The closure of BBC Jam: authority, structure and contradiction in the new mixed economy and third way

politics.
Karl Rawstrone. 14th January 2010.

This paper investigates the events surrounding the suspension of the BBCs Digital Curriculum project, BBC Jam by the BBC Trust in 2007. In particular, it investigates the relationship between the Government, the BBC and the commercial media sector.

The incident is critical for a number of reasons. Firstly, it represents an occurrence of the Government directly influencing the output of the BBC and using the BBC to mediate its own ideology, raising a question over the BBCs independence. Secondly, the suspension and closure of BBC Jam was the first substantial act of the BBC Trust, but raises questions regarding the efficacy and motivations of the Corporations new governing body. The case also makes clear the tension between the public and commercial media sectors in the UK, with the BBC placed in a competitive rather than complimentary relationship with the private sector, raising questions over the nature of public service and the role of the BBC. The Corporation has had a major impact on almost every electronic medium of the modern age, plays a vital role in public service, and its control and independence have been a batleground of ideology since its birth in 1926. BBC Jam brought together the most significant conflicts facing media today.

From 1990 to 2000 I worked for the BBC and a number of commercial broadcasters, editing, directing and producing content for younger viewers. I left broadcasting to become a teacher, now lecturing in Media. I have been involved in e-learning as enduser, researcher and producer since 2001 and it is this role as producer which relies so much upon the actions of the BBC, as the entire UK media landscape does. This incident, therefore, brings together and illustrates a number of key issues which are relevant to my own continuing practice.

British sociologist Anthony Giddens provides the theoretical structure for much of my investigation. His version of structuration theory will be used to analyse the power relationships between the main players in this case. His theoretical model is offset

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against his own proposals for a third way political ideology which describes and influenced much of the new Labour governments intentions for the digitalisation of education in a globalised new mixed economy.

The first part of the paper comprises an analysis of authority and structure. Firstly, I will investigate the methods by which the Government mediated its third way ideology and plans for the digitalisation of education in the UK through the BBC. This points toward a question over the independence of the BBC but raises further questions regarding the adequacy of governance arrangements at the BBC. Authority will be considered as a resource, connected with a consideration of myth as a composite authoritative resource comprising the signification of events over time. Secondly the nature of governance at the BBC will be investigated, suggesting that the model represents reflexive self-regulation which may be inappropriate within a public body. Finally the aggregation of authority will be addressed, looking in particular at the actions of the commercial complainants in this incident.

The second part of the paper addresses contradictory relationships which are implicit in the Governments intentions to use a public body to promote the private sector. As a result of the events detailed herein, the Governments third way intentions resulted in bi-polar conflict. The development of the BBC from a monopoly organisation to a contributor in a mixed economy will be considered in the light of choice and quality, and the substantial weight of tradition will be considered in its effect upon the Corporations ability to innovate. Notions of public service will be considered which suggest a new interpretation of public service which might see the BBC enter into new positive relationships with the wider industry and the public.

Introduction
The New Labour election manifesto of 1997 declared, We aim to put behind us the bitter political struggles of left and right that have torn our country apart for too many decades. Many of these conflicts have no relevance whatsoever to the modern world - public versus private, bosses versus workers, middle class versus working class. It is time for this country to move on and move forward (Labour 1997). The Governments plans for the digitisation of education formed a key part of, and are clearly representative of, third way political ideology which seeks a new mixed economy, as Giddens describes it, a synergy between public and private sectors, utilising the dynamism of markets but with the public interest in mind, involving a

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balance between regulation and deregulation (1998, p.100). The third way reflects, according to Giddens, The end of the bipolar era (p.137). However, the Governments plan to use of the BBC to stimulate the e-learning market resulted in bipolar conflict, rather than the intended synergy between the public and private sectors, leading to the BBCs withdrawal of the service. This investigation will ask whether New Labour were able to successfully apply third way ideology to the real world of complex reflexive structural relationships, or, as Conservative broadcasting spokesman Ed Vaizey claimed, created a mess of their own making (BBC 2007b).

Part One: Structure and authority

To avoid a simple bipolar reading of conflict in the analysis of this case, it is useful to see the parties involved as social structures which interact reflexively (with one another) and are themselves the product of internal reflexive causal loops. Giddens (1984) defines structures as rule-resource sets, implicated in the institutional articulation of social systems (p.377). Both rules and resources are structural properties which reflexively interact in the generation of power, or the ability to act. This duality of structure encompasses the three dimensions of legitimation, signification and domination. Legitimation refers to the property developed by the creation of norms from sanctions. That is, those actions, which a structure carries out, become normalised and legitimated through that structures reflexive interactions with other structures (pp.28-33). Legitimation may come about from the acceptance of events over time as norms or through formal legislation by a legitimated and dominant body such as the Government or other regulatory body. Signification comes through the reflexive communication and interpretation of meaning within and between structures, comprising both denotative and connotative readings of events over time. Signification and legitimation generate power through their application or mediation across time-space through resources. Resources may be allocative, that is, connected to material goods and production, or authoritative, that is, connected to the organisation of time-space, system reproduction and the organisation of opportunity or life chances as Giddens calls them (p.258). All of these properties are dualistic in nature; each one is causally connected to the other. To overcome the limitations of concepts of physical geography and perceptions of history, or historicity, structuration theory refers to the effects of a structure in time-space. In an age of global communication and interaction, and with readings of history differing depending upon context and perspective, this concept allows the analysis of intersecting regions of activity between structures which are not simply defined by the here and now but span past, future and a range of reflexive structural properties. karl.rawstrone@yeovil.ac.uk 3 of 34

Time-space distanciation defines the effect across time and space of an institution and time-space edges are the conflictual or symbiotic connections between institutions or structures (1984, p.377). Giddens states that intersocietal systems characteristically involve forms of relation between [structures] of different types, and argues that they can all be studied as systems of domination in terms of relations of autonomy and dependence, which pertain between them, (p.164). The case of the Digital Curriculum involves the structures of state, the public sector and the private sector; each with their own interacting and reflexive rule-resource sets and with a variety of forms of authoritative resources applied both internally and externally. In addition, the authoritative resources of the BBC may be analysed more fully by accounting for the aggregative authority of events over time, which have involved the Corporation, which might be referred to as the authority, or legitimation of tradition. Giddens version of structuration theory, then, may allow us to analyse these complex causal relationships beyond a mere analysis of conflict.

The Digital Curriculum as an extension of state mediating ideology

To what extent can the BBC be perceived as independent? Here I will investigate methods by which the Government attempted to use the BBC to apply its own political ideology. In the German Ideology (1970), Marx states that the ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas (p.92). The New Labour Party wished to grasp the advantages of both free market economics and state funded public service in the digital global economy to deliver a third way ideology. The Curriculum Online and Digital Curriculum initiatives were intended to mediate the Governments ideology into practice.

