Paraguay and Uruguay: Modernity, Tradition and Transition Author(s): Paul C. Sondrol Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol.

18, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp. 109-125 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992904 Accessed: 06/05/2009 14:31
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Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp 109-125, 1997

1
CARFAX

Paraguay
tradition

and

Uruguay: transition

modernity,

and

PAUL C SONDROL Introduction Paraguayand Uruguay in the 1990s both highlight the complicated dilemmas of consolidating democracies in Latin America. Political change in formerly authoritariansystems takes place within the context of historical legacies, culture,the economic environment,as well as the structural/governmental arena. This paper analyses the nature,underlyingdynamics and outcomes of efforts at political liberalisationand democratisation Paraguayand Uruguay.As part of in the largertransitionsto democracybuffeting Latin America, EasternEuropeand the formerSoviet Union, the Paraguayan and Uruguayancases teach similarities and differences in elite and mass efforts to blend and reconcile newer, workable democratic elements with enduring authoritarian,corporatist arrangements. Detailed case studies often reveal importantnuances overlooked in broader, comparative works. Paraguay and Uruguay thus add a specific comparative perspective and analysis to the broader examination of regime change and that forms the paper's major contribution. democratisation; Alternative developmental models: Paraguay and Uruguay To educated generalists, Paraguay and Uruguay share certain attributes that would suggest a parallel political and social development. Politically, both countries possess traditional,multiclass, two-party systems that are among the oldest in the world; dating back to the 19th century.Culturally,the two nations boast the most homogeneous social structuresin Latin America (Paraguay'sthe most racially mixed, mestizo society; Uruguay's the most European), lacking large, oppressed indigenous populations,whose existence determinesthe socioethnic cleavages and economic extremes of wealth or poverty found in so many other Latin Americannations. Geopolitically, Paraguayand Uruguayare two of the smallest states in South America, and both are buffer-states historically ensnared between the combined and conflicting ambitions of the Southern Cone's two giants-Argentina and Brazil. Yet, despite these resemblances, a deeper examination of Paraguay and Uruguayreveals perhapsthe greatestdyadic contrastin Latin Americanin terms of socio-historicaldevelopment, economic progress and political evolution. For example, landlocked Paraguaywas colonised at Asuncion almost two centuries
Paul C Sondrolis at the Department Political Science, University Coloradoat ColoradoSprings,142OAustin of of Bluffs Parkway, PO Box 7150, CO 80933-7150, USA. 0143-6597/97/010109-17 $7.00 ?C1997 ThirdWorld Quarterly

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before coastal Uruguaywas establishedin 1726. Paraguayis one of the poorest countries per capita in Latin America; Uruguay, one of the richest. Paraguayan political culture remains largely subject-centred and authoritarian; Uruguay's is overwhelmingly participatoryand democratic.' Uruguay's democratic experience throughoutmost of the twentieth century was exceptional in Latin America, and light-years from anything familiar to Paraguay's drearyhistory of despotism. Uruguay experienced at least 60 years of democracy in this century; longer overall than Costa Rica, Colombia or Venezuela. Yet it is ironic that Uruguay's 'polyarchyof exception' was largely attributable the contributionsof one caudillo. PresidentJose Batlle y Ord6niez, to who overshadowed national politics between 1903-1929, engineered the integratingcoparticipacionpower-sharingmechanismsbetween the dominant,feuding Colorado and Blanco parties.2 Uruguay's Colorado and Blanco (National) parties, along with Paraguay's Coloradosand Liberals,3form perhapsthe most enduringtwo-partysystems that date from the 19th century. However, a distinction having enormous consequences for the dissimilarpolitical evolution of Paraguayand Uruguay was the of developmentand institutionalisation Uruguay'sco-participation accord, incorporating minority interests and labour into a unified governmental hierarchy. Incorporatinglabour peacefully through the party system and political party co-existence allowed Uruguay to stabilise and ultimately democratise by integrating disparateparty elites, their followers, and engenderinga strong societal consensus about the rules of the electoral game. By the late 1930s, Uruguay seemed destined towards a bright, shining future of social democracy. The country was enjoying or aspiring to a middle-class standardof living via progressive welfare policies, work in the huge administrative bureaucracyor nationalised industries. Instead, Uruguay began a slow economic and political decline beginning in the 1940s. Over-reliance on traditional commodity exports (wool, mutton, cattle and grains), coupled with a small domestic economy worked against industrialisation;Uruguay was simultaneously a modem, yet distinctly non-technological society, and one dependent on a more traditional agro-export economy, subject to all the fluctuations in price and demand in the capitalist world economy. Economic degenerationacceleratedby the mid-1950s, when exports decreasedin response to shrinking world demand, competition from sheep-raisingNew Zealand, and the introductionof syntheticfibres all conspiredto expose Uruguay'svulnerable, export-dependent economy. A growing trade deficit led successive governments to borrowincreasinglyand to expandthe money supply, triggeringboth debt and inflation.4 Economic pressures thus slowly rotted Uruguay's carefully crafted political balance, polarisingclass conflict as workers' demandsincreasedon the Colorado and Blanco political/patronageparties, which proved unwilling or unable to resist escalating sectoral pressures for increased wages, services, subsidies and public employment. The cumulative nature of this distributionalprocess inevitably collided with the limited capacities of the Uruguayan state, as the competition for dwindling economic benefits destroyed the consensual Batllista legacy and acceleratedpolitical disorder. 110

PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

As tradeunion strikes and riots enveloped society, a leftist guerrillamovement (the Tupamaros), spawned by disillusionment with governmental inefficiency and corruption,reached major proportionsin the 1960s. While urban guerrillas battled police, the ruling Colorado party, backed by the military, responded to the spiral of violence by moving sharply to the right. Uruguay's unique colegiado (a weakened 'collegial' executive system modelled on Switzerland's begun in 1952 and designed to preventcaudillismo) was blamed for immobilism and replaced in 1966 by a uni-personalpresidentialform with greatly expanded powers. A series of increasing political restrictions portended the gradual militarisationof Uruguayansociety throughoutthe late 1960s and early 1970s. By 1973, the military had assumed predominatepolitical power in response to the absence of cohesive, adaptableprogrammatic partiesand civilian paralysisin the face of rising civil violence. The demise of Uruguayan democracy in the 1970s thus illustrates the type of econo-political factors that can doom polyarchy, even where long-standing social conditions are auspicious. Paraguayanhistory and culture have been the antithesis of Uruguay's. Since independence in 1811, Paraguay has experienced two protracted periods of extreme tyranny (1816-1870; 1940-1989) sundered by one semi-democratic intermission (1870-1940). In fact, even though Paraguay's founding 19th century leaders-Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia, Carlos Antonio Lopez and Francisco Solano L6pez-were extreme despots, they are promoted today as archetypes of Paraguayannationalism and independence. Paraguay's involvement in two of Latin America's three great inter-state wars (the Triple Alliance War, 1865-1870; the Gran Chaco War, 1932-1935) also enhanced the position of the armed forces, perhaps to an exaggerated degree, as national saviours. Political leaders in Paraguayconstantly play up the historic reality of Paraguayan resistance to foreign aggressors and the Paraguayan military is probably more highly regardedby civilians than soldiers are anywhere else in Latin America. The decidedly fascist cast to the military regimes headed by Major Rafael Franco, Marshall Felix Estiggaribia and General Higinio Morinigo throughout the 1930s and 1940s reinforced the traditional xenophobia permeating values among elites and Paraguayan political cultureand enshrinedauthoritarian masses. These caudillos buttressedthe norms of resistance to and suspicion of 'foreign' democraticideas not geared to the realities of the Paraguayanexperience.5 An extreme brand of Paraguayan patriotism, an ethos justifying an amplified military role in politics, and a monotonous heritage of dictatorship punctuated by only brief and chaotic interludes of open government, are underlyingfactors nurturingand sustaining a soldierly elite vested in militarism and a public habituatedto authoritarianism. Having rarely experienced democracy, Paraguayanscan only compare an historical record associating strong-man rule with autonomousprogress,and open politics (as duringthe so-called Liberal era between 1904-36) with foreign domination and governmental ineffectiveness.6

Moreover, in contrastto Uruguay's congenial two-partysystem of incorporation, co-participation,non-violent competition and power-sharing, Paraguay's dominantColorado and Liberalpartieshave long remainedvenal and repressive 111

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towards one another. Whereas Uruguay's model of labour incorporationand party co-participationhelped spawn a profoundly democratic value structure, Paraguayanelites sought only to penetrate,control or crush organisedlabour;to exile and exclude oppositionistsfrom the spoils system that is governmentjobs and contracts. As a result, party hatreds are fanned along with the incessant denunciations, conspiring and vicious double-crosses that characterise party politics in Paraguay.7 GeneralAlfredo Stroessnerdescendedfrom this lineage of despotism,political intrigueand militaryintervention.His political life spannedan era of Paraguayan history characterisedby internationalconflict, civil war (in 1947) and military intromission. Following the Chaco War with Bolivia, Stroessner watched or collaborated with various factions of the Paraguayanmilitary as they seized power with mundane impunity: in 1936, 1937, 1948, three times in 1949, in 1954 when he seized power, and finally in 1989 when Stroessnerhimself was overthrown. In sum, throughoutmost of the twentieth century, Uruguayansutilised the stabilising aspects of an interpartyco-participationaccord, giving opponents a power-sharing role in government, until economic crisis and social unrest destroyed the civic culture. Paraguayans,however, historically played a much more exclusionary,zero-sumpolitical game. Out-of-powergroups, facing virtual control over positions and patronage,could expect little monopoly party/military except repression,exile or execution. Stroessnerdid not invent this system, but played these rules as he found them.

Authoritarian regimes The Uruguayanand Paraguayandictatorshipswere discrete from one another, to and particular the region. Many scholarshave arguedthat among the Southern Cone tyrannies in the 1970s, Uruguay's was the closest approximationto a totalitarianstate. Similarly, Paraguayunder Stroessner was overidentifiedwith various military dictatorships.These portrayalsare incorrect,and fail to capture the essence of these two hybrid forms of authoritarianism.8 Uruguay's military regime was neither a totalist movement fusing a utopian dictatorship ideology with an official party, nor a more traditional-personalist was similar to the developsuch as Stroessner's. Uruguayan authoritarianism mentalist, non-personalistic'bureaucratic-authoritarian' regimes (Brazil, 1964+ 85; Argentina, 1966-73) and perhaps even more analogous to the extremely repressive, demobilising 'neo-conservative' systems modelled in Argentina (1976-83) and Chile (1973-89).9 Military rule in Uruguay focused on hyperstablegovernance;the dictatorship was not a revolutionarymovement bent on driving citizens towards some brave new world. The armed forces intended to demobilise and depoliticise the political environmentin the face of civil unrest. Once in power, army officers and civilian technocratsapproached politics from the military'sperspective:with an emphasis on hierarchy,authority,discipline and solidarity. For authoritarian elites, democracy had meant compromise, immobilism, the substitution of 112

PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

political criteriafor efficiency, and a myriad of special-interestlegislation, for a rational integrated plan. 'Antipolitics' and an aversion to 'lazy and petty But militaryrule in Uruguay.10 the lack of participation politicking' characterised and representative institutionsalso blighted regime attemptsto form a mass-base of support,either throughthe existing Colorado and Blanco parties, or through establishment of a new official, military party, as in authoritarianBrazil. Uruguayan officers, out of mutual distrust and lack of political acumen, were also hamperedby the absence of a clear-cutmaximumleader, such as Stroessner in Paraguay, or General Augusto Pinochet in Chile. The military corporation ruled Uruguay, not a caudillo. Uruguay's generals remained a rather faceless
junta.ll

