Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
... _
Approved by:
---.....,....._..,...--""'1t"'+t-"---........... ~r---+-------
----.
, Member, Graduate Research Faculty
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual
student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental
agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing state.ent.)
ii
Acccssion Number:
ADA029460
Citation Status:
Active
Citation Classification:
Unclassified
Field(s) & Group(s):
150600 - MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS
Corporate Author:
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KANS
Unclassified Title:
The Evolution of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939.
Title Classification:
Unclassified
Descriptivc Note:
Final rep!.,
Pcrsoual Author(s):
Doughty,Robert A.
Report Date:
11 Jun 1976
Media Count:
162 Page(s)
Cost:
$14.60
Report Classification:
Unclassified
Supplemeutary Note:
Master's thesis.
Descriptors:
'MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), 'MILITARY DOCTRINE, 'FRANCE,
MILITARY OPERATIONS, WARFARE, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), THESES, HISTORY,
MILITARY PLANNING, NATIONAL DEFENSE
Abstract:
The thesis examines French military operations, warfare aud histOly of the years 1919-1939.
Abstract Classilication:
Unclassified
Distribution Limitation(s):
01 - APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
Source Serial:
F
Somce Code:
037260
Documeut Location:
DTIC
ABSTRACT
1976
France had all too effectively demonstrated the inadequacy of the French
doctrine and the unpreparedness of the French army. The theme of a con
underlying reason for the weakness of the High Command and the flimsiness
the defense, continuous front, and firepower as the most important evi
dence for demonstrating the High Command's responsibility for preparing
for the war of the past, rather than the war of the future.
not adequately portray the intricate and involved process which resulted
iii
Iv
entangled in the remnants of the doctrine left over from 1918, without
war imbrued into the very soul of France. In short, the automatic assign
French. Suffering from the upheaval of the German occupation and the
parties and fallacious ideas. Among the identified failures was the
prewar military doctrine which had emphasized the defense, the continuous
front, and firepower. Few critics doubted the responsibility of the High
The German military had all too effectively demonstrated the adequacy
of their doctrine and of their High Command and the unpreparedness of the
French army. The charging panzers had seemed to herald the war of the
form of war demonstrated by the Germans. For example, Marc Bloch de
scribed in his masterful 1940 work on the Fall of France, Strange Defeat,
the "curious form of mental sclerosis"l that affected the military hier
archy. He said, "Our leaders, or those who acted for them, were incapable
v
vi
search for more fundamental causes, but the picture he painted of the
And hard as I search, I can find only one reason for our defeat:
stupidity and cowardice. The generals were stupid, the men did not
want to get killed. Those two things often go together. Troops
know that an idiot has no right to ask them to get themselves killed. S
The theme of the "sclerosis" of the High Command has also been
in his History of the Second World War, "The French commanders, trained
the most damning and effective of all the attacks against the military
of France was that by Colonel Adolphe Goutard in his 1940: b! guerre des
occasions perdues. In this energetic description of how France had
missed her opportunity to win the war, Goutard exclaimed, "Our defeat may
2
Ibid., p. 36.
3 Ibid., p. 126-176.
4 Ibid., p. 121.
5Jean Dutourd, The Taxis of the Marne, trans. Harold King (New
"sclerosis." As John C. Cairns has noted, "It becomes evident that simple
found themselves entangled in the remnants of the doctrine left over from
democratic society, this process is usually not one of the military simply
society they may be factors over which military leaders have little direct
control. The military hierarchy may bE' able to influence them in varyinr.
Th(~ process becomes cyclic after the bas ic concept is formed, for
result 1.n new weaponry that ultimately forces the abandonment of an old
doctrine and the reestablishment of a new one. Similarly, the doctrine may
cOWltry. That is, if the doctrine evolves into a defensive concept, prob
for the initiation of a new process. The intricate and involved process,
Page
INTRODUCTION v
Chapter
BIBLIOGRAPHY . • • • 123
ix
Chapter I
As with most armies between World Wars I and II, the French had
Between 1871 and 1940 the role of "military prophet" was amply
1
2
the sense of prophetic revelation. For many French officers, his ideas
late 1930's he retained the role of prophet, the man from whom the
General Maurice Gamelin, who was Chief of the General Staff, vice presi
dent of the Superior Council of war,4 and commander of the French army
in 1940, argued in 1935 that the military was different from other
leader's desires and to ensure the entire effort of the military was
a single goal] comes the need for a unity of organization and of doctrine
said, "The word doctrine comes from the Latin word docere, which means to
essential ideas presiding over the training and employment of the army."l
for the military leader, judgment is a more precious quality than memory.,,9
on the army "the same tactical and strategic conceptions," "the same
sian." He declared,
the various weapons and units in order to utilize each to its maximum
directed toward a single goal and served as a basic guide for the con
war in his own way; a common method ensured a common effort toward a
single goal. Doctrine, however, was not something that was permanent
change.
before World War II and became something far more than a loose body of
ideas "presiding" over the army. For example, a lecturer at the War
11
College in 1930-31 explained to an audience of reserve officers that
cerning the tactical employment of large units. The students were then
told, "This document, which has hardly more than a hundred pages,
was told that French doctrine had established the need for a preponder
ance of fire as "dogma," and that since French doctrine was very near to
being the "truth," it "should only be modified with the greatest care.,,13
12 / /
and his ideas were attacked by the top military leaders of the 1930's
and by every individual who had occupied, or was to occupy, the War
Office from 1932 through May 1940. 14 The High Command demonstrated its
intolerance of any more "new" ideas in 1935, stating that only the High
writings did little more than mirror official doctrine. lS Even those
such as General Debeney, who had called for a more flexible policy,
found themselves opposing all new ideas and resisting all attacks on the
By the late 1930's, French military doctrine had moved from the
ideal of being the basis of military education and approached the realm
marching in lock-step. The sound of the drum provided the cadence for
the multitudes all doing the same thing at the same time.
nothing new for the French military. After 1871, doctrine was disseminated
l5General Andre Beaufre, "Liddell Hart and the French Army, 1919
1939," in The Theory and Practice of War, ed. Michael Howard (New York:
Praeger, 1966), p. 140; Eugene Carrias, La pensee militaire fransaise
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), pp. 317-318.
7
ing with the tactical employment of large units. 16 These manuals became
the prime vehicle for inculcating the central idea of each doctrine
holding sway during the various periods from 1871 until 1940. The
but the decree of May 28, 1895 started France on the road toward the
stated, "Only the offensive permits the gaining of decisive results. The
Now that our doctrine had been decided upon, it was essential
to codify it in a fundamental document intended to serve as a ~;uide
for commanders and their staffs. • •• I hoped that all the pre
scriptions concerning the tactical employment of troops would con
verge toward a central idea, and that thus all along the hierarchy
there would be established a single body of principles which would
bring a convergence of efforts. 2l
Tbe central idea contained in this regulations was clearly the dominance
a report to the Minister of War explaining the rationale behind the new
manual. Its first statement dealing with doctrine was, "The conduct of
doctrine from 1911 to 1914 was thus obsessed with the offense, and the
defensive was viewed as being little more than a phase permitting the
25
eventual assumption of the offensive.
23 Ibid ., p. 7.
24 Ibid • , p. 39.
25 See Stefan T. POBBony and Etienne Mantoux, "Du Picq and Foch:
The French School," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. by Edward Mead
Earle (New York: Atheneum, 1967), pp. 206-233; Carrias, La pensee
mi1itaire, pp. 263-308; Irvine, "French Discovery," pp. 143-161; and
Schneider, Doctrines militaires, pp. 58-69.
9
the offensive was gone. The trenches had muddied the enthusiasm for
the glorious and bloody charge against the enemy's defensive position.
is, there were two distinct levels within the French concept of doctrine:
one dealing with division and larger-size units and the other with
and the lower a tactical doctrine. Strategic doctrine was the founda
tion of all doctrine for the French army, and all doctrinal concepts
evolved from that foundation. Basic precepts were established for the
the instructions dealing with larger units. There were only two pub
doctrine for .small units of the various arms. Division-size units were
The 1921 and 1936 Instructions remained the basic documents upon
which the French army's methods were based, and since the 1921 edition
, dominated French thought for most of the interwar period, it was particu
the 1921 Instructions, but they were written chiefly by Marshal Petain
and General Eugene Debeney. The necessity for eventual revision was
29Instructions 1921, p. 9.
11
Thus, the desire to demonstrate the openness of the French army to new
the title of the work. As one military noted, however, "Despite this
title, it remained the Bible of our army for fourteen years."30 A revi
Both the 1921 and the 1936 Instructions stressed the defense, but
offensive and the defensive battle but hardly envisioned any methods other
than those employed from 1914 to 1918. Since the entire army would not
required in the initial battles. But the vast national armies would soon
limited view of the offensive and maneuver dominated French doctrine from
1921 until 1936 when the new Instructions appeared. The idea of initial
not be won solely on the defensive. For example, General Lucien Loizeau,
offensive. ,,32 For General Loizeau, the defensive was a means of con
French officers castigated the idea of the army being prepared solely for
the defense. For example, a July 1936 note from the chief of the military
cabinet of the War Minister labelled the charge that the army had assumed
33
a passive, defensive attitude as "nonsense." There was, nevertheless,
a certain "eclipse of the offensive sense.,,34 The "eclipse" occurred
at every level, for the offense was viewed as being simply the advancing
of fire on the battlefield. The French envisioned the offensive as the
War I.
doctrine had changed. The new manual clearly stated, "Only the offensive
oowever, remained supreme, for the manual stated, "The attack is the
fire that advances [the friend], the defense is the fire that halts [the
Thus, the French army willingly chose to remain tied to the previous
doctrine and to build any new concepts on the foundations of the old.