The Education Reform Act of 1988 (Crown 1988) had introduced the National Curriculum, a Conservative neoliberal reform that set out to standardise the education of school-aged children. The New Labour Party election manifesto of 1997 made education its number one priority, and declared their:

aims for a thriving, diverse media industry, combining commercial success and public service. We will ensure that the BBC continues to be a flagship for British creativity and public service broadcasting, but we believe that the combination of public and private sectors in competition is a key spur to innovation and high standards (Labour 1997).

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Prime Minister Tony Blair announced the creation of the National Grid for Learning (NGfL) and laid out the governments plans for the use of Information Communications Technology (ICT) in education in the paper, Connecting the Learning Society (DfEE 1997). The NGfL would provide teachers with a way of accessing online learning materials and support teaching, learning, training and administration in schools, colleges, universities, libraries, the workplace and homes (p.5).

Media organisations were to play an important role in the delivery of digital education and, thereby, in the mediation of ideology to practice. The paper mentioned not just the BBC, but Channel 4 and ITV, able to use their expertise and archives (authoritative and allocative resources) to enhance the service. Competition would keep prices at market level and promote choice and innovation. The government sought to,

Stimulate public/private partnership, bringing together the best of private sector creativity and the highest standards of public service, [and to] Ensure that nothing is provided at public expense, which otherwise could be provided commercially of good quality and reasonable cost. (p.5) There were, though, two identified obstacles to overcome, identified by an independent investigation by Dennis Stevenson, chairman of Pearson education, into ICT for learning in schools: the need to train teachers and to create a market for high-quality British educational software (p.3). New Labour needed a way to stimulate the market and overcome the barriers identified by Stevenson.

Scanlon cites three options available to the Government in developing the online curriculum. A supply-led, top-down, model would see the Government commission commercial providers to provide content or, alternatively, use a public body such as the BBC to do so. A demand-led model would provide end-users with funding to purchase the resources they required. This second method is generally preferred by commercial organisations as it is claimed to stimulate growth and competition in the private sector (Scanlon, Buckingham 2003, p.194). Scanlon suggests that the Government preferred a third way, utilising the advantages of both models.

Labour quickly demonstrated its commitment to using the BBC to provide online public services through the granting of the Service Licence for BBC Online in 1997, which included the services provision of educational content (Graf 2004, p.89). Keen

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to develop its educational remit through online media, the BBC published its proposals for a Digital Curriculum (BBC 2000 cited in Scanlon 2003 p.192). The Governments re-election manifesto of 2001 continued to put the BBC at the heart of Labours plans for the digitisation of Britain, promising,

the best competitive environment, effective regulation and continued public and private investment in the technologies of the futureWe have committed to major funding increases for the BBC (Labour 2001). The Labour administration, in order to fund the development of the BBCs digital and online services (Economist 1999, para. 3), which would include the Digital Curriculum, increased the Licence Fee from the equivalent at todays prices (ODonoghue 2004) of 130 in 2001 to a peak of 150 in 2004 before settling at around 140 (BBC 2009a). Thereby, the authoritative resources of the Government, in order to deliver their ideology, were mediated through an increase in the allocative resources of the BBC. This mediation of authority through funding has the least expansive effect upon time space distanciation, or spread, of ideology. The Licence Fee is set annually by government and, therefore, cannot extend beyond its tenure. The Licence Fee is usually the first exertion of control over the BBC to be carried out by a new government.

The e-learning sector was, at this time, a nascent market, but, since 1998, the BBC had been considering extending the reach of its online services for schools, children, parents and teachers complementing the national curriculum (Graf 2004, p.90 Dated 09/10/1998) and, in their Annual Report of 2000/2001 stated, The Government has acknowledged the advantages of the BBC playing a central role in the delivery of such a service (BBC 2001, p.23). The use of the word central, though, suggests that the BBC saw itself acting as lead content commissioner rather than complimenting and balancing the commercial provision.

The BBCs position, authorised by the Government to deliver the Digital Curriculum was very much a supply-led model and consent was given by the DCMS in January 2003 for the BBC to develop the Digital Curriculum with a budget funded by the licence fee of 150m over five years (DCMS 2003; BBC 2003).

The Curriculum Online initiative (CO) was the Governments application of a demand-led model. CO provided a portal for schools wishing to purchase digital educational resources from approved commercial organisations using e-Learning karl.rawstrone@yeovil.ac.uk 6 of 34

Credits (eLCs), a form of state funding with a budget, approved by the DfES (formerly the DfEE) in 2002, of 50m (DLA 2002; HarperCollins 2002, p.2).

The commercial sector, though, claimed that the BBCs entry into a free market, offering resources at no cost to schools, would have a distorting effect, effectively threatening their position. In appreciation of this, the DCMS set out eighteen conditions of approval designed to ensure that the Corporation delivered a distinctive and complimentary service, which would play a positive role in the competitive and growing market for digital learning resources (DCMS 2003). Despite this, the only requirement for the BBC to collaborate with the commercial sector was through the BBCs proposal to use half of if its production budget (around 45m or 9m per year) to commission materials from commercial suppliers (PwC 2002, p.36).

The BBC, in the granting of the Digital Curriculum project had its already superior legitimation further developed by Government approval. Director General (DG) Greg Dyke said, This is an important step forward in the BBCs education strategy. The opportunity to make a difference to learning in this country lies deep at the heart of the BBCs Reithian remit (BBC 2003). There was, it seemed, a gap in the BBCs understanding that this project was not a traditional Reithian one, but one which required them to use their authoritative and allocative resources not to simply deliver public service, but to promote the public/private economy.

Dykes comment also implies the myth of the BBC. The term myth is not to be taken pejoratively, but refers to the legitimation of BBC by complex systems of signification stretching both backward in time, through signifiers such as quality, public service and tradition, and forward in time through the implication or promise of that which it is assumed to be capable of, such as defending the public interest. Giddens suggests that myths mediate existential contradictions cognitively (1984, p.194). While Reith is no longer Director General of the Corporation, the signification of his legacy confers legitimation to the Corporations actions, its remit as Dyke suggests. The myth of the BBC mediates the existential contradiction that the BBC does not, in fact operate under a Reithian remit, but that defined by the current Charter. Giddens states structures of signification are separable only analytically either from domination or legitimation (1984, p.33). Given the duality of structure, this legitimation by myth may be seen as being equivalent to an authoritative resource and significantly increases the power of the BBC. This traditional norm, though, as

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will be mentioned later, means that the Corporation carries significant inertia, making change a slow and difficult process.

