American Pershing II, At the White Sands Missile Range Museum

OperationRYAN,AbleArcher83,andMiscalculation: TheWarScareof1983 ByNathanBennettJones FortheUniversityofCaliforniaSantaBarbara InternationalGraduateStudentConferenceontheColdWar April2008

 Introduction "MyfellowAmericans,IampleasedtotellyoutodaythatIvesignedlegislationthatwilloutlaw Russiaforever.Webeginbombinginfiveminutes,broadcastthevoiceofPresidentRonaldReaganover Americanradiowaves.1MorestartlingthanthePresidentspoorsenseoftimingandhumorwasthe dangerousandsecretnuclearconfrontationbetweentheSovietUnionandUnitedStatesduringtheWar Scareof1983. MikhailGorbachevhasrecalled,Never,perhaps,inthepostwardecadeswasthesituationin theworldasexplosiveandhence,moredifficultandunfavorable,asinthefirsthalfofthe1980s.2The SovietStatewasmiredinacostlyandseeminglyunwinnablewarinAfghanistan,anditseconomywas continuingtofallbehindtheWestintechnologyandconsumergoodsproduction.TheWestern introductionofnew,qualitativelymorepowerfulweaponssuchasthespacebasedmissiledefense systemandthesupersuddenfirststrikePershingIImissilesincreasedSovietleadershipsbeliefthat thecorrelationofWorldforceswasturningagainsttheUSSR.TheeminentEuropeandeploymentof PershingIImissileswasespeciallystartlingtoMoscow;theycouldreachtheSovietUnioninminutes andtheoreticallycoulddecapitateSovietnuclearcommandbeforeitwouldbeabletolauncha counterattack.3InafranticattempttomaintainparitywiththeUnitedStates,theSovietleadership launchedOperationRYAN,anacronymforRaketnoYadernoyeNapadenie,nuclearmissileattack.RYAN wasthelargestintelligenceoperationinSoviethistorywiththeintentiontodetectand,frighteningly, preemptanAmericannuclearattack.

On11August1984Reaganjokinglymadethesecommentsduringamiccheckbeforehisnationalradioaddress. Hisjokewaspromptlybroadcastbynewsassociations,butnotlive.SeeNewYorkTimes14August1984. 2 February1986.QuotedinBenjaminB.Fischer,AColdWarConundrum,HistoryStaffCenterfortheStudyof Intelligence(1997).https://www.cia.gov/library/centerforthestudyofintelligence/csipublications/booksand monographs/acoldwarconundrum/source.htm,accessed20March2008. 3 ChristopherAndrewandOlegGordievsky,eds.,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructionsTopSecretFilesonKGBForeign Operations,19751985(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1993),6781.

1

Reagan,forhispart,alsorealizedtheabsurdityofnuclearwar;asheaccuratelysurmised,It wouldbeliketwospidersinabottlelockedinasuicidalfightuntilbothweredead.4Uponentering officehesignedasecretexecutiveorder,knownastheContinuityofGovernmentProgram(Cog).This orderestablished50wartimebunkersforgovernmentleadershipthroughouttheUnitedStatesand createdthreeshadowgovernmentteamsthatwouldassumecontrolduringandafteracatastrophe. ItalsokeptarealtimecomputerdatabaseoneachoftheseventeenUSofficialsinlinetosucceedthe president.5Despitethisaversiontoatomicweapons,Reagansjustificationforhisearlymilitarybuildup wasthatAtthefoundationofmyforeignpolicy,Idecidedwehadtosendaspowerfulmessageaswe couldtotheRussiansOurpolicywastobeonebasedonstrengthandrealism.Iwantedpeacethrough strength,notpeacethroughapieceofpaper.6 ThecrucibleoftheWarScaretheintersectionofthetwosuperpowersnuclearfearsand provocationswasaNovember1983NATOexercisecodenamedAbleArcher83.AbleArcher83wasa commandpostexercisewhichsimulatedaNATOwarwiththeSovietUnionandculminatedina coordinatedandhighlyrealisticsimulatednuclearrelease.Althoughthesourcesremainmeager, historiansnowknowthaton5November1983,KGBagentsintheLondonResidencyreceiveda telegramfromtheKGBCenterinMoscow.Thistelegraminstructedtheagentstogatherinformation regardinganimminentnuclearfirststrikebytheUnitedStatesoritsallies.7TheCenter,fearingthe "steppedup...tempoandscaleofmilitarypreparations"oftheUnitedStates,statedintelegramthatit wasthedutyoftheagentsabroadtodetecttheAmericandecisiontoattack:therewouldbeacrucial delaybetweenthisdecisionandactualstrike.Ifintelligenceagentsdetectedthiswindow,theSoviet Unioncouldpreemptthenuclearattackand,assomePolitburomembersbelieved,survivenuclearwar.8

4 5

RonaldReagan,AnAmericanLife(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,1990),257 JamesMann,TheRiseoftheVulcans:TheHistoryofBushsWarCabinet(NewYork:Viking,2004),139145. 6 Reagan,AnAmericanLife,267. 7 AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,8788. 8 AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,7486.

ParanoiareacheditsheightlessthanaweeklaterwhentheCentersentfurthertelegramstointelligence agentsabroadannouncingthatsomeUSmilitarybaseshadmovedtoalert.ItappearedtoSoviet IntelligencethattheMainAdversaryhaddecidedtolaunchasecretnuclearattack.Despiteor perhapsbecauseofthiscompletemiscalculationbySovietintelligence,thisNovembercrisiswasthe closesttheworldhadcometonuclearwarsincetheCubanMissileCrisisof1962.9 ThispaperwillcontinuetodevelopandcontributetothehistoricalnarrativeofOperationRYAN andAbleArcher83,withparticularregardtowardsthemindsetandperspectiveoftheSovietleadership duringthissecretcrisis.ThispaperhistoriographicallyfollowsWarScare:RussiaandAmericaonthe NuclearBrinkbyPeterVincentPry,TheReaganReversal:ForeignPolicyandtheEndoftheColdWar,by BethA.Fischer,andAColdWarConundrumandTheSovietAmericanWarScareofthe1980s,by BenjaminB.Fischer.ThispapersresearchdrawsfromprimarysourceKGBandCIAdocuments, journals,memoirs,andinterviewspublishedandunpublishedwithkeyactors.Includedinthisbodyof originalresearchisthememorandumrevealingaJune1983meetingbetweenAndropovandformer AmbassadortotheSovietUnionAverillHarriman,textofAndropovs1983speechtotheWarsawPact PoliticalConsultativeCommittee,andaninterviewwithUSAmbassadortoNATODavidM.Abshire,who servedfromJuly1983toJanuary1987.ThispaperhasalsodrawnfromRussianlanguagesources includinganarticledetailingOperationRYANinNovostirazvedkiIkontrrazvedki,andTheOffensive,a manualdescribingSovietmilitarydoctrine. TheEraofRenewedConfrontationisanimportantyetrelativelyunstudiedareaoftheCold

AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,8788;JohnLewisGaddis,interviewbyCNN,27 September1998,http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/guides/debate/chats/gaddis/,accessed20March2008. 9 AndrewandOlegGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,7486. 9 AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,8788;JohnLewisGaddis,interviewbyCNN,27 September1998,http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/guides/debate/chats/gaddis/,accessed20March December2008

