Tunnel Safety

Dr. Mohamed A. Aty, PE

Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................3 THE VISUAL ENVIRONMENT IN TUNNELS.......................................4 TRAFFIC CRASHES AND TUNNELS A STUDY FROM NORWAY .........................................................................................................................6 SIGNING IN TUNNELS .............................................................................9 UNDERGROUND MASS-TRANSIT PROJECTS..................................11 TUNNEL FIRE HAZARD.........................................................................12
THE EUROPEAN CHANNEL TUNNEL (CT)...........................................................................................................14

TUNNEL AIR POLLUTION.....................................................................15

TUNNEL VENTILATION.....................................................................................................................................16 POWER FAILURE.............................................................................................................................................17

SAFETY MEASURES IN LONG RAILWAY TUNNELS.....................17

PREVENTION MEASURES....................................................................................................................................17 MITIGATION MEASURES....................................................................................................................................17 SELF-RESCUE MEASURES...................................................................................................................................18 ASSISTED RESCUE MEASURES.............................................................................................................................18

ENSURING SAFETY IN TUNNELS........................................................19 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS....................................20 APPENDIX A..............................................................................................28

List of Tables
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF TUNNELS IN NORWAY IN THE VARIOUS LENGTH CATEGORIES............................................................................6 TABLE 2: NUMBER OF INJURED AND KILLED IN TUNNELS AND NATIONAL ROADS (NORWAY)..............................................................7 TABLE 3: CRASHES IN ROAD TUNNELS AND NATIONAL ROADS BY ACCIDENT TYPE (NORWAY)...........................................................8 TABLE 4: CRASH FREQUENCIES AND RATES AND AADT............8

INTRODUCTION
Ever-increasing populations of large cities, density of transportation and the need for storage capacity have led, inevitably, to an increased use of underground facilities. Worldwide experience indicates that underground facilities are economically effective in the framework of national and municipal economics (1). New subways and rapid transit and tunnels systems are in various stages of planning and construction throughout the world. Over the past 15 years, many advances have taken place in the system design. Changes have cast up many new problems for safety engineers: Larger stations, larger numbers of people in transit, an increasing utilization of plastics in vehicle construction, and more electronically operated and controlled equipment (2). Underground facilities can couple unobtrusively urban architecture and relevant industrial infrastructure. However, it is necessary to ensure the safety of underground facilities against causes of accidents (1). The primary causes of accidents in tunnels can be classified into (3): Internal causes mechanical or electrical failures concerning the control guide system as well as the logistic and in-service systems. External causes earthquakes (Generally, tunnels have a fairly high safety against earthquakes (1)), floods, avalanches, etc; efforts are being made to create software and hardware for crisis management, and extensive and efficient tunnel information management systems for use in response to accidents such as rock slide and earthquakes (4). Causes associated to human action operating faults, errors during maintenance, sabotages, and terrorist attacks. For many motorists, tunnels are special facilities associated with a feeling of unease resulting from entering into the darkness combined with concern for ones personal safety
(5)

. Also air pollution level caused by vehicle exhaust gas in a tunnel is a problem in

traffic through tunnels (6), (7). Incorrect behavior of road users is the main cause of most accidents. The probability of accidents is significantly lower on motorways than on roads with bi-directional traffic. In tunnels, the number of accidents is often lower than in the open, especially for longer stretches. Nevertheless, due to the confinement of the environment, accidents in tunnels, and particularly fires, can have dramatic results (8).

THE VISUAL ENVIRONMENT IN TUNNELS

The visual environment (visual performance) from the viewing point of the driver in the road transportation is important in order to ensure the safety, comfort and smooth traffic of the running vehicle. Especially, in tunnels, grasp of the vehicle position and a better discovery of the forward obstacle is of great meaning, because the visual performance greatly changes by the differences between the brightness distribution of road and wall surface. Many studies have been conducted until now for the purpose of offering the safe and comfortable travel environment and preventing accidents, and it is reflected on the road structures, lighting facilities, maintenance strategies, etc (9). The sense of enclosure and darkness in tunnels causes drivers to feel less secure and become cautious. The drivers in the excessively dense groups of vehicles thus seek to maintain a longer distance from the preceding vehicle at the entrance to the tunnels. This slows the vehicles down and the slowdown is propagated upstream in a wave of deceleration (10). Various elements such as road structure, traffic volume and brightness of the circumference are known as the visual performance of road, vehicle, and other circumference situation. This situation can be recognized by physiological response and human psychology condition. It can be said that the visual environment for driving in the daytime won't be of great problem, because it doesn't differ from the usual living environment so much. However, the driver will strongly sense the strain in driving at

night or in tunnels, since the visual environment is very different (11), (12), (13). Generally, in tunnels it is not only necessary to ensure the brightness of the road surface but also to grasp the travel position, and to recognize easily the distance perception between the front vehicle and an obstacle. Therefore, the brightness of the tunnel wall surface becomes an important element, so in long tunnels and tunnels with high traffic volume, the inner packaging board of the tunnel wall has been installed. This softens the driver's tension, and hence safety increases (11), (14), (15), (16). To evaluate the visual environment in tunnels, the dynamic luminance distribution measuring system has been developed. While driving, this system measures the luminance distribution of the driver's view by using the image processing technology. Comparing the luminance distributions and the characteristics of the tunnels with different illumination systems, the visual environment is examined. And, experiments were made to find out the relationship between the luminance distribution and driver's eye movement (the fixation point distribution) under such situations where the visual environment differs like before and after the cleaning of the tunnel interior walls. And this is useful to show the effect of cleaning or covering the tunnel walls on the luminance and therefore, the tunnel safety. Experiments for the evaluation of visual environments have been carried out at about 90 tunnels in Japan and Europe
(11)