Further mediation of the Governments ideology through the extension of its authoritative resources came with the Charter review of 2004 (SCCMS 2004), which defined the role of the BBC for the decade ahead. Up to and including the 1996 Charter, the BBCs remit, as laid out by founding DG John Reith in defining the role of the then monopoly broadcaster, was to disseminate information, education and entertainment (Crown 1996, p.1). The Charter of 2006, which came into force on the first of January 2007, reflected the third way ideology of the Government in stating six specific Public Purposes: sustaining citizenship and civil society; promoting education and learning; stimulating creativity and cultural excellence; representing the UK, its nations, regions and communities; bringing the UK to the world and the world to the UK; in promoting its other purposes, helping to deliver to the public the benefit of emerging communications technologies and services and, in addition, taking a leading role in the switchover to digital television (DCMS 2006a, p.2). Third way values had expanded upon the traditional Reithian values of the BBC to include an appreciation of globalisation and the technological drivers of social change. There was no mention in the Charter itself of stimulating competition, but the Digital Curriculum, now called BBC Jam, made its way into the Agreement between the DCMS and the BBC which sets out the executive remit of the Corporations services (DCMS 2006b, p.6).

Control over the content of the Charter comprises the greatest possible increase in the time-space distanciation of the Government into broadcasting, effecting not only the BBC, but, thereby, a great degree of the national, and something of the global, media landscape, reflexive as that landscape is with the structure and actions of the BBC. Service Licences are not granted for the duration of the Charter, being reviewed at least every five years, so there was no guarantee that this aspect of manifesto would outlast the Government, and nor did it, finally falling foul of another reform which the Government desired, that of the governance of the BBC.

It is paradoxical that the very statute, which declares the independence of the BBC, the Royal Charter, becomes a channel through which the Government may mediate its political ideology through the Corporation. The BBCs structural connections with Government could be taken to imply that the BBC is not, in fact independent. The scope of the term must be defined. Structurally, as a public body, the BBC cannot be karl.rawstrone@yeovil.ac.uk 8 of 34

totally independent from the Government, as described above. It tends to be assumed that the Government has no control over the BBCs direct output, but this assumption fails to stand up in this case, as the content of the Digital Curriculum lay within the bounds of the Government-controlled National Curriculum. Perhaps how the BBC delivered the content was up to the BBC, but this was also tempered by the fact that the CO Content Advisory Bureau (CAB) would require evidence of pedagogical and technological experimentation in the resources created by the BBC (DCMS 2003). Perhaps the notion of editorial impartiality is a more useful assumption to make. Using a structural model of intersocietal systems, it may be seen that there is not independence but reflexive interdependence or interaction.

It can be seen, therefore, that there are a variety of methods by which the Government can extend its structure, through the remediation of authoritative resources, statutory and fiscal, to employ the BBC in the application of its ideology. It should not be assumed, though, that this means the BBC is controlled by Government, but that the Government and the BBC may be seen to constitute a composite structure of sorts, incomplete and complex, but connected nonetheless. Structural interactions are reflexive, not only did the Government seek to mediate its authoritative resources through the implication of the BBC in its plans, but the authoritative resources of the BBC were influential on the actions of the Government. The track record of the BBC (mediated through the mythologized signification of past events) was greatly influential upon the actions of the Government.

As a final consideration it is worth considering Marxs statements on the power of the state to control the economic base. Rigby cites Marxs view in The Poverty of Philosophy that, legislation, whether political of civil, never does more than proclaim, express in words, the will of economic relations (1998, p.11). This view would assert that the Government, while expressing its third way intentions for a new mixed economy, could do little to actually create it. But this reductionist view of economic determinism, which attributes far greater, if not total, power to economics over ideology was ultimately denied by Engels, who proposed a model of dialectical interaction (p.185) which saw economics and ideology in a reflexive relationship. The Digital Curriculum project may be seen as being both ideologically and economically driven, and the Governments actions to mediate their ideology both through statute and economics seem to reflect this dialectic. The inter-sector conflict and failure of the Digital Curriculum project may, though, confirm Marxs view. Contradictorily, the growth of schools spending on curriculum software during this conflict and its karl.rawstrone@yeovil.ac.uk 9 of 34

subsequent return to pre-Digital Curriculum levels since the closure of Jam (BESA 2007a, 2009) might indicate a more complex causal relationship; that the conflict caused by the Governments application of authority, rather than the synergy it intended, provided the stimulus which was required by the commercial sector.

The defence of tradition: reflexive self-regulation at the BBC

Marx, in the German Ideology reinforces the importance of the consideration of people as the main mediating force between and within structures, arguing, The social structure and the State [evolve] out of the life process of definite individuals not as they appear but as they really are (1970, p.68). Blame for the Governments failure to successfully employ the BBC in the promotion of its third way project may, possibly, be found in the structure of governance at the BBC and the real actions of people. Giddens suggests that a key principle of third way politics is no rights without responsibilities (1998, p.65). Whilst it was granted the right to develop the Digital Curriculum, The BBC failed to fulfil its responsibility, laid out by the DCMS, to take a complimentary role in a new mixed economy, instead threatening to damage commercial interests through its actions. The governance of the BBC was under criticism, being described as defensive, with implications of incompetence in communication. The findings of the Hutton Inquiry had found the BBC wanting in both inter-board communication and regulation (Hutton 2004), leading to the view that the dual role of the Governors as both champion and regulator was unsustainable (SCCMS 2004).

This seemingly self-defensive model of regulation could be considered to be one of reflexive self-regulation. Giddens defines this as:

Causal loops which have a feedback effect in system reproduction substantially influenced by knowledge which agents have of the mechanism of system reproduction and employ to control it (1984 p.376). System reproduction in this case could be taken to mean the development of the BBCs practices. With Governors and Management so proximate and aware of the effects of each others actions and methods, the natural tendency was to promote the BBC, to reproduce its system. External regulation would mean that the promotion of the BBC would no longer be assisted by the regulator, that the regulator would no longer act to defend the Corporation.

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Investigation of the development of the Digital Curriculum project appears to reveal clearly defensive action by the BBC. The market assessment of the proposition carried out by Pricewaterhouse-Coopers (PwC) on behalf of the BBC in 2002 (PwC 2002) was criticised by NERA Economic Consulting, commissioned by The Digital Learning Alliance (DLA) a body bringing together the British Educational Suppliers Association (BESA) and the Publishers Association. NERAs report claimed that the report had only taken seven weeks to compile, that, on the request of the BBC, PwC did not interview any private firms currently supplying the market, that their assumption that the BBCs entry into the market would increase schools spending on ICT (information communications technology) was extraordinary and that the report had side-stepped the main issue, that the BBC would be providing its resources for free (NERA 2002). The BBC, in this case, appears to be selective in its collection of evidence, limiting it to that which promotes the enterprise.

The BBC also demonstrated shortfalls in communication between the Governors and Management. During the process of application to the DCMS, the BBC was not permitted to use any funds or undertake any action in the development of the service itself until the Government had given its approval. In a judicial review brought by the DLA in 2002, it was found that the BBC had already spent 5m on the proposal and application process and that a further 60,000 had been spent on some further activity. The BBC apologised to the court and instigated an investigation into how the activity and spend came to take place. (BBC 2002b)

Chairman Gavyn Davies and DG Greg Dyke paved the future for the BBC in the new digital economy, but following their post-Hutton resignations, the roles of Michael Grade and Mark Thompson were to repair the past.

