mobilization, in war or national defense, organization of the armed forces of a nation for active military service in time of war

or other national emergency. In its full scope, mobilization includes the organization of all resources of a nation for support of the military effort. The technological advances of the 20th century, particularly since the advent of nuclear weapons, have vastly increased the complexities of the planning and implementation of mobilization. The ratio of a nations standing forces, which provide for defense during the mobilization period, to that nations full war potential has always varied and has depended on such factors as foreign policy, world tensions, strength and situation of allies, and estimates of the time required to implement mobilization. Because of the tremendous power of nuclear weapons and the speed with which they can be delivered to their targets, it is conceivable that a nations war potential could be destroyed before mobilization could be started. This situation has increased the need for adequately prepared forces in beingi.e., the standing army, navy, and air forcewhich might be the only means available to continue the defense and launch a counterattack. Military mobilization, for any kind of war, includes the procurement and training of manpower for military purposes; the selection of areas and the construction of facilities for training and other military purposes; and the procurement and issuance of arms, ammunition, uniforms, equipment, vehicles, and stores. The procurement of military manpower is in itself a complex task that includes the calling up of reserves; the induction of large numbers of raw recruits; and the allocation of manpower to the army, navy, and air force and, within these major components, to the respective arms, services, and other subdivisions. The procurement of military manpower during mobilization must be correlated with the procurement of arms and equipment necessary for training and for combat and must be synchronized with timetables for training and strategic deployment. Mobilization, to be effective, not only must be well organized but must have everything in step

Mobilization traditionally consists of the measures taken to bring the armed forces of a nation to war footing, and includes the calling up of reserves and organizing the supplies and equipment necessary for active operations. In recent years, this process has also included taking the necessary steps to prepare a nation's economy and population for war. The modern concept of mobilization dates from the rise of mass armies and the professionalization of the military which took place in the late 19th century. In the FrancoPrussian war, the Prussian-led German Confederation was able to expand its peacetime army of around 300, 000 to over 1 million men and deploy this force within three weeks. This accomplishment was due to the combination of detailed planning undertaken during peacetime by the Prussian general staff, under the direction of Moltke the Elder, and the introduction of permanent corps-level commands that served as assembly points for recalled reservists. The speed with which it had been able to assemble and deploy such a conscript army conferred upon the German Confederation an advantage over the French, who struggled to get a smaller

army into the field over a longer period of time. The Germans, who possessed the initiative, were able to invade France and fight on their own terms. After the French defeat, the major powers of Europe (with the notable exception of Great Britain) introduced conscription and general staff systems based on the Prussian model. With all the nations of continental Europe employing conscript armies, speed and efficiency of mobilization became of paramount importance. In the years before WW I, each nation developed more sophisticated mobilization and deployment plans and utilized a greater percentage of its population in an attempt to outdo the others. A significant, perhaps indeed the most significant, factor in the Gadarene rush to war in 1914 was the rigidity that these mobilization imperatives introduced into both diplomatic and military calculations. When Russia mobilized against Austria-Hungary in defence of Serbia, she perforce mobilized against Germany as well. Germany was committed to a mobilization that concentrated forces first against France and to a plan that involved the violation of Belgian neutrality, thus giving the British government a casus belli to honour pre-war commitments to the French. No country wanted to be out-mobilized by another, and so by August around 4 million Frenchmen, 4 million Germans, 3 million Austro-Hungarians, and 6 million Russians were committed to war. The duration and demands of WW I caused the government of each belligerent to mobilize not just the military strength of the nation but also the industrial potential. Initially, personnel from industries that contributed to the war effort were exempt from military service. As the war continued and the demand upon industry increased, some nations conscripted personnel into the workforce. All governments found it necessary to manage the economic resources of their nation in some way. WW I convinced most nations that mobilization for a future major war would need to include industry as well as the military. This belief was reinforced by WW II, which required an even greater exploitation of the manpower and economic strength of the belligerents. To this day, although the threat of large-scale war has receded, most nations maintain comprehensive mobilization plans.