, and the characteristics were compared and examined. In

addition, since the visual environment differs before and after the cleaning of the tunnel inside walls, the change of fixation point distribution of the driver has been find out by a real driving experiment. And from that an examination about safety, and comfort has been made. As a result, under a good visual environment after the cleaning of a tunnel wall the contrast of road and wall surface can be clearly recognized. And also the circumference situation and travel position can be sufficiently grasped. Therefore, the driver's fixation rate of the front road surface becomes from 40% before cleaning to 70% after cleaning. This shows that safe driving is ensured and the comfort is

improved. However, it cannot be said that this evaluation technique is established yet. In the future, it is necessary to analyze the various mind and body reactions and psychological factors and clarify the relationship between the visual environments (11), (12).

TRAFFIC CRASHES AND TUNNELS A STUDY FROM NORWAY

As an example of Tunnel Safety Procedure, Norway was found to have nearly 900 road tunnels on national and county roads. Crashes and other incidents were studied. The Norwegian Public Roads Administration conducted studies on traffic crashes in tunnels based on police reported accidents. Findings from these studies are reasonably consistent with similar studies from other countries (17). Table 1 shows the number of tunnels and lengths for the various tunnel length categories (in meters) in Norway. The table shows that the number of tunnels have increased by 13.2%, and the overall tunnel length by 22.9% in four years. The average tunnel length is 845 m against 770 m in 1992. Tunnel Length Under 100 m. 100 500 m 500 1000 m 1000 3000 m Over 3000m Sum Number 1992 113 259 116 102 30 620 Number 1998 118 310 145 131 44 748 Length 1992 6,453 65,880 79,189 174,670 151,451 476825 Length 1998 7,058 77,042 100,954 228,128 217,385 630,567

Table 1: Number of Tunnels in Norway in the various length categories. Source: Studies on Traffic Accidents in Norwegian Road Tunnels (17).

Driver behavior and traffic crashes are the major importance when designing road tunnels and revising tunnel guidelines. Insight into tunnel operation ensures that tunnels can be built to a high level of safety at reasonable costs. Low-cost tunnels can be built and equipped to a high level of safety without excessive use of equipment and costly design standards.

A study in Norway where a total of 587 road tunnels were selected for this study. A total 745 persons were killed or injured during a five-year period (1992-1996). Table 2 shows the severity of injuries compared to the national roads outside the tunnels. National Roads outside tunnels 185 (2.8%) 118 (1.8%) 655 (9.9%) 5643 (85.5%) 6601

Severity Killed Very seriously injured Seriously injured Slightly injured No. of killed or injured

Within tunnel 26 (3.5%) 13 (1.8%) 86 (11.5%) 620 (83.2%) 745

Table 2: Number of injured and killed in tunnels and National roads (Norway). Average for the years 1992-1996 Source: Studies on Traffic Accidents in Norwegian Road Tunnels (17). Table 2 shows that the proportions severely injured and killed in tunnel crashes are higher than the road crashes on the national road network. But average accident rates for tunnels are below accident rates assumed for two-lane roads in the Norwegian Roads and Road traffic plan (NVVP). That means that tunnels are not crash prone but accident severity is somewhat higher in tunnels than on the national road network in general. It was also found that improved lighting and tunnel entrance design have contributed positively to a significant reduction in tunnel transition zone accidents. However, there is still more room for additional tunnel entrance lighting improvements to tunnel traffic safety. Studying the crash types shows that the proportions of frontal, single vehicle and other type crashes in tunnels are similar to those on road network as a whole. Rear-end collisions, however are relatively twice as common in road tunnels as on the open roads. The distribution of tunnel and road crashes is shown in Table 3.

Crash type

Inside Tunnel

National roads outside tunnel

Same direction Opposing directions Crossing and turning Pedestrian involved Vehicle leaving road Other accident types Sum accidents

43.3% 17.2% 1.6% 1.6% 29.8% 6.5% 372

22.2% 14.3% 23.7% 8.1% 26.3% 5.4% 4917

Table 3: crashes in road tunnels and National roads by accident type (Norway). Average for the years 1992-1996 Source: Studies on Traffic Accidents in Norwegian Road Tunnels (17). It was found that crash rates decline with increasing tunnel length. This is to be expected, as entrance zone crash rates are higher than those for the mid-zones. Also a statistical analysis indicated that the crash frequencies in the entrance zones were higher for shorter than for longer tunnels.