9

War.10Inmanyways,todaysAmericanRussianrelationsmirrorthoseoftheearly1980s;afterall,one ofVladimirPutinsfirstactionsasPresidentwastoreinstallAndropovsplaqueatLubyanka.11 Furthermore,AbleArcher83servesasacasestudyofnuclearescalationbetweenstates.TheSoviet implementationofthecolossalifineffectiveintelligenceoperationcanbestudiedasanexampleof thedrasticmeasureswaningstateactorscantake. OperationRYANandAbleArcher83pushedtheworlddangerouslyclosetothenuclearabyss. Thepurposeofthispaperistocontributetoanunderstandingoftheseeventsandexplorethepolicies whichcreatedtheWarScareaswellasthepolicieswhichwerebornoutofit. TheEraofRenewedConfrontation Thenucleardangeroftheearly1980swasdirectlyrelatedtothedeclineofdtente.When Reaganassumedthepresidency,AmericanSovietrelationshadreturnedtothecontentiousconditions presentfiveadministrationsearlierduringthe1962CubanMissileCrisis.Thesignsofthedeterioration ofdtentewerevisibleinsuchSovietactionsasitsinvasionofAfghanistanandprovocativeintroduction ofSS20missilesaimedtowardstheWest.ThisdeteriorationhastenedwiththeelectionofReagan,who declaredinhisfirstpressconferencethat,DtentesbeenaonewaystreetthattheSovietUnionhas usedtopursueitsownaimsofworldrevolutionandaoneworldSocialistorCommuniststate.12Inhis efforttostandtallagainsttheSovietUnion,hecurtailedbothformalandbackchannelcontact,and abandonedSALTII(StrategicArmsLimitationTalks.)Therelativeparityachievedbythetwopowers duringthetwentyyearssincetheMissilesofOctoberhaddisappearedby1983,preparingthepathfor theMissilesofNovember.
ThisperiodhasalsobeencoinedTheSecondColdWar.SeeRaymondL.GarthoffTheGreatTransition: AmericanSovietRelationsandtheEndoftheColdWar(WashingtonDC:TheBrookingsInstitution,1994). 11 SeeLiteraturnaiagazeta31May2000. 12 29January1981,RonaldReagan,ThePresidentsFirstNewsConference,Room450oftheOldExecutiveOffice Building,WashingtonD.C.,,http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/12981b.htm,accessed30 March2008.
10

On4January1983AndropovgavespeechinPraguetothePoliticalConsultativeCommittee,the controllingorganoftheWarsawPactcounties.Andropovspokealmostexclusivelyoftheescalationof Westernweaponscapabilities;heclearlyimpliedtheEuropeandeploymentofMinutemanandPershing IImissiles.HeannouncesthattheWarsawsPactsonlyoptionwastocontinuestrivingtomaintain paritybutwarned, Thenewroundofthearmsrace,whichisbeingimposedbytheUnitedStates,has principalqualitativefeaturesthatdistinguishitfromthepreviousones.Ifinthepastthe Americans,whenspeakingabouttheirnuclearweapons,preferredtoemphasizethe factthatthosewere,firstofall,meansof"deterrence,"now,bycreatingtheimproved missilesystems,theyarenottryingtoconcealthefactthatthosearerealistically designedforafuturewar.Thisiswherethedoctrinesofa"rational"or"limited"nuclear warcomefrom,thisisthesourceoftheargumentsaboutthepossibilitytosurviveand towininaprotractednuclearconflict.13 InaPolitburomeetingfourmonthslater,Andropovcontinuedtodecrytheantisovietcoalitionbeing formedoutthere.Tocombatthegrowingdanger,theChairmancounseledthat,weshouldshow morebrightlyandfullythemilitaryactionsoftheReaganadministrationandthesupportingcountriesof WesternEurope,whichinotherwordsmeansdisclosinginfullscaletheaggressivecharacterofthe enemy.14AsalludedbyAndropov,theintroductiontoEuropeofsupersuddenfirststrikePershingII missilesdashedthenuclearparitybetweenthesuperpowersanddirectlycontributedtothedangerof 1983. PerhapsthemostdamagingaspectoftheEraofRenewedConfrontationwasthelackof communicationbetweenthesuperpowers.DuringhisfifteenmonthreignasSecretaryGeneral, AndropovneversubstantivelymetwithahighlevelAmericanofficial.Reagandidnotmeetwitha Sovietleaderuntilhissecondterm.ReagansfirstSecretaryofState,AlexanderHaig,justifiedthislack
4January1983,SpeechbyAndropov,toPoliticalConsultativeCommitteeinPrauge,theVA01/40473, BundesarchivMilitrarchiv,Freiburg;translatedbySvetlanaSavranskayafromtheNationalSecurityArchive, GeorgeWashingtonUniversity. 14 31May1983SessionofPolitburoofCCCPSUinMoscow,Rossiiskiigosudarstvennyiarkhivnoveisheiistorii [RussianStateArchiveforContemporaryHistory]F.89,Op.42,D.53,L1114;translatedbyLenaMilmanfromThe ColdWarInternationalHistoryProjectBulletin,Issue4,Fall1994.
13

ofdialoguebecause,Atthisearlystagetherewasnothingsubstantivetotalkabout,nothingto negotiate,untiltheUSSRbegantodemonstrateitswillingnesstobehavelikearesponsiblepower.That wasthebasisofourearlypolicytowardMoscow.15On2June1983,W.AverellHarriman,inwhatthe SovietsviewedasthefirstrealmeetingbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionsincethestart ofthecurrent[Reagan]administration,travelledtoMoscowtomeetAndropov.16AlthoughHarriman claimedtomeetasaprivatecitizen,hewasbriefedanddebriefedbyGeorgeSchultz,Reaganssecond SecretaryofState.HarrimansmemorandumofhisconversationwithAndropovrevealsafrank exchangeofviewsandaspirations.Andropovbegantheconversation:Letmesaythatthereareindeed groundsforalarm.HebemoanedtheharshantiSoviettoneofthePresidentandwarnedthat,the previousexperienceofrelationsbetweentheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatescautionsbeyondall doubtthatsuchapolicycanmerelyleadtoaggravation,complexityanddanger.Andropovalludedto nuclearwarfourtimesduringhisshortstatement;mostominouslyhemoroselystated,Itwouldseem thatawarenessofthisdangershouldbepreciselythecommondenominatorwithwhichstatesmenof bothcountrieswouldexerciserestraintandseekmutualunderstandingtostrengthenconfidence,to avoidtheirreparable.However,ImustsaythatIdonotseeitonthepartofthecurrentAdministration andtheymaybemovingtowardthedangerousredline.17 HarrimanconcludedthattheprincipalpointwhichtheGeneralSecretaryappearedtobetrying togetacrosstoMrs.Harriman[whowasalsopresent]andmewasagenuineconcernoverthestateof U.S.Sovietrelationsandhisdesiretoseethematleastnormalized,ifnotimproved.Heseemedto havearealworrythatwecouldcomeintoconflictthroughmiscalculation.SomebelievedAndropov wascoylyusingaccidentalnuclearblackmailtotrumpthesuperiorstrategicpositionoftheUnited
AlexanderHaig,Caveat:Realism,Reagan,andForeignPolicy(NewYork:Scribner,1984),105. 2June1983,MemorandumofConversationwithArbatov.W.AverillHarrimanPapers,Box655,Manuscript Division,LibraryofCongress. 17 2June1983,MemorandumofConversationwithAndropov.W.AverillHarrimanPapers,Box655,Manuscript Division,LibraryofCongress.
16 15

