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IRANDOKHT TOORZANI; PLAINTIFF, Pro Se

Date: February 5, 2012

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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY


BERGEN COUNTY IRANDOKHT TOORZANI, Plaintiff, vs.
1. ELMWOOD PARK BOARD OF

CIVIL ACTION NO. L-8966-11

Letter Of Reconsideration

EDUCATION; RICHARD D. TOMKO, Principal and current Superintendent of Schools; WILLIAM MOFFITT, Board Secretary
2. Defendants.

Letter Of Reconsideration In Regard To Judge Doynes Order (rendered in case management conference of February 2, 2012, which was conducted after ombudsman had alerted Judge Doyne that I (Plaintiff) was going to file a motion for Summary Judgment) a. Forbidding Plaintiff From Filling A Motion For Summary Judgment. And b. Forbidding Filing Any Motion Without Judge Doynes Prior Permission. And Also Asking Courts Permission To Amend My Complaint For Punitive Damages For Defendants Willful And Intentional Violations Of New Jersey Statutes If The Language Of My Complaint Is Not Clear For The Court In Regard To Asking For Punitive Damages

Dear Honorable Judge Doyne, I (Irandokht Toorzani, pro se Plaintiff) am respectfully writing this letter to move the court to reconsider its order rendered during the case management conference of February 2, 2012, in regard to:

IRANDOKHT TOORZANI; PLAINTIFF, Pro Se Date: February 5, 2012

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1)

Forbidding filling any motion with the court, without Your Honors prior permission.

When there had not been any frivolous or excessive filings with the court which could have caused burden on the court and resulted in Your Honors decision. 2) Forbidding me (Plaintiff) from filing a motion for summary Judgment,

when in accordance with RULE 4:46, A party seeking any affirmative relief may, at any time after the expiration of 35 days from the service of the pleading claiming such relief, move for a summary judgment or order on all or any part thereof or as to any defense when: i. There is no dispute as to issues and all necessary factual issues are resolved or need not be tried because they are so one-sided (the same is true here). ii. There is the absence of a disputed material fact 1 and No genuine issue 2 as to any material fact that is relevant to complaint exists and there are no specific facts that present a genuine issue for trial (the same is true here). Thus, I (plaintiff, pro se) 3 am entitled to judgment as a matter of law and in the interest of conserving the court's time and resources. And I am also asking for the courts permission to amend my complaint if the language of my complaint 4 has not been clear for the court in regard to asking for punitive damages for

A disputed fact is material if the fact "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986) A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)."Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact." Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) I have been suffering from severe anxiety (which has even affected on my ability to speak coherently in anxiety provoking circumstances) and filing a summary judgment at this stage can prevent imposing an undue hardship on me (pro se litigant) by not going through unnecessary court proceedings when there are sufficient direct physical evidences which prove that there are no specific facts that present a genuine issue for trial. Since I have stated in my complaint that: WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully requests this Honorable Court declare that defendants violated the Open Public Meetings Act and Open Public Record Act, and declare that actions taken against plaintiff at the meeting of June 28, 2011, which do not conform to the provisions of Open Public Meetings Act, void and also requests Continued on the next page

IRANDOKHT TOORZANI; PLAINTIFF, Pro Se Date: February 5, 2012

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Defendants willful and intentional violations of New Jersey Statutes. Since during the case management conference of February 2, 2012, I (Plaintiff) was asked by Your Honor if I had asked for Money in my complaint, which I responded, No since I have not asked for compensatory damages.

I.

INTRODUCTION
In the case management conference of February 2, 2012, which was arranged by Your Honor to inform parties that having jury is not appropriate for the instant matter, Your Honor also forbade me (Plaintiff) from filling a motion for summary Judgment, which you had been alerted about 5 (Your Honors letter dated January 17, 2012) by the Ombudsman that I (Plaintiff) had a plan to file a motion for summary judgment. During that conference, Your Honor informed me (Plaintiff) that you would not allow me to file a motion for summary Judgment. When I told Your Honor, I have sufficient direct physical evidences to prove my claims and file a motion for summary Judgment and I added, I think based on law I am entitled to file a motion for summary judgment, Your Honor told me that You were not there to hear what I think and Your Honor Stated that I am a teacher and I should at least have average learning ability. Your Honor added when Your Honor had already said that you do not allow me to file a motion for summary judgment I should have understood and I should not have asked again. And also during that conference, after Your Honor forbade filing any motion with the court without Your Honors prior permission, Your Honor directed the Defendants attorneys [the 2nd firm6 (Schwartz Simon Edelstein & Celso LLC); currently same Defendants are being represented by two different firms at the same time] to either file a motion to dismiss or answer

judgment against defendants for their violations of Open Public Meetings Act and Open Public Record Act for attorneys fees, if applicable, costs of suit, and any other relief as the court may deem proper.
5

Not to mention that Your Honor had reviewed my complaint for the first time on the day of case management conference of February 2, 2012, as Your Honor stated during the case management conference. Two firms at the same time are representing the same Defendants for the instant matter. The first firm is Nirenberg & Varano, LLP that responded to the complaint on December 30, 2011, and the 2nd firm is Schwartz Simon Edelstein & Celso LLC that announced its appearance on January 10, 2012, for defendant Elmwood Park BOE and then on January 12, 2012, the amended their notice of appearance to represent all the defendants.

IRANDOKHT TOORZANI; PLAINTIFF, Pro Se Date: February 5, 2012

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to my complaint when Defendants attorneys (1st firm; Nirenberg & Varano, LLP) had already answered to my complaint on behalf of all the Defendants.7 Pro se litigants, as well as those represented by counsel, are entitled to meaningful access to the courts.8Meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental constitutional right,9 derived from the first amendment 10 and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,

Canon 3. A Judge Should Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities. Judicial duties include all the duties of the office prescribed by law. In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply: A. Adjudicative Responsibilities. (1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. A judge should be unswayed by partisan interest, public clamor, or fear of criticism. (2) A judge should maintain order and decorum in judicial proceedings. (3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and should not permit lawyers, court officials, and others subject to the judge's direction and control to display impatience or discourtesy or to detract from the dignity of the court. Commentary: The duty to hear all proceedings fairly and with patience is not inconsistent with the duty to dispose promptly of the business of the court. Courts can be efficient and business-like while being patient and deliberate. (4) A judge should be impartial and should not discriminate because of race, color, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, language, marital status, socioeconomic status, or disability. (5) A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, color, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, language, marital status, socioeconomic status or disability against parties, witnesses, counsel, or others. This section does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, color, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, language, marital status, socioeconomic status or disability, or other similar factors are issues in the proceeding. (6) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to or the subject matter of a proceeding if the judge gives notice to the parties of the person to be consulted and the nature of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to participate and to respond. Commentary: The proscription against communications concerning a proceeding includes communications from lawyers, law teachers, and other persons who are participants in the proceeding, except to the limited extent permitted. It does not preclude a judge from consulting with other judges, or with court personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out adjudicative responsibilities. An appropriate and often desirable procedure for a court to obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on legal issues is to invite the expert to file a brief amicus curiae. (7) A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court. Commentary: Prompt disposition of the court's business requires a judge to devote adequate time to duties, to be punctual in attending court and expeditious in determining matters under submission, and to insist that court officials, litigants and lawyers cooperate to that end. In disposing of matters promptly, a judge must demonstrate due regard for the rights of the parties to be heard and to have issues resolved without unnecessary cost or delay. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612-15 (1974) ; Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969). Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969). NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963).

9 10

IRANDOKHT TOORZANI; PLAINTIFF, Pro Se Date: February 5, 2012


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which protects a litigant's interest in using the judicial process to attain redress of grievances. 12

For pro se litigants, the right guarantees all the means necessary to ensure an adequate hearing on all alleged grievances.13 I could not defend my rights in the case management conference of February 2, 2012, since as I told Your Honor in that conference, because of my health issue (severe anxiety), I cannot have a coherent Speech in anxiety provoking circumstances and as Your Honor witnessed in that conference, I was not able to verbalize myself to defend my rights. Therefore I (Plaintiff, pro se) am writing this letter of reconsideration to preserve my rights since I did not want to continue trying more to defend my rights verbally in the case management conference and be more derided and humiliated because of my disability and I am hoping that Your Honor are not going to question my learning ability or make another comment about my learning ability for writing this letter of reconsideration.
A motion to reconsider an interlocutory ruling requires an analysis of two important principles: (1) Error must be corrected; and (2) Judicial efficiency demands forward progress. Courts have distilled various grounds for reconsideration of prior rulings into three major grounds for justifying reconsideration: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence or an expanded factual record; and (3) need to correct a clear error or to prevent manifest injustice.

II.

STANDARD FOR GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT


One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims . . . ." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). It is "not a disfavored procedural shortcut," but is instead the "principal tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources." Id. at 327. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).

11 12 13

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974). Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579; Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969). Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam).

IRANDOKHT TOORZANI; PLAINTIFF, Pro Se Date: February 5, 2012

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A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense or the part of each claim or defense on which summary judgment is sought. A court may grant summary judgment only when the submissions in the record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.. "The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need of a trial -- whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The party opposing summary judgment must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 485 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). If the opposing party's "evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. However, in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255. The inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52. When the non-moving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden by pointing out the absence of evidence submitted by the non-moving party. The moving party need not disprove the other party's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986).

III.

UNDISPUTED FACTS
The ascertainment of the truth is the fundamental purpose of any trial. There are no disputed facts in the instant matter and the chronology of the events is clear and undisputed. Nothing arises from direct physical evidences to support Defendants Elmwood Park BOE, Richard D. Tomko, superintendent, and William Moffitt, board secretary, for their intentional and willful violations of OPMA and OPRA in any way, and there is no reason to think that proceedings in this matter, will make any difference, except that it imposes an undue hardship on me (pro se litigant), who has been suffering from severe anxiety because of defendants unlawful conducts, and expend the court's time and resources.

IRANDOKHT TOORZANI; PLAINTIFF, Pro Se Date: February 5, 2012

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1) Counts one and seven of my complaint: Defendants violated N.J.S.A. 10:4-12 (b) (8) willfully and intentionally when they discussed the matter of withholding my (Plaintiffs) increments in open session of Elmwood Park BOE meeting on June 28, 2011(I (Plaintiff) was told by superintendent that the matter of withholding my increments had been discussed and voted in the open session of June 28, 2011, BOE meeting). Proof : There are undisputed direct physical evidences which will be submitted along with motion for summary judgment if Judge Doyen allow me ( pro se Plaintiff) to file a motion for summary judgment since in accordance with RULE 4:46, I (Plaintiff) am entitled to file one. 2) Counts two and eight of my complaint: Defendants willfully and intentionally violated N.J.S.A. 10:4-12 (b) (3) and (8) when they did not provide me (Plaintiff) with a notice (rice notice) to inform me that the matter of withholding my increments for 2011-2012 school year would be discussed in the BOE meeting of June 28, 2011. Proof : There are undisputed direct physical evidences which will be submitted along with motion for summary judgment if Judge Doyen allow me (pro se Plaintiff) to file a motion for summary judgment since in accordance with RULE 4:46, I (Plaintiff) am entitled to file one. 3) Counts Three and nine of my complaint: Defendants willfully and intentionally violated N.J.S.A. 10:4-13 when they did not indicate anything in regard to the matter of tenure charges in the meeting minutes of the June 28, 2011, BOE meeting, WHEN Defendants had claimed that the matter of tenure charges had been discussed and voted in closed session of June 28, 2011, BOE meeting. (Tenure charge documents filed with the local School Board's secretary pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. 18A:6-11 are "public records") Proof: There are undisputed direct physical evidences (which one of them is the meeting minutes of June 28, 2011, BOE meeting which is public record) will be submitted along with motion for summary judgment if Judge Doyen allow me (pro se Plaintiff) to file a motion for summary judgment since in accordance with RULE 4:46, I (Plaintiff) am entitled to file one.

IRANDOKHT TOORZANI; PLAINTIFF, Pro Se Date: February 5, 2012

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4) Counts four and ten of complaint: Defendants willfully and intentionally violated N.J.S.A. 10:4-14 and N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, when they denied my (Plaintiffs) request for a copy of the draft of meeting minutes of June 28, 2011, BOE meeting which I requested from Defendants on or about August 4, 2011(a month after June 28, 2011, BOE meeting) as a citizen. Proof : There are undisputed direct physical evidences which will be submitted along with motion for summary judgment if Judge Doyen allow me (pro se Plaintiff) to file a motion for summary judgment since in accordance with RULE 4:46, I (Plaintiff) am entitled to file one. 5) Counts five and eleven of complaint: Defendants willfully and intentionally violated N.J.S.A. 10:4-1, when they did not (post) provide public (and me (Plaintiff) as a member of public) with the draft of meeting minutes of June 28, 2011, BOE meeting on time14 (the draft of meeting minutes of June 28, 2011, BOE meeting was published (posted) on the District Website on or about September 17, 2011, after two more board meetings which had been held on July 13, and August 23, 2011. Not to mention that the meeting minutes of June 28, 2011, BOE meeting, was approved during the BOE meeting of September 27, 2011). Proof : There are undisputed direct physical evidences which is public record and will be submitted along with motion for summary judgment if Judge Doyen allow me to file a motion for summary judgment since in accordance with RULE 4:46, I (Plaintiff) am entitled to file one. 6) Counts six and twelve of my complaint: Defendants willfully and intentionally violated N.J.S.A. 10:4-12 (a), when they censored the public comment/question in regard to my employment during the public comment portion of the BOE meeting of June 28, 2011, that has been indicated and referred to, as Item H4 in the meeting minutes of that meeting (Daniel Golabek 74 Godwin Avenue Questions and comments relative to: Item H4,

14

The minutes of May 17, 2011, BOE meeting was also published (posted) for public on October 25, 2011.

IRANDOKHT TOORZANI; PLAINTIFF, Pro Se Date: February 5, 2012

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Assistant to Athletic Director; Basketball Coach vacancies; Release of Coach, Tennis Program.). Proof : There are undisputed direct physical evidences which is public record and will be submitted along with motion for summary judgment if Judge Doyen allow me (pro se Plaintiff) to file a motion for summary judgment since in accordance with RULE 4:46, I (Plaintiff) am entitled to file one.

IV.

CONCLUSION
There are no triable issues of material fact and my claims are well-founded based on the

undisputed facts supported by the direct physical evidences and the law, WHEREOF I (Plaintiff) ask this Honorable Court: a. To allow me to file a motion for Summary Judgment after I receive the Defendants response to my request for Admissions which I submitted to Defendants on February 2, 2012. And b. To remove the restriction on filing motions without Your Honors prior permission.15 And also c. For permission to amend my complaint for punitive damages for defendants willful and intentional violations of New Jersey Statutes if the language of my complaint has not been clear for the court in regard to asking for punitive damages. Thank you for your consideration. Respectfully, Irandokht Toorzani, pro sePlaintiff CC: Howard M. Nirenberg, Esq. via email Nirenbergvarano@aol.com

15

This restriction was ordered in the case management conference of February 2, 2012, when Your Honor did not rely on any rule or cite any authority and indicate any ground for this restriction (forbidding filing any motion without Your Honors prior permission), and when I (Pro se plaintiff) have disability to speak coherently in anxiety provoking circumstances and writing is the only way to communicate with the court and defend my rights.

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