Mobilization
is the process of assembling and organizing troops, materiel, and equipment for active military service in time of war or national emergency. As such, it brings together the military and civilian sectors of society to harness the total power of the nation. It is the mechanism that facilitates the successful prosecution of any conflict. The modern process of preparing armies for war originated in the midnineteenth century. Inherent in the modern usage of the term is the concept of a large national force, as opposed to the smaller professional forces of earlier timesarmies that depended upon a warrior class maintained in almost perpetual readiness. As they developed generally, and in response to the Napoleonic Wars, European nations shifted to marshaling the entire nationstate for war, and building large national armies. The term mobilization was first used in the 1850s to describe the preparation of the Prussian Army for deployment. Since then, it has become commonplace for governments, or states, to raise volunteers and employ conscription to create mass forces. Mobilization of the state harnesses the national economy to the military machine in order to conduct war.

For the United States, the Civil War brought the draft, mass armies, and massive economic changes. With full public support, both Northern and Southern governments raised volunteers, and within a year or two turned to conscription to help field national armies. Both governments tied their militaries to their respective economic bases to sustain the war effort for a prolonged period. In the years following, America industrialized, expanding markets and interests beyond its own borders. International presence and wartime experience in Cuba and the Philippines kept military issues at the forefront of American policy. Although the armed forces were maintained at a relatively low level, reorganization in 1903 brought a General Staff to oversee the U.S. Army; planning and mobilization became regular missions. In May 1917, President Woodrow Wilson approved the Selective Service System, which remained an instrument for raising armies in war and the Cold War until 1973. That solved the problem of recruiting and maintaining large national armies, but did not address the other half of the mobilization process. Producing equipment, supplies, and facilities turned out to be a far greater challenge. By sheer economic strength, at the end of World War I, the United States had built an army over 3.5 million strong with equally huge equipment surpluses. The United States took some lessons from the staging and conducting of World War I. The warmaking had been so massive that an effort was made to standardize at least some of the procedures. The National Defense Act of June 1920 gave the assistant secretary of war responsibility for planning for industrial mobilization and for procurement through the War Department. Planning was done in the War Plans Division of the General Staff. Two initiatives were significant. One was the establishment of the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board in 1922, which brought the two services together to formulate joint strategy. The second was the creation of the Army Industrial College, which gave officers the opportunity to examine mobilization. Plans and studies followed. In these, availability of supplies and equipment determined the rate at which troops could be absorbed. However, they assumed that production would adjust to strategic plansexpanding and contracting as necessaryand that only one mobilization plan would cover a variety of possible contingencies. Gradual changes in preparedness or a measured transition to a mobilized state did not exist. Manpower and materiel were considered separately. By the end of the 1930s, plans went beyond the role of the army to examine how the nation should organize the control of industry in war. In 1936, the War Resources Administration was designated responsible for control of wartime finance, trade, labor, and price control. By 1939, industrial mobilization plans stipulated that the War Resources Administration be established as soon as it became practical to do so. Economic mobilization was no longer tied to the outbreak of hostilities. The army began developing defensive plans in the mid1930s, addressing the size and composition of an initial defense force and its support. They sought to mesh production schedules and to bring together rates of troop and materiel mobilization. They also provided for a small, wellequipped emergency force to ensure security during general mobilization. That was

