THE ATHEISTS DILEMMA: AN ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT TO COGNITIVE DISSONANCE By Aaron Hastings

Introduction Atheism is an intrinsically oppositional discourse that springs not from creative but from destruction impulses; its philosophy is not positive but negative, and it seeks primarily not to enlighten or to edify but to countervail. Its logic is pure parry, and its rhetoric relentless disputation. In every way, Atheism is defined by the very doctrines it tragically strives to oppose. Of course, Atheism attempts to deny this by deemphasizing its name, which reveals all, and then declaring itself to be merely the doctrine of reason, which inexorably leads to skepticism and disbelief as a natural consequence of unconstrained rational thinking. In this essay, one of the principal arguments advanced by atheists against Theism is examined in some detail. The analysis begins with a clear statement of the argument and the problem it poses for Theism. An analogous and quite difficult but far more accessible problem is then presented and analyzed, first for points of similarity with the first problem, next for solutions that may be applied to the first problem, and lastly to understand why these solutions fail. This leads to a discussion of the problems and limitations inherent to ascending deductive systems, followed by a brief treatment of genuine scientific inquiry. The essay concludes with a demonstration that Atheism is merely one more belief system with no stronger claim to reason or to science than any other, and the Atheists Dilemma then precipitates as an immediate corollary. I Omniscience v. Omnipotence / Determinism v. F ree Agency The traditional and common conception of God, the Supreme Being, is that He is both omniscient and omnipotent. That is, God is all knowing and possesses absolute and unlimited freedom of will. Given these elements, some will argue, it

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then must follow that God knows every act He will perform in the future, and since He knows this, He must perform those acts. However, since He will be performing those acts, He is later not free to act otherwise, for He is constrained to performing only those acts, which by omniscience, He has foreseen. Nonetheless, the given common conception maintains that God possesses absolute free will and is, at all times and under all circumstances, completely free concerning all of His acts. Therefore, the given common conception appears to be self-contradictory in that these qualities cannot logically coexist. For the theist, this is a mystery; for the atheist, it is evidence of the untenable belief in Theism. A similar paradox appears to emerge when an attempt is made to reconcile the apparently competing conceptions of determinism, the view that every event and state of affairs is causally necessitated by preceding events and states of affairs,1 and free will or action, which has been variously defined, but which is generally understood to mean those actions which have been freely chosen and which could have been avoided by the actor. That is, these two philosophical problems appear to be of the same structure in that foreseen (or predestined) actions or events may not be altered or undone; therefore, the conception of omnipotence for God and free will for Man appear to be impossible once the analogous premises of omniscience and determinism have been respectively assumed in each syllogism. Conversely, if actions can be thought of as being truly free at the time of action, then how could such acts be predetermined or foreseen, even by God? Therefore, according to certain philosophers, the concepts of omniscience and omnipotence are incompatible, as are the concepts of determinism and free will. In each case, the problem arises from an attempt to reconcile two opposing logical assertions.