General Alphonse Georges, the senior member of the commission that wrote
the 1936 Instructions, admitted in 1947 that the manual "was not a docu
14
doctrine at the past, and the High Command retained its view of war as
did not recognize its potential until May-June 1940. The common French
perception of the long, stagnant, total war was personified in the doc
days of World War II, however, the Germans used the tank to achieve the
power the tank furnished shock, speed, and mobility. Instead of the
and parrying with the enemy. And instead of the defense, the tank empha
sized the offense by employing its mobility and mass against enemy vul
concept of war for a new one. The French concept of war and doctrine
of war. In 1936 the new Instructions had declared, "At the present time,
the antitank gun confronts the tank, as during the last war, the machine
gun confronted the infantry.,,40 This threat of the antitank gun against
the tank had frequently been used to argue against large armored forma
tions, but in December 1938, when the decision was finally made by the
perception had changed, but the two divisions were not scheduled to be
constituted until 1940. The High Command slowly recognized the potential
of this new weapon but still moved hesitantly before constituting a unit
unproved in war.
in 1939,42 but it was classified and many important officers never were
mations. For example, General Devaux, who had been the Chief of Staff
of the 3rd French Armored Division, stated after the war that he had
43
never received a copy. The French perception of the tank's purpose
remained one of increasing the offensive power and assisting the maneuver
of the infantry, which was the decisive arm. Of the more than two
thousand tanks available to the French on May 10, 1940, only 20% were
battallons.
44 These statistics clearly reflect the French view of the
role of the tank. As for the employment of the armored divisions during
their tanks into small, strong defensive points along the German penetra
tion without ever employing them in mass. Only De Gaulle's 4th Armored
was not applied once the war started. Even then, the doctrine effec
tively tied large armored units to the task of assisting the maneuver of
corps and armies. The infantry was the queen of battle, and it was to
maintain its throne. In March 1949, General Maxime Weygand stated that
France had entered World War II with "two doctrines.,,47 This may have
been true, but one was outmoded and the other stillborn.
those of 1918. 48 If one were able to visually compare the French army
of 1918 with that of the late 1930's, the contrast would have been just
as startling. New armored vehicles and units had been introduced, the
modified the appearance of the army of the 1930's, the apparent differ
ence was misleading, for French doctrine remained wedded to the ideals
his strategy and in doing so, succinctly summarized the doctrine con
The first armored divisions were not created until after World
War II began, and the majority of the French tanks were employed as
had been designed in consonance with the ideas of General Douhet, who
tinuous front would be too costly, but bombers could fly over these
fronts to strike the enemy's heartland and thus destroy his willpower and
establishing of covering forces along the border, had reached its zenith
its basic elements: the defense, the continuous front, and firepower.
The name itself, Maginot Line, became synonymous with safety and with
new armored vehicles, and the growth of the French air force did not
arms. The military strategy of national defense based upon the citizen-
soldier became the foundation of the French perception of total war for
both the military and the civilian population. And the doctrines of
defense and the continuous front were basic ideas linked directly to the
Revolution with the "cannonade of Valmy" in 1792 and the levee ~ masse
in 1793. Its true spirit was reflected in the decree establishing the
levee en masse:
Henceforth, until the enemies have been driven from the territory
of the Republic, the French people are in permanent requisition for
army service. • •• The young men shall go to battle; the married
men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make
tents and clothes, and shall serve in the hospitals; the children
shall turn old linen into lint; the old men shall repair to the
public places, to stimulate the courage of the warriors and preach
the unity of the Republic and the hatred of kings. 2
teers would rise and destroy the invading armies. The concentration of
sufficient to defend France. Even though she moved away from the armed
nation to a professional army for a time after the Napoleonic Wars, the
peril. The resulting sYmbiotic bond between army and nation was well
nation, draws from it all i.ts resources, and has no separate and dis
4
tinct existence outside the nation.
war. France was convinced that her best defense lay in committing all
5
her resources, both men and materiel, against an attackinR enemy.
came to emphasize the defense rather than the offense, and the citizen-
soldier rather than the professional. For many Frenchmen the philosophy
of the nation in arms compelled the army to emphasize the defense and to
There was little doubt that the nation in arms was based essen
tially on a defensive principle. The most important reason for this was
Following World War I, France maintained short-term service for the con
low level. The term of service for the conscript was reduced from three
(though later increased to two years in 1935). During the same period
the permanent component was gradually reduced to the point where it could
be spared only for a few priority roles, e.g., in the frontier fortifi
cations, the conscript training centers, and the planning staffs. The
professional army thus became the cadre for training the citizen-soldier
"The active metropolitan army will act as the covering force; under its
6
protection, the principal mass of our forces will be mobilized."
1935), 240,000 conscripts were trained by the army each year, 120,000
while the other half was absorbed into the active army. By the law of
1928 on recruitme~t for the army, only 72,000 to 106,UOO career soldiers
were retained in the French army.7 Thus, the active army at all times
"France had no army in peacetime in the old sense of the word.,,8 The
French army for all practical purposes was little more than a school for
France.
Since war was becoming more and more technical, he could not believe a
the less military training a nation has had, the better it fights, as
8
Irving M. Gibson (pseudonym), '~aginot and Liddell Hart: The
Doctrine of Defense," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed., Edward Mead Earle
(New York: Atheneum, 1967), pp. 369-370; see *** (anonymous), "Notre
reorganisation militaire," Revue politique et parlementaire (September 10,
1926), pp. 371-406.
24
highly trained troops, not simply more troops; but the short term of
1939 Infantry Regulations stated that even though officers of the reserve
Similarly, the need for more peacetime training for the reservists,
their active duty and reserve training sessions was also frequently noted
by military writers. ll
army, the army of the French territory, organized by the laws of 1927
each active infantry division (one from each military region) was broken
she could make even a limited thrust into German territory. Commjttinr,
battle.
ness, training and efficiency, than did the defensive. The 1936
quality troops.,,16 Since the type "A" and "B" divisions consisted almost
army divisions were hardly any better with two-thirds of its officers
and non-commissioned officers and 45% of its enlisted men also reser
vists, the military hierarchy doubted the French army would be of suf
High Command felt that short-term conscripts could not acquire suffi.ci.ent
offensive.
"high priest of the defense." This officer saw the n;ltion in arms as
distinctly trained for the offensive. This "special army" would rely
the need to fight with care in the beginning of a war, for the "army
mobilized army.
The failure of the French to act, and thus prevent this German coup, was
ment of the activ~~arrny into the Rhineland would seriously hamper total
in the Spanish Civil War, the same conclusion was reached. Mobilization
of at least a million men for the covering force would be necessary, but
covering forces along the northeast frontier, but this action required
22DDF , I, No. 392, 11 March 1936, p. 504; see DDF, I, No. 196
17 February 1936, pp. 290-293; and Gamelin, Servir, II, pp. 208-211.
23
DDF, I, No. 525, 28 March 1936, p. 699.
29
calling more than 750,000 men and 25,000 officers to duty.25 The mobi
zation of the Rhineland and the Spanish Civil War, France could effec
tively respond only with a total war based on the resources of the entire
nation. Even the 'precautionary measures taken during the Munich crisis
plans, France had contingency plans for an offensive movement into the
Rhineland until April 1935. But with the repudiation of the clauses in
the Versailles treaty intenued to keep Germany disarmed and the subse
possibility and offered instead what the General Staff described as "an
immoveable front" from Mezieres to Bale and "a solid front, covering the
In the October 1936 issue of Revue des Deux Mondes, General Maxime Weygand
Weygand said this even though the events of March had all too obviously
June 1936, the General Staff of the army reaffirmed the task of the
from Longuyon to Basel, as well aa in the Alps." The task also included,
"Halting the maneuver of the enemy that may be executed around the wings
remained supreme.
ing numbers raised by the nation in arms and by the technical charac
members of the military hierarchy,30 for the French believed that wars
entire nations which threw all their resources in men and material into
28
Tournoux, Defense des frontieres, p. 338.
vast affairs, since two nations fighting a battle to the death would not
men and materiel would be committed to extend the battle front to the
arms, and one military writer noted its importance. "The 'continuous
Another result of the nation in arms was the need for a more
the complex variance within such an army: "Since the army, that is the
quality and quantity, the proper organization of the army is more than
units uniformly obey the orders of the commander without "defonning" them
but there is little doubt that it opted for a rigid doctrine. No real
quality that was inherent in any army of huge quantity required more
continuous front.
national army was the most effective mode of defense, and that a pro
herself. Marshal Petain expressed the view held by the majority of the
military:
The armed nation remained the firm basis of the French military philosophy
despite the calls by De Gaulle and Paul ReYnaud for its reconsideration.
the nation in arms, it would have had little choice but to accept that
of conscripts. Those who supported this view had only to look back to
the professional army of Napoleon III to see the menace of such a military
who had asserted in 1868, "When one has such fine arms, there are always
fools who are burning to try them out, [for] • • • soldiers, like iron,
36
rust in times of peace." In contrast, an armed nation would fight only
more, the political left believed that a professional army was not neces
sarily a more effective fighting force. One observer from the left opined
After all, a professional French army had lost the Franco-Prussian War of
1870-1871, but a nation in arms had won the First World War.
nation valiantly defending itself, this belief reaching its zenith during
the 1930's when the political left acquired its greatest power. The
institution.