Number AADT of tunnels 0 - 500 501 - 1000 1001 - 5000 5001 - 10000 Over 10000 Sum 108 167 206 49 57 587

Lengths (km) 83.7 159.0 149.6 29.8 38 460.1

AADT (average)

Travel (mill Crashes

Crash rates (crash/mill veh.km) 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.13

(veh./day) veh.km/yr) 400 800 2,200 7,400 23,600 4,000 11.3 44.5 108.5 78.2 324.6 567.1 13 40 76 50 186 365

Table 4: Crash frequencies and rates and AADT. Source: Studies on Traffic Accidents in Norwegian Road Tunnels (17). Table 4 shows that crash rates are highest in tunnels with an ADT below 1000. However, these tunnels are also most likely to be built to the lowest standard. Results also show that
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narrow tunnels (less number of lanes) have a higher crash rate than wider ones. Also it was found that the average crash rate for the sub-sea tunnels in this study was estimated to 0.07 annual person injury crashes per million-vehicle km. And this is a comparatively low accident rate. In these tunnels, the effect of entrance zones will have little impact on the average values. It was found that there is a concentration of crashes outside tunnel openings on roads with one-way traffic. In such cases rear-end collisions predominate. These are often related to high traffic volumes and are sometimes exacerbated by blinding sunlight and closely spaced traffic signals.

SIGNING IN TUNNELS
In a recent study showing an example of signing problems in tunnels, researchers aimed to overcome problems of the signing in Bostons Central Artery (Interstate 93) tunnel (9). Due to low ceiling low height and horizontal and vertical curvature within the tunnel that reduce the distance from which the signs can be seen by motorists. Guide signs may be easily blocked from view by large trucks. Drivers, especially unfamiliar drivers, will have difficulty obtaining the guidance information they need to find the proper exit. This can lead to driver frustration and may also lead to a reduction to safety. The driver simulator was used to overcome these problems and to improve sign design and placement. The physical characteristics of the tunnel include horizontal and vertical curvature and a ceiling height of only 5.19 m (17 feet) in many locations. These characteristics present challenges to providing good guide signing for motorists. The low ceiling height, combined with a 4.12 m (13.5 foot) maximum legal height for trucks and allowing an overhead buffer space of six inches means that all overhead guide signing can be no more than three feet in height. This height is substantially shorter than typical overhead guide

signs, which are often six or more feet in height. The shorter height makes it more difficult to include the amount of information that may be needed to provide adequate motorist guidance, especially when standard letter sizes are used. If a motorist is following behind a large truck, the sign will be obscured by the truck for a longer period of time and will be fully visible for a shorter period of time (9). However, because of the complexity of the geometry, it is not possible for the sign designer to visualize exactly what the guide signs will look like to the motorist. To provide an additional tool to sign designers, to provide the ability to visualize what the guide signing will look like to the motorist, and to actually test motorist response to the signing plan, the tunnel environment and signing plan were replicated on a driving simulator (9). Tunnel height and width, horizontal and vertical curvature, lane placement, entrances, exits, and guide signing in other words, all of the geometric and signing characteristics of the tunnel were re-created for a simulated environment. This allowed the visual driving experience through the simulated environment to be an accurate replication of the driving experience as it will actually be when the tunnel is completed. The driving simulator had great utility for evaluating possible problems with guide signing for tunnels. This tool allowed not only the identification and confirmation of problems, but also resulting in improved signing for tunnels (Central Artery Tunnel). Simulated drive allowed both researchers and sign designers to observe problems that were not so obvious on two-dimensional plan sheets. Sign designers should take advantage of a driving simulator as a tool when freeway guide signing is being developed for situations when complex geometry is involved, when there are multiple exits in close proximity to one another, and when there is an unusually large amount to guidance information to be presented to the driver. Using the simulator helped in identifying potential solutions for the Central Artery

10

Tunnel signing which are as follows: 1- Addition of initial interchange guide sign further upstream. 2- Use of interchange sequence signs to provide more advance notice to drivers of upcoming exits. 3- Relocation of guide signs to locations where they would be less obscured by tunnel walls or ceilings (due to horizontal or vertical geometry). 4- Redesign of guide signs to more clearly communicate information to the motorist.

UNDERGROUND MASS-TRANSIT PROJECTS

Motorways of different types, as highways or expressways, are moving towards underground mainly because of few reasons: there is no available space on the surface, increasing demand for high capacity transportation connections and increase of the transportation speed that predefines transit lines as straight connections. Based mainly on recent traffic accidents in highway tunnels in Europe
(18)

, safety requirements are asking

for additional underground structures as safety and ventilation chambers aside the main tunnel, parallel service tunnels, or additional, second tubes, increasing the size and construction costs of underground motorway projects (18). Mass transit lines in urban areas are usually having parts that are going underground, underneath city centers, and approaching parts that are located on the surface. Sometimes, entire line is located in the underground, establishing subway system of transportation
(19), (20), (21)

. Nowadays, large urban areas are forced to develop underground

way of transportation for people, because surface traffic is not able to provide sufficient capacity and speed of transport that could successfully serve to requirements of daily work and life
(22)

. The demand for subway lines is far beyond the possibility to develop,

finance and construct them. Especially developing countries are having huge demand on such systems, but their development is not supported with available financial sources. Recent development of railways worldwide shows intention to develop high-speed railway lines, that should take over from motorways the most part of the transportation of

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goods. Safety requirements are asking for additional safety structures, similar to requirements on motorways, and therefore are widening the scope of underground works and the size of underground projects. Planning and designing railway with an explicit reference to safety issues is becoming of utmost importance since the combination of high speed, mixed goods-passenger traffic and extreme length of the new tunnels under design or concept evaluation, have sensitively modified the inherent safety of the railway tunnel. Although the probability of occurrence of accidental events may still be considered rather low, the possible consequences of such events in long tunnels can be catastrophic, therefore raising the overall risk to levels that may be no more acceptable (3).