1 Watson, Gary Free Will, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (1982) p2.

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The terms incompatibilism and compatibilism are used to define the positions of adherents at each respective side of the question of determinism versus free will. Incompatibilists accept what they consider to be the obvious conclusion that determinism and free will logically negate one another and consequently, embrace one principle or the other as controlling in the matter of human action. Compatibilists such as A. J. Ayer, on the other hand, take the view that through certain adjustments, these apparently contradictory concepts may logically coexist. We will assume that there exists a similar debate regarding the question of whether it is possible to reconcile, with respect to the given conception of God, the simultaneous attributes of omniscience and omnipotence. The two problems under discussion appear to share four (4) meaningful similarities: 1. In each, there is a prior conception or determination of actions not yet performed (omniscience and determinism). consequent actions. Thus, there appear to be preexisting causes behind every action that exist separately from the In considering the question of omniscience versus omnipotence, Gods foreknowledge of future events (i.e. His future acts) may be seen as preexisting causes that necessitate or determine His future actions. Likewise, determinism, by definition, preexists and necessitates all human action; 2. In each, actions are considered as distinct from their causes (omnipotence, free will). At the time of action, the action itself is presumed to be free in the sense that other acts could have been performed but for the free choice of the (A)ctor; 3. In each case, the competing concepts appear mutually exclusive in the sense that each seems to logically preclude the validity of the other. Despite the distinction between actions and causes, actions appear to be ineluctably
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bound by their causes. That is, acts are preordained by omniscience or predetermined by determinism. It is here that the logical contradiction arises in each case; 4. It may be strongly asserted that both problems involve matters that are beyond the purview of axiomatic science and are thus insoluble by the singular means of ascending logical analysis. That is, each problem, though reasonably argued, has been presented within the context of a particular logical theory or model of reality. As will be shown through metamathematical examples, the problem of paradox results from the limitations of a given theory, and the paradox proffers more conclusions about the theory rather than the propositions that gave rise to the paradox. Therefore, it is the model rather than the propositions within the model that should first be questioned when a paradox is discovered. II Ayers Proposed Solution fo r Co mpa tibilism Various philosophers have advanced a number of well-conceived theories on compatibilism, and from among these I have selected Ayer as an exemplar of a generally representative and accessible viewpoint. A. J. Ayer2 has analyzed the problem of compatibilism and has proposed a solution which, be believes, resolves the logical contradiction between determinism and free will. He begins by accepting the premise that causally determined actions are not free even if the agent believes such actions to be free, for causes of actions may exist despite the agents lack of awareness of them. He rejects, however, the notion that all human actions are causally determined. Ayer makes the point that universal causation is not a necessary presupposition of scientific thought. Indeed, the [mechanistic]
2 Ayer, A. J., Freedom and Necessity, from Oxford Readings in Philosophy (1954) 15-23.

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scientist may assume that laws of causation exist for all observable phenomena, and that such laws, whether causal or statistical, simply await his discovery. This position is plausible because there is no a priori proof to the contrary. By this same logic, however, Ayer postulates the existence of free actions that are not causally predetermined, for in the absence of any a priori or a posteriori proof to the contrary, this supposition is as valid as the [mechanistic] scientists assumption that (presently unknown) laws exist which, when eventually discovered, will causally explain all events.3 Ayer next digresses by considering acts that are not causally determined as either accidental or non accidental and, inexplicably, asserts that non accidental choices regarding free actions imply deterministic causal explanations. This is an unreasonable conclusion. For example, suppose a loved one makes an earnest request of an agent regarding a proposed action. The agent then chooses freely after considering the entreaty of the beloved, but the choice was neither accidental nor constrained. In fact, we have no reasons to believe that free choice is not at all times and in all circumstances possible, and therefore, non accidental actions are not necessarily causally determined. Ayer then defines moral responsibility for ones acts in the context of actions performed according to ones character. This is a very useful paradigm for it provides a context consisting in the cumulative effect of past actions upon future actions rather than attempting to view actions discretely, and this may well be the key to understanding the relationship between determinism and free will. But Ayer then denigrates this construction as an over simplification because it does not take into account the external influences to which the agent has been subjected. What Ayer means here are such influences that are random or accidental; but this assumes that such influences exist, and that
3 The psychological or emotional state herein described is incompatible with science as it is defined but not with

science as it is practiced.

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assumption implies a priori two profound teleological assertions regarding the relationship between the actor and the world.4 Taking this path enframes the inquiry by imposing a belief set or doctrine of hidden ontological assumptions; while rejecting those assumptions leads to a different conclusion. Ayer then defines actions that are causally determined but not constrained as free actions and only those acts that are causally determined and constrained does he consider to be not free. He then offers a 3 point test for non constrained actions: 1) I should have acted otherwise if I had so chosen; 2) My action was voluntary; and, 3) I was not compelled to choose as I did. Ayer continues his analysis by observing that the requirements of determinism are satisfied since each action can thus be causally explained noting that determinism should not be taken to mean than one action is in the power of another but merely that they are factually correlated. He further notes that mistakes occur due to the tendency to confuse logical with causal necessity or to assume, falsely, that the effect is contained within the cause. Therefore, causation or even the ability to determine ones actions from past causes does not preclude free action so long as such action is unconstrained. If Ayer is correct then the past and outside forces no doubt influence present action, but the actor remains free either to surrender to those influences or to overcome them when not constrained.