The close relationship between the nation in arms and the army,
The defense and the continuous front remained essential elements of that
38Instruction 1921, p. 9.
Chapter III
the French concept of the nation in arms. These two fundamental pre
abundant with all their resources and with all their faith."l mobiliza
potential to the war effort. The question of materiel soon became known
There was little doubt that the industrial revolution had im
of weapons, the long range of artillery, the huge number of deadly shells
35
36
and steel fragments sprayed over the battle area, the tremendous multi
were no longer battles fought solely by men. The machine had arrived,
4
and the army itself was even described as a "machine of war."
the pre-World War I dogma of morale. 5 Before the First World War, French
arms and the importance of morale, and Foch's doctrine of the offensive
Colonel Ardant du Picq had formed the French perception of morale, and it
,
has been said that his Etudes ~ Ie Combat was the "most widely read
book in the French trenches during the First World War.,,6 Du Picq stated,
which no longer saw a chance of winning, and thus battle was more a
contest between two opposing wills than between two physical forces.
)
See, for example, Miquel, Enseignements de la guerre, pp. 89-100.
6Stefan T. Possony and Etienne Mantoux, "Du Picq and Foch: The
French School," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed., Edward Head Earle
(New York: Atheneum, 1967), p. 207.
7
Colonel Ardant Du Picq, Etudes sur Ie combat (Paris: R.
Chapelot, 1904), p. 111.
37
suggested ignoring the danger of combat. The essence of his ideas can
the best security." And another, "Go to the excess, and this will per-
haps not yet be enough ... B But the murderous battlefield soon revealed
that more than courage was needed. In his remarkably astute analysis of
How many officers, and those not the poorest, met their death on
the first fields of battle, erect and within full view of the enemy,
in the midst of bullets and shells, under the conviction that it
would have been unworthy of them to seek cover or even to lie down
when their commands were at grips with the enemy: This is a senti
ment which does them the greatest honor; but it was a false concep
tion of the requirements of modern battle, which took time to change
and for which we had to pay too high a price. 9
The bloody price paid in those first few battles convinced the French
that materiel dominated and that imprudence was not the best security.
courage in the face of the enemy.10 The French believed the commander
had to impose his will over that of the enemy, and that this could be
done on either the offensive or defensive. Once this occurred, the inl
11
tiative would be regained, and victory would not be far away. Superior
available by mobilizing the armed nation would permit the French to regain
the initiative from the Germans and impose their will on the enemy.
making items produced from the resources of the entire nation would permit
the nation to the war effort. The presence of the new machines of war
also contributed to the French faith in the continuous front. The employ
the number of personnel required to man a portion of the front and thus a
more extended front could be maintained with the same number of personnel.
More support and supplies may have been necessary, but at the same time
fewer men were now required along the dense, continuous front. 13 France
now saw a chance to overcome the much larger manpower advantage Germany
the opening days of the war. There would be a prolonged lag as industry
would probably be the aggressor in any war with France, who considered
only force his form of war on his opponent, but he could also have the
attaque brusquee and was a common theme in military and civilian journals. 14
The threat of such an attack became a strong argument for the couverture,
1920's the French army persuasively argued that the lengthy and involved
needed to ensure enough time was provided for complete mobilization. The
Maginot Line, which has become infamously synonYmous with the defense in
16
historical analyses of the Fall of France.
the initial materiel that would be used in a war. These strategic stock
piles served the same purpose as the covering force served for the nation.
As the nation mobilized its citizen army and its industrial potential,
the covering force of the army and the stock-piles of materiel provided
the men and the resources for the beginning period of the war. The battle
along the frontiers would consume both as the nation mobilized. The two
were closely associated by the military, and General Debeney even exclaimed,
"Protect our stocks of armaments! They are the covering force of our
17
industrial mobilization."
ancial credits and the drain of building the costly Maginot Line, the
French army found it more advantageous to channel its money into weapons
that could be more effectively used in the initial defensive period. Wea
pons more suitable for the offense could be manufactured as the war pro
instruments. 18 The antitank gun, rather than the tank, was more accordant
17
Debeney, La Guerre, p. 58. On the need for stock-piles of
materiel, see also General W. Sikorski, La guerre moderne (Paris: Berger
Levrault, 1935), pp. 181-182.
18Captain Robert A. Doughty, "De Gaulle's Concept of a Mobile,
Professional Army: Genesis of French Defeat?" Parameters: The Journal
of the U.S. Army War College, IV, No.2 (1974), p. 26; Jeffrey Johnstone
Clarke, "Military Technology in Republican France: The Evolution of the
French Armored Force, 1917-1940," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke
University, 1968, p. 189.
41
French doctrine.
balancing of quality and quantity.19 France had heard the argument for
antitank gun provided the crucial quality needed to counter the attaque
view--to counter this menacing threat. As one military writer pointed out,
"One shell • costing 150 francs can destroy a tank which costs one
addressed the necessity for the defense during the early phases of a war.
those who criticized his scheme as lacking the spirit of the offensive,
While only the offensive would gain decisive results, an initial defen
sive was essential for France's mobilization of her war potential. The
question of her losing the "first battle," however, was not sufficiently
addressed until after she had lost that battle and the war.
its corollary coined by Marshal Petain, "Ie feu tue," or "fire kills." 23
report to the Minister of War by the committee charged with writing the
crushing nature of that fire and its almost "irresistable" nature. The
committee believed the basic nature of the offense and the defense had
combat. 1l2S The 1913 Regulations had claimed, "Battles are above all
morale contests. 'Defeat is inevitable when hope for victory ceases. ·,26
By 1921, the morale factor was no longer supreme; the French firmly
believed "Ie feu tue,lI or firepower kills. That belief differed from
one reads, "The great lesson of the war of 1914-1918 was the preeminence
master, over the field of battle, from which is seems to have chased the
".
combatants. 1128 Even those such as General Emile Allehaut, who criticized
power, hastened to add, l~O one dreams of contesting the effects of fire,
26Reglement 1913, p. 6.
troops. 1129 For the French and for their doctrine, fire did reign supreme.
and that the attack was favored only after the "massing of powerful
power facilitated forming the continuous front and enabled the French to
and permit the French commander to regain the initiative and impose his
own will over the enemy.3! The emphasis on firepower ruled against any
ing the materiel means, and the 1936 Instructions made the remarkable
cally. 1132 Clearly, the batail1e conduite was a logical companion for the
of combat, but it did not change the role of the infantryman. The 1921
The only change made in the 1936 Instructions was the changing of one of
verbatim the 1921 manual but added the sentence, "it [fire] destroys the
and the infantry was one of support; fires permitted the maneuver or
canister, or the infantry, fires assisted the infantry with the "principal
mission of combat," and thus the machines of war were the auxiliaries of
the infantryman.
the tank. 36 In 1939 General Narcisse Chauvineau typified the French view
of the tank, liThe great weakness of the tank is that it is not able to
~obilized and as a result run the risk of being taken as a target by its
enemy, the cannon." And he added, " • • • even though the idea of destruc
of the last war proved that tanks are not able to conquer a defensive
position without the collaboration of the infantry, and it does not appear
officer asserted, " • • • since the enemy armored vehicle cannot occupy
on tracks, designed only to assist the maneuver and supplement the offen
sive capability of the infantry. The fire of the tank was most important,
not its great mobility, nor its potential to rival the previously deci
sive role of the infantry. France's attention was riveted on the infantry
man and on all the external sources of firepower for him. In 1931-32
students at the War College were told, "For the foot soldier, the machine
is only a means." 40 The opposing infantry, not the tanks, was considered
the true enemy of the French infantry; to stop the enemy infantrymen was
the infantry prevailed even after the criticisms of De Gaulle and the
combat, but this did not require altering the doctrine established "on
41
the morrow of victory." The battle would essentially be the same, only
which completed the 1936 Instructions said, "At the present time, the
antitank gun confronts the tank, as during the last war, the machinegun
confronted the infantry.,,42 Just as the machinegun had torn the shroud
could be employed only under the support and protection of the artillery,
and their massed employment would probably occur only after the initial
committee concluded, "The new means • • • have further developed the fire
power that the editors of the 1921 Instructions have already qualified as
annihilating, and which will be employed in the future over the field of
,,44
batt 1 e where it will reign as master. • ••
believed the defender had the advantage and could inflict heavy casualties
43 Ibid •
44 Ibid ., p. 19.
48
massive superiority of "three times as much infantry, six times the
artillery, and fifteen times the ammunition.,,45 This view of the defense
did not mean the French had rejected any possibility of an offensive. The
1921 and 1936 Instructions emphasized the decisive nature of the offensive
and the protective nature of the defensive. 46 The killing fires of the
defense would be used to repulse the attacks of the enemy, while the
offensive would chase the enemy from his position, rout his combat dis
offensive; the defensive might offer many advantages but only an offen
sive would win the war. General Loizeau quoted Clausewitz to illustrate
that point. "The defensive is the strongest form with a negative obJec
The power of the defense furnished a protective shield behind which France
would bleed the attacking enemy and prepare herself for the final vic
torious offensive.
48 Genera
- - 1 L• L i D eux Ma noeuvres (P ar~s:
0 zeau, . Berger-Levrault,
1933), p. 103.
