Goodness of Sanskrit

Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar

Edited by Chikafumi Watanabe Michele Desmarais Yoshichika Honda

D. K. Printworld New Delhi, India January 2012

From Saskta-sdhut: Goodness of Sanskrit. Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar. Edited by Chikafumi Watanabe, Michele Desmarais, and Yoshichika Honda. Published by D. K. Printworld, New Delhi, India, 2012.

Observations on yogipratyaka

Raffaele Torella A seemingly marginal topic in the immense panorama of the philosophies of India is the perception of the yogi (yogipratyaka, yogijna), the special power of insight and visualisation that most of the Indian traditions attribute to the yogis. The term yogi here does not designate someone who has just happened to devote himself to the ancient practices of this discipline, but rather a being that, though being human, is perceived as being (or having become) intrinsically different from the generality of men. Indian philosophers, including the loftiest ones, call them asmadviia different from [superior to] us. The existence of such powers in yogis is taken for granted. Not only is the need to prove them not felt, but they are considered so firmly rooted in common sense (lokaprasiddha) as to be confidently used for exemplification, that is, to confirm the existence of other phenomena deemed to be problematic or somehow in need of demonstration.2 This article does not aim at an exhaustive treatment of this topic, but only presents some of the guidelines of a research in progress, which will, hopefully in a not too distant future, take the shape of a monograph. As a provisional starting point, we could take the third section of the Yogastra, dealing with supernatural powers (vibhti), particularly stras 1655. From the sustained practice of yoga, a radical enhancement of the normal powers of perception derives, which enables the yogi to see distant objects or objects of very minute dimensions, including the atoms, to understand the voices of all living beings, to know the past and the future, to penetrate other minds, to know what happened in his and others previous lives, to foresee the moment of death, to obtain superhuman strength, to know the position of stars and sidereal spaces, to eliminate the need for food, and so on. The fact that these beliefs were not restricted to the circles specifically involved in the theory and practice of yoga is shown by the hints, brief but nonetheless quite explicit, that we can find in other
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1 2

I am very grateful to David Mellins for kindly improving my English, and for his helpful comments. See e.g. Utpaladeva resorting to the example of the magic creation of the yogi to account for iva creating the universe without a material cause (varapratyabhijkrik, I.5.7, II.4.10; cf. Torella 2002: 116, 179).

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ancient texts, such as those of Vaieika and Nyya.3 Vaieika, a school that for sure cannot be suspected to indulge in the mystic or irrational, refers to the perception of the yogi in its very root-stra (IX.1317, according to Candrnanda).4 These stras are implicitly referred to in a passage of Praastapdas Padrthadharmasagraha (Biardeau 1964: 120, Isaacson 1993: 146147), which adds some interesting elements to the overall picture: But for yogis, who are superior to us, when [in the condition called] yukta,5 an unerring seeing of the objects own nature arises, by virtue of [their] internal organ [which] is assisted by dharma arising from yoga, in regard to [the following substances:] their own tman and [the tman of] others, ether, space, time, atoms, air and the internal organ, [as well as] in regard to the qualities, actions, universals and ultimate individuators which are inherent in these [substances], and in regard to [the category] inherence. Furthermore, for [yogis in the condition called] viyukta, perceptual knowledge arises in regard to objects which are fine (skma), concealed [from sight], or at a [great] distance [] (Padrthadharmasagraha, pp. 464465; transl. Isaacson 1993: 146147). Later on, Praastapda returns to the subject, and elaborates on it. In fact, there are also other types of seers, first and foremost the vedic is, who are understood to have seen the vedic hymns, to have authored the root-stras of various branches of learning, and to be the ultimate authorities on language. These semidivine beings belong to an irretrievable past, and their ontological distance from us cannot be filled, even more than the distance that divides us from another different, precisely the yogi.6 But with some exceptions In the is, the creators of tradition [rdhara glosses: the authors of the Veda,] by virtue of a conjunction between the internal organ (manas)
3 Pakilasvmin Vtsyyana (around 500 CE) in his Bhya on Nyyastra I.3 (p. 9) refers to pratyaka yujanasya yogasamdhijam, quoting Vaieikastra IX.13. 4 5 6 Wezler (1982: 664669) tentatively states that the date of the insertion of these stras in the body of the Vaieikastra is relatively recent (post-Praastapda?). yukta is said of the yogi in the state of perfect absorption (samdhi); the yogi is termed viyukta, when he has come out of samdhi. However, when later speculation on this subject more and more shifts to its epistemological implications, yogijna and ijna will tend to be taken as mere synonyms.