4 First, there is no connection to be drawn between what external influences act upon us and who we are or what we

have done in the past; and, second, there is no intrinsic meaning or purpose to the external influences that act upon us, and such influences may thus be construed as random. If Ayer is prepared to affirm these two axioms, then the influences of the world are completely random, and the actor is reduced to little more than a cellular automaton, at which stage Ayer might as well yield completely to the mechanistic determinists viewpoint and abandon compatibilism. Otherwise, external influences must be seen as legibly contributing in some degree to the formation of character and in a way that is teleologically intelligible. Determinism does not negate teleology, and it may just as reasonably be postulated that external influences are somehow appropriate and just, given the actor, and according to time, place, and circumstance. That is, such influences may be meaningful, suited to each actor in a way that contributes to the development of the individuals growth and character, and compelling to varying degrees. Determinism need not be mechanistic.

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III Applying Ayers Solution to the First Problem In applying Ayers compatibilist solution to the first paradox, it appears to succeed because one may argue that although God knows how He will act before He acts, still He is not constrained to act in any way. That is, despite the fact that God knows in what ways He will act: 1) He should act differently if He chooses to do so; 2) His actions are all voluntary; and, 3) He never is compelled to act as He does. And these three criteria are true of all of Gods actions because He is omnipotent by hypothesis. Therefore, the first problem may be resolved through Ayers solution of defining free actions as actions that are not constrained. However, upon closer examination, we find that Ayers solution fails because although we have postulated that God is omnipotent, we also have postulated that He is omniscient. Therefore, the analogous argument from Ayer would be to assume that God is not aware of some actions that He will perform before actually performing these acts, which contradicts our hypothesis of omniscience. There is much more one could say of Ayers approach; however, further analysis offers no elegant solutions, and to avoid contradiction, requires increasingly convoluted and nuanced definitions. Therefore, this seems a most apposite point of departure from Ayer in pursuing a new methodology.

IV Alternative Solutions Well begin by formulating the contradiction using ordinary Sentential logic.5 The first proposition may be represented by the following logical formula:

Although we are presenting these propositions in the language of Sentential Logic, properly they are logical propositions of natural language, which is Second Order or above.

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(p ! q) " (p # q)

(1)

Here, p represents the assertion God is omniscient, and q represents the assertion God is omnipotent. Since if God is omniscient, the argument asserts, then He cannot be omnipotent, thus p q. Similarly, if God is omnipotent, then the argument asserts that He cannot be omniscient, q p. Therefore, if both p and q, (p ^ q), then (p v q). In general, a b is tautologically equivalent to a v b. Therefore, we can say that the assertion (p ^ q) (p v q) is tautologically equivalent to (p ^ q) v (p v q). Consequently, either p or q but not both p and q simultaneously. But if q, (God is omnipotent), then He is Almighty and possesses unlimited power, and there is no act, such as the act of omniscience, He is incapable of performing. We have thus derived a logical paradox because the assertion q implies both p and p.6 The problem illustrated in (1) above is inherent in the Axiomatic Method, which refers to any deductive system based on a finite set of fixed axioms and certain precise rules of inference, and which purports to represent meaning. Such deductive systems accept, as selfevident, a minimal collection of postulates or axioms, for which no proof is offered yet from which the entire theory can be derived using unassailable rules of deduction. Euclids astounding success in applying the Axiomatic Method to only 5 postulates, and thereby inventing the science of Geometry, inspired generations of outstanding thinkers to attempt formal, axiomatic constructions in a variety of disciplines based on this ancient
6

The syntactic Law of Excluded Middle (p v p) and the semantic principle of Bivalence, (p ^ p), are rules of logical inference pertaining to 2-valued logics, which preclude the simultaneous assertion of a proposition and its negation. The reason that 2-valued logical systems abhor contradiction is that due to the Principle of Explosion, a contradiction entails everything. Thus, if p and p then p, which implies p v q, for any arbitrary proposition q. But we have p, and so p v q implies q. This reduces the entire theory to tautology, for every well-formed formula is then a theorem.