49
While one could say the attaque brusquee resembled the blitzkrieg, it
should be recognized that the two are different. The attaque brusquee
was a sudden, unexpected war thrust upon an unwary and perhaps unready
nation, while the blitzkrieg was a method of war that could be used in
exploitation behind these lines. The battle that began on May 10, 1940,
was hardly an attaque brusquee, for the French had more than eight months
to prepare and to mobilize for war. They had prepared for the slow,
methodical war their doctrine envisioned, not the li~htning war the
armor. Their 25mm cannon was effective up to 800 meters against heavily
armored vehicles. The French model 1897 75mm antitank weapon was a much
meters. 50 By 1939-1940, the old 75mm cannon was gradually being replaced
by the new 47mm cannon, which--except for the German 88--was undoubtedly
the best antitank cannon employed in the battle of France. In short, the
French antitank guns could have stopped any of the German tanks used
against France with the possible exception of a few of the Mark IV's
which had been given additional armor plating. Even before the invasion
of France, the Polish campaign had revealed to the Germans, much to their
51
alarm, how effective these antitank weapons could be against their armor.
General Maurice Gamelin, Commander of the French army in May 1940, later
battle began, not because the individual weapons were ineffective against
large numbers of tanks. The French had equated materiel with firepower
and had misunderstood the contribution that materiel had made to mobi.lity.
munitions and war materiel would consume 95% of France's gasoline, while
tanks would consume only 5%.53 Fuel would be consumed primarily along
another heavily used supply route such as the voie sacree, at Verdun in
51
General Ulrich Liss, Westfront 1939/40: Erinnerungen des
Feindarbeiters im OKH (Neckargemund: Kurt Vowinckel Ver1ang, 1959), pp.
99ff; cited in Gunsburg, "The French High Command," p. 219.
52
Gamelin, Servir, I, p. 167.
51
of the tank units to their artillery support. Armor units would not go
field, the French simply were not trained to think of a hastily assembled,
distant armor attack. Their doctrine did not stress the decisive quali
Another fatal error was that doctrine was based on the French
antitank guns supplied the French division was based on the assumption
this assumed maximum density, the French concluded that the proper density
of antitank guns should be one gun each 100 meters, or ten per kilometer. 55
These ten guns would, of course, be arranged in depth and not stretched
54
Instructions 1936, p. 17.
55 Capitaine A. Goutard, "La char en face de l'arme antichar dans
1a rupture," Revue d'Infanterie, Vol. 93 (August, 1938), p. 288; Gamelin,
Servir, I, p. 166. Compare Capitaine Chazal-Martin and Capitaine Suire,
"{tude mathematique de la puissance des armes antichars," Revue d'Infan
terie, Vol. 95 (August, 1939), p. 294; and Colonel Hainie, tiL'Offensive
et la defensive avec les engins blindes," Revue militaire generale
(February, 1937), pp. 165-172.
52
56
and called for at least eighteen antitank guns per kilometer. There was
a clear difference, then, even before the blitzkrieg was truly born, in
the German and French conceptions of what a massive armored attack would
be.
100 tanks per kilometer by lamely asserting, "At the very least, this
military hierarchy. Yet, when the battle of Sedan was fought in Hay
1940, the Germans concentrated along the 8-10 kilometer front a force of
over 800 tanks from Guderian's XIXth Panzer Corps, a density 60mewhat
less than 100 tanks per kilometer. Germany took her own understanding of
who found herself unable to regain the initiative and unable to impose
~\
The legacy of the past was another factor moldinp, France's con
modern materiel had both been amply demonstrated and practiced in the
Great War of 1914-1918. But having accepted the nation in arms and the
the army to be molded by the thoughts and events of the past, rather
This hampered modernization of the army, and the example of the past
became the model within which France formed her approach to war. Speci
fica11y, the Great War had been a long, methodical, consuming, annihilating
war, and the military expected the war of the future to be similar. l As
our land are turned toward the war of yesterday, Germans turn theirs
IFor the French view of war, see Instructions 1936, pp. 97-99;
Instructions 1921, pp. 58-61; General Haurin, L'Armee moderne (Paris:
Flammarion, 1938), pp. 133-151; General Debeney, Sur la securite militaire
de la France (Paris: Payot, 1930, pp. 46-51; and Commandant Bouvard,
Les lecons militaires de la guerre (Paris: Masson, 1920), pp. 13-16.
oS
53
54
colonial forces. Of these, 1,122,400 were killed or died during the war,
3,594,889 were wounded~. and 260,000 were missing. Hence, 1,382,400 French
of the 17,000 graduates of St. Cyr that served in the war were killed.
Since most were junior officers, more than half of the most recent grad
uates fell in the war. These terrible losses were written indelibly into
the minds and memories of the military; the scars of the war could not be
forgotten.
Donald C. McKay 4 has suggested that there are two distinct periods of
and accomplishment from 1871 to 1914, and the descending one of pessimism
and inertia from 1918 to 1940. According to Professor McKay, the war of
ing periods. Such a picture could also be drawn of the military, with
drawal and exhaustion. The period before World War I was the era of the
unbridled spirit; the one following that war was the era of brutal reality,
the era of materiel. While this generalization has some obvious limita
tions, notably the Dreyfus affair, the ~lan, the spirit of the French
army had undoubtedly been drained in the "Great War" of 1914 to 1918.
1913 and the 1921 Instructions on the employment of large units. For
example, the 1913 Instructions claimed, "Battles are above all morale
factor of combat.,,6 The experience of the First World War had convinced
French commanders that they could no longer prepare for battle believing
emotionally asserted, "Studies of the past have borne their fruit: the
descriptive of modern battles but which are not to be found in the 1913
B
Instructions 1921, p. 23.
56
simply do not portray the view of war that existed in 1914 but which per
ship between this changing view of war and the evolution of doctrine,
preference for the defense and for the batai11e conduite. Jean Dutourd,
in his own devastating manner, has described his view of the results
for France. "1 feel a personal grudge against these peace-loving generals.
9
Mistaking their own vocation, they sabotaged mine." France's generals
in 1940 may not have been "peace-loving" in the neKative sense Dutourd
implies, but they were definitely not "war-mongers." Nor were they as
anxious for or mentally as well prepared for war in 1940 as they had been
in 1914.
lasting contribution of Marshal Petain durinR World War 1 and one of the
most important factors in the creation of his reputation had been his
Marshal Petain's preference for the defense and the husbanding of man
power and lives seemed brilliantly logical. While describing the accom
would have to use the title, "How one becomes a great leader by loving
9
Jean Dutourd, The Taxis of the Marne, trans. Harold King (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. 8.
57
lives and to restore the morale of the French soldier, the slogan of the
infantry occupies."ll For the remainder of the First World War, needless
40 t OOO a month. 12 But the years of futile charges against the enemy's
trenches and barbed wire and the final welcome ending of the useless
losses had convinced many French leaders of the advantages of the defense,
and it was not to be a lesson easily forgotten. How could anyone escape
and this influence eventually became the object of much criticism. One
of the most forceful attacks on the military's use of h1storyt and in
directly on doctrine t was made by Marc Bloch after the battle was lost in
1940. He said:
llThis quote was often cited by military writers, but see General
Arthur Boucher, L'Infanterie sacrifiee (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1930),
p. 57.
12
Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World (New York: Collier Books,
1962) , p. 264.
13
Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat, trans. Gerald Hopkins (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1968), p. 119.
58
The civilian segment of society was not alone in criticizing such a use
too much stress on lessons learned from history. One example of such
a satirical sense., this former commandant of the War College and the
on history.
in order to convince the officer corps that a war in the future would be
a carbon copy of that fought from 1914-1918. In fact, the French were
cautious after World War I in their use of history, for they were aware
that unfortunate and improper lessons concerning the offensive had been
drawn from imperfect historical studies before that war. They never
rejected the idea of principles underlying doctrine, but at the same time
they attempted to heed the warning of those such as General Mangin who
that the ways of war were constantly changing, and it was always necessary
to keep in touch with the changes. One of his examples illustrates this.
He said:
changes were the basis for changes in the nature of warfare. At the same
time he was aware that the excesses of the offensive a outrance had come
other eras.
most clear at the War College and the Center for Higher Military Studies.
student officers. As General Loizeau told the students at the War College
in 1932, practical exercises were not intended to provide the student with
terrain, enemy, and friendly forces available varied, this would develop
them to think as a leader, with their good sense, their character, and
are given only as examples. They constitute neither the sole possible
analagous situation." l8
another lecturer told the students at the War College, "Based most often
solution appropriate for every combat problem, since the student was
French recognized that exposure to theory was insufficient and that the
officer needed to learn how to think and decide for himself before he
College and the Center for Higher Military Studies were based on his
torical problems. 21 The fear, the confusion, the unknown, the disorder
a strategic or tactical doctrine, and then defining the changes that must
officer to the problems and realities of war, while exposing him also to
the dynamic changes that occur during war. By understanding how and why
warfare had changed in the past, the officer would understand how warfare
Hi1itary lecturers and writers in the late 1920's and 1930's often
and the mistakes made by the pre-World War I High Connnand with history
the War College quo,t.ed the commission that wrote the 1875 regulations for
The error had been made in the past, and the officer concluded that
from history, and the French military was reassuring itself that it
would not make the same mistake again, that it had learned the true
lessons. For them, the inexorable lesson of history was that a future
Une French officer described the approach of Colonel Bonnal, who had
of the beginning days of World War I were vivid evidence that II improper"
lessons had come from the War College and from the course in military
history, strategy, and applied tactics, which had given a strong impetus
27
to the offensive a Dutrance. Consequently, this course disappeared
in 19lY after the War College had been reopened, and was replaced by
general staff, strategy, and tactics. 28 This change agreed with the
after World War I, however, the conunission charged with the writing the
.