sound enough to become the permanent basis for mobilization. The plans provided for detailed unit and individual training programs, as well as manuals and associated training materials. They established a system for mobilizing men and equipment already available. The United States began mobilizing for World War II by the end of 1939, despite the American public's alienation from military participation in world affairs. The depression had produced much idle and obsolete industrial capacity. The Roosevelt administration encouraged private expansion of facilities for war production through accelerated depreciation and government financing. LendLease also helped stimulate production. Mobilization sped up in 1941, expanded dramatically in 1942, and peaked in 1943. Although the United States has historically relied on mobilization to meet its wartime needs, with the start of the Cold War it began to maintain higher levels of military forces in peacetime and to deploy them in close proximity to potential enemies. American strategy assumed a short warning time to respond to its major threat, the Soviet Union. The ebb and flow of the Cold War was such that public consensus allowed the military to maintain a large active force in high state of readiness, with sizable stocks of supplies for logistics support. The National Security Act of 1947 instituted governmentwide planning by establishing the organizational machinery to implement mobilization and deployment strategy. Management structures include the Department of Defense (DoD), the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The nation's commitment to readiness, in great part, was enabled by the Defense Production Act of 1950, which has since been extended or amended over forty times. Success in mobilization depends upon the health of the national industrial base, the availability of manpower, the state of international trade, and the condition of the nation's foreign relations. In time of war or urgent national need, it is assumed that the marketplace will provide adequate industrial capacity. Historically, the National Guard and Organized reserves have been the assets that supported national defense. Currently, America's reserve forces consist of two National Guard components, the army and air guard; and five reserve components, the army, navy, air force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Reserves. The Guard and organized reserves form the basis for expanding the active component in a military emergency. The National Guard and reserves are similar in that during wartime both are federal forces serving under the president. During peacetime, however, while the reserve is a federal force subordinate to the president, the Guard remains subordinate to the governor of each state, unless federalized by the president. Mobilization levels depend upon the existence of forward bases, the level of industrial infrastructure, prepositioned equipment, industrial preparedness, preparedness planning, and public and congressional support. Ideally, high levels of any or all of those factors ease the entire process. Naturally, all are influenced by perceived threat. Generally, the higher the level of perceived threat, the higher the corresponding levels of support. There are currently five levels of mobilization, governed by Title 10 of the U.S. code: selective,

presidential selected reserve callup, partial, full, and total. These levels are not necessarily sequential. One level may precede another, but may not; they need not build upon one another. Certain policies and programs that immediately increase unit resources and readiness are available only when the president and Congress mobilize the reserve components of the armed forces. Conscription supports the expanding force structure, as determined by Congress and the president, but is not tied to any level of mobilization. Selective mobilization is the expansion of the active forces by activating units and individuals of the selected reserve to protect life, federal property, and functions, or to prevent disruption of federal activities. This includes the callup of the National Guard, which can be done only for a specific purpose, such as the suppression of insurrection or conspiracy, prevention of unlawful obstructions or rebellions or abridgments of civil rights, to repel an invasion, or to execute the laws under legal authorities. Presidential selected reserve callup gives the president authority to augment the active force with up to 200,000 members of the reserve component for up to 90 days, with an extension of a further 90 days. It does not require a declaration of national emergency, but does require a report to Congress within twentyfour hours. Partial mobilization requires presidential or congressional declaration of national emergency. The total force level could be as high as 1 million members of all services for up to twentyfour months or less by presidential authority. If the presidential selected reserve callup already is in effect, the levels are cumulative; the ceiling is 1 million. A partial mobilization allows all selected reserve units and individuals (individual ready reserve, standby, and retired reserve) to be ordered to active duty. Full mobilization is the state that exists when all units in the current force structure are called to active duty, fully equipped, fully manned, and sustained. Assumptions are that presidential selected reserve callup and partial mobilization have been completed and Congress has declared war or a state of national emergency. All reserve components are ordered to active duty for the duration of the war or emergency plus six months; industrial mobilization is initiated; allies are called on for support according to their treaty commitments. Total mobilization is the expansion of the active armed force and the activation of additional units beyond the approved force structure. All additional resources, including production facilities, may be mobilized to support and sustain the active forces. Overall, mobilization reflects American national and military history. As the nation has grown, physically and economically, so has its standing in the international community. Given the size of the armed forces today, their technological level and equipment requirements, and the diversity of threat and mission, the process of mobilization has become both more complex and more significant to the eventual success of the military force.