States.TheActingDirectorofCentralIntelligence,JohnN.McMahon,assertedina3Feb1984letterto NationalSecurityAdvisorBudMcFarlane,that,Clearly,Andropovhasastakeintheappearanceof bilateraltensionaslongasitappearsthattheUnitedStatesistheoffendingparty.Thiswouldnotbe thefirsttimethatSovietleadershaveusedinternationaltensionstomobilizetheirpopulation.18 ThebodyofevidencerefutesMcMahonsclaimandsupportsAmbassadorHarrimansbeliefthat AndropovwastrulyfearfuloftherapidlydeterioratingSovietAmericanrelations.EvenReagans previousSecretaryofState,thehawkishAlexanderHaig,believedthatSovietAmericanhostilities, [werenot]atitfortatresponse.TheSovietsstayedvery,verymoderate,very,very,responsible, duringthefirstthreeyearsofthisadministration.Iwasmindboggledwiththeirpatience.Theywere genuinelytrying.Whattheyhadntfaceduptowaswhatitwouldreallytaketoconvinceus.19 AnylingeringhopesAndropovhadfornormalizedrelationswiththeUnitedStateswereloston 1September1983whentheSovietUnionshotdownacivilianairliner,KAL007,afterithadflowninto itsairspace.ToReagan,theattackrepresentedeverythingwrongwiththeSovietUnion;hedecriedthe Sovietactionsasbarbaric,andacrimeagainsthumanity.20WhatReagandidnottelltheAmerican publicwasthattheUSNavyhadconductedpsychologicalwarfareoperationsintheareamonthsearlier, andtheSovietslikelygenuinelybelievedtheplanetobeanAmericanRC135reconnaissanceaircraft.21 ASovietattackmayhavebeenprovokedbymilitaryPSYOP(PsychologicalWarfareOperation) maneuversbytheUSNavyintheNorthPacificjustmonthsearlier.22KAL007illustratedtheSoviet UnionsincreasedfearofUSaggression.Fiveyearsearlier,duringtheperiodofdtente,anotherSouth KoreanairlinerhadflownintoSovietairspace,andalthoughfiredupon,itwasallowedtoland.
3Feb1984,LetterfromJohnN.McMahontoRobertC.McFarlane.CIAFIOAelectronicreadingroom. AlexanderHaig,quotedinGarthoff,TheGreatTransition,131. 20 2September1983,RonaldReagan,RemarkstoReportersontheSovietAttackonaKoreanCivilianAirliner,Point MuguNavalAirStation,California,http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/90283c.htm,accessed 20March2008;5September1983,RonaldReagan,AddresstotheNationontheSovietAttackonaKoreanCivilian Airliner,OvalOffice,WhiteHouse,http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/90583a.htm,accessed 20March2008;GeorgeShultz,quotedin,AColdWarConundrum. 21 PeterVincentPry,WarScare:RussiaandAmericaontheNuclearBrink(Westport:Praeger,1999),28. 22 Fischer,AColdWarConundrum.
19 18

However,by1983,Sovietattitudesandactionshadhardened.Inhismemoirs,Reaganponderedthe dangerposedbythehairtriggermindsetoftheSovietUnion:If,assomepeoplespeculated,theSoviet pilotssimplymistooktheairlinerforamilitaryplane,whatkindofimaginationdidittaketothinkofa Sovietmilitarymanwithhisfingerclosetoanuclearpushbuttonmakinganevenmoretragic mistake?23Reagan,inallprobability,ponderedthisquestionagain,duringthetensionofAbleArcher 83. AsurveyofSovietmediaportraysthedramaticdomesticfearofwaramongsttheSoviet population.Sovietcitizens,influencedbySovietmedia,appeartohavebelievedthatastheUnited Statesnuclearsuperioritygrew,sotoodidthethreatofwar.AccordingtotheSovietDefenseMinistry, thepurposeoftheWesternintroductionofPershingandMinutemanmissileswastosteeplyincrease thestrikingpowerofthestrategicoffensiveforces,especiallyinpreemptivesurpriseattacksand achievetheabilitytowinnuclearwar.A1983editorialentitledIncreaseVigilanceandBeAlert explainedtotheSovietpeople,Impossibledreamsofworlddominationandahatredoffreedomand progressmovetodayscrusadersfromacrosstheseaWashingtonisinventingmoreandmorenew versionsofinitiationofnuclearwar.24InaninterviewbyMunichsRadioLibert,aSovietcitizen describedtheperceptionsofthecitizensintheUSSR: Wehavebeenhearingalotofrumorsaboutthepossibilityofwarinthenearfuture.At politicalinformationmeetingstheyaresayingthattheUnitedStatesisgettingreadyto attacktheSovietUnionandthatweshouldbepreparedforanattackatanymoment. FromwhatIcouldsee,thosewhobelievedthesewarningssignificantlyoutnumbered thosewhodidn't.Thesimplepeopleareveryfrightenedofwar.25 Duringthisperiod,citizensheldofficialpeacerallies,militarymembersandpartyactivistsheld briefingsaboutthewardanger,excerptsfromStalinsWorldWarTwospeecheswerebroadcast,
23 24

Reagan,AnAmericanLife,548. Ascitedin,Pry,WarScare,35. 25 Ascitedin,Fischer,AColdWarConundrum.

ReaganwascomparedtoHitler,andtheSovietmediaproclaimedthatthechanceofwarwashigher thananypointsinceWorldWarII.26 ThisfearwasnotexclusivetotheSovietpublic;fearofvulnerabilitytoanuclearattackhad reachedSovietleadershipaswell.On26September1983aSovietOKOsatellitedetectedincoming MinutemanintercontinentalmissilesinroutefromtheUnitedStates.Afterafewterrifyingminutes,the ondutyofficer,ColonelStainslavPetrov,realizedthatthesatellitehadmalfunctioned,and,onhisown authority,stoppedthefalsenuclearalert.27InadditiontotheOKOmalfunction,theKAL007disaster provedfurthershortcomingsexistedwithinSovietdefense.IttooktwohoursbeforeSovietfighterjets wereabletoreachtheaircraftand,morealarmingly,eightoftheeleventrackingstationsonthe KamchatkaPeninsulaandSakhalinIslandshadfailedtotracktheplane.Coupledwiththedeployment ofPershingIImissilescapableofstrikingMoscowwithintenminutes,thesesatellitefailurescertainly didnothelpSovietleadershipsleepsoundly.28 Althoughhehadnoplansforlaunchinganuclearattack,PresidentReagandidimplementand

overseethelargestpeacetimemilitarybuildupinAmericanhistory.Heproposeda2.7trilliondollar defensebudgetfor19821989,spendingmoreondefensethanwasspentduringtheKoreanand VietnamWarscombined.29Indeed,thePresidentsjustificationforthisspendingthattheSovietUnion doeshaveadefinitemarginofsuperioritywasnottrue.Infact,theCIA,inaSeptember1983 Congressionalhearing,testifiedthatSovietmilitaryexpenditureshadbeenandcontinuedtobereduced since1976.30Thebeliefintheneedforincreasedmilitaryspendingwaslikelyadvancedbythe conservativesofReagansadministration.ThirtytwoofhisadvisorsweremembersoftheCommittee

Fischer,AColdWarConundrum. Pry,WarScare,37. 28 BethA.Fischer,TheReaganReversal:ForeignPolicyandtheEndofColdWar(UniversityofMissouriPress, 2000)126. 29 RonaldE.Powaski,ReturntoArmageddon:TheUnitedStatesandtheNuclearArmsRace,19811999(NewYork: OxfordUniversityPress,2000),15. 30 Garthoff,TheGreatTransition,41;31March1982,RonaldReagan,ThePresident'sNinthNewsConference,East Room,WhiteHouse,WashingtonD.C.,http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/33182d.htm, accessed20March2008.
27 26

onthePresentDanger,acommitteewhichstaunchlystoodagainstSTARTIIandotherweapons reductions.Reagannodoubtdelightedthemashepressedaheadwithhisnuclearproposalsfor deploymentofPershingIIandPeacekeepermissilesinEuropeandhisStrategicDefenseInitiave.31 StrategicDefenseInitiative(SDI),dubbedbythepressasStarWars,wasthemostpublic