1921 I nstruct10ns d ec id e d not to f urn i s h a 1i st 0 f pr i nC1p
. 1es 0 f war. 30
They did not reject principles of war; they simply avoided the issue. By
1936 principles of war were no longer avoided and were again included in
the new Instructions, but they differed remarkably from the 1913 list.
While the earlier ones had strongly emphasized the offense, the ones in
31
1936 emphasized principles that might apply to any military operation.
The Bir,h Conunand obviously sought to avoid the errors made before 1914,
and the safety of generalities was preferred over the danger of specifics.
thought only hastened the closing of French eyes to all lessons, save
those of the defensive, the continuous front, and firepower. The mili
conunitted the same error; they rejected ideas and formed concepts from
information gained from the improper use of history, not from opportunities
seeking infallible principles from the war, the military was unable to
evident that the examples used in lecture halls were invariably those
to prove a point was General Narcisse Chauvineau, who has been des
34
cribed as "one of the mos t celebrated professors" at the \-Jar College.
carefully examined the Fi rs t World War for lessons concerning the pO\ve r
perties of arms and forti fications. ,,35 In rea1i ty, Chauvineau had
committed the same error as Colonel Bonnal and the other priests of the
thesis, and after the war, General Gamelin acknowledged that Chauvineau's
journals, which we.re saturated with articles 'on the Great War. The
contents before World War I and World War II can be compared. Using
the contents from January 1928 to December 1938 as broken down accord
one reviewed the war in Ethiopia, one described the Spanish Civil War,
and nine discussed ancient campaigns (meaning not in the twentieth cen
of the First World War or campaigns similar to those of that war. Since
the articles on colonial campaigns and the Foreign Legion were concerned
July 1905 to July 1914 actually dealt with the era of Napoleon. Over
41% discussed the Russo-Japanese War, and 32% discussed the Franco
38
Prussian War of 1870-1871. The contents of the journal were strikingl v
tially consider evidence other than that from the r.reat War were often
War College lectured and wrote on "maneuvers of the wing" and analyzed
would sweep around an enemy flank into his rear. This is precisely what
38Data for the period July 1905 to July 1914 were taken from
indexes contained within the individual volumes. If an article were
spread through several issues, it was counted as only one article.
accomplishment and will exact heavy losses.,,41 At the same time, Loizcau
saw the maneuver of armies as being possible only in the first encounters
of war, before enough manpower and materiel had been mobilized to "permit
brigades in 1940 was 59; generals commandinp, divisions, 62; and generals
commanding armies, 65. At the start of World \.Jar II, Gamelin was 67,
Weygand 72, and Petain 83. In contrast, Napoleon had been 46 at \'Jaterloo,
43
and Joffre had been 62 in 1914.
the failure of French military thought and the age of the military
leaders.
Not only had they relived those glorious days [of the past war]
a hundred times in books or lectures: not only had they based on
them a whole curriculum of military education. They were soaked
4l E'co ~.
"" 1 e Superleure d e Guerre (G~enera1 L' ) La!Manoeuvre d u
01zeau,
Corps d'Armcc dans l'Armee (1932), pp. 92, 67-93.
vivid memories of the past, and even though pre-World War I thoughts and
mistakes had been ardently criticized, she failed to realize she was
making similar mistakes in the 1920's and 19]0's. These mistakes accen
was not a conscious, directed program. The failure was more one of pre
Part of the roots of the French failure to modify their concept of war
ready to refight World War I, but they were ready to fight a similar
war. Had the memories of World \oJar I not been so vivid, the French may
have been more willing to change their concept of war and their doc
one especially important legacy being the vast amount of materiel remain
ing after the First World '.Jar. This old and obsolete equipment acted
during the 1920's and 1930's. One clear example of this was the 1917
l{enault FT; the long presence of this tank in the inventory reinforced
prolific writer on French armor during the interwar period, about 3,000
tanks--the vast majority being Renault FT's--wpre left over from the
during the period 1919-1935. With French units and depots overflowing
with these tanks, how could the military not decide to utilize them,
especially since the German threat was not so apparent during these
lightly armed, two-man tank \'leighed 6.5 tons, had a maximum range of 25
to 30 miles, and was only.capab1e of 4.8 miles per hour under ideal
between one and two-and-a-half miles per hour. For traveling long
slowness and light protection, the Renault 1"1' tanks would normally
advance with or slightly precede the infantry. To let the tanks auda
ciously advance far ahead of the infantry would be a mistake and would
risk their being destroyed without actually helping the infantry in the
attack; only when these tanks attacked deliberately \-lith the infantry
of armor, and until 1934 or 1935, the main emphasis for tanks was on their
mission of accompanying the infantry. The only new type tanks hrought
into the French inventory until 1935 were the h-l and the V-I, both
medium tanks. The B-1, however, was not mass produced until after 19J),
with only three actually delivered before 1935. The V-l came into ser
vice in 1931, but there were never more than a total of 150 of this tank
48
and subsequent models of it which followed. The military hierarchy
1930 the new Inspector of Tanks, General Segonne, called for the replace
But little was done until the B-1 came into mass production after 1935.
This very real legacy of the past hampered France's comprehension of how
plodded along with her 1917 tank, ready to fight the war of the future
with the weapon of the past. But even then, her concept of the war of
The Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 could have been the proving
concept of war. The military recognized this, and a keen interest was
51
shown in the events and outcome of that war. Yet, the reader can
had concluded:
The Revue d'Infanterie could only remark, "Note the return to classic
,,53
ideas.
World War I, but there was no sense of relief felt when the deadly
of the Spanish Civil War was emphasized, and one observer asked:
Where is the limit? In the next war \l1hen all the men and
women of military age have disappeared, will we perhaps see chil
dren mutilated by bombs using their stumps to aim machiner,uns, for
which cartridges are being made in the caves by their grandfathers. 54
and no new methods such as the "lightning war" made possible by armor,
in the early 1930's was quieted somewhat,55 and ironically, the example
of World War I became more powerful than ever. The experience of the
Great War dominated French thought, and its lessons--in the opinion of
53 Ibid ., p. 1038.
of mobilizing the entire resources of the nation if war carne, she reco~-
nized her resources were not unlimited. In comparison to the much larger
mobilization was relatively small, and she found herself facing a poten
tially more pmverful enemy for which she needed her every resource to
much of her natural resources and industrial capability was located near
her frontiers and thus within easy striking distance of the Germans.
emphasizing the defense and the continuous front. The problem of the
in war, and they would have to be employed in a manner where the combat
lization of materiel.
The problE~m of manpower for the French armed forces had long
been a source of gloom. From the time of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870
Table 1
(Nillions)
so-called "lean years" when the smaller number of Frenchmen born during
the First World War would come of military age, France required a system
4
that would "enable fewer men to fight more efficiently."
The need for better efficiency was also accentuated by the law
months to one year. Approximately the same number would be drafted, but
their term of service would be cut by six months, or by one third. This
army meant that it would take longer to mobilize the entire nation, and
one deputy asserted that the French military had to "defend the frontier
While the military of the late 1920's did not expect the cover
ing forces along the frontier to hold for "three or four months," few
doubted that they had to be more efficient; this compelling need for
create fortifications along the frontier. With its faith in the superi
ority of the defense, and with its recognition that the defense required
ing a defensive system along the frontiers, perhaps the most important
Such an emplOYment also agreed with the oft quoted principle of initially
needed personnel t.o other parts of the front. 8 The need for fortifica
tions was even more obvious after the evacuation of the Rhineland in
the potential enemy. After the evacuation, nothing stood between France
and Germany that could stop the notorious attaque brusquee before it
reached French territory. As Enno Kraehe has noted, this threat became
the consideration most often discussed in the debate over increasing the
9
defenses of the French frontier.
the German threat and by the increasingly weak nature of the French army.
The smaller French army had to have something extra to successfully ward
off the dreaded attaque brusquee. At the same time, the presence of
much of France's industrial and natural resources along the frontier had
to be considered.
duty personnel with some reinforcement from the reserves. Their mission
was to delay an attacking enemy until the remainder of the French army
possible and then slowly withdraw before the probable enemy superi
ority. After several days of delaying, the covering force would reach
the protection of the fortified system of the upper Moselle and the
Meuse. Here they would continue the fight in order to gain the required
time for the mobilization of the army. Space could thus be traded for
10
the time that was required to mobilize the French army.
explained that the purpose of the covering forces was to permit mobili
zation along the frontier and to protect the debarkation and concentra
tion zones for th~~ mobilizing French army. The regulation said that the
works of art, telt~graph lines, and provisions in the front ier zone, II 11
capability.
