Castros Rise to Power

Economic and Political Instability Cubas political instability and sugar-centered economy were the result of U.S. influence through the Platt Amendment and the various Sugar Acts and reciprocity treaties. Marifeli Perez-Stable takes this stance in her book The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy in her interpretation of Cuban radical nationalism in the 1950s. The domination of Cubas economy by the sugar industry was responsible for much of its wealth but also a great deal of its problems. While the sugar industry generally remained a profitable enterprise in the first half of the 20th Century, Cubas growth was hindered by her dependence on it. It fostered unemployment or underemployment, the standard of living was unable to rise, and attempts at diversification of the economy were unsuccessful. Yet without the income and investment sugar brought into Cuba, the economy would collapse. This is what Perez-Stable terms the sugar conundrum. The United States was the main market for Cuban sugar, and its trade policy perpetuated the sugar conundrum, discouraging diversification in agriculture or manufacturing. The influence of the United States in the political affairs of Cuba is a vital part of PerezStables interpretation. There was a constant need to negotiate with the United States to preserve Cubas preferred sugar trading status, and decisions made by the U.S. were of critical economic importance to Cubans. Therefore, even after Roosevelt abrogated the Platt Amendment in 1934, the wishes of the U.S. government were more influential than what was in the best interests of Cuba. For instance, corruption became rampant as the most honest of all Cuban political groups, the communists, lost political clout because the U.S. was wary toward them. The Ortodoxo Party was formed in 1947 in response to the corruption in the government, but a U.S. supported military coup by Fulgencio Batista in 1952 robbed them of a probable electoral victory, and their chance to make reforms. Perez-Stable theorizes that if elections had occurred, there would have been a favorable environment for moderate reform, perhaps avoiding the later radical and uncompromising measures of Castro.

"The Cuba that Might Have Been" Had Cuba not undergone a radical revolution in 1959, Perez-Stable argues that the economy would have gradually become less dependent on sugar, although it would still be greatly dependent on the United States. She writes that "the transformation of monoculture appeared to be a matter of time" (33), believing that industries such as tourism, cattle-raising, winter vegetables, petroleum, and mass media had potential for growth in a non-revolutionary setting. In order for these new industries to prosper, however, military dictatorships would most likely continue, according to Perez-Stables conjecturing. For capitalism to survive in Cuba, the government would remain unstable, with leaders like Bastista serving as puppets to U.S. interests.

The alternate destiny of Cuba described by Perez-Stable was a realistic possibility, but the "class and state alliances that might have sustained such a transition never quite consolidated, and those that supported the revolution and its radicalization in 1959 did" (Perez-Stable, 35). Castros revolutionary movement unified the clases populares, while the clases economicas were divided among Batista and his moderate opposition. A corrupt and repressive government which held mock elections would never garner the widespread support that Castro did. But it would have been able to stay in power had the United States supplied more effective military aid. By refusing to send arms to Batista at crucial times, the U.S. ended up demoralizing the Cuban army, and strengthening Castro. If Batista had successfully stayed in power, Perez-Stables forecast of Cuban dependent capitalist development seems likely, in light of Batistas economic policies. Even in 1957 American companies were eagerly investing in a variety of new industries in Cuba, thanks to Batistas attractive policy on foreign investment. His government "offered both investment guarantees against nationalization and lenient regulations governing the convertibility of profits into U.S. dollars" (Patterson, 36). But Batistas corrupt government showed little promise of improving the lives of the majority of the Cuban people, one-fourth of whom depended on the sugar industry for uneven employment, and had a standard of living far below that of people in Havana (Patterson, 40). His encouragement of foreign investment proved to be more beneficial to foreign companies than to Cubans. That Batistas vision for the future of Cuba would benefit only a minority of Cubans made it unlikely that it would find support or success.

Evolution of the Struggle Against Batista The July 26th Movement, or the M-26-7, began on that day in 1953 with an unsuccessful attack on the Moncada Barracks led by Fidel Castro. He and his followers felt that the Constitution of 1940 had been betrayed by Batistas coup in 1952, and wished, somewhat naively, to begin a revolution with this attack. While the attack was a complete disaster, Castros trial was a sensation, and he used the media attention he received to outline his revolutionary platform, now in document form, titled "History Will Absolve Me". Castros plans for reform proved to be better thought out than his first military campaign. In it lay the framework of the major revolutionary reforms he would enact starting after 1959, dealing with land distribution, education, health, and corruption. Castro was released after serving only two years of his sentence, and by 1956 was situated in the Sierra Maestra, leading a guerrilla campaign against Batista. The group consisted initially of very few men, but slowly gained in strength and numbers. There was revolutionary fighting as well in the cities by other anti-Bastista groups, which mainly were crushed by Batista. The failures of the urban opponents of Batista secured the authority of the M-26-7 over all other revolutionary forces, leading Che Guevara to believe in "guerrilla action on favorable terrain as the best expression of the technique of popular struggle against a despotic and still strong government, the least grievous for the sons of the people" (202). The revolutionary movement had developed very effective military tactics after a year into the struggle.

