworthy in this exchange because it is manipulated by
Ju-ching through inversion and tautology to represent com-
mand and foresh'adowing, description and inquiry, evaluation
and challenge.
53
Shinjin datsuraku is also distinctive in how frequently and
pervasively it appears in the major writings by and about Dagen. 3
Unlike many of Dagen's other central doctrines, such as gen-
jokoanl (spontaneous realization), uji
k
(being-time), and mujo-bus_
use is generally
hmIted to the fasCIcle of the Shobogenzo
m
III whIch they are intro-
duced, shinjin datsuraku plays a key role throughout much of
the ShobOgenio as well as in the admonition of Fukanzazengi
n
,
the autobiographical reminiscences of HokyokiO, and the sermons
of Shobogenzo Zuimonki
P
, in addition to the biographies .of
Dagen.
4
Furthermore, each of the terms is often used separately:
the non-duality of body and mind is expressed through notions
such as shinjin ichinyoq (oneness of body-mind), shinjingakudiY
(learning the Way through body-mind), and shinjin 0 koshite
S
(unifying the body-mind); datsuraku appears in the sense of
renunciation (suteru)t and detachment (shukke)u.
The term shinjin datsuraku consists of two compound words
linked together as a predicate clause (without a specified subject,
even when not used as a command). Each word presents a
variety of issues in translation and interpretation. Datsuraku,
which refers to the moment of spiritual release or liberation,
suggests an activity that is at once passive or effortless and pur-
poseful or determined. What role does individual decision play
atthis occasion? Is datsuraku instantaneous or perpetual, brought
about by independent resolution or an interdependent illumina-
tive power? Also, how is it related to Dagen's emphasis on con-
tinuous zazen activity (gyojif as the unity of practice and realiza-
tion?
Although the meaning of shinjin seems to be more direct,
an intriguing challenge to the authenticity of the term in Dagen's
dialogue with Ju-ching suggested by modern scholarship has
raised numerous questions about the significance of this com-
pound word. In the study of Dagen's spiritual and philosophical
background and development, Kobutso no manebi
w5
, Takasaki
Jikida
x
has speculated, on textual, linguistic, and ideological
grounds, that Ju-ching did not actually utter "cast off body-
mind," but rather "cast off the dust from the mind." The latter
phrase, pronounced the same as the first in Japanese though
differently in Chinese, may express a dichotomy of subject/ob-
ject, purity/defilement-and thus a clinging to substantialism-
DOGEN
55
out of character with the way shinjin datsuraku is otherwise por-
trayed in Dagen's thought. According to Takasaki, Dagen either
misheard or intentionally and creatively misconstrued-in order
to correct-Ju-ching's expression, in a manner consistent with
his deliberate rereading and rewriting of Mahayana scriptures
and Zen epistles, particularly in the "Bussha"Y fascicle of the
Shi5bogenzo.6
Takasaki's findings have been disputed by Sata scholar
Kurebayshi Kada
z7
. Yet, his arguments force a reassessment of
Dagen's relation to Ju-ching and of his own approach to Zen
theory and practice: What is Dagen casting off? Is it different
than what Ju-ching advises? An examination of different uses
of shinjin datsuraku in Dagen'S works will be undertaken here to
attempt to resolve the controversy, and to uncover the signifi-
cance of this fundamental doctrine in terms of its essentially
non-substantive basis.
II. The Meaning of Datsuraku
Datsuraku is a compound of datsu (also pronounced nukeru) ,
which means "to remove, escape, extract," and raku (or ochiru),
"to fall, scatter, fade." Raku implies a passive occurrence that
"happens to" someone or something, as in the scattering of
leaves by the breeze or the fading of light at dusk. Datsu seems
to be the more outwardly active term, though it refers to the
distinctive occasion of the withdrawal from, omission or termi-
. nation of activity: it is the act of ending activity. Yet, the ceasing
of action suggested by datsu is the consequence of a more delib-
erate decision than the surrender or acquiescence of raku.
In modern Japanese, the compound datsuraku means "to
molt or shed." Though not generally used in everyday conver-
sation, datsuraku frequently appears in technical works as "de-
ciduous." Apparently based on this evidence, T.P. Kasulis trans-
lates shinjin datsuraku as "the molting of body-mind,"s a highly
suggestive rendering, though somewhat awkward in the context
of Dagen'S creative expression. The use of "molting" has two
distinct advantages. It connotes the spiritual loosening and dis-
solution of rigid and lifeless material (i.e., the self or ego)-as
in the natural process of discarding skin, teeth or hair-in order
to disclose a regenerated and unencumbered layer below (one's
original countenance).9 Also, "molting" is not a singular but
perpetually repeated occurrence, which implies that datsuraku
"is renewed and revitalized at each instant; enlightenment is a
continuous process, not a single event."l0
The difficulty with the use of "molting," however, is that it
sounds like an event that takes place of its own accord on a
seasonal or cyclical basis. The subject participates only as an
object that has been acted upon without control or even a
genuine contribution of its own. Yet, in Hokyoki Dagen quotes
Ju-ching as saying: "To cast off body-mind is to sit in
singleminded meditation (zazen). When practicing singleminded
seated meditation, the five desires dissolve, and the five defile-
ments are removed."ll As zazen, datsuraku requires determina-
tion, resolution, and utmost concentration. It is not an automatic
act or an involuntary response to stimuli, but lies at the very
ground of decision-making. 12 Thus, molting probably does not
capture the appropriate sense of effortlessness or spontaneity.
Renderings such as "dropping," "dropping off," "falling," or
"falling away" also seem to put too much emphasis on passivity.
"Renunciation" and "detachment" may have a negative conno-
tation in the sense of "turning away from," and like "freedom"
or "liberation," are too literal, failing to convey the symbolic
and poetic quality of the expression. "Shedding" may be a more
suitable translation; it retains the naturalistic and organic over-
tones of molting, yet implies a purposeful occurrence, as in the
shedding of clothes or tears.
The phrase "casting off' suggests an activity characterized
by decisiveness and dedication beyond the automatic nature of
molting or the ordinariness of shedding. Yet, even this rendering
must be qualified, because the decision of datsuraku is one of
discarding, its impact is a matter of release, and its immediacy
lies in unburdening. As Ju-ching indicates, datsuraku does not
result in the attainment of a new state (such as enlightenment
or Buddhahood), but the removal of ignorance and attachment.
It is the act not of maintaining or acquiring but of letting go.
Therefore, "letting cast off' may be the most precise, if some-
what stilted translation.
Datsuraku thus recalls Heidegger's notion of Gelassenheit,
which literally means "letting-ness," and is generally translated
DOGEN 57
as the "releasement" of the will to will as well as the will to
not-will. Gelassenheit non-obstructively allows the unfolding of
beings in the interplay of their opening and closing, presence
and concealment. Similarly, datsuraku is the decision to abandon
or forego decision, the meeting point of purposefulness and
effortlessness through the mutual reciprocity of one's own
power (jiriki)aa and the power of others (tariki)bb. Datsuraku is
not defined in terms of cause and effect, or rather it represents
the occasion in which initiation and consequence merge.
To speak of other-power in the context of datsuraku does
not necessarily imply an act of faith or surrender. 13 As the term
Gelassenheit suggests, it is possible to release will neither in defer-
ence to a greater will nor through the mere negation of will;
not-willing is cast aside along with willing. To see datsuraku in
terms of the convergence of own-power and other-power high-
lights the inseparability of independent effort and the inter-
dependence of determinative factors at the moment of activity.
As Dagen explains in Genjokoan, the "other" factors are not
entities external to oneself, but non-objectifiable conditions al-
ways intimately related to the self which compel a relinquish-
ment of fixations or attachments:
To study the Buddha Way is to study oneself. To study oneself
is to forget oneself. To forget oneself is to be authenticated
through all experiential factors. To be authenticated through all
experiential factors is to cast off body-mind of oneself as well as
body-mind of others ...
When man first seeks the Dharma [outside of oneself], he drifts
far away from its location. But when the Dharma has been re-
ceived by authentic transmission, the original person is im-
mediately realized. 14
According to this passage, the Dharma is based on self-realiza-
tion, which in turn involves self-forgetfulness or the penetration
of all other phenomena. The self discovers what it is only by
losing itself to elements which are a reflective manifestation of
the self; and as such those elements must be cast off of body-
mind by the same effort which lets one's own body-mind fall
. away. On the one hand, it is delusory to seek the Dharma within
because the self must be eradicated. Yet, true realization is noth-
58 JIABSVOL.9NO.I
ingother than the emergence of the original person who em-
braces the illuminative interplay of self and other.
The interrelatedness of own-power and other-power is rein-
forced by Dagen's assertion that zazen is not a particular event,
but the "supreme activity of continuous practice" (mujo no gyoji)CC,
"which is neither self-generated nor generated by others ...
[yet] upholds and sustains myself and all beings throughout the
universe.,,15 Continuous practice is the eminently creative force,
dependent at once upon the selfless yet resolute exertion of the
individual, which lies at the basis of and determines the universal
context of activity, and upon the influence of all beings, which
constitute the integrated collectivity of independent deeds.
Beyond will and not-will, self and other, independence and
interdependence, datsuraku is the power of the emergence of
phenomena and the discarding of purpose or direction, or the
abandonment of a causal or teleological perspective. Is it con-
tradictory for an occurrence to be both the basis and the disso-
lution of creativity, a decisive activity that is effort-free? This
apparent dilemma can be resolved by orienting the question of
"how" datsuraku takes place in terms of "when" it occurs. That
is, the conceptual structure of datsuraku rests on a temporal
foundation encompassing the coexistence of arising and desist-
ing; its nonsubstantive nature is based on the fluidity and
dynamism of impermanence.
The continuity (ji) of continuous practice is neither endless
time or timelessness nor an eternity superimposed on the cur-
rent moment or a supratemporal realm arriving in time. Rather,
Dagen writes, "The Way which is called 'now' (ima)dd does not
precede continuous practice: 'now' is the spontaneous realiza-
tion of continuous practice (gyoji genjor
e
.,,16 The continuous
practice of datsuraku is the perpetual renewal of the imperma-
nent process of arising-desisting or of the interpenetration of
life and death in each non-substantive instance of "now." From
the standpoint of the here-and-now, aging and dying, destruc-
tion and dispersal, rejection and denial-or the discarding of
casting off-do not indicate a negative condition in contrast to
the supposed constancy of a permanent happenstance. The dis-
solution of creativity is coterminous with the ever-renewable
and selfless possibilities of the creative moment. It is by virtue
of the spontaneity of "now" that continuity occurs, and because
DOGEN
59
of its perpetual regeneration that the immediacy of emergence
and dispersal arises.
To illustrate the interrelation between the occurrence of
. dissolution. and the decision of letting go as manifestations of
the impermanent and non-substantive moment, Dagen makes
a provocative verbal association or word-play between "falling"
(raku or ochiru) and "casting off' (datsuraku) iri'his commentary
on a statement by Ju-ching. According to Ju-ching's own rein-
terpretation of the traditional significance of a noted Zen poem,
the realiz<:ttion of datsuraku is not an elimination of transiency
. but genuine accord with it. "[Zen master] Reiun," he says, "at-
tained enlightenment when he saw the peach blossoms in bloom,
but I attained it when I saw them falling."l7 Dagen indicates
that the actual event of falling is nothing other than a manifes-
tation of casting off, by writing: "Although the spring breeze
opposes the peach blossoms, in falling (ochite) they achieve the
casting off of the body-mind of the peach blossoms." The scat-
tering blossom is at once a literal display of raku and a symbolic
representation of datsuraku. As the flower drops away it sheds
itself of life, and spiritually casts aside the distinction of life and
death to realize the temporal basis of action.
Datsuraku understood as the continuous practice of zazen is
this activity itself, the supreme activity of creative dissolution,
which is a movement that always breaks through its boundaries,
not as a rupture, but by means of the inexorable dynamism of
the self-generating process. The convergence of the decision/dis-
persal of datsuraku straddles and supersedes the tenuous borders
of now and then, present and future, by being rooted in the
. actuality of iife yet simultaneously standing out through antici-
pation of death. In negating itself, it attains what it is; the subject
is lost in the temporal unity of action by letting go of that which
the interdependent factors are causing to fall away.
Ill. Questions Concerning Shinjin
An examination of the "how" and "when" of datsuraku dis-
closes an impermanent process deliberately chosen yet spon-
taneously realized through activity at arice independent of and,
interdependent with the exertions of all phenomena. The next
key question concerning the doctrine of shinjin datsuraku is
"what" is cast off? Is shinjin the object, an entity or
of entities; that is shed? Or is it, as Ju-ching's inversion of the
phrase in the original dialogue with Dagen suggests, actually
the subject which is performing the act? Ju-ching seems to
implying that body-mind both has been cast off and is doing
the casting. Perhaps he is pointing to a perspective whereby
subject and object, question and answer as well as "is" and
"ought," admonition and description, tend to converge.
18
On
the other hand, if it is understood from most usages of the term
that shinjin is the object, then where is it cast to, and what is the
remainder or substratum left? If shinjin is hypostatized as a
substantive object ontically disposed of rather than ontologically
disclosed, the fundamental dynamism of the doctrine may be
defeated.
Shinjin literally signifies "body and mind." But, as Kasulis
points out, since Dagen frequently expresses the non-duality of
mind/matter, physical/spiritual, subject/object in notions such as
shinjin ichinyo (oneness of body-mind), the rendering "body-
mind" better suggests a unified and holistic phenomenon.
Dagen's view of shinjin recalls the basic Buddhist analysis of
human existence in terms of a psycho-physical unity of form
(nlpa) and the designations (niima) of consciousness (vijiiii'YJa) as
a phenomenological field (dhiitu) for the interaction of sense
organs and sense objects. Yet, if shinjin is generally affirmed by
Dagen as the vehicle of realization, in what sense is ino be cast
off; what is the basis and consequence of discarding it?
Difficulties in interpreting shinjin are compounded by a con-
sideration of Takasaki's claim that Dagen altered Ju-ching's ut-
terance precisely to rid from it any trace of objectification or
hypostatization. If Takasaki is correct, then Dagen'S term "body-
mind" must be understood in contrast to Ju-ching's "dust from
the mind." An analysis of Takasaki's argument is essential for
a clarification of the meaning of shinjin.
According to Takasaki, it is highly unlikely that Ju-ching
ever used "body-mind" (Chinese, shen-hsin)ff, but quite probable
that he said dust from the mind" (Ch., hsin-ch'en)gg. Few sources
are available for Ju-ching's own thought outside the context of
Dagen'S reporting and commentary, but the latter term does
appear one time in his recorded sayings (goroku)hh. "Dust from
DOGEN 61
the mind" also is used in other Zen texts of the time. On the
other hand, "body-mind" is used by no one but Dagen; no other
disciple of Ju-ching or Zen thinker in China or Japan has men-
.tioned this term. Furthermore, when Dagen's collected sayings,
Eihei Koroku
ii
, was taken to China by his disciple Giin jj several
decades after his death, the expression was changed to hsin-ch'en,
apparently to conform to the interpretation of Ju-ching's doc-
trine then shared by his followers.
Takasaki conjectures that the discrepancy is due to the fact
that Dagen must have had a "tremendous misconception," sub-
stituting "body" for "dust," homophones (jin)inJapanese. Dagen
may have misheard the term due to a lack of full comprehension
of Chinese, intuitively misrepresented it, or purposefully
changed it. In any case, the result is a constructive and meaning-
ful criticism ofJu-ching's approach to Zen training. The original
;phrase ("dust from the mind") seems to suggest a duality of the
purity of the mind and the defilement of dust, and thus a subtle
clinging to the notion of a fixated self. For an entity to retain
the gathering of dust, it must be stable and therefore substantive.
Since this conception is not in accord with impermanence, it
. prohibits an authentic involvement in the process of casting off.
Dagen's phrasing, however, eliminates any possible separation
. between non-objectifiable phenomena, highlighting the integra-
tion of practice and grounded in the continuing
dynamism of datsuraku. 19
Takasaki's textual argument rests on two basic ideological
implications concerning the character of Dagen's Zen:
1. Dagen's creativity of expression-Dagen is noted for his crea-
tive or innovative use of language in recasting both everyday
expressions and Buddhist scriptures through verbal associations,
homonym conceit, punning, etc. Examples include: his word-
play on the term uji, which in conversation means "sometimes,"
but which he interprets as the primordial unity of "being (u)-time
(ji)"; and his rewriting of the Nirvarpa Sidra pronouncement that
"all beings have the Buddha-nature" as "whole-being-Buddha-
nature," based on the dual meaning of u
kk
as "to have" and "to
be."
2. His independent spirit-Dagen has not only revised the su-
tras, but criticized many of the illustrious Zen masters, including
the sixth patriarch, Hui-neng, for the substantialist overtones
in the of kenshO
ll
(seeing into [one's own-]nature), and "
Rinzai, for an over-reliance on Man-introspection: Although
generally seems to be as respectful of Ju-chmg as he is
of Sakyamuni, it would not be surprising for him to expose and
refute what he considers a philosophical misjudgement in the
saying of his teacher.
Kurebayashi, however, challenges Takasaki's claim about
the authenticity of shinjin on philological and philosophical
grounds. Although he concedes that initially Takasaki's argu-
ments appear to be persuasive, Kurebayashi contends that on ,"
closer examination they begin to unwind. From Takasaki's
standpoint, it seems that Dagen mistook the word "body"_
either naively, intuitively, or deliberately-for "dust" because'
both are pronouncedjin in Japanese. But Kurebayashi points
out that this linguistic confusion could not have occurred in the
original dialogue with Ju-ching, for two reasons. First, if an
error actually was made it was not the mistake that Takasaki
assumes, because "body" is usually pronounced shin. Although
the pronunciation of shin is changed to jin when it appears as
the second word of a compound, "body" is not second in this.
instance. Rather, it is "mind," also pronounced shin, that comes'
second and is changed to jin. Thus, Dagen could not have sub-
stituted "body" for "dust." Second, Dagen's supposed error was
made not in Japanese conversation, but in a Chinese dialogue
with Ju-ching, who was not conversant in Japanese. So, Dagen
would not have been mistakirig one jin (or shin)-"body" for
another jin-"dust"-but shen ("body") for ch'en ("dust"). These'
appear in reversed order in the two expressions-shen is first in
"body-mind" and ch'en is second in "dust from the mind." The
mistake Takasaki describes is even more unlikely when it is
considered that the words from the two expressions that sound
alike in Chinese are both "mind" (hsin) , which Dagen hears
correctly despite the reversal of their order.
The analysis of Takasaki's linguistic claim by Kurebayashi
demonstrates that Dagen probably did not simply undergo a
mishearing of whatever Ju-ching said. But the question remains,
did Dagen deliberately misrepresent or alter the expression to,
suit his view? This issue involves a philosophical evaluation of
the relationship between Dagen and Ju-ching concerning the
nature and practice of zazen and the transmission of the Dharma.
DOGEN 63
IrWhereas Takasaki attempts to highlight the uniqueness or orig-
of Dagen's thought, Kurebayashi denies any inconsis-
$C"
between Dagen and Ju-ching. On the one hand,
stance must be viewed somewhat critically be-
l"
as a modern sectarian scholar, he is eager to show a
of approach taken over by the founder of SaW Zen
from his Chinese mentor.
i}t: Yet, it must also be recognized that even if one concedes
,II:,
uttered hsin-ch'en, as Takasaki argues, his expres-