Thompson reduced the Management Board from sixteen to nine and Grade set up a Governance Unit in order to address the failings in communication between the Governors and the Executive, recruiting its head from outside the BBC (BBC 2005). The Governance Unit gave the impression of externality and an improved line of communication, but their remit was advisory, not regulatory. The regulatory responsibilities remained with the Governors, whose role had not changed. It could be argued, though, that the addition of the Unit simply added another layer of people required to mediate information and authority between the Governors and the Management and thereby increased the complexity of the communication system.

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The contradictions inherent in the dual role of the Governors and the responsibility of the BBC to both the public and itself are mediated by the myth of the BBC as a responsible public body which has built up over time from a conflation of the significance of individual events and personal ideals which form the Corporations history. The myth of the BBC mediates the contradiction of a body acting in the public interest, externally reflexive, but defending its own interests, being reflexively self-regulating. In effect, the mediation of the Governments ideology, the delivery of the Digital Curriculum according to their initial intention and subsequent conditions, may have been inhibited by the actions of people.

It could be suggested that while reflexive self-regulation without external reflexive regulation serves a capitalist organisation well, as the management of capital risk becomes the regulating force, when the risk to revenue is minimised due to its nature as state funding, a lack of external control could be argued to lead toward a situation where the state-funded organisation has nothing to gain by regulating itself.

The Charter of 2006 dissolved the Board of Governors and replaced it with the BBC Trust. While the Trust was intended to have a greater focus on regulation and less on promotion, to what extent did the new framework address the issue of self-regulation at the BBC?

The new governance structure was very similar to Grades: The regulatory Trust, with responsibility to the licence fee payer but no executive connection to the operational Executive Board and the employment of a Trust Unit who would act as communicators between the two. Whenever a new service was applied for, or a significant change was made to an existing service licence, the Trust would be required to undertake a Public Value Test (PVT) in which Ofcom, the state broadcasting regulator, would have the role in conducting a Market Impact Assessment. This model sought to solve the joint accusations of defensiveness and incompetence and was the first to explicitly include the external authority of Ofcom.

There was some scepticism of the Trust and whether they could bring about an improvement in the balance of authority and regulation within the Corporation. Times Online reported that John Whittingdale, the Tory culture spokesman, dismissed the proposed changes as largely cosmetic and said that [t]he BBC needed a separate external regulator, not the proposed Trust (Naughton 2005, para. 20). Former Sun Editor, Kelvin MacKenzie, the article states, suggested that the new Trust would be karl.rawstrone@yeovil.ac.uk 12 of 34

another set of establishment dimwits (Naughton 2005, para. 22), suggesting that the body would be filled with the expected politically favourable appointees with traditional notions of public service and little experience of regulation.

In order to analyse the properties of people as mediators of authority it is revealing to compare their backgrounds. The last Board of Governors consisted of one solicitor (Vice Chair, Anthony Salz), a pair of economists and a range of media and humanities practitioners and academics, none of whom had any experience of regulation. Conversely, the founding members of the Trust comprised five with media backgrounds, four economists, two lawyers and a public service specialist, the Acting Chairman (after Grades departure) Chitra Bharucha. Of these, seven had extensive experience of regulation in public and private sectors (BBC 2006). While not displaying explicit political bias, the make-up of the Trust reflected the ideology of a government keen to bring the BBC into line with other public sector bodies and improve its regulatory structure.

On the suspension of BBC Jam by the Trust, Independent Online reported the new and clear definitions of the roles of the Trust and Ofcom and their possible implications on the future of the BBC:

In theory, the distinction between the Trust's duties and those of Ofcom is clear. The Trust defends the public interest while Ofcom protects the market Announcing Jam's suspension, trustee Diane Coyle said: "In representing the public interest, the Trust's duty includes ensuring the BBC does not adversely affect the market by reducing choice for licence payers." (Luckhurst 2007) Bharucha requested that BBC management prepare new proposals for how the BBC could address its public purpose of promoting education for school-aged children. The new proposal would be subject to a Public Value Test including a Market Impact Assessment and public consultation to which all stakeholders would be invited to respond (BBC 2007a). This proposal would constitute a new service and, at the outset at least, avoid the attentions of the EC, to whom a complaint had been made regarding the distortive market impact of the state aided Digital Curriculum (EC 2003), and allow the BBC to strategise a new relationship with the private sector.

Not only the defined role of the Trust, but the backgrounds and experience of its members and the threat of assessment by Ofcom all contributed to the suspension of BBC Jam and suggested the BBCs willingness to take a role in the new mixed karl.rawstrone@yeovil.ac.uk 13 of 34

economy. The Corporation, it was implied, would no longer develop content that was not distinctive and complimentary to that provided by commercial suppliers in an existing market. As suggested in Luckhursts report, though,

Many dismiss the apparent ruthlessness of the Jam decision as deliberately calculated to make an early impression but a poor guide to the Trust's future conduct (2007). BBC Jam remains the only complete service to be suspended by the Trust and the body is yet to take out any significant sanctions, on fair trading grounds, upon any other BBC service. Some might argue that, following Hutton, the regulators of the BBC needed to be seen to bite, and BBC Jam, a project troubled from the outset, was a suitable target.

The Trust remains a governmentally appointed body and retains many of the conections with the Executive previously present, although with greater focus perceptually on its regulatory role. It might be said that the board members are now appointed on merit according to the Nolan Committees requirements (Nolan 1995), but it is arguable how much they are representative of the Licence Fee payers interests. Giddens suggests that In a society where tradition and custom are losing their hold, the only route to the establishing of authority is via democracy (1998, p.66). The BBC retains a tight grip on the authority of tradition and custom, but the Government operates on the mandate of the people, and the Trust operates on the mandate of the Government. This is not Giddens particpartory democracy writ large, there are no public elections of board members, and so the Trust remains open to accusations of bias, but it is the mediation of the individual authority of each Licence Fee payer through the democracy of State.

The aggregation of authority

It has been seen how the authoritative resources of the Government and BBC are reflexively but incompletely connected and how problems with the reflexive selfregulation of the BBC and the subsequent shortfall in the mediation of authoritative resources may have contributed to the fact that the Governments intentions for the Digital Curriculum were not fully realised and also left the Corporation open to accusations of defensiveness and incompetence in internal communication and accountability.

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It has been discussed in what way the resources of the BBC are based not only in its physical facilities, broadcasting networks and human resources, its allocative resources, but also on its history and notions of quality, its regulation, the actions of government and and its economic status, its authoritative resources. In all, these resources aggregate to an enormous amount of power.