mobilization

n. 1. the act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. 2. the process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the armed forces includes, but is not limited to, the following categories: a. (selective mobilization) expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the president to mobilize Reserve component units, Individual Ready Reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack. b. (partial mobilization) expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the president (not more than 1, 000, 000 for not more than twentyfour consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. c. (full mobilization) expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by Congress and the president to mobilize all Reserve component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Reserve personnel can be placed on active duty for the duration of the emergency plus six months. d. (total mobilization) expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by Congress and the president to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

mobilization
During rehabilitation from a sports injury, the return of a limb to full mobility by carefully applied pressure to a joint or muscle so that it will move through its normal range of movement. Mobilization maintains and then improves muscle tone, reduces joint stiffness, and strengthens ligaments and tendons. It is a graded process, starting gently with passive mobility exercises when injuries are in the acute and painful phase, and becoming more forceful with both passive and active mobility exercises during the recovery phase. Mobility exercises should be designed to restore full mobility by strengthening and stretching muscles. See also aggressive rehabilitation.

Mobilization
Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing troops and matriel for the defense of a nation in time of war or national emergency. It has become a central factor in warfare since the

French Revolution and the rise of nationalism. Whereas eighteenth-century powers most often hired mercenaries to fight limited wars, nineteenth-century nations increasingly demanded that every able-bodied citizen respond to mobilization calls. American attitudes toward war further reinforced the concept of total war because threats to public tranquility were interpreted as being illegal and immoral and thus as calling for nothing short of total war to reestablish the peace. In twentieth-century wars, it has been necessary to mobilize not only men and matriel but also psychological support, as illustrated by President Woodrow Wilson's vow to "make the world safe for democracy" and President Franklin D. Roosevelt's call for Germany's "unconditional surrender." While embracing the notion of total war, the United States, until the twentieth century, was notoriously inept at mobilizing troops and retaining them for the duration of the wars it fought. Congress was ever suspicious of standing armies and of all efficient means that would enable the executive to mobilize the state militia forces, feeling that these instruments might serve partisan causes. The mobilization problems experienced in the War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War (18461848) continued to plague U.S. military efforts throughout the nineteenth century. For instance, the militia system was never workable. This fact, together with the unreliability of the volunteers and the vices of the bounty system, demonstrated the necessity for conscription in any extended war in which the United States was involved. Furthermore, the tendency to mobilize manpower before mobilizing matriel was to create confusion down to World War I. In the Mexican-American War, mobilization was based largely upon an expansible standing army and the calling of volunteers, because the militia's poor performance in the War of 1812 had demonstrated that the militia system was irredeemable. There were traces of preplanning in this first foreign war, as arms and supplies were provided by the federal government based on the needs of the entire mobilized army. The Civil War was a total war and thus a modern conflict, although many of the mobilization mistakes of previous wars were repeated. At the outset, few were able to perceive the conflict's full dimensions, and thus mobilization proceeded sporadically. Initially, President Abraham Lincoln called 75,000 state militia troops. But since this element had not been called since 1836 at the outset of the second Seminole War, the 2,471,377 troops on its rolls represented only a paper force in 1861. Next, a call was issued for volunteers; with no effective mobilization plan, the war department was unable to process the overwhelming number of recruits. Later, when the ardor of volunteering cooled, other methods of raising troops were resorted to, such as the draft implemented by the Conscription Act of 1863. Although the act netted few draftees, it forced many to volunteer who otherwise would not have. Other extraordinary measures employed to mobilize manpower included accepting African Americans for army service and organizing special service units to receive invalid volunteers for noncombatant duty. All the old nightmares of poor mobilization were present in the Spanish-American War (1898), plus some new ones. With no plan of mobilization, there was no integration of manpower with matriel and no training in combined naval and military operations. Only the fact that the war was short and successful helped to ameliorate some of the potentially disastrous problems. A

