Reportable 11SEPTEMBER2007 INTHEHIGHCOURTOFSOUTHAFRICA (TRANSVAALPROVINCIALDIVISION) CASENO:13182/06 Inthematterbetween: IBRAHIMALIABUBAKERTANTOUSH Applicant

and

THEREFUGEEAPPEALBOARD TJERKDAMSTRAN.O. THEMINISTEROFHOMEAFFAIRS THEDIRECTORGENERAL:HOMEAFFAIRS REFUGEESTATUSDETERMINATION OFFICER THESTANDINGCOMMITTEEFORREFUGEE AFFAIRS

FirstRespondent SecondRespondent ThirdRespondent FourthRespondent FifthRespondent SixthRespondent

________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ________________________________________________________________ MURPHYJ

 1.

2 Theapplicanthasmadeapplication,intermsofsection6ofthePromotion ofAdministrativeJusticeAct3of2000(PAJA)readwithsection33of theConstitution,toreviewandsetasidetwodecisionsrelatingtohisquest forrefugeestatusandasylumundertheRefugeesAct130of1998(the Act).

2.

The applicants application for refugee status was first rejected on 11 March 2005 by the fifth respondent, the Refugee Status Determination Officer (RDSO). He appealed against this decision to the first respondent,theRefugeeAppealBoard(RAB). On12December2005 the RAB handed down a decision in which a majority of its members dismissedtheappeal. Themajoritydecisionwashandeddownbythe chairpersonoftheRAB,thesecondrespondent. AdvocateMMHassim handeddown a minoritydecision in which he held thathewouldhave upheldtheappeal. 3. Theapplicantnowseekstohavebothdecisionssetasideandrequests this court in terms of section 8(1)(c)(ii)(aa) of PAJA, read with section 172(1)(b)oftheConstitution,tocorrectthedecisionsoftheRDSOand RABbysubstitutingthemwithadecisiondeclaringthattheapplicantis entitledtorefugeestatusandasylumintermsofsections2and3ofthe Act.Onlythefirstandsecondrespondentsfiledopposingaffidavits.Iwill refer to them collectively as the respondents. The Minister and the DirectorGeneralofHomeAffairs(thethirdandfourthrespondents)and theRSDOhavenotfiledopposingaffidavits.

4.

Section8(1)(c)(ii)(aa)ofPAJAistotheeffectthatacourtinproceedings for judicial review under PAJA may grant any order that is just and equitable, including orders setting aside the administrative action and

3 substitutingorvaryingit,insteadofremittingthematterundersection8(1) (c)(i)forreconsiderationbytheoriginaldecisionmaker,whenexceptional circumstances justify substitution or variation. Section 172(1)(b) of the Constitutiongrantsacourtthepowertomakeanyorderthatisjustand equitablewhendecidingaconstitutionalmatter.

5.

Iwillreturntothespecificgroundsofreviewinduecourse.Thecruxof theapplicantscasethoughisthattheproceedingsbeforeboththeRSDO andtheRABwereattendedbyproceduralunfairness,werefurthervitiated bymaterialerrorsofbothfactandlawandthatsubstitutionistheonly remedyinthelightofthestancetakenbybothadministrativebodiesinthe earlierproceedingsandtheRABinthisreviewapplication.

6.

Inthetermsofsection3(a)oftheActapersonqualifiesforrefugeestatus ifthatpersonowingtoawellfoundedfearofbeingpersecutedbyreason of his or her race, tribe, religion, nationality, political opinion or membershipofaparticularsocialgroup,isoutsidethecountryofhisor hernationalityandisunableorunwillingtoavailhimselforherselfofthe protectionofthatcountryorisunwillingtoreturntoit.Section4excludes fromrefugeestatusthosewhocommitcertaincriminalactsorenjoythe protectionofothercountries.Applicationsforasylumareprocessedfirst byaRSDO,anofficeroftheDepartmentofHomeAffairslocatedata RefugeeReceptionOffice,withappropriatetrainingandexperience. In termsofsection21theapplicationmustbemadeinpersontoaRefugee ReceptionOfficer.Pendingtheoutcomeoftheapplicationtheapplicantis issued with an asylum seekers permit (section 22). The application is determinedbytheRSDOandwhererejecteditisappealabletoeitherthe StandingCommittee forRefugeeAffairsortheRAB,dependingonthe reasonforrefusal.

7.

Therespondentscontendthattheapplicantdoesnotqualifyforrefugee status for two reasons. Firstly because he has failed to satisfy the statutorycriteriaforeligibility.Andsecondlybecauseheisexcludedfrom refugeestatusintermsofsection4(1)(b)oftheRefugeesActonaccount oftherebeingreasontobelievethathehascommittedacrimewhichis notofapoliticalnatureandwhich,ifcommittedinSouthAfrica,wouldbe punishablebyimprisonment.Theyalsodenythattheproceedings(orat leastthosebeforetheRAB)weretaintedbyunfairnessorwerevitiatedby materialerrorsoflaworfact.

Theapplicantspersonalhistoryandthebackgroundtohisarrivalin SouthAfrica 8. Thefollowingfactsregardingtheapplicantslifeandthecircumstancesof hisarrivalinSouthAfrica,takenfromhisuncontradictedavermentsinthe foundingpapersandthetranscriptofhistestimonybeforetheRAB,can beregardedascommoncause. 9. TheapplicantisaLibyannationalwholeftLibyaabout20yearsagoin 1987.SincethenhehasspentmostofhistimeinPakistan.Asastudent hewasopposedtothepoliciesandpracticesofthegovernmentofLibya then(asnow)underthecontrolofColonelQadhafi.Hebecameinvolved inpoliticalactivitywhileastudentatBrightStarUniversityinLibyaduring 1983to1987.Hisactivitiesatthattimeseemtohavebeenfairlylowkey and of a limited nature. His political consciousness was sparked by Libyas war against Chad, which he described as antihumanity. He spokeoutagainstthewarinthemosqueheattendedandinmeetingsat the university. His activities extended to agitation for greater political

5 freedomsandfairelections.Aftergraduatingwithadegreeinmechanical engineeringhereturnedtohishomedistrictnearTripoli.There,together withhisbestfriend,KhalidHingari,hesecretlywrotepoliticalpamphlets agitatingagainstthegovernmentwhichweredistributedatnight.Hingari wassubsequentlyarrestedin1988andimprisonedforpoliticalconduct. Hediedin1996inAbuSalimprisonduringanincidentdocumentedby AmnestyInternationalasinvolvingthemasskillingofperhapsasmanyas 1200politicaldetainees.Iwillrefertothisincidentmorefullylater.

10. BeforehisinvolvementwithHingari,theapplicanttwicecametothe attentionoftherevolutionarycommitteeatBrightStarUniversity,oncein1985 andoncein1987.DuringthattimetheLibyangovernmentheldpeoples assembliesconvenedbyrevolutionarycommitteesaimedatachieving hegemonyinrespectofitssocialistpolicies.Theapplicantregardedthemas propagandameetingsthatweresupposedtoindicatethatthegovernmenthada legitimateconsensusonissueswheninfactitwasmakingauthoritarianand dictatorialdecisions.Heclaimsthathewasforcedtoattendthesemeetings andtokeepquietabouthispoliticalopinionsbecausepeoplewhodidnotattend weretorturedandanegativepoliticalopinionwasimputedtothem. 11. Throughout the period of 1983 to 1987 the applicant nevertheless continuedtoattendstudentpoliticalmeetingsatnight.Hisstudentgroup was a loose association, did not have a specific name, nor was it a politicalparty. 12. The applicants firstbrush with the revolutionarycommittee occurred in 1983,beforeheenrolledatBrightStar,afterhehadpubliclydeclaredhis opposition to the war with Chad and the policy of compulsory military service for teenagers, during the Jumaah service (the weekly congregational gathering on Fridays at midday) at his local mosque. When questioned by the revolutionary committee he lied in order to protecthimself,givingafalseaccountofwhatheinfacthadsaidbytelling themthathehadsimplyraisedquestionsaboutthewarandhadmerely

6 statedthattherevolutionarycommitteeshouldinformthepeopleaboutthe reasonsforthewarwithChad.Histrueopinion,thenandnow,wasthat the war was illegitimate because it was aimed exclusively at the annexationofUzzoprovinceinChad,wherelargedepositsofuranium hadbeendiscovered.

13.

Afterthisencountertheapplicantbecamemorecircumspectinhispolitical activitiesandpublicpronouncements. However,heremainedpolitically motivatedandalongwithhisfellowstudentslistenedsurreptitiouslyonthe radiotoAlJabbaAlWataniaLiInqaadLibya,anexiledpoliticalpartythat broadcastmessagesandpropagandaopposedtothepoliciesofColonel Qadhafi. The applicants attorney at the RAB hearing translated the Arabicnameas:theNationalFoundationfortheSalvationofLibya.

14.

Despitehislowprofile,therevolutionarycommitteeatBrightStarbriefly detained him and some of his fellow students for the purposes of interrogation. Hementionedtwoofhisfellowstudentsbyname:Abdul QaderSharMaddu,currentlyinprisoninLibyaforhispoliticalactivities, andSalahKhuwayldiwhohasbeengrantedrefugeestatusandasylumin Europe. During his interrogation he was warned not to hold political opinionsopposingthegovernmentandwastoldthatreligiousdissidence wouldnotbetolerated.Onceagain,duringhisinterrogationheliedtothe revolutionarycommitteebyprofessingtobeasupporteroftheQadhafi government.

15.

Although the evidence on the point was not elaborated upon in the foundingpapers,orinthetestimonygivenbeforetheRAB,thereismore than a suggestion that the applicant belonged to a mosque that had attractedtheattentionoftheLibyanauthoritiesasonepreachingreligious

7 dissidence. ItalsoemergedduringtheRABhearingthattheapplicants name had appeared on an internet website, referred to as Libjust, established, maintained and controlled by the Libyan government for sometimeuntilitrecentlybecamedefunct.Theinformationcontainedon the website reflected the applicant as being a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), who had received military training in Afghanistan. TheapplicantdeniedthathewasamemberoftheLIFG, that he had ever received military training or that he had ever been associatedwithanyterroristgroup. Inresponsetoaquestionbyoneof themembersoftheRABconcerninghowhebecameinvolvedinpolitics, theapplicantreplied:
When you have people in the school, they are Egyptian teachers. They were involvedintheMuslimBrotherhoodgroups.Iftheteacherssawthatastudentwas clever,theytookhimaside(sic)

When asked whether he had been persuaded to join the Muslim Brotherhoodgroups,heanswered:
Yes,whenIwassittingwiththeseteachers,theyopenedmymind.

The second respondent took up this issue and the following exchange tookplace: Secondrespondent:

When the teachers in your school were opening your mind,whatdidtheytellyou?

Applicant: religion. Secondrespondent:

They told me that I must open my mind. About

Howdidpoliticscomeintothis?

Applicant:

YoucannotseparatepoliticsandreligioninIslam.

Secondrespondent:

Gaddafi(sic)iscalledaprophetofGod.Butyousayhe didnotshowreligion?

Applicant:

Hedidnotrespectreligion.

Secondrespondent: Applicant:

SoheisabadMuslim?

OfcourseheisabadMuslim.

16.

Thesignificanceofthisexchangeisthatitclearlypositionstheapplicantin theIslamisttraditionopposedtoColonelQadhafi. Thecharacterofthat enmity unfortunately was not fully explored. One assumes it was predicateduponaperceivedintolerancebyQadhafitowardstheteachings and doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood and insofar as the applicant appears implicitly to reject Colonel Qadhafis claim to prophethood, if indeed he has made such a claim, then also upon the foundational precept(kalima)ofIslamthattheProphetMohammedisthelastprophet ofGod.

17.

Thereisnoevidencebeforemeexplainingoraccountingforthestance taken by the Qadhafi government towards the Muslim Brotherhood. Suffice to say, it is common knowledge, of which judicial notice may legitimately be taken, that the Muslim Brotherhood (Jamiat alIkhwan Muslimun) originated in Egypt in 1928 and has spread throughout the MiddleEast.ItpropagatesatraditionalistviewofIslamthattherecanbe noseparationbetweensecular,political,spiritualorreligiouslife. Ithas global aims, and some have described it as having a jihadist agenda, whateverthatmaymean.Itsinfluenceissignificantanditsactivitieshave

9 broughtitintoconflictwithgovernmentsintheregion.

18.

Despite his denial of membership of the LIFG, the applicant, as mentioned, was identified by the Libyan government, on the Libjust website,asamember,associateorsupporteroftheLIFG. Byhisown admission, while still in Libya, he listened to, approved of and was influencedbytheradiobroadcastsofexiledpoliticalgroupings.Thereis no direct evidence before me about the LIFG, its aims, methods and activities.Nevertheless,significantinformationaboutithascometolight in a matter recently adjudicated by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (the SIAC) in the United Kingdom, a body equivalent in statustotheUKHighCourt.Itwillbeconvenientatthispointtodigress fromthe applicants life story in orderto consider some of its findings, specificallythoseapropostheLIFG,andtocommentonthelegitimacyof relyinguponitsfindingsforthepurposesofdeterminingthisapplication.

19.

Courts are generallyreluctantto relyupon the opinion orfindings of a courtinaforeignjurisdictionaboutfactualissuesnotventilated,triedor testedbeforethem. Allthesame,itisnotunusualinhumanrightsand refugee cases for courts to take judicial notice of various facts of an historical, political or sociological character, or to consult works of referenceorreportsofreputableagenciesconcernedwiththeprotection andpromotionofhumanrights.InKaundaandothersvPresidentofthe RepublicofSouthAfricaandothers2005(4)SA235(CC)(atpara123) ChaskalsonCJ,commentingonreportsbyAmnestyInternationalandthe InternationalBarAssociationonthehumanrightssituationinEquatorial Guinea,saidasfollows: WhilstthisCourtcannotandshouldnotmakeafindingastothepresent

10 positioninEquatorial Guineaonthebasis onlyofthesereports,itcannot ignore the seriousness of the allegations that have been made. They are reportsofinvestigationsconductedbyreputableinternationalorganisationsand
a SpecialRapporteurappointed by theUnited NationsHuman RightsCommittee. Thefactthatsuchinvestigationsweremadeandreportsgivenisitselfrelevantinthe circumstancesofthiscase.

These dicta haverelevancebeyondthenarrowinquiryintowhetheritis permissibletorelyonthefindingsoftheSIACinrelationtotheactivitiesof theLIFG.TheysanctionrelianceuponthedecisionoftheSIAC,andthe reportsreferred to in the decision,when assessing the general human rightssituationinLibya,whichIdolaterinthisjudgment. 20. TherelevantdecisionoftheSIACisDDandASvTheSecretaryofState fortheHomeDepartment(AppealNo:SC/42and50/2005dated27April 2007).ItconcernedanappealbytwoLibyannationalsagainsttherefusal bytheSecretaryofStatetograntthemrefugeestatusandasylum.Both appellants were alleged to be members of the LIFG, described by the SIACasanorganisationinvolvedinprovidingextensivesupporttoawide rangeofIslamistextremistslooselyaffiliatedtoAlQaedanetworks,who hadbeenengagedinterroristactivityforasubstantialperiodoftime. 21. TheevidenceoftheUKSecretaryofStatewasthattheLIFGisanIslamist extremist organisation which started in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border areain1990withstrongTalebanconnectionsandmanymemberswho had significant connections to Al Qaeda operatives. Its aim was to overthrowtheQadhafigovernmentandreplaceitwithanIslamicstate.It hascarriedoutattacksagainsttheLibyanstate,buthasbeenrebuffed withafierceandseveremilitaryresponse. Manyofitsmembershave been killed, imprisoned or have fled Libya. The dispersal of its

11 membershiphasledtoabroadeningofitsoutlook,andanembracingof the panIslamic, global jihadist outlook of Al Qaeda. Expert opinion before the SIAC suggests it has lost effectiveness since 9/11 with the recentarrestofsomeofitsmembersintheUKdescribedasasymbolic defeatfortheremnantsofafadingorganisation.

22.