Stroessner's Paraguayis ill suited to comparisons with the various developmentalist, technocratic or military dictatorshipsthat descended across the far South of Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. While exercising control and coercion akin to the authoritarian regimes in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the ParaguayanArmed Forces possessed no moderuising agenda. Rather, the military under Stroessner remained a regressive, repressive institution, more representativeof what Almond and Powell termed 'conservative authoritarianism': preoccupied with the maintenance of existing social and institutional arrangements and having no transformativegoals. Stroessner had no larger utopian vision than keeping himself in power.12Moreover, neither the military nor the official Colorado party ruled Paraguay:Alfredo Stroessnerdid. Stroessner was junta like Pinochet in Chile not simply primus interpares within a contemporary or General-President Gregorio Alvarez in Uruguay. Stroessner was the classic 'strongman',totally dominating the political regime for 35 years.13 s Stroessner' autocracy-like Uruguay' s-certainly lacked any full-blown totalitarianideology. But it was also an exception to the general principle that authoritarian regimes lack ideational self-justificationsand mass legitimation, as few contemporary dictatorshipsendurea thirdof a centuryrelying on ham-fisted repression alone. While Stronismo never became a comprehensive ideology, a consensus gave spiritto the regime's vaguer, emotional attitudeor programmatic doctrine. Key elements included loyalty to the persona of Stroessner as president, a virulent nationalism bordering on xenophobia, an almost maniacal anti-communism and a distinctive communitarian,populist tenor. Stroessner thus secured a popular base for his regime. Mass acceptance of Stroessner stemmed from Paraguay's long tradition of personalist-authoritarianism, Stroessner'smanipulationof the ultra-nationalist myths and values of the nation, the penetrationand politicisationof the militaryand civil society and corruption, which glued regime elites together. A personality cult developed in Paraguay under Stroessnerthat resembled General Francisco Franco's in Spain, and even in certain aspects of EasternEuropeanCommunistregimes (particularly Nicolae Ceausescu's Romania).14 Yet the armed forces were a mainstay of Stroessner's regime and, together with the official Colorado party, acted as interlocking twin pillars of an authoritarian system that nevertheless possessed certain organisationalfeatures, impulses and leanings, found in more advanced mobilisational systems. The 1992 discovery of fastidious documentation from the regime's intelligence 113

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agencies reveals the pervasivenesswith which the dictatorshippenetratedalmost all social institutions, and belies the stereotypicalnotion that Stroessner's was simply an old-fashioned, poorly organised personalistregime.'5 The Uruguayanand Paraguayan dictatorships were differentfrom one another, and from their more developmentalist counterpartsin Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Yet, ironically, the machinery of dictatorshipwas much more sophisticated in Stroessner'sParaguaythan in Uruguay's militaryregime. The waves of authoritarian history that have washed over Paraguaynot only eroded incipient democratic ideals, but also sharpened the authoritariantendencies. Given Paraguay's violent history of mass-involvement in politics (notably the 1947 civil war), the Colorado party and its ancillary organisationscame as close to becoming a totalitarianmovement as Paraguay's rudimentarytechnology and Stroessner's limited aims would allow.16

Re-democratisation in Uruguay and liberalisation in Paraguay in In similar and differing ways, Uruguayand Paraguayparticipated the wave of political liberalisationthat appearedto sweep the globe, beginning in the 1980s. Analogous (but not identical) variables accelerating the demise of these two autocracies included: (1) regime failure of political and economic policy; (2) popularmovements acceleratingregime change; and (3) the role of the military in political withdrawal (Uruguay), or reconstructing governmental elites (Paraguay). Uruguay's generals proved as ill suited in dealing with the nation's politicoeconomic crisis as were the civilian political institutions, whose ineffectual responses originally politicised Uruguayanofficers in the 1960s. Moreover, the Uruguayan military created still newer problems that continue to haunt the nation. The junta claimed it came to power to build a 'new' Uruguay;to cleanse society of subversionand restore patriotismand traditionalvalues and to be the 'guardiansof the permanent'.17 Yet virtuallyall the military's attemptsat political and economic re-engineering failed. Most of the old politicos, as well as the traditional Blanco and Colorado parties, survived the dictatorship and reemerged in the mid-1980s firmly committed to democracy and civilian rule. Unions were never restructured, foreign debt quadrupledinstead of falling, and privatisationof moneydraining state-sponsored industries remained limited, despite the neoliberal blandishmentsof military and technocraticelites. Instead, the military's long drawn-outpolitical withdrawal-beginning with the 1980 defeat of its constitutional referendumand ending with the successful Naval Club pact in 1984led to a general restoration of a status quo ante (government giganticisim, presidentialismand fractionalisedparty politics).'8 In Paraguay, adverse economic conditions also accelerated Stroessner's political demise. The boom years of the 1970s, fuelled by constructionof the giant Itaipuihydroelectric project with Brazil, gave way in 1983 to serious recession stemming from the fall-off in construction activities. Thereafter, inflation, unemploymentand debt intensified.The boom had nurtureda nascent 114

PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

Paraguayanmiddle class and mobilised greater popular expectations. The bust left in traina Paraguayan populationmore alienatedand less passive towardsthe oppressive, seemingly interminableStroessnerregime. Institutionalisedcorruption, long an integral aspect of Stroessner's web of patronage and predatory sultanism, began to strain political relationships within the regime. Business elites, for example, traditionally quiescent towards-if not supportive ofStroessner in a Faustian bargain for peace and prosperity,began to resent the enormous rake-offs and graft among military and Colorado party elites and to hanker for a less politicised judiciary and bureaucracy.As Stroessner and the enduring clique aroundhim aged, the regime gradually deteriorated,becoming antiquatedand unable to conjugate more than minimal levels of legitimacy and
effectiveness.19

Militaryroles held certain similarities,but also differences in the authoritarian breakdowns in Uruguay and Paraguay. In Uruguay, civilian opposition to militarism was collective, organised and sustained. In a remarkable 1980 referendum,Uruguayansresoundingly rejected military attempts to institutionalise their rule via a new, highly repressive constitution.This stark defeat-and the military's acceptance of that rejection-uncovered (even among officers) Uruguay's latent commitment to democracy and the basic illegitimacy of military rule. From 1980 on, opposition to the authoritarian regime, though still perilous, was public. Thus began the long dialogue of military extrication between officers and civilian politicians, culminating in the 1984 national elections and democratic restoration.20 Uruguay's redemocratisation, along with Argentina's and Brazil's, left authoritarianParaguayisolated and buffeted by liberalisinggales from exiles, human rights groups and the United States Embassy in Asuncion. Unfortunately for Stroessner, the Carter administration'shuman rights policy had become an essential component of US foreign policy not easily reversed by the Reagan which subsequentlysaw an opportunityfor criticising and presadministration, suring Stroessner without fear of a 'communist' takeover, as a means of legitimising the Reagan anti-leftist 'dictatorship'policy in SandinistaNicaragua. s Moreover,Stroessner' small and remote despotism never had the public support within right-wingUS circles that Chile's high-profileAugusto Pinochet enjoyed. Paraguay's pariah status eroded Stroessner's ability to suppress dissent and to had maintainelite consensus, since US support(in the name of anti-communism) long remained a pillar of regime legitimacy.21 Unlike Uruguay, however, in the final analysis it was not any brawn within Paraguayancivil society that forced Stroessnerfrom power. Stroessner'sdeclining health and detachmentfrom day-to-daydecision making, a succession crisis, and most importantly,instability within the ruling Colorado party, led an army faction to intervene violently and overthrowhim, paving the way for a political
liberalisation.22