exampleofReagansarmsbuildup.WhenReaganpresentedhisinitiativeataspeechon23March, 1983,pinninguponitthehopesofendingMutuallyAssuredDestruction,hisJointChiefsofStaffwere shockedtohearthatthePresidentplannedtoimplementaninitiativewhichareportpreparedbythe AirForce,Armyandprivateindustryhadconcludedwasnottechnicallyfeasibleandshouldnotbe fundedasproposed,normodifiedandfunded.32Nevertheless,StarWarsresearch(andhype) ensued.Foritspart,theSovietUniondidnotseeSDIasanendtoMutuallyAssuredDestructionbut ratherasanadvanceofthearmsraceintoanewarena.SectaryGeneralAndropovassertedthatReagan wasnotattemptingtoendthearmsracebutwasinsteadinventingnewplansonhowtounleasha nuclearwarinthebestway,withthehopeofwinningit.33 WhileStarWarsarousedtheapprehensionsofSovietleadersaboutthearmsrace,the1983 deploymentofPeacekeeperandPershingIImissilesinEuropearousedfearsfortheirpersonalsafety.34 ThePershingII,athirdgenerationnuclearweapon,couldreachMoscowfromGermanyinminutes.The missilesdeployedinresponsetotheSovietSS20deploymentsshiftedthebalanceofpower.Soviet leadersnowbelievedanattacklaunchedfromEuropecouldreachMoscowwithinfourtosixminutes.35 Becauseoftheirnewsupersuddenfirststrikecapability,Sovietleadershipnowcorrectlyperceived theircommandstructureasmorevulnerableandincorrectlyperceivedanuclearattackasmorelikely.

Powaski,ReturntoArmageddon,15. Powaski,ReturntoArmageddon,3031. 33 YuriAndropov,quotedinFischer,AColdWarConundrum. 34 GermanylikelyreceivedthePershingIImissilesin1984.GreatBritain,Italy,Holland,andtheNetherlands, receivedthePeacemaker)ItisunlikelytheSovietUnionknewwhenthePershingIImissileswereoperational. 35 AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,7476;Fischer,AColdWarConundrum;Andrew White,SymbolsofWarPershingIIandCruiseMissilesinEurope(London:MerlinPress,1983),2529.

32 31

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Inresponse,itlaunchedthecolossalintelligenceOperationRYAN.ThisjointKGBandGRUintelligence operationputtheSovietpoliticalandmilitaryintelligenceonhairtriggeralertwiththehopeof discoveringandpreemptingasurpriseNATOnuclearstrike.36Duetotheirvulnerabilitytoattackswhich coulddecapitatetheircommandstructures,bothsidesreliedonpreemption,thiswastermedlaunch onwarning(LOW)bytheUnitedStates.37 OperationRYAN AtasecretconferenceinMay1981,KGBchiefAndropovannouncedtohisagentsthatthe

UnitedStateswasactivelypreparingfornuclearwar.Tocombatthisthreat,Andropovannouncedthat thePolitburohadorderedthelargestpeacetimeoperationinhistory.TheKGBandGRUmountedan unprecedentedworldwideoperationtodetectwiththehopesofpreemptinganAmericannuclear strike.ThisbehemothwascodenamedOperationNuclearMissileAttackRaketnoYadernoyeNapadenie; or,asithasbecomeknowntotheWest,OperationRYAN.TheimpetusforOperationRYANappearsto haveendedwiththedeathsofAndropov,Kryuchkov,andUstinov. Todate,theonlyKGBdocumentsdetailingOperationRYANaccessibletohistoriansare

thosewhichhavebeenpublishedbyOlegGordievskyinhisbook,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions:Top SecretFilesonKGBForeignOperations,19751985.38AccordingtoGordievsky,thesedocumentswere senttoKGBresidenciesintheWest,Japan,andsomeThirdWorldcountries.Thesedocumentsinclude correspondencebetweentheLondonresidencyandMoscowcenterrequestingandreportingthe preparationsforwarGreatBritainwasmaking;thefirsttelegramfromMoscowisthemostexplanatory oftheseries,asitdescribestheimpetusforOperationRYAN,thetasksrequiredoftheagents,and

Pry,WarScare,1522. BenjaminB.Fischer.TheSovietAmericanWarScareofthe1980s,481483.InternationalJournalof IntelligenceFall(2006),480517. 38 OnefacsimileofanoriginalRussiandocumenthasbeenprovidebyGordievsky.Therestofthedocumentshave beentranslatedandarepublishedinEnglish.

37 36

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providesadetaileddescriptionofaWesternnuclearattack.39 On2February1983,theLondonresidencyreceivedthisfirsttelegramentitledPermanent operationsassignmenttouncoverNATOpreparationsforanuclearmissileattackontheUSSR.40Itwas addressedtothestationchiefbyname,labeledstrictlypersonal,andwasdesignatedtobekeptina specialfile.Thetelegramstated: TheobjectiveoftheassignmentistoseethattheResidencyworkssystematicallyto uncoveranyplansinpreparationbythemainadversary[USA]forRYANandtoorganize acontinualwatchtobekeptforindicationsofadecisionbeingtakentousenuclear weaponsagainsttheUSSRorimmediatepreparationsbeingmadeforanuclearmissile attack.41 Attachedtothetelegramwasalistofsevenimmediateandthirteenprospectivetasksfor

theagentstocompleteandreport.Theseincluded:thecollectionofdataonpotentialplacesof evacuationandshelter,anappraisalofthelevelofbloodheldinbloodbanks,observationofplaces wherenucleardecisionsweremadeandstored,observationofkeynucleardecisionmakers, observationoflinesofcommunication,reconnaissanceoftheheadsofchurchesandbanks,and surveillanceofsecurityservicesandmilitaryinstallations.42 Manyoftheassignedobservationswouldhavebeenverypoorindicatorsofanuclearattack.

Others,includingcommunicationslines,nucleardecisionmakers,andmostsignificantlymissile depots,wouldhaveprovedtobeaccurateindicatorsofnuclearattack.Theemphasisplacedonthese targetsmaysuggestthatSovietintelligencehaddiscoveredaspectsofReagansContinuityin GovernmentProgram.43 Alsoattachedtothetelegramwasathoroughandaccuratedescriptionofthelikelymethodsby

whichtheUnitedStatesorNATOwouldlaunchnuclearwar.Thisattachmentemphasizedthatafterthe
AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions.6790 Hewritesthatotherresidenciesreceivedanidenticaltelegrams.AndrewandGordievskyComradeKryuchkovs Instructions,69. 41 AndrewandGordievsky,ComrdeKryuchkovsInstructions,70. 42 AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,7173. 43 AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,7173.
40 39

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Westhaddecidedtolaunchanuclearattack,asubstantialperiodtopreparewouldberequired.These preparationsincludednuclearconsultationsthroughsecretchannels,transportationofnuclear weapons,andpreparationofcivildefenseinstitutions.DetectingtheWesterndecisiontolaunchwas imperativetotheSovietsbecausetheirmilitarydoctrineheldthatpreemptionofanattackwastheonly possiblewaytoavoidMutuallyAssuredDestruction.InachapterfromabasicSovietmilitarytext entitledTheEmploymentofNuclearWeaponsandDestructionoftheEnemybyFire,states, Preemptioninlaunchinganuclearstrikeisconsideredtobethedecisiveconditionfortheattainment ofsuperiorityoverhimandtheseizureandretentionoftheinitiative.44Theimminentarrivalof PershingIImissilesinGermanysubstantiallyshortenedthewindowforpreemptionandmeantthatthe situationhadacquiredanespecialdegreeofurgency.45 OlegKalugin,theheadofKGBoperationsintheUnitedStatesconfirmsthatReaganshardline, antiCommuniststance,hisStarWarsprogram,andthemassiveAmericanmilitarybuildupscaredthe witsoutofourleadership,andAndropovnotifiedKGBstationsaroundthewordtobeonthelookoutfor signsofanimminentAmericanattack.Abrandnewprogram[OperationRYAN]wascreatedtogather informationonapotentialAmericanfirstnuclearstrike.46AnatolyDobrynin,theSovietAmbassadorto theUnitedStates,acknowledgesthattheKGBresidentinWashingtoninformedhimofoperation RYAN.47HealsowritesthatnoneoftheGeneralSecretarieswithwhomheservedKhrushchev, Brezhnev,Chernenko,andGorbachevbelievedanattackcouldtakeplaceunexpectedlyatany moment.Andropovwastheprobableexceptiontothis;herecallsaveryprivateconversationwith AndropovinwhichhecautionedthatReaganisunpredictable.Youshouldexpectanythingfrom

A.A.Sidorenko,TheOffensive(ASovietView)(WashingtonDC:USGovernmentPrintingOffice,1970),115. AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,74. 46 OlegKalugin,TheFirstDirectorate:my32YearsinIntelligenceandEspionageAgainsttheWest(NewYork:St. MartinsPress,1994),302. 47 Dobryninspellsitryon.OtherspellingsincludeVRYANvnesapnoeraketnoyadernoenapadeniesecret nuclearmissileattack.