Nonetheless,Mr.JusticeOuseley,theChairmanoftheSIAC,reachedthe followingconclusionabouttheLIFG: Ingeneral,itisourviewthattherearecloselinksbetweenAlQaedaand manyseniorLIFGmembers;theclosestlinkswereforgedandexistoutside theUK.ThosewhoholdglobaljihadistviewsgenerallyhavethelinkstoAl QaedaandstillseektoopposetheQadhafiregimebymeanswhichinclude violence. Theycooperatewithandsupportothergroupsinabroaderanti western agenda and in actions directed against what they all see as non IslamicstatesnotablyintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.Therehasbeena clearshiftinemphasisinrecentyears,causedinpartbychangesinleadership forcedbyarrests. ThosewithAlQaedaviewsareintheascendancyand someofthoseofotherviewshavelefttheLIFGorhavebecomemarginalized.
ThedifficultiesofoperatingwithinLibya,andthecontactsamongtheIslamistsof manynationalitiesdispersedthroughoutthewestandelsewherehaveencourageda moreglobaloutlook.Thoseofthatoutlookrepresentacleardangertothenational securityoftheUK.

23.

TheSIACwentontodrawthreeotherimportantconclusionsaboutthe LIFG.Firstly,theLibyangovernmenthasaclearinterestindefeatingthe violentoppositionoftheLIFGtoit.Secondly,despiteitsAlQaedaglobal outlook,theLIFGhasnotabandoneditsaimsinLibya.Andfinally,itwas notpossible to conclude fromthe evidence thatthe mere factofLIFG membershipshowsthatanindividualisnecessarilyaglobaljihadistorAl

12 Qaedasupporter. SomeLIFGmemberssupportAlQaeda,othersdo not.Thefocusalwayshastobeonwhattheindividualhasdoneandmay do.

24.

Returningnowtotheapplicantspersonalstory.Itwillberecalledthathe admittedtoanassociationwiththeMuslimBrotherhood,tolisteningtothe broadcasts of the exiled Al Jabba Al Watania Li Inqaad Libya in the mid1980s and to being inspired and influenced by their message. AlthoughhedeniedbeingamemberoftheLIFG,hewasnotaskedifhe wasan associate or supporter oftheLIFG. Hecouldnothavebeena member of the LIFG while in Libya prior to leaving in 1988, because, accordingtotheSIAC,theLIFGonlycameintoexistencein1990whenit wasfoundedinthetribalareasonthePakistan/Afghanistanborder.There isnoevidencetouchingupontherelationship,ifany,betweenAlJabbaAl WataniaLiInqaadLibyaandtheLIFG.

25.

TheapplicantleftLibyaduringthefirsthalfof1988,shortlyafterhisfriend andmentorKhalidHingariwasarrestedonbeingfoundinhiscarwith pamphletshewasintendingtodistribute.Whentheapplicantheardofhis friendsfateheimmediatelywentintohidinginBenghaziandlearnedlater thatmembersoftherevolutionarycommitteehadbeentohisfamilyhome lookingforhim.Asalreadymentioned,Hingariremainedinprisonuntilhis deathin1996duringtheincidentattheAbuSalimprison.

26.

ShortlyafterHingarisarrest,theapplicantobtainedavisatoleaveLibya, exited Libya via Tripoli airport and proceeded on pilgrimage (umra) to MeccainSaudiArabia.Thefacilitywithwhichheobtainedavisaandleft isstrangelyinconsistentwithhisdepictionofbeingsoughtbyandonthe runfromtherevolutionarycommittee.Heclaimedhewasabletodothis

13 becauseLibyansecurityofficialswerenotsophisticatedoreducatedat thattimeandhewasabletoutilisethisfacttoavoiddetection.

27.

HeremainedinMeccaforaboutfourmonths,fromRamadantoHajj.He hadoriginallyhopedtopursueIslamicstudiesinSaudiArabia,butwhen this did not seem possible he considered other options. He met an EgyptianmanattheMedina masjid,whomhedidnotidentifybyname, butwhoassistedhimwithfinancesandavisatotraveltoPeshawarin Pakistan, where he was set up with a job as Director of the Islamic Heritage Foundation, a body based in Kuwait with offices in Pakistan. Thus the applicant happened to find himself in the veryplace that the LIFG wassetup shortlybeforeitsestablishment. Peshawar,itiswell known,isthemaincityintheareaofPakistanborderingAfghanistanand Iran, the socalled Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Society in its immediateprecinctsisorganisedalongtribalandtraditionalistlines.One maysafelytakenoticeofthefactthatitisanareainwhichtheTaleban andAlQaedaenjoysupportamongsttheinhabitants,andthewritofthe Pakistanigovernmentisoflimitedeffectiveness. 28. TheapplicantremainedinPeshawarforalmost13years,from1988until 2001,workingfortheFoundation. TheLibyansclaimhespentsomeof thattimeactivelyengagedintheconflictsinAfghanistan.Duringthattime heneversoughtPakistaniresidenceorcitizenship. Heoperatedtotally illegally by obtaining fraudulent visa extensions from counterfeiters in Peshawar.Whenhispassportexpiredheobtainedacounterfeitone.The explanation wastendered onhisbehalfinargumentthattherewasno compulsionuponhimto regularise hisstatusbecausehebenefitedfrom theprotectionofthetribaleldersintheregion.Heacknowledgedthathe didnotalwaysactlawfullyinsecuringvisasandpassportsbutsubmitted

14 thathisconductwasnobartohisclaimforasylum.

29.

After the attacks in New York on 11 September 2001, the Pakistani governmentcloseddowntheofficesoftheFoundationinPeshawar.The applicantoffersnoexplanationforwhyitdidso. Onecanonlysurmise thatitwasmotivatedmostprobablybyitsundertakingstothegovernment oftheUSAtocurtailtheactivitiesofpersonsassociatedwithAlQaeda and the Taleban. The applicant avers though that the Foundation still existsanditsbankaccountshavenotbeenfrozenasaresultofitbeing deemedaterroristorganisation.IassumethattheFoundationcontinues toexistinKuwait,butthatitsactivitiesinthenorthwestofPakistan,ifnot terminated,havebeenappreciablycurtailed.

30.

As a result of the Pakistani governments decision to close the Foundation, the applicant found himself without a job and somewhat discomfortedbecausethePakistanigovernment,ostensiblyinresponseto USpressure,beganpersecutingArabsindiscriminatelyandirrespectiveof theiraffiliations. BeinganArabhefledtoIranbyroad. Therehewas pickedupinZaidan,atownjustbeyondthePakistanborder,andheldin detentionwith80otherArabrefugeesforaperiodof6months. 31. InIranhewasabletonegotiatehisreleaseontheconditionthatheleft thecountry.InhistestimonybeforetheRABheexplainedthataLibyan national,bythenameofMohammedElSaqui,cametoIranfromtheUK specifically to assist a group of Libyans held in detention after fleeing Pakistan. ItisnotclearwhetherElSaquirepresentedanexiledpolitical movementortheLibyangovernment.Thefactthattheapplicantreferred tohimasabrotherindicatesthathewasmostlikelyanexiledopponent oftheLibyangovernmentofsimilarIslamicpersuasionastheapplicant.

15 ElSaquisinterventionseeminglyledtotheIranianauthoritiesposingthe Libyans with a choice: either they could remain in relatively humane conditions of detention in Iran or they could leave the country. The applicantchosethelatteroptionandleftIranwithhisfamily;hiswifeand childrenhavingflowntoIranimmediatelypriortohiscrossingtoZaidanby road. FromtherehewentwithhisfamilytoMalaysia. Fearfulthatthe Malaysian authorities might repatriate him to Libya he fraudulently obtainedafalseSouthAfricanpassport. Hisplanatthatstage,sohe claims, was to seek asylum in Australia or New Zealand, where he believeditwouldbeeasiertoenterwithaSouthAfricanpassport.Hewas arrested in Jakarta, Indonesia, while on a visit there, and taken into custody. He remained inadeportationholding facilityinIndonesiafor over2months.DuringhisinterrogationheclaimedtobeaSouthAfrican, ofMoroccanorigin,whohadgainedcitizenshipthroughmarriage.Inspite of the passport containing information to the contrary, reflecting the applicantasborninCapeTown,theIndonesianauthoritiesdeportedhim toSouthAfrica. 32. Onhisarrivalhere,on1November2003,hewasimmediatelyarrestedfor beinginpossessionofafraudulentpassport.DuringhisdetentionSouth African and foreign intelligence officials interrogated him. He was eventuallyreleasedandappliedforasylum.On5February2004Interpol again arrested him on an extradition request by the Libyan authorities relating to a charge of theft. The applicant is of the view that the extradition request came about as a direct result of his application for asylumandmaintainedthatthechargewastrumpedupinatransparent attempttoexcludehimfromrefugeestatusintermsoftheprovisionsof section4(1)(b)oftheRefugeeAct.Theoffencewasallegedlycommitted in1985,threeyearsbeforehisdeparturefromLibya,andtherewasno

16 reference to it on the Libjust website which stated merely that he was sought because of his association with the LIFG. I will discuss the evidencerelatingtothiscriticalissuewhenconsideringthedecisionofthe RAB.Theapplicantremainedinprisonuntilhisreleaseon20April2004 andiscurrentlyonatemporaryasylumseekerspermit.Hesayshehas livedalawabidingexistenceinJohannesburgsincethen. 33. Thesecondrespondent,inanopposingaffidavitdeposedtoonbehalfof thefirstrespondent,theRAB,confirmedthattheapplicantsaccountofhis lifebetween1988and2003isinconformitywiththatplacedbeforethe RABasevidence.However,heaverredthathepersonallywasunableto verify any of the allegations and stated that the RAB was deeply concernedabouttheapplicantsselfconfessedabilitytolie,deceiveand tocommitbribery,fraudandcorruption. Aswillbeseenpresently,the RABsconcernsabouttheapplicantscredibilityplayedacentralpartinits decision. Bethatasitmay,thereisnootherevidencecontradictingthe applicantsstory. TheproceedingsbeforetheRSDO

34.

Iturnnowtotheeventsandcircumstancessurroundingthedecisionofthe RSDO.Theapplicantrequestedasylumimmediatelyuponbeingarrested at OR Tambo International Airport on 1 November 2003. A formal applicationwasmadeon19December2003andtheapplicantwasissued withanasylumseekerspermitintermsofsection 22oftheAct. For reasonsnotexplained,theauthoritiescontinuedunlawfullytodetainthe applicant.Onlyafterhehadthreatenedsuicideandanurgentapplication forhisreleasewasmooted,didtheauthoritiesreleasehimon7January 2004. He was arrested again on 5 February 2004 on the extradition

17 request. The extradition request from Libya most likely arose as a consequenceofSouthAfricanpolicecausinganInterpoldiffusiontobe issued. Libya has no extradition agreement with South Africa. Accordingly,intermsoftheExtraditionAct67of1967,anextraditionto Libya may only proceed if the President consents to the extradition. Despite apparently being seized with the request for extradition, the President has elected not to consent to the extradition, and the respondentshaveprovidednoexplanationorindicationofanyknowledge ontheirpartastowhyhehasdeclinedtodoso.

35.

During the time he was in custody on the extradition warrant, South AfricanInterpolofficialscollectedtheapplicantfromprisonon26March 2004andwithoutnoticetohislegalrepresentativestookhimtotheoffice of the Department of Home Affairs in Marabastad, Pretoria where he appearedbeforethefifthrespondent,MsMagiSawa,therelevantRSDO. Becauseoftheintercessionofsomeoneattheprisonwheretheapplicant washeld, the applicantsattorneywas able to intervene timeously and challenge the conduct of the Interpol officials. Prior to the attorneys arrivaltheRSDOinformedtheapplicantthatshehadadecisionreadyfor him.ShesaidthatshewasunderalotofpressurefromInterpoltogivea negativedecision,statingthattheycalledhereverydaytwiceadayto askhertorenderadecisionagainsthim.Nevertheless,inresponsetothe submissions of the attorneys, she agreed to delay the decision. A subsequentinterviewwasheldinApril2004. TheRDSOinformedthe applicantsattorneysinAugust2004thatshehadtakenadecisionbutthat anofficialintheHomeAffairsDepartmenthadrequestedtheapplicants file. The applicant was informed of the RSDOs negative status determinationonlyon11March2005.

 36.

18 The fifth respondent did not deliver an opposing affidavit. Hence, the allegationsthatsheadmittedtobeingputunderpressurebyInterpoland seniorofficialsintheDepartmenthavenotbeendenied,northefactthat Interpol officials sought to be present during the interview until the objectionoftheapplicantsattorneys.Thecontentionthatsheactedunder dictation and without the requisite impartiality has also not been disavowed. In his answering affidavit, the chairperson of the RAB acknowledged that he had no knowledge of these allegations, but submitted that they are irrelevant for the purposes of the application, because,ashesawit,onlytheRABdecisionoughttobeincontention.

37.

In the written reasons for her decision the RSDO made the following pertinentfindings,pivotaltoherruling: InvestigationsconductedbyInterpolandthePolitburoinLibyapointed tothefactthattheapplicantfledLibyaforfearofcriminalprosecution aftercommittingthecrimeofrobbery.

A simple engagement and involvement in student political activity cannotbeproportionatetothepunishmentofdeath.Consequently,the applicantsclaimoffearofpersecutionwasunfounded.

The applicant could, and should, have been declared a refugee in Pakistan.

TherewerenofactstobackuphisclaimthatArabswerepersecutedin Pakistanafter9/11.

The applicant obtained a South African passport fraudulently and consequentlyhisdeportationtoSouth AfricafromIndonesiaisillegal

19 (presumablyunderSouthAfricanlaw). In terms of international law (the exact provision of which not being stated)theapplicantautomaticallybecameaPakistanicitizenbygetting marriedtoaPakistaniwoman. (Theapplicantisinfactmarriedtoan Algerianwoman).

38.

Relyingonthesefactsandconsiderations,someofwhich,itcanbeseen straightaway,arewrongoroflittleornorelevance,theRSDOconcluded thattheapplicanthadnotdischargedtheburdenofproofrestingonhim, foundthattheapplicantdidnothaveawellfoundedfearofpersecutionas contemplatedinsection3oftheActandfurtherheldthattheapplicants claim is unfounded as it relates to a criminal activity as opposed to a politicalactivity. TheproceedingsbeforetheRAB

39.

Theapplicantlodgedanappealsometimein2005intermsofsection26(1) oftheAct,whichprovidesthatanyasylumseekermaylodgeanappeal withtheRABinthemannerandwithintheperiodprovidedforintherulesif theRSDOhasrejectedtheapplicationintermsofsection24(3)(c).Itis commoncausethattheRSDOinthisinstancerejectedtheapplicationfor asylumintermsofthatprovision.Attheconclusionofthehearingbefore theRSDOthelatterisrequiredtograntasylum(section24(3)(a));toreject the application as manifestly unfounded, abusive or fraudulent (section 24(3)(b));to reject theapplication as unfounded (section 24(3)(c));orto refer any question of law to the Standing Committee (section 24(3)(d)). TheRABisestablishedintermsofsection12oftheActandisrequiredin termsofsection12(3)tofunctionwithoutanybiasandtobeindependent. Aswillbecomeevidentlater,thenatureoftheRABsjurisdictionandthe

20 mannerofitsfunctioningwerecontentiousissuesbetweentheparties.Its powersinappealsthoughareclearlystipulatedinsection26(2).TheRAB mayafterhearinganappealconfirm,setasideorsubstituteanydecision takenbyaRSDOintermsofsection24(3).

40.

TheRABmettwicetohearevidenceanddeliberatetheapplicantsappeal. Thefirstmeetingtookplaceon6July2005andthesecondon2November 2005.Thetranscriptionofthefirstmeetingrevealsthatitcommencedwith the second respondent making certain opening remarks read from a prepared document devised with the laudable objective of informing an appellantofthelegalissuesatstakeandthemethodandapproachofthe RAB. The following remarks have assumed particular relevance in this case: WeknowthatoneoftheofficialsattheDepartmentofHomeAffairshas declinedyourapplicationforrefugeestatus.Wehavelookedatthereasons forthis.ButtheBoardassuchmakesitsownindependentassessmentofthe facts andwedonotlookatthereasonsthattheBoard(sic:hemeantthe RSDO)rejectedyourapplication. Thus,youdonotneedtoprovethatthe priorrulingwaswrong.Thisisafresh,oradenovo hearing. Today,wewill
listentoyouasifthiswasyourfirsthearing.