may not have conveyed a standpoint any different than
shen-hsin. Hsin-ch'en does not necessarily imply "dust
fllfrom the mind"-it is not that dust is an obstacle to the purity of
but that both mind and dust, if objectified, are removed
zazen. Or, it could mean "mind-dust" as a synonym for the
of the five desires and five defilements that J u-ching
must be discarded. Thus, hsin-ch'en does not suggest a
standpoint. Conversely, for the sake of argument,
the phrase shen-hsin could be interpreted as an hypostati-
if "body-mind" represents an entity thrown away.
ffKurebayashi concludes that, "The issue of whether it is 'hsin-ch'en
or shen-hsin (body-mind), does not pertain to the
of basis of the religious standpoint.,,2o The
;ivalidity or authenticity of either term depends on the non-sub-
')tantive perspective underlying and interpreting the expression,
not on the particular words themselves.
)Iv. "What" is Cast Off: Casting Off "What"
Dagen himself might deal with the question of the content of
the process or the object determined by the subjective act. A
key passage in the "Bussha" fascicle, centering on the use of
the term datsuraku, sheds light on the topic. Here, Dagen com-
ments on a traditionalZen dialogue in which the fourth patriarch
asks the fifth patriarch, "What is your name?" Dagen's interpre_
tation of the significance of the word "what" in this contex.t
suggests a striking parallel to the question, "What is cast off?,"
and thus serves as a philosophical guideline for understanding
his perspective.
In the beginning of the source dialogue, the fifth patriarch
replies to the question, "What is your name?," by saying, "I have
(u) a name (Sho)ffiffi, but it is not an ordinary name." Dagen's
commentary is largely based on word plays made on the
homonym u, which means both "to have" and "to be," and the
homophone shi5, the identical pronunciation of two different
characters which mean "name" and "nature." "That is," Dagen
writes of the dialogue, "being (u) itself is the name (shi5) [or
nature (also sh(5)], which is not an ordinary name. [Having] an
ordinary name is not this [sense of] being [as name].,,21
This dialogue and commentary can be rewritten in light of
the question, "What is cast off? ," or "What have you cast off?"
The answer would be: "I have cast off, but it is not an ordinary
casting off." The commentary: "Being itself is casting off, which
is not an ordinary casting off (in the sense of discarding or
eliminating an entity), and ordinary casting off is not this sense
of being as casting off." Thus, casting off is being itself, if not
objectified, though not in the ordinary sense of either having
or letting go of a particular entity.
To further explore Dagen's approach to the matter of
"what," the remainder of the passage from "Bussh6" will be
cited, and then followed by a philosophical rewriting. The pass-
age reads:
The fourth patriarch said, "What is this name (ze ka shOrn?,"
which means that whatever it is (ka) is this [name], and this [name]
is whatever it is ...
The fifth patriarch said: "This [name] is Buddha[-nature] (ze
butsu shO)OO," ... Because it is whatever it is, it is [called] Buddha
DOGEN 65
(butsu) ... Therefore, although this [name] is whatever it is (ka)
and is thus Buddha (butsu) , if these [prefixes] are cast off (dat-
suraku) and fully penetrated, this [name] is nothing other than
the name (shO). 22
According to Dagen's commentary, "What is the name?" as a
question becomes its own answer; the name is "what'.' or what-
ever it is. To say "what," from one perspective delimits the name,
but it also liberates naming from partiality by virtue of its what-
ness or nature. Similarly, the designation "Buddha" both re-
stricts the name, as a particular word, and releases it to be the
equivalent of the unobstructed freedom of Buddha-nature. But
question and answer are both relative to the nature of name.
When question (ka) and answer (butsu) are cast off in the literal
sense of being left out of the dialogue, name is truly cast off to
realize its nature beyond the limitations of specific designations.
The passage can now be rewritten to demonstrate the
philosophical consistency underlying Dagen's approach to
"what":
What is this casting off?, which means that,
Whatever it is is cast off, it is the casting off of whatever it is.
It is casting off body-mind (or mind-dust), that is,
Because it is whatever it is, it is casting off body-mind (or mind-
dust). Although the casting off is whatever it is, and is thus
body-mind (or mind-dust-a holistic phenomenon correspond-
ing to Buddha-nature), if these limiting prefixes-"what" as ques-
tion and "body-mind" (or "mind-dust") as answer-are cast off
of objectification or hypostatization, then casting off is nothing
other than casting off.
Thus, the resolution of the question" 'What' is cast off?," is its
own answer, "Casting off 'what,' " for which the word "what"
has two meanings. On one level, it suggests that whatever the
name is, is the name--or the nature of name-as a unity of
question and answer. The being of casting off is nothing other
than the perpetual process of casting off, which is its own content
regardless of whether it happens to be called "body-mind" or
"mind-dust." "Casting off 'what' " also means casting off the
inquiry. If any name is hypostatized, the essential non-substan-:
66
JIABS VOL. 9 NO.1
tive dynamism of casting off is lost. While "what" answers
"what? ," ultimately neither question nor answer pertains to dat-
sumku.
This second level of meaning returns the significance of
the doctrine to the tautology pronounced by J u ~ c h i n g in the
original dialogue with Dagen: "Cast off casting off (datsuraku
datsumku)!" "Casting off 'what' " thus means that even casting
off, if objectified, must itself be cast off through the creative
dissolution of casting off. The continuous practice of datsumku
is a never-ending struggle to realize what it is by terminating
itself.
The tautologically evoked experience of "casting off casting
off' is symbolically expressed in the following waka by Dagen,
which captures the effortless dedication of datsumku. The key
phrase in the poem is sute obune
PP
("drifting boat"). In Japanese
Court poetry, sute obune conventionally signifies loneliness or
alienation in an impersonal world, but it is transformed here
into a symbol for the strength, detachment, and dedication of
enlightenment. Because the verb suteru (lit. "to be cast out" or
"to renounce") is frequently used by Dagen interchangeably
with datsuraku, the expression sute obune may be interpreted as
representing "casting off 'what' ":23
ShObogenzo
Namimohiki
Kaze mo tsunaganu
Suteobune
Tsuki koso yawa no
Sakai nari keri.
Treasury of the true Dharma-eye
24
In the heart of the night,
The moonlight framing
A small boat, drifting:
Tossed not by the waves
N or swayed by the breeze.
The "drifting boat" (lit., "small boat that has been cast out") is
not at the mercy of the elements, but appears thoroughly undis-
turbed by the "waves" (symbolizing objects of attachment) and
the "breeze" (ignorance and desire). The illumination by the
"moon" has both connotations from the poetic tradition, in
which it represents an object of longing and the source of com-
fort in times of turmoil and grief, and Buddhist implications,
as the symbol of the universal manifestations oflhe compassion
and wisdom of the Buddha-nature.
DOGEN 67
The moon deepens the meaning of the resolute detachment
or casting off of the boat. The boat is cut off from the harbor,
but because it falls within the pervasiveness of the moon's glow,
it is not lost, but protected by the compassionate Buddha-nature.
Yet, in contrast to the moon, the boat is not totally aloof from
the world of variability; it remains involved, at once aimless in
its solitude and purposeful in its disciplined reponse to change.
The single phenomenon of the drifting boat-perpetually cast-
ing off casting off (datsuraku datsuraku)-at once shares the over-
view and illuminative remoteness of the moonlight, and partakes
of the world into which it has been cast out, yet has learned to
cast off.
NOTES
1. Although the expression shinjin datsuraku is universally used in
Dagen's biographies, some controversy surrounds the exact phrasing of the
dialogue with Ju-ching at the time of Dagen's enlightenment. The version
presented here appears in the 1538 Meishu
qq
edition of the Kenzeiki (written
in 1470), which is the oldest text available for what is generally considered
the most complete and reliable of the dozen or so traditional biographical
sources. The authenticity of the Meishu version is supported in that it corres-
ponds to the version of Eiheiji sanso gyago-ki
IT
(early 14th century), another
early and dependable authority for biographical studies. There is a slight
difference, however, with the Menzan
ss
text (1738), which is actually the latest
-edition of the Kenzeiki, though the one frequently followed by modern Japanese
scholars until the recent discovery of older manuscripts, including the Meishu
and others, has challenged the accuracy of the Menzan. The discrepancy in
this case is in the last line, which appears in the Menzan as "cast off body-mind"
(shinjin datsuraku) rather than the "cast off casting off' (datsuraku datsuraku)
of the Meishu. For the critical edition comparing the different manuscripts
of Kenzeiki, see: Kawamura Kada, Eihei kaizan Dagen zenji gyajo-Kenzeiki
(Tokyo: Daishukan shoten, 1975). For an English-language discussion ofbio-
graphical sources for Dagen, see: Takashi James Kodera, Dagen's Formative
Years in China (Boulder: Prajiia Press, 1980).
2. Dagen's "doubt," which according to Kenzeiki led to his pilgrimage
to China and training with Ju-ching, involved reconciling the Japanese Tendai
doctrine of original enlightenment (hongaku)tt with the traditional Buddhist
imperative for sustained meditation. The uncertainty is expressed in Fukan-
zazengi, the first work written on Dagen's return to Japan in 1227: "Originally
the Way is complete and all-pervasive. How does it depend on practice and
realization?" In Okubo Dashu, ed., Dagen zenji zenshii. (Tokyo: Chikuma shobo,
1969 and 1970), vol. II, p. 3.
. 3. The centrality o! datsuraku by "To study
Zen IS to cast off body-mmd. It IS not burmng mcense, worship, recitation of
Amida's name, repentance, or reading sutras, but the single minded practice
of zazen-only." Ju-ching's standpoint, recorded by. Dagen in Hakyaki is also
repeated by Dagen in "Bendawa."uu And, as Hee-jin Kim notes, "The central
religious and philosophical idea of Ju-ching's zazen-only was the 'body-mind
cast off-the phrase repeated by Dagen tirelessly throughout his works." See
Kim, Dagen Kigen-Mystical Realist (Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1975),
p.40.
4. Hakyaki, Dagen's account of the teachings of and his conversations
with Ju-ching, written in 1226 (but discovered posthumously), marks the first
appearance of the term in Dagen's collected writings. In ShObi5genza Zuimonki,
the verb suteru ("to be cast out" or "to renounce") is used interchangeably
with datsuraku.
5. Takasaki Jikida with Umehara Takeshi, Kobutsu no manebi (Tokyo:
Kodokawa shoten, 1969), pp. 59-52, 190-193. Takasaki's arguments have
been sympathetically reported in many Japanese works as well as in at least
two of the major English-language accounts of Dagen'S thought: Daigan and
Alicia Matsunaga, Foundations of Japanese Buddhism (Los Angeles-Tokyo:
Buddhist Books International, 1976), pp. 238-239; Kodera, pp. 106-107.
6. For a discussion of the temporal foundations of Dagen's creative
rewriting of scripture, see this author's "Temporality of hermeneutics in
Dagen's ShObi5genza," Philosophy East and West, vol. 33, no. 2 (April, 1983), pp.
139-147.
7. Kurebayashi Kada, Dagen zen no honrui (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1978),
pp.58-69.
8. T.P. Kasulis, Zen Action, Zen Person (Honolulu: University Press of
Hawaii, 1980).
9. As Dagen writes in Fukanzazengi, "[In zazen] body-mind are cast off
naturally Vinen) vv and the original countenance (honrai memmoku) ww is realized."
Jinen literally means "in and of itself'; it can be used either in the philosophical
sense of the unity and breadth of nature or in the ordinary sense of an
automatic reaction.
10. Kasulis, p. 91.
11. Dagen, Hakyaki, in Okubo, vol. II, p. 337.
12. Dagen stresses the efficaciousness of decisive exertion in the "Uji"
fascicle: "The being-time of every single thing in the [heavenly] world and
the [earthly] world are all in all the spontaneous manifestation and the passage
of my utmost exertion." In ShObagenza, ed. by Terada Taru and Mizuno Yaoko
(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1970 and 1972), vol. I, p. 259.
13. Although a convergence of own-power and other-power seems to
be apparent in Dagen's philosophy of Zen, it is probably far too strong to
assert, as Francis Cook does in the chapter "The Importance of Faith," that
" ... Dagen's Zen is not really the Buddhism of self power Viriki), [but] as Pure
Land Buddhists say, itis the Buddhism of other power (tariki)." Cook's interpre-
tation seems to be based not so much on Dagen Zen as on the approach of
Keizan, affectionately known as the "second patriarch" of the SaW sect. Keizan
DOGEN 69
was largely responsible for making Soto a mass movement in the medieval
period through an eclecticism combining elements of Pure Land worship and
Shinto practice. See Cook, How to Raise an Ox (Los Angeles: Center Publica-
tions, 1978), p. 28.
For further discussion of the role of faith in Dogen, see Nakamura
Bajime, Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples (Honolulu: East-West Press, 1964),
pp. 452-458. The closest Dogen seems to come to an other-power standpoint
is the following passage from the "Shoji"XX fascicle, apparently written for a
pure Land audience: "When we let go and forget [synonomous with datsurakul
our bodies and our minds, abandon ourselves to the domain of the Buddha
and let the activity come forth from his behalf, yielding to this without expend-
ing either effort or thought, th.at is release from life and death and the attain-
ment of Buddha-[hood]." In Okubo, vol. I, p. 779.
14. Dogen, Shobogenza, "Genjokoan," vol. I, p. 36.
15. Ibid., "Gyoji," vol. I, p. 165.
16. Ibid., p. 166.
17. Ibid., "Udonge,"YY vol. II, p. 218.
18. The distinction between subject and object is blurred because the
expression is almost always written without the particle wo between shinjin
and datsuraku; wo is the grammatical signpost that the preceding word is the
object of the subsequent verb. The main exception to this-when wo is in-
cluded-is the passage from "Genjokoan" cited above.
19. The controversy as presented by Takasaki seems a remarkable paral-
lel to the famous tale of sixth patriarch Hui-neng's poetic critique of the
Shen-hsiu, whose gatha asserts that the mind is a bright mirror upon which
dust collects and is removed. Hui-neng's verse negates both the mirror and
the dust in accord with thoroughgoing non-substantiality.
20. Kurebayashi, p. 65.
21. Dogen, Shobagenza, "Bussho," pp. 50-51.
22. Ibid.
23. According to the main modern commentary on Dogen's waka collec-
tion, by aba Nanboku, sute obune is a symbol of shinjin datsuraku. See aba,
Dagen zenji waka-shu shin-shaku (Tokyo: Nakayama shobo, 1972), p. 149.
24. The versif, as part of Dogen's waka collection originally included in
Kenzeiki, is in Kawamura, p. 89. This waka was one of a group of twelve poems
written on Buddhist doctrinal topics in 1247 at the request of Hojo Tokiyori's
wife. Because Dogen had been called by the Hojo to preach his approach to
Zen in Kamakura, then the center of the rival Rinzai Five Mountain (gozan)ZZ
monastic institution, the image of the "drifting boat" may symbolize Dogen's
personal feelings of solitude beyond loneliness or isolation during this daring
mission.
70
JIABS VOL. 9 NO. 1
Kanji
a.
-iT\.
aa. h
b.
bb. le> fJ
c.

cc. '#.:
d.
}j dd.
e.
"1'
ee. il H l\tJi
f.

ff.
J$)'L,
g.
t+%' gg.
,l)'
h.
hh.

o D ;L:l'-
l.
11.
;h!f
J.

lJ
itT
k.

kk.
'Ii
1.

ll.
lUi
m.
1:
mm. '1-1 lo"000
n.
nn.
,t
O.
II it!c
00.
f
p. ;E ;;'BitgRli fji,ic pp.
He'llt
q:
h--l-
o qq.
aJl 'I})
r.

rr.

S.

SS.
"[;lLl.J
t.
H
tt.

u. J;'k.
UU.

v.
ti-'rt VV.
w. 6'i,,'Hnu WW. I'l
x.