Uruguay's military thus presents a much clearer picture of praetoriandisintegration than does Paraguay's. The significance of Uruguay's prior democratic culture, illuminated in the surging empowerment of civil society from 1980 onwards, eroded the military's resolve to maintainpower. The 1984 election of President Julio Maria Sanguinetti of the Colorado party restored Uruguay's 115

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democracy after 11 years of military rule. The 1989 victory of Blanco party presidentialcandidate,Luis Lacalle, furtherconsolidatedUruguay's democracy. By contrast, Paraguay's prolonged praetorianlegacy displays no sustained precedent of the military accepting as normal a relatively narrow scope of prerogatives,nor of civilians governing military affairs. On 3 February, 1989, the Stroessner dictatorship ended as it began: in a coup. Unlike Uruguay's negotiated transitionbetween the armed forces and leaders of the major opposition parties, Paraguayancitizens played little role in Stroessner's ultimate demise; the army revolted in a classic golpe. Unlike Uruguay's popular-based transition, Paraguay's rupture was an elite 'transition from above' with the military as the major,controllingactor, maintainingthe same symbiotic alliance with the dominant Colorado party. The major difference between these two cases is implied in the section subheading. Democratisation and liberalisation stand as discrete transitional processes. Liberalisationdoes not necessarily imply movement towardsa democratic polity, since it is by no means certain that those who have presided over or promotedParaguay'srecent liberalisationefforts are seeking to transformthe post-Stroessnerpolitical system into a Western-styledemocracy. The Rodriguez coup was designed to correct contradictionsin Paraguay's authoritarian system, not abolish it. The transitionbegan as part of a strategy, orchestratedby the military, to restore the balance of power along more liberal lines, not to pursue a genuinely democraticoutcome. Change came to Paraguay in the traditionalway: from the top, via an 'indispensable'military leader, and without the participationof average citizens. Rodriguez is a wealthy beneficiary of three decades of collaboration with Stroessner, and a product of the authoritarian system from which he emerged. He-like so many rankingmilitares and Colorados-has been involved, during his entire professional life, in a whole series of parasitic ventures, involving rake-offs, graft and cronyism, that remaineda cornerstoneof his power. This is because corruptionwas an essential component which bound elite loyalty to Stroessnerfor a thirdof a century.High-ranking militaryofficers, partymembers and bureaucrats enjoyed lucrative side interestsinvolving rich sinecures in state monopolies that controlled major commercial areas, and which often served as fronts for less respectable, but more lucrative, businesses like narcotics The trafficking,contrabandand prostitution.23 blackmarketsystem of rake-offs and graft bought complicity, support,and a convergence of elite interests-thus decreasing the likelihood of inter-elite conflict since so many had a personal stake in the continuationof Stroessner's spoils system. The decision to liberalise Paraguay was more the result of a 'Dahlian' calculation by elites of the perceived risks in maintaining government by repression in the face of: (1) divisions in the once-monolithic Colorado party which threatened its symbiosis with the military, and (2) a changing international environment (democratisation,end of the Cold War and US support for anti-communistdictatorship),than any ideal implemented by enlightened polyarchs. In order to retain their power and enormous perquisites, Colorado and military elites determinedthat things had to change if they were to remain the same.24 116

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Authoritarian legacies Dictatorship left indelible scars and multiple meanings across the cultural psyches of Uruguayansand Paraguayans.For Uruguayans,the military regime utterly destroyed the carefully structured national mythology. The halcyon days of the late 1980s following the democratic restorationhave given way in the 1990s to the sober realisation that the consensual welfare state is illusory. It should be stated plainly that in Uruguay, as in most nations, civil society helped destroy its own social democracy.The old dole system was destroyed as much by inept political corporatism undercivilian politicians unwilling to say no to powerful group demandsfor services and subsidies, as by continuedeconomic mismanagementunder the junta. By the late 1960s democratic institutions and elites reacted to Uruguay's generalised systemic crisis and found themselves unable to contain mounting conflict. By the early 1970s sectors of both majorpolitical parties were disloyal to democracy. The parties abdicated responsibility in the face of economic malaise and an urbanguerrillainsurgencyby factionalising and refusing to form coalitions, thus leading to imobilismo.Civilians also failed to come to the aid of PresidentJuan Maria Bordaberry,when he was faced with a rebellious military. Most political groupsencouragedmilitaryrole expansion at one point or another, believing they could utilise the military to their advantage.25 Currently, over one quarter of all Uruguayans are dependent on pensions worth only a fraction of their former value. A jaded counter-imagery now pervades Montevideo, constructed upon a rather insipid foundation that Juan Rial terms 'inverse Hobbesiansim'.Ever-risingstandardsof living and advanced social programmesthat once made Uruguaysuch a happy and unique nation, are now sacrificed upon the alter of 'democracy at any cost'. Too much social upheaval over the perennial question of cui bono might usher in a new, revanchistmilitarism.A common commitmentexists to protectthe rathershabby socioeconomic status quo against any societal tumult enticing the military from the barracks.26 This societal reticence revealed itself in a 1989 referendum, to annul a controversiallaw exempting the army and police from Nuremburg-likerevenge trials for humanrights abuses committedunderthe dictatorship.That referendum was defeated and army immunity upheld by a margin of 57% to 43%. Another plebiscite (December 1992) soundly thwarted President Lacalle's economic privatisation scheme to sell off Uruguay's state-controlled industries. Uruguayansvoted by 72% against privatisation,despite the prevailingneoliberal economic reforms sweeping Latin America. The defeat was an enormous blow to the prestige of Lacalle, and sapped any remaining momentum for economic reform during the remainingtwo years of his term. The defeat of the privatisation referendum signalled Uruguayans' overwhelming desire to reject a new economic path, promisinglong-termeconomic goals (low inflation and balanceof-paymentsequilibrium).Instead,the nation turnedto the traditionsof the past; inept political corporatism,complex bureaucracyand the satisfaction of more immediate social wants/demands(health care and public housing). The process of political and economic regenerationin Uruguay provides lessons for other 117