41.

Aftertheopeningremarks,theapplicantwasledbyhisattorneyandset outthestoryofhislifebetween1983and2003inbroaddetail.Thethree membersoftheRABintervenedwheretheyfeltitnecessaryordesirable withprobingquestionsorinquiriesaimedatelucidationorelaboration. I have already referred to the most relevant aspects of the applicants testimonybeforetheRAB,soitisunnecessarytorepeatit.

42.

Besidesprovidingoralevidence,theapplicantfurnishedtheRABwitha

21 largebundleofdocumentaryevidencethatincludedvariousaffidavitsand lettersofsupportfromLibyanrefugeesthroughouttheworld,includinga letter from His Royal Highness Mohammed ElHassan ElSinoussi, the CrownPrinceofLibya,supportingtheapplicantsclaimtoawellfounded fearofpersecution. Inaddition,hehandedinlettersfromexiledLibyan pressuregroups,suchasLibyaWatchandHumanRightsSolidarity.

43.

Onedocumentofnotablerelevancewastheprintoutofthewriteupon theapplicantontheLibjust.comwebsite: http://libjust.com/details9.htm, nownonoperational.TheprintoutisinArabicanddepictsaphotograph oftheapplicant. Itisaccompaniedbyatranslationsetoutinanemail fromAASMediaaddressedtotheapplicantsattorneydated16February 2004. Thenameoftheauthoroftheemailandthetranslationisnot stated. Theauthenticityandreliabilityofthetranslationhavenotbeen challenged and hence should be accepted as accurate. The relevant portionsofitreadasfollows: On10.01.2001theUSTreasurySecretary,PaulONeil,announcedafreeze on accounts of AbdulMuhsin AlLibi, director of the Islamic Heritage Revival Office in Peshawar. The US Treasury Department said that the LibyannationalAbdulMuhsinwasinflatingthenumbersoforphansinhis listsinordertoobtainmorefundsfromtheKuwaitiassociation,totransferto the Al Qaeda organisation, and that he is sending funds and message to Bin
Laden. Theinformationonhimincludesthefollowing:

Name:IbrahimAliAbuBakerTantoush Nickname:AbdulMuhsin Born:1964atalAziziya(translator:40kmsouthofTripoli) MothersName:alMagtoufahAliZiyadah Qualifications:BScPetroleumEngineering Wifesname:MannoubaBoughouffah/Algerian,andtheyhave5children


AddressinLibya:SayyadDistrictLibya *NOTES:

22

In1988HeleftalJamahiriyyah(Libya)forSaudiArabiaandthentoPakistanandAfghanistan wherehereceivedseveralmilitarycourseatmilitarytrainingcampsbelongingtoalQaeda,and participatedintheAfghanwar. During19901998heworkedfortheKuwaitiIslamicHeritageRevivalAssociation,as aDirectoroftheAssociationsbureauinPeshawar. PakistaniauthoritiesraidedhishomebuthemanagedtoescapeinsideAfghanistan. ThepersonconcernedbelongstothesocalledtheIslamicFightingGroup,banned internationallyunderSecurityCouncilResolutiononAfghanistan(AF169A)SC7222 dated26.11.2001. HewasheadoftheGroupsmembersinPakistanandAfghanistan,andduringhis periodintheserviceoftheKuwaitiIslamicHeritageAssociation,heofferedfinancial assistancetotheGroupheisaffiliatedto. ParticipatedinalQaedameetingsheldinKabulfollowingthe11Septemberincidents andhewasatthattimelivinginJalalAbad. HedivorcedhiswifeandaskedhertoreturntoAlgeriawithherfivechildren. DuringJuly2002thepersonconcernedwasseenatdomesticflightsatKarachiairportarrivingon aninternalflightinsidePakistan.

44.

Thewebsite,ithasnotbeendenied,wasanofficiallysponsoredwebsite oftheLibyangovernment.

45.

AnotherdocumentsubmittedtotheRABwastakenfromthewebsiteof Libya Watch for Human Rights: www.libyawatch.org. It is headed: UrgentAppealforActionRe:Mr.IbrahimAliTantoushLibyanNational. This organisation portrays itself as an independent human rights organisation concerned with monitoring and reporting human rights

23 abusesinLibya.concernedwithupholdinganddefendingthehuman rightsoftheLibyanpeople.Itgoesontoofferthefollowingendorsement: WecanconfirmthatMr.Ibrahim AliTantoush.aLibyan citizen and currentlyanasylumseekerinSouthAfrica,isawellknownLibyandissident. Aftersettingouthispersonalhistory,whichaccordswiththeapplicants accounttotheRAB,itconcludes:

Mr.TantoushsreturntoLibyawouldnodoubtresultinhisarrestandsubsequent interrogationbytheLibyanauthoritiesleavinghiminverygravedangerandphysical harm,especially,whenconsideringthetrackrecordoftheLibyanregimestreatment ofpoliticalopponents.

46.

Inadditiontothelettersandaffidavitsofsupport,theRABwasfurnished withAmnestyInternationalsCountryConditionReportsinrespectofLibya for each year between 2000 and 2005, as well as the US State DepartmentsCountryReportsforLibya2003and2004.

47.

Inparagraph8.1oftheindexofthebundleofdocumentshandedinatthe first hearing there is a reference to the Amnesty International Country ConditionReportofPakistan2003withtheannotationthatitsupportsthe applicantsclaimthatArabmenwerearbitrarilydetainedinanddeported fromPakistanafter9/11.Itisevidentfromthetranscriptofthehearingof 6July2005thatreferencewasmadetothisdocumentandtheattentionof themembersoftheRABwasdrawntoitbytheapplicantsattorneyin support of the proposition that the applicant was a victim of this discrimination and antiArab sentiment at the hands of the Pakistani government.Unfortunately,thereportisnotincludedintherecordfiledin terms of rule 53(3) with the result that I have had no insight into its

 contents. 48.

24

Attheendofthehearingon6July2005,thesecondrespondentstated thathepreferredtoadjournthehearingbecausehewantedtoconduct furtherinvestigationswithregardtotheextraditionwarrantandhearthe evidenceofInspectorMendesofInterpol.Itiscommoncausethatinthe periodbetweenthetwohearingsthesecondrespondenthaddiscussions withMendeswithouttheapplicantorhisrepresentativesbeingpresent. Theapplicantsattorney,whenthiscametoherknowledge,objected.She informed the second respondent that she regarded it as unfair and prejudicialthathewashavingdiscussionswithInterpolofwhichshewas notkeptinformed. Thesecondrespondentsrejoindertothiscriticismin theansweringaffidavitissomewhatcontradictoryandconfusing. Inthe firstinstanceheadmittedtohavingspokentoMendesseveraltimesbut claimedhewasentitledtodosointermsofthelegislation.Section26(3) (a)oftheActprovidesthatbeforereachingadecisiontheRABmayofits own accord make further inquiry or investigation. However, later he qualified this by stating that his discussions with Mendes were at all material times restricted to the question of his availability to present himselfbeforetheRABandthathehadneverdiscussedwithMendesthe merits of the applicants claim or any evidence to be presented by Mendes.NotablythereisnoconfirmatoryaffidavitfromMendes.

49.

The assertion of perceived bias acquired an added dimension on the morningofthesecondhearingoftheRABon2November2005.Inhis foundingaffidavittheapplicantdescribedhowonarrivalattheRABhe and his representatives waited for 20 minutes before the hearing commencedwhilethesecondrespondentwasindiscussionwithInterpol officialsinhisoffice.Hebecameapprehensivethatthesecondrespondent

25 wasbeingundulyinfluencedbyInterpolandisoftheviewthatthisbreak awaymeetingwasprejudicialtohisapplication.Thesecondrespondent intheansweringaffidavitrepliedthattherewasnobasisuponwhichthe applicantcouldimpugntheconductoftheRABashavingbeeninfluenced bypressureexertedbyofficialsofInterpolandthattheallegationsofbias oractingunderdictationweresweepingandlackinginparticularity. He deniedbeingundulyinfluencedbyInterpol.Nevertheless,hedidadmitto havingseparatediscussionswiththeInterpolofficials,butsaidtheywere confinedtointroductionsandanexchangeofcourtesies. Heexplained that the Interpol officials arrived prior to the hearing and proceeded to introducethemselvestomembersoftheRABbeforetheapplicantandhis legalrepresentativesarrived.

50.

The applicant in reply took up the challenge and responded to the allegation that his criticismswere sweeping, lacking in particularityand unfounded.Heexplainedthathehadarrivedwithhislegalrepresentatives at about the same time as the Interpol officials and reiterated that the meetingbetweenthemembersoftheRABandInterpolhadlastedfor20 minutes, stating that he found ithard to understand how itcould have takenthatlongfortheInterpolofficialsmerelytointroducethemselvesto themembersoftheRAB.Insupportofhisversionhefiledaconfirmatory affidavitofMsRubenaPeer,acandidateattorney,whoinNovember2005 hadbeenemployedbytheapplicantsattorneysdoingresearchworkona voluntarybasis. ShearrivedattheofficesoftheRABonthatmorning togetherwithcounselandtwoattorneysfromtheWitsLawClinic. On their arrival they met Mendes who they know and briefly exchanged greetings.Theapplicantandhisrepresentativessatinthereceptionarea oftheRABoncouchessituatedontherighthandsideoftheroom,while theInterpolofficialssatonthecoucheslocatedonthelefthandsideofthe

26 room.Thesecondrespondentthenenteredthereceptionarea,invitedthe Interpol officials into his office and proceeded to consult with them for approximately 20 minutes. One of the attorneys, Ms Bhamjee, noted aloudthattheconsultationwasirregularandapointcouldbetakentothat effectonreview.Theywereshortlyafterwardsledbythereceptionistinto the hearing room. On their way there Ms Peer noticed that the consultationwasstillunderway. MsPeerstatedintheaffidavitthatshe wasdeposingtoitinresponsetothesecondrespondentsassertioninthe answering affidavit that the allegations regarding this incident were sweepingandlackinginparticularity.

51.

As these averments were made in the replying affidavit the second respondentstrictlyspeakinghadnoentitlementtorespondtothemandin the normal course they could not be denied or explained by the respondents.Nevertheless,iftheallegationsbyMsPeerwereuntrue,or ifanadequateexplanationwerepossible,leaveofthecourtcouldand should have been sought to answer them see Sigaba v Minister of DefenceandPoliceandanother 1980(3)SA535(TkSc)at550F. The respondentsdidnotrequesttobegivenanopportunitytodealwiththese averments. Their failure to do so tilts the probabilities towards the applicantsversionthattheconsultationoccurred,thatitlasted20minutes andthatMsBhamjeeobjected.Whethertheinferenceofactualbiasmay bedrawninthelightofthesecondrespondentsdenialthereofisamatter towhichIwillreturnlater.

52.

At the commencement of the second hearing, the second respondent placed on record that the purpose of the hearing was to record the evidencefromSuperintendentMendesregardingthecriminalmatter.By thathemeanttherequestforextraditionoftheapplicantbyLibyabased

27 ontheallegationthattheapplicanthadcommittedeithertheftorrobberyin Libyain1985.Mendestestifiedthatafterthearrestoftheapplicantatthe airport,aninternationaldiffusiontogetherwiththeapplicantsfingerprints, photographandpersonalinformationweresenttoInterpolinParisand disseminatedworldwide.Hisofficereceivedinreplyalotoffeedbackfrom alotofcountries.Mostoftheresponseswerenegative,inthesensethat theapplicantwasunknowntothem.Hehoweverreceivedaconfirmation fromLibyathattheapplicantwaswantedforthe theft ofgold. Interpol SouthAfricaalsoobtainedhiscorrectname,detailsandpassportnumber from Kuwait, who also confirmed that he was an engineer. The theft chargerelatedtothetheftofgoldfromafactorysome800kilometresfrom the applicants normal place of residence in 1985. Mendes sought clarificationandestablishedthatthedeathpenaltywouldnotapplytosuch acrimeinLibyaandthattheapplicantfacedasentenceofnomorethan7 yearsimprisonment. Mendesconfirmedthathisofficewasawaitingthe Presidents decision on extradition and that it was not his duty to go behind the warrant or to consider its veracity. His responsibility was confined to ensuring the warrant complied with formal procedures and thereforehehadnotfullyinvestigatedtheallegationsinthewarrant.

53.

Mendeswasquestionedbycounselabouttheissueofasocalledred notice. Thelineofquestioningstartedwithcounselinquiringwhethera rednoticehadinfactbeenissued.FromMendesanswersitisclearthat adistinctionisdrawnbetweenadiffusionandarednotice.Thepurpose of a diffusion is to identify a fugitive. When the second respondent requestedMendestoclarifythenotionofarednotice,herespondedas follows:
Arednoticeisissuedbyacountrywhereapersoniswantedforacrimecommitted,

28
notbyus.LibyainthismatterhadtoissuetheRedNotice.Thefactthathewasnot circulateddoesnotmeanthathewasnotwanted. Somearenotcirculated,and someareforme,ifitisnotaseriouscrime,IwillnotsendadiffusionifIknow aroundwhichtheareathepersonmaybe(sic).Therednoticewouldinthismatter beissuedbyLibyatoheadofficeinFrance.AndFrancewouldpermitthenoticeto besentaroundtoallcountries.

54.

Therearetwofacetstothisevidence. Inthefirstplaceitclarifiesthe distinctionbetweenadiffusionandarednotice.Theformerisissuedby theintelligenceorlawenforcementauthoritiesofthejurisdictionwherea fugitiveorasylumseekerisheldinordertogarnerinformationabouthim. Arednoticeisissuedbythecountryseekingafugitivefromjustice,either bythelocalintelligenceorlawenforcementagency,andisthensentto InterpolinPariswhoauthorizesitscirculationthroughouttheworld.The secondfacetisthatMendeswasclearlyundertheimpressionthatLibya had not in fact circulated a red notice in respect of the applicant, as appearsfromhisassertionthatthefactthatonehadnotbeencirculated didnotmeantheapplicantwasnotwanted. Asheindicated,hewould normallynotsendone,oradiffusionforthatmatter,incaseswherethe crimewasnotserious.

55.

Averments made in the answering affidavit by the second respondent revealthathemisunderstoodtheevidenceofMendesonthisaspect.His understandingwasthatLibyahadinfactissuedarednoticeandsentitto InterpolinParisandthatit(ratherthanjustadiffusion)hadbeensent aroundtheworld.Althoughthereisnoexplicitreferencetoarednoticein the written decision of the second respondent, his averment in the affidavit, the general tenor of the reasoning in his judgment and his ultimateconclusionstronglysuggestthathismistakenassumptionwasa consideration or factor influencing his decision that the applicant was

29 excluded from refugee status on account of criminal conduct. The applicantsinterpretationoftheevidence(withwhichIagree)isthatLibya hadnotinfactissuedarednotice.Hereliesonthis,andsuchwasputto Mendes,tocontendthatthefailureofLibyatohaveissuedarednotice between1985and2003isindicativeofthefactthatthechargeswere trumpedupinresponsetothediffusionandadeliberateattempttothwart theasylumproceedings.

56.

Therearecontradictorystatementsonrecordaboutwhetherthecriminal chargerelatedtotheftorrobbery,thelatterbeingmoreseriousonaccount oftheelementofviolence. Theseriousnessofanoffenceisacriterion applicable to the exclusion from refugee status. The request for extradition,inaNoteVerbaleissuedbythePeoplesBureauofTheGreat Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the South African DepartmentofForeignAffairs,statesthattheapplicantis:
aLibyannationalwhoiswantedbythejudicialauthoritiesinLibyaintermsofcase (sic)pendingagainsthimbeforetheLibyancourtspursuanttoArticle2and3ofthe LibyanCriminalCodeNo446444fortheftofaquantityofgold.

The Note Verbale is dated 11 February 2004. The warrant of arrest issued by the senior magistrate in terms of section 5(1)(b) of the ExtraditionAct67of1962on3February2004,presumablyonthebasisof an informal request, states that the magistrate was in receipt of informationthattheapplicantwaswantedfortheoffenceoftheftofgold. Mendesthroughouthistestimonyalsoreferredonlytoachargeoftheft. And the second respondent in his decision held there was reason to believetheapplicantwasguiltyoftheft.Accordingly,thereferencetothe crimeofrobberyinthedecisionoftheRSDO,andinotherdocuments alluded to in argument before me, are insufficient to conclude that the

30 Libyanauthoritiesarepursuingtheapplicantonachargeofrobbery.

57.