xx. 'i-R
y. leY!:
yy.
1t:i-l
z. of"- i%I
ZZ. ntJ-l
Buddhism and the Caste System
by Y. Krishan
It has been long recognised that Buddhism and Jainism
were not movements for social reform directed against the caste
system,l and that the Buddha's doctrine did not aim at transfor-
mation or improvement of the social conditions.
2
Still, the
Buddha's criticism of the caste system in general and of the
social superiority claimed by the brahmaI).as is still interpreted
by some to mean that the Buddha held that "all men are born
equal" or that his ideal was to establish a classless society.
3
We
. are of the view that the Buddha by his teaching unwittingly
strengthened the caste system by explaining it in terms of the
doctrine of karma.
The salient features of the caste system in its clasical form
are: \
(i) A hierarchical organisation of laymen into four groups, the
brahamaI).as at the top, followed by vaisyas and the
sudras. Those outside the caste system were called pancamas.
ii) Practice of endogamy and exogamy; endogamy permitted
marriages within a caste, excluding sagotra and sapirprJ,a mar-
riages; exogamy prohibited inter-caste marriages to ensure the
purity of blood of the endogamous caste group .
. (iii) Prohibition of commensality, that is, inter-dining among
the castes.
(iv) Discriminatory treatment of the sudras and the outcastes.
These castes and classes were debarred from studying the Vedic
scriptures, performing Vedic yajnas, or sacrifices. The penal
system, as laid down in the Dharmasastras, was discriminatory:
for the same offence, a brahamaI).a offender had to bear a lighter
punishment, whereas it became heavier as we descend the caste
hierarchy, the heaviest punishment being reserved for the sudra.
71
The paiicama or antyaja, excluded from the pale of the aryan
society, were treated as untouchable; their touch or sight was
believed to cause pollution of the members of the upper castes,
necessitating performance of purificatory rites.
There was another class that was outisde the social system
into which the laymen were organised, viz., the b h i k ~ u s of the
Buddhists, the parivrajakas or sadhus of the Brahmanical faith,
and the yatis and sadhus of the J ainas. They had renounced the
lay life for good. They were a class sui generis, not bound by the
caste restrictions, and they commanded respect from all lay
social groups.
1. Features of the Caste System in Buddhist Scriptures
It seems clear that by the time the Buddhist texts were
composed, the caste system had already acquired most of its
essential features. In the Madhura Sutta (84) of the May"-
jhimanikaya (II 4.4) and in the Assalayana Sutta (93) of Majjhima
(II 5.3), the brahama:t;las claim to be of superior caste (brahmaTf,o
seUho vermo) and the rest are of inferior caste (hZno aTf,Tf,O vaTf,Tf,o);
the brahmaTf,as claim to have fair complexion (sukko vaTf,Tf,o), while
others are dark (kaTf,ho); the brahamaTf,as are pure (sujjhanti) , while
non-brahamaTf,as are not.
The purity of caste blood was highly prized and was a bar
to inter-caste marriages. In the CaTf,k'i Sutta (95) of the MaJjhima
(II 5.5), one of the grounds on which Ca:t;lkl is dissuaded from
going to the Buddha is that Ca:t;lki, both on his father's and
mother's side, is of pure descent back through seven successive
generations, without break or blemish in his caste lineage (jati
vadena). Cankl replies that Gotama is also of pure descent for
seven generations both on the mother's and father's sides.
4
TheAmbaaha Sutta (iii) of the Dighanikaya (I 92-93) records
the fear, entertained by the exiled children of Okkaka, a King
of the Sakyas, of caste impurity (jati sambheda bhaya) that may
lead to marriage between brothers and sisters (sakiihi bhaginihi
saddhim samvasam kappenti). There is also a reference to denial
of seat (asana) or water (uddakam) (ibid. III 98) to a person excom-
municated from the caste group. In modern Indian parlance,
it means that there can be no sharing of hookah (smoking hubble-
BUDDHISM AND THE CASTE SYSTEM 73
bubble) and water with the person who is expelled from the caste.
In the story of Vi<;lu<;labha contained in the Dhammapada
Atthakathii (4.3),5 King Pasenadi of Kosala is incensed at being
tricked by Mahanama, King of the Sakyas, who has given him
in marriage a daughter, advertised as a pure blood, but
actually Vasabhakhattiya, born from a slave girl. When Pasenadi
discovers this deception, he degrades his queen and her son,
Vi<;lu<;labha, to the status of slaves. The Buddha, the kinsman
of the Sakyas, pacifies Pasenadi by emphasising to him that the
family of the mother does not matter; "it is the family (gotra)
of the father that affords the only true measure of social posi-
tion." Thus, the Buddha seems to have accepted the principle
of blood purity as the determinant of social superiority .
. The Esukari Sutta (96) of the Majjhima (II 5.6) indicates that
occupations were linked to castes, and that occupational mobility
across caste divisions was frowned upon. The sutta states that a
member of the higher caste could not serve a member of the
lower caste: a brahamaI).a may be served by members of all the
castes; a (khattiyya) by a vaisya (vessa) or sudra
(sudda) , a vaisya by a vaisya or sudra; and a sudra by a sudra
only. At MaJjhima II 180, a brahamaI).a maintains that it is blame-
able conduct for anyone to desert his vocation for something
else: bhikkhacariyam ca pana brahmarj,o sandhanam atimannamano
akiccakari hoti, gopo va adinnam adivamano ti: by discarding alms
begging, a brahmaI,la fails to fulfil his duty or obligations, and
is like a guardian who what is not given to him. The same
is true of a valsya or sudra, who abandons the duties
prescribed for his caste.
This is in consonance with the teaching of the Bhagavadglta
which enjoins (4.13, 18.41-47) performance of varrj,a-karma as
the most important means for attainment of siddhi, liberation.
T.W. Rhys Davids, in Buddhist India,6 adduces considerable
evidence from the Jatakas to establish that occupa-
tional rigidity had ceased to exist and that there were marriages
between members of higher and lower castes (including sudras)
that did not lead to loss of caste. So far as the question of
occupational flexibility is concerned, the successful assault on
yajna-karma, religious sacrifices, by Buddhism and J ainism, and
consequent occupational loss to the brahmaI).as would have dri-
ven them to take up professions that in theory were the
monopoly of other castes. Bhuridatta Jataka (no. 543, 214) de-
scribes the situation very graphically:
As householders to gain a livelihood
Count all pursuits legitimate and good,
So BrahmaI,las now in our degenerate day
Will gain a livelihood in any way.7
Obviously, this freedom to take up any profession was confined
to the professions open to dvijas, the twice born, and could not
include professions believed to cause pollution. Perhaps as a
compensatory measure, the taboos on inter-caste marriages and
inter-caste dining came to be practised more intensively and vig-
orously.
In the Jatakas, there is evidence that the touch or sight of
the pancamas was believed to cause pollution. In the Setaketu
Jataka (no. 377),8 brahma1J,a Setaketu, on seeing a ca'I'Jq,aZa fears
that "the wind, after striking the ca'I'Jq,aZa's body; might touch
his own body" and thereby pollute him. He calls the ca'I'Jq,ala
ill-omened. In the MatangaJataka (no. 497),9 Dittha-mangalika,
on seeing a ca'I'Jq,ala, says "Bah, I have seen something that brings
bad luck" and washes her eyes with scented water.. This is re-
peated in the Citta Sambhutta Jataka (no. 498).10 In the same
Jiitaka a man describes a: ca'I'Jq,iila as "the blot in the blood" (jatiya
doso). The dwellings of the ca'I'Jq,iilas were outside the towns.u
II. The Buddha's Attitude Toward Caste
The Buddha's reactions to these features of the caste system
do not indicate that he repudiated or condemned the caste
system. In the Madhura Sutta of the Majjhima (II 85), he main-
tains that all four castes are equal: ime cattaro va'I'J'l'Jii samasama
honti; and describes the brahma1J,as' claim to superiority as an ;
empty boast (ghoso). In the Assaliiyana Sutta of the Majjhima (II
149) and the Madhura Sutta, Majjhima II 87, the Buddha refutes
the claim of higher castes to superiority-but on metaphysical
grounds: after death, they shall be reborn in accordance with
their karmas and not in accordance with their caste (jiiti): "a
man who is a murderer or a thief or a fornicator, or a liar, or
, a slanderer, or of violent speech or tattles or covets or is malevo-
lent or holds wrong views,he will, after death at body's dissolu-
. tion pass to the state of misery and woe, whether he be a
. brahmaI).a; a a vaisya or a siidra."
In Jataka no. 498, the origin of ca'Y],q,alas, described as the
lowest race and the meanest of men, is traced to karma: "When
all our deeds were ripe- as guerdon meet, both' as young
car]q,alas had our birth" (sakehi kammehi supapekhi ca'Y],q,ala gabbhe
avasimha pubbe). 12
Regarding the concept of the purity of caste blood, in the
'. Assalayana Sutta of the Majjhima (II 154), the Buddha maintains
that all castes are of equal purity: catu va'Y],'Y],im suddhimpaccagato.
But he attacks the claims of the caste conscious brahmaI).a to
social superiority on the ground that his purity of blood might
.be suspect: jananti pana ... ya janzmatu mata yava sattama mata
'mahayuga brahma'Y],am yeva agamasi no abrahma'Y],a: "Do you know
" Jor certain that your mother's mother and your grandmother
. for seven generations had intercourse with brahmaI).as only and
never with non-brahmaI).as?" The Buddha goes on to repeat
the same for the father's side (sattama pita mahayuga). (ibid II 156)
In the Ambattha Sutta of Dzghanikaya III, the Buddha recog-
nises the caste-superiority of over brahmaI).as by point-
'ing out that the do not admit a child born of an
anuloma
13
or pratiloma
14
marriage into their caste, even though'
the mother or father might be a and the other a
brahmaI).a. Such a child was admitted to the brahmaI).a caste.
The Buddha therefore concludes that when one compares
women with women (itthiya va itthim) or men with men <purisena
va purisam), the are superior (seUho) to the brahma'Y],as,
who are lower (hina). The Buddha avers: khattiyo parama
nihZnatam patto hoti, even when a is fallen in the deepest
degradation, khattiyo va settha hino brahma'Y],o, the is
superior, brahmaI).a inferior. The Buddha quotes Sanam Kum-
ara, a Brahma god, to the effect that the is the best
among those who believe in caste lineage (gotra): khattiyo seUho .
jani tasmin ye gotta pa#sarino.
Again, in the Esukari Sutta, the Buddha's reaction to occu-
pational restrictions and rigidity in relation to various castes is
equivocal; all that he emphasises is that "if the service makes a
man bad and not good, it should not be rendered but if it makes
him better and not bad, then it should be rendered." He em-
phasises: "1 assert that uccakulina, high class family, does not
enter into a man's being either good or bad, nor do good looks
or wealth, for you will find a man of noble'birth who is a mur-
derer, a thief, a fornicator; therefore I assert that noble birth
does not make a good man .... ,,15 In other words, the Buddha
recognises the existence of the caste system and only emphasises
that it is the moral conduct of a person and not his caste that
determines whether he is good or bad. This is saying the obvious;
it is no challenge to the caste system.
There is direct evidence in the suttas that the Buddha recog-
nised caste distinctions. In the KarFfJakatthala Sutta (90) of Maj-
jhima 4.10 (II 128-129), the Buddha, addressing Pasenadi, ob-
serves that there are four castes, khattiyas, brahmarJas, vessas and
suddas. "Among these four castes ... two are pointed to as chief,
the nobles (khattiya) and the brahmal).as, that is to say, in the
way addressing them, rising up from one's seat for them,
saluting them with joined palms and rendering them service.,,16
Again, Buddhas take birth only in two castes, and
brahmal).a.
17
The Buddha clarifies that from the point of view
of causality (heturupam) there is no distinction or difference in
a future state between the castes provided they strive equally
for freedom or the end of sorrow. Again in the Esukari Sutta
(MaJJhima II 181), a person's birth in a particular family of
known parentage on the father's and mother's side is what de-
termines his caste designation: porarJam-pan'assa mata pettikam
kulavamsam [khattiya, brahmarJa, etc.] anussarato yatha yatth' eva
attabhavassa abhinibbati hoti, ten ten' eva sarikham gacchati.
From the Assalayana Sutta (MaJJhima II 149) it is evident that
the Buddhawas also aware that among the Yonas and Kambojas,
those outside the aryan fold, there were only two classes, nobles
and slaves, but that their classes and occupations were inter-
changable: yona dveva varJrJa ayyo c'eva dasoca,' ayyo
hutva daso hoti daso hutva ayyo hoti. The Buddha never advocated
this class structure as a first step to a casteless society.
Regarding the participation of sudras and outcastes in reli-
gious life, it is significant that the Buddha's sermons are ad-
dressed to brahmal).as, grhapatis (respectable house-
holders) and sramarJas or their parisas (assemblies). In the
Sutta (Dzghanikaya V 136) only the
brahmaI).as and householders are invited to attend the great
yajiia (homam) organised by the king-a yajiia approved by the
Buddha. At Ariguttaranikiiya III 363, the Buddha describes the
. goals in life of the three upper castes and makes no mention
of the goals of the sudras and paiicamas. In other words, the
Buddha ignored the sudras and outcastes while encouraging
religious life among the people. There is also no evidence that
the Buddha ever denounced the discriminatory caste system-
based penal laws of the Dharma.siistras. In fact, the Buddhist texts
C do not even show any awareness of such a discrimination.
The later Mahayana doctrine of the bodhisattva expressed
no special concern for the under-privileged and the depressed-
the sudras and the paiicamas, ca1']rjiilas, and the nesiida, vena,
rathakiira and pukkusa kulas.. In the pra-
jiiiipiiramitii (f. 225a, chap. 57) 18 the Buddha tells Subhuti that
the bodhisattva who trains beings to extricate themselves from
samsara is not reborn in hell, or as an animal, is free from
physical deformities, and also is not reborn "among refuse work-
ers or outcastes" (na pukkasa ca1']rjiila upapadyate). In other
words, the bodhisattvas also shun outcastes. Again, the
bodhisattva was concerned with the alleviation of individual suf-
fering and not with the oppression suffered by the mass of sudras
and outcastes or the disabilities of the serfs.
The Buddha only puts forward ideal, philosophical, defini-
tions of brahmaI).a and ca1']rjiila. In the Viisettha Sutta (Majjhima
II 98) and Suttanipiita (3.9 27-28), the Buddha says:
na caham brahan-o brilmi, yonijam matti sambhavam
akincanam, anadanam, brilmi brahman-am
sabbasamyojanam chetva yo ve na paritassati,
samgatigam visamyuttam, tamaham brilmi brahman-am:
I call no one a brahmaI).a from parentage; the man who has
nothing, no possessions, who is free from grasping or covetous-
ness, I call him a brahmaI).a. He who cuts fetters, is free from
thirst and fear, is a brahmaI).a.
19
Likewise, he defines a ca1']rjiila in the Ariguttaranikiiya (III 203):
a layman pursuing five things is an outcaste; he is without faith;
without morals; is a diviner; believes in luck, not deed; and
seeks outside (the order) for a giftworthy person, and therefore
first offers services.
III. Buddhist Monks and the Caste System
Both Buddhism and Jainism led to the creation of another
class outside the lay social system: the bhiksus of the Buddhists,
the sadhus and yatis of the J ainas, and the parivrajakas and sadhus
of the Brahmal).ical faith. They were a class sui generis, not bound
by the caste restrictions, who had renounced lay life for good,
irrevocably. Unlike outcastes, they commanded the respect of
all the lay castes. This group and this group alone the Buddha
had proclaimed free from caste distinctions: it was casteless. In
the Cullavagga of the Vinaya Pi (aka (IX 1. 4) the Buddha says,
'Just as ... all the great rivers namely Ganga, Yamuna, Ai-
cravatI, Sarabhu, Mahl, when they reach the great ocean, lose
their former names and differences and are denominated as
the great ocean, even so ... these four castes (va'fJ'fJa)
brahmal).as, vaisyas, sudras, when they go forth from the house-
hold to houseless life under the doctrine and discipline (dhamma
vinaye) , lose their former family names (namagottani) and are
denominated as sama'fJa .... " In the Anguttaranikaya (III 240),
this is graphically represented by a dream of Gotama in which
four birds of four different colours (nana va'fJ'fJa) fall at his feet
and become entirely white (sabbaseta), symbolising abandonment
of castes by those laymen who give up the household life and,
join the samgha. Thus, in the AmbaHha Sutta (Digha III 2.1),
the Buddha emphasises that "there is not ... in the highest
perfection of knowledge and virtue, any talk of caste (jativado)
or of family (gotta-vado) .... "
In the Madhura Sutta (MaJjhima 84), it is emphasised that
whosoever renounces household life and joins the order of
monks-be he a brahmal).a, vaisya or sudra-and ab-
stains from stealing, falsehood, etc., and observes the good law,
would be entitled to respect and honour irrespective of his caste
prior to renunciation. The Uddalaka Jataka, no. 487 (307), and
NimiJataka, no. 541 (101), make it clear that caste ceases to have
relevance when a person attains sainthood.
On the other hand, slaves and debtors were not admitted
to the samgha unless the slaves had been freed by their masters
and the debtors had discharged their debts. This could only
restrict severely any scope for breakdown of the caste system
via the samgha.
IV. The Doctrine of Karma and the Caste System
In the Vasala Sutta (Suttanipata I 7.21 of the Khuddakanikaya)
the Buddha says:
na jacca vasalohoti, na jacca hoti brahma7}al
kammuno [also kammanaJ vasalohoti kammuno hoti brahma7}a
Not by birth does one become an outcaste, not by birth does one
become a brahmaI)a; by deeds or karma one becomes an outcaste,
by karma alone one becomes a brahmaI)a.
In the Vase((hasutta (ibid. I 9.57), the Buddha repeats:
na jacca brahma7}o hoti; na jacca hoti abrahma7}al
kammana brahma7}o hoti, kammana hoti abrahma7}a
Not by birth does one become a brahmaI)a; not by birth is he a
non-brahmaI)a. It is karmas that make a person brahmaI)a and
non-brahmaI)a.
These verses have been interpreted to mean that the
Buddha had repudiated the Indian caste system. This, I believe,
is erroneous. The karmas referred to in these suttas are not
curren t karmas (sanciyamana karma), but pas t deeds, karmas done
in previous lives. The Vasala Sutta (I 7.22-24) shows that
Mata:ti.ga, who was a carprjala, was honoured by brahmal).as and
because of his high conduct, but he could be reborn.
in the Brahma-world, that is, attain this status of a brahmal).a,
only after his death. Similarly (ibid. I 7.25-26), the sinful Vedic
brahmal).as are blamed or criticised in this existence, but in the
coming world, that is, after rebirth, "birth (as a brahmal).a in
this world) does not save them from hell nor from blame." A
person born as a brahmal).a continues to belong to that caste
even though he may be vile in his conduct; it is only in the next
birth that he is born according to his deeds-his earlier birth as
a brahmaI).a does not protect him against a fall in his caste status.
The VaseUha Sutta (Suttanipata 3.9.8-26) explains the diver_
sity in the world-why there are diverse breeds of grass, trees,
insects, birds, animals. In the case of men, diversity is to be seen
in their trade or callings: some are farmers, (kassako), tradesmen
(siPPiko), merchants (vanijo), servants (pessiko), thieves (coro), sol-
diers (yodhafivo), chaplains (yajako), or monarchs (raja). Diversity
of breeds in the case of plants, animals and birds is explained
by the accumulated karmas (saiicit karmas) of previous births.
Thus, diversity and the difference among men with reference
to trade and profession can best be explained as due to their
karma.
This is conclusively established by the verses in I 9.60 & 61
ibid. In Verse I 9.60, it is said that diversity is the result of
kammavipaka. Again, kammavipaka is the cause of things, yatha
bhutam. The term karma vipaka, as a rule, means that the karmas
of previous lives mature or ripen and bear fruit in subsequent
life or lives. Verse I 9.61 ibid. proclaims:
kammanii vattati [oko, kammanii vattati paja
karmas rotate the world, karmas rotate the people (in the cycle
of existence).
Such karmas are and can only be karmas of previous lives,
saiicita-karmas, not kriyamana-karmas.
This finds support in the Cu{akammavibhariga Sutta and As-
salayana Sutta. In the CulakammavibharigaSutta (Majjhima III
204) the Buddha emphasises that it is their deeds that divide
people into high and low and explain the disparities in life,
length of life, health, wealth and looks. "Such deeds, if persisted
in of deliberate choice, either bring that person at the body's
dissolution after death, to misery or woe or topurgatory.,,20 In
other words, the consequences of these acts are manifest in
another life. The Assalayana Sutta of the Majjhima (II 149-50)
is more explicit: the Buddha says that a person belonging to
any caste, including the superior castes of the brahmaI).a and
who commits murder, theft, sexual misconduct, is
covetous, is malevolent, etc., will "after death, at the body's
dissolution pass to a state of misery and woe .... " Likewise,
one who observes the paficaS'ila would "after death, at the body's
dissolution" "attain heaven irrespective of whether he be a
brahmaI).a, vaisya, orSudra." In the Milindapafiha (127,
.128) it is stated that those who do good karmas are reborn,
according to their wish, in a family of rich warrior, noble, rich
brahmaI).a or rich householder. In the Divyiivadiina (616),
Prakrti, a carpj,iila girl, is freed from her previously accumulated
sins, which had brought about her low birth cpurva saficita piipam
durgati). In the Siirdula Kart'Jiivadiina of the Divyii it is said that
men are architects of their own fottunes, that they are of the
same class, with differences arising out of their karmas. The
SiZavimarhsa Jiitaka (no. 362) is conclusive: khattiyii briihmarJ,ii vessii
suddii, cafJ,rJ,iila pukkusii idha dhamamam caritviina bhavanti tidive
samii: The brahmaI).as, vaisyas, sudras, caI).Q.alas and
pukkusas, by practising the dharma in this world, will become
equal in heaven.
In short, Buddhists recognised caste distinctions in the pres-
ent life as the product of a man's past karmas and not an accident
of birth , as in the gotra-karma of the J aina classification Qfkarmas.
What the Buddha taught was that jiiti caste does not enter
into the moral quality of a person, either good or bad, nor his
physical features (good looks) nor his wealth: "For you will find
a man of noble birth who is a murderer, a thief, a fornicator, a
liar, a slanderer, a man of bitter tongue, a tattler, a covetous
person, a man of rancour or of wrong views, and therefore I
assert that noble birth does not make a good man." While the
caste of an individual is determined by his birth, his caste in the
next birth will be determined by his karmas in the present birth.
The Buddha stresses that, "whatever caste in which a person
might be born in this world, in the next birth, after the dissolu-
tion of his body after death his caste status will be determined
by the quality of his accumulated karmas in previous births."
The destiny of man, the external organisation of his family life,
is, for the Buddhists a necessary consequence of his karma, his
former deeds: "wealth or poverty, high or low caste, the indi-
vidual has deserved through his deeds in a former existence.,,21
The Buddha emphasises that past karmas (saficita karma) deter-
mine the present caste of a human being and the current karmas
(kriypmiina karma)22 determine the caste status in future births.
In this manner, the Buddha found an apparently rational and
firm foundation for the caste system in the doctrine of karma. 23
Thus, the Buddha (and Mahavlra) promoted the formation
of a casteless sarhgha recruited from amongst laymen belonging
to various castes, who lost their caste on renouncing lay life. He
did not condemn or repudiate lay observance of the caste system,
even the practice of untouchability. He accepted the caste system
among laymen as a fact of life; he only emphasised that the law
of karma operated impartially, irrespective of the caste of a
doer, and that karmic law was not discriminatory like man-made
law codes. More importantly, the Buddha taught that, irrespec-
tive of the caste of a person in this world, his caste status in his
birth in the next life (and his happiness and suffering in that
birth) is determined by the quality of his previous karmas, and
thus established a link between caste and karma. The Vedic
explanation of caste rooted in the primordial division of Puru:;;a
eRg Veda X 90) is replaced by a genesis-explanation based on
karma: now the origin of the caste is to be found, not in mythol-
ogy, but in the causal cosmic law.
NOTES
1. E. Senart, Caste in India (Delhi, 1975), p. 206.
2. Richard Fick, The Social Organisation in North East India in Buddha's
Time, English tr. (Calcutta: S. Maitra, 1920), p. 335.
3. A.K. Warder, Indian Buddhism (Delhi, 1980), p. 164, 169.
4. Likewise in the S01]ada1]e/a Sutta of the Dighanikiiya 4.120.21, in
Viiset\ha Sutta (98) of the Majjhima (II 5.8) and in the Samyuttanikiiya (l15),
the brahmal).as claim that what made a brahmal).a was pure descent on both
the parental sides right back through seven successive generations of ancestors
with no break or blemish in the lineage. The Satapatha Briihma1]a (l, 8.3.6)
prohibits marriage among blood relations up to the 3rd or 4th degree. Accord-
ing to Kalpasutra 17, Jaina arhats, etc., are born in families of pure descent
on both sides (visuddhajiiti kulavansesu).
5. E.W. Burligame,BuddhistLegends (London, 1969), Pt. 2, pp. 38-39.
6. Buddhist India: (Calcutta, 1950), pp. 40-42.
7. E.B. Cowell (ed.) The Jiitakas, translated by Cowell, Francis, Rouse
& Neil (Delhi, 1978) vol.IV, p. 112.
8. The Jiitakas, ibid., voLIII, p. 154. In the Br:hadiira1]yaka Upanis.ad (VI
4.13) it is laid down that a sudra should not touch a married woman undergoing
periodic impurity (menstruation).
9. The Jiitakas, ibid., vol.II, p. 236.
10. The Jiitakas, ibid., vol.IV, p. 248.
. 11. The Jatakas, ibid., vol.IV, no. 497, p. 236, vol.IV, no. 498, p. 248,
no. 542, p. 79 and no. 546, p. 217.
12. The Jatakas, ibid., voLIV, p. 248.
13. A higher caste male marrying a lower caste female.
14. A higher caste female marrying a lower caste male. The Satapatha
;Briihmar}a (XIV 4.2.23) and Br:hadarar}yaka Up. (14.11) maintain that "nothing
is superior to Again, in the Chiindogya Upan4ad (5.3.7) it is a
;who instructs a brahmaI).a about the other world, rebirth';- etc. This shows the
. superiority of the vis-a-vis the brahmaI).as.
; 15. Lord Chalmers (tr.), Further Dialogues of the Buddha (Majjhima-nikaya)
'(London: PTS, 1899-1921).
16. LB. Horner (tr.), Majjhima-nikiiya: The Middle Length Sayings (London:
:PTS, 1957), vol. II, p. 310 .
. "' 17. According to the Kalpasutra (17-18), inter-alia, a tirthankara is'born
';only in a high family, a royal and noble family belonging to the race of
%r Hari.
o' 18. E. Conze (ed. and tr.), The Gilgit Manuscript of the
;prajiiii paramita (Rome, 1962). See also Conze (tr.) The Large Sutra on Perfect
iWisdom (Berkeley, 1975) AA V2 P 26. .
.' 19. In the Mahiibhiirata (cr. ed) (III 177.15-16) defines
in a similar manner: a brahmaI).a is one who practices truth, liber-
'aIity, forbearance, self-control, benevolence, austerity and compassion.
C 20. kiiyassa bhedo param marar}a apayam duggatin vinipatam nirayam uppajati.
;1' 2 1. dd d h
1', " 22. To t IS S ou e a e t e unexhausted previous karmas.
;" 23. The attitude of the Buddha towards the diisas (slaves, servants) pro-
a corroborative parallel to his attitude towards sudras and outcastes.
'the Sigalovada Sutta of the Dighanikiiya (31.27) enumerates diisa kammakara
(slaves and workers) as a distinct class; other than friends and kinsmen and
and brahamaI).a. It is significant that they are identified as belonging
fto the nether region. The discrimination in the treatment of friends on the
iione hand and slaves and servants on the other is patent. Friends are to be
:treated like oneself but slaves and servants must get up before the master
:;rises, go to bed after he has retired and take only what is given to them.
", Again, a slave or diisa could not be admitted into the samgha unless he
secured the permission of his master.
NEW AND NOTEWORTHY.
.. .
Shobogenzo
ZEN ESSAYS BY DOGEN
Translated by Thomas Cleary
Translations of thirteen essays from
this classic Zen work which attempt
to convey the form as well as the
content of Dagen's essays, thereby
preserving the instrumental structure
of the original text. $14.00, cloth
The Northern
School and the
Formation of Early
Cb'an Buddhism
John R. McRae
Studies in Eas! Asian Buddhism, No.3
Published in association with the
Kuroda Institute
A historical and doctrinal analysis of
the Northern School, a widely
overlooked yet crucially important
faction of early Chinese Ch'an (Zen)
Buddhism. $40.00, cloth
Zen Action
Zen Person
T .P. Kasufis
"For the thoughtful Westerner this
must be one of the most clear and
perceptive accounts of Zen
available." -Times Lilerary
Suppiemenl
"A must for any reading list dealing
seriously with Buddhism or
Japanese culture." -Choice
$7.95s paper
Dogen Studies
Wi!!iam R. LaFleur, editor
Studies in East Asian Buddhism, No.2
Published in association with the Kuroda Institute
These essays extend appreciation of
the writings of the Zen monk Dagen
beyond the relatively small groups of
Japan specialists in the West.
$19.00, paper
Sangha, State,
and Society
THAI BUDDHISM IN HISTORY
Yoneo Ishii
Translated by Peter Hawkes
ivlonograrhs of the Cenlcr for
Southeast Asian Studies,
KYOIO University
This book shows how the Thai
Buddhist Sangha has, in the course
of history, come to playa crucial
role in the formation of a Buddhist
polity in Thailand. $25.00, cloth
$16.00, paper
Buddhist-Christian
Dialogue
MUTUAL RENEWAL AND
TRANSFORMATION
PaulO. Ingram and
Frederick J. Streng, editors
The 12 essays in this volume focus
on the philosophical, theological,
and structural issues of
contemporary Buddhist-Christian
dialogue as a source for mutual
renewal and transformation.
$10.00s paper
TO ORDER: Send check or money order, plus $1.00 per book for shipping. VISA and
ivlasterCard also accepted (include aCCL no., expo date, and signature).
; ~ h e 'Early Chinese Buddhist
Understanding of the Psyche:
.chen Hui's Commentary on the
Yin Chih Ju Ching
'by Whalen Lai
It is often said that the early Chinese Buddhists misun-
derstood the doctrine of anatman (no-soul); that they subscribed
'Joa notion of an indestructable soul (shen pu-mieh? instead. In
this essay, we want to investigate to what extent this is true to
;the time of An Shih-kaob and the tradition that developed out
'of his translations.
1
An Shih-kao is the first major translator of Buddhist scrip-
tures.in China. It was he who introduced dhyana practice and
Hlnayana texts and the basic teachings.
2
It was at a time prior
to the rise of ko-ic Buddhism, which "matched the concepts" of
Neo-Taoist reflections on nonbeing and Mahayana notions
;about sunyata (emptiness). The Sino-Buddhist conversation was
then conducted more between Han Taoist reflections of the art
of yang-ch'i nien-shien
d
(nurturing the breath and refining the
'soul) and the Hlnayana catechism of the five heaps (skandhas),
the twelve chains of causation (nidiinas, pratitya-samutpada, both
rendered as yin-yuan
e
in Chinese at times), the six faculties
(ayatanas) , the eighteen fields (dhiitus), etc. The concept of shen
(soul, psyche) was one cultural bridge mediating the two systems.
This indestructible soul transmigrated from one life to the next
'as the carrier of karma that would effect retributions.
An important text attesting to this early Sino-Buddhist en-
counter is the mid-third century commentary on the Yin-chi'ih-ju
chinl (Sutra on the Heaps, the Faculties, the Fields).3 The writer is
Chen Hui,g4 a disciple of K'ang Seng-hui
h
of the state of Wu
i
85
in the Three Kingdoms. Chen Hui's understanding of yin, ch'ih
ju, i.e., skandhas, dhiltus, ayatanas, is recognized as an
.in early Chinese Buddhism.
5
. The Yin-ch'ih-ju ching
Itself IS an Important text and was recogmzed as such by Tao-an j
who later contributed a preface to it.
6
This sutra belongs to
same class of texts as another of An Shih-kao's translations, the
fen-pen yu-sheng ching.k Both seek to explain the doctrine of the
skandhas and the nidanas.
7
As Chinese exegeses go, Chen Hui's
commentary on one compared favorably with Tao-an's commen_
tary on the other.
8
Chen Hui's commentary gives us a good indication of Chen
Hui's thought, better in fact than his other important commen-
tary, on the An-pan shou-i ching (Anapana-smrti Sidra), which was
the most popular dhyana-sutra introduced by An Shih-kao at the
time. Unlike this other commentary, which contains a mix of
opinions, Chen Hui's, K'ang Seng-hui's and more, the present
text reflects Chen Hui's thinking more, even though it also cites,
now and then, a certain "master's opinion." It seems that the
master here is Chih Ch'ien
ID
and not K'ang Seng-hui, as once
thought.
9
Although indicative of Chen Hui's thoughts on many
topics, for our more limited purpose, the text will be regarded
as representing a general third-century Chinese response to the
Hlnayana concept of mind, citta.
I. Chen Hui on Shen as Mind and as Spirit
The Chinese Buddhists of the time had accepted the use of the
word shen. Shen covered a multitude of functions and the uses
of it by Chen Hui were no exception. The question is whether
the Chinese or Chen Hui intended the termshen (soul) to mean:
(a) a permanent atman, soul or self, or,
(b) just a continuity of personality or identity.
If it is the former, then it was a mistake; but if it is the latter,
without implying the former, then it is not illegitimate. Most
scholars eager to find Chinese distortions of the anatman ideal
have chosen to highlight the former. However, it is interesting
to note that Chinese Buddhists who said shen pu-mieh (the shen
COMMENTARY ON THE YIN CHIHjU CHING 87
is not destroyed [at death]) never said, in this period, shen ch'eng-
chu
n
(the shen is ever-abiding [permanent]).lO Thus, we must
not jump to the conclusion that the Chinese assumed the shen
to be like the permanent atman.
In the specific case under study here, Chen Hui clearly and
readily uses shen in his exegesis. He never hesitates to call the
vijiiiina (consciousness) shih-shena (consciousness-spirit): Though
shih is the more standard term to render vijnana, the use of the
shih-shen compound, or even just ching-shen
P
(sublime spirit), is
not impermissible-the word shen does cover the meaning of
"psyche." Hsin-shen
q
well describes consciousness in general. One
also must make certain allowances for poetic license. The fact
that Chen Hui lavishes certain traditional attributes of shen upon
the subtle workings of the vijnana may not be philosophically
consequential.
(Consciousness-spirit) is subtle. It comes and goes without leaving
any trace. Secretly it goes; silently it comes-so leaving and re-
turning with no break in between. Because it cannot be seen, it
is called yinr (dark, hidden; a pun on yin for skandhas).ll
Such poetics is harmless; it enriches and does not distort the
discussion.
If that should suggest granting to shen an omnipotence once
. associated with the spirit, we should remember that the Chinese
Buddhists, then as well as later, took the opening verse in the
Dharmapada to heart: the Dharmapada also grants the citta an
omnipotence of thought-even though it only means by it the
mind's authorship of karmic good and evil. Chen Hui says:
When the mind thinks of good, good arises. When it thinks of
evil, evil follows. This is because the mind is the basis of all reality.
So the Dharmapada says, "The mind is the basis of all realities.,,12
Such "moral idealism"-not to be confused with philosophic
Idealism-is in keeping with the text and the spirit of the trad-
ition.
When we examine Chen Hui's discussion of the "indestruc-
tible soul," we find that this shen-pu-mieh doctrine pertains to
. the survival of the vijnana at death and its qualified continuance
into the womb of its next rebirth:
Avidyii (Chinese: wu-ming,' "no-light") means darkness. It involves
sarpskara (hsing:t karmic impulse). The shih-shen (consciousness_
spirit) of sentient beings is drowned in that ignorant darkness.
Blinded, the spirit cannot distinguish safety from harm and thus
would forsake fortune (the good) for misfortune (the evil). This
is basically ignorant; it delights in bodily
pains (of the senses; sensation) as if they were (desirable) pleas-
ures. Not knowing that parents should be respected as one's
elders, it goes forward and thereby takes on a body.13
Chen Hui is describing here the sequence of rebirth in accor-
dance with the twelve chains of causation.
The Twelve Nidiinas in terms of Rebirth
(1) avidyii, ignorance
(2) sa7[lskiira, karmic impulse
(3) vijiiiina .
consciousness
(12) jariimarana
old age and death
(11) jiiti
birth
(10) bhava
becoming
(9) upiidiina
graspmg
(4) niimarupa
name-and -form
(5) !ia4iiyatana
six faculties
(6) sparsa
sensation
(7) vedanii
perception
cravmgs
When Chui Hui talks of ignorance and the karmic impulse, he
is pointing to the resilent nature of items (1) and (2). This pair
remains operative until the person attains wisdom and nirv3.I).a.
By shih-shen pu-mieh, Chen Hui means the survival of item (3),
the vljiliina (consciousness) surviving the corruption of the body
during old age and death, or item (12). It is this entity which,
being carried along by ignorance (1) and the karmic impulse
(2), is being reborn, that is, conceived in the new parental womb
to take on once more name and form, or item (4) in the diagram
above. Name-and-form is attached to the pain of the senses (6
"of' 5). In craving after what it perceives (8 "of' 7), the process
of suffering is rekindled (9, 10, 11, 12).
We can be sure that Chen H ui intended the shen to describe
this process of the rebirth of the vijiiiina in the new parental
COMMENTARY ON THE YIN CHIHJU CHING 89
womb because, being a Confucian, he added the aside about
the irreverent and lusting shih-shen intruding upon the parents-
meaning, intruding upon them in their sexual intimacy, by
which the new life is conceived.
14
Leaving aside whether the
historical Buddha would or would not have accepted this later
theory of the vijiiiina as the skandha to survive death, the fact
is that Chen Hui was only following the then canonical under-
standing of the nidiinas and rebirth.
No permanent atman is assumed in this scenario. The vi-
jniina disintegrates soon after conception and a new nascent
consciousness is born-such that we usually cannot recall our
past lives. Chen Hui knew this. Note the first sentence below:
The consciousness-spirit is dead, being lost now in the dark abyss
of the three poisons and the five heaps, yet it will once more be
receptive to the six feelings. The six deviances will adhere to it
and will corrupt it. This is what is known as "seeing darkly in
the dark.,,15
The rest describes the sequence from item (4) to item (7) in the
twelve chains of causation.
Elsewhere, Chen Hui recapitulates the whole (3) to (12)
series as follows:
Consciousness (shih: in Chinese, "to know") means knowledge.
The hun-ling
U
(lit., the animus or male soul, but here, it probably
denotes,the psychic skandhas) receives (or is conceived into) the
body (as the rupa-skandha/
6
and immediately knows likes and
dislikes, producing the mind of love and dislike (discrimina-
tion) .... By name (tzur is implied rupa (form). 17 (The skandhas
of) sensation, perception, will and consciousness constitute nama
(because they are psychical); earth, water, fire and wind (the four
great elements), being visible, are called rupa (material
form) .... [A description of the flourishing or activism of the
heap follows.] As the skandhas are already deluded, then because
of lust or desire, the consciousness-spirit [in turn] conceives
another body (i.e., in the next cycle of life, commencing with the
chain of bhava: becoming) and life (jati: birth) resumes
again .... (Concerning jaramarana, old age and death, the last
link of the chain,) old age is when the four great elements wither
and death is when life ends and the spirit (vijiiana) flies off
(again).IS
If the law of dependent co-origination innate to this chain is
what proves the case of anatman, then Chen Hui can hardly be
said to be ignorant of the doctrine of no permanent self or soul.
II. Chen Hui on the Skandhas
Truly to appreciate Chen Hui's understanding of Buddhism,
we should therefore turn away from a singluar interest in shen-
pu-mieh to the larger issue of how the basic paradigm of person-
ality comes across in Chen Hui's exegesis. In other words, how
well did Chen Hui understand the skandhas, which the Buddha
had used to counter the notion of a self (atman)? The following
is a list of the five, with the rough English equivalents, the
Chinese used by An Shih-kao to render the five, and the rough
Chinese meanings of those borrowed Chinese terms:
Sanskrit
l)rupa
2)vedana
3) sa17Jjiia
4) sa17JSkara
5) vijiiana
The Five Heaps and Their Renditions
English
form, matter
sensation
perception
will, volition
conSCIousness
Chinese Ch. Meaning
se "color"
tun "")f, "pain"
hsiang j$i. "think"
hsing 1'3 "proceed"
shih ~ "know"
Chen Hui's understanding of the functioning of the five is
not far off the mark.
Question: What are the five heaps?
First (of the five) is form; the four great elements being
visible (to the eye), they are called form.
Second is sensation (lit., pain). This is where mental intent
(chih)W locates what it wishes for (yilan).x19 There, misery and
fear ofloss tax the emotions. For that, it is called (literally) pain.
Third is perception. To perceive is to form (a mental image).
Silent reflection is called thought.
2o
The supporting base for
thought is the senses.
21
When one looks for the source to that
mental image, one finds that it slips already into the past (the
last preceding moment). Therefore, is it called reflecting, (that
COMMENTARY ON THE YINCHIHjUCHING 91
is) the recalling of an image (gone by).
Fourth is volition. The (special Chinese) script hsing
Y
means
to do, to proceed, to go forward. The self might be over here
but the mind would be dashing forward to no end, contemplating
good or harboring evil, extending itself in all directions with
hardly a place lying beyond its reach.
Fifth is consciousness. Shih (for vijnana) means "to know."
Witnessing the doings of the will, the mind immediately knows.
Thus, it is called "knowledge."22
Chen Hui's explanation measures well against modern textbook
explanations of the same.
The basic rationale Chen Hui offers for the five is as follows:
(1) Form is matter; it is the "knowables" of the solid, the con-
gealing, the heated and the fluid, symbolized as earth, water,
fire and wind (the four great elements). Because form is also
the object of eye-consciousness, Chen Hui identifies it with the
"visibles." (2) Sensation is what results from the faculties making
contact with these, so Chen Hui locates them in the senses, a
kind of outreach of the mind. The sensation may be positive or
negative; Chen Hui ties that to the emotional responses to
"pain," which was the Chinese term used to render "sensation"
then. (3) Perception is the recognition of the objects so sensed.
In referring to it as "reflection" chasing after an "image already
gone by," Chen Hui perhaps shows his familiarity with the ar-
gument that the mental object (dharma) is an "after-image" of
the sensed object of a split second ago.
23
We will reserve the
discussion on (4) will and (5) consciousness until later.
The theory of the five heaps and the theory of the twelve
chains were apparently two independent teachings of the
Buddha demonstrating the anatman d()ctrine, such that the
skandhas were not meant originally to follow anyone sequential
order, as some (not all) of them now do in the twelve chains.
Still, the overlap is all too evident, and Chen Hui probably
followed some exegetical tradition and seems to assume this
sequential relationship. Put somewhat crudely, it is: forms (item
1), sensed (item 2) by the five senses or faculties are then per-
ceived (item 3) by the mind faculty. The will (item 4) is what
then runs forward and what is willed becomes known to con-
sciousness (item 5). The items add up to the five skandhas.
In thus granting to will (sarpskara) the function of primary
92 JIABS VOL 9 NO. I
action,24 Chen Hui has this comment on the will being "the
seed of form":
To delight is to love. To seed is to plant. '50, as the six desires
are aroused, the body (self) will by itself give birth to life. It will
take form according to the sarpskara (will-to-be). All living things
exist because of will, for that it is known as the seed (of form). 25
It is not known whether the "seed" imagery was or was not
indebted to the Sautrantika notion of the bijas, but it is clear
that it led Chen Hui to associating it with the Taoist idea of an
elan vital:
This process is comparable to seeding below (ground) followed
by the sprouting of the self above (ground). Or, it is like the
primodial breath (yuan ch'i)Z known to be born in spring, to bloom
in summer, to wither in fall and to die in winter. As the hundred
plants, grass and trees die on earth, the primo dial breath hides
itself once more underground, only to emerge again in spring.
When the spring weather is mild and the times are harmonious,
it bestirs below and the body (of plants) appears (above) anew.
All beings sentient or nonsentient are encompassed by this primo-
dial ether. They will rise and fall, grow and wither, dying only
to be reborn again, round and round in the three realms seeing
neither beginning nor end. Thus is the seed of consciousness
called the seed (of the five heaps).26
In this case, the poetic license of this aside has philosophical
ramifications, for it brings into the discussion of the skandhas
the Han cosmogony of the one ether as the progenitor of all
things. This moves Buddhism back towards satkii:ryaviida.
At one level, this is harmless. For example, the following
open reference to the philosophy of change in the I-ching
aa
only
lends support to the Buddhist notion of impermanence:
Ch'ien and k'un
ab
(in the I-ching) are the basic trigrams; they mark
the beginning and the end. Accordingly, too, myriad things rise
and fall. The accomplished will fail; the lush will fade. Such is
.impermanence. Birth, old age, sickness and death, slave of evil
and receptacle of sin, constitute suffering.27
At another level, though, the Han cosmological assumption
COMMENTARY ON THE YIN CHIH JU CHING 93
could lead to an important sinitic theory and a significant depar-
ture from the original. We will consider this below.
Ill. Chen Hui on Emptiness and Shou-i
ac
The above reference to the I-ching made by Chen Hui ends with
this additional note:
All sentient beings have only subsequent existence (ma yu).ad28
By returning to the origin (pen),ae they would naturally be empty
(wu).af29
This theory of "original nothingness, subsequent existence" was
derived from Han thought-not to be confused with Wei-Chin
Neo-Taoist metaphysics. It also shows a synthesis of Hlnayana
anatmavada and Mahayana sunyavada in the thought of Chen
Hui himself. A word of explanation is called for here.
Though known for his commentaries on the works of An
Shih-kao, Chen Hui was also a student of Chih Ch'ien, the first
major translator in China and the person who apparently re-
worked an earlier Chinese translation of the Prajiiii-
paramita-sutra, the Ta-ming-tu-ching.agChih Ch'ien used the term
pen_wu
ah
to render sunyata (emptiness). Chen Hui took over his
reading of an original nothingness, which he saw as lying behind
the skandhas.
Though young now, it will become empty when it is finally
completed; emptied once more, this is called emptiness. The
body is of the four great elements, but each of these will return
to the origin. As they are never ours,30 it is called not-mine
ifei-hsin:ai literally not-of-the-body or not-self, the current
Chinese for no-soul).
Deeply perceiving the origin of the four matters and fully
understanding the end of its aspiration, i.e., how it transmigrates
in the three realms, forsaking one body at death only to take up
another, accumulating only more suffering to no end; keeping
your mind (hence) on the right meditation, making the three
realms empty, and aspiring to attain the original nothingness in
which all suffering would cease to exist-that is wisdom. .
The Ming-tu says, "The fool mistakes what is impermanent,
painful, empty and without selfto be permanent, joyful, existing
and with self." As the transcendental wisdom, prafiiii-paramita
can transform this, therefore it is known as Ta-ming,a
j
the G r e a ~
Wisdom.
31
Because of the sinitic interest in some primal "one source"
(i_pen),ak Chen Hui also incorporates the Han Taoist meditative
technique known as guarding the i (shou-i), wherein the word i
(intention) means that "initial stir of thought," the first moving
away from the primal, passive, one-source mind, the nascent
mental form prior to "words taking on form. ,,32 Guarding the
i is the best means of preventing its going astray; eliminating
this i is often deemed the way to recovering that primal psychic
unity and harmony. By coincidence, i was then associated with
sarp.skara or cetana, then considered the root of good and evil.
Since Buddhism also taught the technique of "mindfulness" as
a means to purify the mind, the two shou-i traditions merged,
possibly even in the Chinese title to the Anapana-anusmr:ti-sutra
itself, the An-pan shou-i ching. Chen Hui's reflection on how to
terminate the skandhas through the contemplation of breath
reflects that synthesis:
Mysterious is the consciousness-spirit and hard to detect are the
various heaps. However, by being in tune with truth and under-
standing the principle, one can see the working of the five heaps
in one single breath.
In the initial count (of breath), the breath is wind, that is,
the heap of form. Reflecting on it and anticipating the pain, that
is the heap of sensation. Together, these two constitute the heap
of perception. Between the two (the initial breath and the arousal
of perception) lies volition. Knowing that breath's intention is
consciousness. Thus, in one breath can be found the five heaps. 33
The first half of the passage reflects the Taoist ideal of shou-i,
the second half the greater analytical acumen of Buddhist mind-
fulness. Though there is an infusion of sinitic motifs, this does
not mean the abrogation of the Indian insights. The real sinici-
zation occurs in a more subtle and hitherto unnoticed area.
COMMENTARYONTHEYINCHIHjUCHING 95
.JV. Chen Hui on the Hsin, I, Shih
In making this study of Chen Hui's commentary, I came across
a very terse six-Chinese-character line that turns out to be the
key to more than one important Chinese Buddhist development
to come.
34
It involves the meaning of a set phrase, shih san penal
(or, here, shih san shih),am the three basics (or matters) of con-
sciousness-a central topic of discussion from the third to the
fifth century in Buddhist China. However, those exchanges
being lost, we have only certain titles of correspondence to go
. by. Thus, we find it listed in the questions posed by Chinese
. correspondents to Kumarajlva:
Wang Wei-yuan
an
inquiring about whether spirit exists innirvaI)a;
Wang (further) inquiring about shen, hsin, i and shih;ao
Wang (further) inquiring about shen-shih (spirit-consciousness).
Hui Yuan
ap
inquiring about shen.
35
The Li-tai san-pao chi
aq
lists even more:
Yen Yen-chin
ar
on dissociating the shih (consciousness).
Chih Tan-t'i
as
on shen-pen (the basis of shen).
Hsieh Fu
at
on shih-san-pen.
Chih Tao-lin'sau reply to Hsieh.
Tai An-tao'sav threefold exchange with Hsieh on the topic.
Hui-yuan defending hsin, i, shih;
Hui-yuan's inquiry on and discussions of shen.
Chu Fa-tai
aw
inquiring of Tao-an on shen.
36
The fact that the question raged in the third and fourth cen-
turies, only to disappear after the fifth and be forgotten from
the sixth on, has to indicate that it arose as a result of an imperfect
Chinese understanding of the Buddhist model of the psyche;
that a Taoist mind-set had colored the reading of citta, manas,
and vifnana-that is, until Kumarajlva corrected it, for the con-
troversy seems to disappear after his period.
But what is the meaning of this hsin, i, shih trio and how
does it affect the Buddhist appreciation of the structure of con-
sciousness? Normally, the Chinese-Sanskrit correlation would
be as follows:
96 JIABS VOL. 9 NO. I
Sanskrit . English equi. Chinese Ch. Meaning
citta thought hsin