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and the self,7 and of a special merit, an intuitive cognition (prtibha) arises, which furnishes an infallible vision regarding objects which exceed sensorial faculties and belong to the past, the future or the presentsuch as dharma, and which may, or may not, figure in revealed texts. This form of cognition is, primarily, widespread among the divine seers, but sometimes it may also occur among ordinary beings, as when a little girl says: Tomorrow, my brother will come, it is my heart to say so. Then, there is the cognition of the perfects (siddha), which however is not basically different from the latter8 (ibid., pp. 627 629). The terms yogipratyaka (or yogijna), ijna, siddhajna and pratibh,9 though arising in contexts that are (at least partially) distinct, end up being taken as synonymous terms by medieval traditions, united by a common potential: the possibility for the individual to have a different kind of cognition from the ordinary. According to Nyya (but also to many other schools that tacitly accept the Nyya way to account for ordinary reality), normal cognition is characterised by the interaction of six factors, which mutually condition each other through their
7 That is, by jumping the other factors that come into play in the ordinary cognitive process, established by the Vaieikastra (V.2.12, IX.15) in the number of four (tman, indriya, manas, artha; in ordinary perception they can be reduced to three or two, according to the specific nature of the object perceived (Padrthadharmasagraha pp. 459464; cf. Lyssenko 1998: 8889). See also Nyyastra I.9. 8 According to Praastapda, the main difference between ijnna and siddhajna lies in the fact that the former is spontaneous, while the latter depends on a special effort and is the result of a process of perfection, which involves the use of unguents and other magical substances (cf. Lyssenko 1998: 101102). Yogastra III.32. 9 To these we can add praj (particularly in the Buddhist context); according to Jayaratha (ad Tantrloka I.2, vol. I, p. 17), praj is equivalent to pratibh. Bharthari links explicitly pratibh to yoga: in fact, yoga is listed among the six possible causes of pratibh (Vkyapadya II.152). As an example of this kind of pratibh, the Vtti mentions precisely one of the most characteristic powers of the yogi: penetrating the minds of others (p. 222 parbhipryajndiu). According to Vkyapadya I.3738, some particular beings (the Vtti simply says: i), with their divine eyes (rea cku), can perceive what exceeds the range of ordinary senses; what they say cannot be invalidated by inference. In these beings, in whom light has become manifest and mind is not defiled, the knowledge of the past and future arises, and this knowledge does not differ from perception. On the cognition of siddhas, see also

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interaction: self, body, senses, sense objects, the mind, internal sense (Nyyastra I.9); as we have seen (fn. 7), in the classical Vaieika doctrine these factors are reduced to four. At this point, we can already figure out the possible primary reason why, from inside the brahmanical tradition, staunch opponents of any form of yogipratyaka have risen, as discordant voices in an essentially unison choir. In denying even the theoretic possibility of a special perception by the yogi, the Mmsakas are not so much driven by their strong realistic stance, which keeps them distant from any mystical or esoterical practice, but, rather, by the epistemological consequences of such a privileged power of cognition.10 To admit that man, either due to a natural gift or a specific psychophysical training, is given access to what exceeds the range of senses (or, we can add, of human reason), poses a threat to atndriya par excellence, dharma, whose radical otherness requires foundation on a non-human authority: vedic revelation. For this, Mms has established itself as the exclusive interpreter and guardian. Significantly, the Mmsakas anti-yogi polemics flares up in precisely at the time that Buddhist tradition introduces yogipratyaka. Unsurprisingly, this does not occur within mystico-religious schools, but precisely within logico-epistemological ones. It is in fact Dignga who is the first to consider yogic perception as one of the recognised varieties of the primary means of knowledge, perception (pratyaka), side by side with sensorial perception, mental (mnasa) perception and the introspective awareness (svasavitti) that every mental event has of itself. In Pramasamuccaya I.6cd, he defines yogic perception as the vision of the object as it is in itself (arthamtra), unmixed with the teaching of the masters.11 Digngas qualification as it is in itself (mtra) is explained by
10 The considerations of the Mmsakasin the words of their main exponent, Kumrila (lokavrttika, Codan 134136; cf. McCrea forthcoming)concern primarily the possibility of verification: if yogipratyaka is taken in the highest sense of perception of what is intrinsically beyond the cognitive power of ordinary man, or as synonymous with omniscience, then it escapes verification (unless by another omniscient). If, instead, it is understood as the perception of an object that is outside the range of normal perception only occasionally and provisionally, then it is indeed verifiable but also basically futile. 11 Pramasamuccaya I.5cd yogin gurunirdevyatibhinnrthamtradk, to which the svavtti has very little to add: yoginm apy gamavikalpvyavakram arthamtradarana pratyakam. Therefore, the teaching of the masters, according to Dignga, is to be understood as the conceptualisations deriving from [or the various alternatives provided by] the revealed tradition. Cf. the occurrence of this unusual compound in Vkya-