series of postwar reforms was instituted to remedy the worst mobilization shortcomings, among which was the founding of the Army War College in 1901 to study the mobilization process. U.S. participation in World War I (19171918) and World War II (19411945) introduced speed into the war-making equation. Although the urgency of mobilization was slightly cushioned by the prior entry of America's allies into both wars, the gigantic scale of mobilization, the increased importance of technology, the total absorption of a sophisticated industrial economy into the war effort, and the huge number of troops, all raised mobilization planning to the highest councils of war. By the National Defense Act of 1916, the United States avoided some of the desperate measures used to raise manpower in previous wars: uncertain calls for militiamen and volunteers were no longer to be relied on, and draftees were not to make substitutions, purchase exemptions, or receive bounties. Whereas in earlier American wars estimates of manpower requirements had been based largely on guesses of what public sentiment would allow, in World War I, the calls for manpower were limited only by the manpower requirements for industry. Therefore, the great mobilization problems of World War I were not those of recruiting, but of equipping, training, organizing, and transporting the army to the front. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 catapulted the United States into the most massive mobilization effort in history. As in World War I, the armed forces and the war industries were in competition for manpower. In addition, there were the requirements of not one but five theaters of war, the need of maintaining lines of communication to each theater, and the need to dovetail efforts with coalition partners. The squeeze upon American manpower extended the search for able hands to the enlisting of women, indigenous personnel, prisoners of war, and the physically handicapped. The leading role of the United States in the Cold War significantly altered its traditional mobilization techniques. Although never implemented, universal military training, authorized in principle by the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, was intended to provide a peacetime pool of manpower that could be drafted in time of national emergency. Until the Korean War (1950 1953), the emphasis on air power and nuclear arms allowed the army's manpower strength to slip. Selective-service legislation passed in 1955 assured that reserve units would be manned by trained men; but instead of the reserves being called for the Vietnam War, as had been done in the Korean War, forces were raised through increased draft calls. As the war became increasingly unpopular at home, millions of young men sought college deferments to avoid service in Vietnam. Others engaged in open draft evasion, including fleeing to Canada and Europe. The draft created so much political controversy and domestic turmoil that the Nixon administration replaced it with an all-volunteer military in the early 1970s. The U.S. military continues to rely exclusively on volunteers to fill the needs of its fighting forces. Nevertheless, all young men are still required by law to register for selective service upon their eighteenth birthday.

mobilization

1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. See also industrial mobilization. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve Components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to the following categories. a. selective mobilization--Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve Component units, Individual Ready Reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack. b. partial mobilization--Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. c. full mobilization--Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component units in the existing approved force structure, as well as all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Reserve personnel can be placed on active duty for the duration of the emergency plus six months. d. total mobilization--Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Also called MOB.

Mobilization
Mobilization is the act of assembling and making both troops and supplies ready for war. The word mobilization was first used, in a military context, in order to describe the preparation of the Prussian army during the 1850s and 1860s. Mobilization theories and techniques have continuously changed since then. Notably, before World War I and World War II, several countries developed intricate plans to achieve a fast and effective mobilization in case of war. The opposite of mobilization is demobilization. Mobilization became an issue with the introduction of conscription, and the introduction of the railways in the 19th Century. Mobilization institutionalized the mass levy of forces that was first introduced during the French Revolution, and that had changed the character of war. A number of technological and societal changes promoted the move towards a more organized way of assembling armies. These included the telegraph, which allowed rapid spreading of orders, the railways, which allowed rapid concentration of troops, and conscription, which provided a trained reserve of soldiers available in the case of war.