mind,heart
manas mind (faculty) i
\'
'intention
vi:jiiana conSCIousness shih
"'tv
to know
The one-to-one correlations seem proper but when We
take into consideration the meaning-matrixes of the two sets,
differences rise.
The difference may be illustrated by Chen Hui's discussion
of the relationship of the i to the mind and its object.
When the eyes and consciousness meet, the latter distinguishes
likes and dislikes. This is the same for the other of the six sensa-
tions. The Lao-mo ching
aX
(Old Woman Sutra) says, "When the eyes
meet form, this is i, which is (now of) the same (shape) as the
form." The Liao-pen [sheng-shih] ching
ay
(Sutra Penetrating the Basis
[of Life and Death]) also says: "It is with the eye-organs following
the form that consciousness is born.,,37
As senses make contact with objects in their individual fields,
the mind takes on the form of the object. 38 This is the Buddhist
understanding of the mental functions.
In an explicit reference to the san-shih (a variant of san-pen),
Chen Hui cites his master:
(M y) master says, "When the eyes see form, there are three things.
This applies to all six feelings."
From the context, I would assume that what the master meant
was the necessary correlation of the subject, the object and the
related consciousness. The eye-organ would contact form
through the eye-consciousness; the ear-organ would contact
sight through the ear-consciousness ... ; and the mind-faculty
(manas) would contact ideas (dharmas) through the mind-con-
sciousness (mano-vijiiiina). This would cover the "six feelings"
or faculties. But Chen Hui reads it differently. He continues:
The three things [san-pen] are hsin, i, shih (in Chinese: mind,
intention, consciousness; in Sanskrit: citta, manas, v&iiana).39
This could not have been what his master, Chih Ch'ien, in-
tended, because this set would not be applicable to all "six facul-
ties." It is this discrepancy in the two sets that led to the questions
for Kumarajlva, etc.
In six Chinese characters, Chen Hui reveals to us the reason
for the problem:
i nien; erh tso; san chou. az
The first (item) would start thinking;
the second (item) then creates;
the third (item) would seek after.
Nien (to think) belongs to mind (hsin); tso (to create) belongs to
intention (i); neither of these is the doing of consciousness. Good
and evil cannot fall outside these three matters.
40
Chen Hui is saying, more literally than a Sanskritist would deem
proper:
The unitary mind somehow gives rise to thought;
the intention actually creates objects of it;
the subject-object consciousness attaches itself to them.
It is the same sinitic structure that will emerge later in the
Awakening of Faith in Mahayana: a pure mind, author of the three
. realms, devolves into being a dualistic, subject-object, conscious-
ness.4! The words nien and tso will be used in that later, Chinese-
compiled text in a liberal fashion that a Sanskritist purist would
find questionable. The Awakening of Faith does assume the mind
as the creator-tso (creates) the three realms (trilokas) from out
of its suchness (tathata)-base-and preaches the "no-thought"
. (wu-nien) method as the means of recovering the pure mind.
This model of the relationship between hsin, i, shih is drawn,
not from citta, manas, vijfiana, but from a Chinese theory of
mind or psychic scheme first spelled out in the Kuan-tzu:
ba
Do not let things confuse the senses, or the senses the mind.
This is what is meant by "inner te. "bb If my mind is ruled, the
senses are ruled. If my mind is pacified, the senses are pacified.
What rules and what pacifies is the mind. The mind, however,
hides another mind. Within the mind, there is this (deeper) mind
(originally, this is the spiritshen). Out ofthat mind of mind, there
is first i, which precedes all speech. First there is i, then there is
form. Only as there is form, can there be thought (ssu).bc After
thoughts, come knowledge (chih).bd Any lime the form of mind
proceeds beyond knowledge, it will lose its vitality.42
Here, too, the i occupies the pivotal point that marks the passage
from a passive mind to an active consciousness or knowledge
(chih, a synonym of what would be shih, "to know," in the Sino-
Buddhist scheme). What is nien in Chen Hui would be ssu in
the passage above (another pair of synonyms).
When we compare the meaning of the Sanskrit matrix and
the Chinese matrix of hsin, i, shih, the discrepancy becomes
obvious. Whereas in the lndic trio, there is functional continuity
and virtual identity in common usage (the terms are sometimes
used interchangeably), in the sinitic trio, there is functional de-
volution and hierarchy:
hsin shih
citta manas vijiiiina Equivalence

mind > intention > consciousness Hierarchy
Further, when we compare the structure assumed by Chen Hui
and the one found in the discussion in the Kuan-tzu, their cor-
respondence is clear and the rationale for the judgement against
"knowlege" suddenly makes sense:
------------ Common Structure ---------
MIND > MENTATION > KNOWLEDGE
passIve, pure what activates
wu-wez wu-pu-wei
___ ____'I
nature
inactive yet activating all
active, impure
wez
I
wei as the
"artificial"
--------- Kuan-tzu ---------
shen, hsin >
ever divine
ssu (to think) > chih (to know)
ever mundane
--------- Chen Hui ---------
hsin (mind) > i (intention)
>
that nien that tso
Lpure, higher, unitary mind J
shih (consci.)
that chou
I
ill, dualist
conSCIOusness
With the final item {"mundane knowledge": chih-shih) being as-
sociated with the mind's fallen entrapment in the world of
. change and things (the "artificial" in Taoism and the "dualistic"
in Buddhism), there is an implied negative evaluation of that
consciousness. Meanwhile, on the positive side, the inactive mind
is allowed the attribute of wu-wei, inactive yet activating all. This
is why Chen Hui says "Neither nien nor tso belongs to the doings
of consciousness [which grasps, chou, after worldly objects]."
. With consciousness thus condemned as mundane and dualistic,
Chinese Buddhism long opted for "Mind Only" over "Con-
sciousness Only" long before it knew of Yoga.ca.ra (Cittamatra,
Vijiiaptimatra).43 The fusion of Buddhist and Taoist psychology
;. in the same passage in Chen Hui's commentary means that it
is often not easy to disassociate two different but interwoven
,matrixes of meanings. Take the following, for example: .
- . ~ <
By "that which the i thinks about" [in An Shih-kao's translation]
is meant the i. When it thinks of form, it becomes hsing [i.e., it
promotes sarp.skara or active deeds]. Henceforth, it is plagued
by sin [karma or unnatural action]. As there is sin, there is suffer-
ing.
44
Here, we see the word i understood as the author of good and
. evil, as noted by the Dharmapada; as the creative potential of
the spirit, as noted by the Kuan-tzu; as the form of the object
the mind perceives or projects; and as the cetanii, or "initial
stirring of mind," of which a contemplative should ever be mind-
ful (shou). In such a fusion of meanings, the Chinese exegete
synthesizes the native and the foreign tradition.
100
JIABS VOL. 9 NO.1
V. Conclusion
The present study is an analysis of certain elements in an early
Chinese commentary on the Yin-ch'ih-Ju ching. The question was
posed how the intrusion of sinitic modes of thought might or
might not have distorted the original. We have argued that the
much publicized misunderstanding surrounding the doctrine
of the "indestructable soul" may not be a mistake at all; that the
use of pen-wu, or original nothingness, and shou-i may enrich
the discussion without injecting alien value judgments; but that
in the matter of a now-forgotten controversy over the exact
meaning of shih-san-pen (the three factors of consciousness), a
psychic structure indebted to the Kuan-tzu and one to emerge
later in The Awakening of Faith turns out to be a most subtle
sinicization of the lndic Buddhist essentials.
NOTES
1. I am grateful to comments and corrections from Dr. David
Kalupahana in an earlier draft of this paper, which sought originally to ap-
proach the same materials in terms of the Chinese appreciation of Hinayana
as a whole. The article has since been redirected to a more manageable topic.
I am also grateful to the reviewer for the JIABS, whose many corrections and
suggestions I have incorporated into this final version.
2. On the translations by An Shih-kao, see Ui Hakuju,be "An Sefkii no
kenkyu,,,bf in Yakugyo no kenkyu
bg
(Tokyo: Iwanami, 1971), pp. 1-467.
3. In TaishO Daizokyo (henceforth T.) 33, no. 1694, pp. 9b-24c.
4. His given name is Hui; see Ui, op. cit., p. 183.
5. This has been recognized by Eric Zurcher in his The Buddhist Conquest
of China, I (Leiden: Brill, 1959), p. 54, as one of the three early works that
should be studied. I have dealt with another of the three, the running commen-
tary to the first chapter of the Ta-ming-tu-ching in "Before the Prajna Schools:
The First Chinese Commentary on the A ~ \ a . , " Journal of the International Associ-
ation of Buddhist Studies, 6, 1 (1983), pp. 91-108.
6. Ui Hakuju has translated it in his Shaku Doan kenkyu
bh
(Tokyo:
iwanami, 1956), pp. 73-79.
7. So acknowledged too Chen Hui in the Preface, T. 33, p. 9b.
8. Tao-an's is listed in T. 33, pp. 1 b-9b, just before the Chen Hui's.
Overall, Tao-an's tends to be more pessimistic (probably because of the turmoil
he lived through in his life), for his commentary airs a wholesale condemnation
of the i (intention; see later discussion), arguing repeatedly for its negation,
fei-i.
bi
Chen Hui would more patiently discern the good i and the bad i and
COMMENTARYONTHEYINCHIHjUCHING 101
cultivate the inner life accordingly. The difference might lie in the two texts.
In handling the twelve chains of causation, the fen-pen text focuses on the
third and fourth chain, that is, consciousness (vijnana) and form (riipa, or,
namariipa), whereas the Yin-ch'ih text focuses on the second, saI!1skara (will,
'karmic impulse). Tao-an repeatedly went behind the former pair to saI!1skara:
thus he could readily advocate fei-i. But Chen Hui had to analyze the saI!1skara
itself, because, as noted in his preface, it is none other than the "dark support"
yin-ch'ih (a pun on skandhas, ayatana) of all reality itself (T. 33, p. 9b).
. 9. The master is never mentioned by name, but Chen Hui quotes there
works translated or reworked by Chih Ch'ien, i.e., Liao-pen sheng-ssu ching,
Fa-chu-ching
bj
(Dharmapada) , Ta-ming-tu ching (Astasaharika Prajna-paramita
. Sutra); on the earlier opinion that it was K'angSeng-hui, see Vi, op. cit., p. 77.
10. I do not find the ch'eng-chu association made until after the Chinese
have acquired the additional idea of a "permanent Buddha-nature" from the
.. Mahaparinirvana-sutra in the fifth century. After that, it seems that Emperor
Wu of Liang
bk
in the south made the connection, and Wei Shou
bl
still later
in the north, in his summation of Buddhist teachings in the Shih-Lao-chi
bm
(Treatise on Buddhism and Taoism)._
11. T. 33, p. 9c.
12. T. 33, p. lOa. Chen Hui studied under Chih Ch'ien who, working
with Chu Chiang-yen,bn had reworked the Vigha-translated Dharmapada (it is
still under Vigha's name).
13. T. 33, p. 13c.
14. In the Tibetan Book of the Dead, it is said that the attraction to the
father will mean rebirth as a female, to the mother as a male.
15. T. 33, p. 14c.
16. This is derived from the later expression, wu-yin shou-hsin
bo
(i.e.,
paiica-upadana-skandhas) in which nama (name) refers to the four psychic heaps
and Tttpa (form) to the physical heaps.
17. Tzu is as in ming-tzu,b
p
which can stand for ming-se
bq
(for namariipa,
name-and-form).
18. T. 33, p. 13c. The above is from a series of comments on individual
lines dealing with the twelve chains. Certain punctuations and words con-
.sidered corrupted are emended, and explanations added in brackets.
19. This reading is based on a splitting of chih-yuan
br
(aspiration) into
chih (intent: what masters the mind-heart) and yuan (wish,hope).
20. The Taisho has the word "day, sun," and Vi takes it as "daily." But
I believe that this is a corruption. Chen Hui is explaining hsianl
s
by way of
the Chinese-the formation of a hsiang (form, image) in the mind (hsin). We
find a similar exegesis in Hsi Chao later.
21. Excepting abstract ideas (such as numbers and the Sanskrit alphabet),
the mental image we have feeds on input from the senses.
22. T. 33, p. 9c.
23. The mind does not make direct contact with form; there is a relaying
and delaying between sensation and the formation of a corresponding mental
image. This doctrine was more developed in the Sarvastivada abhidharmas.
24. To take form eventually as either the karma of body, mind or specech.
25. T. 33, p. lOa.
26. T. 33, p.lOab.
27. T. 33, p. lOb.
28. The Taisho has mibt for mo, which I take to be a corruption. If We
stay with mi, then it would read: "When all sentient beings are yet to exist
the source and origin by itself is empty." '
29. T. 33, p. lOb.
30. Emending the TaishO word i (already) for chi (one's own).bu
31. T. 33, p. lOb.
32. See the later citation from the Kuan-tzu. This meaning of i was first
pointed outto me by Tang Yung"t'ung
bv
in his Han- Wei liang-Chin Nan-pei-chao
Fo-chiao-shih
bw
(Peking: Chung-hua reissue, 1955), pp. 142-143.
33. T. 33, p. 17a.
34. Including the eventual disagreement between the Hua-yen
bX
school
(representing Mind-Only Idealism) and the Wei-shih
by
school (representing
Indic Consciousness-Only).
35. T. 55, no. 2145, pp. 83-84. The last, by the way, shows that Hui
Yuan was not above using shen in his discourse with Kumarajiva, though shen
is absent in the Ta-ch'eng ta-i chang,bZ T. 45, pp. 122b-143b.
36. Tang Yung-t'ung, op. cit., pp. 561-564.
37. T. 33, p. lOb.
38. In abhidharmic speculation, these forms even take certain specified,
geometrical shapes.
39. For mano-vijiiiina, the more standard term would be i-shih. Re-
peatedly, however, the Chinese glossed over this compound because of the
native set that assumed only hsin, i shih.
40. T. 33, p. 10c. Text formatted for the sake of clarity. The opinion
of the master should end where I punctuated it. Ui Hakuju feels that something
is amiss here but confesses that he cannot decipher it. Ui's passage started
my search, but now I cannot locate it.
41. On this, see my "A Clue to the Authorship of the Awakening of Faith,"
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 2, 2 (1979), pp. 34-52.
42. From Hsin-shu II; my translation. See Allen Rickett, trans., Kuan Tzu
(Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1965) for his.
43. See my, "The Meaning of Mind-Only (Wei-hsin): An Analysis of a
Sinitic Mahayana Phenomenon," Philosophy East and West, 27, 1 (1977), pp.
65-83; and "Hu-jan nien-ch'i: Suddenly a Thought Rose, Sinitic Understanding
of Mind and Consciousness," Journal of the International Association of Buddhist
Studies, 3, 1 (1980), pp. 42-59. The present article, as well as others in prep-
aration, will lend further support to my contention that the sinicization of
Buddhism often occurred at a level of connotative meaning, embedded in the
Chinese language, of which the users themselves might not be conscious and
which some purely textual scholars fail or refuse to acknowledge.
44. T. 33, p. lla.
COMMENTARY ON THE YIN CHIH JU CHING 103
Chinese
Terms
a.

aa.
i)g't.i?}-
ba

b.
--""tJ;ti"i
abo bb.
-1z,
c.
ae.

be. I$, \.",
d.
ad. 1:11 bd.
I.;t=t:.>
e. 6Jn-
ae.
-$-
be. ?if i6-tj
f.
af. bf.

g.

ago
teflJ1t'lO
bg.

h.
ah. bh.
L

al. bi. 'JF:ll':
J
liil*-
aJ.

bj.
k.

ak.
-;p. bk.
1.

al. bI. "lit!."f
ro.
am.
bm.
n.
an. 3' ;i bn. '";';JCj{
O.
ao. boo
j)
p. 'tF=I"'of'
ap.
'ltii
bp. !f,'t-
q.
""t-r
aq.
1ft 1-1;;:; ."i;e-
bq.
-*""
r.

ar.
br.

'So
as. -R. ,;iF bs. (...!'1E1.)
t. 1'3
at.

bt.
u.
;;'X!,'i: au. bu.
e, G
V.
'+'
avo

bv. Jf)
fb
W.

aw.
"" c,,,- ,f,.
bw. ih Jc!rY<If*-;:,-
/'<'
x.

ax.

bx.

y.
"r,Ij'
ay.
Jt-'L
by.
Z.
if.,f'--
az.