Afterhearingargumenton2November2005theproceedingsoftheRAB wereadjourned. TheRABhandeddownitsdecisionon12December 2005. As mentioned, the majority (Mr. Damstra, Mr. Mohale and Ms Morobe) concurred in the decision of Mr. Damstra, the second respondent,withAdvHassimdissentinginaseparatewrittendecision.

58.

ThemajorityconfirmedthedecisionoftheRSDOrejectingtheapplication forasylumonthegroundsthattheapplicantdidnotqualifyforrefugee status in terms of section 4(1)(b) of the Act. It found also, in the alternative, that the applicant was not a credible witness and that his evidenceoughtnottobeaccepted.Theimplicationsofthislatterfinding were notenlarged upon bythe majority,butreading the decision as a wholeitseemstheywereoftheopinionthathislackofcredibilitymeant hehadfailedtoestablishonabalanceofprobabilitiesthathehadawell foundedfearofbeingpersecutedbyreasonofhisreligion,politicalopinion or membership of a particular social group should he be compelled to returntoLibya.

59. Thedissentingminorityopiniontookadifferenttack.AdvHassim disagreedwiththemajoritysfindingoncredibility.Whilehewasconstrainedto acceptthattheapplicanthadlied,committedfraudanduseddeceptionto acquirevisas,passportsandthelike,overaperiodofalmost20years(themain basisforthemajorityimpugningtheapplicantscredibility)hewasnotinclinedto rejecttheapplicantsversiononthataccountalone.Firstly,hefelttheevidence relatingtotheapplicantstraveldocumentswasnotamaterialaspectofhisclaim andthusaninsufficientbasistorejecthisversionofhislifeandhisfearof persecution.Nor,hefelt,wastheapplicantgivenaproperopportunitybythe majorityoftheRABtodealwithanyadverseinferencestheysoughttodrawfrom hispastdeceptions.Ashesawit,theapplicantslying,briberyandfraudwere doneforpoliticalreasonsandwerethemeansofhissurvival.Heaccordingly foundthattheapplicantwascredibleinrelationtoallcoreissuesrelatingtohis claim.Withthat,hereviewedtheevidenceoftheapplicantslife,hisactivities

31

beforeandafterleavingLibya,andconcludedthattherewasareasonable likelihoodthattheapplicanthadfledLibyainanattempttoavoidbeing persecutedforhispoliticalopinion.Healsofound,forreasonsuponwhichIwill expandlater,thatthechargeoftheftwastrumpedup,andtakentogetherwith theinformationontheLibjustwebsitesuchindicated,inhisestimation,thatthe Libyanauthoritieswouldactagainsttheapplicantwereheforcedtoreturnto Libya.ThereportsofAmnestyInternational,hefelt,providedoverwhelming evidencethatpoliticaldissidentsfacepersecutioninLibyaandinviewofthat therewasarealriskoftheappellantfacingthesameifheweretobereturnedto Libya. 60. I will come back to other relevant aspects of the two opinions when I discussthespecificreviewgrounds.Beforedoingthat,itisnecessaryfirst tosetoutmorefullytherelevantlegalprovisionsgoverningthestatusand rightsofrefugeesinourlaw,whichIparaphrasedearlierinthisjudgment. TheywereofobviousimportancetothedecisionsoftheRSDOandthe RAB,andinthefinalanalysiswillbedispositiveofthisapplication.

Thelegalpositioninrelationtorefugees 61. On 6 September 1993 the South African government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) concluded an agreementinrelationtothepolicyregardingasylumseekersandrefugees inSouthAfrica. Afterthat,in1996,SouthAfricaaccededtotheUnited NationsConventionRelatingtotheStatusofRefugeesof1951andits 1967 Protocol. In the same year, South Africa became party to the OrganisationofAfricanUnityConventionGoverningtheSpecificAspects of Refugee Protection of 1969. In order to give effect to these newly acquiredinternationalobligations,ParliamentenactedtheRefugeesAct 130of1998. TheActprovidesanewregimeandseekstoreflectthe principlescontainedinthevariousinternationalinstruments.Thetreaties havethusbeenincorporatedintodomesticlaw.

32

62. ThekeyprovisionsoftheActforthepurposeofthepresentmatterare sections2,3and4,towhichIhavealreadyreferred.Theyreadasfollows: 2. Generalprohibitionofrefusalofentry,expulsion,extraditionorreturnto

othercountryincertaincircumstances.Notwithstandinganyprovisionofthis Actoranyotherlawtothecontrary,nopersonmayberefusedentryintothe Republic,expelled,extraditedorreturnedtoanyothercountryorbesubjectto anysimilarmeasure,ifasaresultofsuchrefusal,expulsion,extradition,returnor other measure, such person is compelled to return to or remain in a country where (a) heorshemaybesubjectedtopersecutiononaccountofhisor herrace,religion,nationality,politicalopinionormembershipofa particularsocialgroup:or (b) hisorherlife,physicalsafetyorfreedomwouldbethreatenedonaccountofexternal aggression,occupation,foreigndominationorothereventsseriouslydisturbingordisrupting publicorderineitherpartorthewholeofthatcountry. 3. Refugeestatus.SubjecttoChapter3,apersonqualifiesforrefugeestatusfor thepurposesofthisActifthatperson (a) owingtoawellfoundedfearofbeingpersecutedbyreasonof his or her race, tribe, religion, nationality, political opinion or membershipofaparticularsocialgroup,isoutsidethecountryof hisorhernationalityandisunableorunwillingtoavailhimselfor herself of the protection of that country, or, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his or her former habitualresidenceisunableor,owingtosuchfear,unwillingto returntoit;or (b) owingtoexternalaggression,occupation,foreigndominationoreventsseriously disturbingordisruptingpublicorderineitherapartorthewholeofhisorhercountryoforiginor nationality,iscompelledtoleavehisorherplaceofhabitualresidenceinordertoseekrefuge elsewhere;or (c) isadependantofapersoncontemplatedinparagraph(a)or(b). 4. Exclusionfromrefugeestatus.(1)Apersondoesnotqualifyforrefugeestatus forthepurposesofthisActifthereisreasontobelievethatheorshe (a) hascommittedacrimeagainstpeace,awarcrimeoracrime

33
againsthumanity,asdefinedinanyinternationallegalinstrument dealingwithanysuchcrimes;or (b) has committed a crime which is not of a political nature and which, if committed in the Republic, would be punishable by imprisonment;or (c) hasbeenguiltyofactscontrarytotheobjectsandprinciplesof theUnitedNationsOrganisationortheOrganisationofAfrican Unity;or

(d)

enjoystheprotectionofanyothercountryinwhichheorshehastakenresidence.

63.

Section3istheoperativeprovisionindeterminingrefugeestatus.Itmust be read together with section 2 which entrenches the international law obligation of nonrefoulement. Section 6 provides that the Act must be interpreted and applied with due regard to the two Conventions, the Protocol, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and any other relevantconventionorinternationalagreementtowhichtheRepublicisor becomesaparty.

64.

InourconstitutionaldispensationtheBillofRightsisapplicableequallyto foreigners(andhenceasylumseekers)asitistocitizens.InMinisterof Home Affairs and others v Watchenuka and Another 2004 (4) SA 326 (SCA)atpara[25],theSupremeCourtofAppealheld:
Humandignityhasnonationality. Itisinherentinallpeoplecitizensandnon citizensalikesimplybecausetheyarehuman.Andwhilethatpersonhappenstobe inthiscountryforwhateverreasonitmustberespected,andisprotected,by section10oftheBillofRights.

65.

Intermsofsection8(1)oftheConstitutionthedutiesimposedbytheBillof RightsarebindingontheRSDOandtheRAB,bothbeingorgansofstate exercisingpublicpowerandperformingapublicfunction. Bythesame token,theirdecisionsareadministrativeactionasdefinedinsection1(i)of

34 PAJA.Likewise,totheextentthattheyareobligedtointerpretlegislation andtheBillofRightstheymustpromotethespirit,purportandobjectsof theBillofRightsandconsiderinternationallaw,intermsofsection39of theConstitution.

Thegroundsofreview 66. The applicant grounds his various causes of action on the relevant provisions of section 6 of PAJA, which for all intents and purposes concretelyembodiestheconstitutionalrighttojustadministrativeaction, andcodifiesandsupplantsthecommonlawgroundsforjudicialreview BatoStarFishing(Pty)LtdvMinisterofEnvironmentalAffairs2004(4)SA 490(CC)para[25]. 67. Inparagraph19ofhisfoundingaffidavittheapplicantsubmittedthatthe decisionoftheRABtorejecthisappealshouldbesetasidebecause:
19.1.1 Iwasnotaffordedafairhearingonthematter; 19.1.2 theAppealBoardwasnotproperlyconstitutedanditwasnotauthorized tohearmyappeal; 19.1.3 thedecisionwasmateriallyinfluencedbyerrorsoflaw; 19.1.4 thedecisionwasnotrationallyconnectedtotheinformationbeforethe decisionmaker; 19.1.5 thedecisionwastakenbecauseirrelevantconsiderationsweretakeninto accountandrelevantfactorswerenotconsidered; 19.1.6 the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable decisionmaker couldhavecometothesamedecision;and

35

19.1.7 thedecisionwasunconstitutionalandunlawful. 19.1.8 thedecisionmakershowedbiasandprejudicetowardsme.

68.

Hemadesimilargeneralsubmissionswithregardtothedecisionofthe RSDO, except there is no allegation that the RSDO was not properly constituted.

69.

Mr. Arendse, who appeared for the respondents, seized upon the generalityofthegroundsandsubmittedthatinsufficientfactualandlegal basisfortheattackhadbeenmadeoutinthepapers.Reliefcanonlybe grantedinanapplicationwheretheordersoughtisclearlyindicatedinthe foundingandotheraffidavitsandisestablishedbysatisfactoryevidencein thepapers. Thebasisforreliefmustbefullycanvassedandtheparty againstwhomsuchreliefistobegrantedmustbefullyapprisedthatrelief inaparticularformisbeingsoughtandbegiventhefullestopportunityof dealingwiththeclaim LuwalalaandothersvPortNollothMunicipality 1991 (3) SA 98 (C) at 112DF. Similarly, it is well established that applicantsareobligedtomakeouttheircaseinthefoundingaffidavitand theprevailingpracticeistostrikeoutmattersinreplyingaffidavitswhich shouldhaveappearedinfoundingaffidavitsTittysBarandBottleStorev A.B.C.Garageandothers1974(4)SA362(T)at368H.

70.

AtfirstglancethereissomemeritinMr.Arendsessubmission,especially insofarasitconcernstheattackuponthedecisionoftheRSDO.Beyond theallegationthattheRSDOactedunderthedictationofInterpolofficials, fewotherfactsareallegedoravermentsmadeinthesupportingaffidavit regardingtheotherreviewgroundsofallegedunfairness,irrationalityand unreasonableness. The point loses some of its force, however, when

36 regardishadtothesupplementaryaffidavitfiledintermsofrule53(4), whichaddedtothesupportingaffidavitoncetherule53recordhadbeen filed.Theretheapplicantmademuchofthefactthattherecorddelivered wasinadequateforthereasonthatitcomprisedonesetofdocuments, and not two. The applicant accordingly maintained that the failure or inability of the first and fifth respondents to file separate and distinct recordswasclearevidenceoftheirfailuretoapplytheirmindsproperly.If thedecisionmakerswerenotabletoidentifywhatdocumentationserved before them and which documents (such as the Amnesty International reports)weretakenintoaccountwhenmakingthedecisionimpugned,that inandofitself,heargued,wouldbeareasontosetasidethedecisions. The allegation is made that the RSDO failed to take into account the documentationandthusfailedtoapplyhermindtotheapplicationand ignoredrelevantinformation.Becausethefifthrespondentdidnotfilean answeringaffidavitshehasnotdeniedtheseallegations.Theunanswered allegationsofactingunderdictationandafailuretoproperlyconsiderthe application therefore do indeed establish sufficient basis for the relief sought on the grounds that the RSDO violated the applicants constitutionalandstatutoryrightstoreasonable,rationalandprocedurally fairadministrativeaction.(Itwasintimatedinargumentthatthedenialsof thesecondrespondentmightbeextendedtothefifthrespondent.That cannotbeso.Onepersoncannotmakeanaffidavitonbehalfofanother. Thesecondrespondentcanonlydeposetomattersinhisownknowledge GerhardtvStatePresidentandothers1989(2)SA499(T)at504G).

71.

Iamsimilarly,ifnotmore,persuadedthataproperfactualbasiswaslaid in the supporting affidavit and the supplementary affidavit for the relief soughtinrelationtotheRABdecision.Beyondthegeneralgrounds,the applicant averred that the two bases of the impugned decision were

37 vitiatedeitherbyproceduralunfairness,materialerrorsoflawandfactand afailureoftheRABtoapplyitsmindtotherelevantconsiderationsinthe documentationprovidedtoit,particularlythatrelatingtothehumanrights situationinLibya.Inparagraphs172and173ofthesupportingaffidavit the applicant complained firstly that his credibility was rejected in circumstanceswherehewasnotcrossexaminedandnoevidence,which hewasapprisedof,wasledsuggestingthathisversionofeventswas false,andsecondlythatthefindingbythemajoritythathedidnotqualify forrefugeestatusbecauseofsection4(1)(b)oftheActwaswronginlaw andfact.Hisexpressedapprovaloftheminoritydecisionamountstoan alignmentwiththefactualfindingsofAdvHassimthatthechargeswere trumpedup and were not enough to exclude him from refugee status. Addedtothatthereareseveralotherstatementsinterspersedthroughout both affidavits alleging variously bias, irrationality and a failure of discretion. There can be little question that the first and second respondentswerefullyapprisedthatreliefinaparticularformwasbeing sought and that they had the fullest opportunity to deal with it in their answeringaffidavit. Moreover,asIhavealreadyintimated,wherenew materialwasintroducedinreply,therespondentscouldhavereliedupon theprincipleenunciatedin SigabavMinisterofDefenceandPoliceand another (supra) to seek leave to file additional affidavits in the sure likelihoodthatsuchleavewouldhavebeengranted. ThehumanrightssituationinLibya

72.

Inthesupplementaryaffidavittheapplicantplacedmuchemphasisonthe fact that he furnished the RAB, among other documentation, with the AmnestyInternationalCountryConditionReportsinsupportofhisbelief thathewillsufferpersecutiononaccountofhispoliticalopinionifforcedto

38 returntoLibya.Referringtotheabsenceofanynoteworthydiscussionof thismaterialinthemajoritydecision,anditsexclusionfromtherule53 record,heunderlinedthatthisrelevantinformationwasforthemostpart ignoredbythefirstandfifthrespondents.Hisassertionisnotdeniedby either the RAB or the RSDO. It must therefore be held that such information was in fact ignored. The fuller implications of that for the reviewabilityofthedecision,ifnotimmediatelyselfevident,willbecome clearlater.Iturnnowthoughtoconsiderthecontentofthatinformation.

73.

Serendipitously,thesameevidencewasplacedbeforetheSIACearlier thisyearinDDandASvTheSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment (supra).Asinthepresentcasethecommissionhadtodecidewhetherthe two appellants,bothLibyans,could lawfullybe returned toLibya. The appellants argued that, due to their political views, they held a well foundedfearofbeingpersecutediftheywerereturned. Despitefinding thatbothappellantswereextremistswithlinkstoAlQaeda,supportiveof terrorist violence and a threat to UK national security, and thus not protectedbytherefugeeconventions,theSIACrefusedtosanctiontheir returntoLibyaonthegroundsthattodosowouldinvolveabreachofthe UKs obligations under the European Convention for Human Rights, in particular the provisions prescribing detention, torture and unfair trials. Thejudgmentincludesadetailed,analyticalandobjectivesynthesisofthe generalhumanrightssituationprevailinginLibyaatthepresenttime.Itis drawn from and paraphrases a variety of authoritative and reputable sources,includingtheCountryConditionReportsofAmnestyInternational andtheUSStateDepartmentwhichwerefurnishedtotheRABinthis matter.