Comparatively, it seemed that the commercial providers in this case had very little power. Following the dot com burst of 2000, online service providers were suffering. At the same time, BBC Online, funded by the licence fee, was growing from strength to strength. In 2001 RM had a turnover of around 242m (RM 2001), while a smaller member of the DLA, Espresso Education, was eligible for nomination in the Turnover under 3m category in the 2002 Educational Resources Awards (TES 2002). These figures compare with the BBCs operating expenditure at that time of over 3.5bn (BBC 2002c). But this is not a simple case of the big corporation and the struggling entrepreneurs. One of the larger members of the DLA, HarperCollins Publishers, who provided a cautious but balanced response to the new service application in 2002 (HarperCollins 2002) is owned by the News Corporation, which had revenues of around 14bn in 2001 (News Corporation 2001).

Two of the individual members of the DLA, News Corporation (a silent member by proxy of HarperCollins) and Pearson Education (part of the Financial Times and Penguin-owning Pearson Plc, with sales of 4.2bn in 2001) (Pearson 2001), could arguably afford to take on the BBC. But the complaints of these large traditional rivals to the BBC seem to carry little sympathy. By collectivising under the DLA banner and including a number of small companies whose existence could be seen to be under threat by the BBCs entry into their market, the rivals could make an impact. The choice of RM as vanguard seems, in this light, to be carefully considered: A recognisably British company; big enough to be taken seriously but not so big as to be seen as a threat to the BBC; well-known to teachers and schools; and struggling after the dot com burst, making for quite a sympathetic case. Scanlon notes that the DLA emphasised that many of its members are small companies, and it has tried to avoid being seen as the voice of big business (2003, p.196). This identifies the importance of the myth or symbolic nature of the DLA. The DLA was not just a collection of resources, but an idea, or symbol, created through the management of its constituent elements. The duality of structure and the equivalence of signification, legitimation and domination mean that the DLAs symbolic properties had a real effect upon its power. karl.rawstrone@yeovil.ac.uk 15 of 34

Collectivisation served to empower the smaller companies in its membership, provide the larger organisations with a sympathetic vanguard and to provide the commercial organisations with a single voice. The individual organisations formed into a composite structure, aggregating their authoritative resources, allowing them to signify their concerns clearly and extending their time-space reach not only by using one another, but also the authoritative resources of the DCMS and EC. The commercial organisations used their collective reflexive self-regulation to expand their system reproduction and defend their market.

Reflexive self-regulation, then, might be seen as a social survival mechanism. It is the method by which structures may expand their authoritative and, therefore, allocative resources. In a climate where the dominant BBC is being required to enter into a reflexive relationship with the private sector, to help develop the Governments wishes of a synergy between the public and private sectors, the BBC must include the private sector in its reflexive self, that is not to say to absorb the private sector, but to consider its actions as part of the UKs media community. Thereby, the UK media sector as a whole might usefully become reflexively self-regulated and promote its own survival and growth.

Part two: Structural contradictions

In this section I will consider a number of dualistic conflictual interrelationships or contradictions sought to be synthesised by the third way intentions of the Government but which became conflictual interrelationships in the case of the Digital Curriculum and define ongoing conflicts in the shaping of the UK media sector: the balance of choice and quality; of innovation and risk; and of public service and the private sector. Giddens refers to contradictions as opposition[s] of structural principles, such that each depends on the other and yet negates the other, and the perverse consequences associated with such circumstances (1984 p.373). The Governments assumption that the BBC could stimulate the private sector had complex perverse consequences. The inter-sector conflict generated the stimulus originally intended, leading to a healthy private sector, but threatened the Corporations ability to promote one of its public purposes. A further contradiction lies in the perception of the BBC as an innovator. The public funding of the BBC mitigates financial risk and reduces innovation, two major drivers of growth in the commercial sector. In its attempt to reconcile the contradictions inherent in its plans, the

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Government became responsible for secondary risks, which were the uncontrollable side effects of its actions.

Monopoly, choice and quality

The BBCs origins as a monopoly broadcaster are, according to Seaton, variously described either as the cultural mission of one man, John Reith, or as a civil solution to the management of the airwaves, formed as it was from a consortium of commercial suppliers (The British Broadcasting Company) and with the apparent benefit to the listener of a state-owned corporation coming only later (Curran, Seaton 1997, p.112). Its status as a monopoly was a short one, competing for audiences with the General Forces Network as early as the 1930s. Even the duopoly of BBC and ITV, formed in 1954, did not significantly effect the ratings of the BBC or viewing figures as a whole (pp165-167), nor does the current number of online sources of information available in the UK prevent the BBCs from being one of the nations most popular sites. Choice, then, does little to damage the BBC and the pluralistic media of our age have not seen an exodus of audiences away from the state broadcaster. This only applies, though, when comparing services which are free at the point of use.

It is useful to compare the popularity of the BBC with a service funded by subscription. BBC1s audience share of around 19% is twenty times higher than that of Sky1, a comparable subscription service (BARB 2009), so it could be reasonably assumed that the BBCs entry into the pay-based market of e-learning with a comparable free service would distort, even dominate, the market as claimed by the commercial complainants. Given any amount choice and assuming the products are of a similar quality, it may be assumed that consumers will tend to select the cheapest option. This amounts to a reduction of choice by economic determinism.

With this consideration in mind, it does not seem that the ameliorative measure of eLearning Credits (eLCs) or the independent production quota of 50% of the Jam budget would be of any benefit to the commercial providers. The Governments Curriculum Online scheme, which ran from 2003 to 2008, provided eLCs to schools for the purchasing of digital learning resources (Curriculum Online 2008). On the announcement of the Digital Curriculum, the Government, in order to ease the negative impact on the commercial sector allocated 50m of eLCs in the first year of Curriculum Online (PwC 2002, p.11), raising this, after commercial complaints, to

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530m over five years by 2007 (Puttnam, TES, 2007). In addition, 50% of the BBCs production budget, around 45m or 9m per year, would be spent on outsourcing production to commercial companies (BBC 2002a; PwC 2002, p.36).