45 44

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him.48 Ithasbeenestimatedthatupto80percentofallWarsawPactIntelligencecamefromthe GermanDemocraticRepublic.49ItisthereforenotsurprisingthatthecapableGDRintelligenceagency playedalargeroleinOperationRYAN.Themanwithoutaface,MarcusWolf,thedecadeslonghead ofEastGermanysGeneralReconnaissanceAdministrationor(HVA)wrote,ourSovietpartnershad becomeobsessedwiththedangerofanuclearmissileattack.TheHVAsmostimportantprioritywas thesurveillanceofPerishingIIandCruiseMissilesites.50 KarelKocher,aCzechoslovakianspyworkingillegallyintheUnitedStatesintheearly1980s confirmstheexistenceofOperationRyanandjustifiesit.InNovostirazvedkiikontrrazvedki,heasserts thatOperationRYANwasaneffectivecountertotheincreasedriskofnuclearwarunderReagan.He contendsthatReaganaddedanadditionalnuclearwarscenariointotheSingleIntegratedOperational Plan(SIOP),inwhichtheUnitedStateswasabletonotonlysurviveanuclearattack,butalsotoinflict defeatupontheenemy,andthusmayhadbelievednuclearwarwaswinnableanddesirable.51InDid EastGermanSpiesPreventaNuclearWar?VojtechMastnyalsopursuesthislineofreasoning.Using Germanmilitary,intelligence,andWarsawPactdocuments,hearguesthatSovietLeadership, particularlyAndropovandUstinov,believedthatchangesinWesternmilitarydoctrine(providedby RainierRupp,anEastGermanspywiththehighestlevelofNATOsecurityclearance,CosmicTopSecret) werelikelyprecursorsforattack.52 Gordievsky,Kalugin,andWolf,itisimportanttonote,wereextremelyskepticalofatheideaof
AnatolyDobrynin,InConfidence:MoscowsAmbassadortoSixColdWarPresidents(UniversityofWashington Press,2001),528529. 49 Fischer,AColdWarConundrum. 50 Fischer,AColdWarConundrum. 51 KorelKochrerNovostirazvedkiikontrrazvedki,1September2006. 52 VojtechMastny,DidEastGermanSpiesPreventaNuclearWar? http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_stasi/mastny.cfm?navinfo=15296,accessed20March,2008;Rainer RuppInterview,SovietWarScare1983DirectorHenryChancellor;ExecProducerTaylorDowning;Quotedwith permissionofFlashbackTelevision,London,2008;MarcusWolf,ManWithoutAFace:TheAutobiographyof CommunismsGreatestSpymaster(RandomHouse,1997),298300
48

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aNATOfirststrike.Wolfrecalls,"Likemostintelligentpeople,Ifoundthesewargamesaburdensome wasteoftime.BothDobryninandGordievskybelievedthatthedriveforOperationRYANcamefrom theleadershipofAndropov,MinisterofDefenseUstinovandKGBchiefofForeignOperations,Vladimir Kryuchkov,thelastguardsoftheStalinistGeneration.OlegKalugindescribesKryuchkovas,themost paranoid,mostantiwestern,[and]totallyinflexibleman[hehadever]met.53Arecentlydeclassified CIAreportfromMay1983couldnotconfirmthatAndropovheldinfluenceoverthePolitburo;itnoted, DespiteAndropovsinitialstrongshowingonassumingtheGeneralSecretaryposeandrecentsigns thathispoliticalbandwagonisgainingmomentum,hestilldoesnotcontrolthePolitburo.54 Althoughmostagentsdidnotbelieveanattackwasimminent,theywereorderedtoreporttheir rawobservationsofevents,nottheirestimationofwhattheirobservationsmeant.Thiscriticalflawin theSovietintelligencesystemcoinedbyGordievskyastheintelligencecyclewasthefactorwhich fedthefearofUSnuclearaggressionandfueledfearsthatanattackwaslikely.55InNovember1983, tenmonthsafterSovietintelligencewasorderedtodetectanuclearstrike,NATObegantopracticeone. AbleArcher83 TheUnitedStatesanditsallieshadnointentionoflaunchingapreemptivenuclearattackin November1983.However,inthenuclearera,evenagenuinefearofanonexistentattackcreatesa genuinedanger.Sovietintelligencewasnotmistaken;itcorrectlyassessedthatfrom2through11 November1983,theUnitedStatesandNATOwereconductingsecretexercisesrelatedtonuclear weaponswhichspannedthecontinentofEurope.AbleArcherwasaNATOcommandpostexercise conductedannuallyaftertheAutumnForgetacticalexercise,butAbleArcher83wasperceivedbythe SovietUnionasmuchmoreofathreatthanpreviousexercisesforseveralreasons:theBritishPrime MinisterMargaretThatcherandWestGermanChancellorHelmutKohlplayedintegralrolesandanew
53 54

MarcusWolf,ManWithoutaFace,299301. May1984AndropovsPoliticalPosition:TheImportanceoftheJunePlenum.CIAFOIAelectronicreadingroom. 55 AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,69.

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typeoflaunchencryptionwasused.56DavidAbshire,USAmbassadortoNATOfromJuly1983to January1987,explainedthatintheusualNATOwargamescenario,theSovietUnionbrokethrough NATOlinesonthecontinentandheadedtowardstheEnglishChannel;atthispoint,whentheycrossed thenucleartripwire,SACEUR(SupremeAlliedCommandofEurope)wouldrequesttolaunchasignal attackonaWarsawPactcountry.IftheUSSRdidnotunderstandthissignal,SACEURwouldrequest anothersignal,thistimeattackingaSovietrepublic.Theexercisesfrequentlyconcludedwhenthe actorsgotwordfromtheWhiteHousethattheSovietsunderstandourdeterminationandwill withdrawfromEurope.57 Duetothevulnerabilityoftheircommandcentertoadecapitatingattack,theSovietsbelieveda surpriseattackwasthemostlikelymethodofanAmericanorNATOnuclearrelease.Topreservethis surpriseSovietsbelievedthatitwaslikelythatanactualattackwouldbemaskedasadrill.TheFebruary 1983telegramdescribedsuchanattack: InviewofthefactthatthemeasuresinvolvedinStateOrange[anuclearattackwithin 36hours]havetobecarriedoutwiththeutmostsecrecy(undertheguiseof maneuvers,trainingetc)intheshortestpossibletime,withoutdisclosingthecontentof operationalplans,itishighlyprobablethatthebattlealarmsystemmaybeusedto prepareasurpriseRYANinpeacetime.58 Sovietdogmaalsoheldthatitwaslikelyforanattacktooccurduringaholiday;Commander

ViktorTkachenko,whowasstationedinastrategicmissilesiloduringAbleArcher83explains,Our commandersalwaystoldusthatwarwouldbeginontheeveofsomeholiday.Whenpeoplewereout celebrating,whenpeoplewererelaxed.59 TheworldeventsproceedingAbleArcher83causedfurtherdistortionandsteeredSoviet