=-i'f '-1',' bz.
;t; *- "-1< Ii
The new bilingual journal of the
Ecole dFExtreme-Orient
Kyoto Section
Responsables de redaction: Anna Seidel et Hubert Durt
Building from a rich scholarly tradition and long association with Japan. the Kyoto Section of the
"t:cole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient" has Jaunched the Cahiers d' Extreme-Asie --
a contribution to the urgent task of furthering our understanding of the East Asian world.
Our bilingual policy
expresses the wish to intensify collaboration among French and English speaking colleagues.
Summary of l/l98S
Anldts
Max Kaltenmark
Hubert Dun
Fri15 Staal
Allan G. Grapard
La Jegende de !a vil!c immergee en Chine
cliches canoniqucs bouddhiqucs dans ks
lcgendes sur Ics debuts du bouddhismc au
Japon
Substitutions de paradigmcs ct religions
d'Asic .
Voltaire and East Asia - A Few Reflections
on the Namrc at Humanism
Rapports de recherche
BlbUograph.lf!'
Articles
Etienne Lamotte
Rolf A. Siein
Jean Ll!:vi
Edward Schakr
ISSN 0766-1177
Bernard Faurc
Please order from:
Farzeen Baldrian
Summary of 2/l986
Les sources scripmraires de et
leurs valeurs respectives
Avalokilq.-vara/Kouan-yin, un exemple de
transformation d'un dic:u en dtesse
Les fonoionnaires et Ie divin -- lulte de
pouvoirs cn!re divinites et fonctionnaires
locaux dans les COniCS des Six Dynaslics
Transcendent Eldcr Mao
Lc maitre de dhyana Chih-ta et Ie
subitismc. de J'ecole du nord en Chine
On Lu Tung-pin in Nonhcrn Sung
literaturc
Anna Seidel EFEO
Christian Des.champs Deux ftles de villagc en Coree
Rinkoin, Shokokuji, Kamikyoku
602 KYOTO JAPAN
CEA 1/1985: 3.000 or $ 12
00
Rapporu df!' rf!'1:hf!'rchf!'
Blbl.lographlf!'
CEA 2/1986: 3.500 or $ 15
00
+ $ 3.
0
postage
(Checks made out to "Anna Seidel EFEO")
The Special Theory of PratTtyasamutpada:
The Cycle of Dependent Origination
1
by Geshe Lhundub Sopa
"Whoever sees dependent origination
sees the Dharma. Whoever sees the
Dharma sees the Buddha." (MaJjhima
Nikiiya, 1 :28)
The idea of dependent origination, the seeing of which is
said to be coextensive with the seeing of the Dharma itself, is
clearly one of the most central theories in all of Buddhism.
There is both the general theory and a special theory. The
former is coextensive with the spectrum of particularly Buddhist
theories accounting for genesis in general. The latter refers to
a special application of the general theory to an explanation of
the genesis of a living sentient being in sarpsara and the means
of that being's potential release from such a sarpsaric birth. It
is to this special theory of dependent origination that the above-
cited sutra passage refers.
This special theory is that of the cycle of the twelve nidiinas,
or twelve components of dependent origination. Having already
dealt briefly with the general theory of dependent origination
in a previous paper aIABS Vol. 7, No.1, p. 125 ff.), we proceed
then to look at the cycle of twelve components, beginning with
ignorance and ending with ageing and dying.
I. Avidyii
Thus, what is the nescience (avidyii) of which it is said that
"because of nescience formatives (sa11Jskiira) arise"?2
Nescience generally means simply not knowing something
or just a state of unknowing. However, within the traditions of
Buddhism, this nescience is not a mere absence of knowing or
105
106 JIABS VOL 9 NO.1
an absence of a true understanding, but rather the contrary of
or incompatible to true understanding. It is just as untruthful_
ness dpes not mean a mere absence of speaking the truth but
rather a speaking something which is the opposite of the truth,
i.e., lying, or just as the unfriendliness between two persons
does not mean a mere absence of friendliness but rather the
opposite of friendliness, i.e., their enmity. Thus, it is stated in
the Abhidharmakosa, "Nescience is a quality which is a contrary
to understanding, like untruthful, inamicable, etc.,',3 Likewise,
the Prama'fJ,avattika says, " ... because it is a contrary to knowing,
and because it is a perception under the influence of a secondary
mental component (caitta) , nescience is a wrong perceiving."4
In answering the question, "What is nescience?", the
PratZtyasamutpada-vibha1iga-nirdesa-siUra says,
Not knowing the limits of the past, and not knowing the limits
of the future ... not knowing actions and their matura-
tions ... not knowing misery, and not knowing its
genesis ... and not knowing cause ... and not knowing virtue
and nonvirtue, and not knowing transgression and nontransgres-
sion, and the to-be-cultivated and the not-to-be-cultivated
... etc. ... 5
On the surface, the sutra seems to be signifying a mere
absence of knowing the past, future, cause and effect, the four
truths, good and evil, etc. However, the commentaries, like
AsaIiga's Abhidharmasamuccaya and Vasubandhu's Pratztyasamut-
pada-vibhariga-nirdesa rightly explain the sutra's real meaning of
"not knowing" as that kind of not knowing which falsely misap-
prehends these objects. Thus, generally speaking, nescience re-
fers to a secondary mental condition, or caitta, which because
of its natural delusion misapprehends its own proper object.
Nescience may further be subdivided from the point of view
of the two truths (satya dvaya) into a perverse misperception of
conventional objects like cause and effect, etc., and a perverse
misperception of the ultimate reality of no-self.
Here, the former, nescience in general, is called in the
Abhidharmakosa a ground of enormous affliction (klesa) because
it is a concomitant of every single afflicting mental moment
6
and consequently it may be present to both sense perception
and to mental consciousness.
PRA TITYASAMUTP ADA 107
The latter, on the other hand, because it is the grasper of
a self, is present only in mental consciousness, but not in sense
perception. Here, the Abhidharmakosa says:
In the desire realms (kiimadhtitu) , attachment should be known
as a concomitant of all the six consciousnesses. Nescience also,
like attachment, should be understood to be SO.7
..
Moreover, all the schools of Buddhism, both upper and
lower, agree that the nescience which binds sentient beings to
sarpsara and which is the root of all the other afflictions, like
attachment, etc., is the innate grasping of "me" and "mine" or
the nescience which is a misperception of the reality of no-self
(nairiitmya). On this, the Pramii'fJaviirttika says:
All these evils originate from a (false) view of the perishable
aggregates. This is nescience. From this (nescience), attachment
arises, and from this (attachment), aversion and the like arise.
s
Likewise, Nagarjuna states in the Ratniivalf: ,
As long as one grasps the aggregates, so long will one apprehend
an 1. If there is the grasping of an I, there is action (karma), and
from that (action) again there is birth.
9
In the Madhyamakiivatiira, Candraklrti says:
Also,
On seeing with true discernment that without exception the afflic-
tors and their ills arise from a (false) view of the perishable
aggregates, the yogin, by utilizing the self as an object, will nullify
the self. 10
I prostrate myself to compassion for those who, like the turning
of a water wheel, go through sarpsara involuntarily, first becom-
ing fond of a self called "I" and creating attachments to things
called "mine.,,11
Tsong kha pa, one of the great Madhyamikas of Tibet says
in his Praise of Dependent Origination:
Nescience is the root of whatever misfortune there is in the world.
Dependent origination is taught to be that by the seeing of which
one brings about a reversal. -
Like this, one might go on quoting similar passages from the
Buddhist sutras and commentaries for a very long time.
Thus, for reasons already mentioned above, that nescience
which is the first of the twelve components of dependent origi-
nation may be defined simply as a mental component which is
delusion as to reality and which is a prime motivator of a seeding
action (karma).
In the Tibetan literature dealing with the subject, a number
of interesting discussions arise. For example, the Abhidhar-
masamuccaya of Asanga states:
Delusion (moha) is twofold: delusion as to the ripening of a result,
and delusion as to the real. On account of delusion as to the
ripening of a result, unmeritorious actions are accumulated. On
account of delusion as to the real, meritorious and immutable
(acala) actions are accumulated.
12
Thus, it is stated that unwholesome actions are impelled by
nescience as to cause and effect. Isn't this statement then incon-
sistent with the above definition of nescience as delusion as to
the real which is a motivator of a seeding action? On close
examination, there is actually no inconsistency here, for Asanga's
statement about the impulsion of unmeritorious actions by de-
lusion as to cause and effect is made from the point of view of
the motivation which is synchronic with the action itself. On the
other hand, it is from the point of view of a primary causal
motivation that he explains the nescience which is delusion as
to the real, i.e., the nescience which grasps a self and which is
the motivator of a seeding karma. It is, moreover, just this pri-
mary causal motivation which is the actual impeller of the action,
whereas the synchronic motivation is mainly the train of ideation
which occurs simultaneously with the actions. This kind of
Abhidharma discussion is often rather difficult to render into
English briefly in an easily understandable way. The import
here is that Asanga's two statements are from the point of view
of two different modes of causality, and we are left with delusion
PRA TITYASAMUTPADA 109
as to the real as that nescience which is the nescience signified
by the first of the twelve components.
!I. Sar(lskiira
The second component of the cycle is variously called the
formative (sar(lskiira) of dependent origination or formative ac-
tion (sar(lskiira-karma). Like nescience, a formative action is a
mental component, or caitta. It is a thrust, or proclivity, or incli-
nation, or impulse (cetanii). Generally speaking, it is an impulse
which is motivated by nescience and which projects or seeds
that future life which is its own proper projectory or target. It
is threefold: a meritorious act which seeds a birth among the
fortunate trans migrants in the desire realms (kiimadhiitu); an
unmeritorious act which seeds a birth among the unfortunate
transmigrants of the desire realm; and thirdly, an acala karma,
or act which is immutable as to its outcome and which seeds a
birth among the transmigrants in the two higher realms, i.e.,
the realms of form and of no-form.
Again, this formative action is often explained as twofold,
i.e., impulse action and gathering action.
I3
Here, it is said in
the Abhidharmasamuccaya, "What is action (karma)? It is impulse
action and gathering action, for this is the epitome of action.,,14
Also, in the Abhidharmakosa, "Impulse is a mental action, and
from this there develops bodily and vocal action.,,15 Here,
moreover, impulse action is a mental action, whereas gathering
action is explained as bodily and vocal action. The V a i b h a ~ i k a
and Prasangika Madhyamika schools of Buddhist thought re-
gard this gathering action of body and speech as corporeal. The
Sautrantika, Yogacara, and Svatantrika Madhyamika schools,
on the other hand, accept it as a mental component which occurs
together with the activity of body and speech.
In the Siilisambhava-sutra, the Buddha explains sar(lskiira by
way of analogy with causation in the external world. The ac-
cumulation of seeding actions refers to the planting of the whole-
some and unwholesome seeds which project the births of sen-
tient beings in any of the fortunate or unfortunate realms respec-
tively by the power of the nescience (avidyii) which grasps a self.
Here, the meaning of "to project a birth" is to cause whatever
110
JIABS VOL. 9 NO.1
birth occurs to occur modally, as that kind of sentient being
who is born when the seeding cause encounters the appropriate
germinative conditions such as craving (tnr],a) , appropriation
(upadana), etc. It is analogous to a farmer's planting at the very
outset the various kinds of seeds, such as rice, wheat, barley, etc.
This seeding action is accumulated by every kind of common
individual (prthagjana) but is not accumulated by the aryan, or
Buddhist saint, for by the power of the aryan's direct perception
of the reality of no-self, the potential of accumulating seeding
action becomes quite debilitated, even though there still remains
a residuum of a subtle self-grasping. It is just as, in a struggle,
a weak person does not defeat a powerful one. Here, Nagarjuna
says, "To one who sees the truth there is no sowing. T,o one
who is free of craving there is no rebirth."16
In the life of the aryan, there is no fresh accumulation of
seeding action, even though the potentials of previous seeding
actions sown formerly while that being was still in the stages of
ordinary individuality are aroused from dormancy by germina-
tiv.e action and craving.
16a
From the stages of the attainment of
the aryan path up to the achievement of arhantship, sa:rp.saric
birth still occurs under the power of action and afflictors, for
as is taught in the above, each and every sa:rp.saric birth must
be roused from latency by germinative action and the moisture
of craving.
Thus, even though seeding actions have been accumulated,
unless they are aroused from dormancy by the three--craving,
appropriation, and becoming-they will not produce rebirth in
sa:rp.sara, just as a dry seed without moisture will not produce a
sprout. Therefore, Nagarjuna's Pratztyasamutpadahrdaya says,
"For one who is free from craving there is no rebirth," for with
the attainment of arhantship there is the realization of nirvaI).a
and the eradication of rebirth in sa:rp.sara.
Again, actions are threefold: seeding actions, germinative
actions, and completing actions. By a seeding action, just the
nature which may be ripened is made to emerge. By a germina-
tive a ~ t i o n , the actual ripening is made to occur. By a completing
action, the life which is made to arise by seeding and germinative
actions is furnished with its individual peculiarities of fortune
and misfortune. On this, the Abhidharmakosa says, "One life is
sown by a single seeding action, but it has many completing
actions.,,17
PRA TITYASAMUTP ADA III
Thus, four possibilities of birth in sarp.sara may be discussed
with respect to wholesome and unwholesome seeding and finish-
ing actions. First, both seeding and completing actions are
. wholesome, as in the birth of deities and the most fortunate of
humans. Secondly, both are unwholesome, as in the births of
the three unfortunate realms. Thirdly, seeding action is whole-
some, whereas completing actions are unwholesome, as in in-
stances of the births of humans whose lives are impoverished,
ailing and short. Finally, seeding action is unwholesome,
whereas completing action is wholesome, as in the instances of
the births of animals who live as pets in ease and comfort under
someone's loving care.
III. Vijiiana
The third component of the cycle of dependent origination
is consciousness, and it is explained as twofold: as a consciousness
at the time of the cause, or a causal consciousness, and as a
consciousness at the time of the effect, or an effect consciousness.
Here, a causal consciousness refers to the prime consciousness
on which is fixed the impression deposited by a seeding action.
Whenever either a wholesome or an unwholesome seeding ac-
tion is done, its impression or seed has to continue on without
interruption from the time of the last moment of the action
until the time of the ripening of the seed of that action. The
kind of consciousness which is the depository or keeper of the
seed is a causal consciousness.
When, then, the impression or seed ripens and gives rise
to some sort of birth later on, that first moment of consciousness
becoming conjoined with a life in a mother's womb is what is
meant by an effect consciousness. According to the Yogacarins,
this kind of causal and effect consciousness is alayavijiiana, or
foundation consciousness. In the systems of both the V a i b h a ~ i k a
and the Sautrantika, as well as in those of the Madyamika, it is
a stabler sort of mental consciousness, or manovijiiana.
IV. N amarupa
The name/form (namarupa) of the cycle of dependent origi-
nation is the fourth component. Very roughly speaking, it cor-
responds to what in the non-Buddhist systems might be called
body and soul, or at least a phase of it. Buddhism, of course,
avoids such a label because it is referring specifically to a tem-
poral or developmental phase of a multiple composite. We may
take the examplebf a human life. From the time of a conscious-
ness' first union with an embryo in the mother's womb up to
the time of the evolvement of the six sense organs, the five
psycho-physical aggregates-the five skandhas of Buddhism-
are already present. Among these five, the body, consisting of
the mixed parental blood and semen, is designated "form,"
whereas the remaining four mental aggregates as they exist in
this developmental period are designated "name" because they
form a basis or referent for naming.
All the schools of Buddhism accept that in the realms of
desire and of form there is both name and form. However,
some of these schools accept that corporeity is entirely absent
in the realm of no-form (arupyadhatu), and for these there exists
only name, or the four noncorporeal aggregates in the formless
realm. On the other hand, the others accept that whereas there
is no gross body in the formless realm, there is nonetheless an
extremely subtle corporeity. For these, both the name and form
are present even in the formless realm. Such differences not-
withstanding, for the Buddhist schools the principal basis or
primary referent which is being designated by names like "sen-
tient being," "life," "person," "personality," etc., are the four
mental aggregates and not form or body.
V. $ac/iiyatana
The six sense organs (-lac/iiyatana) of the cycle of dependent
origination is the fifth component. Again, we can look at a
human life as the example. During the period of gestation in
the mother's womb, the sense organs develop gradually in stages.
Thus, "the six sense organs" refers to the developmental phase
from the time of the completion of the evolvement of the sense
organs up to the drawing together of object, organ, and con-
sciousness-albeit in a diffuse manner-up to the time of the
development of the capability of experiencing an object as attrac-
PRA TITY ASAMUTPADA
113
tive,unattractive, or neutraL Buddhism distinguishes four
modes of birth: from a womb (like humans); from an egg (like
birds); from warmth and moisture (like certain insects); and by
. a miraculous birth (like gods), In instances of the three former
kinds of birth, the sense organs are said to develop in stages.
In instances of divine birth as well as birth in the intermediate
state (antarabhava, bardo), it is said that there is no gradual evolve-
ment of the sense organs but that they occur wholely and all at
once. Thus, with the completion of name and form, an essential
aspect of embodiment is realized. Next, with the completion of
the organs of sense the specific physical properties of such em-
bodiment are realized, and thereby the physical components
become utilizable instruments.
VI. Sparia
Contact (sparia) is the sixth component. This contact de-
pends on the meeting or drawing together of the three, an outer
object of cognition, an inner sense organ, and a moment of
consciousness or cognition. In dependence on this meeting there
arises the capacity to utilize fluctuations of the object-field in
terms of attractiveness, and neutrality, and this is contact. Six
kinds of contact are distinguished: tactile, visual, auditory, olfac-
tory, gustatory, and mental.
VII. Vedana
Feeling (vedana) is the seventh component of the cycle of
dependent origination. This feeling is the appearance of any
pleasant, disagreeable, or indifferent feeling consistent with the
realization by contact of the threefold fluctuation of the object
field. This is simply to say that on encountering an attractive
object there arises a pleasant feeling; on encountering an unat-
tractive object there is a disagreeable feeling; and on encounter-
ing a neutral object the feeling is one of indifference. Thus,
contact is the object side of experience, and feeling is the subject
side, on the latter of which the ripening of action (karma) primar-
ily occurs. Consequently, when these two are completed, then
the full potentiality of experiencing is also completed.
From nescience up to here constitutes one set of compo_
nents of the cycle of dependent originati<1n, i.e., a causal se-
quence which is based on seeding action. From the point of
view of the cause of seeding action, there is a threefold series
of causes consisting of nescience, formatives, and consciousness .
. From the point of view of the effect or the result sown, there
is the fourfold series consisting of name and form, the six sense
organs, contact, and feeling.
In the Salisambhava-sutra, 18 these are explained on the anal-
ogy of the production of a crop. Thus nescience is comparable
to the farmer who sows a field, formatives or formative action
to the field itself, and consciousness to the seed sown, from
which arises the sprout of name and form. Similarly, from the
point of view of the causes which are the sower of a birth,
nescience is the sower because it is the prime mover of an action.
Then, just as from the field various good and bad crops are
produced, from action also there is a production of various good
and bad maturation results, and so these actions are like the
field, and consciousness, because it contains the potential to
produce the fruit of action, is like the seed. Thus; with these
three are completed the principal causes on which depend the
sowing of a sarpsaric birth or life that will not be untouched by
mIsery.
The same is the case with regard to the production of the
sarpsaric result. From the point of view of the genus or type of
birth, this is just name and form or the actualization of the five
skandhas. From the point of view of the further specifics of the
life, there is the body and the range of experience. Of these,
the body is subsumed by the six sense organs, and the range of
experience by contact together with feeling, the former referring
to the objective experience component and the latter to the
subjective component. In this manner, the result or that which
has been sewn into sarpsara may be explained as fourfold.
VIII. Tn'fJa
The eighth component is craving In Buddhism, crav-
PRA TITY ASAMUTPADA 115
ing in general is seen as threefold: desire-craving, as in wishing
to meet with happiness; apprehension-craving as in wishing to
avoid the miserable; and existential-craving as in being covertly
attached to one's body and bases of personality. Here, as the
eighth component of the cycle of dependent origination, craving
is particularly the craving which springs from the experiencing
of feeling which is the mature fruit of a seed sown in previous
life and which first awakens from dormancy the seeds or pro-
pensities sown by a. seeding action. On account of this latter
characteristic, craving initiates a series of germinative causes.
IX. Upadana
The appropriation (upadana) of the cycle of dependent
origination is the ninth component. This refers to the attach-
ment which greatly augments the above craving and strengthens
and assists the actualization of the potency of a propensity de-
posited by a seeding action. Four kinds of appropriation are
distinguished: appropriation by desire; appropriation by false
views; appropriation by a perception of a self; and appropriation
by false ethics and false religious activity. Examples of these are
as follows: of the first, desire for attractive shapes and sounds,
and for life; of the second, attachment to bad views, with the
exception of the wrong view which grasps a self; of the third,
. the wrong view which grasps a self; and finally, the fourth is
attachment to worthless systems of ethics and to worthless reli-
gious methods and duties.
X. Bhava
The tenth component of the cycle of dependent origination
is a mode of existence (bhava). The previous two, craving and
appropriation, have already aroused from dormancy and
strengthened the proclivity deposited by a seeding action. Now,
there is a further germinative action which actualizes a future
life, and this action, which straightaway without an interruption
or intervention of any other life actually brings about the future
life, is called "existence" or "mode of existence" (bhava). Again,
116
JIABS VOL. 9 NO. I
using the analogue of external causation, this is just as warmth,
moisture and all the other necessary causes ripen and condition
a seed so that a sprout is straightaway produced without the
seed's lying dormant for any longer period' of time.
Thus, to accomplish the production of a sarpsaric birth,
there is a need for two distinctive periods of causation, both a
period of seeding and a period of germination, or of actualiza-
tion. These two kinds of action are like father and mother, and
each period requires a complete set of afflictors coupled with
action. For the period of seeding causes, nescience is the afflictor
and formatives are the action. For the period of germinative or
actualizing causes, both craving and appropriation are the afflic-
tors, and existence, or mode of existence, is the action. Here,
Nagarjuna says, "The first, eighth, and ninth are afflictors. The
second and tenth are action.,,19 Likewise, Vasubandhu states in
the Abhidharmakosa, "There are three afflictors and two ac-
tions.,,20
Generally speaking, this existence (bhava) and sarpsara, or
the round of suffering existences, are synonyms. When one
subdivides them, there are four subperiods constituting the
round of existence, i.e., intermediate existence, natal existence,
pre-death existence, and dying existence. The first period, or
intermediate existence, is the period between the dying existence
of the former life and the natal experience of this life. The
second period is just the first moment of conception in the
mother's womb. The third is from the moment immediately
following the first moment of conception to the moment just
before death. The fourth is the actual moment of death.
XI. Jati
The eleventh component of dependent origination is birth,
which here in the cycle of the twelve designates the state of the
maturated five aggregates at the moment when by the force of
the above mode of existence they first become conjoined in
birth. Buddhism explains the places of sarpsaric birth as four-
fold, i.e., womb birth, egg birth, heat and moisture birth, and
magical creation birth. Denizens of the hells, deities, and the
beings of the intermediate state are only magically born. Pretas
PRA TITYASAMUTPADA 117
are generally magically born, although some are said to be womb
born. Men and animals are said to share all four places of birth.
Here, the Abhidharmakosa says, "Among the four places of the
births of sentient beings, birth from eggs, etc., men and animals.
share the four. Hell denizens, deities, and the beings of the
intermediate state are magically born. Pretas are born from the
womb also.,,21
XII. ] aramararpa
The twelfth component is age (jara) and death (mararpa).
From the second moment of birth until death, the now matur-
ated five aggregates become older and older, and this aspect of
theirs is the ageing of the cycle of dependent origination. The
destruction of the continuum of the seemingly identical indi-
vidual .is what is signified as death in the cycle. The two are
counted as one, since death may occur without the white hair,
wrinkles, etc., which are conventionally understood by the proc-
ess of ageing. Also, the sorrow, lamentation, misery, despair,
and anguish, even though they are explained as the concomit-
ants of old age and death, are not reckoned as separate from
the twelfth component, for the similar reason that these do not
inevitably arise in every experiencing of the death of the life
which was born from action and afflictors, for there are some
who, like monks who maintain an excellence of fila, die with
their minds and bodies at ease. Nonetheless, these are taught
together with old age and death in order to show the objection-
. ableness of birth in samsara.
With this we come to the end of our abbreviated description
of the twelve components of the cycle of dependent origination.
Many essentials remain yet to be set forth, for: the cycle of
the twelve components does not come to life until one looks at
their traditional groupings and distributions as causes and ef-
fects. Some of the major of these patterns of causation need
especially to be looked at, in particular: their grouping into a
seeding cause and effect and a germinative cause and effect;
into a. threefold, afflictors (klesa), actions' (karma), and miseries'
(dul],kha); into the realities of misery and its genesis; and finally
into sets of one and two lives. Thus, these twelve are variously
seen to form a cycle of causal genesis which perpetually renews
itself. Moreover, for Buddhism, there exists the possibility of
the cycle's being stopped by the extirpation of the nescience by
which it is perpetuated. These are subjects which I hope to be
able to treat at some little length at another time.
NOTES
1. This paper is a continuation of a treatment of the subject of depen-
dent origination (pratitya samutpiida) originally begun in "The Tibetan Wheel
of Life: Iconcgraphy and Doxography," JIABS Vol. 7, No.1, pp. 125-145. It
was delivered at the lABS Conference at Bologna, Italy in July of 1985. I
wish to thank Elvin W. Jones for his literary and editorial assistance.
2. Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition (TTPE) ed. D.T. Suzuki (Tokyo-
Kyoto, 1957), v. 34, p. 306. Also, see my translation inJIABS Vol. 7, No.1,
pp. 137-140.
3. TTPE, v. 115, p. 119.
4. TTPE, v. 130, p. 87.
5. TTPE, v. 34, p. 306.
6. E.g., "Delusion [i.e., nescience], heedlessness, lack of faith, mental
sloth and fascination are always present to an afflicted mind." TTPE, v. 115,
p. 118.
7. Tibetan Tripitaka, sDe dge edition, preserved at the Faculty of Let-
ters University of Tokyo (TTDG) (Tokyo, 1980).
8. TTPE, v. 130, p. 81.
9. TTPE, v. 129, p. 174.
10. TTPE, v. 98, p. 104.
11. TTPE, v. 98, p. 100.
12. TTDG, v. 12, p. 43.
13. "Impulse action" and "gathering action" are a free translation, or
rather a paraphrase, of sems pa'i las and bsam pa'i las respectively.
14. TTDG, v. 12, p. 43.
15. TTPE, v. 115, p, 120.
16. TTPE, v. 120, p. 302.
16a. Having already identified an important distinction between actions
(and likewise causes) as seeding and germinative, we continue to identify these
distinctions analogically as "seeding" and "germinating" rather than use the
more common "projecting" and "actualizing," which literally translate 'Phen
byed kyilas and 'grub byed kyilas respectively.
17. TTPE, v. 115, p. 122.
18. TTPE, v. 34, p. 305.
19. TTPE, v. 115, p. 119.
20. TTPE, v. 115, p. 119.
...