TUNNEL FIRE HAZARD

On November 18, 1987, a major fire that started an old escalator in Londons Kings Cross underground station killed 31 people and caused extensive damages. The incident was attributed to the negligence and lack of clear fire-fighting procedures. Turning to San Francisco, the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system had experienced train fires in 1974, 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1979; most of them were related and confined to the car interior, but others arose for malfunctioning involving under car equipment. Similar fire statistics are available from practically every subway system around the world
(2)

. On

May 29, 1999, a crash resulted a fire occurred in the Tauren Tunnel in Austria one of the most important transit routes through the Alps connecting the industrial areas of southern Germany and northern Italy. The result of the crash and the following fire catastrophe in terms of passengers and vehicles involved were 12 victims died, 24 cars and 16 trucks burnt out completely
(23)

. People are quite concerned about the safety

aspects of vehicular tunnels, this was consequent to a recent fire resulting of a truck carrying diesel outside the Lion Rock Tunnel in July 1999 (5). The Table in Appendix (A) shows the fire accidents in tunnels worldwide.

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Due to the fact that tunnels are enclosed spaces, fires that occur in them result in poor visibility and the spread of smoke and toxic gases along the tunnel, the rapid development of high temperatures and a reduction in the level of oxygen in the air. The extent of harm to road users in the event of a fire in a tunnel is therefore far greater than is the case on open roads. In view of this, it is essential to provide adequate facilities for road users to escape or be rescued by emergency crews. This means that there should be enough escape routes and that the ventilation system needs to be fast and efficient, particularly in tunnels with bi-directional traffic. These prerequisites also apply in the event of an accident that does not involve fire, but which results in the release of toxic gases. Fires in tunnels not only endanger the lives of road users, they can also cause damage to structural components, installations and vehicles, with the result that the tunnel concerned may have to be closed for a considerable length of time. When a fire accident occurs in a tunnel, much more severe damage results than a fire occurring in the open air. Aggravating factors include confined space, limited number of escape roads, and loss of visibility (5). Fire incidents such as, for example, a major fire at the foot of the shaft, must never occur, since they lead to a catastrophe if people are trapped (24). Three major decisions in relation to Tunnel Fire Hazard can be considered in the safe operation of tunnels. These are 1- Spacing of the cross-passages that link the running tunnels to the service tunnel and form the escape routes for people caught in a fire. 2- Construction of shuttle carrier wagons for heavy goods vehicles involved in the severe tunnel fires. 3- Non-segregation of car drivers and passengers from their vehicles when a fire occurs. Since the intervention time for rescue teams from the outside is very long (up to more than one hour), self-rescue is a priority
(24)

. Workers will be trained and have practice in

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the use of available fire-fighting equipment. In addition, all persons must have self-rescue equipment in their disposal. Consideration will be given to the effects of fires within the ventilation concept. At the foot of the shaft and, in other places, survival containers will be installed that have an independent emergency air supply. In emergency situations, these can guarantee survival until the end of fire or the arrival of external help (24). The occurrence of tunnel fires due to trucks carrying liquid fuel is low if the vehicles are equipped with proper fire protection system. Even so, consequences of such fires should not be disregarded. The fire environment due to a liquid spillage fire might be hazardous. Hot smoke would be generated rapidly, and the smoke front would travel with high speed. This would be very dangerous during traffic congestion (5). Blocking of a tunnel such as after a fire occurs cause a huge economic loss. There may be significant damage to the roadway pavement and slabs. Tunnel equipment may be destroyed or severely damaged by the high temperature and fire byproducts. The extent of damage determines how long the tunnel will be closed for investigation and maintenance. It is very important that safety be provided to the tunnel users. It is recommended that the tunnel management authority should work out a proper safety management scheme. For example, every truck of enclosed structure should be inspected before entering a vehicular tunnel longer than a specified length. If necessary, all trucks of enclosed structure should be prohibited from using the vehicular tunnels during rush hours (5). As an example Eisner (6) reviews the operation of the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority (CTSA) and the process applied to a particular project: the design, construction and operation of the European Channel Tunnel (CT).

The European Channel Tunnel (CT)

The Channel Tunnel serves rail traffic and links up the terminals near Folkestone in the south of England and Calais in northern France. The trains travel through the two single-

14

track running tunnels. Both running tunnels have a continuous escape way in order to enable passengers and train staff to get out of the tunnel quickly in the event of emergency. A service tunnel is located between the two running tunnels as an escape and access facility in the event of an accident in one of the running tunnels and provides access to the technical centers, which are distributed along it. The tunnel is used for the following services:

The passenger shuttles for cars and busses; The freight shuttles for trucks as well as; Express and goods trains belonging to the national railway companies (3).

The seminal safeguard against the heat, smoke and carbon monoxide from a fire, two main running tunnels, each linked by frequent cross-passages to a third, fresh-air, service tunnel, as well as the idea of shuttles composed of fully enclosed, seal able and fire-resistant wagons for carrying cars and their passengers (tourist shuttles).