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Jinendrabuddhi, as meaning with the exclusion of any erroneous superimposition.12 This concept, as introduced by Dignga, is taken up and developed by Dharmakrti, who in the Nyyabindu describes the yogic perception as that which arises at the end of the progressive intensification of the meditation (bhvan) on a real object (I.11 bhtrthabhvanprakaraparyantaja yogijna ceti).13 From Dharmakrtis Pramavrttika (PV) III.281286 and Pramavinicaya I, pp. 2729, vv. I.2832, we learn that what makes this cognitive experience unique is its identification with meditation, visualisation, inner cultivationconceptual and projective processes, which however attain such a vividness and clarity (sphua, spaa) that they become indistinguishable from sensorial perception proper.14 In fact, the laconic definition by Dignga and the very few passages that Dharmakrti devotes to this theme strike us for an undeniable difference in emphasis: while the former mentions yogipratyaka only at the moment of the presentation of the pramas, the latter seems to insert it in a context that is essentially soteriological (cf. Eltschinger forthcoming). Furthermore, Digngas requirement that yogipratyaka be unmixed with the teaching of the masters does not seem to figure in Dharmakrtis conception, which admits that bhvan may encompass this in its process, since a correct bhvan may be applied only to an object sanctioned by the teaching of the Buddhaor even provided by him, such as the Four Noble Truths. The two levels of understanding have been unified only by the post-Dharmakrti authors. It is not without a certain uneasiness that we see Jinendrabuddhi continue his concise comments on Digngas epistemological treatment by shifting abruptly to the meditative-soteriological orientation that will be later adopted by Dharma-

padya II.233cd angamavikalp tu svaya vidyopavartate. After all, also ordinary pratyaka could share this definition; the difference, if I understand it correctly, is that yogipratyaka does not depend on sensorial faculties (Vilmalavat p. 57 yath mnasam avikalpakam pratyakam, tath yoginm api; Pramasamuccayasvavtti p. 3 [] indriynapekatvn mnasa []. 12 Vilmalavat, pp. 5657 mtraabdo dhyropitrthavyavacchedrtha. 13 On the many problematic aspects of this definition see below. 14 This point is the object of strong criticism by all brahmanical opponents (see below). It is very interesting to contrast what Dharmakrti and Utpaladeva (cf. Torella 2007: 546548, 556561) understand by sphuatva in a very similar context, and to see the different, if not opposite, ways they propose to realise it.

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krti.15 Lastly, to further complicate the matter, there is the fact that it is not altogether clear (at least, to me) who precisely are the Buddhist referents of Kumrilas critique, which does not seem to be addressed to the positions of Dignga and Dharmakrti alone. The Buddhist concept of yogipratyaka thus evolves apart from mere supernatural powers,16 which are the culmination and the prize of the career of a proficient yogi, as the admission of the yogic cognition is more and more tightly bound to the concept of omniscience, proper to the Buddha, and the basis of the truth of his teaching, which cannot (nor does it want to) claim extrahuman authority. Moreover, the concept of omniscience is itself problematic in that it oscillates between an omniscience that we could define as quantitative and analytic, and another seen to be qualitative and synthetic. While the former (sarvasarvajatva)17 refers to a knowledge of the immense heap of objects that form the universe, the latter (sarvajatva, upayuktasarvajatva), being oriented to the path of liberation (by far preferred by the Buddhists and finding a parallel in Upaniadic notions of the term) can conceivably consist in the knowledge of a single thing (cf. McClintock 2000) through which the great truths of Buddhism (impermanence, the non-existence of the self, etc.) can be derived. This theme, which becomes popular in later speculation, beginning with that of Jnarmitra, had already been introduced by Dharmakrti (PV II.3031): He who knows the true reality of what has to be abandoned or appropriated, along with the means to realise this [abandon and appropriation]: he alone is to be considered a valid means of knowledge, and not at all he who knows everything. Therefore, we should be concerned only by his knowledge regarding what has to be practised, while his knowing the number of all insects is of no use to us. It is precisely
15 However, Dharmakrti, though undoubtedly focusing on the meditative aspect, appears well aware that other dimensions are also present in yogipratyaka; see his remarks on the yogis penetration of other minds in PV III.453457, examined in Franco forthcoming. 16 In the Buddhist circles such powers (ddhi, abhij) are confined to a well defined dimension and acknowledged as partly common also to non-Buddhist traditions (cf. Jaini 1974: 81, Eltschinger 1997: 83). Dharmakrtis irony on this matter (PV II.33) is quite telling: Let us admit that one may have the power of seeing at great distance (dra payatu), or that he does not have such a power, but he should see instead the truth that we require [for our liberation] (tattvam ia tu payatu)! If one endowed with the power of seeing at great distance should be a means of knowledge [of the truth], then we should worship the vultures 17 This is, for instance, the kind of omniscience that Jainism attributes to its founder (Jaini 1974: 7075).