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re-democratising regimes where the ethics of security can overridethe ethics of change. The intense longing for a returnto something like the pre-authoritarian past can overshadowand obviate historicalopportunitiesfor political innovation provided by regime rupture. The outcome of these particular, transitional 'moments' becomes the vehicle which determinesthe precise timing, style and circumstancesof regime change. In Paraguay,General Andres Rodriguez's coup and subsequentrubber-stamp election as presidentin May 1989, neverthelessleavened democraticyeast buds in civil society. To his credit, Rodriuez put some distance between himself and his consuegro (Rodriguez's daughterwas marriedto one of Stroessner's sons) and the patron that he had supportedfor so long. Press restrictionswere lifted, political prisonersreleased fromjails and political exiles were allowed to return. Rodriuez even thwarted the Paraguayanhabit of continuismo, by peacefully turningover power to his (chosen) successor. The August 1993 inaugurationof Colorado party candidate Juan Carlos Wasmosy saw a civilian president in Paraguayfor the first time in almost 40 years. Clearly, Rodriguez initiated something of a Paraguayan glasnost, as the Stronato (Stroessnerregime) has given way to a society brimmingwith upstart students, haranguingnews editorials and stubborntrade unions. But scepticism regardingParaguay'spotential democraticconsolidationexists given the nature and degree of authoritarianism there. Democracy has never been the norm, nor even the clear-cut preference in Paraguay, and the sheer duration of a halfcentury of military/Colorado domination makes any democratic transition difficult. Aside from purging some die-hard Stronistas, most of the traditional political elite remain in place-within the leadership of the Colorado party, senior army officers, and the state bureaucracy.Most continue to owe their positions to amiguismo (cronyism)and view these sinecuresas a sort of personal and private fiefdom from which to plunder.A long process of socialisationmust be sustained if a more democraticculture is eventually to emerge. The 1993 nationalelections were the 'cleanest, dirty' vote in 48 years. But the process clearly did not representa breakthrough democracy. The climate of for intimidationagainst opposition parties that precededthe plebiscite made it clear that the military would only accept a Colorado victory. The ruling Colorado/ triad controlled the guns, money, patronageand electoral Military/Bureaucratic machinery.The vote was not surprisinglymarredby premature projectionresults proclaiming a Colorado victory, convenient communications failures and a grenade and machine-gunattack on the only opposition television station.27 Wasmosy, a rich industrialistand political neophyte, appears incapable of cultivating or imposing loyalty and unity among disparate politico-military factions a la Stroessner. His weakness is evident in the constant political re-alignments and plotting, public denunciations,power struggles and military meddling that characterise the swirling vortex of Paraguayanpolitics in the 1990s. Paraguay's transitioncontains significant authoritarian elements and an overlay of newer democraticfeatures. It is not fully one or the other.28 For its part, Uruguay no longer conforms to the old stereotype as a sort of polar opposite of Paraguay.Uruguay today is more similar to Paraguay than Uruguayansever thought in the past: indebted, corporate,underdeveloped,and 118

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veiled by the dangerousprecedent of a politicised military. Yet, in contrast to Paraguay, Uruguay's prior commitment to democracy and more sophisticated citizenry inspires a certain optimism. Whatever its failings, Uruguay's is a 'pacted' democracy; one honed throughcompromise, give and take, bargaining and revision, between contending civil and military elites, congruent with the In old Battlista legacy of coparticipation. Uruguay,at least, political competition is almost always about increments; in Paraguay it is normally about wholes. In Uruguay, politics is about something; in Paraguay,politics is about everything. Paraguay's is not a 'pacted' democracy; it is an 'imposed' liberalisation in which a tolerantand accommodatingcivic culture akin to Uruguay's has yet to domination,as well as their almost develop. A half-centuryof Colorado/military complete control over the transition,bolsters a naturaldisposition of these elites to co-govern unilaterally, without any compulsion to push for greater participation and contestation.Reflecting the mood, currentarmy strongman,General Lino Oviedo, has stated that the Colorados, together with the military, will continue to rule Paraguay 'por se'culaseculorum [sic].. .whether anyone likes it or not'. ParaguayanVice-PresidentAngel Seifart echoed this point, stating 'the Colorado party's patience has its limits' if confrontedby threateningopposition demands defying historical parameters.29 In Uruguay, the foundational pact that led to military withdrawal has at least laid the basis for a degree of mutual trust among contending groups (the military, parties, business associations, trade unions, etc), if only because these groups are now socialised to proceduralbargaining. It is difficult to imagine anythingsimilar occurringin Paraguay.Precisely because the military/Colorados exercised such control over the transition,they have never fully agreed, nor been compelled, to compromise. The dimensions of political space are expanding in both nations. But in Paraguay,governmentaltolerance of and responsiveness to escalating opposition and societal demands show less adaptionthan in Uruguay. Harsheconomic conditions also continue to impact politics in both nations. In and rising expectations Paraguay,a decade of stagnantliving standards frustrated cannot long continue without serious repercussions for political stability, let alone democracy. A Paraguayan version of Mexico's 'Chiapas syndrome', replete with rural protests throughoutthe country in 1994, demonstratedthat campesinos are no longer overwhelminglyatomised and passive, and that issues such as rural land reform can no longer remain submerged by Paraguay's predominantlyurban politics. The government's knee-jerk reaction to peasantblocked roads and land seizures (in response to revelations that 15 million acres had been given to Stroessner cronies) was simply to dust off the shop-worn insurgency' cliche and order in the police and military in 'communist-inspired full battle-gear. Still, the peasant protests struck a responsive chord with Paraguay'sthree umbrellalabour organisations.These unions, protesting workers' falling wages (shrunkby 42% over the last six years in the face of inflation), coordinateda general strike on 12 May 1994; the first to be held in Asuncion since 1959. In Uruguay, anaemic economic growth (currentlyunder 2%), coupled with a 50% rate of inflation, now requires major cut-backs in the already emasculated 119

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social welfare system. Uruguaytoday has one pensioner for every two working citizens. The perennial Uruguayanquestion of 'who benefits' clouds expectations that development can be sustained without addressingfundamentalstructural reform of politics (factionalism in political parties) and economics (inept corporatismand statism). The November 1994 national elections brought former President Julio Sanguinettiback to power, but he must now work closely with his rivals in the Blanco party and a leftist coalition. Sanguinetti's Colorado party failed to capturea majorityin the 30-memberSenate, winning only 10 seats (the same as outgoing President Lacalle's Blanco party). The leftist Progressive Encounter coalition won nine seats. In the 98-seat Chamberof Deputies, the breakdown was much the same: 32 seats for the Colorados, 31 for the Blancos and 30 for ProgressiveEncounter.In orderto preventgridlock in a congress almost evenly divided three ways, Sanguinettihanded out six of 12 cabinet positions to the opposition Blancos and smaller parties in March 1995. Nevertheless, these elections-the third in a decade-confirm that Uruguayans have returned to participatorydemocracy, enabling very different political groups to express themselves.