...
..
..
PRA TITYASAMUTP ADA 119
21.- Pretas are generally said to be born magically, however, in the
Abhidharma system some are said to be born from the womb, and this is the
meaning of the "also."
~
~
Now available from:
POTALA PUBLICATIONS
107 EAST 31ST STREET
NEW YORK. N. Y. 10016
TEL. (212) 213-5011
Lectures on Tibetan Religious Culture, by Geshe Lhundup Sopa
Volumes 1 and 2, each $9.50 plus $2.00 postage
The lectures in these two volumes are arranged so as to give the PhD student
in Buddhist Studies preparation for fieldwork among the learned Geshes and
lamas living in the Tibetan communities in India, Nepal, Switzerland, etc.
The language is the modern spoken Tibetan used by Tibetan scholars: a
dialectical superstructure of modern Tibetan employing the vocabulary of
literary Tibetan. Each lecture is first presented in Tibetan orthography, fol-
lowed by a vocabulary in Tibetan and English, notes in English, and an
English translation specifically designed to assist students with the Tibetan
text by showing how the phrases and clauses of the often long periodic
sentences are related to the main concluding verb. The lectures in the first
volume are general, on Tibetan Buddhist monastic life, doctrine, history,
etc., helping the student prepare for the lectures in the second volume which
represent the kind of work the student will be doing with Tibetan scholars
in India and elsewhere - the continued exposition of a single topic .
Please inquire about our brochure of publications on other topics of interest
to students in Buddhist Studies. Potala carries all publications from the Library
of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharamsala, India .
... ~ = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ~
International Jou rnal
for PhUosophy of Religion
Edited by
BOWMAN L. CLARKE and FRANK R. HARRISON III
International Advisory Board of Editors
E. L. Fackenheim, Toronto; Majid Fakhry, Beirut; Kenneth K.
Inada, New York, John Macquarrie, Oxford, Hajime Nakamura,
Tokyo; P. T. Raju, Wooster; Martin Versfeld, Cape Town, R.J.
Zwi Werblowsly, Jerusalem
The organ of no single institution or secretarian school, philo-
sophical or religious, the International Journal for Philosophy
of Religion provides a medium for the exposition, development,
and criticism of important philosophical insights and theories
relevant to religion in any of its varied forms. It also provides a
forum for critical, constructive, and interpretive consideration
of religion from an objective philosophical point of view.
Some Recent Articles
S.J. Wykstra: The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments
from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of "Appearance." W. L.
Rowe: Evil and the Theistic Hypothesis: A Response to Wykstra.
J. L. Kvanvig: Credulism. K. Nielsen: On Mucking Around About
God: Some Methodological Animadversions. K. Surin: Theistic
Arguments and Rational Theism. J. Churchill: Wittgenstein on
the Phenomena of Belief. J. Kellenberger: Kierkegaard, Indirect
Communication, and Religious Truth. M. P. Levine: Self-authentic
-ating Experiences of God:A Reply to Professor Oakes. G. Wallace:
Moral and Religious Appraisals. S. Andre: The Problem of Evil and
the Paradox of Friendly Atheism.
Subscription Information
1986, Vols. 19-20 (6 issues) ISSN 0020-7047
Institutional rate: Of!. 212,- / US$ 75.00 inel. postage/handling
Private rate: Ofl. 80,- / US$ 28.00 inel. postage/handling
MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS
A Member of the Kluwer Academic Publishers Group
P.O. Box 163, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands
190 Old Derby Street, Hingham MA 02043, U.S.A.
Falcon House, Queen Square, Lancaster LA1IRN, U.K.
II. REVIEWS
Chinese Religions in Western Languages: A Comprehensive and Clas-
sified Bzbliography of Publications in English, French and German
through 1980, by Laurence G. Thompson. The Association for
Asian Studies Monograph No. XLI. Tucson: The University of
Arizona Press, 1985. pp. XLIX + 302.
This work is the second edition of a bibliography published
in 1976 under the slightly different title of Studies in Chinese
Religion . ... This first edition, which is now out of print, was
hailed as "a major event for students of all aspects of Chinese
religion" (jAOS 97.3.1977: 409-410). According to Tsuen-hsuin
Tsien, the first edition listed more than 5,100 books and articles
published from the late eighteenth century through 1970. The
present edition adds a great number of items that were over-
looked in the first edition and extends the coverage to 1980. It
seems to contain more than 8,000 entries.
The classification is excellent and easy to use. The bibliog-
raphy is divided into three major parts: I. Bibliography and Gen-
eral Studies. II. Chinese Religion exclusive of Buddhism (this
part has 45 subdivisions). III. Chinese Buddhism (with 22 subdivi-
sions). Lists of abbreviations and of serial sources, as well as
indices of authors, editors, compilers, translators, photographers.
and illustrators are included.
Thompson distinguishes between religion and philosophy
in China, and therefore excludes philosophical studies. Of course,
such a distinction is difficult to maintain. The author himself
says as much in his Foreword, where he writes: "However, be-
cause of the historical facts, the sections on Confucianism, Taoism
and Lao Tzu have necessarily become all-inclusive and constitute
an exception to our general principle." In a more consistent way,
Thompson excludes all the foreign religions that did not become
"an integral part of Chinese religion," as is the case with Bud-
dhism. Therefore "materials pertaining to ethnic minorities and
peripheral cultures" have been omitted. The Foreword gives a
list of topics that are also excluded, such as the T'ai-p'ing rebel-
lion, the question of Fu-sang, and similar items. It is recom-
mended that this Foreword be read attentively.
(p.u.p. drop 12 points to next paragraph)
121
The main criticism one could express regarding the present
work concerns its typography. As in the first edition, here also
capital letters are never used in titles, except for the initial word
or after a full stop. Thus, names of countries, townships and
persons, as well as common names in German, are all without
capital letters, which not only is incorrect, but also rather ungrace-
ful.
There are more than a few misprints. One example may
suffice here: all items on page 268 are referred to in the index
as being on page 269, and this same page of Addenda and Cor-
rigenda is partly useless and partly badly printed.
Notwithstanding these small blemishes, this bibliography re-
mains an excellent piece of work and must be recommended to
all sinologists and specialists in the field of religions.
Yves Hervouet
The Cycle of Day and Night, by Namkhai Norbu. Translated, edited
and annotated by John M. Reynolds, Oakland, CA: Zhang Zhung
Editions, 1984. 80 pages, 2 glossaries, Tibetan text, biography
of the author.
The full title of the volume under consideration is: The Cycle of
Day and Night: Where One Proceeds Along the Path of the Primordial
Yoga. It is not written primarily for scholars or in a particularly
scholarly manner. It consists of teachings on rDzogs chen medita-
tion, along with the author's own commentary, transmitted to a
group of practitioners in Massachusetts. Still, it is a valuable
contribution, and both scholars and practitioners will find it in-
formative.
In my own studies, I have always found such texts most
useful in being able to formulate a more precise picture of the
psychological framework that is the given basis for the philosophy
of any particular school of thought. Since the philosophy is for-
mulated by practitioners and is based on their practice, being
able to understand this foundation is of considerable use. In this
volume, one has a thorough yet concise explanation of the medi-
tational system under consideration.
For those practitioners who have received- the transmission
of these teachings, this should well act as a guide. The various
divisions of the path are treated in full and one should be able
to follow them with considerable ease.
REVIEWS 123
The translations by Mr: Reynolds are very readable and
accurate. He is to be congratulated on such a fine rendering into
English. Further, the glossaries, one of English-Tibetan terms
and the other of Tibetan-English terms, are most useful. The
brief biography is also interesting for those who enjoy that genre
of literature.
I do have one hesitation in regard to thios volume: the trans-
lator never gives any justification for his translation of a'particular
Tibetan term. This could have very easily been added in the
footnotes. This type of information would have made the reading
easier for those with knowledge of both Tibetan and of the rDzogs
chen much easier. One finds oneself often flipping to the glossary
to look up the Tibetan in order to have a more precise under-
standing of what is being presented. Although thisis not a schol-
arly work, some notes on Mr. Reynolds' choice of English for
the Tibetan technical terms would have been appreciated.
In general, this is an excellent volume, presenting for the
first time some of the higher meditations found within the r Dzogs
chen tradition. It far surpasses many other contemporary works,
which present nothing more than general explanations and ex-
tremely preliminary meditations from this little-studied tradition.
A.W. Hanson-Barber
Dharma and Gospel: Two Ways of Seeing, edited by Rev. G.W. Hous-
ton. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1984. Pp. vii, 124. [Copies
are available for $12 from the editor, 500 Wheatland Avenue,
Logansport, Indiana 46947, U.S.A.]
This collection of essays serves as a guidebook to the various
avenues that are being explored in regard to the relationship
between Buddhism and Christianity in the contemporary world.
These pathways include theological discourse, comparisons of
mystical and/or meditative experience, and speculations on the
enactment of religious values in the social sphere. Compiled by
G.W. Houston, a Tibetologist involved with religion on both the
contemplative and pastoral levels, this volume reflects a growing
movement in which leaders and practitioners of Buddhism and
Christianity are using practices and insight of numerous forms
of both traditions for the enhancement of religious life.
John Cobb's contribution demonstrates how Pure Land Bud-
dhism may be understood in terms of Christian theology, and
offers the possibility that the message of Christ will transform
other traditions in the same way that other traditions transform
Christianity. Roger Corless attempts to find theological parity in
five types of thinkers, imaginatively placing primary figures of
each tradition in dialogue, such as Thomas Aquinas with Bud-
dhaghosa and Gregory of Nyassa with Dagen. This technique
informs the reader both of the common rubric that allows these
"conversations" to take place and the uniqueness of each thinker's
position. The somewhat confessional essay of Masaaki Honda
narrates a journey through Zen training and Pure Land de-
votionalism to mystical Christianity. In The Cloud of Unknowing,
the author finds the best expression of God's paradoxical relation
to self, which Honda describes as "one, but not identified," "dif-
ferent, but not separated" (p. 51). The essay by Tokiyuki Nobuh-
ara is an extremely well-documented theological discussion that
attempts to link natural and revealed theology through the
medium of Buddhism. Jay McDaniels offers a well-written and
imaginative article exploring whether Zorba the Greek could
have been a Christian, testing his model against liberation theol-
ogy. The two closing essays, by Eshin Nishimura and Seiichi
Yagi, give an anecdotal, personal account of the encounter of
religions. Although this approach might seem the least scholarly,
it is in fact perhaps the most important for the actualization of
the dialogue process.
This collection of essays, not unlike the journal Buddhist-
Christian Studies of the East-West Religions Project of the U niver-
sity of Hawaii, balances academic analysis with a genuine human
concern for religious life. As such, it is important reading for
those involved with the increasing contact between Buddhism
and Christianity, both at the theoretical and experientallevels.
Christopher Chapple
Meditation on Emptiness, by Jeffrey Hopkins. London: Wisdom
Publications, 1983, 1019 pp. $17.95/$35.00
The publication of Jeffrey Hopkins' magnum opus shows
how much progress has been made in Tibetan studies since the
revolt of 1959 brought many lamas to India, Europe and
America. In his introduction Hopkins retraces his studies since
REVIEWS 125
1963, the year in which he became first acquainted with the Great
Exposition of Tenets by 'Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa (1648-1721), one
of the main sources for his book, which is based both on oral
explanations and the works of 'Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa and other
scholars such as ICang-skya Rol-pa'i rdo-rje (1717-1786). Hop-
kins has an admirable knowledge of literary and spoken Tibetan
and he has obviously derived great profit from the teachings he
has received from several learned lamas. A text such as the Great
Exposition of Tenets is extremely difficult to understand without
the help of Tibetan scholars. Hopkins' translation of a section
of the chapter on the Prasangika doctrines in part six of his book
is a remarkable achievement. Another important text translated
in this book is a section of the first chapter of Candrakirti's
PTasannapadii (ed. L. de La Vallee Poussin, pp. 14.1-36.2), which
is one of the principal documents on the differences between
the two Madhyamaka schools, the Prasangikas (represented in
this text by Buddhapalita and Candraklrti) and the Svatantrikas
(represented by their founder, Bhavaviveka). The first half of
Hopkins' book comprises four parts, entitled "Meditation,"
"Reasoning into Reality," "The Buddhist World" and "Systems,"
in which he gives a comprehensive survey of Buddhist Mahayana
philosophy, with special emphasis on the doctrines of the
Madhyamaka school.
Undoubtedly, the general reader will find it easier to under-
stand the first half of Hopkins' book than the highly complicated
and technical texts translated in parts five and six. The specialist
in Buddhist studies who is not familiar with the dGe-Iugs-pa
tradition will also find in it much to glean. However, he will
probably be somewhat disturbed by the way in which Hopkins
has presented his materials, i.e., by using both written texts and
oral teachings. At the beginning of each section, Hopkins scrupul-
ously enumerates his sources, and in the notes he often indicates
the sources even for very small sub-sections. Nevertheless, it is
not always easy to know which particular text is being used, and
in the case of oral teaching one would like to know on which
texts they are based. Sometimes, also, Hopkins introduces con-
cepts that are explained much later on in his book. For instance,
on p. 57 Hopkins mentions "the diamond slivers," which are
only explained in note 619. In this note, Hopkins makes some
remarks about the possible meanings of the Sanskrit equivalent
of sliver, i.e., karja. This suggests that the term "the diamond
slivers" is based upon a Sanskrit original. However, the only
authority Hopkins quotes is Kensur Lekden, although he refers
126 ]IABS VOL. 9 NO .. l
vaguely to oral and written sources, adding that the oral traditions
with which he has been in contact are by no means always accu-
rate. One would' like to know more about the written sources in
which this term is used and explained, and in-particular about
Indian sources referred to by Tibetan scholars. If no Indian
sources can be tra<:ed, it seems rather strange to speculate on
the meaning of a Sanskrit equivalent of a term used by Tibetan
scholars.
In part five of his book, Hopkins translates and explains the
controversies between on the one hand, Buddhapalita, and on
the other, Candrakirti. Hopkins refers to the Sanskrit text edited
by L. de La Vallee Poussin, but his translation of Candrakirti's
text seems to be based entirely on the Tibetan version. This has
some strange consequences. For instance, Hopkins translates
biidha (Tib. gnod-pa) by "damage, harm" (d. pp. 502, 526 and
note 395), whereas the technical meaning of the Sanskrit term
"refutation, annulment" is well-known from Sanskrit philosophi-
cal texts, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Even more amazing
is his persistent use of the term "renowned" for siddha and
prasiddha (Tibetan grags-pa) which results in such incomprehen-
sible renderings as: "Therefore, some say There is no harm by
inference that is through the force of being renowned to the
other [party] because [we] wish to refute mere renown to others'."
(p. 526). The Sanskrit text has: na paratafJ prasiddhibalad
anumanabadha / parasiddher eva iti (35.4-5): "It is
not possible to refute by inference on the strength of that which
is admitted by others because it is just that which is admitted by
others, that one wishes to refute." Also, in other instances Hop-
kins' renderings of technical terms are not very satisfactory, for
example, "unmistaken" (p. 4S5) for avyabhicarin (21.5). Wrong
is Hopkins' rendering of sadhyadharma by "predicate of the prob-
andum" (p. 50S). The sadhyadharma is the "property to be
proved", i.e., the probandum.
In the Great Exposition of Tenets 'Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa
quotes many texts, but often in abridged form. Hopkins has
given t,he full quotations in his edition of the Tibetan text, which
is added at the end of the book. As Hopkins remarks, these
quotations constitute an anthology of the basic texts for the study
of the Prasangika system. It is therefore desirable that these
quotations should be carefully translated. On p. 60S, Hopkins
translates the following extract from the Dhiira'rflSVara-
rajaparipr:cchasutra: "He leads those sentient beings to the
Tathagata's land through discourse on the irreversible wheel
REVIEWS
127
[cultivation of the union of method and wisdom] and discourse
on the complete purification of the three spheres [of agent, ac-
tion, and object]. those sentient beings of various lineages and
natures-having become the nature of Tathagata-
hood. Thus, they realize [the six perfections and so forth], the
highest boon [bestowing omniscience]." The Sanskrit original of
this quotation is to be found in the Ratnagotravibhiiga (ed. E.H.
Johnston, p. 6.3-7): tata" pasciid avivartyadharmacakrakathayii
trima1Jcfalaparisuddhikathayii ca tiin sattviin avatiirayati
niiniiprakrtihetukiin / avatfr1Jas ca samiiniis tathiigatadharmatiim
adhigamyiinuttarii ity ucyante. The same passage is quoted
in the Tibetan version of Nagarjuna's Siitrasamuccaya. Bhikkhu
Pasadika, who refers to the Ratnagotravibhiiga, translates it as
follows: "Through dIscourses on the 'irreversible wheel' (of the
Doctrine of ekayiina) and the purity of the 'three spheres (of
giving, viz. the giver, recipient, and the act of giving)' he causes
sentient beings of diverse extraction and dispositions to enter
the sphere of the Tathagata. Having entered it and having discov-
ered Buddhahood (tathiigatadharmatii) (in themselves), they are
called the highest (,field of merit') worthy of veneration."] ItT"s'--
obvious that Hopkins' rendering gives a wrong idea of the orig-
inal. This is partly due to the imperfect Tibetan translation as
found on page 33 of the text edited by Hopkins, but also to the
fact that Hopkins has clearly misunderstood such well-known
terms as sbyin-gnas In another passage, Hopkins has
misread the text in Ngawang Geleg Demo's edition, p. 906.5: 'jig
lta sangs rgyas kyi gdung chad pa lta bu de dag gis .. 0 Hopkins'
text has 'jigs lta, etc., and he translates this as follows: "through
fear [of the suffering of cyclic existence Foe Destroyers have
forsaken helping others, and thus] their Buddha lineage has
been severed" (p. 604). In this passage the Arhats are compared
to those whose Buddha lineage has been severed on account of
a false notion of personality ('jig-lta, Twice, the text
mentions those who have entered into the yang-dag-pa nyid-du
nges-pa, which Hopkins renders as "who strictly abide in the
right," and adds between brackets "in a nirvana without remain-
der" (pp. 603 and 606). Hopkins fails to explain this term, which
corresponds to Sanskrit samyaktvaniyiima or -niyama, and which
has been studied by Wogihara, de La Vallee Poussin, Seyfort
Ruegg and Rahula.
2
In the translation of this text, Hopkins is
careless too in his renderings of technical terms. Probably nobody
will recognize in "unusual attitude" Tibetan lhag-bsam, Sanskrit
adhyiisaya (p. 604). On p. 617, Hopkins mistranslates a quotation
from the Ghanavyuhasutra: "Gust as] lands [are the basis of] the
varieties [of all things grown]." A correct interpretation has been
given by Seyfort Ruegg who translates: "Les differentes Terres
(bhumi) [sont] l'alaya.,,3
In order not to give rise to a wrong impression, it is absolutely
necessary to repeat again that Hopkins' work is a remarkable
achievement. However, it is perhaps not superfluous to point
out that it is not always satisfactory to rely entirely on rather
recent Tibetan works and on oral explanations. There are many
Sanskrit texts that have been carefully studied by several gener-
ations of scholars, and it is not advisable to neglect them. Hopkins'
work could be so much more useful if he would take the trouble
to pay more attention to Indian texts and to the study of the
technical vocabulary that is found in these texts. It is impossible
to study Tibetan Buddhism, and especially such a learned school
as that of the dGe-Iugs-pas, without a profound knowledge of
its Indian background and of the Indian texts that are quoted
over and over again.
].W. de Jong
NOTES
1. Cf. "Linh-Son" - Publication d'etudes bouddhologiques, No. 14
(1981), p. 2l.
2. U nrai Wogihara, Lexikalisches aus der BodhisattvabhUmi (Leipzig,
1908), pp. 28-30 (reprinted in his edition of the BodhisattvabhUmi, Tokyo,
1930-1936; 2nd. ed., 1971); L. de La Vallee Poussin, L'Abhidharmakosa
de Vasubandhu. Cinquieme et sixieme chapitres (Paris-Louvain, 1925),
pp. 180-182; D. Seyfort Ruegg, La tMorie du tathagatagarbha et du gotra
(Paris, 1969), pp. 196-197; Walpola Rahula, Le compendium de la super-
doctrine (philosophie). (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asanga (Paris, 1971), p. 152,
n.3.
3. D. Seyfort Ruegg, Le traite du tathagatagarbha de Bu ston Rin
chen grub (Paris, 1973), pp. 35 and 90. See also Robert A.F. Thurman,
Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence (Princeton,
1984), p. 350.
REVIEWS
129
Philosophy of Mind in Sixth Century China. Paramiirtha's 'Evolution
of Consciousness,' by Diana Y. Paul. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1984, vii + 266 pages.
Paramartha (499-569) is considered to be one of the four
great translators of Indian texts into Chinese, the other three
being Kumarajlva, Hsuan-tsang and Amoghavajra. He arrived
in China in 546, but did not meet with favourable conditions
and was forced to wander from one place to another. N everthe-
less, he was able to translate many texts, most of which belong
to the Vijnanavada school. He was interested in particular in the
Mahayanasaqlgraha, and he founded the She-Iun school. His
interpretations of the Vijnanavada texts were disseminated by
his disciples. After the foundation of the Fa-hsiang school by
Hsuan-tsang's chief disciple, Chi (632-682), the She-Iun school
disappeared from the scene.
Diana Paul's book is the first monograph in a Western lan-
guage on Paramartha. The bibliography comprises many
Sanskrit, Chinese and Japanese sources, and among the secon-
dary sources a number of publications by Japanese scholars are
mentioned. Her work seems to be the. result of many years of
study during which the author discussed her ideas with colleagues
both in Japan and America. The first two chapters deal with the
life and times of Paramartha and the spreading of his ideas by
his disciples. Paramartha's views on language and on the
philosophy of mind are discussed in the following two chapters.
His Chuan shih lun is analysed in the last chapter, which is followed
by the translation of the text.
The reader of this book cannot but be impressed by the
wide range of sources both primary and secondary. However,
when one takes the trouble to check the information the author
gives, one soon discovers that her study and interpretation of
the sources leaves much to be desired. For instance, she writes
that all biographical data presented on the figure of Paramartha
are based upon his biography in the Hsil kao seng chuan. The
single most important secondary source in the analysis of the
HSKC is Ui Hakuju's study, Indo tetsugaku kenkyu, vol. 6, 1930,
pp. 5-130 (cp. 187, note 31). On p. 35 Paul writes that after
Hui-k'ai's death in 568 Paramartha continued to translate the
Abhidharma-kofa. On p. 194 (note 25) she repeats the same infor-
mation, referring to Paramartha's biography, and she wonders
how Hui-k'ai could have written an introduction to the Kofa in
567 as stated by Ui on p. 6 of his book. In the same note Paul
writes that the Kosa was translated in the fifth year of T'ien-chia,
or 564, which clearly contradicts her previous statement that
Paramartha continued to translate the Kosa after the death of
Hui-k'ai. Vi discusses the dates of the translation of the Kosa and
points out that this text must have been translated in 564 and.
not in 563 as stated in Hui-k'ai's introduction (Vi, pp. 36-37).
Subsequently the translation was carefully revised and the revi-
sion completed in 567. Vi quotes a passage from Hui-k'ai's biog-
raphy which says that Hui-k'ai lectured on the Kosa until his
death and that after his death Paramartha continued to lecture
on the same text (cf. Vi, p. 37; HSKC, p. 431b9-24.)1
Probably the first text translated by Paramartha was the
Shih-ch'i-ti-lun in five chuan (Paul, p. 25). The text is now lost,
but it is certainly an incomplete translation of the first part of
the Yogiiciirabhumi (cf. Vi, pp. 55-58). In a note Paul writes that
"The Treatise on the seventeen Bodhisattva Stages (Shih-ch'i ti lun) was
a commentary on a sutra by the same name consisting of part of
the Bodhisattvabhumi" (p. 188, note 43)1
In her analysis of the Chuan shih lun, Paul discusses in detail
the problem of the amalavijiiiina and translates several passages
of Paramartha's works in which this term occurs. On p. 142 she
translates one passage of the San wu-hsing-lun (T. 1617, p.
873c23-24) and adds "This is the only instance of amala-v&'iiiina
in the SWHL". However, a much more important passage relat-
ing to amalavijiiiina occurs in the same text (871c28-872aI5; Vi,
pp. 244-245). This passage is discussed by Katsumata Shunkyo
and is also partially translated by Paul Demieville, to mention
only two publications listed in the bibliography of Paul's book.
2
On p. 143 Paul translates a passage of the Chueh ting tsang
lun relating to the amalavijiiiina (T. 1584, 1020bI2-19; 23-24;
Vi, pp. 563-565). The translation contains the most amazing
errors. For instance, the text has: "The iilayavijiiiina is followed
by the effects of In the amalavijiiiina the entire
is absent." Paul translates: "The iilaya-v&'iiiina is the
consequent of subtle evil. The amala-vijiiiina is followed by subtle
evil." In the corresponding passage of Hsuang-tsang's translation
is rendered by tS'u-chung. Paramartha uses the term
tS'u-o-ku.
3
The same passage was translated correctly in 1929 by
Paul Demieville.
4
In the remaining part of this passage as in
other passages relating to amalavijiiiina, the translation is often
far from correct.
The translation of the Chuan shih lun also contains some
very strange renderings. On page 155 Paul translates: "[Verse
REVIEWS 131