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with the quotation of PV II.30 that Ratnakrti sets out the treatment of upayuktasarvaja he who knows everything is [soteriologically] useful in the Sarvajasiddhi (p. 1).18 It does not seem inappropriate to somehow link sarvasarvajatva with the knowledge of real things (vastu), and upayuktasarvajatva with the knowledge of their properties (vastudharma, like impermanence, etc.); see below fn. 33. Pakilasvmin Vtsyyana had already formulated a similar concept. According to the Bhya on Nyyastra I.1.1, (prameya tattvajnn nireyasdhigama From the true knowledge of [] the objects of valid cognition [] there is an attainment of the supreme good), prameya does not refer to any object of valid cognition but only to the objects whose correct knowledge leads to liberation. In this context, the Nyyabhya mentions the four arthapadas significant statements?,19 which correspond to what has to be eliminated (heyam), the cause of what has to be eliminated (tasya nirvartakam), absolute elimination (hnam tyantikam) and means to elimination (tasyopya), and thus are basically homologous to the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism. The general impression one gathers from the lines just sketched is that Buddhist philosophers care less for the yogic dimension proper and the various powers to be derived from this, their interest rather focusing on the epistemological and meditative implications of the yogipratyaka. The same approach is followed also by their opponents par excellence, the Mmsakas, who seem to have no more than a benevolent indifference towards the mirabilia of the yogi, provided that he limits himself to playing with them. For their part, in addressing the issue of yogipratyaka the Buddhists seem driven by two different yet concentric aims: on the one hand, to admit in the individual the capacity of seeking for truth by his forces alone, independently from the support of any revelation, and, on the other, to protect the central tenets of Buddhism from brahmanical critics, who, through sophisticated dialectics, are capable of questioning any truth obtained by way of reasoning. The latter of these might be the motif of the entrance of yogipratyaka into the epistemological and apologetic agenda of Dignga and his followers: to save the Four Noble Truths from the scathing criticism of the brahmanical philosophers by presenting them as warranted by the means of knowledge widely admitted to be the most reliable, the direct perception, though by a non-ordinary person, such as the yogi and, prior to him, the Buddhawhence the attacks, primarily of the
18 On the omniscience in the sense of upayuktasarvajatva, see Steinkellner 1978: 125, Moriyama forthcoming. 19 Here the two lemmas of the compound padrtha, generally translated as category,

thing, are purposely inverted.

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Mmsakas, against all claim of direct confrontation with matters of nonhuman experience and, more generally, to omniscience (by the Buddha and Mahvra). Such criticism was less severe in Nyya and Vaieika, which, being less directly concerned than the Mms with protecting vedic revelation, limit themselves to denying the omniscience alone, and admit yogipratyaka, provided that it does not become too ambitious.20 The post-dharmakrtian speculation, particularly with Jnarmitra and Ratnakrti,21 perseveres in the analysis of yogipratyaka, but its main concern is the defence of the Buddhas omniscience against the refutations of Mmsakas and Naiyyikas. Thus, from a relatively marginal theme in the cursus of the yoga adepts, the issue of yogipratyaka opens to a far wider dimension, absolutely crucial for Indian philosophy as a whole: the question of whether a seeker of truth may do without revealed tradition. Revelation becomes necessary when truth is shown to be beyond the reach of human knowledge. But, in the face of this requisite, India has allowed, or at least not excluded, an alternative solution: a special power of direct penetration which evades the perilous channels of direct perception (however prestigious it may be), inference and other indirect means of knowledge. In the vedic sphere, two powerswhich are sometimes distinct from each other, sometimes intertwined or partially coincidentfall into this category: dh mental vision, visualisation and pratibh direct intuitive penetration.22 The latter has a longer and more articulated life,23 while the former remains restricted to vedic domain or becomes, in non-technical usage, synony20 One can even surmise that Vaieika antedates Buddhism in warranting what cannot be demonstratedor, at least, cannot be seen (atndriya)through yogipratyaka, when it allows the yogi the capacity to see the inherence, the atoms and so on (see the passage of Praastapda quoted above), and even the antyaviea of the various atoms and liberated souls (Lyssenko 1998: 105110). Cf. Wezler 1982: 669, Lyssenko 1998: 112114. 21 The Sarvajasiddhi of Ratnakrti (Bhnemann 1980) closely follows the two works that his master Jnarmitra devoted to this theme, the Yoginirayaprakaraa and the Sarvajasiddhi (Steinkellner 1977, 1978). The issue of the Buddhas omniscience is already present in the Tattvasagraha and the Pajik thereon (McClintock 2000). 22 For dh, I refer to the famous monograph that Gonda devoted to this term, having so indefinite contours (Gonda 1963); on pratibh, see Gonda 1963: 318348, Kaviraj 1990, Tola 1990. 23 Pratibh is also the gift that Sarasvat bestows to her children, the poets (Granoff 1995). On the role of pratibh in artistic creation and aesthetic speculationextraordinarily interesting but too vast and complex to be even cursorily touched on heresee recently Shulman 2008.