TUNNEL AIR POLLUTION

The tunnel air within a tunnel is polluted by exhaust gas from vehicles, and such air is forced out from the tunnel through ventilation equipment. Conventionally, there are two types of sensors that control this ventilation device, which are: 1- A smog permeability meter that directly obtains the pollution level from the decay in light projected in the axial direction of the tunnel. In this method, the range of projection is limited and only a limited area can be detected. 2- An indirect method; a method of estimating air pollution from the number of vehicles entering the tunnel. In this method, the type and size of the vehicle cannot be obtained and thus accurate understanding of the pollution level is not possible. Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) are not only advanced vehicle control systems

15

but also infrastructure sensing systems which detect traffic flow, car crashes, etc. These systems can also detect the tunnel air pollution level. If the tunnel air pollution level can be detected through the construction of a simple system, precise ventilation control can be promoted, and the visibility through the tunnel can be guaranteed for the drivers. Tunnel air pollution level can be detected using the ITV camera image installed inside the tunnel. When the tunnel air is polluted, the overall boundary sharpness of subjects taken by the ITV camera installed inside the tunnel deteriorate compared to when the tunnel air is unpolluted. By making use of this phenomenon, a method of determining the level of air pollution from the boundary sharpness of subjects in the image could be designed (7).

Tunnel Ventilation
Tunnel ventilation is of major significance with respect to preventing or limiting the dissemination of smoke and toxic gases in the event of a fire. In the past few years, the reduction in the emission of pollutants from motor vehicles has overtaken the danger of fires as the main criterion for choosing and dimensioning tunnel ventilation systems. With the drastic reduction in emission levels, especially from heavy goods vehicles, it is now capacity in the event of a fire that has become the determining factor for the design of ventilation systems. The control mechanisms for tunnel ventilation need to include tracking of the longitudinal airflow and, in specific cases, fire detection. The following minimum measures relative to ventilation are to be taken: Air and smoke extraction dampers should be installed, which can be operated separately. The longitudinal air and smoke velocity should be constantly checked and the automatic steering process of the ventilation system (dampers, fans, etc.) adjusted accordingly.

Improved fire-detection systems should be built in (26).

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Power Failure
Without safety measures, power failure at a shaft access site would have severe consequences: no shaft transportation, people trapped, no lighting, no communication, no ventilation, accumulation of pollutants, no cooling, rise in temperature, water rising in declining headings, filling of the shaft pit, and drowning of the people. Therefore, a redundant power supply for all critical installations is required (24).

SAFETY MEASURES IN LONG RAILWAY TUNNELS

Four basic types of safety measures can be distinguished in order to reduce the risk in tunnels; these are prevention measures, mitigation measures, self-rescue measures, and assisted rescue methods (3), (25).

Prevention measures
(a) Systematic recording and specific evaluation of irregularities: all accidents during operation of the railways are recorded, evaluated and documented systematically. (b) Automatic train control: automatic, computer-based train control system, where data are transmitted to the tractive unit computer intermittently via coils and/or continuously via cables installed in the track. (c) Combined brake lock-up and hot-box detector: to be installed ahead of the tunnel portals in such a location that the train in case of detectors reaction can stop before entering the tunnel. (d) Fire Detectors: To be installed in the tunnel or alternatively along the cable for the registration of the rise in temperature of the train service.

Mitigation measures
(a) Emergency braking override in the tunnel: such a system allows the engine driver to override emergency braking initiated inside a tunnel, so the train, in case of a fire, can continue its journey with reduced speed until it reaches the portal; consequently, the evacuation of passengers becomes easier.

17

(b) Fire resistant rolling stock: the wagons, in case of fire, should be able to continue the journey outside the tunnel; a fire resistance of the order of 30 min is required; such requirement is verified through a real scale experiments. (c) Fire detection system: portable fire extinguishers can be installed. (d) Coaches compatible with fire protection regulations: they shall be gas-tight and divided into fire sections; consequently fire propagation is better controlled. (e) Ventilation System: this system strongly depends on the tunnel (for example diesel trains); it can include vertical shafts, horizontal audits and ventilators in the tunnel; special attention must be given to the emergency procedures of the ventilation after an accident.

Self-rescue measures
(a) Escape ways with appropriate geometrical dimensions. (b) Emergency telephones. (c) Footway, railings and escape-way signs (d) Self-illuminating exit signs every 50 min. (e) Tunnel emergency lighting. (f) Preventive information of the passengers about correct behavior in case of accident. (g) Side drifts or vertical emergency exit, utilization of existing opportunities and (h) Sound training of train personnel related to the correct behavior in case of an accident.

Assisted rescue measures

(a) Helipads at the tunnel portals and the emergency exits; (b) Access roads to the tunnel portals; (c) Proper radio channel for rescue services; (d) Definition of a rescue concept with strict time plans (arrival at the accident location within 30 min, evacuation procedure, etc.); and

18

(e) Rescue vehicles. The implementation of the safety measures is an interdisciplinary process involving authorities, designers, rolling stock producers etc.