74.

Itisunnecessarytoregurgitatethefullanalysisandconclusionsofthe

39 SIAC.Thejudgmentisofpublicrecord.Itispermissibletorefertoitand takecognizanceofitsfindingsinaccordancewiththeprinciplestatedin KaundaandothersvPresidentoftheRepublicofSouthAfricaandothers (supra).Referencewillbemadetothepertinentconclusionsofrelevance to this case. That most of the background material on Libya is not controversialisreflectedinanOperationalGuidanceNoteissuedbythe UKHomeOfficeinOctober2006forusebyitsdecisionmakers.Itiscited inparagraph137ofthejudgmentandstates:
Thefollowinghumanrightsproblemswerereportedin2005:inabilityofcitizensto changethegovernment;torture,poorprisonconditions;impunity;arbitraryarrestand incommunicado detention; lengthy political detention; denial of fair public trial; infringementofprivacyrights,severerestrictionofcivillibertiesfreedomofspeech, press,assemblyandassociation;restrictionoffreedomofreligion;corruptionand lack of government transparency; societal discrimination against women, ethnic minorities,andforeignworkers;traffickinginpersonsandrestrictionoflabourrights.

TheGuidanceNoteconcludes:
TheLibyangovernmentcontinuestoberepressiveofanydissentandopposition. Islamicactivitiesaregenerallynotallowedtooperateonanysubstantialscalewithin the country. If it is accepted that the claimant has in the past been involved in oppositionpoliticalactivityorisaradicalIslamicactivistforoneoftheopposition political or Islamic groups mentioned above then there is a real risk they will encounterstatesponsoredilltreatmentamountingtopersecutionwithinthetermsof the1951Convention. Thegrantofasyluminsuchcasesisthereforelikelytobe appropriate.

75.

TheSIACheldthatthesestatementscansafelybeassumedtoreflectthe UKGovernmentsviewsofthestateofaffairsinLibya.

76.

TheUSStateDepartmentReportfor2005recordsthatalthoughLibyan

40 lawprohibitstorture,securitypersonnelroutinelytorturedprisonersduring interrogationsoraspunishment.Thereportedmethodsoftortureinclude chainingtoawallforhours,clubbing,electricshock,breakingfingersand allowingthejointsto healwithoutmedicalcare,suffocatingwithplastic bags,deprivationoffoodandwater,hangingbythewrists,suspension fromapole,cigaretteburns,threatsofdogattacks,andbeatingsonthe solesofthefeet.

77.

Withregardtotherightstofairtrialanddetention,theSIACreferredtoa textofProfessorMansourElKikhiadescribingthePeoplesCourtasa distinctivelyunjustfeatureofthecriminaljusticesystem. Introducedin 1988, (the year the applicant fled Libya), it was separate from the mainstreamjudiciary.Itwastotallyunaccountable,hearingswereheldin private,oftenintheabsenceofdefendants,withnorighttoalawyeror notification of the charge. It is notorious for its politically motivated judgmentsandbiasedtrials.Notwithstandingitsformalabolitionin2005, HumanRightsWatchhasreportedthatanadhocrevolutionarycourtwas usedrecentlyintheretrialof85MuslimBrotherhoodmembers.

78.

Onefeatureoftrialrelatedpracticeisincommunicadodetention. Many politicaldetainees,includingIslamists,weresoheldforunlimitedperiods andofteninunknownplaces,mainlyinAbuSalimprison(SIACjudgment para152).Itwillberecalledthattheapplicantsundisputedtestimonyis thathisfriendandmentor,KhalidHingari,waskilledinAbuSalimprison. AccordingtotheSIAC,AbuSalimislocatedinacompoundoftheMilitary Police in a suburb ofTripoli and has an unusual status among Libyan prisons:itisrunbytheInternalSecurityOrganisationandnottheMinistry ofJustice. InpracticeitoperatesindependentlyandreportstoColonel Qadhafi.In April2004,ColonelQadhafi acknowledged thatkillingshad

41 takenplaceatAbuSalim.Theapplicantclaims800werekilled.Others haveputthefigureat1200.Thereisevidencethatriotsbrokeoutatthe prisoninOctober2006aswell.Inthatinstancetheauthoritiesweremore restrainedwithonlyoneprisonerbeingkilled,butwithmanyothersbeing injuredmostlyfrombulletwounds.

79. The following conclusions of the SIAC (paras 301305) are relevant to assessingthecurrenthumanrightssituationinLibya:

Torture is extensively used against political opponents among whom IslamistextremistsandLIFGmembersarethemosthatedbytheLibyan Government, the Security Organisations and above all by Colonel Qadhafi.Itispracticedforthepurposesofobtainingconfessionsforuse in trials against the confessor or other defendants; it is used in intelligence gathering. There is also evidence that it is used for punishment.

Thejudicialsystemisclearlymarkedbyalackofjudicialindependence stemmingbothfromthepracticeandacceptanceofpoliticalinterference andhostileattitudestowardsthegovernmentspoliticalopponents.

The system of government is designed to procure the survival of the currentgovernment, and it doesso byrepressing the expression and organisationofdissentinavarietyofways,whetherthatdissentisthatof asecularnonviolentopponentorthatoftheviolentIslamist.

ThereviewabilityoftheRSDOdecision

42

80. IturnnowtoconsiderthereviewabilityofthedecisionoftheRSDO.Inthe answeringaffidavittheRABcontendedthatitisonlythedecisionoftheRAB whichfallstobereviewed.TheRABholdsthestandpointthattheappealto theRABintermsofsection26oftheActconstitutesahearingdenovoand on that account the applicant should be precluded from reviewing the decisionoftheRSDO. Theviewisnotentirelyaccurate.Itisobviousthat the appeal to the RAB is an appeal in the wide sense, seeing as the provisionsofsection26(3)permittheRABbeforereachingitsdecisionto inviterepresentationsfromtheUNHCRandtocallforadditionalevidence fromothersources.ThattheRABisanappellatebody,asopposedtoa body of original jurisdiction, is also beyond doubt, if only by virtue of its designation and its powers in section 26(2) to confirm, set aside or substitute such customarily being appeal powers. But these characteristicsaloneshouldnotoperatetojustifyadenialofnaturaljustice bythetrialbody.AsMegarryJputitinLearyvNationalUnionofVehicle Builders[1970]2AllER713(Ch)at720:
Ifamanhasneverhadafairtrialbytheappropriatetrialbody,isitopentoan appellatebodytodiscarditsappellatefunctionsanditselfgivethemanthefairtrial thathehasneverhad?Iverymuchdoubttheexistenceofanysuchdoctrine.

The principle in Leary was considered to have been stated too categoricallybyNicholasAJA(ashethenwas)in SlagmentvBuilding, ConstructionandAlliedWorkersUnion 1995(1)SA742(A)at756IJ whereheheldinessencethatnogeneralrulecanbelaiddowninthis regard. Much depends on the context: the nature of the adjudicative processandtheextentofirregularity.AsBothaJputitinvanGarderen N.OvTheRefugeeAppealBoard(unreporteddecision30720/2006of19 June2007).

43

IrregularitiescommittedbytheRSDOarerelevanttotheextentthattheyhave
notbeenovertakenbyorcuredintheproceedingsbeforetheRAB.

81.

TheundisputedevidenceisthatInterpolbroughtpressuretobearonthe RSDO to render a negative decision in respect of the applicants applicationforasylum.On26March2004theapplicantwastakenbytwo officersfromInterpoltotheRSDOwhotoldhimonarrivalthatshehada decisionreadyforhimandthatInterpolhadinsistedthatshepreparea negative decision. None of this has been denied by the respondents. Section6(2)(a)(iii)ofPAJAprovidesthatacourthasthepowertojudicially reviewanadministrativeactioniftheadministratorwhotookitwasbiased orreasonablysuspectedofbias.Theevidenceindicatesthattheapplicant was justified in reasonably apprehending that the negative decision renderedbytheRSDOwastheresultofexternalinfluence,thatshetook thedecisionactingunderdictationandtherebywhollycompromisedher impartialityandindependence,eventhoughsheaffordedtheapplicanta furtheropportunitytomakerepresentations. Adefectofthiskindwholly vitiatesthedecisionandisnotaproceduralirregularityofthekindthatcan be cured on appeal. It is a total failure of the proper exercise of an independentandimpartialdiscretion. Onthatgroundalonethedecision oftheRSDOmustbesetaside.Notonlyisthedecisiontaintedbybiasit is also reviewable under section 6(2)(e)(iv) of PAJA on account of the decisionhavingbeentakenbecauseofthe unauthorised orunwarranted dictatesofanotherperson.

82.

Althoughtheapplicantinhisfoundingpaperschallengedthedecisionof theRSDOonthegroundsthatirrelevantconsiderationsweretakeninto account and relevant considerations not considered, the point was not

44 pressed inargument. The fact that he mightor should havesought or obtainedrefugeestatusinPakistanisnotrelevanttotheinquirymandated bysection3oftheAct.OnreceiptoftheapplicationforasylumtheRSDO wasobligedtoconductaninvestigationintowhethertheapplicanthada wellfounded fear of persecution in Libya and because of that fear is outsideofLibyaandisunableorunwillingtoavailhimselfoftheprotection ofLibya,thecountryofhisnationality. Similarlythatsheregardedhis involvement to be limited to a simple engagement and involvement in studentpoliticalactivityforwhichthedeathpenaltydidnotapply,means thatshegavenotmuchconsiderationtohisassociationwiththeMuslim BrotherhoodwhilehewasinLibyaortohisactivitiesandassociationsin Pakistan,AfghanistanandIranbetween1988and2001,andparticularly hisflightfromPakistanafter9/11.

83.

By focusing her attention in a limited way upon the credibility of the applicantsreasonsforleavingPakistan,theRSDOappearsnottohave givenconsiderationtoanyriskoftorture,detentionoranunfairtrialthat the applicant might face in Libya. The applicants submission in the supplementaryaffidavitthatsheignoredthedocumentationhandedtoher insupportofthatcontentionhasnotbeendenied. Theabsenceofany specificreferencetotheCountryConditionReportsinherwrittendecision lendscredencetotheinferencethatshepaidthemlittleheed.Finally,her questionabledeclaration thatthe applicantsdeportation fromIndonesia wasillegalwouldseemalsotobeanirrelevantconsideration,albeitthat theextentofitsinfluenceuponherisuncertain. Allthesefactorstaken together leave little doubt that her decision was fatally vitiated by irregularityandmustbesetaside.

ThereviewabilityofthedecisionoftheRAB

45

84.

TheapplicantcontendsthatthedecisionoftheRABwassimilarlyflawed bybiasandproceduralirregularity.Theallegationofbiashastwolegs.It isnotindisputethatonthemorningofthesecondhearingthesecond respondentmetseparatelywithInterpolofficials.Thesecondrespondent iscorrectthat,intermsofsection26(3)(c)and(d),theRABhastheright torequesttheattendanceofanypersonabletoprovideitwithrelevant information and of its own accord may make further inquiry or investigation.AsIhavesaid,thefailurebythesecondrespondenttoseek leavetofileadditionalaffidavitsinresponsetotheversionputupbythe applicantsattorneysleavemepersuadedthatthemeetingwithInterpol endured for about 20 minutes and went beyond introductions and an exchange of courtesies. Still, there is no conclusive evidence that the secondrespondentactedunderdictation.Northathewasputonguard byanycomplaintthattheRSDOhadactedunderdictation. Wherethe secondrespondenterred,however,isthatwhenheconvenedthehearing he failed to place on record the content of his prior discussions with Interpol and did not afford the applicants legal representatives an opportunitytoraiseanyissuesinthatregard.Hisconductandomissions donotjustifyafindingthathewasactuallybiasedinthesensethathe approachedtheissueswithamindwhichwasinfactprejudicedornot opentoconviction. Regretfullythough,theshortcomingsinhisconduct gave rise to a reasonable perception of bias that might have been overcomehadheexplainedtotheapplicantthepowersoftheRABunder section26(3)anddisclosedthecontentoftheseparatediscussionsand hispurposeinholdingthem. Theeventsofthemorningofthesecond hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension that some of the membersoftheRABmightnotbringanimpartialmindtobearonthe adjudication of the case, especially when the applicant and his legal

46 representativeswerefurtherawarethatthesecondrespondenthadbeen engagedintelephonicdiscussionswithMendespriortothehearing,the contentofwhichhadnotbeendisclosedtothem.

85.

Theperceptionofbiasisstrengthenedtosomedegreebythestrenuous oppositionputupbythefirstandsecondrespondentstothisapplication. TheRABisanadjudicativetribunal.Allitsmembersaremembersofthe InternationalAssociationofRefugeeLawJudges.Theyareadministrators taskedwithquasijudicialfunctions.

86. Rule7oftheRulesoftheRefugeeAppealBoard(enactedintermsof section14(2)oftheActandpromulgatedinGG25470of26September2003) providesthatinanyappealbeforeittheappellantandtheDepartmentofHome Affairsarethepartiestotheappeal.TheMinisterandDirectorGeneralofHome Affairswerecitedandservedasthethirdandfourthrespondentsinthisreview application,butfromtherecordIamunabletoascertainanyinvolvementofthe DepartmentofHomeAffairsintheappealbeforetheRAB.Thestateattorney deliveredanoticeofintentiontoopposeonbehalfofalltherespondents, includingtheMinisterandtheDirectorGeneral.However,onlythesecond respondentdeposedtoanansweringaffidavitanddidsoexplicitlyonbehalfof theRABandhimself.Inparagraph3oftheaffidavithemakesthefollowing rathercuriousstatement:
IdeposeheretoonlyonbehalfoftheFirstandSecondRespondent.Iamadvised thattheThirdandFourthRespondentsopposethisapplicationonthebasisthatthey arejointlyresponsibleforinstitutionsandprocessesestablishedundertheAct.Iam advisedthattheThirdandFourthRespondentsaredutyboundtoprotecttheintegrity oftheFirstRespondent.

Whateverthebeneficialaspectsofthestructuralrelationshipbetweenthe RABandtheDepartmentofHomeAffairs,thereismorethanoneproblem with this approach. Firstly, section 12(3) of the Act provides that the AppealBoardmustfunctionwithoutbiasandmustbeindependent. Not onlymustitbeimpartialinitsdecisionmaking,itmustalsobestructurally

47 independent.Secondly,onceagain,thesecondrespondentcannotmake anaffidavitonbehalfoftheMinisterortheDirectorGeneral.They,nothe, arerequiredtosetforththebasisoftheiroppositiontotheapplication Gerhardt v State President and others (supra). Thirdly, and most importantly for the purposes of the present discussion, the strenuous oppositionconductedbytheRAB,theadjudicativefunctionary,onbehalf of one of the parties to the appeal before it, the Department of Home Affairs, the successful party, compromises its independence and adds forcetotheapplicantslegitimateorreasonableapprehensionofbias.

87.

In Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Province and Others 1999 (1) SA 324 (CKH) at 353F 353I Pickard JP made the following comments, with which I respectfully agree, in relation to oppositionputupbyatenderboard:
The perception of bias may quite possibly be enhanced byanother factor which appeared to the Court to be somewhat unusual. Unlike what normally occurs in review matters of this nature, the tribunal (the Board) has in this case offered extremelystrenuousoppositiontothereviewproceedings. Ihavegreatdifficultyin understandingwhy. ItisalmoststandardpracticethatanindependenttribunalsuchastheTenderBoard wouldinreviewproceedingscomplywiththerequirementsofRule53oftheUniform RulesofCourtbymakingavailabletherecordofitsproceedingsanditsreasonsand suchotherdocumentationastheCourtmayneedtoadjudicateuponthematterand, if necessary, to file an affidavit setting out the circumstances under which the decision was arrived at. It seems, however, unusual to me that an independent tribunal such as the Tender Board should file such comprehensive and lengthy papersandoffersuchstringentoppositionbyemployingseniorcounselandthelike toarguetheircase. Moreoftenthannotindependenttribunals,havingdonetheir duty in terms of the provisions of Rule 53, take the attitude that they abide the decisionoftheCourtandleavetheothermatterstotheinterestedpartiestodispute

48
beforetheCourtRegrettablythisattitudeoftheBoardinthiscasemaywellbe tosomeextentsupportforasuggestionthattheyarenotentirelyindependentand disinterested.

