Phil law case digest

REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN

Posted by bestre on Wednesday, September 17, 2008 (GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008) This could be the first case that was decided under Philippine jurisprudence with such unique facts. The author first heard it in the news and decided to make a digested case of the same. However, the Philippine Supreme Court has no complete record of the case yet online. Despite that the author made use of available online facts provided by the Supreme Court and made it possible to come up with the case digest below.

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that "Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female." The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar. RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan's body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.
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Concepcion vs. Concepcion

Posted by bestre on Monday, January 19, 2009 (G. R. No. 147928, January 11, 2005)

FACTS: The land under dispute in the case at bar is the Zulueta property. The trial court in the partition case filed by Jose Concepcion, father of herein respondents, declared Jose entitled to a part of the land under dispute and ordered petitioners to contribute proportionately to satisfy said claim. Petitioners failed to comply said order. Hence, Jose Concepcion filed a petition for the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title of the questioned land before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu sitting as a Land Registration Court. Said court ordered the delivery of said title to the Register of Deeds for the registration of Jose's part of the land. Petitioners opposed the decision but said opposition was dismissed by the cadastral court on the ground that it does not have jurisdiction to resolve the matter. ISSU: Whether

or

not

the

cadastral

court

has

jurisdiction

to

resolve

the

opposition.

RULING: It is the decision of the Supreme Court that the trial court sitting as a cadastral court has jurisdiction to resolve the opposition brought about by herein petitioners. Under Section 2 of P. D. 1529, it is provided that Regional Trial Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of titles to lands, including improvements and interests therein and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The Supreme Court further held that the above provision has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the Regional Trial Court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. at Permalink | 0 comments | Email this post | Links to this post Labels: digested case/case digest (civil law)

ANITA UNGAB-VALERO vs. AMANCIA-UNGAB GRADO

Posted by bestre on Wednesday, January 7, 2009 (G. R. No. 163081, June 15, 2007)

FACTS: Timoteo Ungab, deceased, owned a parcel of land 14.3375 hectares in Binuni, Bacolod, Lanao Del Norte. Petitioner is the only direct heir while respondents are heirs of the brothers and sisters of Timoteo except one named Felix. There is a showing that petitioner and her mother signed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment recognizing the rights of the brothers and sisters of Timoteo. In addition to that a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties showing that a trust was given to petitioner to hold the land subject of the controversy. When respondents asked for their share of the proceeds of the land, petitioner refused to grant the same on the ground that there exists no co-ownership between the parties and that the latter is the sole heir of the deceased Timoteo. The lower and appellate courts, however, ruled that there is co-ownership between the parties and that respondents are entitled to a share of the proceeds of the land. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether

or

not

there

is

co-ownership

RULING: The Supreme Court concur with the defense interposed by respondents that this case involves coownership and not about succession. The Affidavit of Acknowledgment renders petitioner estopped from claiming otherwise. Besides it is a well-settled rule that where one does not have any rightful claim over real property, the Torrens system of registration can confirm or record nothing. The land under dispute was already governed by a state of co-ownership even before the title was issued. What petitioner has over the property is a trust aside of course from the fact of being a co-owner. This is evidenced by the Affidavit of Acknowlegment and compromise agreement which established an express trust wherein respondents, as trustors, reposed their confidence on petitioner as trustee, that the latter will hold the land subject of the co-ownership. Therefore, there is no doubt that co-ownership exists. at Permalink | 2 comments | Email this post | Links to this post Labels: digested case/case digest (civil law)

SANTIAGO vs. SBMA

Posted by bestre on Thursday, July 10, 2008 G. R. No. 156888, November 20, 2006 (This digest is taken from Ateneo Civil Law Reviewer, 2007) FACTS:

Rodriguez is claiming to be the sole heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez who, in his lifetime, was the owner of parcels of land registered in his name under a Spanish title. Rodriguez leased the parcels of land to Santiago and Mateo for a period of 50 years. By virtue of the lease, Santiago is presently occupying the land. SBMA, on the other hand, is claiming possessory, if not proprietary rights over the parcels of land, by using them for its own commercial and other purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not Spanish Titles are still admissible as evidence of ownership of lands.

RULING: No. Although PD 892 reads, whereas, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual possession..., petitioners cannot claim that they can still present the Spanish title as proof of ownership since they were in actual possession.

Actual proof of possession only becomes necessary because Spanish titles are subject to prescription. The holder of a Spanish title may still lose his ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually possesses the same for the required prescriptive period. Because of this inherent weakness, the applicant for registration of his Spanish title under the Torrens system must also submit proof that he is in actual possession of the real property by virtue of prescription. Taking the law as a whole, it has clearly set a deadline for the filing of applications for registration of all Spanish titles under the Torrens system (i.e., 6 months from its effectivity or on 14 August 1976), after which, the Spanish titles may no longer be presented to prove ownership. Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the property when they filed the complaint with the RTC on April 29, 1996, does not exclude them from the application of PD 892, and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their ownership

of the property, whether in a land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title. However, this does not bar holders of Spanish titles from claiming ownership of real property on some other basis, such as those provided in PD 1529 or in the Public Land Act. For sure, Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership.