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mous with knowledge in its most general sense.24 A special prestige is ascribed to pratibh in advaita aivism of Kashmir. When in the Tantrloka (T) Abhinavagupta proceeds to a classification of masters, it is the intuitive master that is given the highest rank: his intuitive knowledge (prtibha jnam), also known as the great knowledge (mahjnam), does not depend either on the scriptures or other masters; to him all the other masters have to pay homage.25 Thus, pratibhlike yogipratyaka for the Buddhistsis placed at the summit of spiritual experience by the aivdvaitins. Buddhism often describes the spiritual progress as consisting of three levels: ruta the teaching derived from authoritative texts, cint intellectual reflection and, lastly, bhvan meditative realisation or spiritual cultivation.26 Yogipratyaka is connected with the latter

24 In common usage, pratibh (or prtibhajna) often becomes interchangeable with yogijna/yogipratyaka. Cf. e.g. Jayaratha ad T XVI. 242 (vol. X, p. 95): yoginm prtibhajndav atndriyrthaviaya jnam. 25 The master in whom the correct reasoning [sattarka; as a technical term, it is the highest aga of aiva yoga] has manifested holds authority on everything, is a consecrated one (abhiikta), being initiated by the goddesses of his own consciousness (svasavittidev). Among all the masters he is rightly said to be the principal. In his presence, the other mastersthe constructed ones (kalpita)have no authority. (T IV.42b44a; transl. based on Gnoli 1999: 87). 26 Pramavinicaya I p. 27 yoginm api rutamayena jnenrthn ghtv yukticintmayena vyavasthpya bhvayat tannipattau yat spavabhsi []. Cf. the first Bhvankrama of Kamalala (p. 514 tatra prathama tvat rutamay prajotpdany/ tay hi tvad gamrtham avadhrayati/ tata cintmayy prajay ntaneyrtha nirvedhayati/ tatas tay nicitya bhtam artha bhvayen nbhtam). ruta, cint and bhvan mark three levels of praj. Such progression is also well known in the aiva circles (T XIII.327). According to Arcaa, the yogi (whose power of perception is at stake) is he who possesses the yogato be understood in the dual sense of samdhi and praj faculty of discerning (Dharmottarapradpa, p. 70 praj ca vivekakaraaaktir draavy). Therefore, the yogi is the one who, at the same time, is permanently absorbed (in samdhi) and intent in the activity of discernment (ibid. nityasamhito vivekakaraaaktitatpara ca yog). This interpretation is echoed by the Bauddhatarkabh (cf. Kajiyama 1963: 53): Yogi is he who possesses the yoga, in the sense of a) samdhi, i.e. the concentration of the mind on a single point (cittaikgrat), and b) praj, the discriminative knowledge of the ultimate truth of all things (niesavastutattvavivecik). On the way of bhvan (bhvanmrga) as the culmination of the way of [intellectual] vision (daranamrga), see Eltschinger forthcoming.