"The Program Manifesto of the 26th of July Movement" was released in 1956, touching on many of the themes Castro discussed at his trial. Again the M-26-7 claims to be the heir to the revolutionary ideals of Marti. While continuing to leave the ideology of the M26-7 undefined, this document shows a greater tendency away from exploitive capitalism. It maintains that "the capitalist system of free enterprise inevitably leads to the accumulation of wealth in a few hands, while the majority is exploited" (129). In order to have a more equal distribution of the countrys wealth, pure and unfettered capitalism would not be possible. Still, the M-26-7 continued to use American ideas and language in their discussion of democracy and liberty, at times even quoting Jefferson and Lincoln. The M-26-7 was very much nationalistic, but hoped to have a friendly relationship with the United States. They had yet to fully develop a completely socialist ideology, even though they had common interests with many communist workers, and held successful strikes in conjunction with them. Continued U.S. opposition to the M-26-7 brought them closer to the communist camp. The July 26th Movement saw themselves as continuing an ongoing struggle to fulfill the Cuban national destiny. They revered the Constitution of 1940 and the ideas of Jose Marti, who they considered the founding father of Cuba. In the "Program Manifesto", each aspect of their planned reforms is prefaced with a quote from Marti. It was extremely important to the rebels to show that they werent going to continue the corruption of leadership in Cuba, but wished to fulfill the promise and potential which was missed after the 1898 and 1933 revolutions. In particular, Martis ideas on sovereignty, and the right of Cuba to pursue its own economic and cultural interests without outside intervention were fundamental to the rebels. Perez-Stable writes, "Fidel Castro and the July 26th Movement were intransigent in their summons for national regeneration. Jose Marti was their mentor; concluding the nineteenth-century quest for Cuba Libre their purpose" (60). The documents support Perez-Stables assessment of the M-26-7, but the later actions of Fidel Castro betray in some instances the Manifesto. In part 7 on civil authority, he quotes Marti who believed in civilian rather than military control of the government. Yet after the success of the Revolution, Castro, who controlled the military, was the real authority within the government.

Perez-Stable and Paterson The causes of the Cuban revolution, and the reasons for its successes are interpreted differently by the historians Perez-Stable and Paterson. The focus of Patersons book is to explain why U.S. policy toward Cuba was ineffective, and led to the radicalization of the Cuban revolution. For Perez-Stable, the Cuban revolution is seen more in terms of an ongoing political struggle within Cuba to counter the hegemonic dominance of the United States. Both historians place the United States at the center of their analysis. Even before the U.S. intervention in 1898, Cubas economy was strongly tied to her more powerful neighbor to the north. Both Perez-Stable and Paterson see economic influence of the United States as vital to understanding the political instability and movement toward a revolution. Perez-Stable points to the extremes of wealth and poverty to be found in Cuba, as a result of the sugar monoculture perpetuated by the U.S. For her and Paterson, the revolution is justifiable because it would vastly improve the lives of Cubans.

Paterson defines hegemony as "the dominance or preponderant influence that permitted U.S. decisions to condition Cubas politics, economy, culture, society, and military" (7). The Cuban economy and government became completely dependent on the United States, which encouraged the continuation of a corrupt sugar economy which hindered growth in other sectors. This stagnated economic situation, and political corruption led to the radicalization of nationalistic politics. The success of the revolution in toppling Batista is viewed by Paterson as the fault of the United States, who only worsened their relationship with Cuba by later trying to undermine Castros regime. Perez-Stable viewed the hegemony of the U.S. over Cuba as a continuous nationalistic struggle against foreign domination, going back to colonial times under Spain.

Why did the M-26-7 succeed? Paterson views the success of the July 26th Movement in terms of Cuba "getting away" from the United States. For a variety of reasons, the great world power of the United States lost its control and influence over the politics of a small island only 90 miles away. For one, the United States completely underestimated the military and political manuevering skills of Castro, and believed that Batista generally had things under control. U.S. officials didnt realize the extent of the popular discontentment with the increasingly repressive Batista regime. Furthermore, Castro did not appear to be a communist, and there were other conflicts throughout the world which seemed more pressing. Similar to the movements of the 1930s and 1890s, the M-26-7 definitely had a popular mandate within Cuba to check the hegemony of its dominating foreign power. The reason that the M-26-7 was able to succeed while the prior two movements failed is that Castro and his men refused at any point to compromise their ideals. They were ardent in their opposition to foreign intervention in the revolution, and pursued a political and economic future independent of the United States. They were determined not to miss the chances missed in the passed. They realized, in the words of Marti, that "The only fruitful and lasting peace and freedom are those accomplished by ones own effort" (Manifesto, 130). References Castro, Fidel. "History Will Absolve Me", excerpt from The U.S., Cuba and the Cold War: American Failure or Communist Conspiracy? Ed. L. Langley, Lexington Mass, 1970. 26th of July Movement, "Program Manifesto of the 26th of July Movement", in Cuba in Revolution ed. R. Bonachea and Nelson Valdes, Garden City NJ, 1972. Guevara, Ernesto Che. "One Year of Armed Struggle", from Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, trans. Victor Ortiz, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968. Perez-Stable, Marifeli. The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy. Oxford University Press, NY 1993.

Paterson, Thomas G. Contesting Castro: The U.S. and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution. Oxford University Press, NY 1994.