MORE

RELATED

LAWS

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ERASUSTA, JR. vs. CA

G. R. No. 149231, July 17, 2006 (This digest is taken from Ateneo Civil Law Reviewer, 2007)

FACTS: Lucena de los Reyes (petitioners mother) sold two lots to Fortunato Amorin. Amorin took possession of such properties. Later, however, Pacific Bank demanded that the Amorins vacate the properties, claiming that such property had been foreclosed by such Bank. As it turned out De Los Reyes was deceived by a certain Benjamin Valenzuela, to whom she entrusted the documents evidencing her rights over the lots, the latter fraudulently transferred the rights over the lots to his name. Valenzuela mortgaged such properties to Pacific Bank. Respondent Bank foreclosed and bought the properties. The Amorins filed an action for Recovery of Ownership with Damages. CA declared respondent Bank an innocent purchaser for value entitled to the protection of the law with a better right over the lots than the Amorins. ISSUE: Whether or not the Bank is an innocent purchaser for value whose title must be upheld.

RULING: No. While, it is a familiar doctrine that a forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title, if the property has already been transferred from the name of the owner to that of the forger, the same is not true. This doctrine serves to emphasize that a person who deals with registered property in good faith will acquire good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a Torrens title.

It cannot be overemphasized that respondent Bank, being in the business of extending loans secured by real estate mortgage, is familiar with rules on land registration. As such, it was, as here, expected to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in their dealing with registered lands. Accordingly, given inter alia the suspicion-provoking presence of occupants other than the owner on the land to be mortgaged, it behooved respondent Bank to conduct a more exhaustive investigation on the history of the mortgagors title. That respondent Bank accepted in mortgage the property in question notwithstanding the existence of structures on the property and which were in actual, visible and public possession of a person other than the mortgagor, constitutes gross negligence amounting to bad faith.

In the absence of such inquiry, the respondent Bank cannot and should not be regarded as a mortgagee/purchaser in good faith. MORE RELATED LAWS at Permalink | 0 comments | Email this post | Links to this post Labels: digested case/case digest (civil law)

FELICIANO vs. SPOUSES ZALDIVAR

G. R. No. 162593, September 26, 2006 (This digest is taken from Ateneo Civil Law Reviewer, 2007)

FACTS: Remigia Feliciano filed a complaint against the spouses Zaldivar for the declaration of nullity of TCT No. T-17993 and reconveyance of the property covered therein. The said title is registered in the name of Aurelio Zaldivar.

Remigia alleged that she was the registered owner of a lot, part of which is that covered by both the above TCT and TCT No. 8502. It was originally leased to Pio Dalman, Aurelios father-inlaw. She attempted to mortgage the lot to Ignacio Gil, but the mortgage did not push through. She vehemently denies ever executing a joint affidavit confirming the sale to Gil and insists that TCT No. 8502 was never lost.

The Zaldivars, on the other hand, claimed that Aurelio bought the property from Dalman who, in turn, bought the same from Gil in 1951. Gil allegedly purchased the property from Remegia, the sale of which was evidenced by the joint affidavit of confirmation of sale that Remegia and her uncle purportedly executed before a notary public in 1965. Aurelio then filed a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-8502 because when they asked Remegia about it, she claimed it had been lost. A petition for partial cancellation of the said TCT was granted and TCT No. 17993 was issued in Aurelios name. They also alleged that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been occupying the said property since 1947, openly, publicly, adversely, and continuously or for 41 years already.

ISSUE: Who is the real owner of the subject lot?

RULING: Remegia is the real owner.

With respect to the claim of acquisitive prescription, it is baseless when the land involved is a registered land since no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, proof of possession by the Zaldivars is both immaterial and inconsequential.

Neither can the spouses rely on the principle of indefeasibility of TCT No. 17993 by virtue of the fact that TCT No. 8502 in the name of Remegia has remained valid. Remegias title, thus,

prevails over Aurelios, especially considering that the latter was correctly nullified by the RTC as it emanated from the new owners duplicate TCT No. 8502, which, in turn, was procured by Aurelio through fraudulent means.

Laches has not set in against Remegia as she merely tolerated the occupation by the Zaldivars of the subject lot. Therefore, Remegias right to recover possession was never barred by laches. MORE RELATED LAWS at Permalink | 0 comments | Email this post | Links to this post Labels: digested case/case digest (civil law)

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. ABAIRO

Posted by bestre on Tuesday, June 17, 2008 90 SCRA 422 (1979) (This digest is taken from Ateneo Civil Law Reviewer, 2007) FACTS: Petitioner contended that CFI of Isabela should have dismissed the application for registration based on an imperfect or incomplete title because it has no jurisdiction over it inasmuch as it was filed on March 1, 1971, that is, after December 31, 1968, the expiry date for filing such kind of application under RA 2061. The latest extension of the period to December 31, 2020 within which to file said applications, as provided in Section 2, RA 9176, shall apply where the area applied for does not exceed 12 hectares.