Conclusions The Uruguayan and Paraguayan cases teach broader, comparative lessons in regardingthe vexing question of democratisation the ThirdWorld. One lesson cautions against the temptation to apply concepts (democratisation,military dictatorship,totalitarianism, etc) to a broaderrange of cases than is warranted, leading to a stretching or distortion of meaning associated with the original construct. The Paraguayancase suggests that civil-military elites in Asunci6n are overseeing a controlled liberalisation from the top down, as a means of triad that has ruled the nation maintainingthe military-Colorado-bureaucratic for 50 years. Certain special characteristicsof the Paraguayanexperience also suggest a proto-totalitarian tone going beyond the usual authoritarianmode. Paraguay hints that non-democratic regimes vary in direction, intensity and totality. Stroessner's dictatorshipimplies that the larger taxonomies are more ordinal than nominal;not final, immutableforms. Paraguay'scurrenttransitionalsystem likewise defies normal categorisation.To put it awkwardly,Paraguayis somewhere between a less-than-democratic and less-than-truly-authoritarian regime. Empirical understanding of comparative politics requires the use of more discrete categories. Simply to term all systems as 'authoritarian' 'democratic' or obscures important distinctions.30Paraguay is 'liberalising'; perhaps even 'democratising'. Paraguay appears to be attemptingto blend newer tenets of liberal pluralism with older authoritarian elements. Appearances,however, are far from meaningless, as they sometimes create opportunities for further changes. Thus a second lesson from both Uruguay and Paraguayconcerns the interaction of social movements and elite reformers in shaping newer democracies. 120

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While liberalisationis a cosmetic exercise in grantingselected concessions as a means of preserving the status quo, liberalisationsometimes provides strategic apertures for social movements to force democratisation well beyond elite
intentions.31

In the Uruguayancase, a military dictatorshiporganised a plebiscite it hoped to win in 1980, was shocked to lose it, but found it impossible to set aside the election. Instead of provided a controlled, limited opening, Uruguay's generals acceded to the vote count and returned power to civilians. Political scientist Samuel Huntingtonasserts that these 'stunningelections' are becoming a pattern in the breakdown of modern authoritarian regimes. Other recent examples in Latin America include the votes in Pichochet's Chile (1988) and Sandinista Nicaragua (1990).32 The whole notion of culturalexplanationsof national differences in political practices emerges as a third lesson from these two cases. The cultural variable evokes almost violent debate in academic circles. Cultureexpresses the uniqueness of each nation, thus limiting generalisability across cases. Perhaps most damning, 'culture'becomes an easy residualtautologicalcategory when no other seems convenient, implying a certain fatalism regarding change. Research, for political culture example challenges the notion of a fundamentallyauthoritarian in non-democraticregimes as 'natural'to the milieu.33 If Uruguay's polyarchy was exceptional and thus not to be compared with a more Spanish-American, Indian, authoritarian,or 'backward culture' as in Paraguay,what, then, led to the 1973 democratic breakdown?The Uruguayan case reminds us that more is at work in the demise of democraticregimes than simply culture. A crucial factor in political development and decay remains a political system's response capacity in relation to demands.34 Clearly, culturalexplanations,utilised sloppily, can lead to gross stereotyping and oversimplification.But the importanceof culture cannot be ignored. Carefully utilised as one among several importantvariables (political institutions, class, exogenous factors) political culture illuminates other societies, non-ethnocentrically, by examining patternsof orientations. Utilising the Paraguayancase as an example, one can argue that clientelism (interpersonal,dyadic 'contracts' binding individuals in asymmetricalrelationships of faithfulness and obligation) is both a cause and effect of authoritarian caudillismo; at least partly responsible for creating an intellectual and political environmentconducive to the steady ascendancy of executive-caesarism,at the expense of countervailing institutions (congresses, courts, pressure groups). Lower ranking members of a camarilla (political clique) anticipate aid, protection and patronage while higher status individuals (patrons) expect loyalty, deference and service from their clients. Paraguayansociety is composed of generally interwovenchains linking thousandsof patron-client relationshipsthat are organised hierarchically.In this way they cut across class lines to separate the peasantryand other lower-class sectors from one another,while reinforcing the status and power of elites. Moreover, distinctive to Paraguayanclientelism is the syndrome's linkage to the nationalpolitical party system. This effects the politicisation of the masses, yet directs their support to reactionary elites not acting in their interests.35 121