88.

TakingthesefactsandcircumstancestogetherIampersuadedthatthe applicanthasmadeoutmorethana primafacie casethattheRABwas reasonablysuspectedofbiaswithinthemeaningofsection6(2)(a)(iii)of PAJA. TheRABsassertionsoffairnessandtheabsenceofactualbias failtoaddresssatisfactorilythereasonableapprehensionofbiasonthe partoftheapplicant. On thatgroundaloneitsdecisionfallstobeset asideundersection8ofPAJA.

89.

TheapplicanthaschallengedthedecisionoftheRABonotherprocedural grounds, most important among them being one relating to the finding regardingtheapplicantscredibility,theproceduraldimensionoftheissue being the failure by the RAB to raise its concerns or assumptions in respectofcredibilityduringthehearinginordertogivetheapplicantan opportunity to deal with it. I will discuss this aspect together with the substantiveissuelater. Atthisstageitmaybesaidthatanyprocedural defect of this kind invariably will colour the quality of the substantive decision.

90.

TheapplicanthastrenchantlycriticisedtheRABsmisinterpretationofthe nature of its functions as an appellate body. As already explained, becauseoftheRABspowerstogatheradditionalevidence,theintention ofthelegislaturewastoconferupontheRABanappellatejurisdictionin thewidesense,meaningthatitisnotboundtopronounceuponthemerits withinthefourcornersoftherecordoftheRSDO.Anordinaryappealis one where the appellate body is confined to the record of the body appealedagainst.Awideappealisoneinwhichtheappellatebodymay

49 makeitsownenquiriesandevengatheritsownevidenceifnecessary TiklyvJohannesNO1963(2)SA588(T)at592AE.Inbothkindsof appealtheprimaryfunctionisoneofreconsiderationofthemeritsofthe decisioninordertodeterminewhetheritwasrightorwrong,orperhaps vitiatedbyan irregularityto theextentthatthere hasbeenafailureof justice.Wheretheappellatebodyisplacedinexactlythesameposition astheoriginaldecisionmakeritwillbeabletocorrectlesserirregularities andwillenjoyapowerofrehearingdenovo:

91.

In paragraph 12.3 of his answering affidavit, the second respondent stated: ThehearingofanappealbytheBoardisinthenatureofa denovohearing.In
otherwords,thedecisionoftheRSDOisnotthesubjectofthehearingatall.Forall intentsandpurposes,whateverhappenedbeforetheRSDOisignored.Noneofthe evidence and/or informationplacedbeforetheRSDO isplacedbefore theBoard, unlessthereisagreementwithappellantslegalrepresentativethatinordertosave timeornarrowtheissues,thenewinformation/evidencebeforetheRSDOshould alsoservebeforetheBoard.Thelatterwasnotthecasehere.

Hemadelikecommentsinhisopeningremarksatthecommencementof bothhearings. 92. I agree with Mr. Katz, counsel for the applicant, that the second respondenthasmisconstruedandmisstatedthefunctionoftheRAB.The schemeoftheapplicationprocessisclearlyformulatedintheAct.Where theRSDOrejectsanapplicationforasylumintermsofsection24(3)(c), theasylumseekermaylodgeanappealagainstthatdecisiontotheRAB in terms of section 26(1). Section 26(2) provides that the RAB, after hearingtheappeal,mayconfirm,setasideorsubstitutethedecisionofthe

50 RSDO.Theinterplaybetweenthewordingofsection24(3)(c)andsection 26makesitclearthatareconsiderationoftheRSDOdecisionisrequired. TheRABmustdeterminetheasylumseekersappealbyreconsidering theRSDOdecision,whichdecisionitmayconfirm,setaside,orsubstitute. Notwithstanding the fact that the Act envisages an appeal in the wide sense,theRABisstillrequiredtohaveregardtotheproceedingsandthe evidenceadducedbeforetheRSDO.Anyfailuretodothatopensittothe chargethatitignoredrelevantconsiderations.

93.

Mr. Katz goesfurtherthanthat. HesubmittedthattheRABsfailureto considerthecorrectnessoftheRSDOdecisionmeantithadcommitteda materialerroroflawandhadactedbeyondthepowersconferredbythe Actwiththeresultthatitsdecisionfallstobesetasideonthosegrounds undersection6(2)(a)and6(2)(f)(i)ofPAJA. Iacceptwithouthesitation thatthesecondrespondenthasmadeanerroroflawcausinghimnotto appreciatethetruenatureofthediscretionorpowerconferreduponhim. But I do not accept that as a result of his misconception he failed to exercisethediscretionorpowerconferreduponhim.Becauseofthat,his errorwasnotmaterialorreviewable.Therecordshowsthatdespitehis statements and mistaken assumption he reviewed relevant evidence, entertainedthesubmissionsoftheapplicantandconfirmedtheRSDOs decisiontorejecttheapplication.AsIhavesaid,theRABseemsnotto havehadthebenefitofanyevidenceorsubmissionsfromtheDepartment ofHomeAffairs.ItdidthoughelicittheevidenceofInterpol,somethingit wasentirelywithinitsrightstodointermsofsection26(3).Accordingly,I amnotoftheviewthattheerror materially influencedthedecisionasto makeitreviewable,nordoIacceptthatthedecisionwasasaresultofthe misconception one not authorised by the empowering provision. The decisiontoconfirmtheRSDOdecision,thoughperhapsnotadequately

51 informedbytheearlierproceedings,wasauthorised.Thatsaid,theremay bevalueinaddinganoteofcaution:hadthemisconceptionnotoccurred theRABmighthavelookedattheRSDOdecisionmorecarefullyandby beingalerted toitsdeficiencieswould havestructureditsowndecision withfullercognisanceofrelevantconsiderationsthatultimatelyitappears tohaveignored.

94.

The second error of law alleged by the applicant has different consequences.Itrelatestotheappropriatestandardofproofapplicablein the determination of whether an applicant has a wellfounded fear of persecutioninordertoqualifyforrefugeestatusundersection3(a)ofthe Act.Whetherornottheapplicanthadawellfoundedfearwastheprimary question for determination before the RSDO. Although she mentioned theobjectivebackgroundinformationonLibya,shedidnot analyse or discussit,andconcludedthattheapplicanthadnowellfoundedfearof persecution because his political life was restricted to; a simple engagement and involvement in student political activity. It was this findingthattheRABwascalleduponinthefirstinstancetoreconsider. However, the tenor and line of reasoning pursued in the second respondentswrittendecisionindicatesthathewasprimarilyconcernedto determine whether the exclusion clause in section 4(1)(b) of the Act appliedtodisqualifytheapplicantfromrefugeestatus. Thoughitmight havebeenbettertohavedeterminedthethresholdquestionfirst,thereis nothinginherentlywrongwithsuchanapproach.Itdoes,however,offer anexplanationforandinsightintothelinethesecondrespondentfollowed in determining whether the applicant had a wellfounded fear of persecution.

95.

Aftersettingoutthebackgroundinformation,theapplicantsaccountofhis

52 lifestoryandthelaw,thesecondrespondentcommencedhisanalysisand hisreasonsforhisfindingswiththefollowingremark:
TheBoardwillconfineitsfindingsinthismattertowhethertheexclusionclauseis applicable and the appellants credibility in order to determine if the appellant qualifiesforrefugeestatus.

Nowhereinhisdecisiondidheexplicitlyposethequestionwhetherthe applicant had a wellfounded fear of persecution in Libya, nor did he indicate an intention to reconsider the finding of the RSDO that the applicant had failed to discharge the onus upon him to prove a well foundedfearofpersecution. 96. Theclosestthesecondrespondentcametothequestionisinparagraph 50 when, after finding that the exclusion clause did indeed apply, he stated: :
Counselfortheappellanthassubmitted,andthisisthecruxoftheappellantscase, thathisreasonforfleeingLibyaisbasedonpoliticalopinion.Shouldthisbedecided oninthealternativetheBoard,beforeitcandeterminetheprincipalissuesinthis matter,mustfirstmakeanassessmentoftheappellantscredibility.

Hewentontosaythatthecredibilityofanappellantisusuallythemain factor in establishing whether there exists a wellfounded fear of persecution.Inparagraph52hethenfound: Thestandardofproofforassessingevidenceisonabalanceofprobabilities. Inthematter OrelienvCanada(MemberofEmploymentandImmigration) [1992]
I.F.C.592(CA)at605itwasstated:Onecannotbesatisfiedthattheevidenceis credibleortrustworthyunlesssatisfiedthatitisprobablyso,notjustpossiblyso.

53 Earlier in his judgment, after referring to the UNCHR Handbook on ProceduresandCriteriaforDeterminingRefugeeStatusandthefactthat theburdenofproofliesontheasylumseeker,hesaid: The standard of proof is real risk and must be considered in light of all the
circumstancesi.e.pastpersecutionandaforwardlookingappraisalofrisk.

97.

TheRABsfindingthattheapplicantwasrequiredtoprovearealriskona balanceofprobabilitiesisnotcorrect.Theappropriatestandardisoneof a reasonable possibility of persecution see Immigration and NaturalizationServicevCardozaTonseca480US421(1987)at440.Two decisions of this division have concluded similarly, namely Fang v RefugeeAppealBoardandothers2007(2)SA447(T)andVanGarderen N.OvRefugeeAppealBoard(supra).Inthelatter,BothaJstated:
Inmyviewbysimplyreferringtothenormalcivilstandard,theRABimposedtoo onerous a burden of proof. It is clear that allowance must be made for the difficultiesthatanexpatriateapplicantmayhavetoproduceproof.Itisalsoclearthat thereisadutyontheexaminerhimselftogatherevidence.

Laterinthejudgmentthelearnedjudgeadded:
Allthisconfirmedmyviewthatthenormalonusincivilproceedingsisinappropriate inrefugeecases.Theinquiryhasaninquisitorialelement.Theburdenismitigated byalowerstandardofproofandaliberalapplicationofthebenefitofdoubtprinciple.

98.

These dicta, with which I respectfully agree, are premised upon the provisionsofpara196and197oftheUNHCRHandbookwhichread:
196. Thus,whiletheburdenofproofinprinciplerestsontheapplicant,the dutytoascertainandevaluatealltherelevantfactsissharedbetween

54
theapplicantandtheexaminer.Indeedinsomecases,itmaybeforthe examinertouseallthemeansathisdisposaltoproducethenecessary evidenceinsupportoftheapplication.Evensuchindependentresearch maynot,however,alwaysbesuccessfulandtheremaybestatements thatarenotsusceptibleofproof.Insuchcases,iftheapplicantsaccount appearscredible,heshouldbegiventhebenefitofthedoubt. 197. Therequirementofevidenceshouldthusnotbetoostrictlyappliedin viewofthedifficultyofproofinherentinthespecialsituationinwhichan applicantforrefugeestatusfindshimself. Allowanceforsuchpossible lackofevidencedoesnot,however,meanthatunsupportedstatements mustnecessarilybeacceptedastrueiftheyareinconsistentwiththe generalaccountputforwardbytheapplicant.

99.

TheapplicationbytheRABofthenormalcivilstandardwasthusanerror oflawandonewhichcauseditnottoexerciseitsdiscretionproperly.The materialityoftheerrorisinterwovenwiththeapproachtheRABtooktothe evidence,andparticularlythecredibilityoftheapplicant.

100. Inparagraph33ofhisdecisionthesecondrespondentmentionedthathe haddueregardtotheobjectivebackgroundinformationonLibyaaswellasthe documentaryevidencetenderedbytheappellantandMendesonbehalfof Interpol.Thereisnodiscussionoftheobjectivebackgroundinformationinthe judgment,noranyreferencetothespecificfindingsintheCountryCondition Reports,bywayofaforwardlookingappraisalofriskoftheprospectsof torture,detentionandunfairtrials.Thesecondrespondentfocusedratheronfour affidavitsofsupport,tononeofwhichheattachedmuchweightorsignificance. OneoftheaffidavitsmakesmentionoftheLibjustwebsiteandincludedthe profileoftheapplicantonit.Giventhedamningcontentofthewriteup,the secondrespondentsassessmentofitispuzzling.Hedismisseditsrelevanceby simplystating: PresentlythecurrentLibjust.comwebsiteisaBritishcommercialwebsite andbearsnorelevancytotheappellant. 101. Havingeffectivelydiscountedtheevidenceoftheapplicantsassociatesin

55 exileinEurope,thesecondrespondentturnedtoexaminethecredibilityof theapplicant.Hisreasoningissetoutinparagraphs5359ofhisdecision asfollows:

[53] TheBoardisnotimpressedwiththeappellantstestimony.Byhisown admissionsheisaliarandapersonwhodoesnothesitatetocommit fraudandbriberytosuithisownneedsandpurposes.Itisonethingto lieortocommitfraudinordertofleefromacountrywhereoneisfacing persecutionbutitisquiteanothertocontinuewithlies,briberyandfraud when this is not required in order to protect yourself for a period of approximatelyfifteenyears. [54] WhentheappellanttraveledfromSaudiArabiatoPakistanheobtaineda visa from the Pakistani authorities to enter Pakistan. He could very easily have obtained an extension of this permit or visa to remain in Pakistanbutinsteadtheappellantchosetohavefraudulententriesmade inhispassport.Whenhispassportsvalidityexpiredtheappellanthadit extended by way of a fraudulent entry in his passport and when his passportcouldnotbeextendedanylongerheacquiredafalseLibyan passport.

[55]

AlthoughtheCanadianFederalCourtofAppealinMarcelSimonChang Tak v Minister of Employment and Immigration A19687, March8, 1988recognisedthatfailuretomakeaclaimforrefugeestatusdoesnot raiseanissueofcredibilityifitcanbeexplained,suchfailurecanshow theimplausibilityofanappellantsevidence.Incasuwhenaskedwhyhe didnotapplyforrefugeestatusinPakistantheappellantrepliedthathe didnotthinkitwasnecessary.Wherevertheappellantwentafterleaving Pakistan he failed to apply for asylum despite the position he found himselfinaccordingtohisevidence.TheBoarddoesnotacceptthisas beingreasonableandfindsthisimplausible.

[56]

BeforeleavingPakistantheappellantobtainedfalseMoroccanpassports for himself and his family. His wife was not a wanted person and

56
presumablypossessedavalidAlgerianpassport.Theappellantwasnot askedwhyhiswifeneededafalseMoroccanpassportseeingthatshe did not travel with him to Iran and the question goes begging unfortunately. [57] ToenterIrantheappellantbribedhiswayin. Insteadofapplyingfor asylumtheappellantwaspreparedtobeincarceratedforsixmonthsby the Iran authorities. After being released and flying to Malaysia and Indonesia the appellant acquired a false South African passport to allegedlyenablehimtotraveltoAustraliaorNewZealand. [58] Itisevidentfromtheappellantstestimonythatheisnotapersonwhois used to the truth. For a period of approximately fifteen years the appellantelectedtolie,bribeandcommitfraudtofurtherhislifestyle whenhehadampleopportunitytolegalisehispositionbyapplyingfor asyluminanumberofcountriesbeforebeingdeportedtoSouthAfrica. Theappellantsevidenceisimplausible.TheBoarddoesnotacceptthat theappellantistellingthetruthnowandconsequentlyfindsthatheisnot a credible witness. In the light thereof the Board does not need to analysetheevidencefurtherinordertoreachitsdecision. [59] The Board finds that the appellant has not discharged the burden of proofwhichrestedonhim.