Table 2
1913 1915
able to the German threat are coal and iron ore. These were especially
critical in thE! opinion of the French, since "total war" would require
vast amounts of the two resources. As for coal, the total reserves of
England's were 190 billion. 13 Within France, the most important coal
field lay in the departments of Nord and Pas-de-Calais, and were never
more than 25 miles from the Belgian border. These coal fields had been
severely damaged during World War I by heavy shelling and by the Germans
damaged mines was not achieved until some ten years after the end of the
war. 14
By 1932, 63% of the coal produced in France carne from this fron
tier region, and another lli~ came from the department of Moselle within
Lorraine. 15 These Lorraine deposits were also located along the German
border, and thus almost 75% of French coal production was exceptionally
matters worse, France had to import about 30% of the coal and coke she
used. 16 These imports were also subject to the whims and changing politics
of foreign powers. 17
French iron ore was even more vulnerable. After the war of 1870
(London: Methuen & Co., LTD., 1931; Revised edition, 1950), pp. 433-435.
16
17
1913, 83% of the iron ore produced in France carne from that part of
Lorraine still under French control. When the war began, however, pro
duction of iron ore was almost completely halted by the German seizure
never exceeded even 10% of that produced in 1913. 18 After the war and the
restoring of all of Lorraine to France, nearly 95% of the iron ore pro
duced in 1932 came from Lorraine. 19 In the interwar period, these iron
fields were the largest in Europe, the second largest known in the world,
and the most economical of all to work. 20 In short, the iron fields
were immensely important to the French economy and to any war effort, but
these had been controlled by Germany from 1870-1871 until the end of
jumped to some 47,000 metric tons in 1919 and reached 67,000 by 1926. 21
envisioned from the point of view of national defense t' is then essentially
of her own minuscule oil reserves had little effect on defense planning,
and other than increasing her storage capability, France could do little
more than hope that her needs would be met 1f war came.
sources of coal and raw materials, especially iron ore, many factories
were located around the Pas-de-Calais and Nord coal field and near the
Lorraine iron and coal fields. Another important industrial area was
skilled labor, and reasonably easy access to the requisite coal and raw
ways, it was the heart of France. In the 1930's one out of every seven
Frenchmen lived in Paris, and the other six were greatly influenced by
what went on 1.n that city. It was the seat of government, the center of
French industI'y, the hub of the communications system, and the focus of
its will, tho\';.ght, and opinion. Yet, Paris was only a scant 110 miles
Sedan--where General Heinz Guderian was to cross the Meuse River in May 1940.
formed by Dunkirk, Strasbourg, and Paris, France had about 75% of her
coal and 95% of her iron ore production. And most of her industry was
within that s,~e triangle. Drawing another triangle between Paris, Lille,
goods. In that same area was produced most of France's chemical products,
all its automobiles, and all its aircraft. Since the French considered
coal, iron, and factories as the basis for the materiel side of total
threatened even if she were successful in again halting the enemy before
enemy.
The 1914 covering forces had been able to trade much French
territory in order to gain the critically needed time for the mobiliza
tion of the army; if France were to win a future total war, she would
110 longer have that "luxury." By the early 1930's the areas of north
west France, Lorraine, and Paris had become far too important to a future
Calais. This area between Belgium and France had little defensible
terrain and extending the Maginot Line would have disrupted or gone
behind (!.~., not protected) much valuable industry in the Lille area. 25
In March 1934, Ma-rshal Petain argued persuasively before the Senate Army
them [the industrial regionsj • • • because they are too close to the
defensive lines by French troops within Belgium, though this was qualified
terrain. After th~ war General Gamelin explained, "If one considers the
place, isn't the argument [for advancing into Belgium] even more con
seize any of the industrial capability of France was what Enno Kraehe
France had suffered four invasions (1814, 1815, 1870, 1914) by Germany
over the past century, and the profound desire by most Frenchmen was to
tured the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate on the terrible effects of
the German occupation during World War I, but one of the most emotional
over the concept clf the frontier defenses. 30 Albert Meunier passionately
areas and pleaded that no Frenchman should ever again come under German
rather than allow ~:hem to be used by the enemy. He repeated the tales of
villages burned and destroyed and their inhabitants shot. and although
these tales are mo're myth than fact. they continued to have an impac t on
France. The perception of the brutality of the Germans was more impor
tant than the reality. Against this consuming fear of Germany, France
After the second war. Jacques Mordal argued persuasively that France
had little choice but to construct a continuous front along the northern
the continuous front was the belief after 1940 that France could have
concentrated along the frontier and with the routes of communication all
converging on Paris, Mordal saw no real alternative other than the con
the military befol'e World War II, most of whom could not conceive abandon
ing parts of France to the Germans. For them, the idea of not having a
continuous front \o'as a "myth," because France had to have every ounce of
'the need for defending along the frontier in several of his pre-war
publications:
an earlier one by General Ely, "Les lecons qu'il faut tirer des operations
88
defending along thE~ frontiers, and for example, General Bernard Serrigny
pointed out that on the Italian frontier in the Alps, the army could
against an enemy. But he added, "The zone to be ceded to the enemy cur
German border came the slogan for winning the first battle. General
lose the first battle. A clear first victory [by the enemy] is the con
potential to the enemy, and even if she were initially able to survive
an initial loss, dE!feat would soon come when she could not meet the
"parry the maneuver of the enemy" around the "wings of the fortified
front. ,,35 In hj.8 post-war memoirs, Gamelin explained why the frontiers
had to be defended; "One should not forget that in modern war the neces
sity appears for protecting to the maximum all the resources of the
national territury.,,36
along the front:Ler, the French army may have found the ideas of De Gaulle
and Reynaud on large armored formations more appealing, but with the
barrier, and thl~ir very mobility promised that crucial areas could pass
to and fro from enemy hands to friendly hands. 37 From the French per
armored corps' fate against a mass German army: "We will have a brilliant
35
Tournoux, Defense des frontieres, pp. 338-341.
36
Gamelin, Servlr, III, p. 529; see DDF, VIII, No. 127, 8 February
1938, pp. 256-257; and ~, VIII. No. 445, 15 March 1938, pp. 818-821.
communique at the beginning, then silence, and after a few days, a use
less 5.0.5.,,39
to split the rultional army into two armies, thereby causing the second-
line army to suffer. This was not a theory solely constructed to counter
that would progressively act to drain resources from the legitimate needs
corps would atl:ract the best personnel and the best equipment, to the
an army with enough strength in manpower and materiel to stop the initial
attack, and enough potential to expand its size for the long total war.
from the poten 1cial for molding an effective national army. As General
40Genera
" 1 De beney, Sur 1a secur i te~ m
ilit
a ri e d e 1a France (P ar i s:
Payot, 1930); and "Encore l'armee de metier," pp. 279-295.
91
Weygand asserted, the second-line army would quickly "fall to the state
this "resigned militia" that would have to defend the crucial resources
along the frontiers and fight the final battle for the defense of France.
an attacking enemy. Even its presence would drain much needed resources
from the larger second force, and make the winning of the final victory
serv(~ only with the authorization of the English fleet or the many nations
that produce the petroleum." 42 The crucial resources and the frontier
High Command. Since the form given to the military hierarchy would
the army, the problem was to balance the requirement for an effective
unchanged over the next fifty years, was the hierarchical structure
army led her to create a High Command that was neither as effective,
IOn the intricacies of the High Command, see Conunandant Jean Vial,
tiLe Defense nationale: son organization entre les deux guerres," Revue
d'histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale, V, No. 18 (April, 1955), pp.
11-32; and Stephen Ryan, Petain the Soldier (New York: A. S. Barnes
and Company, 1969), pp. 192-217. On the French problem with technology,
see Colonel Ail1eret, "Immobilisme des doctrines et progres des armaments,"
Revue de defenBe nat10nale (December, 1955), pp. 539-554.
92
93
the less diffi.cult course of retaining the older concept of war and
adapting new t.echnology to that concept, rather than seeking new tech
The IDCLjor parts of the High Command of the French army were the
triad of the Hinister of War, the Superior Council of War, and the Chief
of the General Staff. By law and practice the war minister was the most
powerful and :~nfluential of the three. The Superior Council of War and
the Chief of the General Staff functioned beneath the war ministry with
the war counc:Ll acting as an advisory body (but including the highest
ranking military officers in the army), and the Chief of the General Staff
(and the General Staff) performing the function of preparing and plan
ning for the lwentuality of war. These two bodies, the purely military
tion of vast :?owers over the military that Georges Clemenceau had
Befor,~ 1914 political leaders had argued, "When the guns begin
2
to speak, it is best that the politicians keep qUiet," and as a result
of the decrees of JUly 29, 1911, and January 20, 1912, Marshal Joffre
gained more control over the French army than any general officer since
ended the almost unchecked power of the military and the assumption of
After the war the High Command sought a new command structure
that would have ended the authority of the war minister and concentrated
all authority in the hands of a single military leader, but this pro
Mordacq, the "Tiger' sIt military assistant, later stated that he did not
but his authority was diluted by the duality of the Superior Council of
War and the Chief of the General Staff. Instead of creating a distinct
military chain of command, applicable in both war and peace, the French
..
"
constructed a bureaucratic trilogy of competing institutions and per
',,'
sonalities.
and authority for the French army. This is particularly true in the
question of incorporating new technology into the army, for the several
July 27, 1872, wit:l the mission of examining various measures pertaining
to the army, especially those dealing with the "armament of the troops,
It was not extensively used over the next decade, and although modified
by decree in 1881, 1882, and 1886, its functions remained largely un
7
defined with no specific areas of responsibility. It was not until
1888 that the Superior Council of War was established as the most
the war council was act.ivated and enlarged to provide advice to the war
7
~ (1881), p. 6571; J.O. (1882), p. 953; J.O. (1886), p. 1066.