ENSURING SAFETY IN TUNNELS

For both new and renovated road tunnels, structural and technical safety installations have to comply with national and international recommendations, regulations or standards. These safety installations can only be fully effective if they are well operated and combined with an efficient emergency service and correct behavior on the part of road users. In this connection, traffic control and monitoring by the police or other relevant authority have a preventive effect. However, even permanent and intensive efforts on the part of road construction authorities and traffic police cannot fully eliminate the occurrence of accidents and fires in tunnels (26). The following objectives have been set for attaining the optimal level of safety in road tunnels (26): Primary objective: prevention To prevent critical events which endanger human life, the environment and tunnel installations. Secondary objective: reduction of consequences Of events such as accidents and fires; to create the ideal prerequisites for 1- People involved in the incident to rescue themselves 2- The immediate intervention of road users to prevent greater consequences. A fire can generally be easily extinguished immediately after it breaks out, but ten minutes later it will have developed into a full blaze 3- Ensuring efficient action by emergency services 4- Protecting the environment 5- Limiting material damage. Efforts to increase the level of road safety have to be primarily aimed at preventing these
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human errors. The second step is to ensure that errors that may still be made by drivers do not give rise to grave consequences. Basically, the driving rules that apply in tunnels are the same as those for open roads, i.e. maintaining a safe distance, observing speed limits and maximum loads, thoroughly securing all loads and warning other road users in the event of a breakdown or congestion. And even more than on open roads, it is recommended that drivers listen to their radio while in tunnels so that they are able to receive traffic reports as well as possible specific instructions. However, there are a number of additional traffic regulations that apply especially to tunnels: Overtaking is forbidden if there is only one lane in each direction No turning or reversing is allowed, if not specifically asked for by tunnel officials Headlights must be used, even in lit tunnels No stopping is allowed in a tunnel, except in an emergency, in which case the engine must be switched off immediately. The main tasks of tunnel operators are as follows: To secure safety for users and operators both in normal conditions (prevention) and in the event of an incident To monitor the efficient performance of all installations (including ventilation, lighting, etc.) during normal operation and adjust them as required in the event of an incident To properly maintain all structural and electromechanical installations.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the previous sections, tunnel safety was briefly discussed. It was found that the behavior of road users and the characteristics of certain materials need further research from the point of view of safety in road tunnels. The following conclusions

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and recommendations should be the subject of in-depth studies in tunnels: Driver behavior and traffic crashes are the major importance when designing road tunnels and revising tunnel guidelines. Insight into tunnel operation ensures that tunnels can be built to a high level of safety at reasonable costs. Low-cost tunnels can be built and equipped to a high level of safety without excessive use of equipment and costly design standards (17). Under a good visual environment after the cleaning of a tunnel walls the contrast of road and wall surface can be clearly recognized. This shows that a safe driving is ensured and the comfort is improved. In the future, it is necessary to analyze the various mind and body reactions and psychological factors and clarify the relationship between the visual environments (9). It was also found that improved lighting and tunnel entrance design have contributed positively to a significant reduction in tunnel transition zone accidents. However, there is still room for additional tunnel entrance lighting improvements to further tunnel traffic safety (17). Tunnels are not crash prone but accident severity is somewhat higher in tunnels than on other roadways in general. It was also found that improved lighting and tunnel entrance design have contributed positively to a significant reduction in tunnel transition zone accidents. However, there is still room for additional tunnel entrance lighting improvements to further tunnel traffic safety (17). Studying the crash types shows that the proportions of frontal, single vehicle and other type crashes in tunnels are similar to those on road network as a whole. Rear-end collisions, however are relatively twice as common in road tunnels as on the open roads (17). Crash rates are highest in tunnels with an ADT below 1000. However, these

21

tunnels are also most likely to be built to the lowest standard. Results also show that narrow tunnels (less number of lanes) have a higher crash rate than wider ones. Also it was found that the average crash rate for the sub-sea tunnels in a Norwegian study was estimated at 0.07 annual person injury crashes per millionvehicle km. And this is a comparatively low accident rate. In these tunnels, the effect of entrance zones will have little impact on the average values (17). It was found that there is a concentration of accidents outside tunnel openings on roads with one-way traffic. In such cases rear-end collisions predominate. These are often related to high traffic volumes and are sometimes exacerbated by blinding sunlight and closely spaced traffic signals. The occurrence of tunnel fires due to trucks carrying liquid fuel is low if the vehicles are equipped with proper fire protection system. Even so, consequences of such fires should not be disregarded. The fire environment due to a liquid spillage fire might be hazardous. Hot smoke would be generated rapidly, and the smoke front would travel with high speed. This would be very dangerous during traffic congestion (5). Blocking of a tunnel such as after a fire occurs cause a huge economic loss. There may be significant damage to the roadway pavement and slabs. Tunnel equipment may be destroyed or severely damaged by the high temperature and fire byproducts. The extent of damage determines how long the tunnel will be closed for investigation and maintenance (5). Immediate and reliable detection of fires as well as identification of their exact locations are of the utmost importance in most tunnels, and advanced systems are currently in the process of being developed. Smoke control is a fundamental part of fire safety. Improvements of ventilation systems and their operation should be the subject of continuing research.

22

It is very important that safety be provided to the tunnel users. It is recommended that the tunnel management authority should work out a proper safety management scheme. For example, every truck of enclosed structure should be inspected before entering a vehicular tunnel longer than a specified length. If necessary, all trucks of enclosed structure should be prohibited from using the vehicular tunnels during rush hours (5).

Driving simulators have great utility for evaluating possible problems with guide signing for tunnels. This tool allows not only the identification and confirmation of problems, but also result in improved signing for tunnels. Simulated drive allows both researchers and sign designers to observe problems that were not so obvious on two-dimensional plan sheets (9).