BethA.Fischer,TheReaganReversal,123,131.Pry,WarScare,3344. 29February2008DavidAbshireinterviewbyauthor.AbshirewasnotaM.A.D.man.Herecollectedtome thathehadalwayswantedtotellReaganduringadrillthatSovietswerelaunchinganuclearattackonBostonbut nottoworry,Itsonlysignaling.HisaccountfollowsthedescriptionprovidedinShaunR.Gregory,Nuclear commandandControlinNATO(NewYork:St.MartinsPress,1996). 58 AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,78. 59 ViktorTkachenkoInterview,SovietWarScare1983.
57 56

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intelligenceintoreportingtheirbeliefintheincreasedlikelihoodofUSaggression.Inadditiontothe KAL007fiasco,USmilitarybasesheightenedtheirsecurityfollowingthebombingoftheMarine barracksinBeirut,anindicationlikelymistakenforpreparationofanuclearattack.60 Severalotherindicationsdescribedinthe17February1983PermanentOperationalAssignment todiscoveranuclearattackwerepresentduringAbleArcher83,furtheringtheimpressionthatthe exercisemightbeacoverforarealattack.Theindicationsincludedactionsby: AcadreofpeopleassociatedwithpreparingandimplementingdecisionaboutRYAN, andalsoagroupofpeople,includingserviceandtechnicalpersonnelthoseworkingin theoperatingservicesofinstallationsconnectedwithprocessingandimplementingthe decisionaboutRYAN,andcommunicationstaffinvolvedintheoperationandinteraction oftheseinstallations.61 Moreconspicuously,theBritishPrimeMinisterMargaretThatcherandGermanChancellor HelmutKohlparticipated(thoughnotconcurrently)inthenucleardrill.PresidentReagan,Vice PresidentBush,andSecretaryofDefenseWeinbergerwerealsointendedtoparticipate.Fortunately, NationalSecurityAdvisorMcFarlanewhohadassumedthepositionjusttwoweeksearlierrealized theimplicationsofsuchparticipationearlyintheexercisesplanningandrejectedit.62 AnothermisleadingindicatorprobablynoticedbySovietanalystswasaninfluxofciphered

communicationsbetweenGreatBritainandtheUnitedStates.Sovietintelligencewasinformedthat socallednuclearconsultationsinNATOareprobablyoneofthestagesofimmediatepreparationby theadversaryforRYAN.63 TotheSovietanalysts,thisburstofclandestinecommunicationsbetweentheUnitedStatesand

GreatBritainonemonthbeforethebeginningofABLEARCHERmayhaveappearedtobethis

AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,8587;BenjaminB.Fischer,AColdWar Conundrum;Pry,WarScare,3738. 61 AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,72. 62 RobertMcFarlane,quotedinDonOberdorfer,FromtheColdWartoaNewEra:TheUnitedStatesandtheSoviet Union,19831991(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1998),65. 63 AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,76.

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consultation.Theburstofcommunicationdidnot,ofcourse,regardnuclearattack,butrathertheUS invasionofGrenada,anislandofwhichQueenElizabethwasthenominalsovereign.64 AfurtherstartlingaspectreportedbyKGBagentsregardedtheNATOcommunicationsused

duringtheexercise.AccordingtotheMoscowCenter: It[was]ofthehighestimportancetokeepawatchonthefunctioningof communicationsnetworksandsystemssincethroughtheminformationispassedabout theadversarysintentionsand,aboveall,abouthisplanstousenuclearweaponsand practicalimplementationofthese.Inaddition,changesinthemethodofoperating communicationssystemsandthelevelofmanningmayinthemselvesindicatethestate ofpredationforRYAN.65 SovietintelligencestirredfurtheralarmwhenitreportedthatNATOwas,indeed,usingunique,never beforeseenproceduresaswellasmessageformatsmoresophisticatedthanpreviousexerciseswhich possiblyindicatedtheproximityofnuclearattack.66 Finally,duringABLEARCHER83NATOforcessimulatedamovethroughallalertphases.While

thesephasesweresimulated,alarmistKGBagentsmistakenlyreportedthemasactual.Accordingto Sovietintelligence,NATOdoctrinestated,OperationalreadinessNo1isdeclaredwhenthereare obviousindicationsofpreparationtobeginmilitaryoperations.Itisconsideredthatwarisinevitable andmaystartatanymoment.67 UponlearningthatUSnuclearactivitymirroreditshypothesizedfirststrikeactivity,theMoscow Centersentitsresidenciesaflashtelegramon8or9NovemberGordievskycannotrecallwhich incorrectlyreportinganalertonAmericanbasesandfranticallyaskingforfurtherinformationregarding anAmericanfirststrike.Thisalertpreciselycoincidedwiththeseventotendayperiodestimated

MartinWalker,TheColdWar:AHistory(NewYork:HenryHoltandCompany,1993),276. AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,8081. 66 AndrewandGordievsky,KGBTheInsideStoryofItsForeignOperationsfromLenintoGorbachev(NewYork: HarperCollins,1992),599600. 67 AndrewandGordievsky,ComradeKryuchkovsInstructions,79.

65 64

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betweenNATOspreliminarydecisionandactualstrike.68ThiswasthepeakoftheWarScare. TheSovietUnion,believingitsonlychanceofsurvivingaNATOstrikewastopreemptit,readied itsnucleararsenal.TheCIAreportedactivityintheBalticMilitaryDistrictandCzechoslovakia,nuclear capableaircraftinPolandandGermanywereplacedonhighalertstatuswithreadingofnuclearstrike forces.69FormerCIAanalystPeterVincentPrygoesfurther,suspectingthattheaircraftweremerely thetipoftheiceberg;hehypothesizesthatinaccordancewithSovietmilitaryprocedureandhistory ICBMsilos,alreadyatahighstateofalertanddifficultfortheUnitedStatestodetect,werealso preparedforalaunch.70CommanderVictorTkachenko,stationedataSovietMissileSiloduringAble Archer83,recounts,Whenwereachedthecommandbunkerthatnight,wereceivedaspecialorder. Weweretoldtoimmediatelygotoraisedcombatalert.Itwassoseriousthattherewasathirdman therewithus,tomaintainuninterruptedcommunications.71 VojtechMastny,oftheParallelHistoryProjectassertsthatneitherEastGermannorSoviet intelligenceagents,outofcommonsenseorbecauseofincompetence,providedtheDefensive MinistryorPolitburowithinformation;thisconjecturehasrecentlybeenrefutedbyRainerRupp,known asAgentTopaz.72Rupp,recentlyreleasedfromanespionageprisonsentence,recountedina2008 televisedinterviewthatduringAbleArcher83,acourierdeliveredhimamessagewhichreadHigh alert,theRussiansarereallyscaredandtheywanttoknowNATOispreparingforwarandsoon.Iwas reallyupset,Iwasthinkingwherethisleading?Hewentontorecountthathehadthentransmitteda messagetohishandlersstating:TherewasnoindicationthatNATOwaspreparingforwaratthis time.73

AndrewandGordievsky,KGB,600. Pry,WarScare,4344.RobertGates,FromtheShadows:TheUltimateInsidersStoryofFivePresidentsandHow TheyWontheColdWar(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,2007),271,272. 70 Pry,WarScare,44. 71 VictorTkachenkoInterview,SovietWarScare1983. 72 VojtechMastny,DidEastGermanSpiesPreventaNuclearWar? 73 RainerRuppInterview,SovietWarScare1983.