Indeed, it was claimed that the commercial sector relied on the BBCs entry into the market. The PwC report suggested that schools were slow to accept the new technologies into their classrooms and claimed that a free, critical mass of content would improve the understanding and take-up of e-learning materials by teachers and develop a virtuous circle which would benefit the industry as a whole by increasing demand and providing seed capital for commercial suppliers (2002 p.37). The potential negative impact on commercial suppliers caused by the withdrawal of Jam was highlighted by a supporter of the Digital Curriculum, and left-wing peer, David Puttnam, writing in the Media Guardian:

The Pact [(Producers Alliance for Cinema and Television, a trade association in the UK representing independent media producers)] vice-chair Andrew Chitty, whose company Illumina derives 50% of its overall work from the BBC, was quoted last week as estimating that pulling Jam would cost the new media industry 20-30m in addition to further revenue from rights ownership. (Puttnam 2007) The above figures do seem to demonstrate the Governments preparedness to defend the commercial sector and the damage that the BBCs withdrawal from the market would do, if they are compared with PwCs estimate of a 40m per year spend on software by schools in 1999/2000 (PwC 2002, p.11). But even PwC expected growth in the sector, partly funded by eLCs, estimating a figure of over 100m in 2002 and growing to potentially 150m by 2004/2005 (PwC 2002, pp.3536). The DLA estimated the size of the market in 2002 as 85m. By the time Jam was suspended, though, the market had increased. Research by the British Educational Suppliers Association (BESA) in 2007 showed an expected spend on curriculum software in 2007-8 of over 150m, including approximately 50m from the eLC scheme (BESA 2007a, p.11). This implies an unsubsidised commercial market of approximately 100m. The PwC report did acknowledge that it was very difficult to estimate the true value of the BBCs 30m per year project as the resources would be free at the point of use (2002, p.36) but suggested that the failure of the Digital Curriculum project would have a negative impact on the commercial sector, with a similarly correlative effect if the project succeeded (pp.36-37). The DLAs findings objected with this summary, stating that, The BBCs proposal will smother the commercial sector and place the BBC in a monopoly provider position (DLA 2002, karl.rawstrone@yeovil.ac.uk 18 of 34

para.5). BBC Jam, by offering free content, therefore threatened a potential loss in revenue for the commercial sector of around 100m, up to two thirds of the market. Even if schools spent more than just their free eLCs on commercial software, the market tendency, through the increase in supply with free content, would be to drive prices down and devalue the sector. Only a further increase in the eLC provision would stop this happening.

How, then, could the monopolisation of a commercial marketplace by a supplier of comparable free products be avoided by economic means? In order to create a level playing field, the Government could provide schools with eLCs to the value of their entire software spend, thereby making the commercial content effectively free (bought by UK tax-payers) or, alternatively, force the BBC to sell its content at a price not lower than the accepted market price as set by the Office of Fair Trading. This would require the resources to be produced and sold by a commercial subsidiary of the BBC, such as BBC Worldwide, which is not funded by the licence fee, as laid out in the BBCs Fair Trading Guidelines (BBC 2009b). Given this option, the BBCs content could have been purchased under the Curriculum Online/eLC initiative, as were commercial resources. Either of these options would have allowed the BBC to exist economically alongside the commercial organisations in a demand-led economic model rather than the part demand- parts supply-led model chosen by the Government. The use of eLCs to purchase Digital Curriculum learning resources from any commercial subsidiary of the BBC was expressly forbidden, though, by the DCMS (DCMS 2003, condition 6). One can assume that this condition was set on the assumption that the BBC resources would be funded by the licence fee, and prohibited the BBC from furthering its place in the market by additional commercial trading using public funds. If this condition were set on its head, stating that all BBC resources must be produced by a commercial subsidiary of the BBC and purchased with eLCs, the BBC would be forced to compete fairly with the commercial sector.

The other method by which the BBCs monopoly was to be avoided was by limiting the BBCs coverage of the curriculum. Hence, a further condition of the DCMS agreement to the Digital Curriculum was that no more than 50% of the learning outcomes which could be appropriately addressed by e-learning (DCMS 2003, condition 7). However, the DLA noted that, given the limited use of e-learning in schools, 50% would effectively address all of a typical teachers ICT needs (DLA 2002, p.3). The BBC, though, claimed that there was room in the curriculum for other suppliers. Nick Simon, executive producer at BBC Scotland told the Times karl.rawstrone@yeovil.ac.uk 19 of 34

Educational Supplement, in technology, we dont do manufacturing or workshop, nor did they cover physical geography, concentrating on human geography; but, In time, he said, it will become a huge resource. Eventually we are going to have 140 subject areas, mapped out across all the curriculums (sic) (TES 2006a). That would seem to be plenty for most teachers to cover their e-learning requirements. Condition 9 of the DCMS approval laid out a timetable by which the BBC would publish its plans for addressing specific learning outcomes, at least 12 months before the start of the year in which they would be published and broad plans a further 6 months before that (DCMS 2003, condition 9). Although the BBC was to consult with Becta (the Governmental educational technology agency) and the Curriculum Content Advisory Board regarding the content to be addressed (DCMS 2003, conditions 7, 10, 11), but no consultation with the commercial organisations was required. This policy amounts to giving the BBC the responsibility to give advance notice to the commercial sector regarding which subjects they were about address rather than the responsibility to consult directly regarding content the commercial sector could not provide. Supply would come before demand.

The above notions of choice and monopoly pivot around the central question of quality. If the quality of the BBCs and the private sectors provision is similar, then cost will decide the success of either, as suggested by the comparative audience shares of BBC1 and Sky1. Traditionalist notions of quality, popular among supporters of the BBC, suggest that increasing choice leads to reducing quality. Stephen Fry, a BBC broadcaster and traditionalist, providing some thoughts on The future of public service broadcasting, equated choice to an enormous bin liner, filled with thousands and thousands of those white plastic coffee-stirrers. It is the Reithian myth, tied up in traditionalism, self-defensiveness and de haute en bas monoculturalism as demonstrated both by Frys thoughts and some of the responses posted on his web-log (Fry 2008). This traditionalist mythology sees the BBC not just as the flagship of British broadcasting, but as the entire navy, defending British culture from the hegemonising swarm of commercial privateers. Is it appropriate in this late modern age, though, for the BBC, or any organisation, to decide what is good for the consumer? By reducing choice, whether by reducing the range of what is on offer or forcing choice by market distortion, the ability of the consumer to define the value of a service is reduced. In the late modern age, and key to the third way, the role of the individual in determining their own outcomes, having the ability to decide what is good for themselves is vital. Giddens refers to this in politics as participatory democracy (1998, p.67). It is a principle which may be equivalent in karl.rawstrone@yeovil.ac.uk 20 of 34

some ways to the free market of capitalism but which clashes with the Reithian ethic of providing people with what is good for them. It is claimed that BBC Jam had over 170,000 registered users when it closed (BBC 2007b), but given the free-ness of the service, this cannot be used as a simple measure of quality but, simply, of availability. The withdrawal of Jam has not left the consumers bereft of quality materials. A simple review of the quality and quantity of the current commercial provision shows a wide range of learning materials, many of which are highly valued by the people who buy and use them (BETT 2009). Quality does not seem to be an issue in this case, but the ability of consumers to exercise choice does.

The distortion of the marketplace by free content does not allow one late modern benchmark of quality, the market, to operate. As long as operating within a free market on level terms with competing commercial companies, and collaborating with commercial companies rather than simply commissioning independent producers, remains anathema to the BBC, the desired synergy between public and private sectors may not be achieved and the true value of the BBC to the consumer will be impossible to measure empirically. It is notable that while the commercial companies, rivals in a single market, were prepared to collectivise their authoritative resources in seeking a mutually beneficial outcome, the BBC seems to remain isolationist in attitude, and, although audience panels form a key role in developing and reviewing services (as did schools in the development of Jam services), the consultation of external organisations occurs only when required by its regulatory framework suggesting the ongoing defensiveness or even disconnectedness of the Corporation.