Sign designers should take advantage of a driving simulator as a tool when freeway guide signing is being developed for situations when complex geometry is involved, when there are multiple exits in close proximity to one another, and when there is an unusually large amount to guidance information to be presented to the driver (9).

In an image processing method that monitors the level of a tunnel air pollution caused by vehicle exhaust gas, it was found that there is a close correlation between the edge strength output of the image taken inside a tunnel and the level of the tunnel air pollution. This system could be used in actual situations (7).

The competencies and responsibilities of tunnel operators should be clearly defined in the form of regulations. Operators should provide their staff with comprehensive specialized training so that they are able to deal effectively with any incident that may occur (26).

An international database for recording data concerning fires in tunnels should be

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established so that it is possible to carry out comprehensive evaluations. This requires the positive collaboration of all parties involved, including fire brigades, on the basis of commonly agreed definitions.

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References:
1- Kirzhner, F., and Rosenhouse, G. Numerical Analysis of Tunnel Dynamic Response to Earth Motions. Seismic Analysis Tunneling and Underground Space Technology, Volume 15, No. 3, Pages 249 258, 2000. 2- Cheng, L.H., Ueng, T.H., and Liu, C.W. Simulation of Ventilation and Fire in the Underground Facilities. Fire Safety Journal, Volume 36, 2001, Pages 597-619. 3- Diamantidis, D., Zuccarelli, F., and Westhuser, A, Safety of Long Railway Tunnels. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Volume 67, 2000, Pages 135-145. 4- Kawataki, H., Ito, M., and Okada T. Control operation of emergency vehicles at disaster. Paper presented at the ITS congress, 1996. 5- Li, J. S. M. and Chow, W.K. Illegal Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Their Effects on Tunnel Safety. Tunnel Safety, Tunneling and Underground Space Technology, Volume 15, No. 2, Pages 167 173, 2000. 6- Eisner, H.S. The channel Tunnel Safety Authority. Safety Science. Volume 36, 2000, Pages 1-18 7- Ueda. S., Murata, S., Kato, H., Kaneta, M., and Miyata, Y. Development of road Ambient Monitoring Systems. A paper submitted for presentation at the January 2002 Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting. Washington, D.C. 8- United Nations (UN)- Economic and Social Council Recommendations of the Group of Experts on safety in road Tunnels. Final Report. http://www.unece.org/trans/main/ac7/ac7rep/ac709e.doc 9- Upchurch, J., Fisher, D., Carpenter, R., Dutta, A., Freeway Guide Sign Design for the Central Artery Tunnel Using a Driving Simulator. A paper submitted for presentation at the January 2002 Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting. Washington, D.C. 10- Kurihara, K., Hayama, A., and Tomitaka H. On the Possibility of Using ITS Technology to Eliminate Bottlenecks. Research Institute, Japan Highway Public Corporation Paper presented at the ITS congress, 1996.

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11- Hozumi, J., and Sato, M. Evaluation of Visual Environment In-Tunnel by Image Processing. . A paper submitted for presentation at the January 2002 Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting. Washington, D.C. 12- Noda, N. Making of visual environment measurement system in tunnel for trial purposes. The Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan, 1990 13- Japan Highway Public Corp. Investigation research concerning visual environment measurement system in tunnel (No. 3). 1992. 14- Matsuda, K., and Hozumi, J., Luminance distribution measurement system in tunnel. The Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan, 1993. 15- Hozumi, J., and Suda, Y. Luminance distribution measurement system, The Illuminating Engineering Institute of Japan, 1994 16- Sato, M., Kobayashi, A., Hozumi, J., and Kodaira, Y. Measurement of Road Visual Environment by Image Processing, The Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan, 1996 17- Amundsen, F.H. and Ranes, G. Studies on Traffic Accidents in Norwegian Road Tunnels. Tunnel Safety, Tunneling and Underground Space Technology, Volume 15, No. 1, Pages 3-11, 2000. 18- Kolic, D., Risk Analysis Methodology for Underground Mass-Transit Projects. A paper submitted for presentation at the January 2002 Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting. Washington, D.C. 19- Snel, A., van Hasselt, D. Risk Management in the Amesterdam North/South Metroline: A Matter of Process-Communication Instead of Calculation. Int. Conf. Challenges for the 21st Century, Alten et alt.(eds), Balkema 1999, Rotterdam, pages. 179-186. 20- Kolic D., and Wagner H. Risk Analysis for Subway Systems. Professional Days of Tunnel Construction and Civil Engineering Budapest 2000, Budapest, Hungary,

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May 29-30, 2000, pages. 49-57

21- Eskesen, S.D., and Kampmann, J. Risk Reduction Strategy in Urban Tunneling: Experience From the Copenhagen Metro. AITES-ITA 2000 World Tunnel Congress, Durban, South Africa. Pages 161-166

22- Halcrow/Fox J.V Mass Rapid Transit in Developing Countries Final Report, World Bank Urban Transport Strategy Review, July 2000, Page 228. 23- Leitner, A. The Fire Catastrophe in the Tauern Tunnel: Experience and Conclusions for the Austrian Guidelines. Tunneling and Underground Space technology, Volume 16, Pages 217-223, 2001. 24- Vogel, M., and Rast, H.P. AlpTransit safety in Construction as a Challenge: Health and safety Aspects in Very Deep Tunnel Construction. Health and Safety in Tunneling Tunneling and Underground Space technology, Volume 15, No. 4, Pages 481-484, 2000. 25- Zuccarelli, F., and Diamantidis, D. Safety Concept for Long Railway Tunnels Application to Brenner pass. . Proceedings of Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels Conference,Granada, Spain, 1995.