69

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InMay1984theSecretNationalIntelligenceEstimateentitledImplicationsofRecentSoviet MilitaryPoliticalActivitiesconcluded"WebelievestronglythatSovietactionsarenotinspiredby,and Sovietleadersdonotperceive,agenuinedangerofimminentconflictwiththeUnitedStates."74 ThisconclusionhasrecentlybeenrefutedbyRobertGates,CIADeputyDirectorforIntelligence duringAbleArcher83: InformationaboutthepeculiarandremarkablyskewedframeofmindoftheSoviet leadersduringthosetimesthathasemergedsincethecollapseoftheSovietUnion makesmethinkthereisagoodchancewithalloftheothereventsin1983that theyreallyfeltaNATOattackwasatleastpossibleandthattheytookanumberof measurestoenhancetheirmilitaryreadinessshortofmobilization.Aftergoingthrough theexperienceatthetime,thenthroughthepostmortems,andnowthroughthe documents,Idon'tthinktheSovietswerecryingwolf.Theymaynothavebelieveda NATOattackwasimminentinNovember1983,buttheydidseemtobelievethatthe situationwasverydangerous.AndUSintelligence[SNIE11984andSNIE111084]had failedtograspthetrueextentoftheiranxiety.75 AmbassadorAbshirealsoseemstocontradictthe1984CIAreport,hestatedinaninterview,They[the USSR]knewourwarplans.Thattheymightfigurewecouldattackwasapossibility.76 UponlearningoftheSovietreactiontoABLEARCHER83bywayofthedoubleagentOleg Gordievsky,aBritishMI6asset,PresidentReagancommented,Idontseehowtheycouldbelievethat butitssomethingtothinkabout.77Aftersomethought,hispolicytowardstheSovietUniontooka suddenchange. ReagansReaction In1990,RonaldReaganwasaskedwhyhethoughtrelationsbetweentheSovietUnionand UnitedStateshadimprovedsodramatically.Heansweredthatitwasduetomutualinterest: GorbachevsinterestindealingwiththeeconomicemergencyintheSovietUnionandReagansbelief
May1984SecretNationalIntelligenceEstimate:ImplicationsofRecentSovietMilitaryPoliticalActivities,CIA FIOAelectronicreadingroom. 75 RobertGates,FromtheShadows,273. 76 29February2008DavidAbshrireinterviewbyauthor 77 RonaldReagan,ascitedin,Oberdorfer,ANewEra,67.
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thatitwasadangertohaveaworldsoheavilyarmedthatonemisstepcouldtriggeragreatwar.78 Reaganactedonhisinterestfirst.79ThirteenmonthsbeforeGorbachevrosetopower,Reagandelivered apivotal16January1984speechwhichmarkedtheendoftheWarScare.Inhisspeech,givenata special10:00AME.S.T.timeandbroadcastthroughasatellitehookupsothatitcouldbeviewedduring primetimeintheSovietUnion,Reagandeclared:IftheSovietGovernmentwantspeace,thentherewill bepeace.Togetherwecanstrengthenpeace,reducethelevelofarms,andknowindoingsothatwe havehelpedfulfillthehopesanddreamsofthosewerepresentand,indeed,ofpeopleeverywhere.Let usbeginnow.80ThismayhavebeentheolivebranchAndropovwasseekingwhenhespoketo Harrimanofthegrowingnumberofexplosiveproblems.81 ShultzsentacabletoSovietForeignMinisterGromykopromptlyafterReagansspeech.Itread, Thecombinationofcircumstances,domesticandinternationalor,ifyoupreferthecorrelationof forcesprovidestheopportunityforpositivemovementforthefirsttimeinseveralyears.Laterinthe cableShultzemphaticallystated,Thecentralissuebetweenusistheavoidanceofwar.Ifwedonot agree,atleasttacitly,onthatissue,theremainderofouragendaandyoursisirrelevant.82 Inhismemoirs,Reaganwroteoftwoeventswhichprofoundlyaffectedhimintheweeksleading uptoABLEARCHER83.ThefirstwasascreeningofTheDayAfter,afilmwhichdepictedthehorrific visionofnuclearholocaust.Reaganwroteinhisdiarythatthefilmwasveryeffectiveandleftme greatlydepressed.83TheSecondwasaPentagonbriefingonnuclearwarquitepossiblylinkedtohis ContinuityofGovernmentPlan.84 ThesetwoglimpsesofnuclearwarpsychologicallyprimedReaganforABLEARCHER83,giving

78 79

Oberdorfer,ANewEra,479. AnexpandedargumentforthisassertioncanbefoundinFischer,ReaganReversal. 80 RonaldReagan,UnitedStatesSovietRelations,16January1984. 81 2June1983,MemorandumofConversationwithAndropov.W.AverillHarrimanPapers. 82 January1984ShultzcabletoGromykofromtheCIAFIOAelectronicreadingroom. 83 Reagan,AnAmericanLife,585. 84 Fischer,ReaganReversal,120122.

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himaveryspecificpictureofwhatwouldoccurhadthesituationfurtherdeveloped.Afterreceiving intelligencereportsfromsourcesincludingGordievsky,itwasclearthattheSovietshadpanicked.While officialswereconcernedwiththeSovietpanic,theywerehesitantaboutbelievingtheproximityofa Sovietattack.Shultz,atthetime,believedittobeincredible,atleasttousthattheSovietswould believetheUSwouldlaunchagenuineattack.85Reagan,forone,didnotsharethebeliefthatcooler headswouldprevail,writing: Wehadmanycontingencyplansforrespondingtoanuclearattack.Buteverythingwould happensofastthatIwonderedhowmuchplanningorreasoncouldbeappliedinsucha crisisSixminutestodecidehowtorespondtoabliponaradarscopeanddecidewhetherto unleashArmageddon!Howcouldanyoneapplyreasonatatimelikethat?86 McFarlanestatedthatABLEARCHER83hadabiginfluenceonReaganssubsequentapproach

toforeignpolicy:HedidreceivefromtheCIAthekeycoreissuesthatwereexposedinGordievskys reportsandwasverymovedbythem.87ThepresidentwhohadbelievedtheprophecyofArmageddon wouldbefulfilledbyanuclearapocalypse,hadstatedthatMADpolicywasmadness,andwhohad writtenthatcivilizationhadregressedbecauseofnuclearweapons,finallyadministeredapolicywhich reducedratherthanenflamedtheriskofnuclearwar.88Inlate1983,Reaganbeganimplementinga policyofincreasedofUSSovietdialogue,weaponsreductions,andrapprochement. Inhismemoirs,Reagan,withoutspecificallymentioningABLEARCHER83hestatesearlierthat

hecannotmentionclassifiedinformationwroteofhisrealization: ThreeyearshadtaughtmesomethingsurprisingabouttheRussians:Manypeopleat thetopoftheSoviethierarchyweregenuinelyafraidofAmericaandAmericans. Perhapsthisshouldnthavesurprisedme,butitdid. DuringmyfirstyearsinWashington,Ithinkmanyofusintheadministrationtookitfor grantedthattheRussians,likeourselves,considereditunthinkablethattheUnited Stateswouldlaunchafirststrikeagainstthem.ButthemoreexperienceIhadwith Sovietleadersandotherheadsofstatewhoknewthem,themoreIbegantorealizethat

85 86

Shultz,TurmoilandTriumph,464. Reagan,AnAmericanLife,257. 87 RobertMcFarlane,quotedinFischer,ReaganReversal,135;McFarlaneInterview,SovietWarScare1983. 88 RobertMcFarlane,quotedinFischer,ReaganReversal,106107;Reagan,AmericanLife,278,549.