To address the argument that the Digital Curriculum would stimulate the market, as figures suggest it may have done (PwC 2002; BESA 2007a; BESA 2009) the positive impact of the BBC competing with the commercial sector, even on an unequal economic footing, should also be considered. By providing a base level of high quality materials, as many argue the BBC does, the level of quality which must be achieved by the commercial sector, for whose products users must pay or be subject to advertising content, must be that much higher. The acceptance of the BBCs brand as one of quality and familiarity by the market may have done as the Government intended, overcoming Stevensons barriers and promoting e-learning.

To take another side in the argument, it is important to consider the limitations upon choice imposed by the Government, both explicitly and unintended. The National Curriculum defines the boundaries of school education in Great Britain and both the karl.rawstrone@yeovil.ac.uk 21 of 34

BBC and the commercial sector, if they were to be eligible for the Curriculum Online scheme, had to adhere to its limitations. The unintended limitation of choice was further compounded by the appointment of the BBC as a primary content provider. Regardless of its actions, the BBC cannot be held entirely responsible for the consequences.

Complimentary innovation
The considerable authoritative resources available to the BBC through its composite myth allow the Corporation to pursue the self-regulated promotion of its purposes, but also, in creating a norm of considerable weight, restrict the Corporations ability to innovate and change. The failure of the BBC to act in an innovative manner during the events described here raises the question of what form innovation may take in the Corporation.

Scanlon argues that it is doubtful whether a free market would guarantee diversity and choice, and that there are few commercial incentives for companies to provide diverse and innovative content, particularly as the market becomes more competitive (2003, p.200). This argument, though, ignores the Governments intentions. It was, in fact, the responsibility of the BBC to produce content which could not be provided commercially (DfEE 1997, p.5). It was assumed that the commercial sector would, necessarily, follow the market and that this would, consequently, leave gaps in the overall provision. The role of the BBC was to use its public funding and freedom from market forces to fill these gaps. Condition 4 of the DCMS approval of the Digital Curriculum stated:

The service must innovate continually, and exploit the extensive archives of the BBC and its media rich resources, and promote technological and pedagogical experimentation. The service, taken as a whole, should be distinctive from and complimentary to the services provided by the commercial sector (DCMS 2003). That this condition, in particular, had not been met by the BBC was the primary continuing complaint of the commercial sector and the one which, arguably, formed the basis of the withdrawal of Jam. BESA stated that their complaint to the Curriculum Online Content Advisory Bureau on these grounds was upheld in 2005 (BESA 2007b).

What is innovation in this context? The BBC is keen to promote itself as innovator and describes its history as a pioneering journey (BBC 2009c). What is evident, karl.rawstrone@yeovil.ac.uk 22 of 34

though, is that the BBCs claims to innovation are largely based upon the remediation of content, be that theatre to television or television to the Web, in order to exploit each new medium as it comes along.

The BBC did not innovate the World Wide Web, in the same way that it did not innovate television or radio, but, in each case, successfully exploited the potential of a new medium. Nor, in the case of the Digital Curriculum, did the BBC innovate the market that they were to enter, as this had already been created by the private sector.

The above DCMS condition holds an inherent contradiction to innovation in stating that the BBC must exploit, or remediate, its existing archives to the new medium, thereby, at least in part, restricting the innovative capacity of the Corporation. The possible implication was that the BBC was to do what it did best, translating its content from one medium to another. The PwC report itself suggested that, some aspects of [the service] would notbe innovative (2002, p.35).

Evaluating the nature of innovation in relation to the structure of an organisation, Everett Rogers states that, "When the system's norms favor change, opinion leaders are more innovative, but when the norms are traditional, opinion leaders are not especially innovative" (1971 in Rogers 1976, p.298). This seems to concur with a view of the BBC as a traditional structure. It has been shown previously that the BBC is resistant to change and Everetts argument could be used to demonstrate that this resistance at a governance level extends its reach symptomatically to the Corporations approach to production. Reviewing early versions of the BBCs resources, the Content Advisory Board declared a degree of disappointment with the extent to which the prototypes demonstrated genuine technological or pedagogical experimentation (TES 2006b).

It is, perhaps, helpful to see the BBC not as an innovator, but as an innovation of State. The creation of the BBC by Charter was an innovation in the use of radio technology in the service of the public. The DCMS did not clarify what it meant by innovate and therefore missed the opportunity to use the BBC not as an innovator, but as an innovation.

Michael Grade, talking to the IPPR Media Convention in 2005 declared the importance of not treading the same ground as commercial companies: karl.rawstrone@yeovil.ac.uk 23 of 34

The BBC's assured income means it does not have to compete - nor should it - in the business of replicating commodity programming that is available elsewhere. It also means that when the BBC comes up with a really original new format, it should not attempt to wring every last drop from it. At some point, that hugely original new format will start to feel a bit tired, a bit repetitive, a bit formulaic. When that happens the BBC needs to be brave: move out, move on, move up. Make room for something new. (BBC 2005) This suggests what role the BBC could take in innovation. The innovation of new markets is something that the BBC, with its great experience and track-record in producing high quality content, could engage with commercial organisations, creating new sectors and new methods of working with existing media. This level of innovation is key to the success of the private sector, but is, as Everetts comment suggests, not a property associated with traditional organisations. Grade is correct, the licence fee means that the BBC does not have to compete with the private sector, but it has been suggested that their actions can have a very negative impact upon it. The difference is one of risk. The BBC, it could be argued, has its reputation to risk, possibly with the effect of having the licence fee reduced, but does not take real financial risks. In the case of the BBC, the risk is mitigated by the security of its income. In the private sector, risk is managed in order to develop and exploit a market. A third way style relationship between the BBC and private sector, which exposes the BBC to an increased culture of change would serve to increase the Corporations innovative capacity. Concurrently, the security provided by the BBCs authoritative and allocative resources could allow commercial corporations working collaboratively with the BBC to mitigate their own risks, by the connectedness with the BBCs resources, including experience and branding. In this way, the BBC could help to improve quality in the private sector, create new fertile ground for the independent media sector and move on. It could be useful to see the BBC not as a dominator of the UK media sector, but as part of the welfare state. In economic and social terms a reflexive relationship with the commercial sector could be created if the remit of the Corporation was as a social safety net - a neoliberal model (Giddens 1998, p.8). There is no desire for the BBC to chase ratings or do, as Grade commented, what the commercial sector already does. As a welfare organisation, with the public as its main responsibility, it should provide that which the commercial sector cannot provide but which, through a process of participatory democracy, not top-down Government edict, is judged to be

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required. This would cover content which, although socially beneficial, is uneconomic to produce, where the cost to revenue relationship is not economically profitable. If the BBC wishes to produce content which is capable of generating profit, it should do so through a commercial subsidiary and compete in the free market.