102.Theapplicantcannotdeny,norhasheattemptedto,thathesurvivedthe past20yearsthroughlying,briberyanddeception.Theexclusivesource ofthetestimonyestablishinghiswebofliesanddeceitistheapplicant himself. He truthfullytoldthe RAB about thenature and extentofhis dishonesty. His evidence on that score was candid, consistent and coherent.Twopreliminaryobservationscanbemadehere:firstlythefact thattheapplicanthasinthepastliedtotheauthoritiesinPakistan,Iran, Malaysia,Indonesia,SouthAfricaandLibyadoesnotperseexcludehim fromrefugeestatusintermsofsection4oftheActoranyotherprovision

57 orprincipleoflaw.Secondly,thefactthatawitnesshasbeenuntruthful ononeorotheraspectonanotheroccasiondoesnotmeanthathewas untruthfulinrelationtotheenquiryathand,orthathisentiretestimony shouldberejectedonaccountofanyadmitteduntruth.Thecredibilityand reliabilityofhistestimonyforthepurposeofestablishingwhetherhehasa wellfoundedfearofpersecutionmustbeweighedlookingattheinherent probabilities, the presence or absence of external or internal contradictions,itsconsistencyorotherwisewiththeotherevidence,his candourandoverallperformanceintestifying,andsoon.Theobjective factsmustbeexaminedtodecideifawellfoundedfearexists.Andfor thatpurposeitwillusuallynotbeenoughtorelyalmostexclusivelyonthe evidence of the asylum seeker only to reject his claim of fear of persecution because he has previously lied while living, for whatever reasons,onthemarginsorintheshadowsofalegalexistence.

103.

Within the contextof a review of the RAB decision, as opposed to an appeal,thereareanumberofdifficulties,amountingtoirregularities,with theRABsassessmentoftheapplicantscredibilityandtheconsequences ofit.

104.

Firstly, when viewed against the objective facts available about the applicantslife,hisassociationsafterleavingLibyaandthehumanrights situationcurrentlyprevailinginLibya,itseemsthatanoverrelianceonthe applicants life of deception operated to exclude consideration of other morerelevantfactors.Secondly,theapplicantwasneverapprisedduring thehearingthathispastdishonestywouldbeusedtomakeanadverse findingtodiscountthecredibilityandreliabilityoftheaccounthegaveof hislife,activitiesandassociationsthatunderpinnedhisapprehensionof persecution.Thirdly,thefailuretohavepreviouslysoughtrefugeestatus

58 does not raise a credibility issue, and in fact amounts to an irrelevant consideration,ifitcanbeexplained,asitwas,bytheabsenceofanyneed ofprotectionagainstrefoulement. Theneedforrefugeestatusbecame most compelling for the applicant on fleeing from Pakistan after 9/11. Beforethathereceivedinformalprotectionfromthetribalchiefsthatexert considerableinfluenceandcontrolinthePeshawararea. Fourthly,the assessment of credibility was predicated exclusively on the historical accountprovidedbytheapplicant.Theapplicantwasnotcrossexamined on his credibility so as to expose any inconsistency, contradiction or incoherenceinthathistoricalaccount.TheRABacceptedtheapplicants versionabouthisliesandfraud,butdidnotexplainwhyitrejectedother aspectssuchashisassociationwiththeMuslimBrotherhood,AlJabbaAl WataniaLiInqaadLibyaandKhalidHingari,andthedamningaccountof hisactivitiesdescribedontheinternet.

105.

Inthesupportingandsupplementaryaffidavitstheapplicantchallenged thecredibilityfindingstatingthatitwasinexplicablebearinginmindthat hewasnotcrossexamined,thatnocountervailingevidenceofanykind waspresentedtotheRABandthathisversionstooduncontradicted.The onlyresponsetothisintheansweringaffidavitisthestatementthatthe negativecredibilityfindingwasbasedontheapplicantsowntestimony.In hisreplyingaffidavittheapplicantadmittedtolyinginordertoavoidbeing sentbacktoLibyawherehefacedpersecution,butstatedthatthesecond respondent was not in a position to deny his version. He invited the membersoftheRABtoexplaintothecourt,priortothehearingofthe application, exactly what allegations they disbelieved. The second respondentdidnottakeuptheinvitationandaccordinglyoneiscompelled to accept that the applicant was in fact associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Jabba Al Watania Li Inqaad Libya and Khalid Hingari

59 whileinLibyaandthathedidwhathesaidhedidinPakistanandwhileon themovethereafter.

106. HadtheRABgivencarefulconsiderationtothisevidence,aswellasthe factthattheapplicantarrivedinPeshawaratexactlythetimetheLIFGwas establishedthere,shortlyaftertheintensificationofpoliticalrepressioninLibya, in1988,asevidencedbytheestablishmentofthePeoplesCourtinthatyear, thatthePakistanishadshutdowntheFoundationofwhichhewastheDirector andthathehadbeenontheruneversince,itmightreasonablyhaveconcluded, havingregardtothepastpatternsofpersecution,andtakingaforwardlooking appraisalofrisk,thattheapplicantfacedareasonablepossibilityofpersecution. Inthefinalanalysis,theimpressionisinescapable,themisplacedoverreliance onitsquestionableandprocedurallyflawedcredibilityfindingandtheapplication oftheincorrectstandardofproofcausedtheRABtoignorethemorerelevant considerationsofthehumanrightssituation,theobjectiveevidenceofthe applicantsassociationwiththeLibyanIslamistoppositionandtheobviousrisk suchentailedforhimifreturnedtoLibya. 107. The finding ofAdvHassimthattheapplicantsdeceptionwasprobably doneforpoliticalreasonsandcouldnotreasonablybeusedtomakean adversecredibilityfindingforthepurposeofassessingwhetherhehada wellfounded fear of persecution accords with the applicants own explanation. Thefactthathehassolied,andhisreasonsfordoingso, ironically perhaps, are relevant considerations to be kept in account in assessing his apprehension. He lied, bribed and deceived precisely becausehehadanapprehensionthathewouldbepersecutedifreturned. ThemajorityoftheRABignoredthis. 108. Mr. Arendse haspresseduponmetheadmonitionnottoblurthelines between appeal and review by indulging in a review of substantive reasonableness. The applicant, he argued, was, in effect, seeking an appeal on the merits. In review proceedings, he submitted correctly, deferencetowardstheRABdecision,anditsinstitutionalspecialistnature, is essential. Such deference is certainly salutary when reviewing the

60 exercise of power or functions under section 6(2)(h) of PAJA on the groundsofreasonableness,whenthecourtsshouldtakecarenottousurp thefunctionsofadministrativeagencies BatoStarFishing(Pty)Ltdv Minister of Environmental Affairs (supra) at para 45. However, the groundsofreviewraisedbytheapplicantinthismatterdonottargetthe substantive reasonableness or the rational relationship between the purpose,evidenceandreasonsforthedecision.Theyaredirectedmore atthedialecticalaspectsofthedecisionmakingprocess,theissuesof natural justice and the failure to consider relevant considerations. The applicantscaseisthatthedecisionmakingprocesswasflawed.Thefact that an irregular process most likely produced an irrational or unreasonabledecisioncannotbeavoided. Butthatisnotthechallenge posedbytheapplicantandhencethereisnoneedtoexaminewhether thedecisionclearedtheminimumthresholdrequirementofrationalityor reasonableness, and, if so, to defer to it. The decision is dialectically flawedandthatissufficienttosetitaside.

The criminal charge of theft and exclusion from refugee status under section4(1)(b)oftheAct 109. TheapplicanthaschallengedtheRABsfindingthatheisexcludedfrom refugeestatusintermsofsection4(1)(b)oftheActontwofronts:firstly thatitmadeanerrorinlawinfindingthattheallegedcrimefellintothe disqualifyingcategory;andsecondlyitwasfactuallymistakeninfinding that there was reason to believe that the applicant had committed the crimewhenitwasinfacttrumpedupinresponsetotheapplicationfor asylum. 110. Section4(1)(b)providesthatapersondoesnotqualifyforrefugeestatus

61 forthepurposesoftheActifthereisreasontobelievethatheorshehas committedacrimewhichisnotofapoliticalnatureandwhichifcommitted inSouthAfricawouldbepunishablebyimprisonment.Thecrimeallegedly committed by the applicant in 1985 was designated in the supporting documentation,particularlythe NoteVerbale,tobethecrimeoftheft. TheRSDOwithoutmuchelaborationstatedinherreasons:
TheApplicantsclaimisunfoundedasitrelatestoacriminalactivityasopposedtoa politicalactivity.

TheRABprovidedaclearerandfullerconsiderationofthequestionand itsconclusionsonthematterformtheprincipalreasonforitsdecisionto rejecttheapplicantsclaim.Forunderstandablereasonsitreliedlargely,if notexclusively,ontheevidenceofMendes.Itheldthattherequestmade byLibyatoInterpoltoapprehendtheappellantforthecrimeoftheftof goldwasirrefutableevidenceandthat:

AccordinglytheBoardhasnootheroptionbuttofindthatthereisreasontobelieve thattheappellantcommittedanonpoliticalcrimeofsuchaseriousnaturethatifit had been committed in the Republic it would be punishable by imprisonment. Section4(1)(b)oftheActisthusapplicableandtheBoardfindsthattheappellant doesnotqualifyforrefugeestatus.

111.

Thereisampleprecedentontheapproachacourtortribunalshouldfollow whendecidingwhetherthereisreasontobelievethatanobjectivestate ofaffairsexists.Thephraseplacesamuchlighterburdenofproofona partythan,forinstance,acourtissatisfiedTrustBankvanAfrikaBpkv LiefandAnother 1963(4)SA752(T). Thereasontobelievemustbe constitutedbyfactsgivingrisetosuchbeliefandablindbelief,orabelief based on such information or hearsay evidence as a reasonable man

62 ought or could not give credence to, does not suffice Native CommissionerandUnionGovernmentvNthako 1931TPD234at242. Theremustbefactsbeforethecourtortribunalonwhichitcanconclude thattheapplicantforasylumcommittedanonpoliticalcrimepunishable byimprisonmentinSouthAfrica. Onemustaskthereforewhetherthe factsputupbyMendes,andregardedasirrefutableevidencebytheRAB, weresufficienttoconstituteareasonablebeliefthatthecrimehadbeen committed? Putinanotherway,fortheretobeareasontobelievea crimewascommittedtheremustbeabeliefbaseduponreasonandan objective factual basis for the reason. It will not be enough that the secondrespondentthoughthehadreasontobelieveHurleyandAnother vMinisterofLawandOrder1985(4)709(D&CLD)at717A.Thephrase thus imposes a jurisdictional precondition that there must exist a reasonablebasisforthefactualconclusionthattheapplicantcommitteda crime before the discretion to exclude can be exercised. Absent a reasonablebasis,theexerciseofpowermustbesetaside.

112.

Thefirstpointtakenbytheapplicantisthattheallegedcrimedoesnotfall intothecategoryofseriouscrimescontemplatedbysection4(1)(b).The provisionsofsection4(1)(b)donotexplicitlyintroducearequirementof seriousnessbeyondtheconditionthatthecrimemustwarrantasentence ofimprisonment. Thoughcounseldidnotmaketheargument,thepoint couldbetakenthatthespecificinclusionoftheprerequisiteofasanction of imprisonment excluded ex contrariis any other requirement or dimensionofseriousness,suchasthenatureofthecrimeoranelement ofviolenceinclusiouniusestalteriusexclusio.Counselfortheapplicant, however,hasurgedforamorecontextualapproachbyhavingregardto the provisions and intention of the treaty, that is, the UN Convention RelatingtotheStatusofRefugees.Theapproachisexpresslymandated

63 bysection6(1)oftheActprovidingthattheActmustbeinterpretedand applied with due regard to the Convention and section 39(1)(b) of the ConstitutionobligingcourtswheninterpretingtheBillofRightstoconsider internationallaw.Article1FoftheConventiondealswithexclusiononthe groundsofcriminality.Therelevantprovisionsread: TheprovisionsofthisConventionshallnotapplytoanypersonwithrespect towhomthereareseriousreasonsforconsideringthat:
(a) ..;

(b)

he has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the country of refugepriortohisadmissiontothatcountryasarefugee;

113.

In passing, it is noteworthy that the condition precedent of serious groundsforconsideringsetsthebarsomewhathigherthanthestandard ofreasontobelieveintheAct.Theevidencesupportingthebeliefshould be compelling, and hence courts and tribunals in South Africa should considergivingmeaningtothelatterwithreferencetoandrelianceupon theformer.

114.

Returning to the issue at hand, the expressed intention in the ipssima verba isthatonlyseriouscrimesjustifyexclusionordisqualification. In Hathaway:TheRightsofRefugeesUnderInternationalLaw(2005)at349 the learned author, an acknowledged expert in the field, in relation to article1F(b),commentsasfollows:
Seriouscriminalityinthiscontextisnormallyunderstoodtomeanactsthatinvolve violenceagainstpersons,suchashomicide,rape,childmolesting,wounding,arson, drugstrafficking,andarmedrobbery.

 115.

64 Thetheftofgoldwouldnotfallintothecategoryjustifyingexclusion;but theft in which violence or the threat of violence is used to induce the possessorofthegoldtosubmittoitstakingandwherethatisachieved throughtheaggravatingcircumstanceofafirearm(armedrobbery)would. Documentsaccompanyingthewarrantandthe Note Verbale introduced byMendesduringhistestimony,formingpartoftheRule53record,reveal thatLibyanlawdrawsadistinctionbetweentheftandaggravatedtheft. Thelatteriscommitted, interalia,byusingviolenceagainstthingsand contemplatesthe use ofweapons.The NoteVerbale doesnotreferto aggravatedtheft,onlytheft.

116.

ItfollowsaccordinglythatboththeRSDOandRABappliedtheincorrect test of seriousness to exclude the applicant from refugee status, meaningthattherejectionoftheapplicantsapplicationforrefugeestatus was materially influenced by an error of law resulting in the power of exclusion being improperly exercised, for, among other reasons, there wasnoreasontobelievethataseriouscrimehadbeencommitted.Since theLibyangovernmenthasnotallegedthecommissionofviolence,and Mendesdidnottestifytotheuseofanyviolence,thereisnoreasonto believethataseriouscrimewascommitted. Thedecisionsofboththe RSDOandtheRABconsequentlyfalltobesetasideundersection6(2)(a) ofPAJAaswell.

117.

Mr.Katzalsoadvancedtheargumentthatbecausetheallegedtheftwas committed during May 1985 it may not be prosecuted in South Africa becauseofthe20yearprescriptionperiodlaiddowninsection18ofthe CriminalProcedureActof1977.Itfollowed,inhisview,thattheoffence was not punishable in South African law and that the relevant pre conditioninsection4(1)(b)wasthusabsent. Section18oftheCriminal

65 ProcedureActprovidesthattherighttoinstituteaprosecutionforany offence(otherthanspecifiedseriousoffences)lapsesaftertheexpiration ofaperiodof20yearsfromthetimewhentheoffencewascommitted.In viewofthedecisiontowhichIhavecome,itisunnecessarytopronounce definitivelyonwhethertherighttoprosecutehadlapsedunderourlaw. TheevidenceonthestepstakenbytheLibyanauthoritiesisinanyevent notfullorclear. Forwhatitisworth,ItendtoagreewithMr. Arendse, giventhedateoftheNoteVerbaleissuedin2003,thattheLibyansmust havetakenatleastsomestepsatthattimetoconstituteprosecution. A decision on the part of the prosecuting authorities, conveyed to the accusedinaformalmannerthatheistobeprosecuted,wouldtomymind amounttotheinstitutionofaprosecution MinisterofLawandOrderv Kader1991(1)SA41(A)at51EG.Thatmeanstheprosecutionbythe Libyanauthoritieswasmostlikelyinstitutedwithinthe20yearperiod.

118. Finally,Ithinkthereismuchtosupporttheapplicantscontentionthatthe chargeagainsthimwastrumpedupbytheLibyanauthoritiessothatthe applicantwouldberefusedasylumandreturnedtoLibya.Themajoritydecision oftheRABfailedentirelytodealwiththeevidenceandallegationsinthatregard. UndercrossexaminationMendesconcededthathewasnotinapositionto criticallyanalysethedocumentationreceivedfromLibyaandthathewasnotina positiontogainsaytheapplicantsevidenceabouthisfearofpersecution.Nor couldheexplainwhytheSouthAfricanauthoritieshadnotconsentedtoLibyas requestfortheapplicantsextradition. 119. The RABs almost exclusive reliance on the evidence of Mendes as irrefutableamountedtoitfailingtogiveconsiderationtotwopertinentfacts that raise a doubt about whether the crime was committed, and coincidentally add to the reasonable possibility that the applicant risks persecution. The first is that if Libya was indeed serious about the allegationsconcerningthegoldtheftitwouldhaveissuedarednoticeto Interpol.ThesecondisthatthereisnoreferenceontheLibjustwebsiteto

66 thefactthattheapplicantwassoughtforthatparticularcrime. Muchof theinformationinthewriteupontheapplicantisaccurate.Iftheapplicant wasagenuinetheftsuspect,onewouldhaveexpectedtoseeareference tothateffect.