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blueprint, The Elements. As conceived in the works of Bacon, Descartes, Compte, and others, this scientific method was gradually accepted as the apotheosis of human inquiry, which one day would culminate in a Social Physics, or a purely scientific account of human behavior. Adhering closely to the tenets of Descartes Discourse on Method, the operational principle of science became methodological reduction; its precise language, mathematics, and the standard of theory construction and compilation, Euclids Elements. Since Aristotle there has remained a natural presumption within science granting to mathematics and to the physical sciences preeminent status as the only models of knowledge possessing unquestionable validity, but even for these hard physical sciences, such validity is established always through mathematics. In 1931, an Austrian mathematician named Kurt Gdel irrefutably ended the notion that mathematical systems can be completely axiomatized due to inherent limitations he proved to exist within any axiomatic scheme of sufficient explanatory power.7 Gdel's First Incompleteness Theorem states that "Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete. In particular, for any consistent, effectively generated formal theory that proves certain basic arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical statement that is true, but not provable within that theory." It turns out that any plausible and sufficiently developed scientific theory or generally useful logical model easily meets this minimal threshold. The various paradoxes found in Number Theory thus apply to Geometry, Algebra, Analysis, and Statistics, and extend also to the sciences to which these deductive systems are integral, such as Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and Computer Science.

7 Gdel, Kurt "On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I" Jean van Heijenoort (trans.), From Frege to Gdel: A Sourcebook in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931 (Harvard 1931).

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Gdel's Second Incompleteness Theorem states that "For any effectively generated formal theory T including basic arithmetical truths and certain truths about formal provability, T includes a statement of its own consistency if and only if T is inconsistent." This means that no sufficiently rich theory is capable of establishing its own validity, and this result has been established using unimpeachable methods accepted by the three principal schools of mathematical philosophy.8 It is known, for instance, that no complete proof theory exists for logical systems beyond First Order logic, and this explains various paradoxes expressed in natural language, such as the Liars and Richards paradoxes. For this reason, the emergence of a genuine paradox generally indicates that certain assertions are undecidable within a given theory or model. There have been attempts to circumvent Gdel's incompleteness results by positing systems wherein all theorems are deemed axioms rather than being effectively generated (recursively enumerated), but such maneuvers miss the point entirely. At the very least, it is intellectual sleight of hand to declare as axiomatic what we know to be true first and often only through deduction, after applying rules of inference to a compact set of definitions and independent axioms (recursive enumeration). The greater obstacle facing such theoretical mavericks, however, is that of substituting an even greater problem for a lesser one. We accept postulates or axioms because they literally force themselves upon us as being true. We accept the logical rules of inference because these are the natural postulates of reason. Consequently, we accept the truth of deductive systems because they flow
8 Eves, Howard An Introduction to the History of Mathematics. Saunders Publ. (1954) 628-635. The three schools of mathematical philosophy are: Logicismthe thesis that mathematics is a branch of logic; Intuitionism the thesis that mathematics is to be built solely by finite constructive methods on the intuitively given sequence of natural numbers; and, Formalismthe thesis that mathematics is concerned with pre logical marks or symbols and a set of operations with these marks.

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naturally from these first principles. If we then remove deductive logic as the foundation of our knowledge then we must again return to answer the ancient epistemological question the Axiomatic Method has served for millennia to forestall. No, if we are to accept science then we must accept its logic and methodology, and along with these, its limitations of possible inconsistency and certain incompleteness. The essence of empirical science is observation and measurement, neither of which is conceivable without mathematics; while theoretical science is expressed almost exclusively through mathematics. Science intrinsically relies upon mathematics to prove the validity of its theorems, and consequently, Gdels incompleteness results extend to all of science. Therefore, within any given axiomatic theory or model of science, there are assertions that are unprovable or undecidable within that theory, and no scientific theory is capable of establishing its own validity or consistency. We come finally to philosophy and observe that philosophical logic, while denoting various things to different philosophers, and while always vigilant in distinguishing itself from mathematical logic, remains intimately connected with natural language and makes free use of the machinery of mathematical logic when it pleases. In general, natural language logics are at a minimum of Second Order, and thus by formalizing any of the various forms of philosophical logic one obtains a system that can be shown to be incomplete using Gdels theorems. The conclusion is that the very rules of inference used by philosophers are incomplete, possibly inconsistent, and various open questions posed by philosophers ultimately are undecidable. This conclusion is not surprising, given the utter inability of philosophers since time immemorial ever to agree on anything.