ISSUE: Whether or not the application is valid despite being filed after the period expired and before the extension was granted.

RULING: Yes. It is clear from the law itself that those who applied for judicial confirmation of their title at any time prior to the cut-off date of December 31, 1976 did so on time, even if such application was filed during the intervening period from January 1, 1969 to June 18, 1971. Respect should be given to the obvious intention of the lawmaker in extending the period for filing such applications time and again, to give full opportunity to those who are qualified under the law to own disposable lands of the public domain and thus reduce the number of landless among the citizenry.

MORE RELATED LAWS

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TIU vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Posted by bestre on Sunday, May 18, 2008 G.R. No. 142596, July 10, 2006

FACTS: Private respondents entered into a contract of sale with petitioner spouses. They agreed to sell their house and lot at a price of only P 15,000.00 with the intention of repurchasing the same within one year. However, it appears that petitioners thought it otherwise, that is, allegedly they bought the property in pursuance of a Deed of Absolute Sale. Due to failure of petitioners to reconsider the sale as one with right of repurchase, respondents instituted a case for reformation of instrument or rescission of contract and damages. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of respondents which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that respondents are victims of misrepresentation. On this petition under Rule 45, petitioners questioned the appellate courts decision on the ground that said court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in not considering a ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Luctan v. Court of Appeals (266 SCRA 663) that, the meeting of the minds in a contract speaks of the intent of the parties in entering into the contract reflecting the subject respecting the subject matter and the consideration thereof, and if the words of the contract appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.

ISSUE: The pivotal issue in the case at bar is whether or not the sale is actually a sale con pacto de retro or with right of repurchase.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Court of Appeals. The evidence of the case proved that the sale is a sale with right of repurchase and not an unconditional, irrevocable and complete conveyance of the subject house and lot. This is evident from the receipt issued by respondents and which was received by petitioners stating, among others, that the former is selling their house and lot under pacto de retro. The contention of petitioners has done more harm than good to their cause. The Supreme Court further ruled that even when a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property may prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage. Thus, the Deed of Definite Sale was declared as an equitable mortgage. In the case at bar, the stipulation in the Deed of Absolute Sale that respondents have agreed to unconditionally sell their lots to petitioners must give way to the true intent of the parties that the sale is subject to the right of repurchase in favor of private respondents.

(It is my humble opinion to add another decision of the Supreme Court in this case which may somehow be useful to you.)

In deciding the case, the highest tribunal enunciated that it is incumbent upon petitioner to present special, strong and convincing reasons to obtain the nod of approval by the Court. A scrutiny of the aforequoted grounds in support of the instance petition reveals that petitioner has fallen short of the standards set by the rules of procedure and jurisprudence. The petition has failed to convince the Court that the appellate court has ruled on a question of substance not previously decided by the Court; or has decided it in a way not in accord with the law or jurisprudence or that the court a quo has deviated from the normal judicial proceedings as to call for judicial supervision. On this score alone, the court is constrained to disregard this action as wanting in substance or importance.

MORE RELATED LAWS

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REPUBLIC vs. SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (SHAI)

G. R. No. 156951 & 173408, September 22, 2006 (This digest is taken from Ateneo Civil Law Reviewer, 2007) FACTS: Proclamation No. 423 which established a military reservation known as Fort William McKinley later renamed Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, was issued by former President Carlos Garcia. Areas specified in the Proclamation were withdrawn from sales and settlements and were reserved for military purposes. Several presidential proclamations would be later be issued excluding certain defined areas from the operation of Proclamation 423.

What is mainly sought to be declared as a nullity in this petition is the title over the parcels of land that are referred to as JUSMAG housing are in Fort Bonifacio being occupied by active and retired military officers and their families. SHAI, a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP military officers, was able to secure title in its name over the bulk, if not the entire, JUSMAG area. The TCT was issued by the Rizal Registry on the basis of a notarized deed of sale purportedly executed by then Land Management Bureau Director Abelardo Palad Jr. The investigation conducted by the DOJ, however, reported land scams at the FBMR and also finding that the signature of Palas was forged.

In 1993, then Pres. Ramos ordered the OSG to institute an action towards the cancellation of TCT 15084 in SHAIs name as well as the title acquired by the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel of land within the reservation.

ISSUE: Whether the land sold was alienable.

RULING: No. As regards the issue of inalienability, the Court upheld the contention of the Republic that the JUSMAG area is inalienable, the same having not effectively been separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and disposable. Until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a military

reservation remains, even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp or for defense. SHAI had not pointed to any proclamation or legislative act for that matter segregating the property from the reservation and classifying the same as alienable lands of public domain. Furthermore, the Constitution also forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable public land except through lease for a limited period. The whole conveyance process was also suspicious since the whole process was accomplished only in one day.