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(PV III.281ab prgukta yogin jna te tad bhvanmayam).27 However, while bhvan is gradual by its very nature, becoming more and more intense through constant practice, and operates on conceptual contents that are progressively refined and dynamised till they cannot be distinguished from direct perceptions, pratibh, on the contrary, does not need any preparation or gradation, for it enlightens and transforms instantly. The ascending hierarchy of masters described in the T begins with kalpita formed, constructed, proceeds to kalpita-akalpita formed-spontaneous, and concludes with akalpita spontaneous: the kalpita master is characterised by bhvan, and the akalpita master is characterised by pratibh. One could note that this may be suitable to an esoteric and relatively marginal tradition, such as the Trika, less concerned than Mms with defining an orthodoxy (to the limit that this term can be applied to Indian religions) or at least with establishing an atemporal, non-human tradition as the cornerstone of the social and religious sphere.28 However, although it cannot be denied that Abhinavagupta highly praises the spontaneous (ssiddhika) or self-born (svayambh) master, being able to tune himself with the absolute withoutor even againstany traditional teaching, the existence of this perfect, whose mere sight would suffice to liberate the man that may casually meet him (T III.40), is presented as so exceptional and rare as to leave the impression that this represents only a theoretical possibility, a borderline idea conceived of in order that the too tightly controlled building of tradition should not risk imploding. And while it is true that the Kiraa-tantra determines that out of the three possible kinds of knowledgerespectively those arising from the master, the scriptures and spontaneouslythe latter is by far the highest (vidypda, IX.14ab), the texts mostly warn the adept against trusting to a master who embodies such kind of knowledgethe spontaneous or self-born masterand, after all, recommend the normative master (cfr. T XXIII.710). Thus, apparently it would remain only Buddhism which defends the primacy of yogic perception without reservation. But is this indeed how things stand? On a closer scrutiny, Buddhism seems quite far away from encouraging a solitary tte--tte between the individual seeker, equipped with his supernormal powers of perception, and truth. Yogic perception, Dharmakrti clearly says, cannot be a guarantee of truth by itself alone, but has to apply itself to a certain
27 This does not mean that bhvan coincides with yogipratyaka; rather, bhvan is what makes yogipratyaka possible. 28 To this end, Mms will not hesitate even to downplay the significance of the cognitive moment of the vedic seers themselves, an attitude that a careful observer can discern also in akara.

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content whose truthfulness has been already guaranteed by a valid means of knowledge, in this case the authoritative teaching of the Buddha (weighed by the adepts reason? See below). The object of meditation must be real, and this warning is introduced to exclude fancies, dreams or hallucinations, which bhvan might have the power to render as vivid as real things. More generally, the object of bhvan must have first passed, successfully, through the second of the three levels of praj mentioned above, cint intellectual reflection. See PV I.286ab tatra prama samvdi yan prnirtavastuvat, Pramavinicaya I.28cd yaj jnam avisavdi tat pratyakam akalpakam, Nyyabindu I.11 bhutrthabhvan (which Dharmottara p. 70 comments upon: pramauddhrthagrhitvc ca savdakam). In this manner, yogipratyaka can match also the second of the requirements that Dharmakrti has established for pratyaka in general: being kalpanpoha and abhrnta (the former is echoed by PV III.281c vidtakalpanjlam, etc.). All authors agree that the object of meditation par excellence (real as it has the guarantee of the Buddha, besides the secondary rational verification by the adept) is the Four Noble Truths. 29 Only after such rational scrutiny, the job of bhvan can be carried out and be cognitively significant: it progressively gives a dazzling aspect to that conceptual content and eliminates in it all discursive elaboration. Therefore, the Buddhist yogi is not required (or allowed) to contemplate the darkness of the universe in search of his own truth, but can exercise his powers only on pre-defined objects already consecrated by (Buddhist!) tradition. In other words, he knows at the very outset what he will have to find: neither more nor less than the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha, which it is not up to him to discover, but at most to re-discover, making them his own. The truths of Buddhism are not accessible to normal perception or human reasoning: their original discovery is due to the Buddha and we must derive them from him, but not prior to examining his reliability.30 I am well aware that by saying so I am taking a significant distance from the prevailing position in Buddhological studies, according to which (cf. e.g. Franco forthcoming, Eltschinger forthcoming) the
29 As Eltschinger forthcoming notes, only Prajkaragupta adds something: paraloka (Pramavrttiklakra p. 327, on PV III.286b, prnirtavastu paralokacaturryasatydika tadviayam eva pratyakam). 30 It has been noted that the characteristics ascribed to the Buddha, which guarantee his status as a prama, have a definite counterpart (and also a possible source) in the characteristics of the pta, listed in Nyyabhya (Franco 1997: 2942). On pta in Nyyabhya and his relationship with the yogi, see Biardeau 1964: 120128. Interestingly, Nyyabhya p. 97 notes: evam ptopadea pramam/ eva cpta pramam.