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Returning now to our original problem, recall that at the beginning of this section we derived the inconsistency (paradox) p ^ p, which means the deductive theory within which the paradox emerged is inconsistent; it also is incomplete because it is insufficient to decide the validity of the propositions p and q. We may then either reformulate our theory or conclude that the question is undecidable and leave it there. If we choose to reformulate our theory, we must ascertain the axioms upon which the theory is based, and then decide whether these axioms, the rules of inference, or both must be modified to derive a consistent theory. Since the axioms have not been explicitly stated, we must infer these axioms from the logical construction of the argument itself. First, the statement is made that it must be true that God knows every act He will perform in the future. From this statement, it must have been postulated that Gods perspective to past, present, and future is akin to our own. For the human actor, time is unidirectional, flowing always from past to present to future, and action occurs only in the present, which permits the intentionality or will to affect the future, but never the past. Human consciousness dimly lights a fleeting present and a retreating infinitesimal segment of a highly subjective past, and is utterly blind to the future until it passes into presence. It thus follows a fortiori that postulating Gods perception of time somehow resembles our own necessarily implies that God is in some degree subject to the temporal states of past, present, and future. Next, it is argued that Since He will be performing those acts, He is not free to choose to perform other acts, but must perform only those acts which, by omniscience, He has previously foreseen. From this statement, it must have been postulated that it is possible for conditions to exist that actually compel God to act in certain ways as opposed to other ways. In particular, this postulate extends the correspondence between human cognition and Gods cognition by assuming the influence of time has the power to compel Gods thoughts and
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actions, thereby making time in some sense superior to God. Clearly, if we next postulate that God is omnipotent we have constructed an inconsistent system or theory, for the first two postulates contradict or negate the concept of omnipotence.9 To resolve this, we must abandon the notion that God is subject to natural laws, such as the influences of time and of material cause and effect, and instead postulate that God is transcendental to time and to all other material conditions. We postulate that Man is finite in the sense that Man is limited in every sphere of thought and action; whereas, God is infinite, which, for purposes of this discussion, we may define as not finite. Under this theory, it makes no sense to think of God as experiencing past, present, or future in the same sense that humans experience the passage of time, for such attempts are equivalent to applying finite methods to infinite objects.10 That is, God is beyond the scope and influence of time. Although we can understand from the above analysis that these postulates are essential to our theory, it also means that the position of God beyond the influence of time remains inconceivable to human consciousness, which is divided into past, present, and future. Further, Gods knowing cannot be conceived or defined in
9 For example, if we define a set as any collection of things, then we may construct the following set

S= x: x ! x . Then is S ! S ? If so, then by definition we have that S ! S . Similarly, suppose S ! S , then by definition of S again, we have that S ! S . This is the famous Russell Paradox, and it is due to this paradox that things like S above may not properly be construed as sets. We apply the same method in modification of the underlying theory so as to avoid paradox.
10 For example, it is impossible for the human mind to quantify or even to conceptualize the distinction between

the first two infinite cardinal numbers, ! 0 and ! 1 , which represent the infinity of natural numbers (1,2,3,...) and the infinity of Real numbers, respectively. The natural numbers, although infinite, can be counted successively, but the Real numbers are uncountably infinite. In fact, the number of real numbers between any two numbers, say 0 and .0000000000000001, can be shown to be equal to the number of Real numbers contained on the entire infinite Real line stretching from ! to + ! . Both ! 0 and ! 1 are infinite, and yet the first infinity is less than the latter, which also can be proved mathematically. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the Continuum Hypothesis, the question of whether there exists any number between ! 0 and ! 1 , is undecidable. By the early Nineteenth Century, extreme havoc had occurred in Mathematics due to the widespread indiscriminate treatment of infinite objects, which left Real Analysis in a state of near chaos. This crisis of foundations required the unparalleled genius of Weierstrass, Cauchy, and others to set right. Generally, great care must be taken when dealing with infinite objects because the properties of infinite objects quite often do not correspond with those of finite objects.