26- The worlds longest Tunnel Page, Serious Fire Accidents in Road Tunnels http://home.no.net/lotsberg/artiklar/brann/en_tab.html

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APPENDIX A

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Fire Accidents in Worlds Road Tunnels:

Year TUNNEL Length Holland 1949 2 550 m Mont 1974 Blanc 11 600 m 1976 Crossing BP - A6 430 m 1978 Velsen 770 m Nihonzaka 2 045 m Location Country New York USA France-Italy Paris France Vehicle where fire occurred Lorry with 11 tons of carbondisulfid Lorry Lorry with drums of 16 tons polyesterfilm 4 lorries 2 cars 4 lorries 2 cars Most possible cause of fire Load falling off lorry explosion Motor High speed CONSEQUENCES Duration Consequences Damaged Structures of fire people vehicles and installations 66 injured Serious 10 lorries 4h smoke damage 13 cars inhalation over 200 m 15 min 1h 1 injured 12 light injuries (smoke) 5 dead 5 injured 7 dead 1 injured 1 lorry Serious damage over 150 m

Velsen Nederland Shitzuoka Japan

Front-rearcollision Front-rearcollision Collision with side wall and overturning Front-rearcollision

1h 20

4 lorries 2 cars

1979

159 h

Serious damage over 30 m 127 Serious lorries damage 46 cars over 1 100 m

1 truck with 3600 litres of Japan paint in 200 cans 1 car, 1 coach Caldecott Oakland 1 lorry with 1982 1 028 m USA 33000 l of petrol Soviet military 1982 Mazar-e-Sharif Salang column. At 3. - Kabul 2 700 m least Nov. Afghanistan one petrol truck. Pecorila Gnes Lorry 1983 Galleria Savone wth fish 662 m Italy Kajiwara 1980 740 m L'Arme 1986 1 105 m 1987 Gumefens Nice France Berne Lorry with trailer 1 lorry

1 dead

1 truck, 4t Serious 1 truck, damage 10t over 280 m 3 lorries Serious 1 coach damage 4 cars over 580 m

2h 40

7 dead 2 injured

Unknown. Probably mine explosion

> 200 dead

Front-rearcollision Braking after high speed Front-rear2h

9 dead 22 injured 3 dead 5 injured 2 dead

10 cars Little damage 1 lorry 4 cars 2 lorries Some equipment destroyed Slight

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343 m Rldal 1990 4 656 m

Switzerland Rldal Norway

collision 50 min 1 injured

1 van

damage Little damage Some equipment destroyed

VW transporter with trailer Mont Lorry with 1990 Blanc France-Italy 20 tons of 11 600 m cotton Serra 1 car + lorry Bologne-Florence 1993 Ripoli with Italy 442 m rolls of paper 1993 Hovden 1 290m Huguenot 3 914 m Hyanger Norway South-Afrika Austria Motor cycle 2 cars Bus with 45 passengers Lorry with trailer 1 tanker with liquid gas + 1 little bus

Motor

2 injured 4 dead 4 injured

1 lorry

Collision

2h 30

5 lorries Little damage 11 cars 111 m insulation material destroyed Serious damage Serious damage

Front-rearcollision Electrical fault Collision

1h

1 motor 5 injured in the cycle collision. 2 cars 1 dead 28 injured 3 dead in the collision 4 injured 5 dead 20 injured 1 coach 1 lorry 1 van 1 car

1994

1h 1h

1995 Pfander 10. 6 719 m April 1996 Isola delle 18. Femmine March 148 m

Palermo Italy

Front-rearcollision

1999 Mont 24. Blanc March 11 600 m 1999 Tauern 29. 6 401 m May

France-Italy

Lorry with flour and margarine

Oil leakage Motor

39 dead

Serious 1 tanker damage 1 bus tunnel closed 18 cars for 2.5 days 23 lorries Serious 10 cars damage 1 motor Tunnel cycle reopens 2 fire 22.12.2001 engines 14 lorries 26 cars Serious damage

A10 SalzburgSpittal Austria

Lorry with paint

Front-rear-collision 4 cars and 2 lorries

12 dead 49 injured

The trailertruck that caused the Front-rear-collision multiple A trailer-truck 2000 E 134 Drammen Seljestad collision had a pushed a car 14. Haugesund 45 min 1 272 m diesel fire into 4 cars that July Norway in the engine had stopped behind room another truck. before the collision.

6 injured

1 lorry 6 cars 1 MC

Serious damage. NOK 1 mill. Tunnel colsed for 1 1/2 days.

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2001 Prapontin 28. 4 409 m May 2001 Gleinalm 6. 8 320 m Aug. 2001 St. 24. Gotthard Oct. 16 918 m

A 32 Torino Bardonecchia Italy A 9 near Graz Austria A2 Switzerland Car Front collission lorry - car Front collission 2 lorries

19 injured by smoke 5 dead 4 injured

Closed til 6. June in direction Frejus (west)

Lorry

11 dead

Serious damage. Closed 2 months

Table of Fire Accidents in World Road Tunnels

Source: The

worlds Most Longest Tunnel Page (26).

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