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Buddhist adept submits the cardinal doctrines of Buddhism (above all, the Four Noble Truths) to a personal scrutiny, and accepts them only after giving a rational demonstration of them. But, if the Buddhist adept possesses all the cognitive tools to prove the Four Noble Truths by himself, I wonder why Buddhist tradition has felt the need to strive so much to recognise Buddhas status of prama. A possible answer would be that the Buddha, as can be seen from the texts, has arrived at the truths of Buddhism by way of direct (yogic) perception; it is only the subsequent verification that may require the resort to inference, and this is so precisely because the adept is not able to arrive at them by a spontaneous perception of his own (cf. the ruti-smti relationship, described in Dharmastra as a perception-inference relationship). But evidently this inferential proof is not felt as a strong proof, whence the resort to yogipratyakabhvan to re-enact somehow the original pratyaka of the Buddha. One might object that Buddhist tradition distinguishes two levels in the teaching of the Buddha: one, of a mainly noetical character, lends itself to rational verification, the otherrather concerning behaviours, ethical aspects, cosmology, ultramundane lifeconstitutes the (strictu sensu) atndriya component of it, and, as such, is intrinsically inaccessible to rational scrutiny, only allowing a generic control of non-contradiction (cf. Eltschinger 2007: 7477, 100101).31 Furthermore, one might wonder whether the Buddha has attained the knowledge of this second level thanks to special powers (yogipratyaka), which instead did not prove necessary for the first level (the adept in fact being able to arrive at them by his rational forces alone). But since the Four Noble Truths are unanimously considered as the principal element (pradhna; cf. e.g. PV I.217c), it seems hardly plausible that the foundation of what is atndriya might instead be cognised by ordinary means (which the adept could reproduce by himself). I deem it possible to abstract the following statement by Dharmakrti from its context (the scrutiny of Digngas inclusion of scriptural authority in the domain of inference) and take it as a general truth: Man is incapable of existing without the support of revealed scripture (PVsvavtti p. 108 nya puruo nritygamaprmyam situ samartha). Cf. Prajkaragupta (p. 76 ad PV II.5b; cit. in Moriyama forthcoming): Precisely for this, error is eliminated only by the revealed doctrine (stra) pronounced by an omniscient, not by any other person. Thus, a means of valid knowledge is only the omniscients word. In the absolute sense, a means of valid knowledge is only the omniscients knowledge and nothing else. This is the ultimate truth. (ata eva
31 Interestingly, Prajkaragupta seems somehow to unify the two levels, when he lists both ryasatyni and paraloka as the possible objects of yogipratyaka (see above fn. 29).

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streaiva sarvajoktena moho nivartyate, nnyenety anena prakrea sarvajavacanam eva pramam iti paramrthata sarvajajnam eva pramam, nparam iti paramrtha). The word of the Buddha (buddhavacana) plays an essential role in the constitution of Buddhist doctrine, and the authority of buddhavacana is based on the conviction of his omniscience (and, for the Buddhists, also of his compassion). This is apparent also from the attitude suggested by Kumrila, who in the Bhak (cf. Kataoka 2003: 4041) endeavours above all to confute the Buddhist assertion: The teaching [of the Buddha] constitutes a valid means of knowledge, since it has been pronounced by the omniscient Buddha.32 Although admitting that yogipratyaka has been introduced by Dharmakrti in a mainly soteriological context (which seems different from Digngas), it is a given fact that Kumrila understands it and attacks it for its epistemological significance, having as his principal aim challenging the notion of pta/prama, referred to the Buddha, which indeed rests primarily on the special power of perception of the yogi/ Buddha. In the progression of the Buddhist adept (cf. Eltschinger forthcoming), yogipratyaka takes on the essential meaning of meditation, inner cultivation (bhvan) and has the main function of eliminating the most subtle and insinuating form of satkyadi the conviction that the I exists, that called sahaja innatewhereas the path of vision (daranamrga) is sufficient to eliminate this in its vikalpita (or parikalpita) version. Bhvan is the way to achieve the naturalness of such attainment, its taking place without any conscious effort (svarasa, anbhoga). In sum, bhvan has in fact been given an assimilative function (and also a purgative one in that it destroys kleas), much more than a cognitive function.33 Bhvan or yogic perception is applicable only at a subsequent stage of engagement and in a subsidiary way, when the aim is to instill in the contents of the teaching the necessary vividness for the spiritual path and everyday life to
32 That is, not because the truth of his teaching has been rationally proved. 33 It has been rightly stressed (Eltschinger forthcoming) that bhvan is only the means to yogipratyaka, its cause (cf. PV III. 281b bhvanmayam, 284d bhvanbalanirmitam; Pramavinicaya I v. 31c bhvanparinipattau; etc.). However, one might reply that at the end (paryanta; cf. the Nyyabindu quoted above) of the bhvan process, only the modality of the cognitive act changes (from conceptual to aconceptual), not its content. Referring to Jnarmitras statement, yogipratyaka is reliable only as far as it invests the properties of the real thing (vastudharma), not the real thing itself; cf. Steinkellner 1978: 133. I would reply to Prevereaus (1994: 76, fn. 2) nice formulation it [yogipratyaka] reveals truths, not facts that, after all, the facts are precisely made by the totality of their true aspects (including impermanence, and so on).

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be imbued with it, and, possibly (as we have hypothesised above), also for the teaching of the Buddha to be defended more efficaciously against its brahmanical opponents. It seems likely to conclude that, for the Buddhists, only perception is able to create persuasion.34 An indirect confirmation might come from the fact that the Mmsakas direct such strong criticism precisely against the Buddhist claim that yogipratyaka may be entitled to be classified as perception.35

BIBLIOGRAPHY Texts Abhinavagupta, Tantrloka with Commentary by Rjnaka Jayaratha, edited with notes by Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, vols. IXII, KSTS XXIII, XXVIII, XXX, XXXVI, XXXV, XXIX, XLI, XLVII, LIX, LII, LVII, LVIII, Allahabad-Srinagar-Bombay 19181938. Bharthari, Vkyapadya (mlakriks), Bhartharis Vkyapadya, edited by W. Rau, Abhandlungen fr die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 42, Wiesbaden 1977. Bharthari, Vkyapadya II: Vkyapadya of Bharthari, containing the k of Puyarja and the ancient Vtti, Ka II, edited by K.A. Subramanya Iyer, Delhi 1983. Dharmakrti, Pramavrttika with the Commentary Vtti' of Acharya Manorathanandin, critically edited by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi 1968. Dharmakrti, Pramavrttika I: Pramavrttikam. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary, text and critical notes by R. Gnoli, Serie Orientale Roma XXIII, IsMEO, Roma 1960. Dharmakrti Pramavinicaya I, II: Pramavinicaya chapter 1 and 2, critically edited by E. Steinkellner, Sanskrit Texts from the autonomous Tibetan region No, 2, Beijing-Vienna 2007. Dharmottara, Nyyabinduk, see Durveka Mira, Dharmottarapradpa.
34 According to Vcaspatis Nyyakaik, the Buddhists fail to make a proper distinction between perceiving something with clarity and perceiving something real: vikalpas remain such even when they are perceived vividly. The immediacy of cognition in bhvan does not derive directly from the object, as it happens in ordinary perception, but is generated by bhvan itself (Taber forthcoming). 35 Cf. Woo 2007: 351352. This aspect is concerned by the first three of the five objections to yogipratyaka, which the Bauddhatarkabh first formulates and then rejects one by one (Kajiyama 1963: 5456).

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Dignga, Pramasamuccaya, see Steinkellner 2005, Hattori 1968. Durveka Mira, Dharmottarapradpa [being a sub-commentary on Dharmottaras Nyyabinduk, a commentary on Dharmakrtis Nyyabindu], edited by Pandita Dalsukhbhai Malvania, Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Revised II Ed., Patna 1971. Jinendrabuddhi, Vilmalavat Pramasamuccayaik, Chapter I. Part I: Critical Edition, by E. Steinkellner, H. Krasser, H. Lasic, China Tibetology Research CentreAustrian Academy of Sciences, Beijing-Vienna 2005. Jnarmitra, Yoginirayaprakaraa. In: Jnarmitranibandhval, edited by A. Thakur, Patna 1959. Kamalala, Bhvankrama I, see Tucci 1958. Kumrila, lokavrttikam with the commentary Nyyaratnkara of r Prthasratimira, edited and revised by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Prcya-bhrati Series-10, Varanasi 1978. Mmsdarana [], edited by K.V. Abhyankar and G. Joi, vols. I-7, Anandashram Sanskrit Series No. 97, repr. Pune 1994 (I Ed. 19291943). Mokkaragupta, [Bauddha]Tarkabh, edited by Embar Krishnamacharyya, Gaekwad Oriental Series 94, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1942. Nyyastra with Bhya: Gautamyanyyadarana with Bhya of Vtsyyana, edited by A. Thakur, New Delhi 1997. Prajkaragupta, Pramavrttiklakra: Pramavrttikabhyam or Vrttiklakra, being a Commentary on Dharmakrtis Pramavrttika, ed. by R. Saktyyana, Patna 1953. Praastapda, Padrthadharmasagraha with rdharas Nyyakandal, edited by D.Jh. Sarma, Varanasi 1963. Ratnakrti, Sarvajasiddhi, in: Ratnakrtinibandhvali, deciphered and edited by Anantalal Thakur, Patna 1975. Vaieikastra: Vaieikastra of Kada with the Commentary of Candrnanda, edited by Muni r Jambuvijayaji, GOS 136, Baroda 1961. Yogastra: Yogastra with Vysas Bhya, Vcaspati Miras Yogatattvavairad and Ngea Bhaas Vtti, edited by R.S. Bodas and V.S. Abhyankar, Varanasi 1917. Translations and Studies Biardeau, M. (1964) Thorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique, Paris-La Haye. Bhnemann, G. (1980) Der Allwissende Buddha. Ein Beweis und seine Probleme. Ratnakrtis Sarvajasiddhi. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 4. Wien.

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