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terms of human knowing because, once again, the human mind is finite, and is thus incapable of comprehending infinite objects; whereas, Gods mind is infinite. Finally, the finite human mind cannot conceptualize the meaning of omnipotence since comprehension of the Almightys ability to perform any act presupposes a comprehension of the universe of all possible actions, including what we have through deduction reasoned to be an infinite class of actions that are beyond human comprehension but which remain available to God. Now, the paradox will not occur under this theory when attempting to reconcile the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience because the assertions that resulted in the paradox under the old theory may no longer be posited under this new axiomatic schema. One may then question what basis exists upon which to justify the postulation of such axioms, and the reply is simply that these postulates conform to generally accepted beliefs and notions of God presently existing throughout the world and which have existed throughout recorded history. Since within any given theory, axioms can neither be proved nor disproved but must be accepted purely upon the basis of intuition, these axioms must be considered as reasonable as any atheistic construction. One may disagree with this theory, but one cannot dispute the validity of this theory without positing contrary axioms, that is, without first embracing a contrary belief system. One may thus axiomatically assert an opposing set of ontological assumptions, that is, one may believe differently, but nothing more. In the absence of any serious logical challenge based upon a demonstration of internal inconsistency, such a theory cannot be disproved. At most, such Theistic theories are incomplete, and this explains why they must be supported by faith and belief. This is not unlike the scientist, who believes in the existence of Dark Matter, Dark Energy, Higgs-Boson particles, and multiple spatial dimensions,

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not because he has seen them or has otherwise measured or experienced these things, but because his theories, though unproved, require such belief.11 Similarly, Atheism is a belief system based on a different set of axioms, and while various nuanced versions exist, all agree on at least one axiom: God does not exist. Like their Theistic counterparts, Atheistic systems all present theorems that are undecidable, such as the theorem, there is no life after death. Therefore, Atheism is incomplete, also requiring faith and belief to sustain itself. Atheists, nonetheless, believe otherwise, dissemble, and demand much more, claiming a unique and natural right to the prestige and imprimatur of science as validation of their particular faith. Genuine Science, on the other hand, is not merely a profession, vocation, or tool in the service of any particular ontology or worldview, but rather is an epistemology defined by proof, by the principles of demonstrability and verifiability. It is a methodology constrained by repeatable observation and measurement, and its theories, which are constructed using unassailable rules of inference, are motivated by an unfettered willingness to pursue knowledge wherever it leads. It is chastened by an honest recognition of the stark line between theory and certainty, awed by a profound respect for the vast unknown, which dwarfs the diminutive proportion of what is known, and it is humbled by the grandeur, beauty, and complexity of Nature. For a true scientist, the existence of God must therefore remain an open question because within the epistemological framework of science, this is an undecidable proposition. The atheists leap of faith on this open question instantly removes the atheists discourse outside of science, and we must then conclude that
11 Ontological commitment, also known as the indispensability argument, is the doctrine espoused by Quine

stating that we are ontologically committed to accepting the reality of the objects indispensable to our theories, and that it is intellectual dishonesty to deny the existence of what one daily presupposes to exist. Quine, W.V.O. From nd a Logical Point of View, 2 Ed Rev. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press (1980).

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Atheism is no more scientific or integral to scientific thinking and methodology than is Shamanism, for both rely upon axioms that neither can be proved nor disproved and which can be maintained only by positive or negative faith and belief. The atheist resides in a perpetual limbo of cognitive dissonance, hopelessly unable to bridge the infinite gulf between skepticism and belief, while childishly imagining that he has a foot on both shores. The public persona of a true scientist must always remain agnostic, and atheists must come to terms with their dilemma, either by converting to agnosticism or by just admitting they are not scientists. BIBLIOGRAPHY Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Barnes, Jonathan (trans), (Clarendon Press 1975) Ayer, A. J., Freedom and Necessity, from Oxford Readings in Philosophy (1954) Balaguer, Mark "Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics" (Oxford 1998) Bell, E.T., Men of Mathematics (Simon & Shuster 1937) Enderton, Herbert A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (Academic Press 1972) Feferman, Solomon "Kurt Gdel: Conviction and Caution" 7th International Congress on Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Salzburg 1983) Gdel, Kurt "On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I" Jean van Heijenoort (trans.), From Frege to Gdel: A Sourcebook in MathematicalLogic, 1879-1931 (Harvard 1931)

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Hellman, Geoffrey "Mathematics Without Numbers" (Clarendon-Oxford 1989) Kleene, Steven "The Work of Kurt Gdel" The Journal of Symbolic Logic vol 41 no 4 (1978) Maddy, Penelope "Realism in Mathematics" (Clarendon-Oxford 1992) Quine, W.V.O. From a Logical Point of View, 2nd Ed Rev. Cambridge Mass: (Harvard 1980) Watson, Gary Free Will, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (1982)

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