96
According to that decree, the council was charged with "examin
ing questions connected with the preparation for war." A long list of
was also included. These included plans for mobilization and concen
zation and training of the army, the adoption of new engines of war,
was added: the council was to be consulted "in a general manner, on all
measures able to affect the constitution of the army and the manner in
next five dec;ades, the membership included the Minister of War, the
Chief of the General Staff, and the most senior and powerful general
officers in t.he French army. The latter included those holding the
rank of marshal (after World War I) and the general officers who would
eventuality (If war. This officer was commonly known as the "Generalissime,"
or GeneralisElimo.
97
Follow:lng the Great War, Marshal Petain was named the vice-pre
sident of the war council. After accepting the position, Petain was
also offered the position of Chief of the General Staff. When it became
apparent that Petain might refuse the second position, Marshal Foch sent
General Weygand to plead with him to accept the position and thus
unify the mili'~ary elements of the High Command. But Petain refused.
Staff: I cannot see myself going every evening for the signature of
the minister ... lO The two key positions of the Chief of the General
have had enough influence at the time to prevent such a division, his
An attempt was also made to place the Chief of the General Staff
Petain to the new post of Inspector General of the army, a position every
implicitly, but not legally held since the early 1890's. As Inspector
General. Petain could legally supervise and inspect the army's prepara
tion for war. but these powers were no real expansion of the de facto
power given by the decree. and the most controversial, was the require
ment that the Chief of the General Staff "submit for the examination
98
of the Inspector General of the army all questions concerning organiza
war minister. 12
ister of War and the Chief of the General Staff in favor of the General
of the General Staff and vice-president of the war council, but he was
was never a complete melding of the military elements of the High Command.
the French army, since, for example, it could be called into session
Even then, many of the projects presented to the body for consideration
had already been "worked out, leaving little opportunity for its members
15
to demand major revisions." Also, the Generalissimo and the designated
commanders of army groups and armies did not "command" their units dur
i11g peacetime. They only had the power to "inspect" their future units
those rare occasions when the minister sought their advice, the role of
relations between the~ war council and various war ministers became
in the number of effectives during the "lean years," which were caused by
the low birth rate during World War I. The crises exacerbated already
16
angry tempers within the two critical institutions. The military hier
year service was, however, a pyrrhic one, for open disagreement eventually
led to an even greater weakening of the power of the war council. After
1936 the role of the Superior Council of War became less important, and
15
Hughes, To the Maginot Line, p. 103.
16
"Daladier, who was Minister of War from June 1937 until the war and who
But tht~ Sup,erior War Council was never a "hot spot" of demands
that might o'l/e;~turn the French concept of war, since it was very 810w-
units has been studied in France since 1932. But the development of the
Minister of War, also gave the order for the General Staff to study the
proper role and composition of large armored formations, but the only
clear conclusion was that the Renault 1935 tank was unsuited for emp1oy
nized that the Hotchkiss 1935 and Renault 1935 tanks were nor appro
priate for armored divisions, and that there would not he enough medlw.u
or heavy tanks in the inventory before 1939 for the formation of large
tank units. The final decision on that day was to continue the study
General P. Hering and one or two others, still had an antiquated view
stitute these units before the beginning of 1941, and clearly these
military leaders felt no sense of urgency to create this new type unit,
for which they hardly understood the proper employment, much less the
proper organization. And the beginning of World War I I was only nine
months away.
doctrine, such as the nation in arms and the experience of the past, were
version of one of the three brigades in each of the five cavalry divi
played by the war minister during this period and paid him the highest
might even say. ,,22 His opinion of other war minister was much
arrival of Mr. [Joseph] Paul-Boncour [in June 1932] that the era of dif
23Ibid., p. 383.
103
General Weygand openly complained of the poor utilization of the
General Louis Maurin, and in his last days before compulsory retirement
from the war council because of age, charged that "in spite of repeated
demands, the council has not been consulted on measures to take against
,,24
dangerous insufficiencies. • Conflict and mutual distrust con
tinued after Weygand, and in his post-war apologia, Gamelin claimed that
and also the Chief of the General Staff, General Maurin who was the war
minister told him, "For you, training and the preparation for operations;
advice. ,,25
leaders. • • and those who have direct charge over our interests there
of the late 1930's when her concept of war should have changed as a
it was easier (and politically more palatable) to retain the old concept
of war and mold the new technology to that concept, than it was to alter
repeated after 1935, and nothing would be done to risk a major confron 4
•
there was no appal'ent need for a major political uproar, especially since
the military leadE~rship was not firmly convinced of the value of large
coupled with the lack of understanding, that bogged down France's move
ment toward large armored formations and that prevented France from
having a clear sense of direction with this new technology. The desire
die was thus cast, not by a decision to act, but by a decision not to
act.
into its military arsenal. Part of the reason for an absence of a unity
27
Gamelin" Servir, I, p. 257.
105
High Command between the Minister of War, Superior Council of War, and
General Staff, which spilled over into the arena of doctrine and tech
doctrine, were simply incorporated into the older concept of war without
substantially modifying it. There was neither a clear system for evalua
28 I.B. Holley, Jr., Ideas and Weapons ( New Haven: Yale Univer
sity Press, 1953), p. 10.
29 Ibid., p. 19.
None of these channels ever seriously doubted that the tank was
cerned how the tank was to be used on the battlefield, and the differ
for the soldier on the ground; they also believed the antitank weapon
envisioned the tank to be the perfect vehicle for exploitation, and their
approach was remarkably close to simply replacing the horse with a gaso
as the "father of French armor," and his followers saw the tank playing
what one might describe as a "modern role." Or, at least it was more
General Estienne's concept was far from that employed by the Gennan
General Guderian in. May 1940 t but his concept was still iae aheCld of
favorable for Frenc~h armor, since some of the tank studies remained
under the Artillery's Study and Armament Inspectorate and clearly under
until the early 1930's.33 With the abolishment of the Tank Technical
for Combat and Vehi.c1e Materiel, absorbed the functions of the Tank
Technical Section,34 and the drive for a "modern" medium battle tank
technology existed within the French army until General Weygand became
Superior Council of War, nor the Chief of the General Staff were able to
officer of the General Staff of the army was specially and exclusively
confusion reigned.
General Weygand, permitted him "to give needed directives and to order
realize the most impol·tant ones." 36 The bureau also provided liaison
War, the Chief of the General Staff, the Directors and Inspector Gen
Secretary General of the War Ministry, and the chief of the Bureau of
35
Weygandt Memoires, II, p. 369.
36
I bid.. p. 370.
109
Materiel. Despite this impressive membership, neither the Bureau of
Materiel nor the Consultative Council had responsibility for the devel
ual branch.
the "state of anarchy" that had reigned until the new system was esta
blished and argued that new technology could now "follow a line of
The new department would execute armament plans conceived by the various
was placed within the Armaments Department to assist the technical sec
tions of each arm in the design and testing of their weapon systems. 38
Thus, the new Armaments Department served as a conduit for orders and as
oping new technology remained with the individual branch, and DecaU8~
the system was confustng even to those who worked within it. After the
cODDDittee that the entire process was complex and difficult to under
ended some of the confusion and some of the redundancy, but they had
not created a system whereby the responsibility for development lay with
needs had long been identified 5 General Jean Mordacq, Clemenceau's roili
tary assistant. for example, had earlier complained of the "anarchy" within
the General Staff of the army. After the re-establishment of the pre
And none of the reforms in the interwar years effectively ended this
muddled independence.
doctrine for the new weapons. In short, no system for combining cech
nological and doctrinul improvements had been made, and nothing was done
to .encourage the overturning of the old concept for a new one. But
these programs are fiJced by the General Staff. ,,41 But the important
The thrust of the reforms, as Jeffrey Johnstone Clarke has argued, "only
firm direction from the High Command was effectively opting for the
France even had difficulty with those weapons of war for which
France had only 40,000 mines on hand upon mobilization and had manu··
becomes why France did not have more mines and who had failed to order
civilians who had worked in the various armament sections of the General
45
Staff and War Ministry, General Martignon, the ex-director of the
answer:
The failure of some unnamed officer in the General Staff to order 8uf
a woefully inadequate supply, and even this simpl, function had become
of technology and weapons. One might even say that the example of the
war was nothing new to France and was not always due solely to the con
in the 1920's over the nature of the Maginot Line is a cleac example of
ing views on the plcoper form for the fortifications SOOll appeared. 48
War when Harshal Pi;tain and General E. A. L. Bual, his war-time chief of
wire system of World War I. Opposing this view were chose led by
Marshals Foch and Joffre who supported the concept of fortified regions
army. Such armies would maneuver around the centers of resistance seek
ing the proper time and most favorable conditions for the launching of
offensive and with the defensive maneuver of armies, while the continuous
initially under Joffre and then under General Adolphe Guillaumat, which
the northeast frontier to permit the projection of French power into the
known as the Magine>t Line was thus not dominated by the defense.
with Marshal Peta111 leading the opposition. 51 The Marshal saw no reason
to abandon the methods proven effective in World War 1,52 and the war
council was unable to agree on the form the fortifications should take.
him that the large fortified regions initially suggested could be reduced
plan, the three major fortified regions could be constructed, but they
115
the post-war wisdom that would enable him to charge the a111itary hier~
along the entire frontier, their concept closely coincided with the
after his reconnaissance in the summer of 1927. While this concept was
of Pitain and Joffre, it was simply a much more powerful continuouB line
consist of trenches and barbed wire but of vastly more expensive concrete
and steel. Joffre's vast underground fortresses had been expanded from
the construction of a line far more suitable for hiding behind than
attacking from. The final concept for the Maginot Line was a "victory"
molded into one of the defensive. and the prevailing belief in the
dominance of the defense had not been overturned by Joffre's plan for
and the vigorous opposition of the political leaders had eabily over
sisting of the Minister of War, the General Staff, and the Superior
and priorities was needed, France could only employ the time-honored
and personality, there was little chance France could ever break from
superior weapon and the superior doctrine that might have prevented her
defeat.