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In the end, any understanding Paraguay'stransitionmust take into account of the nation's sustainedlegacy of extreme tyranny.Its culturedictates circumspection regardingthe short-termhabituationof newer democraticnorms in the face of long-standing personalist, militarist and elitist structuresand routines. The cuartelazo by Senior Army Commander,General Lino Oviedo, in April 1996, only highlights the fact that the Paraguayanarmed forces may not govern at present, but they are never far from power. Since at least the Chaco War, no Paraguayanregime has remained in power without military backing.36 A fourth lesson drawn from these cases concerns the issue of defining civil-military relations,unresolvedin Paraguayand Uruguay,as elsewhere in the developing world. As a matterof definition,what, precisely, constitutes 'successful' or 'permanent' military disengagement? Like the larger authoritarian, totalitarianor democratictaxonomies, the case studies imply that 'demilitarisation' is more or less militarisation,rather than either civilian control of the military, or military interventionin politics. Does a shift from overt military 'participation'in governmentdecisions to intermittent'influence' mark successful withdrawal?In the Paraguayancase, how does a 'civilian' regime operate that is characterisedby near-completemilitaryjurisdiction over certain policy matters, with the army as a permanentfactor in any calculus of power? Lastly, Paraguayand Uruguay teach us something of the issue of corruption in developing societies. Corruptionin developing countries is misunderstoodin the First World; there exist functional attributes to corruption as a crucial mechanism in politics. By allocating spoils, corruption buys complicity and support from elites with a personal stake in the continuation of the system. Corruptionis utilised as a purging mechanism and scapegoat device; displacing blame for systemic, governmental failures and assigning culpability to less destabilising individuals ('a few bad apples').37 But corruptioncan become dysfunctional if it assumes an ever-heightening spiral beyond all rationalboundaries.Corruptionis pervasive in Paraguay.The Paraguayanform of corruptionclosely approximatesthat found in Mexico, but differs completely in magnitude and nature from that found in Uruguay. The Uruguayan variety is a malodorous lubricant for local political bosses and entrepreneursthat get public housing, highways, resorts and shopping centres built. Paraguayancorruptionis incapacitating;a malignancy that poisons an entire political and social system in which people rapaciously prey upon one another with little thought of ultimate consequences.38 The Paraguayanand Uruguayancases clarify and suggest new questions and crossnationalcomparisons regarding such diverse issues as civil-military relations, personalistrule, clientelism, corruption,reformismand liberalisation,and how value orientationsshape social structures.These are all universal phenomena, but their meaning is infinitely variable across time and space. At present, no consensus exists among scholars as to which conditions, variables, or characteristicsare most essential in understandingpolitics in the developing world;no single, universaland teleological 'grandtheory' of developmentexists. But this shifting focus in the literature,brimmingwith eclecticism and 'islands' of middle-rangetheories of change, representsless fractureand more a vibrant maturation of development studies. Paraguay and Uruguay illuminate the 122

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changes afoot in the Third World and the paradigms with which to better understandthose changes.

Notes
1Kenneth Johnson, 'Measuring the scholarly image of Latin American democracy, 1945-1985', in James
Wilkie, ed, Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 26, Los Angeles, UCLA Latin American Center, 1988, p 198. Johnson shows Paraguay ranking either 18th or 19th out of 20 Latin American states in nine successive surveys of democraticdevelopment at five year intervals.Uruguay,however, consistently ranked as the most democratic nation in Latin America from 1945 until the mid-1960s. and personalism may be found 2Thus, to one degree or another, an underlying currentof authoritarianism throughoutLatin America, but its incidence and permanencevaries across time and space. Viewed in this light, Paraguay'sGeneral Andr6s Rodriguez and Uruguay's Battle y Ord6fiezare not particularlydifferent. The more formal name for Uruguay's Blancos is the National Party. Paraguay'sColorado party is formally termed the National Republican Association, or ANR. 4See Herman Daly, 'The Uruguayan economy: its basic nature and current problems', Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, 7, 1965, pp 316-30; Luis Costa Bonino, Crisis de los partidos tradicionales y movimiento revolucionario en el Uruguay, Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1985. 5See Alfredo Seiferheld,Nazismo y fascismo en el Paraguay: visperas de la II Guerra Mundial, 1936-1939, Asunci6n: Editorial Historica, 1985, ch 4. 6Paraguay had three strong dictatorsbetween independenceand the Triple Alliance War in 1865. After 1870, the next 80 years brought dozens of cuartelazos (barracks revolts), overt threats of coups and seven successful ones. Between 1870 and the 1930s Paraguayhad 32 presidents,two of whom were assassinated and three overthrown.In the decade 1901-11 Paraguayhad 10 presidents, including four in 1911. The parties emerged from the ashes of Paraguay's crushing defeat in the Triple Alliance War (1865-70). Those claiming to be the heirs to Francisco Solano L6pez formed the Colorado Party. The Liberals, fashioned from survivors and descendants of exiles who fled Paraguay during the father/son L6pez dictatorship,constitute the main opposition. As a result of their collaborationwith the occupying Brazilians after the war, the Liberals suffered from an anti-patrioticstigma applied by the Colorados. See Harris Gaylord Warren, Paraguay and the Triple Alliance: The post-war Decade, 1869-1878, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1978. On 'totalitarian'Uruguay, see Alfred Stepan, RethinkingMilitary Politics, Princeton,NJ: University Press, 1988, p 14; and MartinWeinstein, Uruguay:Democracy at the Crossroads, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988, p 56. On Paraguay's 'military' dictatorship,see Roy Macridis, Modern Political Regimes, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1986, p 216. 9 On distinctions between bureaucratic-authoritarian neoconservative military regimes, see Hector E and in Schamis, 'ReconceptualizingLatin American authoritarianism the 1970s', ComparativePolitics, 23(2), 1991, pp 201-20. 10 The term 'antipolitics'comes from Brian Loveman & Thomas J Davies, Jr, eds, The Politics of Antipolitics: the Military in Latin America, Lincoln, NB: University Press, 1989. The quote was translatedfrom the militarycommunique,Juntade Comandantesen Jefe, Las Fuerzas Armadas al Pueblo Oriental: el Proceso Politico, Montevideo: Las Fuerzas Armadas, 1978, p 247. 1 Paul C Sondrol, '1984 revisited? A re-examinationof Uruguay's military dictatorship',Bulletin of Latin American Research, 11 (2), 1992, pp 187-203. 12 Gabriel Almond & G Bingham Powell, ComparativePolitics: A Developmental Approach, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1966, pp 280-84. 13 See R Andrew Nickson, 'Tyranny and longevity: Stroessner's Paraguay', Third World Quarterly, 10 (1), 1988, pp 237-59; Paul C Sondrol, 'Authoritarianismin Paraguay: an analysis of three contending paradigms', Review of Latin American Studies, 3 (1), 1990, pp 83-105. 4 Stronismo should not be confused with Coloradismo. By 1967 Stroessner had completely converted the century-oldparty into a personalistvehicle to develop a mass base of support.To the preexisting Colorado 'mentality' (traditionalhatred of the Liberals, a contempt for formal procedures, rather populist in party appeals to poor farmers), Stroessner melded authority with control and representationinto a leadership and absolutist regime (Ftihrerstaat).Stroessnerthus became 'El Continuador',in principle (Ftihrerprinzip) the tradition of Francia and the L6pezes. See Robin Theobald, 'Patrimonialism:research note', World Politics, 34, 1982, pp 548-549; FrederickHicks, 'Interpersonal relationshipsand caudillismo in Paraguay', Journal of InterAmericanStudies and WorldAffairs, 13, 1971, pp 89-111.