VII:] This consciousness and its associated [mental] states are
eliminated in the Arhat stage, being ultimately eliminated upon
entering cessation-meditation (nirodha-samiipatti)." This is exactly
the opposite of that what is found in the text: "This consciousness
and its associated dharmas are finally destroyed upon arrival in
the Arhat stage and are also all destroyed upon entering the
meditation of cessation." As Ui explains, the destruction is defini-
tive in the Arhat stage but only temporary during the meditation
of cessation, because upon arising from this meditation conscious-
ness .returns (Ui, p. 447). This is of course a well-known doctrine
and found, for instance, also in the Ch'eng wei-shih lun: "Dans
l'etat d'Arhat, Ie Manas souille (kl4iarIJ manas), tant actuel que
Bijas, est absolument coupe. On dit done qu'il n'existe pas (na) ..
Quant aux S a i k ~ a s , dans l'etat de "recueillement de cessation"
(Nirodhasamapatti) et lorsqu'ils pratiquent Ie Chemin, Ie Manas
souille est provisoirement "dompte" (incapable de s'actualiser).
On dit done qu'il n'existe pas" (La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang traduite
etannotee par Louis de La Vallee Poussin, I, Paris, 1928, p. 267).
According to verse 16 of the Tri'fl}iikii, the mano-vijiiiina is
absent in five states: manovijiiiinasarIJbhutilJ, sarvadiisarIJjiiikiid r:te /
samiipattidvayiin middhiin murchaniid apy acittakiit. La Vallee Po us sin
translates: "Le Manovijfiana se produit toujours excepte dans
l'etat de dieu inconscient, et dans les deux recueillements, la
torpeur et la defaillance exempts de pensee" (La Siddhi, p. 398).
Paramartha mentions six states: asarIJjiiisamiipatti, asarIJjiiidevas,
sound sleep without dreams (middha), d:r;unkenness, stupor (mur-
chana) and temporary death of the mind, omitting
nirodhasamiipatti and adding drunkenness and temporary death
of the mind (cf. Ui, p. 452). In her translation Paul manages to
smuggle into the text the two samiipattis: "[cessation] meditation
without conceptualization (nirodha-samiipatti) , [meditation as-
sociated with the third level or dhyiina in] heavens without concep-
tualization (asarIJjiii-samiipatti), dreamless sleep, drunken stupor,
unconsciousness, or a coma" (p. 158). No note accompanies her
translation, which clearly was made without understanding the
Chinese text and without consulting Ui's commentary.
Diana Paul is not more successful in her interpretation of
Sanskrit texts. She translates verse 17 of the Tri'fl}iikii as follows:
"Evolution of consciousness is discrimination that is falsely dis-
criminated; therefore, it does not exist. Thus, an is Consciousness-
Only" (p. 239, note 42). The Sanskrit text is: vijiiiinapari1fiimo
yarIJ vikalpo yad vikalpyate / tena tan niisti tenedarIJ sarvarIJ vijiiiiptimii-
trakam. Paul's translation ("discrimination is falsely discrimi-
132
JIABS VOL. 9 NO.1
nated") sins both against Sanskrit grammar and the meaning of
the verse. The interesting fact is that this verse is interpreted in
two different ways by Hsuan-tsang and Sthiramati. This is clearly
explained by La Vallee Poussin, who points out that Hsuan-tsang
understands: "Ce developpement du Vijnana est la pensee et Ie
"pense", ce qui pense (cogitat) et la chose qui est pensee
(cogitatur). Par (tena) cela (tad = Atman et Dharmas)
n'existe pas. Par consequent tout cela est Vijnapti-sans-plus."
Sthiramati makes a break after vikalpah: "Le developpement du
Vijnana est Ie Vikalpa, imagination; ce qui est imagine par cette
imagination (tena [vikalpenaJ), cela n'existe pas; par con-
sequent ... " (La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang, p. 416).
In other instances Paul advances new interpretations which
are completely unacceptable. On p. 134 she refers to the following
passage of Sthiramati's commentary on verse 1 of the Trirpsika:
vijiianarIJ punah pratftyasamutpannatvad dravyato 'stfty abhyupeyarIJ !
(ed. Sylvain Levi, p. 16.16-17). Paul suggests that vijiianasya may
modify parir}ama, although she concedes that "the more common
reading by Buddhologists" connects it with pratftyasamutpanna
(cf. p. 225, note 94). One wonders whether there is one reputable
Buddhologist who accepts this interpretation. We have not taken
. the trouble to consult all the existing translations of the Trirpsika,
but Sylvain Levi, Jacobi and Ui all connect vijiianasya with
pratftyasamutpanna. Another new interpretation is given on p. 138
for the following sentence: tena grahyagrahaker}a paratantrasyasada
sarvakalarIJ atyantarahitata ya sa parinispannasvabhiivah (TrirIJsika,
ed. Sylvain Levi, p. 40.4-5). Paul writes: "Grammatically, this
phrase ... could be translated in the following manner .... : 'Be-
cause always and in all times what is separate from the dependent
nature through the agency of the perceiver and the perceived is
called the absolute nature.'" Paul adds that "from the context of
the bhiisya this reading is unlikely," but even to suggest the pos-
sibility of such an interpretation is unwarranted.
The above remarks are the result of an examination of only
a few passages taken more or less at random from Paul's book;
other examples could be adduced. Paramartha is a very important
figure and it is to be hoped that he will receive due attention
from Western scholars. In the first place it will be necessary to
give a complete translation of his biography and those of his
main disciples. In translating his works it would be highly desir-
able to translate also the corresponding passages in Hsuan-tsang's
translations. In his book, Ui has presented parallel texts followed
by a detailed commentary which is extremely useful. Ui's book,
REVIEWS 133
although published in 1930, is still the most important publication
on Paramartha and is indispensable for any further study of his
life and ideas.
].W. de Jong.
NOTES
1. See also Paul Demieville, "Sur l'authenticite du Ta tch'eng k'i
sin louen", BMFJ, II, 2 (Tokyo, 1929), p. 21.
2. Katsumata Shunkyo, Bukkyo ni okem shinshikisetsu no kenkyu
(Tokyo, 1961), p. 704; Demieville, op.cit., p. 41.
3. On the meaning of see Unrai Wogihara, Asanga's
Bodhisattvabhumi (Leipzig, 1908), pp. 27-28; Sylvain Levi, Asanga,
Mahayana-sutralar[!kara, Tome II (Paris, 1911), p. 51, note 2; Louis de
La Vallee Poussin, La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang, I-II (Paris, 1928-1929), pp.
331 and 608.
4. Op.cit., p. 42.
Diana Paul Replies:
I always enjoy taking the time to reply to reviews of my
books that have grappled with the content and basis of the
analysis. A well-thought-out review always leaves the reader with
a clearer idea of the author's purport and intent for writing the
book. It gives a clear exposition of the substance and thesis of
the book. I am sorry to say that the reader who looks at de Jong's
review will not be able to grasp the nature of my project at all.
The burden on any conscientious reviewer is to pay attention to
what the author does write about rather than being preoccupied
with issues that the reviewer wants to raise because he or she
thinks those issues are more important. It is one thing to meet
on the issues and substance and to disagree or to criticize. It is
quite another to read a protracted discourse that, in fact, does
not acknowledge what does appear in the work. This discourse
by de Jong is such a protracted one. First, the reader should note
that de Jong makes note of only Chapter One (two references)
and Chapter Five (three references), without discussing Chapter
Two, "The Dissemination of Paramartha's Ideas," Chapter
Three, "Theory of Language in Yogacara," and Chapter Four,
"Philosophy of Mind."
My major intent was to show in simpler, readable language
and in a philosophically systematic way how Paramartha, in his
representation of Yogacara Buddhism, thought that it was in the
very nature of the structure of the mind to undergo self-analysis
and eventually to be able to analyze and dissect the structures of
the mind itself, assuming proper discipline and meditative train-
ing. Chapters Three. and Four represent the major thrust of this
intent and are entirely ignored by de Jong.
I do not plan to take each of the five examples, three of
which discuss footnotes, and refute de Jong, belaboring the points
on which the contents of his review are based. I think one or
two examples should be sufficient to indicate that de Jong did
not read my work carefully, nor did he pay close attention to
detail, although on first appearance it may seem so to the reader
who has not read my book.
My first example: He remarks that I claim "that all biograph-
ical data presented on the figure of Paramartha are based upon
his biography in the Hsu kao seng chuan." The indisputable fact
is that I wrote: "All biographical data presented on the figure of
Paramartha are based upon this account (HKSC), unless otherwise
noted (emphasis added). At one time there were three biographies
of Para martha .... " (p. 187, #31). De Jong goes on to describe
what an important source Ui Hakuju's study is, apparently imply-
ing that I do not give credit to his contribution. In the same
citation given above (p. 187, #31) I clearly assert: "Ui Hakuju
has analyzed Paramartha's biography in great detail ... and his
work is the single most important secondary source in my analysis
of the HKSC."
My second example, on a question of historical dating with
regard to the translation made by Paramartha of the Kosa: The
Kosa was translated in 564 and Hui-k'ai wrote an introduction
even though the translation by Paramartha had not yet been
completed (p. 194, #25). The biography of Paramartha clearly
states that Paramartha continued to translate that same text after
Hui-k'ai's death, although he dearly missed his favorite student.
Ui claims that the biography means to say that Paramartha revised
and polished an already completed text, even though the HKSC
does not say that. I consider this an unsolved puzzle-that is, an
alleged introduction to an imcomplete translation. Ui insists that
the translation was completed before Hui-k'ai's death, choosing
to disagree with the only biography available to us. Ui and de
J ong have the same position. I strictly adhere on this point to
the biography itself. One may, of course, be unpersuaded by my
arguments and side with Ui on this point.
REVIEWS 135
On translation differences, I again will be brief and discuss
only one example. De Jong does not like my rendering of verse
VII (p. 155) and prefers Hsuan-tsang's Chinese translation. The
text, according to Paramartha's rendition of this verse, does state
quite clearly that the adana-vijiiiinais eliminated absolutely in
implying that the Arhat has indeed not
completely attained a non-grasping, non-appropriating egoless-
ness. This is a severe criticism made against the Arhat's spiritual
attainment and quite unusual. But Paramartha does make that
claim, although Hsuan-tsang does not.
One final comment on de Jong's review: Unfortunately, for
both the readers of the review and of my rejoinder, the framework
for discussing my book was reduced to five very narrow points
or footnotes that do not get to the substance and heart of my
analysis of Para martha's unique contributions to an extraordinary
school of thought in Chinese Buddhism. The latter would be the
only proper subject for an informative review of this book and
would focus on the central issues I discussed. De Jong's lengthy
review apparently professes to be about the central issues but,
in fact, does not show recognition of what the central issues are.
J. W. de long Replies:
In order not to take up too much space I will deal as briefly
as possible with the remarks made by Diana Paul in her reply.
Diana Paul insists that "all biographical data presented on the
figure of Para martha are based upon this account (HSKC), unless
otherwise noted" (i.e. on HKSC 2060.50.429c6-431a6). On p.
35 Diana Paul writes: "Two months later on the twelfth day,
eighth month, of the second year of Kuan-t'ai (September 18,
1568), Paramartha's favorite disciple, Hui-k'ai, died." This is not
found in Paramartha's biography but in that of Hui-k'ai. How-
ever, the date mentioned here is not the twelfth day ofthe eighth
month, but the twentieth day of the eighth month (HSKC
2060.50.43Ib15). Diana Paul continues: "Paramartha grieved
deeply for him, and, with the rest of his disciples, burned candles
and incense in Fa-chun's room." This also is not found in
Paramartha's biography but in that of Chih-Chi (HSKC
2060.50.431cll-12). Then follows the sentence to which I re-
ferred in my review: "He (i.e. Paramartha) continued to translate
the Abhidharma-kosa."
In her reply Diana Paul writes that "the biography of
Paramartha clearly states that Paramartha continued to translate
that same text (i.e. the Kosa) after Hui-k'ai's death." I am sorry
to insist on the fact that this is stated nowhere in Paramartha's
biography. In my review I wrote that Hui-k'ai lectured on the
Kosa until his death and that after his death Paramartha con-
tinued to lecture on the same text, and I referred to both the
HSKC and to Ui. I may add that the same information is given
by Demieville in an article mentioned in Diana Paul's bibliog-
raphy (see Choix d'etudes bouddhiques, p. 21).
In her reply, Diana Paul writes that "Ui claims that the
biography means to say that Paramartha revised and polished
an already completed text, even though the HSKC does not say
that." Ui's source is not, of course, Paramartha's biography, but
Hui-k'ai's preface to Paramartha's translation ofthe Kosa (Taisho
1559.29.161 b20-22).
Diana Paul's third example is her translation of verse VII.
It is rather amazing to see that she still does not recognize that
her translation is wrong, as has already been pointed out by
another reviewer (see Collett Cox's review in the Journal of Asian
Studies, 45,l,p. 126). It is absurd to say that I prefer Hsuan-tsang's
translation which reads: "It (i.e. the defiled mind) does not exist
for the Arhat, nor in the meditation of cessation, nor on the
supramundane path" (see Ui, p. 411).
The eight (not five) points raised in my review represent
only a small selection of the critical notes I made while reading
Diana Paul's work. I believe that they are sufficient to show the
way in which Diana Paul handled her Chinese sources and her
"single most important secondary source in [her] analysis of the
HSKC." Diana Paul's reply only confirms what I have already
said in my review.
Seven Works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological Doctor, by
Stefan Anacker, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984. 492 pages.
Seven Works of Vasubandhu is divided into fourteen sections.
The major chapters are: Vasubandhu, His Life and Times; A
Method for Argumentation (Viidavidhi); A Discussion of the Five
Aggregates (Pancaskandhaka-prakararJa); A Discussion for the
Demonstration of Action (Karma-siddhi-prakararJa); The Twenty
Verses and their Commentary (VirIJsatikii-kiirikii [v-rtti]); The
Thirty Verses (TrirIJsikii-kiirikii); Commentary on the Separation
of the Middle from Extremes (Madhyiinta-vibhiiga-bhii4ya); and
The Teaching of the Three Own-Beings (Tri-svabhiiva-nirdda).
REVIEWS 137
The work further includes: a glossary and index of key terms in
English, Sanskrit and Tibetan; the Sanskrit text for: the VirJJ,satikii-
vr:ttil}, TrirJJ,sikii-vijiiapti-kiirikiil}, Madhyiinta-vibhiiga-bhii
4
yam, and
the Trisvabhiiva-nirdesal}; a bibliography, index of proper names
and a index.
This is an authoritative work that will prove to be required
reading for those interested in either Yogacara or in Vasubandhu.
Dr. Anacker's wide range of knowledge of Buddhist studies and
of Buddhist languages has been utilized to its fullest extent in
presenting a comprehensive volume. The translations are most
reliable and his annotation is enlightening.
Three of the works were first translated in Dr. Anacker's
Ph.D. dissertation (Wisconsin, 1970): the Viidavidhi, Karma-siddhi-
prakara7la and Madhyiinta-vighiiga-bhii4ya. The translations found
in the present volume are all re-worked and offer the reader a
considerably improved rendering into English. They also include
less use of technical Sanskrit vocabulary. The latter is not lacking,
but it is contained in the extensive and useful glossary.
The first chapter presents a historical discussion of previous
attempts to deal with the problems surrounding the figure of
Vasubandhu. The work draws information from Sanskrit, Ti-
betan and Chinese sources. It concludes that there was only one
Vasubandhu, who wrote both the Abhidharmakosa and the Yogac-
ara works normally ascribed to him.
Each of the translations is preceded by an introduction useful
for understanding the text under consideration. In general, these
discussions help place the particular text in the philosophical
milieu wherein it belongs. For example, in the "Discussion for
the Demonstration of Action," there is a discussion of Vasuban-
dhu's early theory of memory, found in the Abhidharmakosa, as
well as of the V explanation and the view of
Sanghabhadra. Finally, the author summarizes the text and
points out some of its salient features.
Some readers may object to Dr. Anacker's notion of Vas-
ubandhu as a "Psychological Doctor." I believe that Dr. Anacker's
understanding of this term is considerably different from what
the words first imply, and sharply contrasts with any Western
psychological model. Indeed, Dr. Anacker criticizes quite severely
the whole basis of Western psychology, which he sees as formulat-
ing concrete categories such as "psychotic," forcing a particular
individual into this pigeon-hole and finally applying the pre-
scribed remedies. Vasubandhu, by contrast, views the situation
in an Abhidharmic manner, i.e., seeing individual moment-
events and then applying antidotes to increase benefit and de-
crease suffering. These categories of moment-events are then
discarded for the more advanced theories of the Y ogacara, which
are seen as being based experientially in meditation. This allows
for a non-fixed base of viewing and a dynamic approach to the
human situation. Thus, the use of the word "psychological" must
be understood in light of Buddhist notions, and not tied to West-
ern theories.
I have two minor reservations about this work. The first is
that the general index is so short as to be nearly useless. Some
of the problem is corrected by an extensive index of proper
names. However, more should have been added to the general
index.
The second is Dr. Anacker's tendency to employ hyphenated
and multi-hyphenated words to express technical terms. Al-
though this cannot at all times be avoided, there are definite
examples of abuse. A case in point: "A Discussion of the Five
Aggregates," one will find the term"kuSala milIa" translated as
"root-of-the-beneficial" (e.g., p. 66). Certainly there must be al-
ternatives to translating a term with three hyphens separating
the elements.
Overall, this is an outstanding contribution to the field of
Buddhist Studies in general and to Yogacara studies in particular:
scholars interested in Mahayana developments and later-Indian
philosophy/psychology will find considerable information here
that should prove most useful.
A.W. Hanson-Barber
Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence:
Reason and Enlightenment in the Central Philosophy of Tibet, trans-
lated with an introduction by Robert A.F. Thurman. Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, Princeton Library of
Asian Translations, 1984. xviii + 442 pp.
As Prof. Thurman points out in his introduction to this
book, "Even in recent times, great critical scholars such as Stcher-
batski (sic) and Murti were misled ... into thinking that the Cen-
trists were 'metaphysical absolutists' who repudiated all forms of
logic whatsoever, along with the meaningfulness of all language."
(p. 57) An outstanding testament to the contrary is this fine
REVIEWS 139
translation and study of Tsong kha pa's Legs bshad snying po along
with the versified rTen 'brel bstod pa, a milestone in the study of
Madhyamika philosophy and in particular of the significant con-
tribution of the Tibetan exegetes in that field.
The Legs bshad snying po (the "Essence"), a detailed examina-
tion of some of the most subtle notions in BlJ..ddhist philosophy,
is famed in the Tibetan scholastic community for its rigorous,
finely tuned arguments and, for that reason, its great difficultly
and profundity. The work is primarily a presentation and defense
of the Prasangika Madhyamika position (here rendered "Dialec-
ticist Centrism"), and it considers in depth the implications and
flaws in the assertions of the Svatantrikas ("Dogmaticist Cen-
trists"), Yogacarins ("Experientialists"), Sautrantikas ("Tradition-
alists"), Sautrantika-Yogacarin logicians, Yogacara- Svatantrika-
Madhyamikas, and various Tibetan predecessors of Tsong-kha-
pa, including the J o-nang-pas. (Criticism of these teachers, how-
ever, is handled delicately and with all due respect by Tsong-kha-
pa; for example, it is implied that Asanga, in true Buddhist
upaya-kausalya-style, taught Yogacara to accord with the inclina-
tions of his disciples, even though his own understanding was of
the highest Centrist sort.)
The Essence opens with an examination of the varying state-
ments in the Buddhist texts concerning svalaks.arJasiddha ("intrin-
sic identifiability") and its relevance to the three niftsvabhiivas
("unrealities": laks.arJa, utpada and paramartha) and the three
svabhiivas ("natures": parikalpita, paratantra and parinis.panna).
From the start, the hermeneutical question is raised as to which
of the three turnings of the wheel are n'itartha ("definitive") and
which are neyartha ("interpretable"), and statements from the
Smidhinirmocana-sutra and many other scriptures are cited
throughout. The discussion elicits an investigation of such key
Buddhist issues as the differing Madhyamika interpretations of
paramartha and samvr:ti satya ("ultimate" and "superficial reality");
the role of the pramarJas ("validating cognitions") and of yukti
("analytic reason") in establishing existence; the validity of the
svatantranumana ("private syllogism"); the nature of samaropa
("reification") and apavada ("repudiation"); the Sautrantika
theory on the unreality of universals and the Yogacarin position
on svabhiiva and vises.a vikalpana ("ascriptive" and "descriptive
designation"); the implications of positing an alayavijiiana ("fun-
damental consciousness") and svasamvedana ("apperception");
the reality status of external objects; the distinction between
prasajya and paryudasa pratis.edha ("absolute" and "implicative neg-
ation"); and differences in the understanding of dharma and pud-
gala nairatmya ("objective" and "personal selflessness").
The author of this dense treatise, the 14th-century Tsong-
kha-pa Blo-bzang Grags-pa, is famed as a reformer and as found-
er of the dGe-lugs-pa school of Tibetan Buddhism, which has
since become the largest school in that country and the formal
sectarian affiliation of the Dalai Lamas. In his introduction, Thur-
man provides us with a detailed biography of Tsong-kha-pa
(along with'shorter accounts of the lives of the other philosophers
mentioned in the book), and this allows us a glimpse of Tsong-
kha-pa's impressive training in Buddhist thought and practice.
Thurman, Associate Professor of Religion at Amherst College,
is in fact one of the principal scholars who have been endeavoring
to bring this master's work to light in recent years. Alex vVayman
(whose Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, New York, 1978,
translates a major part of the Lam rim chen ma) and Jeffrey Hop-
kins (whose Tantra in Tibet and Yoga in Tibet, London, 1977 and
1981, present the first sections of the sN gags rim chen ma) are the
other Buddhologistsknown for their work on Tsong-kha-pa, in
addition to such competent philosophers as Paul Williams,
Michael Broido, Tom J.F. Tillemans, and a number of Tibetan
and Western scholars publishing translations with the Library of
Tibetan Works and Archives in Dharamsala. Thurman himself
has already edited a collection of translations of Tsong-kha-pa's
work (Life and Teachings oj Tsong Khapa, Dharamsala, 1982, includ-
ing a section from the Lam rim chung ngu).
Thurman's current book represents close to fifteen years of
research, and he deserves much credit for his extensive personal
contacts with the living Tibetan tradition, which inform this trans-
lation throughout. His learned notes to the text itself, in which
he provides copious citations from the Sanskrit works referred
to therein, and his lengthy introduction to the doctrinal and
historical background of the text, are tributes to Thurman's own
abilities. He finds that most Western commentators have fallen
either into the trap of making an overly mystical interpretation
of Buddhism, or an overly relativistic and nihilistic one, in both
cases failing to appreciate the sophisticated philosophical de-
velopments in Buddhist logic, epistemology, etc. Thurman, on
the contrary, wants to conceive of Hume, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche,
Heidegger and Wittgenstein as the modern representatives of
the lineages of Maitreya and Manjusrl. Thurman has been par-
ticularly struck by the appropriateness of giving a Buddhist read-
ing to Wittgenstein. This has already been advancedlin a general
REVIEWS 141
way by Chris Gudmunsen (Wittgenstein and Buddhism, London,
1977), who equated that philosopher's critique of Bertrand Rus-
sell with the Madhyamika critique of the Abhidharmists. Thur-
man refines the parallel by asserting that it is the Svatantrika
admission of a real "intrinsic identifiability" on the conventional
level that entails the most subtle and thereby most problematical
version of a private language doctrine. I am not qualified to
pronounce upon how closely the Prasarigika refusal to posit any
sort of independently real status, conventional or absolute, is
analogous with Wittgenstein's thinking, but certainly this sort of
comparison, if approached cautiously and with adequate ground-
ing in both traditions, facilitates a modern evaluation of the rel-
evance of Buddhist philosophy.
On only a few points must Thurman's statements be ques-
tioned. One of the most noteworthy is his claim that the rNying-
ma-pa philosopher Klong-chen-Rab-'byams-pa preserves the
"Idealist Dogmaticist Centrism of Santaraksita and Kamalaslla"
(po 62): in fact it is generally accepted that Klong-chen-pa puts
forth the supremacy of the Prasarigika view, in particular in his
Yid bzhin mdzod and its commentary Padma dkar po (Gangtok,
1966). It should also be pointed out that the dust jacket's assertion
that Tsong-kha-pa is "universally acknowledged as the greatest
Tibetan philosopher" would not be assented to by members of
the several Tibetan schools other than that of Tsong-kha-pa,
despite the high regard in which he is held.
The translation itself is an admirable rendering of a very
difficult text: if at times the English locutions seem wordy and
complex, this can confidently be attributed in most cases to the
original Tibetan itself. Thurman is to be thanked for his numer-
ous explanatory notes, where he restates some of the more
obscure arguments (usually in a simpler way) and fills out the
many ellipses where Tsong-kha-pa assumed the reader's familiar-
ity with the subject matter. Comparing two passages ofthe trans-
lation with the original for clarification on points of my own
interest, I found Thurman's comprehension of the text to be
consistently sound. Apart from such lapses as the dropping, of
phrases (discovered, however, in both of the passages I con-
sulted), mostly to be remarked upon are the inevitable questions
concerning the translation of technical terms. Thurman's render-
ings are usually ingenious and innovative, such as his ubiquitous
"intrinsic identity" for the simple "technique" for
upiiya; "fundamental consciousness" for iilayav&iiiina, following
the Tibetan; and even his "thing" for dharma. Other choices seem