120.

Moreover,thepronouncementsonthegeneralhumanrightssituationby theSIAC,AmnestyInternationalandHumanRightsWatchaddcredence to the trumping up of charges by the Libyan authorities as a distinct possibility. The SIAC drew attention to the spurious case against the Bulgarian nurses (that lasted for 8 years and which has attracted international condemnation), known as the Benghazi trial. These accused were charged with deliberately infecting children with the HIV virus.DuringthetrialLucMentagnier,thecodiscovereroftheHIVvirus, testified that the children were probably infected as a result of poor hygiene and many had been infected before the arrival of the foreign medics.Despitethat,theaccusedwereconvictedandsentencedtodeath on charges quite evidently trumped up. Even though he was in possessionofallthisinformationthesecondrespondentdidnotdiscussit orappeartotakeitintoconsiderationinanymeaningfulway.Intheresult, hisbeliefthatthecrimewascommittedwasnotbasedonreasonoran objective factual basis. There is no reasonable basis for his factual conclusion.

121.

In his dissenting decision Adv Hassim went to considerable length to explainwhyhebelievedthechargeagainsttheapplicantwastrumpedup andwhyhiscolleagueshaderredintheirfindingthatthecrimehadbeen committed.Paragraphs4951ofhisdecisionareilluminating.Theyread: [49] The bundle of documents submitted by the Libyan authorities

67 includes adetailedinvestigationdiaryrelating tocase134/1985 openedin1985.Italsoincludesadiaryofinvestigationopenedby theLibyaauthorities onthe 17 December 2003 outlining how a
certainMr.AbdelbariAbdallahHusienAlFailungreturnedfromexileand gavedetailsrelatingtothehiscontactwiththeappellantwhiletogetherin overseas.Mr.AbdelbariclearlystatesthattheAppellantmentionedthat he [the appellant] was involved in the gold theft in 1985. This th investigation continued untilthe 20 December 2003. Thereafter the matter was referred to the office of the Attorney General on the 29 th th

December 2003. A warrant of arrest dated 28 December 2003 was issuedfortheimmediatearrestoftheappellant. Whatisinterestingto notethatitwasonlyafterthisinvestigationwhichcommencedonthe th 17 December2003 didtheLibyansauthoritiesallegethattheycame to know that the appellant was the person involved in the criminal offenceofgoldtheftthatallegedlytookplacein1985.Strangelyaletter fromtheLibyanEmbassyinPretoria,SouthAfricaDATED11December 2003 [acopyoftheletterwassubmittedtotheBoardbyInterpol,Wits LawclinicaswellastheDepartmentofHomeAffairs]clearlystatesthat theappellantisaLibyannationalandiswantedinLibyaforacriminal chargeofrobberytofinanceterroristactivities. [50] Therefore,to summarise, theLibyangovernmentaccordingto itsown evidenceinthewarrantofextraditiondocumentsclearlystatesthatthe first occasion it had any knowledge whatsoever of the Appellant Mr. Tantoush having committed the crime of gold theft was on the 17 th

December 2003 whenMr. Abdelbari wasquestioned yet strangelyits th officesinPretoriaissuedaletteronthe11 December2003statinghe iswantedfortheoffenceofgoldthefttofundterroristactivities. Itisa manifest contradiction in their testimony. It is critical to peruse the aforementioned documents submitted in this matter by the Libyan authoritiesinordertodeducethatthechargesagainsttheappellantwere


indeedfabricated. [51]

68

Thisevidenceclearlyshowsthattherewasanapparentengineeringof documentsin adesperate attempt tohave the appellant extradited to Libyaonthebasisofatrumpedupcharge.

122.

The logic and rationality of this reasoning is persuasive. What is surprisingisthatthemajoritydecisionmadenoefforttogiveadifferent gloss to the contradictory evidence referred to or the inference drawn, leadingmetodeducethatthemajorityforreasonsunknownpreferredto ignoreit.

123.

InanotefiledsubsequenttothehearingMr. Arendse madetwopoints about this issue. Firstly he pointed out that counsel had not cross examinedMendesonthedocumentationandsecondlythediaryreferred to had in fact been opened on 16 May 1985. I am not sure that the secondpointdisposesofthefindingthattheLibyansstatedtheyfirstknew thattheappellantcommittedthecrimeon17December2003butthatthe Pretoriaembassyhadearlierissuedaletteron11December2003saying that he was wanted. As for the first point, Mendes admitted knowing nothing about the merits and Adv Hassim in any event reached his conclusiononhisownanalysisofthedocumentaryevidence. Theonly relevantfacetofallofthis,inthecontextofthepresentreview,isthatthe failure by the majority to deal with the contradictory evidence raises a furtherquestionastothereasonablenessofitsbeliefthatacrimehad beencommitted.

124.

ForalltheforegoingreasonsthedecisionsoftheRABandtheRSDOon theoperationoftheexclusionclausemustbesetaside.

69

Substitution 125. Inadditiontosettingasidethedecisions,theapplicantseekstohavethis court substitute them and grant the applicant refugee status. As mentionedatthebeginning,section8(1)(c)(ii)(aa)ofPAJAempowersa courtinexceptionalcircumstancestosubstituteitsowndecisionforthatof theadministrativebodyinsteadofremittingitforreconsideration. 126. In deciding whether to substitute a court normally considers whether furtherdelaywillcauseanapplicantunjustifiableprejudice,whetherthe original decisionmaker has exhibited bias and incompetence, and whether remitting the matter will result in a foregone conclusion. Furthermore, the court should practically be in a position to take the decision.Considerationsoffairnessmayinagivencasealsorequirethe court to make the decision itself provided it is able to do so Commissioner,CompetitionCommissionvGeneralCounciloftheBarof SouthAfricaandothers2002(6)SA606(SCA)atparas1415;Gauteng GamblingBoardvSilverStarDevelopmentLtdandOthers2005(4)SA67 (SCA) at para 28; and Johannesburg City Council v Administrator, Transvaal1969(2)SA72(T)at75H77C. 127. Exceptional circumstances justifying substitution exist in this instance. Both the decisionmakers a quo exhibited bias and the uncertainty surrounding the appellants fate should not be allowed to continue indefinitely. In Ruyobiza and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2003(5)SA51(C)at65CHtheprejudicecausedbydelaywas considered to be an exceptional circumstance sufficient to justify substitution.

70

128.

Mostimportantly,fromtheevidence before me Iamable to determine whethertheapplicanthasawellfoundedfearofpersecution,andinview ofwhathasgonebeforefairnessdictatesthatIdoso.

129.

TheuncontradictedevidenceisthattheapplicantwasinfluencedinLibya by the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood, aligned with Al Jabba Al Watania Li Inqaad Libya and participated in the dissemination of anti Qadhafi propaganda. He left Libya in 1988. Libya witnessed an intensificationofpoliticalrepressionin1988withtheintroductionofthe Peoples Court by the security apparatus. Although the court was abolishedin2005,thereisevidencethatquiterecently85membersofthe MuslimBrotherhoodareontrialbeforeanadhocrevolutionarycourt(see para148oftheSIACjudgment).

130.

WhiletheapplicantdisavowsanyconnectiontotheLIFG,franklyIdoubt hehasfurnishedthecompletepicture.HearrivedinPakistanatthevery placetheLIFGwasestablishedattheverytimeitwasestablished. He worked for an organisation that the Pakistani government closed down immediatelyafter9/11. HewasforcedtofleePakistaninthefaceofa crackdownbyPakistaniauthoritiesaimedprimarilyatAlQaedaelements and their associates, which according to Amnesty International was extendedindiscriminatelytopersonsofAraboriginonthenorthwestern frontier.BeforearrivinginPakistanandafterleavingit,theapplicantwas financiallyassistedbyLibyanandEgyptianexiles.Theremaybetruthin hisstatementthathebenefitedfromMuslimcharity(zakat);morelikelyhe was assisted by compatriots who shared his political and religious convictions. In1989hewashelpedwithhismovefromSaudiArabiato Pakistan and given a job in an Islamist foundation. After fleeing with

71 otherstoIranin2001,Libyansnegotiatedhisreleaseandfacilitatedhis movetoMalaysiaandIndonesia,whereIslamistoppositionhasgivenrise tosecurityconcerns,suchperhapsbeingafactorinhisarrestthere.From thesefactsalegitimateandplausibleinferencemightbedrawnthatifnot actuallyamemberorassociateoftheLIFGoritaffiliates,theapplicantis perceivedtobesoaligned,andasthepagefromtheLibjustwebsiteand thetrumpedupchargesreveal,thatperceptionpersistsinLibya.

131.

However,infairness,itmustbekeptinmindthattheapplicantsdenialof membership of the LIFG or that he has engaged in terrorist activities standsuncontradicted.Mendesconfirmedthathewasnotawareofany allegations of terrorism against the applicant. During his initial interrogationinSouthAfrica,bothUSandBritishintelligenceofficerswere inattendance.Hadtherebeenanyevidenceofterroristactivity,nodoubt theDepartmentwouldhaveputthatinformationbeforetheRABinorderto exclude the applicant from refugee status under section 4(1)(a) or (c) becausetherewasreasontobelievehehadcommittedacrimeagainst peaceorwasguiltyofactscontrarytotheobjectsandprinciplesofthe UNO or the OAU. The fact that there may be reasonable grounds to suspectthathemighthaveassociatedwithelementsoftheLIFGisnot sufficienttoshowthatheisanAlQaedasupporterorathreattonational securityhereorelsewhere.TheobservationsofMr.JusticeOuseleyin DDandASvTheSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartmentatpara33 onthispointareworthrepeating.Hesaid:
Weacceptthatitisnotpossibletoconcludefromtheevidencethatthemerefactof LIFG membership shows that an individual is necessarily a global jihadist or Al Qaeda supporter. The real focus of the analysis of that aspect of the national securityriskisnotthereforesimplyonwhethertheindividualisanLIFGmember,but isonwhatanindividualLIFGmemberhasdoneandmaydointhefuture,taking

72
accountofwhatisknownofhisoutlookandwithwhomheassociates.

132.

In the face of the applicants uncontested denial of membership or association, there is therefore at most in the light of his history a reasonablesuspicionthathemighthavebeenassociated,andassuch notevena primafacie case. Insupportofthatsuspicionisthestrong possibilitythatfacinganuncertainfutureandtheprospectofreturningto LibyahethoughtbesttoputsomedistancebetweenhimselfandtheLIFG byadmittingonlytoalessdangerousinvolvement. Whateverthecase, onefactiscertain:hisrecenttravailsthroughIran,MalaysiaandIndonesia onfleeingPakistansuggesthehasnotescapedthetaintorstigmaarising fromaperceivedassociationwiththeLIFGandAlQaeda.Oneimagines heknowsthatalltoowellandthatiswhyheisafraidtobesentbackto Libya.Hehasawellfoundedfearofbeingpersecutedforhispoliticaland religiousaffiliations.

133. Thefactthattheapplicantisamemberofaloosegroupingofpoliticaland religiousdissidentswhosemembersareregularlydetained,torturedandunfairly prosecutedinLibyaandthathefacestrumpedupchargesrendersitaxiomatic thatonhisreturntoLibyahewillbedetainedinaninstitutionlikeAbuSalim, wherethereisarealrisk,morethanareasonablepossibility,thathewillbe subjectedtocruelandinhumanetreatment. 134. Section6(1)(d)oftheActrequirestheActtobeinterpretedandapplied with due regard to any other relevant conventions or international agreementstowhichtheRepublicisorbecomesaparty.Bydueregard ismeantthegivingofseriousconsideration. Article3oftheConvention AgainstTorture,towhichSouthAfricabecameapartyon10December 1998,provides:
1. NoStatepartyshallexpel,return(refouler)orextraditeapersontoanother State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in

73
dangerofbeingsubjectedtotorture. 2. Forthepurposeofdeterminingwhethertherearesuchgrounds,thecompetent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable,theexistenceintheStateconcernedofaconsistentpatternofgross, flagrantormassviolationsofhumanrights.

135.

The nonrefoulement obligation underboth the Torture Convention and section2oftheActarecentraltothequestionofsubstitution,ifonlyon accountoftheRABnothavinggivendueregardtoit.Objectivelythereis a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant and perhaps mass violation of human rights in Libya; and subjectively the evidence establishes conclusivelythattheapplicanthasengagedinactivitywithinandoutside ofLibyaoverthepast20years,includinghisapplicationforasylum,which makeshimvulnerabletotheriskofbeingplacedindangeroftorturewere hetobereturnedtoLibya.Theprimacyofthenonrefoulementobligation wasunderscoredbytheultimateconclusionoftheSIACinDDandASv TheSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment.ItheldthatDDwasnot entitledtorefugeestatusundertheRefugeeConventionbecauseofhis terroristactivities,butdespitetheriskheposedtoUKnationalsecurityhe couldnotbereturnedbecauseofthenonrefoulementobligation.Itclosed atparagraph430ofthejudgmentwiththefollowingsalutarydeclaration:
Wehavegiventhisdecisionanxiousconsiderationinviewoftheriskswhichthe Appellantscouldfaceweretheyreturned(toLibya),andthosewhichtheUK,and individualswhocanlegitimatelylooktoitforprotectionoftheirhumanrights,would faceiftheywerenot. Wemustjudgethematter..byconsideringonlytherisks whichtheAppellantscouldfaceonreturn,nomatterhowgraveandviolenttherisks which,havingchosentocomehere,theyposetotheUK,itsinterestsabroad,andits widerinterest.Thoseinterestsatriskincludefundamentalhumanrights.

 136.

74 Thereisnoevidencethattheapplicantposesanygraveorviolentriskto SouthAfrica,butliketheSIAC,thecourtsandrelevantauthoritieshere areequallyifnotmoreconstrainedbythewiderinterestofourtreatyand constitutionalobligationsto avoidrefoulementinthefaceofthe riskof torture.

137.

Forallthosereasons,theapplicantshouldbegrantedrefugeestatusand thereisnobasisforexcludinghimundersection4oftheActonaccount oftherebeingnoreasontobelieveheisguiltyofanyoftheproscribed conduct.

138.

Beforefinalisingthismatter,Iwouldliketoexpressmyappreciationto counsel,Mr. Katz andMr. duPlessis fortheapplicant,andMr. Arendse SC with Mr. Matjila for the respondents, who produced most comprehensiveandwelldocumentedargumentsupportedcogentlywith therelevantauthorities.Theircombinedeffortshavebeenofgreatservice tothecourt.

139.

Intheresult,thefollowingorderismade: 1. ThedecisionoftheRefugeeAppealBoardtakenonorabout12 December 2005, rejecting the Applicants appeal in terms on section26oftheRefugeesAct130of1998againstthedecisionof theRefugeeStatusDeterminationOfficerinalettermadeknownto the Applicant on 15 March 2006, in which his application for refugee status and asylum was denied, is declared to be inconsistentwiththeConstitutionof1996,unlawfulandinvalid;and isherebyreviewedandsetaside. 2. ThedecisionoftheRefugeeStatusDeterminationOfficertakenin

75 March2005,rejectingtheApplicantsapplicationforrefugeestatus andasylum,isdeclaredtobeinconsistentwiththeConstitutionof 1996,unlawfulandinvalid;andisherebyreviewedandsetaside. 3. TheApplicantisdeclaredarefugeewhoisentitledtoasylumin SouthAfricaascontemplatedbysection2and3oftheRefugees Act. 4. TheRespondentsshallbearthecostsofthisapplication,including thecostsoftwocounsel,jointlyandseverally,theonepayingthe othertobeabsolved.

JRMURPHY JUDGEOFTHEHIGHCOURT

DateHeard:14August2007 FortheApplicant:AdvAKatz,CapeTownandAdvMduPlessis,Durban InstructedBy:WitsLawClinicc/oLawyersforHumanRights FortheRespondent:AdvNArendseSC,CapeTownandAdvOMatjila,Pretoria InstructedBy:StateAttorney,Pretoria