Mobilization in World War I

Map of the Schlieffen Plan and planned French counter-offensives Intricate plans for mobilization contributed greatly to the beginning of World War I, since in 1914, under the laws and customs of warfare then observed (not to mention the desire to avoid compromising national security), general mobilization of one nation's military forces was invariably considered an act of war by that country's likely enemies. As the proverb[citation needed] claims, no army has ever mobilized without going to war. In 1914, the United Kingdom was the only European Great Power without conscription. The other Great Powers (Austria-Hungary, France, Germany and Russia) all relied on compulsory military service to supply each of their armies with the millions of men they believed they would need to win a major war. France enacted the Three Year Law (1913) to extend the service of conscripted soldiers to match the size of the German army, as the French population of 40 million was smaller than the German population of 60 million people.[1] The British and the Germans also started a race to build up a stronger navy, sparked by the German enactment of the Second Naval Law. Each of the Great Powers could only afford to keep a fraction of these men in uniform during peacetime, the rest were reservists with limited opportunities to train. Maneuvering formations of millions of men with limited military training required intricate plans which left no room for error, confusion or discretion after mobilization commenced. These plans were prepared under the assumption of worst-case scenarios. For example, German military leaders did not plan to mobilize for war with Russia whilst assuming that France would not come to her ally's aid, or vice-versa. The Schlieffen Plan therefore dictated not only mobilization against both powers, but also the order of attack France would be attacked first regardless of the diplomatic circumstances. To bypass the fortified Franco-German frontier, the German forces were to be ordered to march through Belgium. Whether or not Russia had committed the first provocation, the German plan agreed to by Emperor William II called for the attack on Russia to take place only after France was defeated. Similarly, the Russian Stavka's war planning assumed that war against either Austria-Hungary or Germany would mean war against the other power. Although the plan allowed flexibility as to whether the main effort would be made against Germany or Austria-Hungary, in either case units would be mobilized on the frontiers of both Powers. On July 28, 1914, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia (William's cousin) ordered partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary only. While war with Austria-Hungary seemed inevitable, Nicholas engaged in a personal dialogue with the German Emperor in an attempt to avoid war with Germany. However, Nicholas was advised that attempts to improvise a partial mobilization would lead to chaos and probable defeat if, as pessimists on

the Russian side expected, no amount of diplomacy could convince the Germans to refrain from attacking Russia whilst she was engaged with Germany's ally. On July 29, 1914, the Tsar ordered full mobilization. In response, Germany declared war on Russia. Germany mobilized under von Moltke the Younger's revised version of the Schlieffen Plan, which assumed a two-front war with Russia and France. Like Russia, Germany decided to follow its two-front plans despite the one-front war. Germany declared war on France on August 3, 1914, one day after issuing an ultimatum to Belgium demanding the right of German troops to pass through as part of the planned pincer action of the military. Finally, Britain declared war on Germany for violating Belgian neutrality. Thus the entangling alliances of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente directed the intricate plans for mobilization. This brought all of the Great Powers of Europe into the Great War without actually utilizing the provisions of either alliance. The mobilization was like a holiday for many of the inexperienced soldiers; for example, some Germans wore flowers in the muzzles of their rifles as they marched. Trains brought soldiers to the front lines of battle. The Germans timetabled the movements of 11,000 trains as they brought troops across the Rhine River. The French mobilized around 7,000 trains for movement. Horses were also mobilized. The British had 165,000 horses prepared for cavalry, the Austrians 600,000, the Germans 715,000, and the Russians over a million.[1] Britain's Dominions including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa were compelled to go to war when Britain did. However, it was largely left up to the individual Dominions to recruit and equip forces for the war effort. Canadian, Australian and New Zealand mobilizations all involved the creation of new field forces for overseas service rather than using the existing regimental structures as a framework. In the case of Canada, the Militia Minister, Sir Sam Hughes, created the Canadian Expeditionary Force from whole cloth by sending telegrams to 226 separate reserve unit commanders asking for volunteers to muster at Valcartier in Quebec. The field force served separately from the Militia (Canada's peace time army); in 1920 the Otter Commission was compelled to sort out which units would perpetuate the units that served in the trenches - the CEF or the prewar Militia. A unique solution of perpetuations was instituted, and mobilization during the Second World War did not repeat Sir Sam Hughes' model, which has been described by historians as being more closely akin to ancient Scottish clans assembling for battle than a modern, industrialized nation preparing for war. "Colonials" served under British command, although perhaps owing to the limited autonomy granted to the Dominions regarding their respective mobilizations the Dominions eventually compelled the British government to overrule the objections of some British commanders and allow the Dominion forces to serve together instead of being distributed piecemeal amongst the various British divisions. The "colonials" would go on to be acknowledged by both the British and German high commands as being elite British units. On May 23, 1915, Italy entered World War I on the Allied side. Despite being one of the weakest of the Allied powers, the Italians soon managed to populate its army from 560 to 693 infantry battalions in 1916; the army had grown in size from a million to one and a half million

soldiers.[1] On August 17, 1916, Romania entered the war on the Allied side, mobilizing an army of 23 divisions. Romania was quickly defeated however by Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria. The production of supplies gradually increased throughout the war. In Russia, the expansion of industry allowed a 2,000 percent increase in the production of artillery shells - by November 1915, over 1,512,000 artillery shells were being produced per month. In France, a massive mobilization by the female population to work in factories allowed the rate of shell production to reach 100,000 shells a day by 1915.[1] Both sides also began drawing on larger amounts of soldiers. The British Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, appealed for hundreds of thousands of soldiers, which was met with an enthusiastic response. 30 new British divisions were created. The response by volunteers allowed the British to put off the introduction of conscription until 1916. New Zealand followed suit, with Canada also eventually introducing conscription. On April 6, 1917, the United States entered the war on the Allied side. At the entrance, the U.S. only could mobilize its army of 107,641 soldiers, ranked only seventeenth in size worldwide at the time. The United States Navy quickly mobilized, adding 5 dreadnoughts to the Allied navy. However, conscription quickly ensued. By March 1918, 318,000 U.S. soldiers had been mobilized to France. Eventually, a force of 3 million U.S. soldiers joined in the war effort.[1]

Mobilization in World War II

Poland partly mobilized its troops on August 24, 1939, and fully mobilized on August 30, 1939, following the increased confrontations with Germany since March 1939. On September 1, 1939 Germany invaded Poland, which prompted both France and Britain to declare war on Germany. However, they were slow to mobilize, and by the time Poland had been overrun by the Axis powers, only minor operations had been carried out by the French at the Saar River. Canada actually carried out a partial mobilization on 25 August 1939. in anticipation of the growing diplomatic crisis. On September 1, 1939, the Canadian Active Service Force (a corpssized force of two divisions) was mobilized despite war not being declared by Canada until September 10, 1939. Only one division went overseas in December 1939, and the government hoped to follow a "limited liability" war policy. When France was invaded in May 1940, the Canadian government realized that would not be possible and mobilized three additional divisions, beginning their overseas employment in August 1940 with the dispatch of the 2nd Canadian Division (some units of which were deployed to Iceland and Newfoundland for garrison duty before moving to the UK). Canada also enacted the National Resources Mobilization Act in 1940, which among other things compelled men to serve in the military, though conscripts mobilized under the NRMA did not serve overseas until 1944. Conscripts did, however, serve in the Aleutian Islands in 1943 though the anticipated Japanese defense never materialized due to the evacuation of the enemy garrison before the landings. Service in the Aleutians was not considered "overseas" as technically the islands were part of North America.

Mobilization during the Cold War

Full scale mobilizations were not enacted by the two Super Powers, or their allies, during the Cold War, as the era was characterized by "war by proxy". While many leading nations participated in military actions, some of significant size, national mobilization in the historical sense never occurred. Examples of this would be US involvement in Vietnam, though their enemies may be said to have mobilized, as well as the Falklands War between the UK and Argentina.

Economic mobilization
Economic mobilization is the preparation of resources for usage in a national emergency by carrying out changes in the organization of the national economy.[2] Bibliography

Jacques S. Gansler, The Defense Industry, 1980. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mobilization, JCS no. 21, 1983. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Uri Raanan, eds., The U.S. Defense Mobilization Infrastructure, 1983. Roderick L. Vawter, Industrial Mobilization, 1983. Hardy L. Merritt and Luther F. Carter, eds., Mobilization and the National Defense, 1985

References
^ a b c d e Keegan, John (1999). The First World War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. ISBN 0-375-40052-4 2. ^ "Economic mobilization". About.com. Accessed on May 13, 2006.
1.

State, society, and mobilization in Europe during the First World War, edited by John Horne, Cambridge-New York : Cambridge University Press, 1997.