rather strained, e.g., "truth-habit" for satyagraha which suggests
a positive connotation for what in this context is a wrong mental
attitude, or "evolution" for karma. I would also like to remark
that "Centrism" for Madhyamika, while reading 'well in English
as the name for a philosophical view, seems to lose some of the
wonderful sense of unspecifiability that a more literal translation
using "middle" could retain.
More serious, perhaps, is a certain lack of rigorous consis-
tency in the rendering of the same technical term: admittedly
such terms can have different connotations in different contexts,
but when the same word appears several times in a single passage
and with the same meaning, to vary its translation adds unneces-
sary confusion and is inexcusable. Examples are yang-dag, which
is translated both as "authentic" and "reality," the latter actually
being Thurman's term for don in this passage (p. 283); bsam-pa,
which becomes "mental habits" and "habitual thoughts" in the
same section (p. 284); and mngon-par brjod-pa, which appears
alternatively as "verbal formulation," "verbalization," and "for-
mulation" in a single passage (p. 215 ff.).
A final point concerns the lack of Tibetan-English and
Sanskrit-English glossaries, which would have been easy enough
to generate, since an English-Sanskrit-Tibetan glossary has been
prepared. This absence makes it difficult, for the reader who
lacks a grasp of Thurman's conventions, to use the index to locate
passages discussing technical subjects of interest, and is the reason
why it seemed useful to resurrect some of the principal Sanskrit
terms at the beginning of this review.
It is a pleasure to note that the useful footnotes to the trans-
lation are placed at the bottom of each page, and that twelve
Tibetan paintings of the philosophers represented in the text
have been reproduced in this first-rate publication of Princeton
University Press.
Janet Gyatso
IV. NOTES AND NEWS
ELECTION RESULTS, lABS, MARCH 31, 1986
RETENTION OF SUBSIDIZED RATE.
The overwhelming majority of members of the lABS voted to
retain the subsidized rate, which is now set at $15 per year for
members from economically developing countries. Applicants
from the following countries are eligible for the subsidized rate:
India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Thailand,
Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
CHAIRPERSON
A.K. Narain (USA)
VICE-CHAIRPERSONS
Heinz Bechert (West Germany)
Lokesh Chandra (India)
Ismael Quiles (Argentina)
GENERAL SECRETARY
Luis G6mez (USA)
TREASURER
Lewis Lancaster (USA)
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Gregory Schopen and
Roger Jackson (USA)
as co-Editors
REGIONAL SECRETARIES
LuisG6mez
NB: Since ProfessorG6mez
has been elected General
Secretary this position is
now open
Akira Yuyama (Asia)
Paul M. Williams (Europe)
143
EDITORS
Alexander W. Macdonald (France)
Ernst Steinkellner (Austria)
Jikido Takasaki a apan)
Robert Thurman (USA)
NB: Two more editors will be
chosen according to their areas,
by the Editors-in-Chief.
ADDITIONAL BOARD
MEMBERS
D, Seyfort Ruegg (England)
Akira Hirakawa a apan)
Per Kvaerne (Norway)
Erik Zurcher (N etherlands)
Leslie Kawamura (Canada)
Richard A. Gard (USA)
Amalia Pezzali (Italy)
Charles Prebish (USA)
Jeffrey Hopkins (USA)
Alex Wayman (USA)
CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENTS
8th Conference of the
International Association of Buddhist' Studies
We are pleased to announce that the 8th Conference of the lABS
will be held on the campus of the University of California, Ber-
keley, from the 8th to the 10th of August, 1987. The 8th CIABS
will be preceded by a conference of the International Association
for Shin Buddhist Studies, and followed by the Buddhist-Chris-
tian Conference. Registration fees for each will be separate, but
participants in all three conferences will be able to enjoy various
cultural, etc., events together. Housing arrangements and trans-
portation will also be undertaken in common. Paper topics and
one-page abstracts will be due January 1, 1987.
Members of the lABS will receive brochures in the mail when
they are complete in September, 1986. For further information
please contact the Local Secretary for the 8th Conference of the
lABS:
Professor Lewis Lancaster
Local Secretary, 8th CIABS
Dept. of Oriental Languages
The University of California
Berkely, CA 94720
USA
NOTES AND NEWS
32nd International Congress for Asian
and North.African Studies (ICANAS)
145
(Former International Congress of Orientalists, and former
International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North
Africa)
The 32nd International Congress for Asian and North African
Studies will be held in Hamburg, Germany, from August 25th
to the 30th, 1986. The officers of the Congress Organizing Com-
mittee are: Honorary President, Professor Dr. Herbert Franke;
President, Professor Dr. Lothar Ledderose; Secretary General,
Professor Dr. Albrecht Wezler; and Vice-Secretary General, Pro-
fessor Dr. Ernst Hammerschmidt.
For further details please write immediately to:
32nd ICANAS Congress Organization
Hamburg Messe und Congress GmbH
Postfach 30 24 80
D-2000 Hamburg 36
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
VIIth World Sanskrit Conference
The VIIth World Sanskrit Conference will be held at the Univer-
sity of Leiden, the Netherlands, from the 23rd to the 29th of
August, 1987. The Organizing Committee of the Conference
consists of the following officers: Honorary President, F.B.]'
Kuiper; President,].C. Heesterman; Vice Presidents, T.E. Vetter
and E.].M. Witzel; Secretary, ]. Bronkhorst; Advisory Board,
H.T. Bakker, H.W. Bodewitz, F.Th. Dijkema, M.S. Oort, G.H.
Schokker, and W.F.H. Verver.
For further information please contact:
VII World Sanskrit Conference
P.O. Box 16065
2301GB Leiden
THE NETHERLANDS
AAR Buddhism Group
The Buddhism Group of the American Academy of Religion
has organized panels on Buddhism at the national meetings of
the AAR since 1981. This is one of the few regular forums for
the exchange of ideas on Buddhism in the U.S., in fact the only
one provided by a large national professional academic organiza-
tion. The Buddhism Group is now also beginning regular pub-
lication (twice a year) of a Newsletter. Anyone who would like to
receive this Newsletter and to be kept informed about the AAR's
Buddhism Group should contact:
Paul J. Griffiths
Department of South Asian Languages and Civilizations
University of Chicago
Foster Hall, 1130 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
USA
OBITUARY
Ernst Waldschmidt (1897-1985)
Ernst Waldschmidt, Professor emeritus of Indology at the University of
Gottingen, passed away on February 25, 1985, at the age of 87. Waldschmidt
made essential contributions to Indian and Buddhist studies and was one of
the most eminent Buddhologists of his generation.
He was born on July 15, 1897, in Liinen (Westphalia). In 1919, he
enrolled at the University of Kiel. Here, his teachers included Paul Deussen,
who greatly contributed to the study of ancient Indian philosophy, and Emil
Sieg, who became famous as' the decipherer of the "Tokharian" language.
Later, he continued his studies in Berlin under Heinrich Liiders, receiving
his Dr. phil. there in 1924. His doctoral dissertation was an edition of the
Sanskrit text of the Sarvastivadin from Central Asian
manuscript remains. During the following years, Waldschmidt served as an
employee of the Ethnological Museum in Berlin. In 1929, he was appointed
"Kustos" and Director of the Indian collection of the museum. In 1930, he
obtained venia legendi for Indology at the University of Berlin. From 1932 to
1934, Ernst Waldschmidt, together with his wife Rose Leonore Waldschmidt,
who is an expert in the history of handicrafts, undertook a journey through
India and Sri Lanka. They collected a considerable number of objects of
Indian and Ceylonese popular art and handicrafts, which now form the so-
called Collection Waldschmidt.
In 1936, Waldschmidt was appointed Professor of Indology at the Uni-
versity of Gottingen, succeeding his former teacher Emil Sieg. He held this
post until his retirement in 1965. In 1957, he donated his residence at Hain-
bundstrasse 21 to the university as a permanent home for Indian and Buddhist
studies in Gottingen.
Waldschmidt's name is closely tied with the evaluation of the materials
that were discovered by the four Royal Prussian Turfan Expeditions in Eastern
Turkestan (Xinjiang) between 1902 and 1914 and partly removed to the
Ethnological Museum and to the Academy of Sciences in Berlin. He first
concentrated on the study of the art objects that now count among the most
valuable parts of the collections of the Berlin Museum of Indian Art. His
studies on their style and chronology have retained their importance for the
147
148
JIABS VOL. 9 NO.1
history of Central Asian art until today. Waldschmidt also completed the
monumental series, "Buddhistische Spatantike in Zentralasien," which was
begun by Albert von Le Coq, by contributing the two last volumes (1928-1933),
Waldschmidt never lost his interest in and love for Indian art. Many
years later, he wrote Miniatures of Musical Inspiration in the Collection of the Berlin
Museum of Indian Art (2 vols., Berlin, 1967-1975), and compiled the detailed
descriptive catalogue Nepal, Art Treasures from the Himalayas (German edition,
Recklinghausen, 1967; English edition, London, 1969).
Wa,ldschmidt's contributions to the philology of early Buddhist texts may
be considered even more important. He was the author of a long series of
editions and studies of the scriptures of early Buddhism, most of them based
on the evaluation of the Central Asian manuscripts. With these works, he
started a new period in the study of early Buddhism. After his dissertation
on the which was published in 1926, he continued this
work with Bruchstucke buddhistischer Sutras aus dem zentralasiatischen Sanskritkanon
(Leipzig, 1932). He evaluated all existing versions of the Mahiiparinirvii7}asutra
in a masterly way in Die Uberlieferung vom Lebensende des Buddha (2 vols., Got-
tingen, 1944-1948). During the following years, Waldschmidt edited the
Sanskrit versions of Mahiiparinirvii7}asutra (3 vols., Berlin, 1950-1951),
(3 vols., Berlin 1952-1962), and Mahiivadiinasutra (2 vols.,
Berlin 1953-1956), together with the parallel versions in Pali, Chinese and
Tibetan, and he added detailed philological comments. By these works, he
set new standards for Buddhist philology. A considerable number of papers
published in various journals and felicitation volumes contains similar critical
editions of other canonical texts in Sanskrit. At the same time, the German
Academy of Sciences in Berlin (now Academy of Sciences of the G.D.R.)
appointed him editor of the eleven-volume series, Sanskrittexte aus den Tuifan-
funden (1965-1975). He took painstaking care to see all those volumes prepared
in accordance with the methodology he had developed and the high standards
he had established for his own publications. Together with his co-workers, he
then began compiling a complete survey of all the Central Asian Sanskrit
manuscripts of the Berlin collection, in his monumental Sanskrithandschriften
aus den Tuifanfunden (which forms part of the Verzeichnis der orientalischen
Handschriften in Deutschland). Five volumes, covering more than a thousand
more or less fragmentary manuscripts, have been published so far, the last
one posthumously (Wiesbaden, 1965-1985). This project is being continued,
as is the dictionary of these texts, also initiated by Waldschmidt (Sanskrit- Wiir-
terbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Tuifan-Funden, Gottingen, 1973 ff.).
Ernst Waldschmidt was a devoted academic teacher, and he deeply influ-
enced the development of Indian and Buddhist studies 'in Germany and
abroad. He was elected member of the Academies of Sciences in Gottingen
and in Berlin, honorary member of the Societe Asiatique in Paris, of the Royal
Asiatic Society in London, of the Archaeological Survey of India and other
OBITUARY 149
learned societies, and, last but not least, an honorary fellow of the International
Association of Buddhist Studies. On the occasion of his 70th birthday, collected
minor writings of Ernst Waldschmidt were published along with a bibliography
(Von Ceylon bis Turfan, Gi:ittingen, 1967).A supplementary collection will be
published soon in the series of the Glasenapp-Stiftung (Kleine Schriften, Wies-
baden, in the press).
With Ernst Waldschmidt, the learned world has lost a great s.cholar who
was in the forefront of Indian and Buddhist studies for more than half a
century.
Heinz Bechert
Turrell V. Wylie (1927-1984)
Turrell V. Wylie, Professor of Tibetan Studies in the Department of
Asian Languages and Literature at the University of Washington, Seattle,
died on August 25, 1984, after a brief illness. His untimely passing has not
only deprived the University of Washington of the leadership of its program
in Tibetan studies, but has also meant a major loss for Tibetan and Buddhist
studies both in America and throughout the world.
Terry (to use the affectionate version of his name by which he was always
known) was associated with the University of Washington for most of his adult
life. After taking a B.A. there, he went on to a Ph.D. in Chinese, meanwhile
also beginning the study of Tibetan language and literature that was to become
his principal scholarly field. Studying with C. Tucci in .Rome, Terry soon
became one of the very few American scholars in the field whose training
combined solid linguistic preparation with a rigorous command of text-
oriented philological discipline. His many notable publications in such areas
as Tibetan historical geography and the early history of institutionalized B.ud-
dhism in Tibet set new standards for Western studies of Tibet, as did his many
years of devoted teaching at the University of Washington, where he was
never too busy with his own work to help a student with a text, often spending
many extra hours each week tutoring both undergraduates and graduates.
Terry was able to present his last completed scientific paper, a comprehensive
text-critical study and translation of the Tibetan passport first edited by Csoma
de K6ros, at an international conference on Tibetan and Buddhist studies
held in Bloomington in March, 1984. Even at the time of those meetings, his
illness had already made serious inroads, but few of those participating realized
how much it cost him in physical courage to come to Indiana and present his
paper. The same fortitude, and concern above everything else for the feelings
of others, characterized him throughout his final difficult days.
Administration also claimed much of Terry's time and energy. After the
Chinese invasion of Tibet and the subsequent Tibetan national uprising of
1959, Terry became deeply involved in the work in international relief under-
taken by the Rockefeller Foundation, attending a number of the international
conferences that devised ways in which to assist the Tibetan refugees. He
travelled widely in northern India in order to locate a number of Tibetan
150
OBITUARY 151
religious and scholarly leaders whom he was eventually able to bring back
with him to Seattle; here, under Terry's unflaggingly energetic leadership,
they not only formed the nucleus of Seattle's still-thriving Tibetan community,
but also sparked a notably vigorous period in Tibetan and Central Asian
studies at the University of Washington, where many of them were employed
as teachers and research scholars for a number of years.
Terry's warm personal rapport with the Tibetans whom he met in India,
and particularly with the members of the diaspora community that he helped
bring to Seattle, grew out of his own awareness of the universality of human
dignity, and his profound understanding of the meaning oflife. At a Memorial
Service held at the University of Washington on October 9, 1984, Jigmie
Yuthok, speaking on behalf of the Seattle Tibetan Community, characterized
Terry in the following words:
As a scholar in the truest sense of the word, whose life-long research in
the histories of Tibet and China led him to discern fact from fiction, he stood
up for the truth of Tibet's independent status and spoke out at every opportunity
even in the face of overwhelming opposition from numerous vested interest
groups. He was not the one to compromise anything for the Truth. To the
Tibetans here in particular, he was a great teacher, a mentor, a patron and an
affectionate brother whose kindness and generosity had nurtured the first batch
of Tibetans that he brought to Seattle in 1960 to grow into a thriving little
community that it is today.
As a friend he was the most forgiving, affectionate and caring person that
I have ever met in my life. Even after minor disagreements and disappointments
he was the one to forgive first, he was the one to offer encouragement and he
was the one to care for the health and welfare of all his friends. As a scholar his
life was a success story, defined not in the terms of name and fame, wealth and
power, but rather of richness of experience and depth of character in the search
for Truth and Knowledge.
Still other indications of the high regard in which his beloved Tibetans held
Terry is the name that the Dalai Lama bestowed upon him in an audience
held in Dharmsala in 1960, Bkra-shis-bsam-'phel, a name that is now inscribed
on the stone that marks Terry's grave in his native Durango, Colorado. His
Holiness also took the extraordinary step of sending a personal message of
condolence to Terry's family and friends, through Tenzin Tethong, His rep-
resentative in New York, in the following cable:
To the bereaved family members and those gathered at the memorial services
for the late Dr. Turrell Wylie his Holiness the Dalai Lama conveys his sincere
condolences. Dr. Wylie's strong and genuine feelings for the Tibetan people and
their just cause will long' remain deeply appreciated. In the death of Dr. Wylie
we have lost a true friend and a distinguished scholar of Tibetan studies. His
Holiness further offers his deepest prayers.
Nor shall those of us present at the simple, private service of commitment
held in Seattle.before Terry's remains were taken to Durango, ever forget the
enormously touching sight of the many Tibetans who attended reverently
and prayerfully advancing toward his coffin to adorn it with kha-btags, as one
last expression of their love, affection, and respect.
Those of us privileged to have known Terry not only as a scholar and
as a colleague but also as a friend will never forget his unfailing good humor,
his devotion to his beloved wife and family, and the wide range of the extra-
academic gifts and interests that distinguished and enriched his life. From his
student days in Rome, he gained an enviable fluency in demotic Italian that
several subsequent visits to Italy enhanced and perfected; from his days in
Italy too came his deep affection for painting and for sculpture, as did his
discriminating tastes in food and wine. He took great pleasure in sharing his
knowledge of the world of Italian culture and art with visitors to Rome; I
fondly recall him showing me the two magnificent Caravaggio altarpieces in
the Cerasi Chapel of Santa Maria del Popolo with as much pride and en-
thusiasm as if he had been their owner. Himself a talented amateur painter
in oils and sculptor in wood and stone, he found in the plastic arts not only
the enjoyment of passive contemplation, but the rewards of active creativity
as well.
Everyone everywhere who ever met Terry Wylie could not help but
immediately become his friend; and everyone who met him, anywhere in the
world, always loved him. This, perhaps his greatest gift of all, only makes it
all the more difficult to cope with the loss we have sustained.
Roy Andrew Miller
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1957
"A Place Name Index to George N. Roerich's Translation of The Blue Annals."
Serie Orientale Roma. XV. Rome, 1957.40 pp.
1959
"A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription." Harvard Journal of Asiatic
Studies. 22: 261-67. Dec. 1959.
"Dating the Tibetan Geography 'Dzam-gling-rgyas-bshad Through Its Des-
cription of the Western Hemisphere." Central Asiatic Journal. IV, 4: 300-
11. 1959.
"Nature in Tibetan Poetry." (in Chinese translation) Wen-hsiieh-tsa-chih. 6,5: 36-
43. 1959.
OBITUARY 153
1962
"The Geography of Tibet According to the 'Dzam-gling-rgyas-bshad." Serie Orien-
tale Roma. XXV. Rome, 1962, 286 pp.
1963
'''O-lde-spu-rgyal and the Introduction of Bon to Tibet." Central As{atic Journal.
VIII, 2: 93-103. 1963.
1964
"Mar-pa's Tower: Notes on Local Hegemons in Tibet." History of Religions
Journal. 3,2: 278-91. Winter, 1964.
"Ro-langs: The Tibetan Zombie." History of Religions Journal. 3,4: 69-80. Sum-
mer, 1964.
1965
"The Tibetan Tradition of Geography." Bulletin ofTibetology. II: 17-25. March,
1965.
"Mortuary Customs at Sa-skya, Tibet." HarvardJournal of Asiatic Studies. 25:
229-42. 1965.
1966
"A Propos of Tibetan Religious Observances." Journal of the AmeTican Oriental
Society. 86,1: 39-45. 1966 (Review Article)
1967
Editor (anonymous co-author) Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.369 pp.
"Tibet: A Study in Chinese Chauvinism." Orient/West. 12:1,41-59.1967.
"Tibetan Studies in the United States." The Tibet Society Newsletter. 1: 1, 51-60.
1967.
"A Selective Bibliography on Tibetan Historyand Culture." The Tibet Society
Newsletter. 1:1,30-35.1967.
"Tibet." (A chapter on Tibetan linguistics). Current Trends in Linguistics. II:
766-74. 1967.
"Sectarianism in Tibetan Buddhism." Bulletin of the Field Museum of Natural
History. 38 (12): 6-7, 12-13. 1967.
"Dalai Lama." Encyclopedia International. 5: 420-21. 1967.
"Panch'en Lama." Encyclopedia International. 14: 40. 1967.
"Phagspa." Encyclopedia International. 14: 254. 1967.
1968
"Tibetan Passports: Their Function and Significance." Central Asiatic Journal.
XII (2): 149-52. 1968.
1969
"Tibet." Encyclopaedia Britannica. 21: 1106-10, 1110A-H, 11lf ..... 6. 1969
"Lhasa." Encyclopaedia Britannica. 13: 1012-15. 1969.
"Kailas Range." Encyclopaedia Britannica. 13: 187. 1969.
"Chang Thang." Encyclopaedia Britannica. 5: 267-8. 1969.
"Batang." Encyclopaedia Britannica. 3: 271-2. 1969.
"Zhikatse." Encyclopaedia Britannica. 23: 964-5. 1969.
"Gartok." Encyclopaedia Britannica. 10: 3. 1969.
"Tibetan Language." Encyclopaedia Britannica. 21: 1119-9A, 1119B-1120
1969.
"Dalai Lama." Encyclopaedia Britannica. 7: 3-4. 1969.
1970
"Gyangtse." Encyclopaedia Britannica. 10: 1056. 1970.
"A Tibetan Religious Geography of Nepal." Serie Orientale Roma. XLII. Rome.
1970.66 pp.
"Was Christopher Columbus from Shambhala?" Bulletin of the Institute of China:
Border Area Studies.
1974
"Central Asian Peoples, Arts of; III. Performing arts: dance and theatre."
Encyclopaedia Britannica. 3: 1127-30. 1974.
1975
"Tibet's Role in Inner Asia." Indiana State University. Asian Studies Research
Institute, 1975. 24 pp.
1977
"Etymology of Tibetan: bla-ma." Central Asiatic Journal. 21: 145-48. 1977.
"The First Mongol Conquest of Tibet Reinterpreted." Harvard Journal of Asiatic
Studies. 37: 103-33. 1977. .
OBITUARY 155
1978
"Reincarnation: A Political Innovation in Tibetan Buddhism." Proceedings of
the Csoma de K6r6s Memorial Symposium. (Budapest): 579-86. 1978.
1979
"Lama Tribute in the Ming Dynasty." Tibetan Studies in Honotlr of Hugh
Richardson. Proceedings of the International Seminar on Tibetan Studies, Ox-
ford, 1979. pp. 335-40.
1980
"Some Political Factors in the Early History of Tibetan Buddhism." A.K.
Narain, Editor, Studies in History of Buddhism, Delhi, 1980. pp.365-72.
"Monastic Patronage in 15th-century Tibet." Acta Orient. Hung. tomus XXXIV,
Fasc. 1-3. 1980. pp. 319-28.
1981
"Influence of the Bodhisattva Doctrine on Tibetan Political History." The
Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhism. Edited by Leslie S. Kawamura. (Winifrid
Laurier University Press: Ontario, 1981). pp. 81-94.
1982
"Dating the Death of Naropa." Indological and Buddhist Studies. Edited by L.A.
Hercus, et. al. (Canberra, 1982). pp. 687-9l.
CONTRIB UTORS
Prof. Heinz Bechert
Seminar fUr Indologie und
Buddhismuskunde der
Universitat Gottingen
Hainbundstrasse 21
D-3400 Gottingen
Federal Republic of Germany
Prof. Christopher Chapple
Dept. of Theology
Loyola Marymount University
Los Angeles, CA 90045
Prof. j.W. de Jong
Faculty of Asian Studies
The Australian National
University
Box 4, Post Office
Canberra, A.C.T. 2600
Australia
Prof. Janet Gyatso
Institute for the Advanced Study
of World Religions
Melville Memorial Library
SUNY at Stony Brook
Stony Brook, NY 11794
Prof. Bruce Cameron Hall
Dept. of Religion
College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, VA 23185
Prof. A.W. Hanson-Barber
Institute for Sino-Indian
Buddhist Studies
#22 Lane 1l0, 2 section
Yang T ~ Road Shih Lin
Taipei, Taiwan
Republic of China
Prof. Peter Harvey
Dept. of Languages and Culture
Forster Building
Sunderland Polytechnic
Chester Road
Sunderland, England
Prof. Steven Heine
Religious Studies Dept.
Villanova University
Villanova, P A 19085
Prof. Yves Hervouet
Universite de Paris VII
Unite d Engseignement et de
Recherches
Langues et Civilisations de l'Asie
Orientale
2, Place Jussieu, tour 24-44,
1er etage
75221 Paris, France
Prof. Y. Krishan
D-12 Anand Niketan
New Delhi 110021
India
Prof. Whalen Lai
Dept. of Religious Studies
University of California
Davis, CA 95616
Prof. Roy Andrew Miller
Dept. of Asian Languages and
Civilization
University of Washington
DO-21
Seattle, W A 98195
Dr. Diana Paul
2470 Ramona
Palo Alto, CA 94301
Prof. Geshe Sopa
Dept of South Asian Studies
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53706
SPRING
WIND
BUDDHIST CULTURAL FORUM
A quarterly journal dedicated to promoting spiritual culture
and practice in the nuclear age. The journal is devoted to
the Way of Wisdom and Enlightenment through the practice
of Buddhist meditation, and seeks to serve as a vehicle of
social expression and action. As Buddhists we are concerned
with peace in the world, the spiritual awakening of all beings,
and encounter with different cultures and religions. It has
been the traditional Buddhist attitude towards all to promote
friendliness and harmony even at our own sacrifice, and to
transform self and others for new inspiration and new
culture. We uphold this Buddhist spirit of change and
evolution.
To subscribe. remil $15/yr. ($28/2 yr.) by cheque or M.O.
in U.S. funds 10: Spring Wind, 46 Gwynne Avmue, Toronlo, Onlario M6K 2C3, Canada.
Include your name and full mailing address wilh poslal code. Spring Wind is published by Ihe Zen
wlus Sode/y, a non-profil religious organizalion.
Where West Meets East

The Vajradhatu Sun is a bi-monthly Buddhist news-
. paper reporting on the growth and ferment in the
... contemporary Buddhist world, both in the West and
. in Asia. Regular features include a Buddhist News
Summary, interviews with leading teachers and
. scholars, profiles of artists and writers, book reviews,
up-to-date coverage of the arts, psychology, science, health, and the on- .
going dialogue between the East and West. Plus current news of the
Vajradhatu Sangha.
For one year subscription (6 issues): please enclose $15 for USA; $18 outside USA
(in US currency). Vajradhatu Sun, Dept. IOC 1345 Spruce Street, Boulder,
Colorado 80302
Name ______________________________________________ __
Address ____________________________________________ ___
City _____________________ State __________ Zip ______ _
Country ____________________________________________ ___
Published by Vajradhatu, an international association of Buddhist meditation and study centers;
and Nalanda Foundation, a nonprofit educational corporation.

Jiabs 9-1

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Jiabs 9-1

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

THE JOURNAL

Of THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION Of

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi