Title: Nuclear Issue Submitted by: Ambreen Sultan. Submitted to: Sir Shoaib Akhtar. Program: BPA 1.

Submission Date: January 30th, 2008.

FATIMA JINNAH WOMEN UNIVERSITY, RAWALPINDI.

Since Pakistan became an overt nuclear power, the Americans have been seeking to undermine this reality through a number of tactics and ploys. The sanctions approach may not have worked directly, but the disastrous and panic-stricken policies the Government of Pakistan adopted in their wake have taken their toll on the nation's financial health. While the Americans have realized the futility of sanctions, what seems to be working for them is the so-called nuclear dialogue they have managed to rope Pakistan into, within a bilateral framework. To begin with, it makes no sense at all for Pakistan to hold this bilateral dialogue since our security framework, especially the nuclear one, is related to the South Asian milieu - and the US cannot affect that. If anything, both Pakistan and India should be talking to each other on the nuclear issue rather than to the US. The US has cleverly created a trap into which Pakistan has fallen, quite in ignorance it seems. To begin with, before the bilateral dialogue began, there was a complete stand-off in the positions of the two sides, especially in the wake of the US sanctions. So, the very fact that Pakistan chose to go into a dialogue, without the US first removing sanctions, gave a certain level of legitimacy and acceptance to these sanctions on the part of Pakistan.

Pakistan major policy error:

Then Pakistan made a major policy error. It made signing of the CTBT a bargain able issue. Given that Pakistan had declared a moratorium on future testing and given the reality that further testing would be almost impossible in the foreseeable future for Pakistan, Pakistan should have signed the CTBT immediately on concluding its tests. This way, it would have gained major diplomatic and political advantages without losing anything. For one, it could have then differentiated between itself and India on the sanctions issue. And, at the same time, by signing the CTBT on its own accord, there would have been no bargaining or seeming sign of weakness. None of this Pakistan chose to do. Instead, its political leaders raised a hue and cry about how CTBT was being thrust upon them. By the time they realized that in actuality the CTBT was not the real issue -

rather it was future treaties like the (Fissile Material Control Treaty) - it was too late. The Americans had found an opening for 'negotiations' and pressurization and so the bilateral 'dialogue' commenced! CTBT was the bargaining ploy, with IMF/IBRD assistance as the quid pro quo. And, this was just the beginning. As for the US, Pakistan should put counter proposals to the Americans, instead of merely discussing a US-formulated agenda on the nuclear issue. Amongst the issues Pakistan should put forward for discussion are: First, sanctions should be lifted in totality if the US wishes to conduct a bilateral dialogue on the nuclear issue. For, otherwise, it means that Pakistan is accepting the legitimacy of these sanctions - which it must not do. Second, as a gesture of good faith the US should immediately return Pakistan's F-16 money - morally, it should now be returned with interest. Third, in order to lower the specter of an unintended nuclear war or any other accident in this region, the US should provide technical assistance relating to the field of Command and Control and nuclear safety of installations - as well as safety measures to ensure, as much as possible, that nuclear missiles are not set-off prematurely or accidentally.

President Musharraf on Indo-US deal:

President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan initiated a campaign to counter the Indo-US deal at two levels. He did not oppose the deal. Nor did Pakistan energetically try to have the deal disapproved by the US Congress through Congressmen and Senators sympathetic to it. Instead, it sought to counter the deal by using the following arguments. First, it will be discriminatory to Pakistan if it was not made applicable to it too. Second, it will create a military nuclear asymmetry in the sub-continent by enabling India to divert its domestic stock of fuel for military

purposes, while using the imported fuel for civilian purposes under international safeguards. Thus, it will have an adverse effect on Pakistan's national security.

US reaction: The US rejected the Pakistani arguments by pointing out that Pakistan's economy was unlikely to grow as rapidly as the Indian economy in the short and medium terms and hence it should be possible to meet its energy requirements from conventional sources. The US also repeatedly made it clear that in view of the role of Dr. A. Q. Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, and some of his colleagues in secretly supplying nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya, Pakistan cannot be treated on par with India, which had an unimpeachable record of non-proliferation.

Chinese Assistance:
While sticking to his arguments, Musharraf requested the Chinese leaders during his State visit to China in February, 2006, for Chinese assistance in the construction of six more nuclear power stations, with a capacity of 600 or 900 MWS each. The Chinese reportedly agreed in principle to supply two stations of 300 MWs each to be followed later by four more. This subject again figured in the General's bilateral discussions with Mr.HU in the margins of the SCO summit in June, 2006, and in the subsequent discussions between the officials of the two

countries, who met at Islamabad and Beijing for doing the preparatory work for Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Pakistan from November 23 to 26. Gen. Musharraf and his officials were so confident that an agreement in principle for the construction of two new nuclear power stations (Chashma III and IV) would be initialed during Mr. Hu's visit that they even set up a site selection task force. Chinese Attitude: Then for reasons, which were not clear, there were indications of changes in the Chinese attitude---less negative towards the Indo-US nuclear deal and increasingly guarded on the Pakistani request for new nuclear power stations. In the case of India, the changing Chinese attitude was reflected in the daily media briefing of the Foreign Office spokesperson and in a media interview given by the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi. In the case of Pakistan, the change was reflected in the daily media briefings of the spokespersons of the two Foreign Offices at Beijing and Islamabad

Criticism on Mr. Hues visit:

Almost coinciding with these explanations at New Delhi and Beijing, the spokespersons of the Foreign Ministries of Pakistan and China tried to discourage expectations in Pakistan that Gen. Musharraf and Mr.Hu would be initialing a memorandum of understanding on the Chinese supply of two more nuclear power stations. They described the reports in this regard, which had been appearing in the Pakistani media for weeks before Mr. Hu's visit, as speculative and not based on facts. As against this, the change in the Chinese position with regard to Pakistan's request for six more nuclear power stations came about suddenly in the days (not weeks) before Mr. Hu's arrival in Islamabad. Well-informed Pakistani sources attributed the more guarded Chinese position to the bilateral discussions

between President George Bush and Mr.Hu at Hanoi in the margins of the summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Organization on November 18 and 19, 2006. The speculation was that during these bilateral discussions, Mr. Bush pointed out to Mr.Hu that the Chinese supply of new nuclear power stations to Pakistan could not be projected as a continuation of the Chinese assistance to Pakistan under a 1985 bilateral co-operation treaty under which CHASHMA I and CHASHMA II were given and hence would need the clearance of the NSG. According to this speculation, Mr. Bush was also reported to have referred to the Pakistani rejection of repeated requests from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to hand over Dr. A. Q. Khan for an independent interrogation and pointed out that the Chinese supply of the new power stations could encourage Pakistan's non-cooperation with the IAEA.

Cooperation between Pakistan and China :

There was no substantive reference to the co-operation between China and Pakistan in the field of civilian nuclear energy during Mr. Hu's visit to Pakistan. The joint statement issued on November 25, 2006, by Gen. Musharraf and Mr.Hu said: The two sides also agreed to strengthen cooperation in the energy sector, including fossil fuels, coal, hydro-power, nuclear power, renewable sources of energy as well as in the mining and resources sector. Addressing a press conference after his talks with Gen. Musharraf, Mr.Hu said in reply to a question on nuclear co-operation: "Cooperation in the energy sector is an important component in the relationship between the two countries. We reached a common understanding on strengthening energy cooperation. We would continue this cooperation in future as well." While Mr.Hu himself did not refer to any future supply of new nuclear power stations, some Pakistani analysts interpreted Mr. Hu's remarks as indicating a willingness to supply more nuclear power stations. Pakistani officials and analysts close to the Government tried to give the impression that the fact that no memorandum of understanding was signed did not mean that the Chinese were not going ahead with the project. But, the

Chinese Foreign Office spokesperson was very clear on this point during a media briefing on November 20, 2006, at Beijing. He said: "As far as I know, there will be no new arrangement in this area." Mr. Sean McCormack, a spokesperson of the US State Department, said in Washington as follows on November 27, 2006: "The US welcomes strong ties between China and Pakistan and urges China to play a constructive role in world affairs. We encourage development of bilateral relations between Pakistan and its neighbors. China and Pakistan have a long history of relations. As for any sort of nuclear angle on this, Im not aware of anything new that was announced or is allowed for by these agreements other than what was already grandfathered in by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. What he apparently meant was that in addition to the Chashma I and Chashma II power stations given by China under an old agreement of 1985 for civilian nuclear co-operation between China and Pakistan, there would be nothing new for the present till approved by the NSG. What was significant was that China paid attention to the US reservations on this subject instead of going ahead with its assistance as it did in the past in matters such as the supply of M-9 and M-11 missiles and nuclear equipment to Pakistan. This new attention to US reservations is what the Americans welcomed as China's constructive role.

Relation between Pakistan and China:

There was no reference to China's possible assistance to Pakistan for the construction of Chashma IV and V for nearly seven months ---either from the Pakistani side or from the Chinese side. On July 18, 2007, there was a surprising reference to it in a Chinese statement on the Pakistani commando action in the Lal Masjid. This caused anger against the Chinese, who were suspected to have forced Musharraf to order the commando action after the kidnapping of six Chinese women by some students of the girls' madrasa attached to the Masjid.

The "China Daily" reported as follows on July 18, 2007: "China did not push Pakistan for operations against the Red Mosque, Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Luo Zhaohui said. It is the consistent policy of China not to meddle in the domestic affairs of other countries, he told The News, a major Pakistani daily. Luo said he was considering an invitation to visit the mosque but it was made impossible due to the unstable security situation. "We enjoy very cordial relations with the ruling party here and likewise we maintain friendly ties with other segments of the society including the political parties of the opposition," he said. "I had no knowledge as to why Chinese nationals are being targeted and were the victims in five recent incidents", Luo said, referring to several Chinese who were killed in that country. He said if Chinese continued to be targeted, cooperation between the two countries could suffer. To protect the 3,000 Chinese working in Pakistan, China and Pakistan have decided to set up a Joint Task Force (JTF), the Ambassador revealed. China and Pakistan are still close friends and neighbors, Luo said. The Chinese Government is in discussions about proposed Chashma-III and IV for nuclear power projects. Chashma-II will be completed early next year, he said."

Nuclear Issue Slows U.S. Aid to Pakistan

The United States has decided to withhold aid from Pakistan as it seeks new assurances from the Pakistani Government that it is slowing down its nuclearweapons program, Administration officials said today. The United States has decided to withhold aid from Pakistan as it seeks new assurances from the Pakistani Government that it is slowing down its nuclearweapons program, Administration officials said today. The officials said the aid would be delayed until Administration officials were able to discuss the concerns with the Pakistani Government and with members of Congress who have raised questions about Islamabad's nuclear-weapons program. This could delay the assistance until after Oct. 24, when a new Pakistani Government is to be elected, officials said today.

By law, aid to Pakistan cannot be continued unless President Bush certifies that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon and that the American aid is serving to discourage Islamabad from developing nuclear weapons. $500 Million a Year Pakistan says that it does not possess nuclear weapons. And during her June 1989 visit to Washington, the former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, declared in a speech to a joint session of Congress that Islamabad did not intend to develop a nuclear device. The United States gives about $500 million a year in assistance to Pakistan. The delay in certification will preclude Washington from providing new economic and military aid to Pakistan and will force a halt to military aid.