Chapter VII
CONCLUSION
the formative influence. Rather, the French theory of war wa& a product
the French military and civilian society, and each acting as one piece
foundation for the structure of the French theory of war, and the edifice
basis for the theory of total war. The struggle was not between armies,
but between entire peoples fighting for their very survival with every
the coming war, since the French view of the evidence suggested an
118
119
fight would have to take place on the frontier. The battle could hardly
be carried into the enemy's land, since political considerations and the
defensive nature of the nation in arms ruled out the possibility of any
aggressive attacks. World War I became the model for the concept of total
war, for it was the most recent and the most vivid of suell unlimited
struggles.
The nature of tht:: threat also convinced the French military that
the coming war would be a total one. With the threat of a massivt:: German
population and much larger industrial potential, the French were convinced
that any effort on their part short of total commitment could only l'esult
respond with every Frenchman, every factory, and with every speck of coal
dust and iron are. There was always the possibility of an immensely lucky
and quick victory by France. but she had little choice in preparing for
the "most unfavorable eventuality" 1 of the long total war, since she
could hardly hope to win the short war. Preparing for the worst and not
having it occur was better than not preparing and then having it occur.
France thus prepared for the total war, and her doctrines became
in arms, the need to defend the frontiers, the French concept of materiel,
1
Commandant H. Houvard, Les lefons militaires dc_la guerre (Paris:
Masson, 1920), p. 16. For a more thorough examination of the threat of
a long war, see General Serrigny, Reflexions sur l'Art de 1a Guerre (Paris:
Char1es-Lavauze1le, 1930), pp. 69-75.
120
the French theory and strategic doctrines of war. Instead of new tech
suitability, with the final two criteria being heavily flavored uy th~
mobile, offensive armored formations simply did not fit within the French
concept of a defensive, pacific army. But the French army did manage to
to witness a much more advanced concept of war and effective army in May
June 1940.
the French High Command had "retired to its Mount Sinai [after World War
2
I and sat] among its revealed truths and remnants of past glories.. II
than that, and considering the nature of the problem, the French mili
tary probably entered World War II with the best doctrine available to
them. Any other dramatically different doctrine would have required not
only a drastic change in the concept of war, but also in many funda
that she had committed in 1914 and in 1871. In these wars she had
expected to force her way of war on the enemy and had a doctrine of war
that was an ! priori concept. 3 That is, her approach was one of placing
ing in advance the method and place where the enemy would be destroyed.
arms fire would give obvious advantages to the defender. After 1870 she
slowly erected her doctrine of the offensive a outrance, only to see the
the pendulum moved back to the side of the defensive. While this was not
France from the war model and methods of the Great War, Frallce's military
again attempted to force the enemy to fight her battle. Had the Germans
fought the battle the war the French desired, the bataille conduite, the
results could have been a French victory. The Germans may have battered
themselves against the defenses of France until they were weakened enough
strategy of war. The French did the expected and lost; the Germaus did
For France to have done the unexpected, she would have had to
altered her doctrines, France would have had to relinquish many impor
her army solely on an abstract and unproved relation between a new tech
nology and ideas of war. She may have been able to do some of these, but
collapse in 1940.
SEl.ECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bibliographic Essay
I. Primary Sources
A. Published Documents
1. Hooks
2. Articles
B. General Sources
124
125
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY
staggering. Because of the tragedy of the event bctng i:itudied and the
war~ These studies, memoir~1 and personal accounts were heavi.ly flavored
of whom were bitter about the fall of the Third Republic and the subse
quent charade of the Vichy Regime. The greater part of these earlier
bitterness and the partisan squabbling that had marred the Third l{epublic's
of the Germans was emphasizeJ j or the finger ot guilt was pointed at the
many of the politicians were pointing their fingers at the military at the
same time. Amidst the bitterness and the many attempts to prove that
someone else was responsible, however, Borne progress was made. Some of
the best earlier works were done by Colonels Pierre Lyet anli Alphonse
have also been made by some of the journals specializing in the period,
126
have never shown as much interest in the army of France after 1871 as
they have shown in the German army of the same period. For example,
there has never been an in depth analysis of the French General Staff.
raphic essays that should be the beginning point for dnyone starting a
the best general studies of this era have been done by "outsiders," his
Guy Chapman reveals that much is yet to be done. The works of Richard
role in the collapse of the Third Republic, with the works of Fred Greene,
Alvin D. Coox, and D. J. Harvey being the earlier leaders in the field.
of the French mode of warfare, except for a recent one by Jeffrey Guusburg
that purports to "downgrade the thesis that the doctrine of the French
Despite the numerous studies, the best sources for the study of
the fall of France remain the primary ones. The definitive study uf the
committee on the downfall of the Republic (though cut short for political
the numerous military works of the 1920's and 1930's, the invaluable and
sources for the serious historian. Only by consulting them directly can
events of 1919-1939.
I. PRIHARY SOURCES
A. Published Documents
Blum, Leon. L'oeuvre de Leon Blum. 6 Volf:. Paris: Albin Michel, 1955.
128
129
I
France. Ecole Superieure de Guerre. Cours d'Arti11erie (Colonel de la
Porte du Theil). Courbevoie: P. Chanove & Cie •• 1930.
-1925.
. !:!.. guerre n' est pas une industrie. Paris: Berger-Levrau1t,
Lavauze11e, 1927.
Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air. New York: Arno Press, 1972.
ULa guerre des chars," Revue d'infanterie, Vol. 93, No. 554
(November, 1938), pp. 972-981.
Blum, Leon. "A bas l'armee de metier:" Le Popu1aire (December 16, 1934),
p. 1.
137
Brouillard, Capitaine. "Cas concrets de defense contre les chars,
premiere cas." Revue_.d'infanterie, Vol. 90, No. 536 (May, 1937),
pp. 879-907.
Cugnac, General de. "La tour de Babel." Revue mi1itai'ce generale, No. 6
(June, 1937), pp. 679-688.
Epailly, Colonel. "La defense contre une attaque allemande par surprise."
Revue militaire generale, I, No.5 (Mary, 1937), pp. 605-618.
Revue d'infanterie, Vol. 87, No. 514 (July 1, 1935), pp. 75-113.
1. Books
Chapman, Guy. Why France Fell. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1969.
Dutourd, Jean. The Taxis ,_of. the Marne. Translated by Harold King. New
York: Simon and Schuster 1 1957.
Griffiths, Richard. Petain. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company,
Inc., 1972.
Kerillis, Henri de. I Accuse De Gaulle. New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 1946.
Liss, General Ulrich. Westfront 1939/40: Erinnerungen des Feindarbeiters
1m OKH. Neckargemund: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1949.
Maugham, William Somerset. France at War. New York: Doubleday, Doran &
Co., Inc., 1940.
Ryan, Stephen. Petain the Soldier. New York: A. S. Barnes and Company,
1969.
Shirer, William L. The Collapse of the Third Republic. New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1969.
2. Articles
Cairns, John C. "Along the Road Back to France 1940." American Histori
cal Review, LXIV, No.3 (April, 1959), pp. 583-603.
Chabert, Henri. "A Possible Historical Mistake: The Causes of the Allied
Military Collapse in May 1940." Military Review, LIV, No.9
(September, 1974), pp. 80-91.
Danel, R. "L' armee de l' air francaise a l' entree en guerre. II Revue
d'histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale, Vol. 19, No. 73 (January,
1969), pp. 111-116.
De Weerd, H. A. "Academic Soldier: Gamelin and the Fall of France."
Infantry Journal, Vol. 49, No.5, pp. 10-19.
Ely, General. "Les lecons qu'il faut tirer des operations de 1940."
Revue de defense nationale (December, 1953), pp. 563-582.
Vial. Commandant Jean. "La defense nationale: son organisation entre les
deux guerres." Revue d'histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale.
Vol. 5. No. 18 (April. 1955). pp. 11-32.
B. General Sources
146
Chapman, Guy. "The French Army and Politics." Soldiers and Governments.
Edited by Michael Howard. London: Eyre & Spottlswoode, 1957, pp.
51-72.
Davis, Shelby Cullum. The French War Machine. London: George Allen &
Unwin, LTD., 1937.
Falls, Cyril. Marshal Foch. London: Blackie & Son, Limited, 1939.
Holley. I. B., Jr. Ideas and Weapons. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1953.
La Gorce. Paul-Marie de. The French Army. New York: Goerge Brazi11er,
1963.
Poasony, Stefan T. and Etienne Mantoux. "Du Picq and Foch: The French
School." Makers of Modern Strategy. Edited by Edward Mead Earle.
New York: Atheneum, 1967.
Reithinger, A. Why France Lost the War: A Biological and Economic Survey.
New York: Veritas Press, 1940.
Ropp. Theodore. War in the Modern World. New York: Collier Books, 1962.
Vagts, Alfred. "Age and Field Command." Military Affairs, VI, No.1
(Spring, 1942), pp. 13-20.