This view requires a new perspective on definitions of public service. The new politics seeks a synergy between public and private, and this recalls the old class struggle the worker-consumer and the capitalist. A third way would see both public and private as part of the same composite structure. Private organisations exist economically, socially and politically in reflexive relationship with each other, the public and the public sector. The BBC, given its privileged position as being in receipt of public funds, must use those funds to promote all structures of society, regardless of their economic, social or political models.

Giddens says that, a positive engagement with risk is a necessary component of social and economic mobilisation (1998, p.63) and advocates a society of responsible risk takers in the spheres of government, business enterprise and labour markets (p.100). He suggests there is too much reliance upon established economic institutions, including the public sector, and that, without entrepreneurship there is an absence of competition. He also suggests, restructuring welfare systems to give security when entrepreneurial ventures go wrong (p.124). An over-reliance on the BBC by the Government to deliver its educational policy threatened to stifle entrepreneurship and placed the BBC in the potential role of monopoliser. The direct funding of commercial companies to develop better educational resources and the collaboration and support of the BBC could have resulted in a very different, more positive outcome for all involved, not least the 170,000 children who were using the suspended service.

In Risk Society, Ulrich Beck identifies the division between the State and the business sector in the identification of risk. Risks as side effects fall under the responsibility of politics and not business, and therefore, politics is responsible for something over which it has no control (1992, p.227). In this case, risk takes on a contradictory nature. The Government, in its intentions for the digitisation of education, was attempting to mitigate the risks of globalisation and international competitiveness in the educational and technological sectors. In doing so, it created a risk relationship between public service and the private sector. Without the ability to

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exert complete control over the ensuing events, it nonetheless became implicated in the negative effects of the results.

Life after Jam: consequences

Both the Trust and Executive Board of the BBC decided that continuing to pursue a curriculum based service was not possible given regulatory constraints and ongoing commercial concerns (BBC 2008a), and BBC Jam was formally closed in September 2008. All 200 staff working on BBC Jam lost their jobs (Singh 2007). A post-investment review of the closure was undertaken and, following a short public consultation exercise, some of the indigenous language content of Jam, judged to have a high public value but low market impact, was released (BBC 2008b).

The structure of authority connecting the Government and the BBC remains largely unchanged through the formation of the Trust. Although the Nolan reforms (1995) set out a framework for the selection of boards, the appointment of the Trust is still made by the Secretary of State for Culture and the Director General is still appointed by the Trust, leaving the Government open to accusations of bias. The existence of the Trust unit does not seem to have solved all of the Corporations internal communication problems, as evidenced by complaints referring to the complaints system itself (BBC 2009d).

The Trust have yet to exercise the same degree of authority over any other service that they did over Jam and, although commercial complaints are considered under their Fair Trading guidelines and Competitive Impact Principle, no complaint has yet been fully upheld. BESA has continued its attack on the BBCs formal online learning provision, leading the Trust to partially uphold the allegations that the Executive, since 2007, had not conducted adequate competitive impact assessments nor had it sufficiently engaged with the wider industry concerning its new service developments (BBC 2009e, p.4).

The Government closed the Curriculum Online and eLC schemes in 2008 (Curriculum Online 2008). The scheme has been replaced by the Harnessing Technology Grant, which allows funding only for capital expenditure by schools. This may include curriculum materials, but only if their life extends beyond the financial year in which they are purchased.

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The size of the e-learning sector has dropped from a 165m spend on curriculum software in 2005-6 to just over 100m in 2009-10 (BESA 2009, p.5). This may suggest that BBC Jam did indeed have a stimulatory effect on the commercial marketplace, whether through increased take-up of online curriculum resources, the balancing measure of eLCs or the increased coverage of e-learning in the press caused by the inter-sector conflict over Jam.

Having smelled blood in their successful attack on Jam, the commercial sector is likely to continue to attack the BBC on grounds of distinctiveness and fair trading. Similarly, the BBC is likely to continue to defend its position in delivering its public purposes ultimately referring complainants to the external authority of the Office of Fair Trading and Ofcom. These attacks have continued upon the BBCs formal online learning and local news provision and have begun on the upcoming IPTV project Canvas. The more successful these attacks are, the more attacks might be expected across more of the BBCs services where they are seen to overlap with the capacity of the commercial sector.

The BBC is still at the centre of the Governments plans for the future of the media in the UK. In the Digital Britain report (DCMS 2009), the Government states its belief that the market alone will not provide plurality in the production of public service content (p.141) and seeks partnerships between a strong and independent BBC (p.142) and the commercial sector. Following the completion of the Digital Switchover scheme in 2013, it proposes a Contained Contestable Element or top-slicing of the Licence Fee to support commercial enterprise in socially valuable areas. The BBC traditionalists, obviously, do not support the move.

An upcoming election is not likely to see the revenues of the BBC increase further; indeed, a Conservative government is likely to almost immediately cut the Licence Fee. The next Charter Review process will begin in 2014, and may see more significant restructuring of the BBCs governance and operational arrangements. It does not seem that there is the political will, as there was in the 1980s, to destroy the BBC, but there is significant pressure for it to take a distinctive and positive role in a new mixed economy.

The events investigated here are not important for the changes which they caused, but for the changes which they promised. That the same tensions and contradictions remain in the independence and governance of the BBC and the relationship of karl.rawstrone@yeovil.ac.uk 27 of 34

public service to the private sector point to a lack of success in the Governments third way intentions and the ongoing structural connection of the BBC to its authority of myth and tradition. It is this authority, perhaps, which needs to be addressed before the BBC can take on a positive reflexive relationship with the wider industry, much as New Labour distanced themselves from the myth of Old Labour and traditional socialism to develop a new brand or myth as social neoliberals, subsequently gaining their election victory in 1997. So long as the BBC trades upon the past rather than the present or future, there is no way forward.

Personally, the complexity and sometimes paradoxical nature of this incident highlights the impact which the actions of the BBC have upon the UK media sector as a whole, but it also illustrates the unpredictable nature of cause and effect. As an independent producer, it is not enough to keep an eye on the BBC, to consider the desires and actions of government, the role of the market and media consumption and, of course, events in the global media landscape, but to be aware of the sometimes chaotic interrelationships and perverse consequences of even the best laid plans.

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Abbreviations
BBC BESA BETT DCMS DfEE DfES DLA EC NGfL SCCMS TES British Broadcasting Corporation British Educational Suppliers Association British Education and Teaching Technology Department for Culture, Media and Sport Department for Education and Employment Department for Education and Skills Digital Learning Alliance European Commission National Grid for Learning Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport Times Educational Supplement

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References
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