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manySovietofficialsfearedusnotonlyasadversariesbutaspotentialaggressorswho mighthurlnuclearweaponsattheminafirststrike Well,ifthatwasthecase,IwasevenmoreanxioustogetatopSovietleaderinaroom aloneandtrytoconvincehimwehadnodesignsontheSovietUnionandRussianshad nothingtofearfromus.89 AndsoconcludesthelittleknownhistoryofAbleArcher83.AftertheMissilesofNovember, ReaganbravelychangedhispolicytowardtheSovietUnioninthehopeofavoidingfuturenuclear occurrencesbetweenthetwosuperpowers.ThefruitsofReagansrapprochementwouldbeginto blossomduringhissummitwithGorbachevinGenevabutthatisahistorywellchronicled. Conclusion InmidMay,2007Igrabbed,opened,andrapidlythumbedthroughthepagesofmycopyof

TheReaganDiaries,hotoffthepress.AsIreachedNovemberof1983mybreathingquickenedIwas lookingforanyfurtherinsightIcouldgleanintoPresidentReagansreactiontothenewslearned throughtheBritishasset,OlegGordievskythattheNATOdrillinwhichhewassupposedtohave participatedhadarousednuclearpanicwithintheSovietUnion.Finally,Ireachedthedatesjustafter theexerciseandscannedthepage,lookingforanyhistoricalclue.Thereitwas:Thursday,November24 [Redacted].Oh,theagonyofthehistorian! Tobesure,therearemanygreyareasintheyounghistoryoftheWarScare.MostAmerican intelligencedocumentsregardingthiseraarestillnoteligiblefordeclassification.Evenwhentheyare eligible,manywillfallunderthedeclassificationexemptionsofExecutiveOrder12958.90Themost comprehensiveUSdocument,NinaStewartsForeignIntelligenceAdvisoryBoardreportonAbleArcher
Reagan,AnAmericanLife,588589,585. ExecutiveOrder12958dealswithClassification,http://www.archives.gov/isoo/policydocuments/eo12958 amendment.html#3.3accessed20March2008.DocumentsrelatingtotheWarScarecouldverylikelybeexempt forthefollowingreasons:(3)revealingcryptologicsystemsoractivities,(4)revealingU.S.weaponsystems information,(5)revealingU.S.militarywarplans,or(6)revealinginformationwhichwoulddamagerelationswitha foreigngovernment.
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83,presentedtothePresidentin1990,remainsclassified.OtherclassifiedCIAreportsincludethose publishedintheaftermathofAbleArcher83withsuchtantalizingtitlesasWhyistheWorldSo Dangerous?andSovietThinkingonthePossibilityofArmedConfrontationwiththeUnitedStates.The prospectsfromtheRussiansideappearworse.Politburominutes,whichwouldlikelyilluminatethe creationofOperationRYANandpresentanunfilteredaccountofSovietappraisalsandfears,remain almostentirelyinaccessible.TheyareheldintheArchivesofthePresidentoftheRussianFederation andarestillclassifiedastopsecretandunavailabletoallbutaveryselectfewhistorians.91KarelKoffer, aformerCzechoslovakspyreportsthathisRussianintelligencecolleagueswithknowledgeofOperation RYANhavetoldhimthatitwillremainforeverclassifiedtopsecret.92 However,theviewfromsomeformerWarsawpactcountriesappearslessgloomy.Vajtech MastnydrawsextensivelyfromGDRdefensivedocumentsinhispresentationoftheEasternBlocs perceptionsonNATO.Likewise,JordanBaevdrawsfromrecentlyopenedarchivesinTheSovietBloc IntelligenceServicesCollaborationAgainsttheUSAandNATOintheBalkansandEastern Mediterranean19671987.93TherearealsomanyColdWarriorsonbothsideseagertotelltheirstories andjustifytheiractions.Theirhistories,thoughnotreplacementsfordocuments,areavenuesfor immediateresearchontheWarScare. AbleArcher83isanimportantchapterinthehistoriesoftheUnitedStates,theSovietUnion, theColdWar,andthenuclearera.Itremainsastarkreminderoftheparadoxofnuclearweapons:while theseinventionshelpedtopreventdirectwarbetweentwodiametricallyopposedsuperpowersfor45 years,theyalsocouldhaveeruptedintoworldwidecatastropheatanygivenmoment.Thelessonsof
ArcheoBiblioBasehttp://www.iisg.nl/~abb/abb_c1.html,accessed20March2008;Theminutescitedinthis paperweredeclassifiedaspossibleevidenceforthe1992ConstitutionalCourttrialoftheCPSU. 92 KorelKochrer,Novostirazvedkiikontrrazvedki,1September2006. 93 VojtechMastny,DidEastGermanSpiesPreventaNuclearWar?;JordanBaevTheSovietBlocIntelligence ServicesCollaborationAgainsttheUSAandNATOintheBalkansandtheEasternMediterranean19671989, SeminarPaper,NorwegianNobelInstitute,2002.
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AbleArcher83,oneofthemosttellingencountersbetweenthesuperpowers,mustbebroughttothe attentionoftheRussianandAmericanpublic.AsonestudiestheMissilesofNovember,onegleansa glimpseoftheworst,andthebest,ofmankind. InWeNowKnow:RethinkingColdWarHistory,renownedhistorian,JohnLewisGaddisusesa metaphoroftwodinosaurs,onehealthy,theotherailing,toexplaintheColdWar.94TheSovietUnion, hesays,isanailingtriceratops;hisinsides,mirroringtheSovietdomesticeconomy,arerotting. America,perhapsahealthytyrannosaurus,standsopposedfromthetriceratops;however,thetwo neverfight,aseachisrationallydeterredbytheothersspikes,capableofmassdestruction.Leftalone, theailingtriceratopscollapsesanddiesofitsinternalsickness.This,arguesGaddis,wastheLongPeace; nuclearweaponspreventedwarbetweentheUnitedStatesandSovietUnion. Gaddissmetaphorisaccuratetoapoint;hisassertionthatthedomesticeconomyoftheSoviet UnionwouldalwayslagbehindthatofAmericaistrue.Hiserrorliesinhisbeliefthatthetwosides undernocircumstancewouldeverbeginanuclearwar.WeNowKnowlargelyseemstopresent,like somanyotheroldColdWarhistories,alinearpathalbeitwithafewthirdworldscufflesfromthe brinkofwarattheCubanMissileCrisisstraightthroughtheSALT,START,andIMFtreatiesand concludingwithReaganandGorbachevsvisittotheStatueofLiberty.Asthosewhostudyprehistoric Earthknow,ifatyrannosaurusencroacheduponandthreatenedanailingtriceratops,aterriblebattle wouldlikelyhaveerupted.IcontendthatthisdynamicwasapproachedduringOperationRYANand AbleArcher83.Therewasneverapactbetweenthesuperpowersnevertolaunchanuclearwar; frighteningly,theuseofnuclearweaponswas,andcontinuestobe,averyrealpossibility.95 ThisstudyoftheWarScarehasproventhreethings:First,thedangerofnuclearwarwasindeed
JohnLewisGaddis,WeNowKnow:RethinkingColdWarHistory(OxfordUniversityPress,1997);Gaddis,The LongPeace:InquiriesintotheColdWar(OxfordUniversityPress,1989).AndJimHershbergcounterargument, ReconsideringtheNuclearArmsRace:ThePastasPrelude?inAmericanForeignRelationsReconsidered1890 1993(NewYork:Routledge,1994),187. 95 Gaddispolitelyomitsthatdinosaurshadbrainsthesizeofwalnuts.
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heightenedinNovemberof1983.Second,thecontinuedmilitarybuildupandconfrontationalpoliciesof theUnitedStatescontributedtothisdanger.Finally,PresidentReagancomprehendedthisdangerand correctedAmericanpolicy.Intheend,itappearsthatheandAndropovagreed;theSovietPeopleand theAmericanpeoplehaveacommonfoethethreatofawarincomparablewiththehorrorswewent throughpreviously.Thiswarmayperhapsnotoccurthroughevilintent,butcouldhappenthrough miscalculation.Thennothingcouldsavemankind.96

96

MemorandumofConversationwithAndropov.W.AverillHarrimanPapers.

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