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PAUL C SONDROL The totalitarianfeel of Stroessner's Paraguay was evident in the Colorado party's systematisation of traditionalhatredsinto a kind of ideology, mass-line penetrationof societal life, and the politicisationof the military. What is particularlyinteresting regarding Stroessner is that his personalist rule rested upon no charismaticelements. See Paul C Sondrol, 'Totalitarianand authoritarian dictators:a comparison of Fidel Castroand Alfredo Stroessner',Journal of LatinAmericanStudies, 23 (3), 1991, pp 599-620. On the recent release of secret-police files, see R Andrew Nickson, 'Paraguay's Archivo del terror', Latin American Research Review, 30 (1), 1995, pp 125-129. 16 See Paul Lewis, Paraguay Under Stroessner, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, pp 225-30. 17 General Luis Queirolo, El Soldado, 74, August 1980. (El Soldado is a monthly periodical and unofficial voice of the officer corps published by the Centro Militar in Montevideo). 18 See Charles G Gillespie, Negotiating Democracy: Politicians and Generals in Uruguay, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1991. 19Corruption,as Stroessner once said, was 'the price of peace'. See Carlos Maria Lezcano G, 'Lealtad al Asunci6n: Investigaci6nesSociales Educaci6nComunicaci6n, 1986; Tomas Palau, ed, General-Presidente', Dictadura, Corrupciony Transici6n, Asunci6n: BASE/Investigaciones Sociales, Programade Estado y Sociedad (ISPES), 1990. On the Paraguayaneconomy, see Bejamin Arditi, Recesion y estancamento: la economfaparaguaya durante el periodo post-'boom' (1981-1986), Asunci6n: Centro de Documentaci6ny Estudios, 1987; Melissa H Birch, 'El legado econ6mico de los atios de Stroessner y el desaffo por la democracia', in Diego Abente, ed, Paraguay en transicio'n,Asunci6n: Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1993, 31-52. 2 pp 0 For analysis of the cronograma of military withdrawal,see Luis E Gonzdlez, 'Uruguay, 1980-1981: an unexpected opening', Latin American Research Review, 19, 1983, pp 63-76. 21 See Thomas Carothers, the Name of Democracy: US Policy TowardLatin America in the Reagan Years, In Berkeley, CA: University of CaliforniaPress, 1991, pp 163-66. On Paraguay'sinternationalisolation, see Jose Luis Sim6n, 'Aisalmiento politico internacionaly desconcertacion:El Paraguay de Stroessner de espaldas a America Latina', Revista Paraguaya de Sociologia, 25, 1988, pp 185-243. 22 A more detailed examinationof background factors leading to the 1989 coup is providedin Paul C Sondrol, 'The Paraguayanmilitary in transition and the evolution of civil-military relations', Armed Forces and Society, 19(1), 1992, pp 105-22. 23 The Cox newspapergroup, citing a classified US State Departmentreport, said Rodriguez was considered by US law enforcementauthoritiesto be Paraguay'snumberone narcotraficantero. See The Arizona Daily Star (Tucson), 5 February1989, p 11. 24 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971. 25 Gillespie, Negotiating Democracy, p 239. 26 JuanRial, 'The social imagery:utopianpolitical myths in Uruguay',in Saul Sosnowski & Louise B Popkin, eds, Repression, Exile, and Democracy: Uruguayan Culture, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993, 85-86 (uncorrectedpage-galley proofs). 27 pp See Jan Knippers Black, 'Almost free, almost fair: Paraguay's ambiguous election', NAcLA: Report on Democracy, 27 (2), 1993, pp 26-8. 28 Paul C Sondrol, 'The emerging new politics of liberalizing Paraguay: sustained civil-military control without democracy', Journal of InteramericanStudies and WorldAffairs, 34 (2), 1992, pp 127-63. 29 Latin American WeeklyReport, 13 May 1993, p 213; 27 May 1993, p 1. 30 In LarryDiamond, JuanLinz & SeymourMartinLipset, eds, Democracy in Developing Countries,Boulder, CO: Lynne RiennerPublishers, 1990, p 8, the authorsoffer terms to indicate the mixtureof democraticand non-democraticelements that can be found in the developing world. One generic hybrid regime is termed 'pseudo-democracy',given the existence of democratic institutions and procedures (multipartyelections, new constitutions, etc) enshrined in law that often mask a de facto authoritarian regime as a way of legitimising it. Paraguay's system, along with Mexico's, closely resembles this typology. But Paraguay's military occupies a far greaterplace in politics than does Mexico's, thus Paraguayalso parallels the less institutionalised, typically more personalistic and unstable Central American systems of El Salvador, Guatemalaor Honduras. 31 Shahid Qadir,et al, 'Sustainabledemocracy:formalismvs substance', ThirdWorldQuarterly,14 (3), 1993, 32 pp 415-22. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, OK: University of OklahomaPress, 1991. 33 See, for example, John A Booth & Mitchell Seligson, 'The political culture of authoritarianism Mexico: in a reexamination',LatinAmericanResearch Review, 19 (1), 1984, pp 106-24; and Susan Tiano, 'Authoritarianism and political culturein Argentinaand Chile in the mid-1960s', Latin AmericanResearch Review, 21 (1), 1986, pp 73-98. 3 At the same time, one could add that a militarycoup would surely have occurred-much earlier-in the long process of economic deteriorationand political delegitimation in any number of other Latin American/ African/Asiancases that lacked the depth of Uruguay's democraticculture.
15

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35 Hicks, 'Interpersonal relationshipsand caudillismo in Paraguay'.
36 37

On General Oviedo's attemptedputsch, see Wall Street Journal, 29 April 1996, p 1. Stephan D Morris, Corruption and Politics in ContemporaryMexico, Tuscaloosa, AL University of Alabama Press, 1991. 38 This observationis not empirical, nor universal;clearly there are many honest, dedicatedpublic servantsin Paraguay.But low salaries commonly justify utilising one's office to 'supplement'one's income, if for no other reason than, 'everyone else does it'. These impressions were gleaned during extended visits to Paraguayand Uruguay in 1989, and a year in Paraguayas a Fulbrightscholar in 1994 (including a month in Montevideo).

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